

**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION COURT
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA**

IN THE MATTER OF:

IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

[REDACTED]

File Nos: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

RESPONDENTS

Date: October 30, 2019

CHARGES:

Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA" or "the Act"), as amended, as an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who has arrived in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General.

Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA, as amended, as an immigrant who, at the time of application for admission, is not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or other valid entry document required by the Act, and a valid unexpired passport, or other suitable travel document, or document of identity and nationality as required under the regulations issued by the Attorney General under section 211(a) of the Act.

APPLICATIONS:

Asylum pursuant to INA § 208(a); Withholding of Removal pursuant to INA § 241(b)(3); and protection under Article III of the Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment ("CAT" or "Convention Against Torture").

APPEARANCES

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS:

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DECISION AND ORDERS OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE

I. Procedural History

(collectively Respondents), are Guatemalan natives. Exh. 1.¹ They entered the United States at or near Santa Teresa, New Mexico on or about January 1, 2016 without inspection or valid immigration documents. Id. On July 5, 2017, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) served Respondents with Notices to Appear (“NTAs”), charging them with inadmissibility under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) for being present in the United States without being admitted or paroled and under INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) for entering the United States without valid immigration documents. Id. The NTAs did not include the date and time of their initial hearing. See id. On August 11, 2017, DHS filed the NTA with the Court. See id. A Notice of Hearing, dated August 15, 2017, was served on Respondents by mail, thereby commencing removal proceedings and vesting the Court with jurisdiction. See Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I&N Dec. 441, 447 (BIA 2018); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) (2019); Unmarked Exh. 1A.

At a master calendar hearing on September 27, 2017, Respondents, through counsel, admitted the factual allegations in the NTAs and conceded the charges of inadmissibility under INA § § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Based on Respondents' pleadings, the Court sustained the charge of inadmissibility. Respondents declined to designate a country of removal and the Court designated Guatemala as the country of removal upon DHS's recommendation. On June 9, 2016, Respondent filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT, Form I-589, with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"). Exh. 2, Tab A at 1.

On February 28, 2018, Respondent filed a Form I-589 application with the Court. See Exh. 2, Tab B at 3–14. Respondent’s application listed Greysi as a derivative beneficiary. Id. at 4. On October 3, 2019, Respondent filed an updated Form I-589 with the Court. Exh. 3, Tab H at 167–78. On October 21, 2019, Respondent appeared before the Court and testified on behalf of her application. The Court now renders the instant decision regarding Respondent’s application.

II. Summary of the Evidence

The evidentiary record includes exhibits one through four and testimony from Respondent. All admitted evidence has been considered in its entirety regardless of whether specifically mentioned in the text of this decision.

A. Exhibits

Exhibit 1: Respondents' NTAs, Form I-862, filed Aug. 11, 2017;

Unmarked Exh. 1A: Notice of Hearing, dated Aug. 15, 2017;

¹ The factual allegations set forth in each NTA are identical. See Respondent's NTA (Aug. 11, 2017); Greysi's NTA (Aug. 11, 2017). Each NTA will be collectively referred to as Exhibit 1.

Exhibit 2: Respondent's Notice of Intent to Offer Evidence, Tabs A-G, filed Feb. 28, 2018;

Exhibit 3: Respondent's Additional Documents in Support of her Application, Tabs H-K, filed Oct. 3, 2019;

Exhibit 4: Respondent's Brief in Support of her Application, filed Oct. 3, 2019;

B. Respondent's Testimony

Respondent was born on December 2, 1977 in Guatemala and she is indigenous. Her native language is Achi, but she is able to speak a limited amount of Spanish. Respondent has no formal education. She married [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) and they have five children: three-year-old [REDACTED], seven-year-old [REDACTED], sixteen-year-old [REDACTED], eighteen-year-old [REDACTED], and nineteen-year-old [REDACTED]. She had one other child, one-year-old [REDACTED], while in the United States with Jesus. Respondent fled Guatemala and entered the United States in 2016 because [REDACTED] harmed her and she desired to obtain a better life for herself and her children.

Respondent met [REDACTED] at age eighteen when he came to her parent's home and asked them for permission to date her. A year later, they began dating and she later moved into his home. They officially married in about 1997 and they have never separated. In Guatemala, they both performed agricultural work in the "plantations." Respondent relationship with [REDACTED] was initially good. However, about two months into their marriage, [REDACTED] behavior changed. He began verbally and physically abusing Respondent. [REDACTED] would tell Respondent that she was poor and would call her a "worthless woman."

[REDACTED] would also physically hit Respondent at least once or twice per week. He would hit Respondent with his fists, feet, belts, and on some occasions he would hit her with the blunt end of a machete. In 2008, Respondent was hospitalized for a day due to a beating she endured from [REDACTED]. She explained that he violently kicked her on her back and hips causing her to suffer tremendous pain. As a result, she traveled to a small hospital in Cubulco where she received medication for pain before she was later discharged. Respondent reported this incident to the police, but they did not respond to her complaint.

[REDACTED] also harmed Respondent while they worked in the plantations and his abuse would occur in front of others. On one occasion, in about 2012, when Respondent was working at a plantation [REDACTED] harmed Respondent in front of her younger sibling, [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]). On that date, Respondent and [REDACTED] were working together at the plantation. Respondent was harvesting coffee beans and she tied a basket on top of her head to collect the beans. At some point, [REDACTED] appeared at the plantation and kicked Respondent causing her to fall into a nearby ravine. [REDACTED] then jumped on top of Respondent and began assaulting her. [REDACTED] then came to Respondent's aid by jumping into the ravine and untying the basket from Respondent's head so that she would be able to get up out of the water. During this incident, [REDACTED] told Respondent that she was a "poor lady" and that he was going to kill her.

Respondent acknowledged that [REDACTED]'s statement that was submitted in support of her application does not state that [REDACTED] kicked Respondent into a ravine, but instead details an incident where [REDACTED] rescued Respondent from [REDACTED] when he choked Respondent. However, Respondent asserted that [REDACTED] kicked her into a ravine and that [REDACTED] in fact rescued her from that abuse. She further indicated that the two incidents were the same. Specifically, Respondent swore that [REDACTED]'s statement correctly details that on that day [REDACTED] had also choked Respondent and that [REDACTED] tried to rescue Respondent from [REDACTED] by hitting him with a stick on his back. When asked why she did not mention the ravine incident in either of her affidavits, Respondent replied, "Maybe I was not clear on that, but now I disclose it."

Respondent reported the ravine incident to the closest police station, which was about thirty-minutes walking distance from her village. Respondent's mother accompanied her to the station. In response to Respondent's complaint, the police summoned [REDACTED] to the police and they also provided Respondent with a report. [REDACTED] complied with the police's summons, but was not arrested or charged with any crime. When he appeared at the station, the police simply told him that he should be nice to his wife and should not hit Respondent. However, their statements had no lasting effect on [REDACTED]'s behavior as shortly thereafter he resumed abusing Respondent. Respondent no longer has a copy of this report in her possession because she lost it.

Respondent explained that [REDACTED] was abusive towards her because he was a jealous man who desired to always be informed of her whereabouts. He would follow Respondent whenever she left the home to ensure that she was not meeting another man. During his abusive episodes, Respondent would object to his abuse and question his motive for harming her. In response, [REDACTED] would tell her "to go to hell" and would call her a "worthless woman." He also told her that she was "not the only woman in the world" and there were several other woman in the world he could date. Respondent disclosed that [REDACTED] was also abusive to their children, including their male child [REDACTED]. She explained that he would hit their children whenever any of them tried to defend her against his abuse.

Respondent does not know whether [REDACTED] was ever physically abusive to other women, including his previous wife. However, [REDACTED] spoke ill of his ex-wife to Respondent. Specifically, he told Respondent that his ex-wife was a lazy woman who did not prepare his food for him on a timely basis. Respondent does not know whether he is currently in relationship with another woman.

Respondent recalled that during her marriage she reported several of the beatings she endured to the police. Respondent's mother accompanied her to the police station on at least two occasions. Respondent did not attempt to obtain a letter of support from her mother because her "mother is not allowed to intervene between [Respondent] and [REDACTED]." She further noted that her mother does not speak any Spanish and is illiterate.

Respondent declared that the police failed to protect her despite her repeated efforts to report [REDACTED]'s abuse. She explained that the police officers at the station closest to her village only spoke Spanish. That fact prevented her from effectively communicating with the

officers because she only speaks a minimal amount of Spanish. However, she would state that [REDACTED] harmed her and would point to her injuries. In response, they would just instruct [REDACTED] that he should not harm Respondent. At some point, she was able to communicate with a translator and her case was transferred to a hearing before a judge. When she and [REDACTED] appeared before the judge, the judge instructed [REDACTED] that he should "man up" and be responsible. The judge further instructed him that he had the option to divorce Respondent, but [REDACTED] did not want to pay the divorce fee. Instead they remained together and [REDACTED] continued his abusive conduct.

Respondent reported the abuse that occurred subsequent to her appearance before a judge to the police several times. However, there was only one occasion that the police arrested [REDACTED]. On that occasion, they detained [REDACTED] for about five days and issued him some "paperwork" that informed him that he should stay away from Respondent. After [REDACTED] was released from detention, he was a "good man for two or three days," but again later reverted to abusing Respondent. Respondent did not report that subsequent abuse to the police; instead she chose to end her relationship with [REDACTED].

Respondent recalled that her relationship with [REDACTED] ended sometime prior to [REDACTED]'s birth on April 16, 2015. Specifically, [REDACTED] moved out of their shared home and into one of his family member's home. His family lived nearby in the same village as where they lived. Respondent later fled Guatemala about eight months later in December 2015. [REDACTED] never communicated with Respondent after they ended their relationship and she has not seen him since he left their home. [REDACTED] has never met [REDACTED] and he does not provide their children with financial support.

Respondent is afraid of returning to Guatemala because she fears that [REDACTED] will kill her especially since she has had a child with another person. Since Respondent has been residing in the United States, [REDACTED] has told her mother that he would kill her if she returns to Guatemala. Most recently, in 2018, he told Respondent's parents that he "was going to get her" if she ever returns to Guatemala and accused them of allowing her to leave Guatemala. Respondent does not believe that the Guatemalan government will protect her from [REDACTED] nor does she believe that there is any place she can reside safely in Guatemala.

Respondent's parents reside in the same small village where Respondent resided and they have custody of Respondent's child, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] resides in an undisclosed town in Guatemala with her romantic partner. The remaining of Respondent's four children reside with Respondent in the United States. All of Respondent's siblings reside in the United States. Respondent has uncles, aunts, and cousins who live in the village of Choain (phonetic), which is about thirty minutes walking distance from where Respondent resided in Guatemala. However, Respondent does not believe that she could reside in that town because it is "far" from the town where she resided in Guatemala and she also fears that she may still encounter [REDACTED] in that town.

Respondent is currently employed and is solely responsible for providing for her children. She is not presently in a romantic relationship with any one. Her youngest child's father, [REDACTED] is a Guatemalan native and he does not have lawful immigration status. Respondent has never been arrested or convicted of a crime in any country. She never harmed any person on account of a

protected ground and she has not received permanent resident status in any country. Respondent has never been a member of any armed group or terrorist organization and she has never provided false testimony for an immigration benefit.

III. Credibility and Corroboration

Respondent filed her application for relief with the Court on February 28, 2018. See Exh. 3, Tab B at 11–21.² Thus, the REAL ID Act of 2005 applies to her claim. See Matter of S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 42, 43 (BIA 2006); REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). Under the REAL ID Act, an applicant bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that she satisfies the applicable eligibility requirements and, if applicable, warrants a favorable exercise of discretion. INA § 240(c)(4)(A); see also Matter of Almanza-Arenas, 24 I&N Dec. 771, 774–75 (BIA 2009).

To determine if an applicant has met her burden, the Court will assess whether her testimony is credible, persuasive, and fact-specific. INA § 240(c)(4)(B). The Court weighs the testimony along with other evidence of record. Id. In making its credibility determination, the Court considers the totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors. INA § 240(c)(4)(C). In applying the “totality of the circumstances” approach, the Court will assess:

[T]he demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record (including the reports of the Department of State on country conditions), and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.

Id. § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii). An applicant’s own testimony may be sufficient to meet her burden of proof if it is believable, consistent, and sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible and coherent account of her claim. Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516, 518–19 (BIA 2015). An applicant may be given the “benefit of the doubt” if there is some ambiguity regarding an aspect of her asylum claim. See Matter of Y-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 1136, 1139 (BIA 1998). However, if deemed necessary, an applicant must provide corroborative evidence unless she does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain it. See INA § 240(c)(4)(C); Matter of M-D-, 21 I&N Dec. 1180 (BIA 1998).

The Court acknowledges that there are a number of omissions and a few inconsistencies between Respondent’s testimony and her written statements. Compare supra § II.B with Exh. 2, Tab C and Exh. 3, Tab I. However, Respondent speaks a very remote language and does not understand much Spanish. This likely had a significant impact on her communication with her attorney and prohibited her from disclosing all that happened to her in her written statements. Indeed, Respondent’s attorney explained that she had great difficulty locating an interpreter to assist in preparing Respondent’s case and had to use relay interpretation, from Achi to Spanish and from Spanish to English, to communicate with Respondent. See Exh. 2, Tab E at 21–22.

² She first filed her application with the USCIS on June 9, 2016. Exh. 2, Tab A at 1.

Moreover, Respondent was not cross-examined on several of the omissions or any of the inconsistencies present between her written statements and testimony, and as such the Court cannot consider them. See Caushi v. Atty. Gen. of U.S., 436 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2006). Furthermore, DHS has not questioned her credibility. A review of the testimony reflects that Respondent was generally responsive to questioning and was also forthright regarding difficult questions, including some of her motivations for traveling to the United States in late 2015. The central aspect of her testimony, that being that Mr. Ajroelli abused her repeatedly during the course of their marriage, is consistent with the record evidence. As such, the Court shall find that Respondent is generally credible. Where Respondent's testimony and written statements conflict, the Court shall rely on Respondent's testimony before the Court.

IV. Asylum

To qualify for asylum under INA § 208(a), an applicant must establish that: her application was timely filed within one year of her last arrival in the United States; she is not statutorily barred from relief; she is a "refugee" within the meaning of the INA; and she merits relief as a matter of discretion. INA § 208(a); Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 218-19 (BIA 1985), modified on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439, 446 (BIA 1987). Here, the dispositive issues before the Court are whether Respondent is a "refugee" within the meaning of the INA and whether she warrants relief as a matter of discretion.

A) "Refugee" within the Meaning of the INA

A "refugee" is a person who is outside her country of nationality or last residence, unable or unwilling to return to that country, and unable or unwilling to avail herself of that country's protection because of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group (PSG), or political opinion. INA § 101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). The applicant's fear of persecution must be countrywide and inflicted by the government or persons the government is unable or unwilling to control. Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 222, 235.

1. Past Persecution

To establish eligibility for asylum on the basis of past persecution, an applicant must show (1) an incident, or incidents, that rise to the level of persecution; (2) that is/are "on account of" one of the statutorily protected grounds; and (3) that is/are committed by the government or forces whom the government is "unable or unwilling" to control. Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002).

a. Persecution

Persecution is "a threat to the life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon, those who differ in a way regarded as offensive." Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 222; see also Li v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 164-68 (3d Cir. 2005). Persecution "encompasses a variety of forms of adverse treatment, including non-life threatening violence and physical abuse or non-physical forms of harm." Manzur v. DHS, 494 F.3d 281, 288 (2d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also

Matter of O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I&N Dec. 23, 25–26 (BIA 1998). It does not include “all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust or even unlawful or unconstitutional.” Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993). Isolated incidents of physical abuse or harassment, unaccompanied by serious injury is not persecution. Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 615 (3d Cir. 2005); Jarbough v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2007). Similarly, unfulfilled threats do not amount to persecution, unless they are highly imminent and menacing in nature. Li, 400 F.3d at 164; Chavarria v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 508, 518 (3d Cir. 2007). However, multiple beatings combined with other harassment may constitute persecution. Voci, 409 F.3d at 614–15. Persecution is considered in the aggregate. See Fei Mei Cheng v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 623 F.3d 175, 192 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[I]n determining whether actual or threatened mistreatment amounts to persecution, ‘[t]he cumulative effect of the applicant’s experience must be taken into account because ‘[t]aking isolated incidents out of context may be misleading.’”) (citations omitted).

Here, Respondent testified that she fled Guatemala because her husband, Mr. Ajroellip, abused her. She and Mr. Ajroellip were together for about nineteen years. For eighteen years while they were together, Mr. Ajroellip physically assaulted her at least once per week. Specifically, Mr. Ajroellip hit Respondent with his fists, feet, belt, and sometimes with the blunt end of a machete. On one occasion, he kicked her violently causing her to fall into a ravine. Thereafter, he jumped on top of Respondent while she was immersed in the water and choked her—only stopping when her sister intervened to protect her. The Court finds that the years of repugnant abuse Respondent suffered at the hands of Mr. Ajroellip amount to more than mere harassment and is sufficient to rise to the level of persecution. See Fei Mei Cheng, 623 F.3d at 192; Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388, 389–90 (BIA 2014) (concluding that “repugnant abuse” such as rape and beatings rises to the level of persecution), abrogated on other grounds by Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 319 (AG 2018); Matter of Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357, 362 (BIA 1996) (“[R]ape . . . , sexual abuse and domestic violence, infanticide and genital mutilation are forms of mistreatment primarily directed at girls and women and they may serve as evidence of past persecution[.]”).

b. On Account of a Protected Ground

Respondent claims that the persecution she suffered and fears occurred on account of either her race, nationality, or membership in a particular social group. See Exh. 4.

1. Race and Nationality

Here, Respondent claims that Mr. Ajroellip persecuted her on account of her Achi indigenous race/nationality. Exh. 4 at 9. In order to succeed on claim based on race or nationality, an alien must provide some evidence, direct or circumstantial, that one central reason that motivated her persecutor to target her was either her race or nationality. J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 208, 212 (BIA 2007). The Court finds that the evidence of record does not suggest that Mr. Ajroellip harmed Respondent on account of her either her race or nationality. Notably, Mr. Ajroellip himself is of the Achi indigenous ethnicity and he did not say or do anything that indicates that he had an animosity towards indigenous persons like himself or Respondent. The Court recognizes that indigenous women are among the most marginalized persons in Guatemalan society and they suffer from domestic abuse, including abuse from partners who are also indigenous. Exh. 2, Tab K at 348, 353. However, women generally suffer from high rates of abuse in Guatemala and

nothing in the record demonstrates that [REDACTED] harmed Respondent because she was an indigenous woman as opposed to her status as being a Guatemalan woman. As previously noted, he never mentioned her indigenous heritage; rather while abusing her, he merely stated that she was a “worthless woman” and told her there were several other women in the world that he could date. Accordingly, the Court does not find that Respondent has met her burden to demonstrate that her race or nationality was a central reason for the persecution she faced at the hands of [REDACTED].³

2. Membership in a Particular Social Group

An applicant who alleges that she was persecuted on account of a PSG bears the burden of establishing the existence of a cognizable PSG and her membership in that PSG. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208, 223 (BIA 2014). The applicant “must initially identify the particular social group or groups in which membership is claimed.” Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 189, 191 (BIA 2018) (instructing applicants to “includ[e] the exact delineation of any particular social group(s) to which she claims to belong” on remand) (citations omitted). The applicant must further demonstrate that the group she claims membership in is: (1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic; (2) defined with particularity; and (3) socially distinct within the society in question. See S.E.R.L. v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 555 (3d Cir. 2018); W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. at 223; Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014).

A common immutable characteristic is one that is so fundamental to the identity or conscience of each group member that it cannot or should not be changed; it can be an innate characteristic, such as sex or family relation, or a shared past experience. Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 222. A group defined with particularity has “discrete and [] definable boundaries” and is not “amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.” W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. at 214. However, it cannot be circularly defined by the fact that its members have been subjected to harm in the past, rather the group “must exist independently of the persecution.” Id. at 215; see Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 579, 584 (BIA 2008); see also Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 172 (3d Cir. 2003). To be socially distinct, the society in question must, in general, perceive, consider, or recognize persons sharing the particular characteristics to be a group. See W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. at 217; Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 951, 959–60 (BIA 2006). Social distinction may not be determined solely by the perception of an applicant’s persecutors. W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. at 218. However, the persecutors’ perceptions may be relevant because it is indicative of whether society views a group as distinct. M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 243.

The Board has repeatedly held that the determination of whether a particular social group is cognizable is a fact-based inquiry that must be made on a case-by-case basis. See M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 243; W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. at 218. The Circuit Courts of Appeals have similarly held

³ Respondent contends that the fact that she and [REDACTED] share the same Achi ethnicity does not preclude a finding that he harmed her on account of her ethnicity and attempts to analogize her claim to the alien in Matter of Kasinga, who was persecuted by other members of her same ethnic group. 21 I&N Dec. 357, 358 (BIA 1996). However, Kasinga is distinguishable from Respondent’s case because Kasinga’s claim was not based on her ethnicity, but on account of her membership in the PSG, “Young women who are members of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of northern Togo who have not been subjected to female genital mutilation . . . and who oppose the practice.” Id. Indeed, Respondent does not claim that [REDACTED] harmed because she did not conform to accepted practices or standards within her indigenous community or that he ever mentioned their shared indigenous heritage or cultural beliefs.

that factual findings underlie the analysis of a group's cognizability, particularly social distinction. See, e.g., Hernandez-De La Cruz v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 784, 787 (5th Cir. 2016); Sanchez-Robles v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 688, 691 (6th Cir. 2015).

Here, Respondent claims that she is a member of the following PSGs: "Guatemala women," "Women," "Guatemalan Women of Achi Descent," "Guatemalan Women Viewed as Property," and the "Joj family." Exh. 4 at 1.

1) Guatemalan Women

The Court finds that the proffered group, "Guatemalan Women," is a cognizable PSG. First, the group, "Guatemalan women," is immutable. Members of this group all share characteristics that cannot be changed or that should not be required to change. Indeed, gender and nationality are prototypical examples of common, immutable characteristics because one cannot change or should not be required to change their gender and / or nationality. See Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1233; Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 233; see also Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 667 (9th Cir. 2010); Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding that Somali women may form a cognizable PSG).

Second, Respondent's proposed group is sufficiently particular. The particularity analysis focuses on whether the terms used to define a group forms a group that has "discrete and definable boundaries," and is not "amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective." M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 239. It is an objective inquiry into "whether a reasonable person could look at the proposed definition of a social group and determine who falls within it." S.E.R.L., 894 F.3d at 553. Here, the terms, "women" and "Guatemalan," used to describe this group are clear, fixed, and identifiable. It is limited only to female natives of Guatemala and does not include any other persons.

The Court recognizes that Respondent's proposed group is large in that it contains many members. However, a group's size, while an important factor, is insufficient on its own to foreclose a finding of particularity. See Matter of H-, 21 I&N Dec. 337 (BIA 1996); S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. at 585; see also Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 676-77 (7th Cir. 2013); Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797-98 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding a group comprised of "Somali females" to be a cognizable social group given the widespread practice of FGM). In S-E-G-, the Board explained that, "[w]hile the size may be an important factor in determining whether the group can be so recognized, the key question is whether the proposed description is sufficiently 'particular,' or is 'too amorphous . . . to create a benchmark for determining group membership.'" 24 I&N Dec. at 584 (emphasis added). Here, the Court reiterates that the characteristics defining the group, "women" and "Guatemalan," are objectively unambiguous and provides an adequate benchmark for determining group membership.

Moreover, the Board has previously found other large groups to be defined with sufficient particularity. See, e.g., H-, 21 I&N Dec. at 343; Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I&N Dec. 819, 822-23 (BIA 1990). For example, in Matter of H-, the Board found Somali clans to constitute a particular social group based on their unique identification within society, including, among other things, their linguistic attributes. 21 I&N Dec. at 343. Given that some Somali clans number in the millions, it is clear that the size of the group does not foreclose a finding of particularity. See id.;

see also Cece, 733 F.3d at 674–675; Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 797–98. The Board has also long held that homosexuals in particular countries can qualify as members of particular social groups, despite their size. See Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I&N Dec. at 822–23. Notably, the Board recently affirmed that “homosexuals in Cuba” are members of a cognizable particular social group because, among other things, the group is defined with particularity. See M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 245; W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. at 219.

The Court further recognizes that Respondent’s proposed group contains diverse members. However, “cohesiveness or homogeneity” are not required elements necessary to establish a cognizable PSG. See C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. at 957. Indeed, the Board has found several diverse groups to be defined with particularity. The Court reiterates that in Toboso-Alfonso, the Board held that a group comprised of homosexuals in Cuba constitutes a particular social group. 20 I&N Dec. at 822–23. No group will have more diversity among its members than a group defined by sexual orientation, as the group will have members of varying ages, social classes, economic statuses, and places of residence. In spite of the wide diversity of the other characteristics of membership, however, the fact remains that homosexuals have a characteristic that makes them part of a particular social group: their sexual orientation. Similarly, in Matter of V-T-S-, the Board found “Filipinos of Chinese Ancestry” constituted a particular social group. 21 I&N Dec. 792, 798 (BIA 1997). This group is also not limited by age, sex, economic status, or any particular belief. The only unifying characteristic of that group is their Chinese ancestry. Like in Toboso-Alfonso and V-T-S-, Respondent’s group here, “Guatemalan women” include a diverse range of members, but the group contains characteristics that make it sufficiently particular, namely, their sex and nationality.

The Court also finds that that Respondent’s proposed group exists independent of the harm its members suffer. See A-B-, 316 at 334 (“To be cognizable, a particular social group must ‘exist independently’ of the harm asserted in an application for asylum or statutory withholding of removal.”) (emphasis in the original) (citing M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 236 n.11, 243). The harm the members suffer does not create any of the characteristics they share; rather, very clearly, as discussed infra, the characteristics of the members give rise to the harm. See Exh. 2, Tab G; Exh. 3, Tab K. Apart from any abuse women suffer, Guatemalan society treats them separately from the rest of society because of their gender. See Exh. 2, Tab G; Exh. 3, Tab K.

Third, Respondent’s proposed social group is socially distinct. In M-E-V-G-, the Board explained that “[a] viable particular social group should be perceived within the given society as a sufficiently distinct group,” and that “[t]he members of a particular social group will generally understand their own affiliation with the grouping, as will other people in the particular society.” 26 I&N Dec. 227, 238; see also W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. at 217 (stating that “social distinction exists where the relevant society perceives, considers, or recognizes the group as a distinct social group”).

Respondent provided several country condition reports and articles establishing that Guatemalan society perceives women as sufficiently distinct from society generally. In Guatemala violence against women, including rape and domestic violence, is a serious problem. Exh. 3, Tab K at 199–200, 281–285, 351, 379, 389. Indeed, Guatemala has the one of the highest rates of femicide, defined as the “murder of women because of their gender,” in the world. Id. at 379. The violence perpetrated against women in Guatemala is due to discrimination against women,

including a culture of deep rooted gender bias and machismo. Id. at 196, 200, 281, 283, 348; Exh. 2, Tab G at 165. The machismo culture is premised on the notation that men have the power and authority to control women and renders all women as subservient to men. Id. at 269; Exh. 2, Tab G at 165. “Women are commonly viewed as the ‘daughters’ of their husbands, and as such, women must obey their partners.” Exh. 2, Tab G at 165. As such it is widely accepted that men have the right to abuse women. Id.; Exh. 3, Tab K at 380. Those women who do not conform to their expected role or place as women in society are penalized for being “bad” and deserving of any mistreatment they face from men. See Exh. 2, Tab G at 165.

Due to the pervasive violence and discrimination against women, the Guatemalan government has recognized the need to protect women and has enacted several laws to combat violence and discrimination against women. See Exh. 3, Tab K at 199–200. Yet despite laws enacted to foster gender equality and criminalize discrimination, women continue to face discrimination and are less likely to hold management positions. Id. at 200. Likewise, violence against women remains a serious problem in Guatemala. Id. at 199–200. Indeed, more than two women are killed each day because of their gender. See id. at 379. This attributed to the ingrained machismo culture and the government’s failure to effectively enforce the laws passed to protect women. Id. at 199–200, 242, 256–57. Notably, there are several reported incidents of discrimination against women by the police and the “police had minimal training or capacity to investigate sexual crimes or assist survivors of such crimes, and the government did not enforce the law effectively.” Id. at 199–200. Police also often failed to respond to requests for assistance to domestic violence. Id. at 200. The situation is particularly worse for indigenous women. Id. at 302, 351–52. They are described as the most marginalized, powerless, and vulnerable members of Guatemalan society due to their race and gender. Id. at 348. They usually have limited access to justice for abuse because police stations are not located in their remote villages. Id. at 302. They also often times face difficulties in communicating with the police because the police do not speak their native language. Id.

Accordingly, the Court finds that taken as a whole, Respondent has shown that Guatemalan women are “set apart, or distinct, from other persons within [Guatemala] in some significant way.” M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 238. As discussed, society treats women as inferior to men, permits violence against women who fail to comply with their societal role, and the government has recognized the need to protect this vulnerable group. See Exh. 2, Tab G; Exh. 3, Tab K. Therefore, Respondent’s articulated social group meets the requirements for social distinction and is cognizable under the Act. The Court further finds that Respondent is a member of this group, as she is a Guatemalan female.

2. Nexus Between Harm and Guatemalan Women PSG

In addition to establishing membership in a particular social group, an applicant must show that a “nexus” exists between the persecution alleged and the protected ground. W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. at 223; J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I&N Dec. at 212–14; 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). The protected ground cannot play a minor role in the mistreatment and cannot be incidental, tangential, or superficial to another reason for the harm. Ndayshimiye v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 124, 130 (3d Cir. 2009); J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I&N Dec. at 214; Matter of S-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 486, 490 (BIA 1996). As long as the applicant shows that one central reason for the persecution faced was on

account of the protected ground, the applicant may establish eligibility for relief. See J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I&N Dec. at 212. The Third Circuit has stressed that the proper standard is “one central reason” and not “the central reason.” See Ndayshimiye, 557 F.3d at 129–31 (finding that the BIA’s decision in J-B-N- & S-M- is not entitled to Chevron deference to the extent that it requires that an applicant prove that their asserted protected ground was not subordinate to another reason for harm); Matter of N-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 526, 529 (BIA 2011). In making this determination, the Court can consider both direct and circumstantial evidence of a persecutor’s motive and may make reasonable inferences based on the evidence in the record. N-M-, 25 I&N Dec. at 529; Matter of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. 445, 453 (BIA 2011).

Here, in drawing all reasonable inferences based on the evidence in the record, the Court finds that Respondent’s status as a Guatemalan woman was “one central reason” for her persecution. Respondent was physically abused by her husband, Mr. ~~Ajxollip~~, for the majority of their twenty-two year marriage. During the several incidents of abuse she suffered at the hands of ~~Mr. Ajxollip~~, he routinely demeaned Respondent’s gender, calling her a “worthless woman” and attempted to dominate their relationship. See supra § II.B. Indeed, Respondent described ~~Mr. Ajxollip~~ has a “machista” or male chauvinist who appeared to have specific views of the role of women. See supra § II.B; see also Exh. 2, Tab C at 18 (Respondent’s affidavit discussing her fear of returning to face Mr. Ajxollip). Pointedly, Respondent recalled that he would not only physically abuse her, but would also routinely follow her whenever she left the home because he demanded to know her every whereabouts; thereby demonstrating his need to control or dominate their relationship. See supra § II.B; see also Exh. 2, Tab C at 18 (Respondent’s affidavit). He further criticized his ex-wife as being lazy simply because she did not prepare his food on a timely basis— further illustrating his machismo beliefs that women should be subservient to men. See supra § II.B.

Respondent’s experience of abuse at the hands of ~~Mr. Ajxollip~~ fits neatly into the pattern of threats and violence inflicted on Guatemalan females on account of their gender. See Exh. 2, Tab G at 162–65; Exh. 3, Tab K at 269, 277–85, 380. The record shows that gender is a primary cause for domestic violence and abuse of women, particularly in Guatemala. See Exh. 2, Tab G at 162–65; Exh. 3, Tab K at 269, 277–85, 380. Indeed, women in Guatemala are subjected to high levels of violence because they live in a “machista culture that treats women as inferior [and] has normalized the violence and murder of women.” Exh. 3, Tab K at 380; see Exh. 2, Tab G at 165. With respect to motives of batterers of women, like ~~Mr. Ajxollip~~, it is reported that:

[t]he male batterer is motivated by a firm belief in male privilege, which expresses itself in an expectation that men and women conform to traditional and rigid gender roles. The batterer treats his wife or partner like a servant rather than as an equal partner, acts like the “master of the castle,” and assumes authority to define men’s and women’s gender roles and make final decisions regarding what his wife or partner will or will not do. His partner’s failure to fulfill his traditional and rigid expectations for how a woman ought to behave may trigger an episode of abuse or violence. . . .

Exh. 3, Tab K at 366.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the totality of the record demonstrates that Mr. Ajxomp abused Respondent because of her status as a Guatemala woman. As discussed, Mr. Ajxomp routinely mentioned her gender when he abused her and holds “machista” views of women, which as corroborated by the country conditions evidence is the catalyst behind the shocking levels of violence against women in Guatemala. See Exh. 2, Tab G at 162–65; Exh. 3, Tab K at 269, 277–85, 380. Therefore, the Court finds that Respondent has met her burden in demonstrating a nexus between her fear of persecution and her membership in a particular social group consisting of Guatemalan women.

c. Unwilling or Unable to Control

Respondent also must demonstrate that the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to protect her from Mr. Ajxomp. See Gao, 299 F.3d at 272. An applicant seeking to establish persecution based on conduct of a private actor must show that “the government condoned the private actions ‘or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the victim.’” A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 337. While not binding on this Court, the Court finds the First Circuit Court of Appeals’ (“First Circuit”) analysis in Rosales Justo v. Sessions persuasive. 895 F.3d 154 (1st Cir. 2018). In Rosales Justo, the First Circuit distinguished the Mexican government’s willingness to investigate crime from its ability to protect its citizens from harm. Id. at 163–64. There, the court determined that the police’s investigative efforts into the applicant’s son’s murder was not alone sufficient to demonstrate the government’s ability to protect the applicant from harm in light of country conditions evidence showing the failure of police to protect Mexican citizens from organized crime. Id. at 164.

Here, the evidence in the record demonstrates that the Guatemalan government is unable to control violence against women or protect Respondent from abuse. Although the country conditions evidence reflects that the Guatemalan government has taken steps to combat gender violence, such as enacting several laws to combat violence against women, impunity for violence against women remains a serious problem throughout Guatemala. See Exh. 3, Tab K 199–200, 277–81. Guatemala has one of the highest rates of femicide in the world. Id. at 379. This is attributable to widespread inefficacy and bias in the Guatemalan justice system. Id. at 199–200, 274, 296–302. Notably, “police had minimal training or capacity to investigate sexual crimes or assist survivors of such crimes, and the government did not enforce the law effectively.” Id. at 199. The police also often fail to respond to requests for assistance in domestic violence situations and sometimes engage in outward discrimination against women. Id. at 200. Additionally, “[t]here is also a pattern of prosecutors and judges urging conciliation of conflicts, rather than seeking to protect victims of domestic violence. Even in cases where the courts successfully prosecute and convict perpetrators of domestic violence, commutable sentences render protection illusory.” Id. at 274. Indigenous women face even further obstacles because they do not speak Spanish and live in remote areas of the country without access to the police in their villages. Id. at 302. Notably, even when a woman is able to travel to the police, she may be unable to communicate with the police. Id.

Respondent’s personal experiences in Guatemala are consistent with the country conditions reports. Indeed, she testified that she reported Mr. Ajxomp abuse to the police on multiple occasions during the course of their eighteen year relationship. On almost every occasion, the

police or other government actors merely told [REDACTED] that he should not hit Respondent or that he should divorce Respondent, but did not otherwise take any actions to protect Respondent from [REDACTED]'s abuse. Notably, despite Respondent's several complaints of domestic abuse, the police arrested [REDACTED] on only one occasion during which they ordered him to stay away from Respondent. Yet, despite his significant history of abuse, the police only detained him for five days. After he was released, [REDACTED] returned to the home he shared with Respondent and within two days resumed his abusive conduct; thereby demonstrating the general ineffective nature of the police's singular act to protect Respondent.

The Court acknowledges that Respondent did not report [REDACTED]'s subsequent abuse, but instead decided to end their relationship and that [REDACTED] complied with her request by moving out of their shared home. However, [REDACTED]'s decision to end his relationship with Respondent does not appear to have been caused by any actions on the part of the government to protect Respondent. Indeed, the government's single act to arrest [REDACTED] for five days, over the course of his eighteen years of violent abusive conduct against Respondent, had no effect on his behavior as he returned to her home after that arrest and continued his violent actions against Respondent. Moreover, as discussed, Respondent suffered several years of abuse at the hands [REDACTED] prior to his arrest and the termination of their relationship, which was due to her gender, and for which the government did not protect her.

In light of the aforementioned evidence, the Court finds that the Guatemalan government was unable to control [REDACTED] or protect Respondent from his abuse.

B. Presumption of Future Persecution

Respondent established that she experienced past persecution on account of her membership in a PSG at the hands of an actor the Guatemalan government is unable or unwilling to control. Therefore, she benefits from a rebuttable presumption of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1). To overcome this presumption, DHS bears the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) there has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution in her country of nationality on account of a protected ground; or (2) the applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of her country of nationality and under the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect her to do so. See Matter of D-I-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 2008) (remanding for failing to shift the burden of proof to DHS that, by a preponderance of the evidence, relocation was reasonable); see also 8 C.F.R. § § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A)-(B), (b)(3)(ii).

Here, DHS argues that there has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that Respondent is no longer at risk of harm from [REDACTED] because: (1) she has ended her relationship with [REDACTED], (2) has not suffered harm from him since 2015, despite having resided in Guatemala for eight months in 2015 prior to her travel to the United States, and (3) has not communicated with him since 2015. See supra § II.B. DHS alternatively contends that Respondent could reasonably avoid future harm from [REDACTED] by moving to a village called Choain where she has several extended relatives. See supra § II.B. However, for the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that DHS has not rebutted the presumption.

First, although Respondent has ended her relationship with [REDACTED], does not communicate with him, and has not been harmed by him since 2015, the record reflects that he is still interested in harming Respondent. Notably, Respondent revealed that while he has not communicated with her, he has communicated several violent threats to harm her to her parents in Guatemala. Specifically, in 2018, [REDACTED] blamed Respondent's parents for allowing Respondent to leave Guatemala and warned them that he was "going to get her" if she ever returns to Guatemala. See supra § II.B. Respondent's sister further details in her affidavit that [REDACTED] has learned that Respondent is in immigration proceedings and has professed his desired to harm her upon her return to Guatemala. See Exh. 2, Tab D at 19. Furthermore, as discussed supra, the country conditions evidence reveals that violence against women continues to remain a serious problem in Guatemala and the police do not effectively enforce the laws to protect women against harm. Exh. 2, Tab G; Exh. 3, Tab K. Accordingly, the Court does not find that there has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that Respondent would not be at risk of harm from [REDACTED] upon her return to Guatemala.

Next, while Respondent has family in the village of Choain, this village is only thirty minutes walking distance from where Respondent resided in Guatemala. Thus, moving from her hometown to the village Choain would not be a safe alternative to where she previously reside, as it is entirely possible or even likely that Respondent could encounter [REDACTED] in Choain due its close proximity to where they resided together. Moreover, Respondent is an indigenous woman with no education, speaks very limited Spanish, and has no family ties in any other area of Guatemala that [REDACTED] could not easily reach Respondent. Additionally, DHS has not presented any evidence detailing any manner in which Respondent could be able to move to another part of Guatemala considering her aforementioned unique circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3) (noting that economic and social and cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social and familial ties are factors to be considered regarding the reasonableness of internal relocation). Therefore, the Court does not find that DHS has met its burden to show that Respondent could escape harm by reasonably relocating within Guatemala.

Accordingly, the Court finds that DHS has not rebutted the presumption that Respondent has a future fear of persecution on account of her membership in a particular social group, namely Guatemalan women. Therefore, the Court finds that she is statutorily eligible for asylum.⁴

d. Discretion

An applicant who establishes statutory eligibility for asylum also bears the burden of demonstrating that she merits a grant of asylum as a matter of discretion. See INA § 208(b)(1)(A). In determining whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted, both favorable and adverse factors should be considered, Matter of Pula, 19 I&N Dec. 467, 473 (BIA 1987), including adverse factors such as "the circumvention of orderly refugee procedures," A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 345 n.12, and humanitarian factors, such as age, health, and family ties, H-, 21 I&N Dec. at 348. The danger

⁴ Because the Court has concluded that "Guatemalan Women" is a cognizable PSG and that she has an un rebutted presumption of future persecution on account of her membership in that group, the Court need not analyze whether her other proffered PSGs are cognizable. See I.N.S. v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) ("As a general rule, courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.").

of persecution should outweigh all but the most egregious adverse factors. Pula, 19 I&N Dec. at 473. Here, the negative discretionary factors are that Respondent entered the United States without inspection and traveled through Mexico prior to arriving in the United States. Exh. 1; Exh. 2, Tab Bat 9. However, since her arrival in the United States, she has attended all of her immigration hearings and has not committed any criminal offenses. Furthermore, it appears that she merely traveled through Mexico, does not have any ties to that country, and was not offered any immigration benefits or protection in that country. Therefore, considering the risk of harm facing Respondent in Guatemala and the absence of any major adverse factors, the Court finds that Respondent's case merits a favorable exercise of discretion.

C. Conclusion

The Court finds that Respondent established past persecution on account of her membership in a particular social group in Guatemala and that she has a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution if she returns to that country. Additionally, Respondent established that she merits asylum as a matter of discretion. Therefore, the Court grants Respondent asylum pursuant to INA § 208.

V. Withholding of Removal under the Act and CAT

As the Court grants Respondent asylum under INA § 208, the Court does not reach Respondent's application for withholding of removal pursuant to INA § 241(b)(3) or her request for protection under CAT.

VI. Respondent Greysi

Greysi, Respondent's minor child, was included as a derivative beneficiary of Respondent's Form I-589. See Exh. 2, Tab B at 4. The child of an alien who is granted asylum, if not otherwise eligible for asylum, may be granted the same status as the alien if accompanying such alien. See INA § 208(b)(3). In this case, Respondent met her burden to establish eligibility for asylum. See supra § IV. Therefore, Greysi will be granted asylum as a beneficiary of Respondent's Form I-589. See INA § 208(b)(3).

Accordingly, the Court issues the following orders:


ORDERS

ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent's application for asylum pursuant to INA § 208 be **GRANTED**

ORDER: IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent Greysi be **GRANTED** asylum as a derivative of Respondent's application for asylum pursuant to INA § 208(b)(3)

Date

10/30/19


Charles M. Honeyman
Immigration Judge
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

APPEAL RIGHTS: Both parties have the right to appeal this decision. A notice of appeal must be filed with the BIA within 30 calendar days of the issuance date of this decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(b). If the final date for filing the notice of appeal occurs on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the time period for filing will be extended to the next business day. See id. If the time period expires and no appeal has been filed, this decision becomes final. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(d).

CC: Respondents' Counsel
Assistant Chief Counsel, ICE



CAMBRIA & KLINE

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

BRIDGET CAMBRIA, ESQ. • JACQUELYN KLINE, ESQ.

22 de Enero 2020

Petrona Matom Matom
14483 Rustling Leaves Ln
Centreville, VA 20121

Re: Permiso de Trabajo

Petrona,

Adjunto encontrará una forma G-28 y un formulario de autorización de trabajo para su firma. Por favor revise que toda la información este correcta antes de firmar. Por favor firme en la "X" indicada y devuélvalos tan pronto como sea posible.

También solicitamos los siguientes artículos:

- 2 fotos tamaño pasaporte de usted;
- Un pago de \$410.00 para migración (tiene que ser en forma de cheque o money order a nombre de **U.S. Department of Homeland Security**);
- Un pago hace su balance de \$1,600.00;
- Una copia de su permisos de trabajo.

~~Si tiene alguna duda, por favor no dude en ponerse en contacto conmigo en (484) 926-2014, o por correo electrónico a Bridget.cambria@cambriaklinelaw.com.~~

Respetuosamente,

Bridget Cambria, Esq.
BC/mfr
recinto