

ID-CPPA-CBA: Provably Secure Identity-based Conditional Privacy-preserving Authentication and Clustering-based Batch Verification for VANETs

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Abstract—In this paper, we have proposed conditional privacy-preserving authentication scheme, for secure Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs). We use pseudo-identity for this purpose and it facilitates the Trusted Authorities (TAs) to track the real-identity of a vehicle by its signature but not any malicious user. In our proposed scheme, we used the clustering technic to speedup the batch verification process to simultaneously verify all the authentication messages send by a number of vehicles. A new protocol in batch verification is also proposed, called clustering which allows the vehicles to help a Road-Side Unit (RSU) in the verification process.

Index Terms—Authentication, Batch verification, Binary search, Bilinear pairing, Clustering, Digital signature,

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the rise of self-driving vehicles and dedicated short-range communications technologies have led to an increase in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs). A VANET is considered as a particular type of Mobile Ad Hhoc Network (MANET). They share some similarities, such as their rapidly and dynamically changing network topologies due to the fast motion of vehicles; however, they do have specific vital differences in both architecture and design [1]. The mobility of vehicles in VANETs is, in general, constrained by predefined roads. Various conditions, such as road conditions, weather situations, traffic, and traffic control mechanisms (stop signs, traffic lights, and speed limits), restrict the velocity of a vehicle. Besides, given the fact that vehicles can be equipped with devices with potentially longer transmission ranges, rechargeable source of energy, and extensive onboard storage capacities, processing power, and storage efficiency are not an issue in VANETs as they are in MANETs [1]. From these features, VANETs are considered as an extremely flexible and relatively easy-to-manage network pattern of MANETs.

VANET applications include onboard active safety systems that are used to assist drivers in avoiding collisions and in coordinating among them at critical points, such as intersections and highway entries [2]. Safety systems may intelligently disseminate road information, such as incidents, real-time traffic congestion, high-speed tolling, or surface condition to vehicles in the vicinity of the subjected sites. This

helps to avoid platoon vehicles and to improve road capacity accordingly [2]. With such active safety systems, the number of vehicle accidents and associated damage are expected to be largely reduced. In addition to the safety, as mentioned above applications, IVC ([Inter-Vehicular-Communication](#), or [V-2-V i.e. Vehicle-to-Vehicle comm.](#)) [3] communications can also be used to provide comfort applications. The latter may include weather information, gas station, restaurant locations, mobile e-commerce, entertainment applications, and interactive communications such as Internet access, music downloads, and content delivery [4].

A. System model

The two-layer network model is very suitable for VANETs [5]. The various components of the network model are shown in Fig. 1. The top layer of the network model is comprised of traffic control centers (TCCs), and Trusted Authorities (TAs), where they could communicate with each other securely through the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol. The bottom layer of the network model consists of a number of Road-Side-Units (RSUs) and vehicles, where they could communicate with each other through the Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) protocol [6]. The details of the participants of the network model are given as follows:

- **Trusted Authority (TA):** The TAs and the PKG are always trusted and can never be compromised, and two or more TAs do not collude. They are also powered with sufficient computation and storage capabilities. A TA is responsible for generating system parameters and preloading them in the OBU of the vehicle offline. It is the only participant that could get the real identity of the vehicle from the intercepted messages.
- **Road-Side Unit (RSU):** A RSU is a wireless communication device that uses a DSRC protocol. It is located on the roadside and could communicate with the vehicles. It can verify the validity of received messages and sends them to the traffic management center or process them locally.
- **Vehicle:** A vehicle in a VANET equipped with a tamper-proof device, called On-Board Unit (OBU). An OBU is a wireless communication device, and its information is never be compromised. Through a DSRC protocol, an OBU helps a vehicle to exchange traffic information with the nearby vehicles, RSUs, and can also communicate with the TCC via the Internet. Each vehicle in a VANET

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has its own real identity, pseudo-identity, and a private key. A vehicle used its private key to sign all the messages and send them to a nearby RSU. Each RSU that receives traffic-information is responsible for verifying the digital signatures of the messages.




Figure 1: Two-layer network model for VANET

The RSUs communicate with an AS and a TA using a secure transmission protocol, such as the wired Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The RSUs are responsible for forwarding the valid messages received from the OBUs to an AS. A TCC is in charge of further analysis and giving feedback to the RSUs after collecting traffic-related information such as the current time, location, instances of traffic accidents, traffic distribution, and the road weather information from the RSUs. Secure vehicular communications are mainly meant for civilian applications. In most highway scenarios, RSUs are assumed to connect with the TAs by wired links or via any other link utilizing high bandwidth, low delay, and low bit error rates. The RSUs also communicate with each other either via the TCCs or through a secure and reliable peer-to-peer channel.

The communications in VANETs can be divided into two types: Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication. Both types of communications are controlled by a DSRC protocol. In a VANET, each vehicle periodically broadcasts the messages about road traffic and vehicles' conditions every 100~300 milliseconds, where road traffic conditions include weather conditions, road defects, congestion situation, etc. and vehicles' conditions include location, speed, traffic status, etc. [1]. Upon receipt of these messages, other vehicles could change their traveling routes to avoid possible traffic events such as traffic congestion, traffic accident, etc. Besides, RSUs can also send messages about traffic conditions to the TCC. Based on received messages, the TCC can take some timely actions

(such as adjusting traffic lights) to improve traffic safety and efficiency. All the aforementioned benefits make VANET a promising technology for the modern intelligent transportation system.

B. Our motivations and contributions

Our scheme is based on the concept of identity-based cryptography (IBC). This is because when the traditional public key cryptography (PKC), which used a trusted authority (TA) and public key infrastructure (PKI), were used in VANETs, some of the problems that occurred were:

- (1). Each vehicle should have a huge storage space to store its public and private key pairs and the corresponding public key certificate.
- (2). The TA should also have a huge storage space to store all vehicle's public key certificates.
- (3). It is challenging to find the real identity of a misbehaving vehicle when it sends the wrong message because the TA has to perform an exhaustive search of all stored public key certificates.

In IBC, a user's identity is served as his/her public key, and a trusted third party, called the Private Key Generator (PKG), generates the corresponding identity-based private key. In this case, no certificate is needed to bind the user's identity to his/her public key. Therefore, the IBC could solve the certificate management problem in the PKI-based PKC.

Our main contributions in this papers are given as follows: Our main contributions in this papers are given as follows:

- (1). We propose an identity-based conditional privacy-preserving authentication and clustering-based batch verification (ID-CPPA-CBA) scheme for VANETs.
- (2). The proposed ID-CPPA-CBA scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model (ROM) under the intractability assumption of the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem.
- (3). In the proposed scheme, we have used the bilinear pairing and general hash function. In our construction, we have avoided the use of Map-To-Point (MTP) hash function to reduce the computation and communication costs.
- (4). We use the pseudo-identity instead of the vehicle's real identity to bring in conditional privacy-preservation (CPP) facility. The trusted authorities (TAs) are the only ones to find out the real identity of a vehicle and keep malicious vehicles at bay.
- (5). Our ID-CPPA-CBA scheme includes the batch verification mechanism as well as a new variation, i.e., cluster verification. These protocols help increase the time efficiency of VANETs.
- (6). We have also proposed an idea, called binary search to find out the malicious user in case batch verification shows there's an invalid signature in the population for a given RSU.

C. Organization

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II discussed the related works. Section III described the concept

of VANET. Section IV described the preliminaries to be used to construct the proposed ID-CPPA-CBA scheme. Section ?? explained the proposed ID-CPPA-CBA scheme. Section ?? illustrated the provable security of the proposed ID-CPPA-CBA scheme. Section VII discussed the performance analysis and comparative study of the proposed ID-CPPA-CBA scheme with other competing schemes. Section VIII ended the paper with some concluding remarks.

II. RELATED WORKS

To address the certificate management problem in the above PKI-based conditional privacy-preserving authentication (CPPA) scheme, Zhang et al. [7] incorporated IBC and proposed an identity-based signature (IBS) scheme. Based on the proposed IBS scheme, Zhang et al. designed an identity-based CPPA (ID-CPPA) scheme for VANETs. Neither the vehicle nor the RSU in Zhang et al.'s scheme needs to store a certificate. Besides, their scheme incurs a lower verification cost because it supports batch verification. Later, Chim [8] pointed out that Zhang et al.'s ID-CPPA scheme [7] is vulnerable to impersonation attack and anti-traceability attack. Chim [8] also proposed an improved ID-CPPA scheme for VANETs. With only two shared secrets, Chim's scheme [8] could satisfy the privacy requirements in VANETs. Besides, this scheme has lower communication costs than previously proposed ID-CPPA schemes. To improve the performance, Shim [9] proposed an efficient IBS scheme and used it to design a new ID-CPPA schemes. Unfortunately, Liu et al. [10] pointed out that a security flaw exists in the proof of Shim's IBS scheme, and therefore the ID-CPPA scheme suffers from a modification attack, i.e., an adversary can generate a new legal message by modifying a previous message.

To enhance the security of previous schemes, Zhang et al. [7] and Bayat et al. [11] also proposed two improved ID-CPPA schemes for VANETs. By modifying the process of generating the anonymous identity and the digital signature, Zhang et al.'s ID-CPPA scheme [12] and Bayat et al.'s ID-based CPPA scheme [11] could solve security problems in Lee and Lai's ID-based CPPA scheme [13] and have better computation performance results. Despite these improvements, Zhang et al. ID-based CPPA scheme [12] and Bayat et al.'s ID-based CPPA scheme [11] still suffer from the modification attack shown by Liu et al. [10]

Add more related works. I found many works available in the literature.

III. PRELIMINARIES

A. Bilinear Pairing

Let p be a large prime number and a field \mathbb{Z}_p^* of order p . The non-singular elliptic curve $E(a,b)_p$ can be defined as:

$$y^2 \bmod p \equiv (x^3 + ax + b) \bmod p$$

where $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and $(4a^3 + 27b^2) \bmod p \neq 0$. The points on E/F_p defines an additive cyclic group $\mathbb{G}_s = \{(x, y) : x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_p^* \text{ and } (x, y) \in E(a, b)_p\} \cup \{\mathcal{O}\}$, where the identity element \mathcal{O} is called "point of infinity".

Assume that \mathbb{G}_s be a additive elliptic curve group of order p , and \mathbb{G}_t is a multiplicative group of order p . We define P be the generator of \mathbb{G}_s . A map $e : \mathbb{G}_s \times \mathbb{G}_s \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_t$ is a bilinear map that satisfies the following properties.

- **Bilinearity:** $\forall a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and $\forall P \in \mathbb{G}_s$: $e(aP, bP) = e(P, P)^{ab}$.
- **Non-degeneracy:** $\forall P \in \mathbb{G}_s$, $e(P, P) \neq 1_t$, where 1_t is the identity element of \mathbb{G}_t .
- **Computability:** There must exist a polynomial time-bounded algorithm that can easily commute $\hat{e}(P, Q)$, $\forall P \in \mathbb{G}_s$.

B. Computational Hard Problems

This subsection exhibits the computational hard problems and their assumption. These are laid below:

- **Negligible function:** Given t , $\varepsilon(t)$ is said to a negligible function if, $\varepsilon(t) \leq \frac{1}{t^v} \quad \forall v > 0, \exists t_0$ such that $\forall t \geq t_0$ [14].
- **Elliptic curve discrete logarithm (ECDL) problem:** The ECDL problem states that it is hard to compute $a \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ from a given $Q = aP$, where $P, Q \in \mathbb{G}_s$. The advantage of solving the ECDL problem by a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm \mathcal{A} is defined as: $Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{ECDL} = Pr[\mathcal{A}(P, Q) = a : P, Q \in \mathbb{G}_s; Q = aP, a \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*]$ [14].
- **ECDL assumption:** For any PPT algorithm \mathcal{A} , $Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{ECDL} \leq \varepsilon$ [14].
- **Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem:** The CDH problem states that it is hard to find abP from a given tuple (P, aP, bP) , where $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and $P \in \mathbb{G}_s$. The advantage of solving the CDH problem by a PPT algorithm \mathcal{A} is defined as: $Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{CDH} = Pr[\mathcal{A}(P, aP, bP) = abP : a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*, P \in \mathbb{G}_s]$ [15].
- **CDH assumption:** For any PPT algorithm \mathcal{A} , $Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{CDH} \leq \varepsilon$ [15].
- **Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem:** The BDH problem states that it is hard to find $\hat{e}(P, P)^{abc}$ from a given tuple (P, aP, bP, cP) , where $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and $P \in \mathbb{G}_s$. The advantage of solving the BDH problem by a PPT algorithm \mathcal{A} is defined as: $Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{BDH} = Pr[\mathcal{A}(P, aP, bP, cP) = \hat{e}((P, P)^{abc}) : a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*, P \in \mathbb{G}_s]$ [15].
- **BDH assumption:** For any PPT algorithm \mathcal{A} , $Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{BDH} \leq \varepsilon$ [15].

C. Forking Lemma [16]:

Let (G, Σ, V) be a generic digital signature scheme with security parameter k . Let \mathcal{T} be a PPT Turing Machine (TM) whose input only consists of public data. We denote by Q and R the number of queries that \mathcal{T} can ask to the random oracle and the number of queries that \mathcal{T} can ask to the signer. Assume that, within time bound t , \mathcal{T} produces, with probability $\varepsilon \geq \frac{10(R+1)(R+Q)}{2^k}$, a valid signature $(m, \sigma_1, h, \sigma_2)$. If the triples (σ_1, h, σ_2) can be simulated without knowing the secret key, with an indistinguishable distribution probability, then there is another machine which has control over \mathcal{T} replacing interaction with the signer by simulation and produces

two valid signatures $(m, \sigma_1, h, \sigma_2)$ and $(m, \sigma_1, h', \sigma_2')$ such that $h \neq h'$, in expected time $T' \leq \frac{120686QT}{\epsilon}$.

IV. PROPOSED ID-CPPA-CBA SCHEME

In this section, we have described the proposed identity-based conditional privacy-preserving authentication and clustering-based batch verification (ID-CPPA-CBA) scheme for VANETs. In our ID-CPPA-CBA scheme, we have used the IBS scheme proposed by Choon and Cheon [17]. In our ID-CPPA-CBA protocol, three entities are involved, (i) a TA, (ii) a vehicle V_i (OBU_i is attached with V_i), and (iii) a Road-Side-Units RSU_j . The OBU_i has memory to hold some secret information, a clock for synchronization and a battery. The OBU_i of V_i signs on all outgoing messages. The access to OBU_i should be restricted to the driver of V_i only. The TA stores all the required information of V_i in OBU_i during the registration process. The list of notations used in this paper is listed in Table ?? . Our ID-CPPA-CBA consists of the following phases.

Draw a Table here to list the notations used in this paper..

A. Setup phase

In this phase, the TA does the followings:

- (1). Choose an elliptic curve additive cyclic group \mathbb{G}_s of prime order p and a multiplicative cyclic group \mathbb{G}_t of same order.
- (2). Choose a generator P of \mathbb{G}_s with order p , and a bilinear pairing $e : \mathbb{G}_s \times \mathbb{G}_s \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_t$.
- (3). Choose $s \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, and $P_{pub} = s \cdot P$ as the master secret key and public key of TA.
- (4). $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, and $T_{pub} = \alpha \cdot P$ as the private key and public key of TRA.
- (5). Choose two cryptographic one-way hash functions $H_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_s$ and $H_2 : \{0, 1\}^* \times \mathbb{G}_s \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$.
- (6). Publish the system's parameters $\Gamma = \{\mathbb{G}_s, \mathbb{G}_t, p, e, P, T_{pub}, P_{pub}, H_1(\cdot), H_2(\cdot)\}$.

These are loaded onto the tamper proof OBU of the vehicle.

B. Private Key Extraction

In this phase, a vehicle V_i will registered with the real identity RID_i to the TRA. This phase can be described as follows:

- (1). V_i sends RID_i to TRA a trusted channel. TRA computes the public key of V_i as $PID_i = H_1(RID_i || \alpha || ET_i)$, where ET_i is the validity period for PID_i . **This way you cannot calculate the public key PID_i . A Public key can be computed publicly. But in this case, PID_i cannot be computed publicly. So you are violating the concept of identity-based cryptography.**
- (2). TRA delivers (PID_i, ET_i) to TA over any public channel.
- (3). TA computes the private key of V_i as $XID_i = s \cdot PID_i$ and sends (PID_i, XID_i) to V_i over a trusted channel.

C. Message Signing

- (1). V_i selects a number $r_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ at random.
- (2). V_i chooses a message m_i , and calculates $h_i = H_2(m_i || tt_i || U_i)$ and $U_i = r_i \cdot PID_i$, where tt_i is the current timestamp. It is used to discover the freshness of signed message packet.
- (3). V_i computes $V_i = (r_i + h_i) \cdot XID_i$
- (4). V_i sends $\langle \sigma_i, m_i, PID_i \rangle$ to the nearby RSU_j , where $\sigma_i = (U_i, V_i, tt_i)$ is a signature on $m_i || tt_i$ for PID_i

D. Message Verification

- 1) Check whether tt_i lies in ET_i i.e the time limit for the ID hasn't expired.
- 2) Compute $h_i = H_2(m_i, tt_i, U_i)$ for packet
- 3) Verify whether the following condition holds or not.

$$e(V_i, P) = e(h_i \cdot PID_i + U_i, P_{pub})$$

If it holds accept message signature.

E. Batch Verification

- 1) Discard all the frames for which tt_i doesn't lie in ET_i
- 2) Compute $h_i = H_2(m_i, tt_i, U_i)$ for each packet
- 3) Accept the entire batch if this holds

$$e\left(\sum_{i=1}^n V_i, P\right) = e\left(\sum_{i=1}^n [h_i \cdot PID_i + U_i], P_{pub}\right)$$

F. Cluster Verification

We now present a variation on the batch verification scheme. Our approach would bring in better time and space efficiency for verification functions. Please note, that appropriate changes would have to be made in current VANET protocol for the *V-to-V communication* and the respective OBUs for this protocol to work. In this verification scheme we will form clusters amongst any k vehicles, close to one another, in a batch of n vehicles near to any particular RSU. The RSU can be used to assign the clusters to vehicles in the batch.

- **Leader node:** In every cluster we have a leader node which communicates with the nearest RSU. Its function is to take in message packets from the member nodes.
- **Member node:** Rest of the nodes in the cluster are called Member nodes. They transmit their respective packets over to the Leader node.

Clustering

Let there be a total of M clusters, each of size k . Then, leader node of the cluster collects the message packets from the members nodes and calculates the following (except his own packet) for cluster j :

- 1) Check if tt_i lies within ET_i , else drop the packet.
- 2) Leader node computes:

$$h_i = H_2(M_i, tt_i, U_i), \quad V_j^m = \sum_{i=1}^{k-1} V_i,$$




Figure 2: Cluster-1 with Leader L_1 and member nodes M_1 to M_4 . Same goes for Cluster-2.

$$X_j^m = \sum_{i=1}^{k-1} h_i \cdot PID_i \text{ and } U_j^m = \sum_{i=1}^{k-1} U_i$$

These values are calculated for all member nodes only, i.e., $k-1$ values.

- 3) Then *Leader node* signs and sends over these values of V_j^m , X_j^m and U_j^m with its own message, i.e.,

$$\langle V_j^m, X_j^m, U_j^m, M_j, \sigma_j^l, PID_j^l \rangle$$

where,

$\sigma_j^l = (V_j^l, U_j^l, tt_j^l)$ is signature for leader of cluster j .

$M_j = (M_1, M_2, M_3, \dots, M_k)$ is the tuple containing all message strings of *Member nodes* and *Leader node*

$PID_j^l \rightarrow PID$ for leader of cluster j

Verification

Then RSU takes these tuples $\langle V_i^m, X_i^m, U_i^m, M_i, \sigma_i^l, PID_i^l \rangle$ from leaders of each of M clusters and computes:

$$h_i^l = H_2(M_i^l, tt_i^l, U_i^l)$$

M_i^l (Message string for leader) should be in M_j tuple sent by each cluster. RSU accepts the message strings if this equation holds:

$$e \left(\sum_{i=1}^M [V_i^m + V_i^l], P \right) = e \left(\sum_{i=1}^M [h_i^l \cdot PID_i^l + X_i^m + U_i^l + U_i^m], P_{pub} \right)$$

Clustering (Risk-mode)

Another approach can be taken when sending over the signature from *Leadernode* to RSUs. Leader collects the packets (σ_i, M_i, PID_i) from Member nodes and computes:

$h_i = H_2(m_i, tt_i, U_i)$. Accept the messages if equation holds

$$e \left(\sum_{i=1}^{k-1} V_i, P \right) = e \left(\sum_{i=1}^{k-1} [h_i \cdot PID_i + U_i], P_{pub} \right)$$

If the equation holds, it collects the message packet M_i of each Member node and sends over $M_j = (M_1, M_2, \dots, M_k)$ with just its signature.

In short, Leader node does the message verification step for all the Member nodes and then for its own authentication sends its signature to RSU with M_j , i.e., Leader sends $\langle PID_j^l, \sigma_j^l, M_j \rangle$

to RSU for verification and if it holds all the messages are accepted.

The issue with this approach is that there's no direct link between Member nodes and the RSU. The RSU accepts the messages of the entire cluster as long as Leader's signature is valid.

Thus, if there's a malicious user in the cluster as a Member node and if it colludes with the Leader then it should be able to deliver its message easily over to RSU.

However this approach gives even better time and space efficiency, so this approach can be used in cases when the Identity of Leader node is vetted by the TAs. For example, if the Leader node is a vehicle related to Government agencies like Police, Hospital services etc. And we know for sure that the Leader node won't collude with members.

G. Binary Search

In case when the batch verification equation doesn't hold means that a signature has been tampered with, or a replay attack (using an ID that has expired), or any other form of attack on the system. We need to start an individual verification process to find out the invalid signature.




Figure 3: Binary Search for malicious user.

We propose an idea to bring down this $O(n)$ complexity of individual search for n -vehicles.

V. RHA SCHEME : RSU-to-Vehicle

We remove the *Pseudo-ID* generation part, rest is the same as Vehicle-to-RSU in our scheme.

A. Private Key Extraction

- 1) PKG computes the private key $\rightarrow XID_R = s \cdot RID_R$, given RID_R is the real-ID of a RSU and s is the master-secret key for PKG.
- 2) PKG sends XID_R to vehicle over a trusted network. Then RSU stores XID_R corresponding to RID_R .

B. Message Signing

- 1) Vehicle uses RID_R from storage and a random $r_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q$
- 2) Vehicle calculates $h_i = H_2(m_i, tt_i, U_R)$ and $U_R = r_i \cdot RID_R$
- 3) Vehicle computes $V_R = (r_i + h_i) \cdot XID_R$
- 4) Vehicle calculates signature $\sigma_i = (U_R, V_R, tt_i)$
- 5) Vehicle sends a tuple of $\langle \sigma_i, m_i, RID_R \rangle$ to the RSU

C. Message Verification

- 1) Check whether tt_i lies in ET_i i.e the time limit for the ID hasn't expired.
- 2) Compute $h_i = H_2(m_i, tt_i, U_R)$ for packet
- 3) Verify whether the following condition holds or not.

$$e(V_R, P) = e(h_i \cdot RID_R + U_R, P_{pub})$$

If it holds accept message signature.

D. Batch Verification

- 1) Discard all the frames for which tt_i doesn't lie in ET_i
- 2) Compute $h_i = H_2(m_i, tt_i, U_R)$ for each packet
- 3) Accept the entire batch if this holds

$$e\left(\sum_{i=1}^n V_R, P\right) = e\left(\sum_{i=1}^n [h_i \cdot RID_R + U_R], P_{pub}\right)$$

VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS

A. Source Authentication and Message Integrity

We show that our scheme is *euf-cma* (existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen-message attack) in the random oracle model under *CDH assumption*.

Proof : Suppose A is a forger who breaks our scheme. Algorithm B is given a ECDLP instance $(P, XID \cdot P)$. Let Q and R be the number of queries that an algorithm A can ask the random oracle and the number of queries that A can ask to sign the oracle, respectively. By using A we will construct an algorithm B that breaks ECDLP and outputs XID given $(P, XID \cdot P)$ within a time period T which is expected to be less than $120686 \cdot QT/\epsilon$, if $\epsilon \geq 10(R+1)(R+Q)/q$. B performs the following simulation by interacting with A . At anytime, A can query the random oracles H_1 and H_2 , Extract, ID-Sign Oracle.

Setup : Algorithm B sets $P_{pub} = sP$ and starts by giving A the system parameters $Params$, including $\langle P, P_{pub} \rangle$.

H_1 and H_2 queries : To respond to H_1 queries (H_2 queries), B maintains a list of tuples $(RID, ET, PID) ((M, U, h))$. We refer to this list as the H_1 -list (H_2 -list). When A queries the oracle H_1 (H_2) at $(RID, ET) ((M, U))$, B responds as follows.

- 1) If the query $(RID, ET) ((M, U))$ already appears on the H_1 -list (H_2 -list) in a tuple $(RID, ET, PID) ((M, U, h))$ then B responds with $H_1(RID, ET) = PID \in \mathbb{G}_1$ ($H_2(M, U) = h \in \mathbb{Z}_q$)
- 2) Otherwise, B picks a random $PID \in \mathbb{G}_1$ ($h \in \mathbb{Z}_q$), adds tuple $(RID, ET, PID) ((M, U, h))$ to the H_1 -list (H_2 -list) and responds to A with $H_1(RID, ET) = PID$ ($H_2(M, U) = h$)

Extract (Pseudo-ID/Private Key) query : When A queries a private key corresponding to RID_i . Then B responds to A with (PID, XID) where, $XID = s \cdot PID$ and stores (RID, PID, XID) to the Ext-list.

At any time, A can query the signing oracle. To answer these queries B does the following.

Sign Queries : When A makes an ID-sign query on M for RID , B finds (RID, PID, XID) from the ext-list.

B computes $h = H_2(M, tt_i, U) \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ where $U = r \cdot PID$ and $V = (r+h) \cdot XID$, for a random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q$

Then, $\sigma = (U, V, tt)$ is a valid signature on M , since it satisfies $e(h \cdot PID + U, P_{pub}) = e((r+h) \cdot XID, P) = e(V, P)$

- If (RID, PID, XID) already appears on the Ext-list, then B can compute a signature σ by performing the signing algorithm.
- Otherwise, B requests an extract-query to obtain the corresponding private key XID . Then, B computes a signature σ on M for PID using XID , responds to A with σ and stores (RID, PID, XID) to Ext-list.

Note that A 's view is identical to its view in the real attack.

Output : By forking lemma, after replaying A with the same random tape, B obtains two valid signatures $\sigma = (M^*, h, U, V)$ and $\sigma' = (M^*, h^*, U, V^*)$ within a polynomial time, where $V = (r+h) \cdot XID$, $V^* = (r+h^*) \cdot XID$. Then B computes

$$\frac{h^*V - hV^*}{r \cdot (h^* - h)} = XID \quad (1)$$

We can achieve XID as solution to the ECDLP instance, within an expected time less than $120686 \cdot QT/\epsilon$, if $\epsilon \geq 10(R+1)(R+Q)/q$.

B. Resistance to replay attack

A current timestamp tt_i is attached to messages in our scheme $h_i = H_2(m_i, tt_i, U_i)$.

ET_i is the validity period for a Pseudo-ID of a vehicle. We check if tt_i lies within ET_i , in which case we accept the message. Otherwise, we drop it.

C. Traceability

Given a pseudo-ID PID in a signed message, the TRA with the master secret α for traceability can trace the real identity of a vehicle by computing PID .

D. Role Separation

Both TA, \tilde{A} (TRA and PKG) have their separate role assigned. TRA generates Pseudo-IDs for vehicles and PKG gives Private keys for these corresponding IDs. Only TRA with tracing secret key α can trace the RID (Real Identity of Vehicle). This role separation helps making sure there, \tilde{A} no concentration of power (leads to single point of failure).

E. Short Term Linkability

A malicious user may try to act as different vehicles, known as Sybil [18] attack, and can be countered by Short-term linkability. Unless the Pseudo-ID for a vehicle expires (i.e. ET, validity period, is over), all the message signed with the same PID can be recognised by RSUs. This doesn't lead to

invasion of privacy but these messages from the malicious user can be dropped. So if a vehicles transmits multiples messages within a time frame of ET the nearest RSU will recognise this behaviour and drop these messages from its buffer.

F. Long term unlinkability

In our scheme, different messages are signed by different Pseudo-IDs. A pseudo-ID expires after ET (its validity period) passes. So, if the same vehicle sends over another message packet after ET time, then it won't be possible for any adversary to find out the RID(real ID) of the vehicle from PID (Pseudo-ID).

VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

A. Time Analysis




Figure 4: Comparison study of batch verification time for various schemes




Figure 5: Time for Binary Search. Worst time complexity being $1 + 2\log_2(n)[f(n)]$

For our scheme, we have used the MIRACL library and chosen a 160-bit elliptic curve for our scheme. All performance results have been calculated by using that library on our specific system. In case of time analysis, we divide the scheme into individual operations and calculate the time for each operation. The program is run for 10 seconds (10,000 ms) and in that time the number of iterations are recorded for every operation and from that we obtain the time. For comparison purposes, we categorize the operations into mainly 6 parts:

- 1) the execution time of a scalar multiplication operation $x \cdot P$, related to the bilinear pairing, where $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and $P \in \mathbb{G}_1$ (33,046 iterations)
 $T_{mp} = 0.30ms$
- 2) The execution time for point addition of 2 scalar multiplication of 2 points on the curve (Ex. $x \cdot P + y \cdot Q$, where x and y are scalars and $P, Q \in \mathbb{G}_1$) (27,023 iterations)
 $T_{pa-mp} = 0.37ms$
- 3) The execution time of a bilinear pairing operation $e(S, T)$, where $S, T \in \mathbb{G}_1$ (3,341 iterations)
 $T_{bp} = 2.99ms$
- 4) The execution time of a hash function (T_{hf}). Most standard cryptography hash functions take negligible time (ex. SHA-1), unless it is MaptoPoint Hash function but we will consider it as 0.0001 ms.
- 5) Execution time of a map-to-point hash function (142386 iterations)
 $T_{mp} = 0.07ms$
- 6) The execution time of a small-scale multiplication operation $v_i \cdot P$ related to the bilinear pairing where $P \in \mathbb{G}_1$, v_i is a small random integer in $[1, 2^t]$ and t is a small integer (94,335 iterations)
 $T_{mp-s} = 0.106 ms$

All these times are calculated in Intel Core i5-7200U CPU @2.5 GHz up to 2.7 GHz, 8 GB RAM and 64-bit OS and x64 based processor (Rohan's system). We draw comparison with three other VANET schemes (Shim [9], Zhang et al. [12] and Bayat et al. [11]) based on bilinear pairings in order to understand how much of an improvement our scheme is in terms of time efficiency.

Type ID	Message ID	Payload (Message)	Timestamp	Signature	Pseudo-ID
1 byte	1 byte	67 bytes	4 bytes	60 bytes	41 bytes

Figure 6: Study of Space taken by various schemes

B. Communication overhead

The communication overhead of the proposed scheme is discussed as follows. In order to reduce signature size, Shim [9] developed a method to reduce the size of a point $Q = (x, y)$ if an OBU or an RSU can send this point to a well-designed destination, i.e., another RSU or OBU. The signature size reduction method is that an OBU or an RSU only sends the x-coordinate of Q and the designed destination can learn the y-coordinate by computing the square root. Since the size of the signature is reduced by applying Shim's method, the total communication cost of CPAS is reduced. Table above shows the format of the signed message adopted in our scheme. Based on the same signature size reduction method, since our scheme uses 160-bit subgroup Elliptic Curve instead of a 159-bit subgroup of the MNT curve with an embedding degree of 6 is used in Shim's scheme, the total size of one signed message is $160 + 160 + 160 + 3 = 483$ bits

Table I: Time Analysis

Scheme	Pseudo ID generation/ Private Key Generation	Message Signing	Message Verification	Batch Verification
<i>RHA</i> (Our scheme)	$T_{mp} + T_{hf} =$ 0.3001 ms	$2 * T_{mp} + T_{hf} =$ 0.6001 ms	$T_{hf} + T_{mp} +$ $T_{pa-mp} + 2 * T_{bp}$ $= 5.2501$ ms	$n * T_{hf} + n * T_{mp}$ $+ (3n - 2) * T_{pa-mp} + 2 * T_{bp}$
Shim's Scheme (<i>CPAS</i>) [9]	$4 * T_{mp} + 2 * T_{hf} =$ 1.2002 ms	$T_{mp} + T_{pa-mp} + T_{hf} =$ 0.6701 ms	N/A	$2n * T_{hf} + (n+1) * T_{mp} +$ $(3n-3) * T_{pa-mp} + 3 * T_{bp}$
Zhang et al., Scheme [12]	$3 * T_{mp} + T_{pa-mp} + 2 * T_{hf} =$ 1.2702 ms	$3 * T_{mp} + T_{mp} + T_{pa-mp}$ $+ 2 * T_{hf} =$ 1.3402 ms	$2 * T_{hf} + T_{pa-mp}$ $+ 2 * T_{mp} + 3 * T_{bp}$ $= 9.9402$ ms	$3 * T_{bp} +$ $(n+1) * T_{mp} +$ $(3n-2) * T_{pa-mp} +$ $3n * T_{hf}$
Bayat et al., Scheme [11]	$3 * T_{mp} + T_{pa-mp} + T_{hf} =$ 1.2701 ms	$2 * T_{mp} + T_{pa-mp} + T_{hf} + T_{mp} =$ 1.0401 ms	$3 * T_{bp} + T_{pa-mp}$ $+ T_{hf} + T_{mp} =$ 9.4101 ms	$3 * T_{bp} + (3n-3) * T_{pa-mp} +$ $n * T_{hf} + n * T_{mp}$

= 60.375 bytes. Then, the total size of pseudo ID is $160 + 160 + 2 + 4 = 326$ bits = 40.75 bytes, where the timestamp field is set as 4 bytes. Hence, the total message size from vehicle (OBU) to RSU in the proposed authentication scheme is only 174 bytes based on the signed message format shown in the table above. If the size reduction method proposed by Shim [9] is adopted, our proposed scheme has the same signature size as CPAS. In summary, the proposed scheme and CPAS require less communication bandwidth to transmit signed messages by applying the signature size reduction method and corresponding message format when comparing with signed messages using current IEEE Trial-Use standard format for VANET security (which takes a total of 250 bytes per signed message).

VIII. CONCLUSION

We have proposed a secure conditional privacy-preserving authentication scheme using a new IBS scheme with the one of the fastest batch verification process for secure V-to-I communications in VANETs. The scheme achieves conditional privacy preservation in which each message launched by a vehicle has been mapped to a distinct pseudo-ID and a TRA can always retrieve the real identity of a vehicle from any pseudo-ID.

In the scheme, an RSU can simultaneously verify multiple received signatures such that the total verification time can be considerably reduced. We have also proposed two methods to significantly increase the efficiency of batch verification. It is common for all VANET schemes to include batch verification but no one considers that it is a waste to discard all the messages in the batch just because one of the message signatures doesn't check out. Ours is the first scheme in that regard to propose a less wasteful (in terms of data) solution to fix this.

Although our scheme has covered and solved most of the common attacks in networks, there is still room for improvement. A recently emerging form of attack is DDOS (Distributed Denial of Service), which is when the hackers decide to jam the network with unnecessary data packets so legitimate users cannot use the network to communicate. It is done in a distributed manner, i.e. thousands of computer systems run by bots are involved in such an attack and so it is impossible to identify who is a legitimate user and who is a malicious user.

There are a few solutions to solve this problem although not implemented in our scheme. One, we could set up a DDOS challenger similar to an Adversary challenger which will ask every user and so even the botnet to solve few puzzles only a human can solve and hence they will be caught. Second, we could use machine learning algorithms to monitor the number of messages being sent from a vehicle and try to find the botnet systems in that way and stop their access. Third, and possibly the surest way to stop these botnets is the IP Reputation. DDOS attacks happen in every server every network and they are monitored and their IP's are noted so in future no other server is affected by it. So, we simply block all the IP's that have a bad IP reputation. In terms of performance, our scheme is on par and better than some of the recently developed schemes in VANET authentication in all three respects of time, space and security analysis.

In terms of what some additional problems that remain to be solved in the future is the localised databases of the RSUs. The RSU whether a vehicle is registered and legitimate but when the vehicle crosses the range of coverage of that particular RSU and heads into the territory of an RSU, it doesn't recognize it. The obvious solution would be to have a common database of all the vehicles registered under the VANET scheme, and load that database onto every RSU, which is a immense waste of space. A better solution to this remains to be discovered in the future.

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