


SSRF DoS Relaying and a bit more...

Alexander Bolshev
@dark_k3y



15th DefCon Russia meeting

March 27, 2013

```
; cat /dev/user
```




Alexander Bolshev aka @dark_k3y

- IS auditor @ Digital Security
- Ph.D.
- just another man with somecolorhat




Back to 199x: SYN- and connect- DoS attacks

Half-opened DoS



TCP only resources exhaustion,
easy to defend

Full-opened DoS



TCP **and service** resource
exhaustion, much harder to defend

Full-opened connection DoS


- Full-opened connection DoS is much more effective against target.

...but!

- Full-opened connection DoS with data exchange requires much more resources on attacker host.
- Full-opened connection DoS cannot be spoofed (in general case).



All you know what is SSRF(hopefully).



Classic SSRF attack scheme

Idea!

We can relay
connections
with SSRF



We can relay
full-opened
DoS with it!

But you can't just simply relay it... ¹ ²



You can't just simply DoS with pure SSRF.

¹[|||||], but I couldn't resist to place this pic

²*sometiMe\$* you can...

You can't just simply relay it... Why?

Full-opened DoS attack with pure SSRF will be ineffective cos of:

- You should hold opened connection with the relay, while relay holds connection with the victim.
- Most protocols drops connection when you're using invalid format (HTTP && others).
- You're dependant on your host capacity, not on relay host capacity.




But we have FTP!

Almost all "SSRF-enabled" technologies support FTP URI scheme. The FTP for relaying is interesting cos of:

- FTP has two connections between client and server: **control** and **data**.
- While control connection may be closed, data connection will exists till the end of "transaction" or timeout.
- FTP passive mode allow to exact specific remote port(!) and host (!!) for data connection.

FTP passive connection scheme



Difference between PASV and EPSV

PASV:

- old version of FTP, allows to establish control connection to any host/port.

EPSV:


- modern versions of FTP, allows to establish control connection only to specific FTP server port.

So we can't use PASV anymore?

We just can say that we didn't support it!

```
220 i58 FTP server ready.  
USER anonymous  
331 Guest login ok, send your email address as password.  
PASS Java1.6.0_01@  
230 Guest login ok, access restrictions apply.  
TYPE I  
200 Type set to I.  
EPSV ALL  
500 Command not implemented, superfluous at this site.  
PASV  
227 Entering Passive Mode (vic,tim,server,ip,0,80).  
RETR doc  
150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for 'doc' (99999 bytes).
```

Attack scheme



Attack inside wireshark

| | | | | |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----|-----|-----------------------------------------------------|
| 192.168.200.138 | 192.168.200.128 | FTP | 76 | Request: EPSV ALL |
| 192.168.200.128 | 192.168.200.138 | FTP | 121 | Response: 500 Command not implemented, superfluous |
| 192.168.200.138 | 192.168.200.128 | FTP | 72 | Request: PASV |
| 192.168.200.128 | 192.168.200.138 | FTP | 110 | Response: 227 Entering Passive Mode (46,4, ,0,80 |
| 192.168.200.138 | 46.4. | TCP | 74 | 36659 > http [SYN] Seq=0 Win=14600 Len=0 MSS=1460 S |
| 192.168.200.138 | 192.168.200.128 | TCP | 66 | 46376 > ftp [ACK] Seq=61 Ack=251 Win=14720 Len=0 TS |
| 46.4. | 192.168.200.138 | TCP | 60 | http > 36659 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0 |
| 192.168.200.138 | 46.4. | TCP | 54 | 36659 > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=14600 Len=0 |
| 192.168.200.138 | 192.168.200.128 | FTP | 77 | Request: RETR file |
| 192.168.200.128 | 192.168.200.138 | FTP | 134 | Response: 150 Opening BINARY mode data connection f |
| 192.168.200.128 | 192.168.200.138 | TCP | 66 | ftp > 46376 [FIN, ACK] Seq=319 Ack=72 Win=64169 Len |

Attacking HTTP server on remote host (46.4.x.x) with 192.168.200.138 relay using Fake FTP on 192.168.200.128.

Knowing technology "features" makes you stronger

| Technology | Ability to relay DoS with FTP |
|-------------------|-------------------------------|
| PHP | Yes ¹ |
| cURL | Yes |
| LWP | Yes ¹ |
| Java \leq 1.6.x | Yes ¹ |
| Java 1.7.x | Partially ^{1 2} |
| ASP.Net | No ³ |
| Python | Yes |

¹ DoS with FTP control connection available

² only supports data connections to localhost and FTP server address.

³ but as always has a "killer feature" ...

Java trying to defend: Fail!

In Java 1.7.x developers tried to mitigate this "feature" by disabling data connections to any other hosts except FTP server.

But they forgot to disable data connections to localhost!



ASP.Net: Much More FAIL.

ASP.Net don't support PASV command. Only EPSV.

..but..!

... when an XXE injection is executed, control FTP connection to the remote host is established **in any case**. This connection is **sustained** after the termination of the SSRF attack connection.



Possible mitigations

On administrators side:

- Disable ALL non-established outgoing TCP packets from host (on ALL ports, even on TCP). Hard to do, more problems, much pain. ☹️

On developers side:

- Don't make mistakes that lead to SSRF. (cap is laughing here)

On vendors side:

- Disable PASV command **at all** (because there are no more FTP servers that don't support EPSV). But to it in *another* way than Oracle and Microsoft.

Back to 199x again: other funny stuff (not mine)

There're more techniques that exploits the client side of SSRF:

- libcurl SASL buffer overflow vulnerability (by Volema, see CVE-2013-0249) ¹
- port scanning like FTP BOUNCE (hello, Fydor!) but with SSRF (several whitepapers on the internet) and more (google for Vladimir Vorontsov "SSRF Bible cheatsheet")

¹http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20130206.html

More fun – some bombs and ldap freeze

Another cool stuff to do:

- gzip bombs in PHP and LWP (PHP didn't support gzip-compression in HTTP, **but...** FAIL!
compress.zlib://http:// and zlib://http:// are your friends).
- Have you ever tried to search the base DN with a filter of `userid=*` (or similar) with a SORT on userid on LDAP server with 10k users? ⇒ DoS on client side and freeze on server side: **double strike!**

SSRF DoS Relaying article:

- <http://habrahabr.ru/company/dsec/blog/171549/>
[RUS]

; thanksgiving

Thanks to:

- Alexander Polyakov aka @sh2kerr for the idea
- Vladimir Vorontsov aka @d0znpp for the SSRF Bible cheatsheet
- Fedor Savelyev aka alouette for some good thoughts about PHP
- defcon 7812 :)

Questions?