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2       THE UNITED NATIONS WITH RANK OF AMBASSADOR AND U.S.  
3       REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL  
4                                   AND  
5       U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO SESSIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
6       GENERAL ASSEMBLY DURING HIS TENURE OF SERVICE AS U.S.  
7       REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

8  
9                                   Monday, April 11, 2005

10  
11                                  U.S. Senate  
12                                  Committee on Foreign Relations  
13                                  Washington, D.C.

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15       The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in  
16       Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G.  
17       Lugar, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

18       Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Coleman,  
19       Alexander, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer,  
20       Nelson, and Obama.

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1           OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S.  
2           SENATOR FROM INDIANA

3           The Chairman: This hearing of the Senate Foreign  
4           Relations Committee is called to order.

5           The Foreign Relations Committee meets today to consider  
6           President George W. Bush's nomination of John Bolton to be  
7           United States Ambassador to the United Nations. Mr. Bolton  
8           has served the last four years as the Under Secretary of  
9           State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs.  
10          In this capacity, he has played an important role in several  
11          of the Bush Administration's most notable diplomatic  
12          successes, including the President's proliferation security  
13          initiative, the Moscow Treaty, the G8 Global Partnership  
14          Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,  
15          and the opening of Libya's WMD programs.

16          Secretary Bolton also served for four years in the  
17          Administration of George H.W. Bush, as the Assistant  
18          Secretary of State for International Organizations. In this  
19          position, he was heavily involved in matters related to the  
20          United Nations, including United Nations financing and  
21          reform proposals. He also assisted former Secretary of  
22          State James Baker in his role as the Secretary General's  
23          personal envoy for the Western Sahara.

24          In announcing this nomination, Secretary of State  
25          Condoleezza Rice stated, and I quote, "John Bolton is

1 personally committed to the future success of the United  
2 Nations, and he will be a strong voice for reform at a time  
3 when the United Nations has begun to reform itself to help  
4 meet the challenging agenda before the international  
5 community," end of quote from Dr. Rice.

6 Perhaps no organization is so frequently oversimplified  
7 by both its proponents and its detractors as the United  
8 Nations. The United Nations is not a monolithic entity  
9 controlled by a Secretary General; rather, it's a complex  
10 collection of agencies, programs, diplomatic venues,  
11 traditions, and agreements that depend on the actions of the  
12 individual member states. As such, the various parts of the  
13 U.N. often work independently from one another with little  
14 coordination or oversight.

15 The U.N. has produced great accomplishments, even as  
16 some of its structures have experienced episodes of  
17 corruption, mismanagement, contentiousness, or timidity.  
18 Some agencies and programs, like the World Health  
19 Organization, the World Food Program, and UNICEF, have a  
20 proven record of achievement and are trusted by people and  
21 nations around the world. Other endeavors, like the Oil-  
22 for-Food Program or the U.N. Commission on Human Rights,  
23 have been gravely flawed and suffer from severe  
24 organizational deficiencies.

25 Foreign Relations Committee held the first

1 congressional hearing on the U.N.'s Oil-for-Food scandal a  
2 year ago this month. At that hearing, I said, and I quote,  
3 "Billions of dollars that should have been spent on  
4 humanitarian needs in Iraq were siphoned off by Saddam  
5 Hussein's regime through a system of surcharges, bribes, and  
6 kickbacks. This corruption was not solely a product of  
7 Saddam Hussein's machination; he depended upon members of  
8 the U.N. Security Council who were willing to be complicit  
9 in his activities, and they needed U.N. officials and  
10 contractors who were dishonest, inattentive, or willing to  
11 make damaging compromises in pursuit of a compassionate  
12 mission," end of quote.

13 During the last year, we have learned much more about  
14 the extent of that corruption and mismanagement involved,  
15 and this knowledge has supported the case for reform.

16 United Nations reform is not a new issue. The  
17 structure and role of the United Nations has been debated in  
18 our country almost continuously since the U.N. was  
19 established, in 1945. But in 2005 we may have a unique  
20 opportunity to improve the operations of the U.N. The  
21 revelations of the Oil-for-Food scandal and the urgency of  
22 strengthening global cooperation to address terrorism, the  
23 AIDS crisis, nuclear proliferation, and many other  
24 international problems have created momentum in favor of  
25 constructive reforms at the U.N.

1           Secretary General Annan has proposed a substantial  
2 reform plan that will provide a platform for further reform  
3 initiatives and discussion. The United States must be a  
4 leader in the effort to improve the United Nations,  
5 particularly its accountability. At a time when the United  
6 Nations is appealing for greater international help in Iraq,  
7 in Afghanistan, in trouble spots around the world, the  
8 diminishment of U.N. credibility because of scandal reduces  
9 U.S. options and increases our burdens.

10          Secretary Bolton has thought a great deal about this  
11 subject, and we are anxious to listen to his ideas for  
12 reform, as well as his evaluation of the Secretary General's  
13 plan. We want to know what specific parts of that plan  
14 deserve United States support. Beyond substantive  
15 evaluation, we want to know how the nominee intends to  
16 pursue these reform ideas. What strategy does he propose  
17 for making constructive changes a reality? How will he  
18 apply the substantial experience in this area?

19          Even as reform must be a priority, the world will not  
20 stop while we attempt to improve the structures of the U.N.  
21 The next U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. must pursue reform  
22 without diminishing the effectiveness of its core diplomatic  
23 mission; namely, securing greater international support for  
24 the national-security and foreign-policy objectives of the  
25 United States.

1           During the last several months, President Bush and  
2           Secretary Rice have undertaken important missions designed  
3           to reinvigorate relations with allies and partners. This is  
4           an urgent national-security imperative that cannot be  
5           neglected by the next ambassador to the U.N. The United  
6           States does not possess infinite financial and military  
7           resources. We need help to advance security, democracy, and  
8           human rights. This fact should not preclude us from taking  
9           unilateral action when it is in our interest, but it does  
10          require that we be persistent and imaginative in our  
11          pursuits of international support.

12          The nomination of Secretary Bolton to be Ambassador to  
13          the United Nations has generated public debate on U.S.  
14          policies toward the United Nations and on the degree to  
15          which the United States should embrace multilateralism. In  
16          this context, opponents of Mr. Bolton have criticized some  
17          statements of the nominee as abrasive, confrontational, and  
18          insensitive. Some of these same statements have been  
19          celebrated by supporters of the nominee as demonstrating a  
20          tough-minded, refreshingly blunt approach to diplomacy. But  
21          in the diplomatic world, neither bluntness nor rhetorical  
22          sensitivity is a virtue, in itself. There are times when  
23          blunt talk serves a policy purpose. Other times, it does  
24          not.

25          When President Ronald Reagan stood before the

1 Brandenburg Gate in 1987 and said, "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down  
2 that wall," blunt speech was serving a carefully planned  
3 diplomatic purpose. It reflected broader themes of  
4 democracy that had been nurtured for years by the Reagan  
5 Administration. It reaffirmed to Germany, on both sides of  
6 the wall, the United States would have staying power in  
7 Europe. It underscored to the Kremlin, in a personal,  
8 tangible way, that the United States and its allies were  
9 intent on achieving the peaceful transformation of Eastern  
10 Europe.

11 Blunt as it was, there was nothing gratuitous about  
12 President Reagan's statement. Diplomatic speech by any  
13 high-ranking Administration official has policy  
14 consequences. It should never be undertaken simply to score  
15 international debating points, to appeal to segments of the  
16 U.S. public opinion, or to validate a personal point of  
17 view.

18 As President John Kennedy once said, and I quote, "The  
19 purpose of foreign policy is not to provide an outlet for  
20 our own sentiments of hope or indignation; it is to shape  
21 real events in a real world," end of quote.

22 I believe that diplomats serving under the President  
23 and Secretary of State can apply a basic three-part test to  
24 almost anything they utter in a diplomatic context. First,  
25 is the statement true? Second, is the statement consistent



1 with the policies and directives of the President and the  
2 Secretary of State? And, third, is there a rational  
3 expectation that the statement will advance or support U.S.  
4 interests?

5 It is particularly important that the statements of our  
6 ambassadors to the U.N. meet this test, because, more so  
7 than any other American ambassadors, they are perceived as  
8 speaking directly for the President of the United States.

9 President Bush has selected John Bolton, a nominee of  
10 experience and accomplishment, to be his spokesman and  
11 representative at the United Nations. Given the importance  
12 of the position, it is vital that we act both expeditiously  
13 and thoroughly in evaluating the nominee. We look forward  
14 to hearing the nominee's insights and learning how he will  
15 work on behalf of the President and the Secretary of State  
16 in fulfilling this duty.

17 I'd like to turn now to the distinguished Ranking  
18 Member of the Committee, Senator Biden, for his opening  
19 statement.

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1           STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR  
2           FROM DELAWARE

3           Senator Biden: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.  
4           Welcome, Mr. Secretary.

5           Let me say, at the outset, I'm probably -- of all the  
6           people up here, I'm going to be the least critical of anyone  
7           who's blunt. I don't like to indict myself publicly that  
8           way. But -- I hadn't planned on starting this way, but I  
9           think that the -- to state my grave concern with this  
10          appointment, Mr. Chairman, I think that the test you set out  
11          for diplomacy is the accurate one: true, consistent with the  
12          policy of the Administration, and a rational expectation  
13          that it would be in U.S. interests.

14          Obviously, all of this is subject to explanation and  
15          rebuttal and -- by our friend, Mr. Bolton, but I think that  
16          my problem with your statements about the U.N. is, I don't  
17          think they're true, I don't think they're consistent with  
18          U.S. policy, and I don't think -- I clearly believe they do  
19          not advance U.S. interests. And, you know, you can be  
20          blunt. President Reagan was blunt about the Berlin Wall,  
21          because it was, in fact, clear to the whole world that it  
22          was an odious thing. I think your statements, which I'll go  
23          into in a minute, about the U.N. are a little bit like being  
24          blunt about NATO. If you had said, which you haven't, to  
25          the best of my knowledge, "NATO forces can't keep with us --

1 up with us. The French air force can't fly on our wing," et  
2 cetera, et cetera, et cetera. That would be blunt. That be  
3 also clearly against U.S. interests to say those things.  
4 But it would be blunt. And I would think that's more akin  
5 to my criticism of what you will soon hear of your  
6 statements about the U.N. than the Berlin Wall.

7 I don't believe -- well, I should point out, at the  
8 outset, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank you for your  
9 cooperation. You have been, as always, straightforward and  
10 honorable and fair to both the witness and to the minority.  
11 I don't believe this hearing, quite frankly, is ready to be  
12 conducted today, because we've not completed the review of  
13 certain allegations, none of which go to the integrity, the  
14 honesty, the personal conduct of the nominee. When I say  
15 "allegations," I'll get into what I mean by that,  
16 allegations involving the nominee. They all relate to  
17 whether or not he attempted to use his influence unfairly to  
18 get certain analysts fired because they didn't agree with  
19 his assessments. That's what I mean, at the outset, so the  
20 press doesn't think there's anything nefarious about this.  
21 That's the issue that's going to be discussed here, among  
22 others.

23 On March 21st, I asked the State Department for access  
24 to certain individuals and documents related to an incident  
25 involving the nominee and a State Department employee

1 relating to whether or not that person should or should not  
2 have been fired. For two weeks, the Department stonewalled.  
3 It was only after you, Mr. Chairman, intervened, last  
4 Thursday -- and we sent repeated letters to the State  
5 Department -- last Thursday that you intervened, that we  
6 received some cooperation.

7 On Thursday, last, at 1:45 p.m., the Democratic staff  
8 was informed that two individuals -- we asked for four --  
9 would be made available that afternoon, starting at 3:00  
10 p.m. On Friday morning, some of the documents we requested  
11 began to arrive, but the Committee was not allowed to retain  
12 them or make copies of them, but only take notes, further  
13 handicapping our ability to review the materials.

14 Since Thursday afternoon, staff on both sides -- this  
15 has been on both sides -- I asked my chief of staff to  
16 correct me -- on every interview, there's been a majority  
17 member staff person there, so this isn't a -- this isn't --  
18 the Democrats are asking for it, but this -- none of this  
19 has been done absent a majority staff person being present.

20 Since Thursday afternoon, staff on both sides have  
21 worked diligently to interview the witnesses and review  
22 materials. And so, I'm grateful for your intervention at  
23 the time that you intervened, because I was having no  
24 success with Secretary Rice. But the Committee's work to  
25 investigate this matter, which would have proceeded over the

1 past two-week period, was compressed into 90 hours. The  
2 staff still only -- has at least two more interviews to  
3 conduct, and I don't believe that all documents responsive  
4 to the request have been provided.

5 And because many of the documents are classified, they  
6 could not be made available to Senators to review unless  
7 they happened to be in Washington during this period. Many  
8 of us were -- the reason it was initially postponed is, many  
9 of us were in Rome with the President's funeral. Excuse me.  
10 Freudian. I beg your pardon. At the Pope's funeral that  
11 the President attended.

12 This is not a way that we should do business. The  
13 Department's lack of cooperation -- this is not Mr. Bolton;  
14 he did not fail to cooperate, the Department did not  
15 cooperate until the last possible minute -- stands in marked  
16 contrast to the nomination four years ago for this same  
17 position. In that case, involving John Negroponte, the  
18 Committee reviewed, with full cooperation, and obtained  
19 hundreds of pages of documents without delay or resistance.  
20 And my friend from Connecticut was a prime mover in dealing  
21 with that nomination.

22 The fact is that, unlike four years ago, Under  
23 Secretary Bolton, when he came before this Committee, had  
24 little background in Arms Controls, and we confirmed him.  
25 But there's no question that he comes before us today with

1 extensive experience in U.N. affairs. He served as the  
2 Assistant Secretary of State during the first Bush  
3 Administration, supervising policy regarding the United  
4 Nations. And he has written and testified frequently about  
5 the subject. And it is precisely the record in his first  
6 part of this -- the first Bush term that concerns me.

7 I believe the President is entitled to significant  
8 deference in his appointment of senior personnel, and I've  
9 -- but I have opposed nominees, however, who I believe were  
10 hostile to the mission for which -- to which they were  
11 assigned. For example, I voted against two -- one Secretary  
12 of the Interior who was -- clearly had an animus toward that  
13 Department, under the Reagan Administration. And I voted  
14 against Secretaries of Education appointed by Reagan,  
15 because he said he was appointing them for the express  
16 purpose of doing away with the Department of Education.

17 And so, this will -- not the first time I have voted  
18 against a -- if I vote against John -- it would not be the  
19 first time that I voted against a nominee for -- that the  
20 President has put forward that's not a member of the  
21 judiciary.

22 And, quite frankly, I'm surprised that the nominee  
23 wants the job that he's been nominated for, given his -- the  
24 many negative things he had to say about the U.N.,  
25 international institutions, and international law. Now,

1       you've going to have an opportunity to respond to all these  
2       kinds of things. They're taken -- they're attempted to be  
3       in context, but they're -- but I'm just going to cite some  
4       of the things you said, and they'll be put in context during  
5       the question-and-answer period.

6            You said, there's no such thing as the United Nations  
7       -- quote, "There's no such thing as the United Nations."

8            You said, and I quote, that -- excuse me -- you said,  
9       If they removed ten stories from the 38-story U.N.  
10      headquarters, quote, "it wouldn't make a bit of difference,"  
11      end of quote.

12           You said that if the Security Council were to be made  
13      today, that you would have only one permanent member, the  
14      United States.

15           You said that international law really isn't, quote,  
16      "It" -- that it really isn't law, and that, quote, "While  
17      treaties may well be politically or even morally binding,  
18      they are not legally obligatory," end of quote.

19           You said the International Court of Justice, a body  
20      created under the U.N. Charter, is a, quote, "travesty and a  
21      pretend court," end of quote.

22           You said that the peace-enforcement operations of the  
23      United -- of nation and nation-building should, quote, "be  
24      relegated to history's junk pile at the first opportunity,"  
25      end of quote, because they resulted in, as you said, quote,

1 "American personnel and resources being committed to U.N.  
2 operations far removed from America's vital interests," end  
3 of quote, even though they wouldn't be there unless we -- if  
4 we didn't want them there, we could veto the effort.

5 I want to give you a chance to explain, clarify, and  
6 possibly, hopefully, repudiate these and other statements  
7 you've made over the years, but, for now, let me point to  
8 two things.

9 First, the logical conclusion of your views is that --  
10 in my view, is that if the U.S. Embassy is sacked by a  
11 foreign state, or a U.S. soldier tortured, then this country  
12 and its citizens have no recourse under international law,  
13 because, in your view, there's no such thing as  
14 international law. How can that possibly be in America's  
15 interest?

16 Second, it seems to me your views about the U.N.  
17 treaties and international law are out of sync with those of  
18 the President of the United States and Secretary Rice. Soon  
19 after his election, the President stated that one of his  
20 priorities for the second term was, quote, "to defend our  
21 security and spread freedom by building effective  
22 multinational and multilateral institutions and supporting  
23 effective multilateral action," end of quote.

24 The President, right now, is demanding, to his great  
25 credit, Syria's full withdrawal from Lebanon, under the



1 authority of a U.N. Security Council Resolution. The  
2 Administration has finally joined the European effort to  
3 convince Iran to forego nuclear weapons. Quote, "We're  
4 working closely with Britain, France, and Germany," the  
5 President said, continuing the quote, "as they insist that  
6 Tehran comply with international law."

7 The President recently decided the United States,  
8 quote, "will discharge its international obligations," end  
9 of quote, under decisions of the International Court of  
10 Justice by having several state courts, including courts in  
11 Texas, give effect to the decision of that court in certain  
12 death-penalty cases. Does he know that he's implementing an  
13 order that is from a "pretend court"?

14 The Administration strongly endorses the U.N. decision  
15 to send 10,000 peacekeepers to Sudan to help secure a North-  
16 South peace agreement, a mission your statements about  
17 peacekeeping suggest that you'd have trouble supporting.

18 During her confirmation hearing, Secretary Rice told  
19 this Committee, quote, "that the time for diplomacy is now,"  
20 end of quote.

21 This month, speaking before the American Society of  
22 International Law, she said, and I quote, "One of the  
23 pillars of that diplomacy is our strong belief that  
24 international law is a vital and powerful force in the  
25 search for freedom," end of quote.

1           I suspect that if President Clinton's Secretary of  
2     State had made that same statement, you might have been  
3     leading the charge that this was an ill-founded statement.  
4     I could be wrong. I'm anxious to hear what you have to say.

5           In the past two months, the President and the Secretary  
6     have made clear that there is a new-found commitment to work  
7     closely with others, including the United Nations. And I'm  
8     hopeful that they're trying to return America to its  
9     historic role in building a strong international system that  
10    serves our interests, rather than running roughshod over it.

11          Your views seem, based on what you've said in the past,  
12    John, to be contradictory and contrary to the direction the  
13    President and the Secretary of State now want to take this  
14    Administration, which leads me to believe that it must mean  
15    that you no longer agree with those statements, because they  
16    appointed you. I wonder, as I did in 2001, about your  
17    diplomatic temperament. You have a habit of belittling your  
18    opposition, and even some of your friends.

19          You said that, quote, "Republicans are adults on  
20    foreign-policy questions, and we define what we're willing  
21    to do militarily and politically by what is in the best  
22    interest of the United States." I wonder what you think of  
23    the motives of some of us who aren't Republicans.

24          You once quoted that the head of the International Law  
25    Commission -- you once quoted the head of the International

1 Law Commission as evidence of the grandiose ambitions of  
2 supporters in the International Criminal Court by saying,  
3 quote, "That's not the same as knuckle-dragging" -- excuse  
4 me -- "That's" -- excuse me -- of the International Criminal  
5 Court by saying, quote, "That's not some knuckle-dragging  
6 Republican from some southern state, it's the head of the  
7 International Law Commission," end of quote. I don't think  
8 that's the kind of attitude that is going to serve us very  
9 well in the United Nations if it continues.

10 The U.N. needs reform. Lots of it. I work with former  
11 Chairman Jesse Helms to promote such reforms. The Helm-  
12 Biden amendment was -- the legislation was part of that  
13 reform. That work's not finished. We need a strong voice  
14 in New York who knows the U.N. and who can advance our  
15 reform agenda, but we don't need a voice which people may  
16 not be inclined to listen to. And I fear that, knowing your  
17 reputation, and your reputation known well at the U.N.,  
18 people will be inclined to tune you out. Above all, we need  
19 an able diplomat skilled in working the corridors of a  
20 complex international institution. Some have said that  
21 sending you to New York would be like sending Nixon to  
22 China. I'm concerned it'll be more like sending a bull into  
23 a china shop.

24 Ambassador Kirkpatrick, who served at the U.N. under  
25 President Reagan and strongly supports you, may have summed

1     it up best in describing you in the New York Times. She  
2     said, "He may not -- he may do diplomatic jobs for the U.S.  
3     Government, but John is not a diplomat," end of quote.

4             So we'll want to spend some more time exploring your  
5     views on the United Nations and how you approach the job, if  
6     confirmed. We also have an obligation to assess your  
7     performance in your current job, Under Secretary of State  
8     for Arms Control and International Security. The fact is  
9     that, on your watch, in areas in which you are responsible,  
10    the world has gotten more, and not less, dangerous. Not  
11    your fault, but that's a fact. We didn't create these  
12    threats, but it's our responsibility to contend with them  
13    wisely and effectively. And, in my judgement, your  
14    judgement on how to deal with the emerging threats have not  
15    been particularly useful.

16            Over the past four years, Korea has increased its  
17    nuclear-weapons capacity by as much as 400 percent. It may  
18    now have as many as eight nuclear weapons, which it could  
19    test, hide, sell, or sell to the highest bidder. During  
20    your 2001 confirmation hearing, you highlighted a danger  
21    posed by North Korea 27 times. You were right. But the  
22    record suggests that your approach has undermined the  
23    efforts to address the growing threat posed by Pyongyang.

24            Over the past four years, Iran has accelerated its own  
25    nuclear program. It's much closer to the bomb than when the

1 President took office. The record suggests you opposed the  
2 President's policy, the one finally adopted by President  
3 Bush. He's come around to, after several years, a  
4 coordinated strategy of carrots and sticks with our European  
5 partners. No one can guarantee it will work. We do know  
6 that the approach you apparently advocated has not worked.

7 Over the past four years, the invaluable program  
8 Chairman Lugar started to help Russia account and destroy  
9 excess nuclear weapons and a complementary program to deal  
10 with its chemical arsenal has to withstand efforts by some  
11 in this Administration to cut it. Now these programs have  
12 become mired in red tape, and despite the fact that loose  
13 Russian weapons pose one of the greatest potential threats  
14 to our security, we still haven't cut through that red tape.

15 The Administration did succeed in convincing Libya to  
16 give up its weapons of mass destruction, but, according to  
17 press accounts -- and I'd like to hear what your view is --  
18 that only happened after you were taken off the case. And  
19 that success was the result of a policy begun by a previous  
20 Administration that you roundly disparaged.

21 Finally, a serious concern has been raised about your  
22 attitude toward dissenting views. Specifically, it has been  
23 alleged that, on at least two occasions, you sought to have  
24 removed from their positions officials who disagreed with  
25 your assessment of critical intelligence matters. After all

1       this country has been through with Iraq and faulty  
2       intelligence, if that's true, that's not the approach we  
3       should be rewarding. You'll have a full opportunity to  
4       address these complaints.

5             John, I have great respect for your abilities and your  
6       intellectual capacity. It's your judgement and temperament,  
7       as well as your approach to many of these issues, that give  
8       me great pause.

9             Let me conclude with this. After a necessary war in  
10      Afghanistan and a optional war in Iraq, Americans are  
11      rightly confident in the example of our power. But I've  
12      been concerned that many in this Administration have  
13      forgotten the power of our example. Foreign policy is not a  
14      popularity contest. We must confront hard issues.  
15      Sometimes they require hard choices that other countries  
16      don't like. But, above all, they require American  
17      leadership. That's the kind that persuades others to  
18      follow. And I'm not convinced this nominee has that as his  
19      strongest suit.

20            I thank the Chair, and I yield back to the Chair.

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1           The Chairman: I thank the distinguished Ranking  
2 Member.

3           I would mention that when the hearing was originally  
4 scheduled for Thursday of last week, our distinguished  
5 colleague, Senator Warner, had planned to join us to  
6 introduce Secretary Bolton. With the rescheduling of the  
7 hearing for this morning, Senator Warner is unable to attend  
8 because of commitments in his state. He's asked me to  
9 convey to the Committee his strong support for the nominee.  
10 And I would ask unanimous consent that Senator Warner's  
11 statement be included in the record.

12           [The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

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1           Senator Biden: Mr. Chairman, may I clarify the point I  
2       made? I said "every witness has been interviewed jointly."  
3       Three weeks ago, the Democratic staff interviewed one  
4       witness alone, and then, I believe, notified -- am I  
5       correct? -- notified the majority staff, who then  
6       interviewed that nominee, which began this ball rolling. So  
7       there was one interview, that I'm aware of, that the initial  
8       interview did not take place with both majority and minority  
9       in the room. That was the only one. I just wanted to  
10      clarify the record.

11          The Chairman: I thank the Senator for the  
12      clarification.

13          Let me say, at the outset, that we have good attendance  
14      this morning, for which the Chair is grateful, and I would  
15      ask that Members limit their questions to ten minutes. We  
16      will have a ten-minute round, followed by an additional ten-  
17      minute round. I would just simply announce my willingness  
18      to preside over the Committee throughout the afternoon and  
19      into an evening session, if that is required, for Members to  
20      have opportunity to ask all the questions that they wish to  
21      ask. I want to make that clear at the outset, that Members  
22      will have that opportunity throughout the morning, the  
23      afternoon, and the evening, but I would ask Members to  
24      respect the ten-minute time limit.

25          Now, the Chair will not stop the witness from



1       responding when the ten minutes comes to a conclusion, but I  
2       will ask the Senator involved to restrain from further doing  
3       business during that period until another turn comes around,  
4       in fairness to most Members who have changed their plans in  
5       order to be here today and have come at least to do  
6       business, to participate in the hearing.

7               Having mentioned that, I will ask the Clerk to start  
8       the clock on my questioning, and I will ask the first ten  
9       minutes of questions and then yield to my distinguished  
10      colleague, Senator Biden. We'll go back and forth, then,  
11      with our questions.

12             Excuse me, I've jumped the gun. We've not heard from  
13      the nominee.

14             [Laughter.]

15             The Chairman: And we do want to hear from the nominee.

16             [Laughter.]

17             The Chairman: We were so excited about asking you  
18      questions, Secretary Bolton --

19             [Laughter.]

20             The Chairman: -- that we just wanted to get right into  
21      it. But, nevertheless, we do look forward to your  
22      statement. Please take the time that is required, really,  
23      to fully express your views, and then I'll start the clock  
24      on my ten minutes of questioning.

25             Secretary Bolton?

1           STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN R. BOLTON, NOMINEE TO BE U.S.  
2       REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES WITH THE RANK OF  
3       AMBASSADOR AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
4       SECURITY COUNCIL AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO SESSIONS OF THE  
5       UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY DURING HIS TENURE OF SERVICE  
6       AS U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES

7           Mr. Bolton: Thank you, Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden.

8           I am honored to appear before you today as President  
9       Bush's nominee to be U.S. Permanent Representative to the  
10      United Nations. I'm grateful for your consideration, and I  
11      look forward to discussing the critical leadership role that  
12      the United States plays in the United Nations.

13          I'd like to thank Senator Warner, who would have been  
14      here, as you suggested, had the schedule not changed, and my  
15      wife Gretchen, who is here with me today.

16          I do have a longer statement, Senator, if I could, I'd  
17      submit for the record, and I'll just read a shorter version  
18      of it.

19          The Chairman: It will be published in the record in  
20      full.

21          Mr. Bolton: Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the  
22      opportunities that I have had to work with this Committee  
23      over the years. This is the fourth time I have appeared  
24      before this Committee in a confirmation hearing. If  
25      confirmed, I pledge to fulfill the President's vision of

1 working in close partnership with the United Nations.

2 The United States is committed to the success of the  
3 United Nations, and we view the U.N. as an important  
4 component of our diplomacy. As the President stated before  
5 the U.N. General Assembly last September, "Let history show  
6 that, in a decisive decade, members of the United Nations  
7 did not grow weary in our duties or waver in meeting them."

8 The Secretary has made this a top priority, as well.  
9 She was unequivocal in her remarks, and I quote, "The  
10 American people respect the idealism that sparked the  
11 creation of the United Nations, and we share the U.N.'s  
12 unshakeable support for human dignity. At this time of  
13 great opportunity and great promise, the charge to the  
14 international community is clear. We, who are on the right  
15 side of freedom's divide, have an obligation to help those  
16 who were unlucky enough to be born on the wrong side of that  
17 divide. The hard work of freedom is a task of generations,  
18 yet it is also urgent work that cannot be deferred. Now,  
19 more than ever, the U.N. must play a critical role as it  
20 strives to fulfill the dreams and hopes and aspirations of  
21 its original promise to save succeeding generations from the  
22 scourge of war, to reaffirm faith in fundamental human  
23 rights, and to promote social progress and better standards  
24 of life in larger freedom."

25 If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with

1       this Committee to forge a stronger relationship between the  
2       United States and the United Nations, which depends  
3       critically on American leadership. Such leadership, in  
4       turn, must rest upon broad bipartisan support in Congress.  
5       It must be earned by putting to rest skepticism that so many  
6       feel about the U.N. system.

7               Through the course of three decades of public service,  
8       both in and out of government, I have learned that this  
9       consensus is not only essential, but possible. Working  
10      together in a spirit of bipartisan cooperation, I believe we  
11      can take important steps to restore confidence in the United  
12      Nations.

13             Mr. Chairman, we are at a critical juncture, and I  
14      fully share the sentiments that you expressed in 1997 when  
15      you remarked, and I quote, "It is time to decide if we want  
16      a strong and viable United Nations that can serve United  
17      States' interests, or a United Nations that is crippled by  
18      insolvency and hobbled by controversy and uncertainty."

19             Mr. Chairman, there are four priorities that I believe  
20      are important to pursue if confirmed as U.S. Representative  
21      to the U.N. One priority is to strengthen and build  
22      institutions that serve as the cornerstone of freedom in  
23      nascent democracies. Mr. Chairman, we should never  
24      underestimate the impact of free and fair elections on a  
25      country. I look forward, if confirmed, to working with

1 relevant U.N. agencies to enable them to contribute further  
2 to the growth of democratic institutions in countries freed  
3 from the bonds of oppression.

4 I also look forward to working with you on President  
5 Bush's request for \$10 million in the fiscal year 2006  
6 budget to set up a democracy fund within the United Nations.  
7 I'm grateful to Secretary General Annan for endorsing the  
8 President's proposal in his new report in U.N. reform.

9 While the U.N. has had its successes in the human-  
10 rights field, there have been problems, as well, such as the  
11 United Nations Commission on Human Rights. For too long,  
12 some of the most egregious violators of human rights have  
13 undercut UNHRC's principles and its effectiveness. The  
14 consequence, as Secretary General Annan has said, is that  
15 the Commission's important work has, and I quote, "been  
16 increasingly undermined by its declining credibility and  
17 professionalism," close quote. We must work with our  
18 friends and allies to keep those who would usurp the moral  
19 authority of this Commission off of it, and to send clear  
20 and strong signals that we will not shy away from naming  
21 human-rights violators.

22 We must work to galvanize the General Assembly to focus  
23 its attention on issues of true importance. Sadly, there  
24 have been times when the General Assembly has gone off  
25 track, such as with the abominable Resolution 3379, equating

1       Zionism with racism. I am proud to have been an active  
2       player in getting this resolution repealed.

3           Mr. Chairman, a second priority, should I be confirmed  
4       will be stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass  
5       destruction to ensure that terrorist organizations and the  
6       world's most dangerous regimes are unable to threaten the  
7       United States, our friends, and our allies. As Under  
8       Secretary of State for Arms Control and International  
9       Security, I have worked hard to promote effective  
10      multilateral action to curb the flow of dangerous weapons.  
11      As you know, I served as the lead U.S. negotiator in the  
12      creation of the G8 Global Partnership Against the  
13      Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,  
14      which will add an additional \$10 billion over ten years in  
15      Nunn-Lugar-type programs.

16           In the case of Libya, I had the opportunity to work in  
17      close consultation with our British colleagues in diplomatic  
18      efforts to secure the verifiable elimination of Libyan  
19      weapons of mass destruction. I also helped build a  
20      coalition of more than 60 countries to help combat the  
21      spread of dangerous weapons through President Bush's  
22      Proliferation Security Initiative.

23           I have no doubt that these efforts played a critical  
24      role in enabling the United States to lead the Security  
25      Council to pass Resolution 1540, first suggested by

1 President Bush in his speech to the General Assembly in  
2 September 2003. This resolution calls upon "all member  
3 states to fulfill their obligations in relation to arms  
4 control and disarmament, and to prevent proliferation in all  
5 its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction."

6 Resolution 1540 was the first of its kind focusing on  
7 WMD proliferation. I am proud that our strong leadership  
8 contributed to its unanimous adoption. I'm happy to report  
9 that, as of March 15, over 80 countries have submitted  
10 reports required by the resolution, outlining their plans to  
11 enact and implement measures to stop WMD proliferation. I  
12 look forward to working with Security Council members to  
13 achieve 100 percent compliance with the resolution.

14 A third priority that I would pursue, if confirmed, is  
15 supporting the global war on terror. As we all learned on  
16 September the 11th, 2001, no one is safe from the  
17 devastating effects of terrorists intent on harming innocent  
18 people. Confronting and triumphing in the global war on  
19 terror remains the central priority of the Bush  
20 Administration. To win this war requires long-term  
21 cooperation with all like-minded nations.

22 The President is firmly committed to working with the  
23 United Nations to make this shared goal of the civilized  
24 world a reality. As he noted in his speech to the U.N.  
25 General Assembly in September 2003, "All governments that

1 support terror are complicit in a war against civilization.  
2 No government should ignore the threat of terror, because to  
3 look the other way gives terrorists the chance to regroup,  
4 recruit, and prepare. And all nations that fight terror as  
5 if the lives of their own people depend on it will earn the  
6 favorable judgement of history."

7 The United Nations has taken positive steps to support  
8 the war on terror, but more, of course, remains to be done.  
9 In the wake of September the 11th, we have been actively  
10 encouraging member states to become parties to the U.N.  
11 conventions on terrorism. I have been personally involved,  
12 in the past four years, as well, in working to complete the  
13 negotiations on a Nuclear Terrorism Convention. We must  
14 built upon Security Council Resolution 1368, passed one day  
15 after the tragic events of September 11, and which, for the  
16 first time, classified every act of international terrorism  
17 as a threat to international peace and security.

18 We must also work together to help member states build  
19 capacities to combat terrorism, as outlined in Resolution  
20 1373, passed on September 28th, 2001. This resolution  
21 obligates all U.N. member states to use their domestic laws  
22 and courts to keep terrorists from sheltering resources or  
23 finding safe havens anywhere in the world and to cooperate  
24 in investigating, prosecuting, and preventing terrorism  
25 wherever it may spring up.



1           The U.N. Security Council is monitoring compliance with  
2           the requirements of this resolution, with impressive  
3           results. To date, 142 countries have issued orders freezing  
4           the assets of suspected terrorists and terrorist  
5           organizations. Accounts totaling almost 105 million have  
6           been blocked; 34 million in the U.S., and over twice that  
7           amount in other countries.

8           Overall, Resolution 1373 has been the framework for  
9           unprecedented international consultation and coordination  
10          against terrorism, including the provision of technical  
11          assistance to governments that want to do the right thing,  
12          but may not have the specialized expertise necessary.

13          Mr. Chairman, a fourth priority is addressing  
14          humanitarian crises. It is not just the scourge of war we  
15          must confront. We must confront the scourge of disease and  
16          affliction, such as HIV/AIDS, through strong U.S. leadership  
17          in the United Nations system. Along with the President's  
18          emergency plan for AIDS relief, a five-year, \$15 billion  
19          investment, we are strong supporters of the U.N. declaration  
20          of commitment on HIV/AIDS and are working to ensure  
21          resources from the global fund for AIDS, malaria, and  
22          tuberculosis are available to countries most severely  
23          affected by the disease.

24          I will make it a key priority, as well, to improve  
25          programs that have been involved in the tsunami relief

1 effort so that we can enhance and build upon structures and  
2 institutions already in place.

3 More broadly, we must confront the scourge of poverty,  
4 which leaves hundreds of millions on the margins of  
5 societies scrambling for food or shelter, with little  
6 opportunity to improve their lives or those of their  
7 children.

8 We must also make sure that the U.N. acts effectively  
9 in promoting the economic and social advancement of all  
10 people. Policy reform, institution-building, appropriate  
11 technology transfer, and private-sector involvement are  
12 critical for sustained economic growth. We will continue to  
13 support the contributions of women to economic growth and  
14 development, as well as their critical role in the growth of  
15 democratic institutions worldwide.

16 The U.N., in conjunction with U.S. leadership, has  
17 recognized that the traditional models of development have  
18 been insufficient to achieve development objectives and  
19 better the lives of people around the world. The  
20 Partnership for Maternal, Newborn, and Child Health, the  
21 Global Alliance for Vaccinations and Immunizations, and  
22 Rollback Malaria are all examples of how U.N. agencies, such  
23 as UNICEF, are working alongside the private sector,  
24 charitable organizations, and foundations such as the Gates  
25 Foundation, to leverage resources, generate new activities,

1 and impact the lives of millions in developing countries.  
2 We support these new and innovative structures that rely  
3 less on bureaucracy and more on putting resources into the  
4 field, aiding results-based performance standards.

5 This brings me to the issue of accountability and  
6 reform. The Administration welcomes the Secretary General's  
7 new report on U.N. reform, and we are examining carefully  
8 its many recommendations. I hope to work closely with the  
9 Secretary General and my colleagues to bring greater  
10 accountability and transparency to the United Nations.

11 On a personal note, I should mention that Secretary  
12 General Kofi Annan and I have had a relationship that goes  
13 back 16 years, based on mutual respect and friendship, and I  
14 was pleased to receive a call from him last week.

15 The key is to implement changes to the U.N. structure  
16 and management, including budget, personnel, and oversight  
17 reforms. Scandals such as those that we have witnessed with  
18 the Oil-for-Food Program, undermine, not only America's  
19 confidence in the United Nations, but the confidence of the  
20 international community, as well. They must not recur. And  
21 we must never lose sight of the reality that ultimately it  
22 is member governments that must take responsibility for the  
23 U.N.'s actions, whether they be successes or failures.

24 Mr. Chairman, let me close by reiterating what I said  
25 at the beginning. If confirmed, I will work closely and

1 effectively with this Committee in both houses of Congress.  
2 The President and Secretary Rice are committed to building a  
3 strong, effective United Nations. The United Nations  
4 affords us an opportunity to move our policies forward  
5 together with unity of purpose. Now, more than ever, the  
6 U.N. must play a critical role as it strives to fulfill the  
7 dreams and hopes and aspirations of its original promise to  
8 save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, to  
9 reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, and to promote  
10 social progress and better standards of life in larger  
11 freedom. This effort demands decisive American leadership,  
12 broad bipartisan support, and the backing of the American  
13 public. I will undertake to do my utmost to uphold the  
14 confidence that the President, Secretary Rice, and the  
15 Senate will have placed in me.

16 Thank you, and I would welcome the opportunity to  
17 answer your questions.

18 [The prepared statement of Mr. Bolton follows:]  
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1           The Chairman: Thank you very much, Secretary Bolton,  
2           for your opening statement.

3           I'd like to mention that Mrs. Bolton is with us today,  
4           on the front row, and we're delighted that you are here, and  
5           we appreciate your coming to the hearing.

6           Now, as I mentioned earlier, and prematurely, we'll  
7           have a ten-minute round of questioning, and we'll begin the  
8           clock now, as I commence my ten minutes of questioning.  
9           Then I will yield to Senator Biden.

10          Secretary Bolton, as Senator Biden has mentioned in his  
11          opening statement, prior to this hearing staff on both sides  
12          of the aisle have visited with Mr. Carl Ford. Carl Ford was  
13          supervisor for Christian Westermann, who is an INR  
14          biological warfare analyst. Now, I mention this because the  
15          allegation has been made that, in a speech that you were  
16          preparing for the AEI on Cuba, and which, I might mention,  
17          was on television this morning in its entirety, that you  
18          wished to change some language. Christian Westermann, the  
19          analyst, refused to change the language. You were severe in  
20          your criticism of him. And so, herein lies at least what  
21          appears to be a major flap for the last 90 hours, as Senator  
22          Biden has pointed out.

23          Now, staff has, in fact, interviewed Mr. Westermann and  
24          Carl Ford, who will be appearing before the Committee, as I  
25          understand, tomorrow morning, at our hearing at 9:30, Mr.

1 Fred Fleitz, the Bolton special assistant, who might know  
2 something about this, Tom Fingar, the INR Principal Deputy  
3 Assistant Secretary at the time, Fulton Armstrong, National  
4 Intelligence Office for Latin America at the NIC at the  
5 time, Stuart Cohen, Mr. Armstrong's supervisor at the NIC at  
6 that time. These interviews took place, aside from the Carl  
7 Ford interview, which Senator Biden has pointed out occurred  
8 earlier, on April 5, the other interviews on April 7 and  
9 April 8, and lasted, in most cases, for two hours, although  
10 the Fingar interview was only an hour and a quarter, and 30  
11 minutes devoted to Stuart Cohen.

12 Now, I mention all of this because, very clearly, there  
13 has been at least an allegation that pressure was applied,  
14 and, as Senator Biden suggested, making a transfer, that I  
15 think is a stretch. But we are very sensitive in this  
16 country about reports given on Iraq intelligence and how  
17 accurate, or how comprehensive, our intelligence agencies  
18 were, whether anyone distorted that, or misused that, or  
19 went beyond that intelligence with regard to public policy.  
20 Nonetheless, you were talking about biological warfare in  
21 Cuba. Your suggestions for change were not accepted. The  
22 speech, therefore, did not have words that you wanted, but  
23 it had the official interpretation. And, as a matter of  
24 fact, no one was discharged, although feelings may have been  
25 hurt.

1           I raise all of this, in this context, simply to give  
2           you an opportunity to explain, if you can, what the flap is  
3           about. In essence, who said what to whom, and for what  
4           reason? And if you had it to do all over again, would you  
5           do it the same way? In essence, give your side of the  
6           story.

7           Mr. Bolton: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think  
8           that the couple of points I'd want to stress from the outset  
9           is that all of these allegations have been reviewed in the  
10          past by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the  
11          Committee found that there was no evidence of any indication  
12          of an attempt to influence or pressure analysts in their  
13          professional conclusions.

14          Second, with respect to the speech, which was in May of  
15          2002, and was entitled "Beyond the Axis of Evil," it was a  
16          discussion of WMD efforts in a number of countries -- really  
17          had preparations begun earlier in the year, just a few  
18          months after September the 11th, when I think we all  
19          conclude that, however horrible September the 11th was, it  
20          could have been far worse had the terrorists had access to  
21          chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. And it was our  
22          feeling in the Administration that we wanted to talk  
23          seriously to the American public about these kinds of  
24          threats.

25          The intelligence community gave appropriate clearance



1 to declassified language and to the text of the speech  
2 itself. The speech was cleared throughout the State  
3 Department, including the Office of the Deputy Secretary,  
4 throughout the interagency. Assistant Secretaries Ford and  
5 Otto Reich used essentially the same declassified language  
6 in testimony in March, before the speech; in June, after the  
7 speech; and elsewhere.

8 And I wanted to say, also, Mr. Chairman, as you say,  
9 there have been a lot of interviews and transcripts and  
10 documents produced. I haven't seen all of them. But I want  
11 to say to the Committee, right here, unequivocally, I'd be  
12 happy if all of that were made public right now. There are  
13 problems with classifications. Some of it, I think, we need  
14 to be concerned about privacy for people who are, sort of,  
15 collaterally involved, the issues that have to be worked  
16 out. Mr. Chairman, there is nothing there, there, and I  
17 would put it all out on the public record. All of it.

18 The Chairman: Well, I would indicate, Secretary  
19 Bolton, that State Department and CIA representatives stayed  
20 with the materials as they were made available in the Senate  
21 Foreign Relations Committee offices. There were a number of  
22 pages that were classified, and that, I think, is an  
23 important point. But, at the same time, I appreciate your  
24 forthcoming desire that all of this be made public. And I  
25 suspect that that can be accommodated.

1           Now, I simply want to know, with the specific  
2           allegation of pressure and discharge and those specific  
3           thoughts surrounding Mr. Westermann, specifically, what is  
4           the case? What happened?

5           Mr. Bolton: I never sought to have Mr. Westermann  
6           fired, at all. And, in fact, you have e-mail from the  
7           Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the  
8           Intelligence Research Bureau the day of the conversation,  
9           Tom Fingar; his e-mail to me that day that said that Mr.  
10          Westermann behavior was, and I quote, "entirely  
11          inappropriate," close quote. Mr. Fingar said, referring to  
12          INR, quote, "We screwed up," close quote. And he said,  
13          twice in a relatively short e-mail, quote, "It won't happen  
14          again," close quote.

15          The Chairman: Well, I thank you for that  
16          clarification. I suspect that we will hear more about it  
17          throughout the hearing. But, at the outset, I wanted to  
18          raise it, because it appears to me to have been the source,  
19          really, of almost half of the controversy about your  
20          nomination thus far.

21          Now, let me get into the second half. What are you  
22          going to do about reform at the U.N.? You have mentioned  
23          specific desirable aspects, but clearly one of the  
24          rationales given by the President, and, even more  
25          emphatically, by the Secretary of State, is that you are a

1 person who is going to be able to bring about reform of the  
2 institution so it will be strengthened. The United Nations  
3 is important for our foreign policy. It's more important  
4 if, in fact, it's a strong organization, with greater  
5 integrity, in terms of its activities. What do you have in  
6 mind as you approach this task?

7 Mr. Bolton: I think there are -- analytically, there  
8 are basically two categories of reform that one can  
9 consider. The first category is the reform of governance  
10 structures in the U.N., how the member governments of the  
11 U.N. carry out their business. The second analytical  
12 category, I would call management, budget, and personnel,  
13 actual operation, actual delivery of product from U.N.  
14 agencies. And I think that there's a lot of work to be done  
15 in both categories.

16 And I mentioned, in my prepared remarks, the widespread  
17 feeling, including as shared by Secretary General Kofi Annan  
18 himself, that the U.N. Human Rights Commission had come  
19 close to completely crashing. That definitely needs to be  
20 fixed.

21 We must address, I think, the most important question,  
22 governance question in the U.N. system, the composition of  
23 the permanent membership of the Security Council. This is  
24 an issue that I faced, myself, going back to the first Bush  
25 Administration, when Japan made a very strong case for its

1 becoming a permanent member, a case which has grown even  
2 stronger over the years, and which Secretary Rice commented  
3 on during her recent trip.

4       There are a lot of very complex and competing claims  
5 for change in the composition of the Security Council. It's  
6 going to take time to work that out. I think one rule I  
7 hope we can all agree on one objective to achieve in working  
8 on that structure is that we not make the Council less  
9 effective than it is now, and that's going to be, I think, a  
10 very arduous task.

11       I think, just quickly, on the management side, back in  
12 the first Bush Administration I developed a concept called  
13 the "unitary U.N.," which was a way of trying to look at the  
14 U.N. system as a whole, not bits and pieces; not loosely  
15 structured, unconnected specialized agencies, but looking at  
16 the system as a whole to try and rationalize its delivery of  
17 services, the research that it carries out, the work of the  
18 various specialized agencies and funds and programs that, on  
19 an organizational chart, are really quite complex.

20       These are some of the things I hope to get into, if  
21 confirmed, and I think I've had the benefit of, as you  
22 mentioned, four years of service as Assistant Secretary for  
23 International Organizations, and the chance to work for the  
24 U.N. on a pro-bono basis, myself.

25       The Chairman: Thank you for those responses. My time

1 is up.

2 And I recognize the distinguished Senator from  
3 Delaware, Senator Biden.

4 Senator Biden: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

5 There's a number of things, Mr. Secretary, I'd like to  
6 discuss with you. I'm going to try to do it in sort of an  
7 orderly way.

8 I will be asking you a number of questions this  
9 afternoon, and as long as we go, about the issue of trying  
10 to have professionals removed from -- I don't think  
11 anybody's ever said you tried to have them fired -- "have  
12 them removed from your portfolio," I think is the term of  
13 art. Did you ever ask anyone to remove Mr. Westermann from  
14 your portfolio?

15 Mr. Bolton: I think, as the interviews that your staff  
16 conducted show -- and that's one reason why I want to get  
17 them all out in public -- we believe Mr. Westermann had  
18 behaved in an underhanded fashion. And I think I -- as my  
19 assistant mentioned to your staff, I said to him at the  
20 time, "I don't care if you disagree with me, just don't do  
21 it behind my back." I mentioned it --

22 Senator Biden: Well, that's not my question. I only  
23 have ten minutes, so I don't want you to be a Senator and  
24 filibuster me.

25 Did you attempt to have him removed from your

1 portfolio?

2 Mr. Bolton: I mentioned it to Mr. Fingar. I may have  
3 mentioned it to one or two other people. But then I  
4 shrugged my shoulders, and I moved on. He was --

5 Senator Biden: So the answer is, yes, you did.

6 Mr. Bolton: And he was not moved, and I did not --

7 Senator Biden: Okay, and that's all I wanted -- I just  
8 wanted to make sure we're talking about the same thing.

9 Let me talk about the U.N. I'll go back to --

10 Mr. Bolton: I, in no sense, sought to have any  
11 discipline imposed on Mr. Westermann.

12 Senator Biden: Other than removed from your --

13 Mr. Bolton: No.

14 Senator Biden: -- portfolio.

15 Mr. Bolton: No. I said, to at least one of his  
16 supervisors, that I specifically had no intention whatever  
17 to cause him any ill will, but I --

18 Senator Biden: I'm not suggesting that.

19 Mr. Bolton: -- had lost trust and confidence in him.  
20 And I think in any professional relationship, you need trust  
21 and confidence.

22 Senator Biden: No, I got that. I just want to make  
23 sure our terminology is -- we're all using the same  
24 terminology when I talk about this with you this afternoon.

25 But let me speak about the U.N., if I may, for a

1 moment. As you know, Chairman Lugar and I have been working  
2 to improve the Federal Civilian Response to post-conflict  
3 reconstruction and stabilization crises that we now face,  
4 and will face in the future, and we strongly support the new  
5 Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and  
6 Stabilization of the State Department, which, really, the  
7 overwhelming credit should go to my colleague from Indiana.  
8 The mission statement of that office outlines, and I quote,  
9 "Failing in post-conflict states pose one of the greatest  
10 national, international security -- and international  
11 security challenges of our day. Struggling states can  
12 provide breeding grounds for terrorism, crime, trafficking,  
13 and human catastrophes, and can destabilize an entire  
14 region."

15 Now, that's the statement, the mission statement of the  
16 office. You have stated, on the record, unrelated to that  
17 office, before -- and, as a matter of fact, in your capacity  
18 -- well, I believe the date was in '97. You said, quote,  
19 "We should be relegated -- what should be relegated to  
20 history's junk pile at the first opportunity is this  
21 chimerical Clinton notion of U.N.," quote, "peaceful  
22 enforcement and nation-building and enlargement. Those  
23 unworldly concepts have resulted in American personnel and  
24 resources being committed to U.N. operations far removed  
25 from vital American interests." And that was in the

1 "Creation, Fall -- Rise and Fall of the United Nations"  
2 speech I believe you delivered.

3 How do you define, in that context, "America's vital  
4 interests"?

5 Mr. Bolton: Well, I don't -- I don't think you have  
6 that quote accurately, Senator, but I won't slow down --

7 Senator Biden: Well, no, that's very important. I do  
8 not want to, in any way, misrepresent what you say. Let's  
9 get everything really straight.

10 Mr. Bolton: And I would --

11 Senator Biden: Because now -- with all due respect, I  
12 don't want to -- I don't want to put you in a spot to say  
13 something you didn't say. "Creation, Fall, and Rise of the  
14 United Nations," John R. Bolton -- where was this speech  
15 made? Pardon me? And what's the name of the book? It's  
16 chapter 3 of a book entitled "Delusions of Grandeur." And I  
17 want to read it again so we're --

18 It says, "Traditional peacekeeping, together with the  
19 often important role of agencies of the U.N. system play in  
20 international delivery of humanitarian assistance can work  
21 and should be continued. Although peacekeeping has only  
22 been limited -- has had only limited use throughout much of  
23 U.N. history, it is an option that we should preserve for  
24 appropriate use, such as U.N. disengagement observer force  
25 along the Golan Heights, between Israel and Syria. What



1       should be relegated to history's junk pile at the first  
2       opportunity, however, are" -- am I pronouncing it correctly?  
3       -- c-h-i-m-e-r-i-c-a-l, chimerical?

4             Mr. Bolton: Chimerical.

5             Senator Biden: -- "Clinton notions of U.N." --  
6       internal quotes, "'peace enforcement,'" comma, quote,  
7       "'nation-building,'" comma, "and," quote, "'enlargement'"  
8       period. "Those unworldly concepts have resulted in American  
9       personnel and resources being committed to U.N. operations  
10      far removed from vital American interests. These concepts  
11      are based on misreadings of what happened in the world and  
12      in the U.N. in the late '80s and early '90s," end of quote.

13            Now, my question to you is -- and here's the cover --  
14      title of the book, "Delusions of Grandeur, the United  
15      Nations and Global Intervention," edited by Ted Galen  
16      Carpenter, "Why We Shouldn't Give the U.N. More Power,"  
17      Cato, 1997.

18            Now, my question is, to you -- and I'm going to run out  
19      of time very quickly, obviously -- and let me be more  
20      precise -- the United States strongly endorses the recent  
21      U.N. Security Council resolution to send 10,000 U.N.  
22      peacekeepers to Sudan to support North-South peace  
23      agreement. Is this an example of an operation far removed  
24      from the vital interests of the United States?

25            Mr. Bolton: Absolutely not. And, in fact, in the

1 passage you read, the second time you read, you referred --  
2 you read what I had written about the effectiveness, the  
3 historical effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping operations,  
4 citing the example of the U.N. disengagement observer force  
5 along the Golan Heights.

6 At least part of the distinction I was making there was  
7 between peacekeeping, as that term has been historically  
8 defined in U.N. operations, and peace enforcement.

9 Traditionally, peacekeeping relies on the consent of the  
10 parties to the conflict, the consent to U.N. involvement,  
11 and U.N. neutrality, as between the parties, and the very  
12 limited rules of engagement for the peacekeepers,  
13 essentially being authorized to use force only as a means of  
14 self defense.

15 By contrast, peace enforcement, as envisaged  
16 conceptually, would give the -- would give U.N. forces a  
17 role without the consent of the parties. The U.N. would not  
18 act in a neutral fashion, and the U.N. rules of engagement  
19 would be much more robust.

20 Senator Biden: Which is --

21 Mr. Bolton: The situation in the Sudan is a  
22 peacekeeping role, as traditionally defined. We have a  
23 historic agreement between the government in Khartoum and  
24 the rebels in the south that Senator Danforth and many  
25 others worked on. The force to be deployed, pursuant to the

1 recently adopted resolution, I would say, is clearly a  
2 traditional U.N. peacekeeping operation.

3 Senator Biden: Now, is that -- do you support it, or  
4 not? I thought I -- I thought you said peacekeeping and  
5 peace -- what's the other alternative?

6 Mr. Bolton: The analytical terms --

7 Senator Biden: It's enforcement, right?

8 Mr. Bolton: -- that are implied are peace- --

9 Senator Biden: Keeping and enforcing.

10 Mr. Bolton: -- -keeping versus peace enforcement. And  
11 those imply separate kinds of operations. The force to be  
12 deployed in Sudan is a peacekeeping force.

13 Senator Biden: And do you support the peacekeeping --

14 Mr. Bolton: Absolutely.

15 Senator Biden: If it had been a peace-enforcement  
16 operation?

17 Mr. Bolton: Well, I think that's a hypothetical,  
18 because --

19 Senator Biden: Okay, take Kosovo.

20 Mr. Bolton: But it's an important --

21 Senator Biden: Let's take Kosovo. Now, it didn't  
22 involve the U.N. It involved NATO.

23 Mr. Bolton: Right.

24 Senator Biden: In terms of Kosovo. That was a --  
25 would that be -- if that had been a U.N. operation, would

1       that have been called a peace-enforcement operation?

2           Mr. Bolton: That would have been called peace  
3       enforcement, I think, that's correct. And that's -- I think  
4       that's one reason why it never -- it never achieved the  
5       approval of the Security Council.

6           Senator Biden: That's true. Now, would you not have  
7       supported that?

8           Mr. Bolton: I did not feel, at the time, that that was  
9       an appropriate action.

10          Senator Biden: Was -- what was the U.N. role in Korea?  
11       Was that peace enforcement or peacekeeping?

12          Mr. Bolton: Well, the -- that was very definitely a  
13       kind of peace enforcement, but one that the U.N. has only  
14       engaged in essentially twice in its history, once in Korea,  
15       when the authorization to use force was adopted, because the  
16       Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council in protest  
17       of the continued presence of the Republic of China holding  
18       the Chinese permanent seat. When the Russians -- Soviets  
19       realized that their absence from the Council and their  
20       inability to veto resolutions was allowing coalition  
21       resistance to the North Korean invasion, they returned, and  
22       that ended the effectiveness of the Security Council in the  
23       Korean incident.

24          The second, of course, was in the first President  
25       Bush's Administration, in the immediate aftermath of the

1 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, when President Bush and Secretary  
2 Baker led the successful effort through a series of Security  
3 Council resolutions, ultimately resulting in Resolution 678,  
4 which was only the second authorization to use force in U.N.  
5 Security Council history.

6 Senator Biden: So when you say that -- is peace  
7 enforcement associated with nation-building?

8 Mr. Bolton: No, I think it's very separate concepts.

9 Senator Biden: And so, the peace enforcement and  
10 nation-building and enlargement are things we should stay  
11 out of, not be involved with, with the United Nations. Is  
12 that right?

13 Mr. Bolton: I think they're very -- I think they're  
14 very separate contexts. I was writing, at that point,  
15 specifically critiquing the Clinton Administration policy,  
16 yes, sir.

17 Senator Biden: I'll come back to that.

18 Thank you very much.

19 The Chairman: Thank you, Senator Biden.

20 Senator Hagel?

21 Senator Hagel: Mr. Chairman, thank you.

22 Secretary Bolton, welcome. Thank you for agreeing to  
23 take on a big job if this Committee and the United States  
24 Senate work its will and send you to that big job. We  
25 appreciate what you're doing.

1           I have been a United States Senator who has strongly  
2 supported the United Nations. It's an imperfect  
3 institution, like all institutions are, but if the world had  
4 not had this body over the last almost 60 years, I don't  
5 think we would have seen the kind of progress in the world  
6 that we've seen that's occurred in a complicated post-World  
7 War II community. Much yet to be accomplished, and you've  
8 noted some of those challenges in your statement. But the  
9 entire purpose, the focus on the United Nations, as you have  
10 also alluded to, was to bring the world community together  
11 in common purpose to deal with common challenges in a  
12 common-interest way. It hasn't always worked. There have  
13 been difficulties. Obviously, reform is a dimension of  
14 institutions, every institution, that is always in play.

15           And I want to start with the reform part of this and  
16 then work our way down into a couple of the specific  
17 questions I have for you.

18           You noted in your four principles, which I agree with,  
19 where you would focus your priorities, where America should  
20 focus its priorities, working with our allies at the United  
21 Nations. And you talk about reform. You talk about the  
22 Secretary General, who you have a relationship with. Give  
23 me some sense of the larger context of reforming that  
24 institution, without getting into a lot of the specifics,  
25 because I suspect we will get into those when Senator

1 Coleman's time is here. We will talk about Oil-for-Food and  
2 other issues. But I'm interested in your philosophy about  
3 the future of the United Nations. How should it be  
4 reformed? Less power? More power? More engagement? Less  
5 engagement? Give this Committee some sense of your own  
6 feeling about that issue.

7 Mr. Bolton: Well, I think that there is enormous  
8 potential in the institution that is often not allowed to be  
9 developed, in part because of the attitude of member  
10 governments. And this is one of the points, I suppose, will  
11 come to a little bit later in some statements I've made over  
12 the years. But I alluded to this in my opening statement.  
13 I think it's important. The United States puts an enormous  
14 amount of resources at the State Department and its missions  
15 around the world to working on U.N. matters. And I think  
16 that it's because we believe that, as the largest paying  
17 member government, that we have a big responsibility for  
18 what goes on in the United Nations.

19 I think, though, even within the United States and in a  
20 number of other countries, there's sometimes the temptation  
21 to say, "Well, if we, sort of, give a problem to the United  
22 States -- to the United Nations, it takes it off our plate,  
23 and that people can say, 'Well, the United Nations is  
24 handling it.'"

25 Fundamentally, talking about any element of reform is

1 to recognize that the United Nations is made up of member  
2 governments, and the United Nations does what member  
3 governments want it to do. And reform in the U.N. means  
4 member governments have to take their responsibilities  
5 seriously. That's something I think that we have  
6 historically done here. I think it's important that all  
7 member governments do that.

8 I think that in implementing, then, the policies that  
9 we're trying to pursue, that you have to take into account  
10 what's possible in the real world, and you have to be  
11 realistic about what can be done through, not just the  
12 United Nations, but through any institution, any  
13 international organization we've set up. And I think that  
14 the sustained attention to these kinds of issues is  
15 required.

16 This is nothing that can be overcome in a matter of a  
17 few months, or even a few years; this is something that's  
18 going to take a lot of work over a long period of time.

19 Senator Hagel: Thank you.

20 Let me ask about a specific area of the United Nations,  
21 the International Atomic Energy Agency. I'd like to hear  
22 your thoughts about the relevancy, the effectiveness of the  
23 IAEA, Director Baradei, what you think of him. I think most  
24 who are following your nomination are aware -- certainly,  
25 this panel is aware -- that as we have seen the results of



1 more of our internal intelligence reports, the Senator  
2 Intelligence Committee, the recent Silverman-Robb Commission  
3 report, the 9/11 Report, what we've seen is that Hans Blix  
4 and the United Nations inspectors had it right in Iraq; we  
5 had it wrong. I would like you to work your way into that.  
6 How could they, the United Nations inspectors, be so right  
7 and our Intelligence Committee be so wrong? And that cuts  
8 to the bigger question of the future of the IAEA. Do you  
9 support the IAEA? Do you support Mr. Baradei's continuation  
10 as director?

11 Mr. Bolton: Well, perhaps I could address the IAEA  
12 question first, and then try to come to your larger  
13 question. I have been, since the first Bush Administration,  
14 a supporter of the IAEA. I remember the first President  
15 Bush, in the hours before giving one of his speeches to the  
16 General Assembly, saying how much he wanted to strengthen  
17 the hand of the IAEA. It's been a phrase that has stayed in  
18 my mind ever since then. And I think we've seen, just in  
19 the first four years of this Administration, that the level  
20 of cooperation with the IAEA on the question of North Korea,  
21 before North Korea withdrew from the Non-Proliferation  
22 Treaty, was very good.

23 I think that we have had a number of transactions with  
24 the IAEA involving Iran, involving sharing some pretty  
25 sensitive information that's been very helpful. We have

1 maintained our contributions to the IAEA. We are -- we've  
2 had numerous voluntary contributions to the IAEA's work.

3 Our feeling on the Director General is that we support  
4 the longstanding policy of two terms for Director Generals.  
5 That's been the policy. We'll -- there are no -- currently,  
6 there are no candidates to oppose him, so we'll have to see  
7 how that policy plays out. But we've said repeatedly that's  
8 not a policy aimed at him or anybody else, it's a policy  
9 that we think is good for the U.N. system as a whole.

10 On your larger question, I don't think there's any  
11 doubt that what we've learned about -- what we've learned  
12 post-war in Iraq about our intelligence is the kind of  
13 lesson that we need to address, and in a very serious way,  
14 in a very urgent manner.

15 I think the Silverman-Robb Commission -- and I haven't  
16 -- I don't want to say I've carefully studied all of it,  
17 including the classified portions, but I have read large  
18 parts of it, and particularly the parts on Iraq, and I think  
19 that the Silverman-Robb Commission really captured quite  
20 well many of the failings that, not just our intelligence  
21 community, but many of us had.

22 And I would describe the principal insight that they  
23 had that I think is just very clarifying of what the problem  
24 was, that reasonable hypotheses about what Saddam was up to  
25 and what Iraq's capabilities were became hardened in the

1 minds of the intelligence community over the years into  
2 assumptions and then presumptions that were not subjected to  
3 repeated scrutiny and verification by hard facts, and that  
4 then were not really corroborated in more recent years by  
5 hard intel on the ground in Iraq.

6 So there are two basic failings, among others. One,  
7 the belief, the reasonable belief, that Saddam Hussein's  
8 inability, for example, to account for large stocks of  
9 chemical-weapon agent that he had declared in the aftermath  
10 of the first Gulf War, his inability to prove he had  
11 destroyed those stocks led to the hypothesis that they still  
12 existed.

13 Senator Hagel: May I interrupt you? And I apologize  
14 for this, but I have very little time left.

15 Let me ask you, in following along with your point  
16 here, How could the United Nations inspectors be right? And  
17 why didn't we listen to them? Which cuts right to the  
18 question that you answered about the credibility, and are  
19 they important, should we continue to strengthen them? But  
20 following along with your point here, how did we miss it,  
21 and they told us?

22 Mr. Bolton: Yeah.

23 Senator Hagel: In fact, I was briefed many times by  
24 the U.N. inspectors. And so, how could we miss it?

25 Mr. Bolton: I would say two things, if I could. And I

1       see your time is short here.

2               On the chemical-weapons point, Hans Blix, himself, took  
3       seriously the absence of records that Saddam had actually  
4       destroyed the chemical weapons. And he said -- it was  
5       reported publicly, he had said to the Iraqis, "Look, this  
6       stuff isn't marmalade. You must have records that you've  
7       destroyed it." Now, that -- it still hasn't been found.  
8       And his conclusion, that the hypothesis that the chemical  
9       agents still existed was wrong, was probably right.

10              On the IAEA, you know, the IAEA was pretty clear that  
11       they did not see evidence of a revived uranium enrichment  
12       program. And contrary to what some press reports have  
13       indicated, I think we believe that that was right. It's  
14       very hard to hide an extensive uranium enrichment program.  
15       It's much easier in the case of chemical or biological  
16       weapons, because of the inherent dual-use nature of that  
17       sort of thing. But I don't really think that the IAEA  
18       conclusions on the absence of an ongoing Iraqi uranium  
19       enrichment program were really disputed by the  
20       Administration.

21              Senator Hagel: Thank you.

22              The Chairman: Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.

23              Senator Sarbanes?

24              Senator Sarbanes: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

25              Mr. Bolton, what's your position on the Law of the Sea

1 Treaty?

2 Mr. Bolton: The Administration has submitted the Law  
3 of the Sea Treaty as one of its priorities, and I support  
4 that.

5 Senator Sarbanes: That's simply because it's an  
6 Administration position, or does that represent your own  
7 view of it?

8 Mr. Bolton: Well, I haven't personally read the Law of  
9 the Sea Treaty. I don't think I've ever read it, to be  
10 honest with you. The issues that -- concerning the Law of  
11 the Sea Treaty that came within the cognizance of bureaus  
12 operating under my supervision this time, the -- basically,  
13 Law of the Sea aspects dealing with military use of  
14 international waters -- the Pentagon approved, and I had no  
15 reason to dispute them.

16 Senator Sarbanes: Well, now, in an article in a book  
17 entitled "Understanding Unilateralism in American Foreign  
18 Relations," published by the Royal Institute of  
19 International Affairs in London, you called the Law of the  
20 Sea Treaty not only undesirable as a policy, but also  
21 illegitimate methods of forcing fundamental policy changes  
22 on the United States outside the customary political  
23 process. Am I correct about that?

24 Mr. Bolton: I don't -- I don't have the article in  
25 front of me, Senator. It was -- this was a Chatham House

1 publication?

2 Senator Sarbanes: I assume so, yes.

3 Mr. Bolton: Yeah. The issue that I believe led  
4 President Reagan to oppose the Law of the Sea Treaty in the  
5 first instance was the -- were the provisions having to do  
6 with the undersea mining issue that were -- and that's why  
7 President Reagan withdrew American support for it. Those  
8 issues were addressed later during the Clinton  
9 Administration, and reviewed by people, not including  
10 myself. During this Administration, a decision on -- the  
11 decision was that the provisions had been adequately fixed.  
12 I --

13 Senator Sarbanes: But you wrote this article in 2000.

14 Mr. Bolton: Right.

15 Senator Sarbanes: That's after these problems had been  
16 addressed, by your own statement, just now.

17 Mr. Bolton: Right. I have not --

18 Senator Sarbanes: Well, if the problems had been  
19 addressed, which you just suggested made the treaty  
20 acceptable, how could you, at that point, be writing that it  
21 was a -- not only undesirable as a policy, but also  
22 illegitimate methods of forcing fundamental policy changes  
23 on the United States outside the customary political  
24 process?

25 Mr. Bolton: That was my opinion at the time, based on

1       what I knew at the time.

2               Senator Sarbanes: But you just told me that you were  
3       -- that you thought the problems that President Reagan found  
4       had been addressed by that point, correct?

5               Mr. Bolton: The analysis --

6               Senator Sarbanes: You were still holding to a position  
7       regarding this as illegitimate and undesirable.

8               Mr. Bolton: I think what I said, Senator -- I hope  
9       that I said this -- if I didn't, if I was unclear, I  
10      apologize -- I think what I said was, those who had -- those  
11      in the Bush Administration who reviewed these particular  
12      provisions of the charter -- and that did not include me,  
13      because they were not part of my responsibility -- concluded  
14      that the issues had been successfully addressed, and that,  
15      therefore, they were to recommend to the President that he  
16      support the treaty.

17              I've not independently gone back into that, because  
18      I've been busy with other things, frankly. But if it's the  
19      opinion of my colleagues in the Administration who are  
20      expert in these matters that it's satisfactory, I accept  
21      that.

22              Senator Sarbanes: What's your view of the NGOs and  
23      their involvement in the U.N. system?

24              Mr. Bolton: Well, I think that, in terms of delivery  
25      of humanitarian services, and in disaster situations, in

1 work in international development, my own experience, in two  
2 and a half years of the U.S. Agency for International  
3 Development has given me a view that they can be -- they can  
4 be very effective.

5 Senator Sarbanes: Well, now, in an article you wrote  
6 for the Oxford Companion, "The Politics of the World," in  
7 2001, you stated, and I quote, "The penetration into the  
8 U.N. system by NGOs has had profoundly undemocratic  
9 consequences by giving some, but not all, interest groups a  
10 second bite at international decision-making." How do you  
11 square that with the -- what you just said about --

12 Mr. Bolton: I think --

13 Senator Sarbanes: -- the role of the NGOs?

14 Mr. Bolton: It's two separate issues, Senator. The  
15 question of the role of the NGOs goes to -- and there's a  
16 huge literature on this, both in the academic world and in  
17 the policy world -- that goes to how decision-making in an  
18 organization composed of member governments should be made,  
19 that the -- in my judgement, member governments should make  
20 the decisions, member governments should set the policy.  
21 NGOs, in democratic societies, have every right, and should  
22 be encouraged, to make their voices known within their  
23 democratic societies. And through elections, and through  
24 all of the political processes that we're familiar with,  
25 governments come up with policies. Those policies are then



1 negotiated out by the governments that are members of the  
2 international organization.

3 The second-bite-at-the-apple concept comes when some  
4 NGOs that are perhaps disappointed in their ability to  
5 influence policy within their own -- within their own  
6 government, try and come back at it again. They are not  
7 accountable to anybody. Nobody elected them. That's what  
8 the basic problem of democratic theory is there.

9 Senator Sarbanes: Well, then how would they -- I  
10 thought, at the outset, you wanted to encourage the NGOs'  
11 involvement in the U.N. process.

12 Mr. Bolton: I think, as I said -- I hope I was clear;  
13 let me try it again -- the NGOs, as deliverers of services  
14 providing humanitarian assistance, for example, in the case  
15 of the recent tsunami and other natural disasters, in civil  
16 conflicts, their contribution in the longer-term effort of  
17 international development, as recipients of grants or  
18 contracts by USAID, The World Bank, or the U.N. Development  
19 Program -- I think these are all very desirable, and should  
20 be encouraged. The issue is not their participation in the  
21 economic and social and humanitarian operational side of  
22 things. It's the democratic theory question about whether  
23 they should have influence outside of, and above, member  
24 governments.

25 Senator Sarbanes: In other words, their influence has

1 to go through the member governments? Is that the way you  
2 see it?

3 Mr. Bolton: Well, I think, as a matter of democratic  
4 theory, within the United States we have interest groups  
5 that cover the entire spectrum, and they can, and should,  
6 under our system of liberty, make their influence felt any  
7 way they choose, that they can participate in elections,  
8 they sponsor seminars, they engage in public education. And  
9 out of this process that we're all familiar with comes a  
10 United States Government position.

11 Senator Sarbanes: Well, now, it's not just the U.S.  
12 Government. You took the further -- you made the statement  
13 to the U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade and Small Arms  
14 and Light Weapons, in 2001, "We do not support the promotion  
15 of international advocacy activity by international or  
16 nongovernmental organizations." Is that your position?

17 Mr. Bolton: That was a statement that was cleared  
18 within the United States Government and reflected our view  
19 of what the U.N.'s role in the small arms and light weapons  
20 arena should be. That is a reflection of --

21 Senator Sarbanes: Let me broaden it beyond that issue.  
22 Is that your position with respect to advocacy activity by  
23 international or nongovernmental organizations?

24 Mr. Bolton: Senator, that was in the context of a  
25 larger statement, which, again, I don't have in front of me,

1 but which explained the circumstances that we faced at that  
2 conference, in 2001.

3 Senator Sarbanes: Well, I'm trying to get you to go  
4 outside of that particular issue. You're not prepared to do  
5 that, I take it?

6 Mr. Bolton: Not without the document in front of me,  
7 Senator. You know, that --

8 Senator Sarbanes: What's your general position on the  
9 NGOs --

10 Mr. Bolton: Well, I think people ---

11 Senator Sarbanes: -- and advocacy?

12 Mr. Bolton: I mean, I think anybody is free to  
13 advocate anytime they want.

14 Senator Sarbanes: But you don't think they -- you  
15 think it counters democratic theory if they do that, not  
16 working through the country, is that correct?

17 Mr. Bolton: I think -- well, I think this is an  
18 important question of democratic theory.

19 Senator Sarbanes: All right, now, who speaks for  
20 people in undemocratic countries?

21 Mr. Bolton: The issue --

22 Senator Sarbanes: If the NGOs can't present an  
23 advocacy position because they have to work through their  
24 government, who speaks for the people in undemocratic  
25 countries?

1           Mr. Bolton: Senator, the context -- well, I think it's  
2 permissible for them to speak for people in nondemocratic  
3 countries. The precise context I was speaking of was in  
4 democratic countries, where NGOs participate in the broad  
5 political process. I'm not confining it to the electoral  
6 process. They participate in the broad political process.  
7 The result is a policy that the government, of which they  
8 are citizens, espouses. And then the question is whether,  
9 having participated in that democratic process, they get a  
10 second bite of the apple.

11          Senator Sarbanes: Well, now, in the past, the U.S. has  
12 been at the forefront of encouraging the United Nations and  
13 other multilateral institutions actually to invite and  
14 welcome the participation of civil-society groups, albeit  
15 outside the formal decision-making process. I take it, from  
16 what you're telling me today, you have difficulty with that  
17 encouragement.

18          Mr. Bolton: I have difficulty when international  
19 organizations try to influence opinion within democratic  
20 societies. And I think some of the groups, not all of them,  
21 have that in mind. That's been very evident in some of  
22 their public statements. And I do think this is a -- this  
23 is an important question of democratic theory. Responsible  
24 government, representative government, rests on  
25 constitutional structures that define who participates, and

1       how. And, for us, as Americans, those structures are the  
2       foundation of legitimacy in government. And I think if  
3       those structures are disregarded, we have a potential  
4       problem.

5             Senator Sarbanes: So would you welcome -- I'll close  
6       with this question, Mr. Chairman; I see the red light is on  
7       -- would you welcome the participation of an NGO in the U.N.  
8       process if the NGO was speaking on behalf of peoples in an  
9       undemocratic country?

10            Mr. Bolton: I would not object to that.

11            Senator Sarbanes: You wouldn't.

12            Mr. Bolton: I would not.

13            Senator Sarbanes: Uh-huh. What is it you would object  
14       to?

15            Mr. Bolton: The second bite at the apple. In other  
16       words, the -- as I said before -- I guess that's about as  
17       clear as I can be on it.

18            Senator Sarbanes: Would you welcome an NGO from a  
19       democratic country speaking on behalf of the peoples of an  
20       undemocratic country?

21            Mr. Bolton: I don't have any trouble with that.

22            Senator Sarbanes: Even if it runs counter to the  
23       policy of the democratic country?

24            Mr. Bolton: I think -- I think that's a different  
25       circumstance. What I'm talking about is the challenge to

1 legitimacy --

2 Senator Sarbanes: All right --

3 Mr. Bolton: -- of representative --

4 Senator Sarbanes: -- thank you.

5 Senator Sarbanes: -- government.

6 Senator Sarbanes: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

7 The Chairman: Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

8 Senator Chafee?

9 Senator Chafee: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

10 Welcome, Mr. Bolton. You said all the right things in  
11 your opening statement. And one of them, you said that Kofi  
12 Annan -- Secretary General Kofi Annan had called. I'm  
13 curious, did he endorse your candidacy?

14 [Laughter.]

15 Mr. Bolton: He said -- well, I probably shouldn't get  
16 into it, but he said, "Get yourself confirmed quickly."

17 Senator Chafee: Well, I think that's important.

18 My question is having to do with your confirmation  
19 hearing in 2001, and you said that you felt that the  
20 admission of Taiwan to the United Nations would be  
21 consistent with this Administration's "one-China policy."  
22 You explained how Taiwan meets the requirements of  
23 statehood, and, therefore, entrance to the U.N. And you  
24 went on to compare our government's position on Taiwan to  
25 our prior positions on Germany and the two Koreas.

1           The one-China policy has been successful due to  
2           consistent and partly ambiguous statements by government  
3           officials. A careful balance of words has to be struck in  
4           order to help preserve the relationships we have with both  
5           countries, and their confidence that current actions on our  
6           part are intended to help strike a balance across the  
7           Straits.

8           I would like to know how you would balance these  
9           competing interests of wishing to support our democratic  
10          ally, Taiwan, and trying to gain various concessions from  
11          the People's Republic of China.

12          Mr. Bolton: Well, Senator, perhaps I could answer your  
13          question by falling back a little bit on the subject of the  
14          comments I had made on Taiwan during my time as a private  
15          citizen in think-tanks and so on, where I was expressing my  
16          opinions as a private citizens on -- and without the  
17          responsibility of being a government official. And I think  
18          I was -- in the 2001 hearing, I still had the luxury of  
19          being a private citizen, and I was discussing it at that  
20          point. I think I can say that this is a good example of  
21          something where I've had an opinion, and I've expressed it.  
22          I don't back away from the opinion. But time and tide have  
23          moved on. President Bush has expressed his view on the  
24          relationship between Taiwan and China. He's made it clear  
25          the Administration has supported Taiwan as observer in the

1 World Health Organization, but that he doesn't go beyond  
2 that. And I accept that.

3 I think when a person comes into the government, either  
4 fresh or when you go into a new position, just because  
5 you've had an opinion ten years before doesn't give you the  
6 chance to say, "Okay, let's start over at square one and  
7 talk about my opinions." I'm not a golfer, but I think the  
8 metaphor is, you have to play it as it lays. And I know  
9 what the President's policy is, and I'm prepared to follow  
10 it.

11 Senator Chafee: Well, thank you very much.

12 As the Six-Party talks commenced with North Korea, you  
13 gave a speech that some would say undermined the stated  
14 policy of the State Department at the time. And there was a  
15 bit of a dispute with Mr. Pritchard and him saying, "Those  
16 are your own personal views." Ultimately, he resigned. Can  
17 you tell us what happened there? Especially in view of  
18 saying that you like to play it as it lies, using the golf  
19 metaphor.

20 Mr. Bolton: Senator, on that speech, I can assure you  
21 that speech was fully cleared within the appropriate  
22 bureaucracy and was given in Seoul. People knew it was  
23 coming for weeks, and the timing of it. And I can tell you  
24 what our Ambassador to South Korea, Tom Hubbard, said after  
25 the speech. He said, "Thanks a lot for that speech, John.



1 It'll help us a lot out here."

2 Senator Chafee: Why would Mr. Pritchard take exception  
3 to that?

4 Mr. Bolton: Probably his --

5 Senator Chafee: His position at the time was Special  
6 Envoy for Negotiations with North Korea. He's the point  
7 man.

8 Mr. Bolton: Probably for the same reason he resigned  
9 from the Administration. I don't think he agreed with the  
10 President's policy. I respect Mr. Pritchard, but I don't  
11 think he agreed with the President's policy.

12 Senator Chafee: Was the State Department policy at  
13 odds with the President's policy?

14 Mr. Bolton: Not at that point, no. I think -- and, as  
15 I say, the speech was cleared within the State Department  
16 and throughout the interagency.

17 Senator Chafee: Well, the ramifications from that  
18 dispute were that, at the time, some of the top diplomats in  
19 China were saying that United States does not have a  
20 negotiating strategy, and they considered the United States  
21 their main obstacle -- these are their quotes, back at the  
22 time -- to progress on these Six-Party talks. And one of  
23 their diplomats, Chinese -- People's Republic of China  
24 diplomats said, "How the U.S. is threatening the DPRK, this  
25 needs to be further discussed in the next round of talks."

1       He says, "Washington's negative policy towards North Korea  
2       is an impediment." So the ramifications of this dispute  
3       seem to be impeding our progress as we try and work with  
4       North Korea.

5           Mr. Bolton: Well, I think that North Korea has taken  
6       exception to a number of things that we've said. They took  
7       exception to the President putting them in the "axis of  
8       evil." Most recently, they took exception to Secretary Rice  
9       calling them an "outpost of tyranny." I think that the fact  
10      is, though, that, as I say, the speech was in preparation  
11      for quite some time. It was known within the Department of  
12      State. Everybody who should have had a chop on it, did have  
13      a chop on it. And it was given with the full knowledge and  
14      understanding of the Department, as a whole.

15           I think -- I don't mean to underestimate, at all, the  
16      difficulty of working these Six-Party talks. It's something  
17      that the President is very committed to. We've worked hard  
18      on it. We've worked particularly hard with China, which has  
19      been the host of three rounds of the Six-Party talks.  
20      Secretary Rice, as you know, was recently there, and worked  
21      hard with China to try and get the North Koreans back to the  
22      negotiating table. It's now been ten months since the last  
23      round of Six-Party talks, and we've been prepared, for quite  
24      some time, to sit down and resume those talks.

25           Senator Chafee: Well, very good. On the positive

1 side, certainly one of the initiatives you had at the State  
2 Department, which you were rightfully praised for, is the  
3 Proliferation Security Initiative. And the PSI is a global  
4 effort that aims to stop shipments of weapons of mass  
5 destruction, the delivery systems, and related materials  
6 worldwide. The PSI uses existing authorities, national and  
7 international, to defeat proliferation. And you worked in a  
8 multilateral fashion on this proposal. Ten other countries  
9 -- Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The  
10 Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom -- all  
11 agreed initially to PSI, and 60 more have signed on since.

12 But you have said that you are loathe to call it an  
13 organization. You call it an activity. And you said, in  
14 Tokyo, "Our goal with the PSI is based on an equally simple  
15 tenet, that the impact of states working together in a  
16 deliberately cooperative manner would be greater than the  
17 states alone in an ad-hoc fashion." And this statement  
18 would seem to point to your support of the kind of  
19 cooperation a body like the U.N. can foster.

20 Can you outline your feelings on the best way to set up  
21 multilateral agreements?

22 Mr. Bolton: Well, I think PSI is an example of a  
23 flexible approach to a very serious problem. And, as you  
24 indicated, there's no doubt in our minds that international  
25 trafficking in weapons and materials of mass destruction can

1       only be addressed in a multilateral fashion. The United  
2       States acting alone simply is unable to stop that  
3       international trafficking. That's why we began with our  
4       original 11-country core group to put together the statement  
5       of interdiction principles and then to try and persuade  
6       others to accept the PSI.

7             I think that -- and we've had some notable successes,  
8       not least of which was the interception of the ship, the BBC  
9       China, which I think played a material role in Libya's  
10      strategic decision to give up the pursuit of nuclear  
11      weapons. And I think the lesson that I derived from PSI and  
12      from the G8 Global Partnership is that you can conduct  
13      multilateral activity effectively without large  
14      bureaucracies. That's not to say that, in some cases, you  
15      don't need bureaucracies. The IAEA that Senator Hagel asked  
16      me about a minute ago is an example. You need experts in an  
17      organization like that to build up their knowledge and  
18      conduct operations over a long period of time. But surely  
19      you can do this without large bureaucracies that don't  
20      deliver effectively.

21            And so, I think there's always room for improvement in  
22      bureaucracy, and the lesson I draw from PSI is, the leaner  
23      you make the operation, the more successful you're likely to  
24      be.

25            Senator Chafee: And can you make some relationship to

1       how you'll work now with the United Nations, which is a  
2       gigantic bureaucracy?

3           Mr. Bolton:  Yeah, well, I hope -- I hope the lesson of  
4       PSI is that you can take what many people thought at the  
5       time was a pretty controversial idea, the physical  
6       interdiction of weapons or materials of mass destruction in  
7       international commerce, explain that we were prepared to do  
8       it entirely consistently with existing international and  
9       national authorities, and rally support for it.  I think  
10      that's the kind of thing that I had a small hand -- I was a  
11      junior official at the time in first President Bush's  
12      Administration, when he and Secretary Baker rallied the  
13      Security Council and the international community to the  
14      series of resolutions that led to the ouster of Saddam  
15      Hussein from Kuwait.  But I think that is possible.  I think  
16      that's what our objective should be.

17           Senator Chafee:  Thank you very much, Secretary.

18           The Chairman:  Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.

19           Senator Dodd?

20           The Chairman:  The Chair calls for order.  The hearing  
21      is adjourned until order is restored.

22           [Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

23           [Whereupon, at 11:14 a.m., the hearing was resumed.]

24           The Chairman:  The hearing will recommence.

25           I now call upon the distinguished Senator from

1 Connecticut, Senator Dodd.

2 Senator Dodd: Does that come out of my time, by the  
3 way?

4 [Laughter.]

5 The Chairman: The full ten minutes are restored.

6 Senator Dodd: Timing's everything.

7 Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I have some opening  
8 comments, but I'd like to ask unanimous consent they be  
9 included in the record, if I may --

10 The Chairman: They will be included in the record in  
11 full.

12 Senator Dodd: -- and lay out some thoughts on this, on  
13 the nomination, generally, if we could.

14 [The prepared statement of Senator Dodd follows:]

15 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1           Senator Dodd: Secondly, let me just say, I think most  
2 of my colleagues -- I've been on this Committee for 24  
3 years. I've enjoyed working with several Members here  
4 during that entire period of time. I was trying to recall  
5 other occasions in this Committee when I've opposed a  
6 nominee, and I can't recall one. There have only been a  
7 handful. In fact, many of my colleagues on this side, I  
8 know, are disappointed from time to time when I've supported  
9 nominees of the Administration, not because I agreed with  
10 their views, but because I've generally embraced the view  
11 that Presidents, once elected, have a right to put together  
12 their official families, people who share their views. So I  
13 -- others have a different criteria, but that's generally  
14 been my point of view.

15           So I begin, Mr. Chairman, as I think you do, and others  
16 have over the years, with the assumption that if a President  
17 sends up a nominee here, that the Presidents begin, with my  
18 view, anyway, to be able to have that team, unless there are  
19 reasons which would disqualify an individual under any set  
20 of circumstances, not just their views with particular  
21 matter of policy; in this case, foreign policy.

22           I'd ask, as well, Mr. Chairman -- Mr. Bolton has made  
23 the request, and I don't think it's an unfair one at all --  
24 you may want to evaluate how to do this -- but I think all  
25 of these interviews and e-mails and so forth ought to be

1 made a part of the public record. And I'll make the  
2 request. If you want to think about that, Mr. Chairman,  
3 I'll -- before you want to respond to it, but I'd make the  
4 request, because I think it deserves to be out there in the  
5 public domain so that people can have a full opportunity to  
6 review what's been said, what are in e-mails, what other  
7 witnesses -- we've interviewed some; I think the staff have  
8 jointly -- some six different people, who bring a particular  
9 set of facts regarding what I think are the most serious  
10 allegations about your nomination, and that is the  
11 allegation that you tried to have two analysts removed from  
12 their jobs because you disagreed with their intelligence  
13 conclusions. That, to me, is, in this environment we're in  
14 today, Mr. Bolton, I would say, putting aside your views  
15 about the United Nations and other things -- if that is  
16 true, then I don't think you have a right to serve in a high  
17 post. I think it would be unfortunate to set the example,  
18 in this day and age, when we're trying to get the best  
19 intelligence we can, if you tried to remove someone.  
20 Whether or not you were successful or not is not the issue.  
21 Trying to rob a bank and failing to do so is not -- is a  
22 crime, in my view. Trying to remove someone, as an analyst,  
23 from their job, because you disagree with what they're  
24 saying, I think, is dreadfully wrong. And you've got an  
25 opportunity to defend yourself here, and I want to get to



1 the bottom of it if we can.

2 Now, you've made the statement, in response to Senator  
3 Biden, that you did not try to -- or you did try to remove  
4 -- or at least you recommended that these two individuals --  
5 one we've talked about, Mr. Westermann; the other we'll just  
6 call an intelligence officer, because his name should be  
7 kept private. Is that -- did I hear you correctly when you  
8 responded to Senator Biden?

9 Mr. Bolton: I don't think so, Senator, respectfully.  
10 The way you put it, at the beginning, was that I tried to  
11 have people removed because of their -- because I disagreed  
12 with their intelligence conclusions, and that's not true.

13 Senator Dodd: You thought because they went behind  
14 your back --

15 Mr. Bolton: I thought in -- I thought, in both cases,  
16 if I may say so, their conduct was unprofessional and broke  
17 my confidence and trust, which I think -- I think is  
18 important in all professional relationships, especially in  
19 ones involving intelligence.

20 Senator Dodd: Let me address that particular point.  
21 Now, as I understand it, Mr. Westermann, who, by the way,  
22 has a distinguished background, is highly regarded by his  
23 peers -- and I'll lay that out for the record hearing here,  
24 going back and interviewing his superiors and others over  
25 the years. As I understand it -- and you correct me if I'm

1       wrong, now -- that this going behind your back -- Mr.  
2       Westermann sent an e-mail to your Chief of Staff, as I  
3       understand it now, Frederick Fleitz -- is that how you  
4       pronounce his name?

5             Mr. Bolton: That's correct.

6             Senator Dodd: He sent an e-mail in February to your  
7       Chief of Staff that tried to alert your assistant that you  
8       were probably going to have trouble getting the language  
9       cleared that you wanted to include, and suggested  
10      alternative language, at that time, to him. Your assistant,  
11      Mr. Fleitz, pressed to have the language sent out for  
12      clearance. So Mr. Westermann did so, at the suggestion of  
13      your Chief of Staff. The submission to the Intelligence  
14      Committee made clear the language that you wanted cleared.  
15      It was also -- contained Mr. Westermann's suggested  
16      alternative language. Now, all due respect, how is that  
17      going behind your back?

18            Mr. Bolton: You know, Senator, a lot of the material  
19      that's in the --

20            Senator Dodd: Well, am I correct in my assessment of  
21      what occurred, that he did send an e-mail?

22            Mr. Bolton: I don't -- I don't know what the  
23      circumstances were. I've seen a lot of it, after the time.  
24      What I did was talk to Mr. Westermann's supervisor. I first  
25      called Mr. Ford. He was not in the office that day. I

1 forget the reason why. Carl Ford, the Assistant Secretary,  
2 the head of the Bureau. I then asked to speak to Tom  
3 Fingar, who was the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of  
4 the Bureau, the senior career official. And I said,  
5 basically -- I said, basically, "What's going on here?" And  
6 --

7 Senator Dodd: Did you call Mr. Westermann?

8 Mr. Bolton: I called -- I called him to find -- and he  
9 -- and he basically said he had -- he had sent something out  
10 into the clearance process without notifying us. So I put  
11 this to Mr. Fingar --

12 Senator Dodd: Well, you've made a statement he went  
13 behind your back.

14 Mr. Bolton: Yes, and --

15 Senator Dodd: Have you checked?

16 Mr. Bolton: I did. That's why I asked Mr. Fingar. I  
17 didn't know what the facts were. I asked Mr. Fingar, the  
18 senior career officer in the Bureau of Intelligence and  
19 Research, and he came back a couple of hours later with --  
20 he didn't know what the circumstances were, which is  
21 understandable, I think -- but he came back to me a couple  
22 of hours later with an e-mail that said that Mr.  
23 Westermann's behavior was, quote, "entirely inappropriate,"  
24 close quote. He said -- meaning -- referring to INR -- he  
25 said, quote, "We screwed up," close quote. And he said,

1 twice, "It won't happen again."

2 Senator Dodd: Let me -- let me just -- because I think  
3 that's important. You said that earlier. Mr. Brannigan,  
4 who is a staff member of the Chairman of this Committee, had  
5 an interview with Mr. Fingar over the last several days, and  
6 let me quote Mr. Brannigan's question to Mr. Fingar  
7 regarding this very point.

8 Mr. Brannigan, speaking now to Mr. Fingar, "You said  
9 that what Mr. Westermann did was entirely within the  
10 procedure. He was never disciplined. It was perfectly  
11 normal. That the only failure of his was lack of prudence.  
12 And then there is the e-mail to Mr. Bolton. You say it's  
13 entirely inappropriate, and we screwed up, and it won't  
14 happen again. That seems like a rather different  
15 assessment."

16 Mr. Fingar, responding to this question, in the last 72  
17 hours or so, "Well, I knew I was dealing with somebody who  
18 was very upset," speaking about you, sir. "I was trying to  
19 get the incident closed, which I didn't regard as a big  
20 deal. I knew John Bolton was mad. I assume when people are  
21 mad, they get over it, so I did lean over in the direction  
22 of, 'Sure, we'll take responsibility.' He thanked me for  
23 it. At least as far as I'm concerned in my dealings with  
24 Mr. Bolton, that closed it."

25 That's a different assessment. In fact, what Mr.

1 Fingar is saying is that the reason he said what he did was  
2 because you were furious.

3 Mr. Bolton: Well, I think the -- I mean, I basically  
4 thought the matter was closed when I got Mr. Fingar's e-mail  
5 saying, "It won't happen again." And I --

6 Senator Dodd: Well, then --

7 Mr. Bolton: -- take his --

8 Senator Dodd: Let me move you forward.

9 Mr. Bolton: May I just add one point?

10 Senator Dodd: Yeah, go ahead.

11 Mr. Bolton: The comments Mr. Fingar made the day of  
12 the incident, I took to be his opinion at the time. And I  
13 think that's the relevant point in time to look at. But I  
14 --

15 Senator Dodd: Yeah, well --

16 Mr. Bolton: -- but I agree with his point -- I agree  
17 with his concluding point.

18 Senator Dodd: Well, then Mr. Brannigan asked him  
19 again, "Were there any policies or procedures changed as a  
20 result of this incident?" Answer: "No."

21 Mr. Bolton: Senator, I have no idea what INR's  
22 policies are. That's why we gave it to INR, and that's why  
23 I asked Mr. Fingar to look into it. And his response back  
24 to me was, what happened was entirely inappropriate --

25 Senator Dodd: Well, let me take --

1           Mr. Bolton:  -- and that they --

2           Senator Dodd:  -- you seven months forward.

3           Mr. Bolton:  -- screwed up.

4           Senator Dodd:  Let me take you to September 2000.

5           That's February.  So the matter's over with in February, in  
6           your mind.  And yet in September of 2000, in a conversation  
7           that you had with -- let me get the quote here if I can --  
8           here it is now, in September, with Mr. Neil Silver.  Do you  
9           know who Mr. Neil Silver is?

10          Mr. Bolton:  Yes, I do.

11          Senator Dodd:  Right.  He was the direct supervisor for  
12          Mr. Westermann.

13          Mr. Bolton:  One level up, right?

14          Senator Dodd:  Right.  Okay?  So, in September, seven  
15          months later, now, all right?  Mr. Silver is in your office.  
16          All right?  And, again, here -- now, this is an interview  
17          done in the last few days here by the joint staff of this  
18          Committee.  September 2002, I think.  "Neil told me that, at  
19          the end of the meeting that he had with Mr. Bolton, Mr.  
20          Bolton took him aside and, out of the blue, said, 'And that  
21          Westermann fellow, we really would like him removed from his  
22          portfolio, and transferred.'"

23          Mr. Bolton:  This is Mr. Silver testifying?

24          Senator Dodd:  Well, this is Mr. Westermann talking  
25          about his interview with Mr. Silver.  By the way, that is

1       also corroborated in other documents we have here, from  
2       this, right here. This is also included, if you will, in  
3       the Report on U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar  
4       Intelligence Assessment on Iraq, page 278, paragraph (u),  
5       the third paragraph on that page. The analyst said, "Six  
6       months later, after the incident, with his new office  
7       director, met with the Under Secretary," speaking about  
8       yourself, "the Under Secretary asked to have the analyst  
9       removed from his current worldwide chemical and biological  
10      weapons portfolio. The analyst said he was not removed from  
11      his portfolio and did not suffer any negative effects  
12      professionally." That's seven months later, Mr. Bolton.

13           Mr. Bolton: Yes. And have you interviewed Mr. Silver?

14           Senator Dodd: Not yet. We've tried to. We're going  
15      to try interview --

16           Mr. Bolton: My recollection is that, for some period  
17      of time --

18           Senator Sarbanes: You do think he should be  
19      interviewed, right?

20           Mr. Bolton: I have -- absolutely.

21           Senator Dodd: Yeah.

22           Senator Sarbanes: Uh-huh.

23           Mr. Bolton: The -- for some period of time, there had  
24      been a vacancy. Mr. Silver came in to be the office  
25      director, and he asked to come up to pay a courtesy call on

1 me. I didn't ask for the meeting. And he wanted to come up  
2 and introduce himself. And I think my schedule was such  
3 that several months went by. But he came in September, and  
4 my recollection is that he said, you know, he hoped his  
5 office would work with the bureaus that reported to me, and  
6 asked if there had ever been any problems. And I thought,  
7 he had asked an honest question, I ought to give him an  
8 honest answer, which I did, and that --

9 Senator Dodd: So in September, it still bothered you.

10 Mr. Bolton: It was a -- it was a one-on-one meeting.  
11 It was a courtesy call. He said, "Have you ever had  
12 problems?" And I said, "Yes."

13 Senator Dodd: Yeah.

14 Senator Sarbanes: And did you say --

15 Mr. Bolton: But I had done nothing --

16 Senator Sarbanes: -- did you say to him you thought  
17 Westermann should be removed?

18 Mr. Bolton: I thought he should be given other  
19 responsibilities. I do recall, very specifically, with Mr.  
20 Silver, since he had obviously had no contact with this  
21 episode before. I said, "I wish Westermann no ill will.  
22 I'm not trying to affect him. I just have lost trust in  
23 him."

24 Senator Dodd: Well, let me tell you we've talked in  
25 the last few days. Now, you've made the statement --



1           The Chairman: Let me just ask --

2           Senator Dodd: Let me just finish on this, if I can,  
3           Mr. Chairman.

4           We've talked to Thomas Fingar, who is presently the  
5           Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research.  
6           We've talked to your Acting Chief of Staff, Mr. Fleitz. We  
7           have reports, at least, about the Neil Silver conversation.  
8           We've also spoken with Carl Ford. We've talked with Stuart  
9           Cohen, former Chair of the International Intelligence  
10          Council and the former boss of the nameless NIO. In every  
11          one of those instances, they claim, independently, that you  
12          asked for this man, Mr. Westermann, or this NIO, to be  
13          removed from their job. Every one of them have said this.  
14          These are your people, in some cases, who have said it.  
15          I'll quote 'em for you here.

16          Mr. Bolton: Senator, and that's one reason why I'd  
17          like all these transcripts to be released.

18          Senator Dodd: Well, I've asked unanimous consent they  
19          all be laid out there.

20          Mr. Bolton: So that the --

21          Senator Dodd: So I'm going to ask you once again, Did  
22          you ask for these two people to be removed from their jobs?

23          Mr. Bolton: No. I said that I wanted the -- in the  
24          case of Mr. Westermann, that I had lost trust in him, and  
25          thought he should work on other accounts.

1 Senator Dodd: What other portfolio did he have?

2 Mr. Bolton: In the case within INR, I think they're --

3 Senator Dodd: What's his portfolio?

4 Mr. Bolton: A lot of --

5 Senator Dodd: What's his --

6 Mr. Bolton: I don't know what his portfolio was.

7 Senator Dodd: He has one portfolio, biological weapons  
8 and chemical weapons.

9 Mr. Bolton: If you say so, Senator. I don't -- I  
10 don't know what his portfolio is.

11 The Chairman: All right. And the --

12 Senator Dodd: In the case --

13 The Chairman: -- Chair would like to ask that we  
14 continue this, maybe, in the next round.

15 And I'd like to recognize, now, Senator Allen.

16 Senator Allen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17 And thank you, Mr. Bolton, for being here. And I look  
18 forward to all the questions, back and forth.

19 Mr. Chairman, I have a statement I'd like to be made  
20 part of the record.

21 The Chairman: It will be made in part -- made in the  
22 record in full.

23 [The prepared statement of Senator Allen follows:]

24 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

25

1           Senator Allen: For those who are watching this  
2 hearing, you can cross-examine people in such a way that it  
3 makes it act as if it's something more than it is. The -- I  
4 don't think all of this questions on these individuals, and  
5 e-mails, would matter if Members didn't have, really, a  
6 disagreement with you, let's say, on what really matters.  
7 You are -- you have been appointed, or nominated, by the  
8 President to be our representative, the United States  
9 Representative to the United Nations. And I think we ought  
10 to focus on the big picture, and your record of performance  
11 on the big picture.

12           Senator Chafee brought up the admirable leadership you  
13 provided in the Proliferation Security Initiative, which  
14 garnered 60 nations in this effort. And that is something  
15 that showed initiative on your part, obviously essential to  
16 get other countries involved in it, and I think that's part  
17 of your record of performance, which I find very salutary,  
18 that, as you talked in your opening statement about  
19 supporting freedom and democracy, we want to, in my view,  
20 advance freedom and justice and, obviously, our security,  
21 and when the United Nations can be helpful, they can be; if  
22 not, find a method -- a way of doing it. And you have done  
23 that. As well as the G8 Summit, where you got other  
24 countries to match the United States' \$1 billion in the  
25 Cooperative Threat Reduction, or Nunn-Lugar Program.

1           You also played a central role in negotiating the  
2 Treaty of Moscow, which will reduce operationally-deployed  
3 nuclear weapons by two thirds. You also, in previous years,  
4 served in a variety of fronts, but one of the best things  
5 you did was -- is get the United Nations to repeal that  
6 odious U.N. resolution that likened Zionism to racism. And  
7 that's why I think groups like B'nai Brith and others are  
8 supporting you, as well.

9           You, I think, have the experience, you have the  
10 knowledge, you have the background and the right principles  
11 to come into the United Nations at this time. There's  
12 scandals right now. The Oil-for-Food scandal that I know  
13 Senator Coleman has just been a lead in the Senate in  
14 addressing. It is important that we have, for the United  
15 States, someone who will be advocating, forthrightly and  
16 honestly, the views of the American people. I guarantee  
17 you, the taxpayers out in the real world aren't so concerned  
18 about e-mails back and forth, and personnel disagreements,  
19 here, there, and the other; they care about what's going on  
20 with the money we're putting in the United Nations. Is the  
21 United Nations helpful for the advancement of freedom and  
22 justice? Can it be made into an organization more relevant  
23 to real people in the real world?

24           And I think the President, in selecting you, Mr.  
25 Bolton, has selected the absolute perfect person. The fact

1       that there has been controversy, the American people, they  
2       think that's probably good, because you'll bring a  
3       credibility to the United Nations that they sorely need.  
4       And I like the fact that you'll advocate our principles,  
5       you're not going to be seduced by empty, meaningless,  
6       courteous pontifications by international bureaucracies.  
7       And I like that. And that's important for the advancement  
8       of our ideals, and it -- as well as for others in the world.

9               Now, as has been discussed in a variety of ways, the  
10       United Nations -- even Kofi Annan has put forward some  
11       recommendations to reform and bring greater efficiency to  
12       the United Nations. Let me ask you how you would prioritize  
13       many of these needed changes at the United Nations, and how  
14       do those relate to the interests of the United States?

15              Mr. Bolton: Well, many of the governance changes  
16       discussed previously -- the Security Council, the reform of  
17       the Human Rights Commission -- these are all things that  
18       need attention. But I think, in terms of the management  
19       side of reform, one of the aspects that we tried to  
20       emphasize in the first Bush Administration, Bush 41, under  
21       the concept of "unitary U.N.," was to avoid the duplication  
22       and overlap and waste of resources that existed in many of  
23       the U.N. specialized agencies, funds, and programs, where  
24       many different agencies are doing the same thing, and, in  
25       effect, duplicating work, and in a very inefficient way.

1     And I think -- and I don't want to anticipate questions that  
2     may come later, but the Oil-for-Food Program, as it has  
3     evolved, has taught us a lot, I think, about the culture of  
4     the bureaucracy at the U.N. And just as we've learned  
5     through the Silverman-Robb report, and others, about the  
6     culture of some of our practices on the intelligence side, I  
7     think Oil-for-Food has told us a lot about the culture of  
8     the bureaucracy at the U.N., and emphasized why management  
9     reform is needed there.

10         And I think working with the other principal  
11     contributors in the Geneva group -- this is the group of  
12     countries that supply, typically, more than one -- each of  
13     them supplies, in the assessed budget, more than 1 percent  
14     of that budget -- and working with other concerned  
15     countries, that this is a real moment of opportunity to  
16     eliminate waste and duplication and overlap in the U.N.  
17     system, and to concentrate on performance-based evaluation  
18     for the services and the activities that the various U.N.  
19     agencies are involved in.

20         Senator Allen: Well, thank you. I'd -- the American  
21     people would never tolerate that sort of fraud and abuse  
22     that was in the Oil-for-Food Program in our own government,  
23     nor should we tolerate it in any organization that we fund  
24     with the taxpayers' money. And I think the concept of  
25     accountability and measurement -- or, you call it

1 "performance-based" -- is very important. I think it --  
2 what gets measured, gets better. And to the extent that  
3 that can be done with the United Nations, that's helpful.

4 Let me ask you this, since you worked on some of the  
5 proliferation issues. How do you envision the United States  
6 working with the United Nations, if possible, to realize a  
7 solution to the nuclear concerns that we have with North  
8 Korea, as well as with Iran?

9 Mr. Bolton: Well, on those two, specifically, when  
10 North Korea withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we  
11 worked in the IAEA Board of Governors and got a unanimous  
12 agreement that the question of North Korea should be  
13 referred to the Security Council, as the IAEA statute  
14 provides. Now, the Council has not taken action on North  
15 Korea, because of the pendency of the Six-Party talks. But  
16 I think the fact that the Security Council is there as a  
17 possibility is an important point to make, not just to North  
18 Korea, but to other countries that would attempt to achieve  
19 weapons of mass destruction.

20 In the case of Iran, we have worked hard, at the IAEA,  
21 to have the matter of Iran referred to the Security Council,  
22 because its pursuit of nuclear weapons, as North Korea's  
23 pursuit of nuclear weapons, amounts to a clear threat to  
24 international peace and security. And I think one of the  
25 important steps that Secretary Rice was able to make, in

1 just her first couple of weeks on the job in providing  
2 certain commitments we made to the Europeans, was to  
3 receive, from the EU-3 in return, their very clear public  
4 statement in a report to their EU colleagues that they, too,  
5 would support a referral to the Security Council at an  
6 appropriate time if Iran did not make the strategic decision  
7 to give up nuclear weapons.

8 I think that weapons of mass destruction and terrorism,  
9 and the confluence of those two things, are the biggest  
10 threat to international peace and security that the  
11 civilized community faces. And the Security Council should  
12 play a role in that. That's the position I've taken within  
13 the Administration, within this -- within this  
14 Administration from the get-go.

15 Senator Allen: Well, thank you.

16 Mr. Chairman, I appreciate those remarks, because I  
17 think that these are the issues that matter most with the  
18 United Nations and for our own security. It will be  
19 proliferation of arms, weapons of mass destruction, as well  
20 as nuclear proliferation.

21 Your record is one that is exemplary in that area.  
22 Also, that of advocating freedom for all people, regardless  
23 of their background and culture, throughout the world, which  
24 I think can be very -- where the United Nations could be  
25 very helpful. If they're not, then we have to find other



1 approaches to doing so. And I think you've shown that, that  
2 capability.

3 Finally, just to follow up -- I think it was Senator  
4 Chafee, or maybe it was Senator Sarbanes -- insofar as  
5 Taiwan joining the World Health Organization, you support  
6 Taiwan joining the World Health Organization?

7 Mr. Bolton: The Administration's position has been to  
8 support Taiwan becoming an observer in the WHO.

9 Senator Allen: Right. Good. Thank you.

10 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11 Senator Sarbanes: Is that your position?

12 Mr. Bolton: Yes. I support that position.

13 Senator Sarbanes: I thought you supported their being  
14 a member.

15 Mr. Bolton: When I -- as I said before, when I wrote,  
16 as a private citizen, during the 1990s, that's what I said.  
17 And when I wrote it then, I understood it. The President  
18 has made his policy on this very clear, and I support his  
19 policy.

20 Senator Allen: Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I'd  
21 be, personally, happy if they were a member, but if we can  
22 have them as an observer, they certainly ought to be  
23 involved, especially with the SARS epidemic. They can be  
24 very, very helpful. And the fact that China is so paranoid  
25 about it should not be of any consequence when we're

1 concerned about world health.

2 The Chairman: Thank you, Senator Allen.

3 Senator Kerry?

4 Senator Kerry: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

5 With all due respect to Senator Allen, I just don't  
6 think that one can dismiss, or should dismiss, how one  
7 interprets intelligence and how one operates within a  
8 position of high responsibility as somehow not important to  
9 the American people. We've just come off the most massive  
10 intelligence failure in our history, and we recognize that  
11 there are serious questions still outstanding about the  
12 degree to which that intelligence was manipulated, or the  
13 degree to which a predetermined position determined the  
14 outcome of that intelligence. And so, it is vital to the  
15 security of the American people, whether or not Mr. Bolton,  
16 in his position, was party to the same kind of activities.  
17 And that's the question with respect to Mr. Westermann.

18 The fact is that on September 18th, in 2004, the Bush  
19 Administration using stringent standards -- and I'm quoting  
20 from the New York Times -- adopted, after the failure to  
21 find banned weapons in Iraq, conducted a new assessment of  
22 Cuba's biological weapons capacity, and concluded that it is  
23 no longer clear that Cuba has an active offensive big-  
24 weapons program. And so, that directly contradicted the  
25 position that Mr. Bolton took. And, in fact, Mr.

1 Westermann, was correct. And I think the American people  
2 deserve to have people, who are correct, not fired, but  
3 rewarded.

4 So that's what's at issue here. And it is in the  
5 interest of the American people to know that their  
6 intelligence is being properly sifted and vetted and  
7 listened to.

8 Now, I don't think that's the only reason to have  
9 questions and doubts about this nomination. I want to make  
10 that clear. It's only one of the issues. It's not the  
11 prime issue in my mind. There are much more serious and  
12 significant issues.

13 The ambassadorship to the United Nations is one of the  
14 most important, foremost diplomatic positions in the world  
15 today. And I think that it is critical that we have someone  
16 there who comes with both the respect for that institution  
17 and the reputation for diplomacy that is vital to American  
18 interests at this point in time.

19 I think we need somebody who believes in the United  
20 Nations, despite its flaws, and believes in that diplomacy  
21 and negotiation, and has a track record of effectiveness.  
22 And that track record of effectiveness is what we need to  
23 measure here today.

24 There are questions about Mr. Bolton's commitment to  
25 the United Nations, and his effectiveness. I'm not going to

1 go in -- I'd like to ask unanimous consent that the full  
2 text of my opening statement be put in the record.

3 The Chairman: Put in the record in full.

4 [The prepared statement of Senator Kerry follows:]

5 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1           Senator Kerry: But, you know, we've seen, certainly,  
2           some instance where, when Mr. Bolton wants to, he's  
3           effective. I think the PSI is a good effort, and I think  
4           there have been some positive advances for our country in  
5           that regard. But on two of the most critical proliferation  
6           issues facing us, both North Korea and Iran, Secretary  
7           Bolton opposed the idea of direct negotiations with each of  
8           these countries, even when our allies were asking us to do  
9           so. And that's an important part of the diplomatic effort  
10          that we're going to have to engage in, going forward.

11          At a critical moment with North Korea, in a speech that  
12          he gave in Seoul, that he attacked Kim Jung-Il, whom we all  
13          attacked, we all dislike, we all recognize is, you know,  
14          someone we'd love to see removed or in a different -- you  
15          know, not leading that country; but, on the other hand, at  
16          this critical moment, to almost 50 times in one speech  
17          personally vilify him, was to almost guarantee the outcome  
18          of the diplomatic effort that he was engaged in.

19          In North Korea, I think Mr. Bolton deserves a lot of  
20          the credit for the abandonment of the efforts that the  
21          Clinton Administration had made that effectively froze  
22          Pyongyang's plutonium program. Now, whatever you want to  
23          say about the cheating -- and we all understood that that  
24          was probably going on, including Bill Perry, who was  
25          negotiating it at the time -- nevertheless, we knew where

1       that plutonium was. We had inspectors in the reactor. We  
2       had television cameras in the reactor. Today, we don't.

3               There's been a huge increase in the nuclear capacity of  
4       North Korea, on your watch. And the question, legitimately,  
5       ought to be asked why you ought to be rewarded to go to an  
6       increasingly important position, given that. In fact,  
7       Senator Domenici raised those questions. Threat reduction  
8       programs are spread over the Departments of State, Defense,  
9       and Energy. I'm not going to belabor the Administration's  
10      refusal to heed the advice of the Baker-Cutler Commission to  
11      increase funding for threat reduction, but when the  
12      Committee met last year to hear from Mr. Bolton about threat  
13      reduction, the fact is that there's been a failure to  
14      dispose of nearly 70 tons of plutonium. That's enough for  
15      thousands of weapons. Our colleague, Senator Domenici,  
16      said, at that hearing, quote, "Why a program of this much  
17      global importance should be blocked by something as basic as  
18      liability remains beyond me. I've been amazed that the  
19      leadership of the United States and Russia cannot resolve  
20      this issue. Failure to resolve this issue is simply not  
21      consistent with the urgency that the Administration has  
22      attached to nuclear proliferation."

23             Senator Domenici took specific issue with Mr. Bolton's  
24      performance. He said, "I submit that Mr. John Bolton, who  
25      has been assigned to negotiate this, has a very heavy

1 responsibility, and I hate to say that I'm not sure, to this  
2 point, that he's up to it. If he doesn't think it's  
3 important enough to solve this issue of liability, then I  
4 submit that you ought to get somebody who can."

5 I also believe Mr. Bolton has made a selective reading  
6 of recent events. For instance, he frequently refers to the  
7 Libya model of counterproliferation. By his interpretation  
8 of events, a proliferating country makes a strategic  
9 decision on its own just to abandon nuclear weapons. And he  
10 suggests that that's what Iran and North Korea ought to do.  
11 Well, it would be wonderful if they did. But that's a  
12 distortion of the reality of what happened.

13 The fact is that the Clinton Administration and the  
14 British were long involved prior to this Administration and  
15 engaged in a dialogue with Libya. Libya was prepared to  
16 move, some time ago. And the fact is that the Libyan model  
17 represented a willingness of the United Kingdom to engage in  
18 a patient, frank, and secret dialogue that ultimately  
19 resulted in their giving it up. And some people have  
20 suggested publicly that Mr. Bolton engaged in an effort to  
21 try to scuttle that particular initiative.

22 So when you add the totality of statements made and  
23 beliefs about the United Nations, I think there are serious  
24 questions about the nomination.

25 Mr. Bolton, let me just ask you, Is it fair to say that

1       you really don't respect or believe in the institution of  
2       the United Nations?

3           Mr. Bolton: No, I think it's very inaccurate, and I'll  
4       just give you one example to show why it's not accurate.  
5       During the period, roughly, 1997 to 2000, I served, without  
6       compensation, as an assistant to former Secretary of State  
7       Baker, who, at that time, had been asked by Secretary  
8       General Annan to be his personal envoy for the Western  
9       Sahara. The U.N. peacekeeping force in the Western Sahara,  
10      MINURSO, which is -- it's a Spanish acronym -- had been  
11      created during the first Bush Administration, in the late  
12      spring or early summer of 1991, but had not been successful.  
13      And Secretary General Annan wanted to take advantage of  
14      Secretary Baker being out of office to see if he couldn't  
15      help resolve the matter. And Secretary Baker called me -- I  
16      think it was in January of 1997 -- and asked if I would be  
17      willing to assist. He said, "I'm going to do this pro bono,  
18      so if you want to help, you're going to have to do it pro  
19      bono, too." And I said that I would. And Secretary --

20           Senator Kerry: But that's -- sorry, go ahead.

21           Mr. Bolton: Secretary Baker has just recently resigned  
22      his position; unfortunately, in my judgement. He devoted an  
23      awful lot of time to it.

24           The reason I worked for him again, for the United  
25      Nations, for free was not because I ever expected to use it



1       in a confirmation hearing, or because I expected anybody to  
2       give me a pat on the head; I did it because I thought that  
3       the U.N. peacekeeping operation in the Western Sahara could  
4       bring a resolution to the uncertainty of the status of that  
5       territory and get those tens of thousands of refugees who  
6       have been in the Sahara Desert for decades --

7             Senator Kerry: But my question to you --

8             Mr. Bolton: -- back to their homeland.

9             Senator Kerry: -- is not --

10            Mr. Bolton: That's what I worked for.

11            Senator Kerry: My question to you is not whether or  
12       not you have selectively chosen, here and there. As I said  
13       a moment ago, there's a selectively to your approach, as  
14       there was, evidently, in your belief about the intelligence  
15       with respect to Cuba. When it serves a particular purpose,  
16       you adopt it; but, generically, over the long history, your  
17       writings, your comments, your public statements, your  
18       speeches, your interviews about the United Nations have been  
19       disdainful of it.

20            I mean, you have said, "There's no such thing as the  
21       United Nations."

22            You've said, "There's an international community that  
23       occasionally can be led by the only real power in the  
24       world," and you point to the United States as essentially  
25       being the United Nations.

1           You've said, "If the U.N. Secretary building in New  
2           York lost ten stories, it wouldn't make a bit of  
3           difference."

4           You've said that you would have one permanent member of  
5           the Security Council, because that's the real reflection of  
6           the distribution of power in the world.

7           You've said that you not only don't care about losing  
8           the General Assembly vote, but it actually -- you see it as  
9           a "make my day" outcome.

10          How do these statements reflect a respect for the  
11          United Nations and empower you to go there and have other  
12          people believe you're there to enhance it?

13          Mr. Bolton: Well, first, Senator, a lot of those  
14          statements are not accurate reflections of what I've said.  
15          Second --

16          Senator Kerry: You said them. Do you deny saying  
17          them?

18          Mr. Bolton: Yes. I can -- I can think of several that  
19          are --

20          Senator Kerry: You didn't say those statements.

21          Mr. Bolton: -- quoted out of context, and I'd be happy  
22          to address them. But my larger point is --

23          Senator Kerry: Well, they're direct quotes. They're  
24          right off tapes. There's -- I mean, how is the context out  
25          of context?

1           Mr. Bolton: Well, for example, the last -- I believe,  
2           the last one you mentioned had to do with the loss of the  
3           U.N. vote, which comes from an article that I wrote in the  
4           1990s at a time when, under the U.N. financial regulations,  
5           U.S. --

6           Senator Kerry: But that's precisely what you wrote.

7           Mr. Bolton: Well, and --

8           Senator Kerry: I can quote the whole article for you.

9           Mr. Bolton: -- and --

10          Senator Kerry: -- I have it here.

11          Mr. Bolton: I would like to put the whole article in  
12          the record, because, at the end of the article, what I say  
13          is, there is a solution to this problem of the U.S.  
14          arrearages that can result in the U.S. not losing its vote.  
15          And the solution, if I may just elaborate on it, was to take  
16          the very extensive in-kind contributions that the Department  
17          of Defense had made to U.N. peacekeeping operations  
18          beginning in the early 1990s, but for which we had not  
19          charged the United Nations, and, in effect, restate the  
20          books of the U.N. to reflect that reality. This is  
21          analogous to things that were done for China, Russia, and  
22          France, in circumstances over the years, to bring -- to  
23          eliminate their contested arrearages account. So, in that  
24          case, I wasn't say it would "make my day" to lose the vote;  
25          I proposed a way to -- so as not to lose the U.S. vote.

1           Senator Kerry: Well, we need to come back to this. My  
2 time is up.

3           The Chairman: Thank you very much, Senator Kerry.

4           Now, the Chair would just like to outline the roadmap  
5 until we recess.

6           Senator Sarbanes: Another roadmap?

7           The Chairman: Exactly.

8           [Laughter.]

9           The Chairman: This is the Bolton-hearing roadmap.

10          Senator Sarbanes: I'm not sure we can handle the  
11 roadmap we --

12          The Chairman: All right.

13          Senator Sarbanes: -- already have.

14          The Chairman: We will hear from Senator Coleman, in  
15 order, and then each of the four Democratic Senators who are  
16 here, because you've patiently waited for this period of  
17 time. And by 12:30 or 12:40, we'll have been three hours in  
18 the hearing. Then we will commence again this afternoon  
19 with another round of ten-minute questioning.

20          Senator Coleman?

21          Senator Coleman: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

22          I really want to talk about U.N. reform. I'd like to  
23 get, if I can, kind of, the nitty-gritty of -- but before I  
24 do, I want to just -- kind of, for the purpose of clarifying  
25 the record, I want to go over a couple of things, just to

1       make sure that I understand them.

2               We've had a lot of discussion about Westermann. And,  
3       for some, the issue is whether you lost confidence in  
4       someone, and the ramifications of that. For others, it may  
5       be how one interprets intelligence. If I can just walk  
6       through it.

7               As I understand, 2002, you were going to give a speech  
8       on weapons of mass destruction in countries on the terrorist  
9       list.

10              Mr. Bolton: That's correct.

11              Senator Coleman: And, at that point, was that the  
12       process is, if you're going to give a speech, you've got to  
13       run it through folks to make sure that it's -- if there's  
14       classified information on that, that that's not in there; if  
15       anything has to be declassified -- but you run it through a  
16       process, and part of that is intelligence services,  
17       including those within the State Department, get a chance to  
18       review that. Is that the way the process works?

19              Senator Biden: Will the Senator yield on an important  
20       point? The speech doesn't have to be reviewed, does it?  
21       Only the portions of the speech that cite intelligence --

22              Mr. Bolton: There are two -- there are two issues  
23       here. The first is, in the case -- can I say one thing  
24       first? This speech was not about Cuba. It was about a  
25       whole range of countries -- Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and

1 North Korea. The question, in the case of Cuba, arose  
2 because the U.S. Government had not said anything publicly  
3 about Cuba's BW efforts in a number of years. There was  
4 classified information in various publications of the  
5 intelligence agencies that discussed that. So to say  
6 anything about Cuba, you have to -- it was necessary to get  
7 agreement by the intelligence agencies --

8 Senator Biden: Right.

9 Mr. Bolton: -- that they would declassify it. And  
10 this is -- this is, I want to say, is an entirely legitimate  
11 and important step, because the sensitivity of sources and  
12 methods that might be involved, particularly at a time, you  
13 know, when we just had the arrest and then confession of the  
14 spy, Ana Balen Montes, a Cuban spy -- the intelligence  
15 agencies were going to be concerned that nobody say anything  
16 in an unclassified environment that would compromise sources  
17 and methods.

18 And so, the first step, Senator, was, in the case of  
19 language about the Cuba BW situation, to see if there --  
20 frankly, if there was anything that the intelligence  
21 agencies would agree upon to say.

22 Senator Coleman: And your concern with Mr. Westermann  
23 was that, in his review of it, he offered his own views, he  
24 indicated INR does not concur, added some alternative  
25 language, and you found out about that after the fact?

1           Mr. Bolton: That's correct. That's what I thought was  
2 "behind my back."

3           Senator Coleman: So you --

4           Senator Biden: Excuse me, if I can ask -- this is --  
5 I'm not taking issue; I just want to make sure -- I'd ask  
6 unanimous consent that this not be on the Senator's time --  
7 and that is, I want to make clear, Mr. Westermann did not  
8 have access to your whole speech, did he?

9           Mr. Bolton: The question at the time was the  
10 declassification. The whole speech was later cleared by the  
11 Bureau of Intelligence --

12          Senator Biden: That's not my --

13          Mr. Bolton: -- and Research.

14          Senator Biden: -- question. I just -- I'm not taking  
15 issue --

16          Mr. Bolton: The whole speech wasn't written then.

17          Senator Biden: No.

18          Mr. Bolton: It wasn't a speech then, basically.

19          Senator Biden: But if the process -- it's really  
20 important we're all on the same page and understand the  
21 process, to give you a fair shake here -- the process is,  
22 your staff sends to INR the portion of what you're  
23 considering saying about biological weapons relating to  
24 Cuba. They do not send the whole speech, right? It's just  
25 -- it's -- in fact, it was basically a paragraph, is that

1 not correct?

2 Mr. Bolton: It was language taken from existing  
3 intelligence reports --

4 Senator Biden: Right.

5 Mr. Bolton: -- put together. And this was --

6 Senator Biden: Right.

7 Mr. Bolton: -- to be -- the declassification  
8 procedures. This is then, in turn, sent to INR, which is --

9 Senator Biden: Gotcha.

10 Mr. Bolton: -- the function within the State  
11 Department that deals with --

12 Senator Biden: Last interruption --

13 Mr. Bolton: -- intelligence.

14 Senator Biden: -- Mr. Chairman. The only point I want  
15 to make is, there was -- Mr. Westermann was not commenting  
16 on your speech; he did not have a copy of a speech. He had  
17 a copy of the material that had been gathered by the  
18 intelligence community relative to BW, biological weapons,  
19 in Cuba that you might or might not be attempting to use in  
20 a public way, and this had to be cleared, correct?

21 Mr. Bolton: No, no, no. I mean, had the language been  
22 declassified, that would have been the language used in the  
23 speech.

24 Senator Biden: No, I got it. But it wasn't.

25 Mr. Bolton: And so --



1           Senator Biden: That's the point.

2           Mr. Bolton: -- it was -- but the --

3           Senator Biden: It needed to be cleared, right?

4           Mr. Bolton: It needed -- it's a two-step process.

5           First was, the language had to be declassified. And,

6           because of the sensitivity of intelligence --

7           Senator Biden: Right.

8           Mr. Bolton: -- sources and methods, the -- what was

9           agreed to be declassified was the only intelligence material

10          that I would use. So, in a sense, had they declassified

11          what was derived from their own reports, that would have

12          been what was in the speech.

13          The Chairman: Let me just say, now, that the Chair has

14          felt these questions were relevant, but I'm hopeful that we

15          can stay within our time limit. We're going to have more

16          opportunities. And in fairness to each one of us, we ought

17          to observe that.

18          Back to Senator Coleman.

19          Senator Coleman: Thank you.

20          Just to conclude, then. So, Westermann has this piece

21          of this -- does he send this request to other agencies with

22          his own notations in it?

23          Mr. Bolton: That's my understanding.

24          Senator Coleman: And that -- and you found out about

25          that after the fact, and so you lost confidence in him.

1           Mr. Bolton: Yeah. I mean, occasionally there's --  
2 another way to have done this would be -- it's not unheard  
3 of; it does happen once in awhile, for the State Department  
4 to have one view. If he had had a different -- he could  
5 have come to my office, to my staff, and said, "Look, let's  
6 work this out," and he didn't -- that's what caused me to  
7 lose confidence --

8           Senator Coleman: This is not an issue of interpreting  
9 intelligence, is it?

10          Mr. Bolton: It has nothing to do with the substance of  
11 intelligence, the analysis, or anything -- there's no  
12 substantive disagreement here.

13          Senator Coleman: And, in fact, as I understand it, the  
14 speech actually was supposed to be given on May 6th. It was  
15 ultimately given later. But the information in question,  
16 was that actually -- that information the language delivered  
17 to the Foreign Relations Committee on March 19th --

18          Mr. Bolton: Essentially --

19          Senator Coleman: -- by Assistant Secretary of State  
20 Carl Ford?

21          Mr. Bolton: -- essentially, exactly the same language,  
22 yes.

23          Senator Coleman: So, again, we're not talking about  
24 interpreting intelligence here.

25          Mr. Bolton: It's not a disagreement about the

1 substance of the intelligence. In fact, when Assistant  
2 Secretary Ford testified again before this Committee in  
3 June, he was -- he said that the language in my speech -- he  
4 said, "That language was our language, the intelligence-  
5 community language, not his," meaning not mine.

6 Senator Coleman: Mr. Bolton -- Secretary Bolton, is  
7 there any question -- do you have any question whatsoever  
8 about your commitment to the mission of the United Nations  
9 in taking this position?

10 Mr. Bolton: Absolutely not.

11 And to finish, in part, if I can, and answer to Senator  
12 Kerry, the consistent theme of my writings, consistent theme  
13 of my writings, is that for the U.N. to be effective, it  
14 requires American leadership. I say it over and over again.  
15 I deeply believe it.

16 My criticisms during the 1990s were, in large measure,  
17 because of what I thought was the lack of effective American  
18 leadership.

19 Senator Coleman: And in terms of the U.N., itself,  
20 it's fair to say that it's legitimate to be disdainful of  
21 the United Nations action of comparing Zionism with racism.

22 Mr. Bolton: Yeah, I thought -- I don't think there's  
23 any doubt, that is the greatest mistake the United Nations  
24 ever made. And I can tell you, it was very much my view,  
25 but also the view of Secretary Baker and President Bush 41,

1 we wanted to repeal "Zionism is racism" because it was the  
2 right thing to do, to -- it was -- it needed to be expunged.  
3 But we also knew that many Americans, across the political  
4 spectrum, understood "Zionism is racism" to be an emblem of  
5 the U.N. When they thought of the U.N., they thought  
6 "Zionism is racism." And repealing that resolution was a  
7 prerequisite to getting past the -- in the minds of many  
8 Americans, the idea that the U.N. could be useful for  
9 anything. So it had a very important operational role, as  
10 well.

11 Senator Coleman: And, in fact, you know, as we kind of  
12 move to the present time, the Secretary General, himself,  
13 has said the U.N. needs reform. And I wanted to repeat what  
14 Senator Hagel said. I'm going to make the same comment. I  
15 strongly believe in the United Nations, but I think it's  
16 very legitimate to raise -- to criticize the United Nations  
17 that has Libya, at one time, as the Chairman of the Human  
18 Rights Commission, or a Human Rights Commission that has  
19 Zimbabwe or the Sudan or Cuba, as part as the Human Rights  
20 Commission. They've been working the last couple of weeks,  
21 right now. And in 2005 we're finally hearing discussion  
22 from the Secretary General that maybe something -- not  
23 "maybe" -- that something is wrong. Does -- when Cuba or  
24 Zimbabwe or the Sudan are part of the Human Rights  
25 Commission, do you think that undermines the credibility of

1 the United Nations?

2 Mr. Bolton: I do. And I thank Secretary General Annan  
3 does, as well. I don't think there can be any question  
4 about it. That's why we need reform.

5 Senator Coleman: And let me focus, in the time I have  
6 in this round, a little bit on Oil-for-Food. You made the  
7 comment that it taught us about the culture of the  
8 bureaucracy. And let me back it up. You have a scandal,  
9 and one could argue about the amount of dollars, but it's  
10 all in the B's, with billions, that Saddam was able to put  
11 in his pocket because the Oil-for-Food Program was in  
12 effect. And it's pretty clear, from the first Volcker  
13 report, that Benon Sevon, who was in charge of the program,  
14 Kofi Annan's personal point person in charge of -- was on  
15 the take from Saddam Hussein. It's pretty clear, from the  
16 Volcker reports, that Secretary General's Chief of Staff  
17 destroyed three years' worth of documents. It's pretty  
18 clear from the OIOS audits that were done, that what you saw  
19 was massive mismanagement, massive mismanagement.

20 You made the comment that it taught us about the  
21 culture of the bureaucracy of the United Nations. What did  
22 you mean by that?

23 Mr. Bolton: Well, I think -- in terms of some of the  
24 specifics, I think it's important, from the Administration  
25 perspective, that we wait for the final Volcker report, and

1 we wait for the results of the investigations of all six of  
2 the -- I think it's six congressional committees that are  
3 looking -- that are looking into the matter. But I know,  
4 going back to my own time serving in the first President  
5 Bush's Administration, that the potential of the United  
6 Nations is often sadly diluted by the encrustations of  
7 bureaucracy that have grown up over the years. And it's  
8 very important that, in order to be able to justify the  
9 large amounts that Administrations every year request for  
10 Congress to appropriate, that we can make the case that we  
11 are acting to make the United Nations a more efficient and  
12 uncorrupt organization. And the United Nations, itself, is  
13 obviously concerned. The Deputy Secretary General Louise  
14 Frechette, said, a few weeks ago, "We hope we never get  
15 another Oil-for-Food assignment." I, personally, disagree  
16 with that. There may come a time when we want the United  
17 Nations to undertake something like this.

18 We had -- in the first Bush Administration, we imagined  
19 the Oil-for-Food Program, as set up under Resolution 706 and  
20 712, as very different from the program that was actually  
21 carried out. Saddam Hussein rejected 706/712. If it had,  
22 it would have been an even larger U.N. operation, because we  
23 didn't want to have the distribution of humanitarian  
24 assistance inside Iraq, in Iraq hands. We wanted it in U.N.  
25 hands.

1           But if you can't -- if you don't have the basic support  
2           and belief that the United Nations will function in an  
3           uncorrupt and effective fashion in the Congress of the  
4           United States, we'll never have the opportunity to do  
5           something potentially even bigger than the Oil-for-Food  
6           Program. So this is -- this, to me, is an urgent matter.

7           Senator Coleman: And reform really has to be in two  
8           parts. There's both the structural reform nature of the  
9           Security Council who's involved -- who are the members --  
10          Human Rights Commission, other things like that -- but then  
11          there's also the management side.

12          I'm going to just read a list of areas where it would  
13          be -- it's clear to me that the U.N. has to improve:  
14          performance measurement, program management, procurement,  
15          evaluation, monitoring. Are there -- can you respond to  
16          those? And are there things that are needed, in terms of a  
17          comprehensive management strategy that the U.N. should be  
18          looking at, or that we, in Congress, should be urging the  
19          U.N. to look at?

20          Mr. Bolton: Well, I think both of those are true. It  
21          think one thing that you might find interesting is, if you  
22          went back to the Thornburg report of 1993, when, again, the  
23          first President Bush persuaded former Attorney General  
24          Thornburg to become Under Secretary General for Management  
25          at the U.N. And after President Bush lost the '92 election,

1     Dick Thornburg was -- his one-year appointment was not  
2     extended. I guess that's the way I should put it. But  
3     before he left, he produced a report on his year experience  
4     at the U.N. and the kinds of management changes that he  
5     would recommend and that he would have endeavored to carry  
6     out, had he been there -- had he been able to stay. And it  
7     makes for -- it makes for good reading today.

8             I'm not saying that there aren't good people at the  
9     U.N., who work hard. And, in fact, the current Under  
10    Secretary General for Management, Cathy Bertini, is an  
11    American citizen and a long-time friend of mine. She's  
12    worked herself to the bone. But it requires a sustained  
13    effort of a long period of time, and I am very optimistic  
14    that, with the Secretary General, himself, weighing in,  
15    we've got a major chance of success here.

16            Senator Coleman: I'd like to continue that discussion  
17    in the next round, and also talk about the role of Congress.

18            Just one other thing for the record. There was a  
19    comment made that you didn't respond to. Is it your belief  
20    that, in the Clinton Administration, that North Korea froze  
21    its nuclear development program?

22            Mr. Bolton: I think the evidence is overwhelming that,  
23    while the United States and others were, sort of, looking  
24    down a soda straw at the plutonium facility, the plutonium  
25    storage -- the spent-fuel storage and reactors at Yongbyon,



1 the North Koreans had embarked on an aggressive procurement  
 2 program to acquire uranium enrichment capability that would  
 3 take them on a different road to nuclear weapons. And the  
 4 intelligence is far from clear, there's much that we don't  
 5 know. The only, I think -- but one -- the only real  
 6 question is, How early in time did the North Koreans begin  
 7 violating the agreed framework? It's something that we  
 8 talked about in 2001, Senator Kerry, as you remember.

9 Senator Kerry: Yeah, let me just make clear, if I can  
 10 insert, I didn't suggest they froze the nuclear program. I  
 11 said the plutonium program. Everybody knew the uranium  
 12 program was on the side.

13 The Chairman: Thank you very much, Senator Coleman.

14 Senator Feingold?

15 Senator Feingold: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

16 Secretary Bolton, in your testimony you indicate that,  
 17 if confirmed, you will make it your objective to provide  
 18 sustained and decisive leadership to create a stronger,  
 19 better, more effective U.N. In the same spirit as Senator  
 20 Kerry's opening remarks, I'm trying to square this idea with  
 21 your past statements, which really do suggest that you view  
 22 the U.N. as a deeply flawed institution. And I agree with  
 23 you, with that part of your assessment. It can sometimes  
 24 serve as a useful instrument for U.S. policy. But,  
 25 otherwise, you appear to believe that the U.N. is, at best,

1       irrelevant, and, at worst, harmful.

2               Now, I believe that we cannot effectively fight the  
3       terrorist threat before us without a strong multinational  
4       commitment to doing so. I also believe that getting the  
5       rest of the world to invest in what is our top priority,  
6       fighting terrorism, means that we probably have to convince  
7       them that we are also invested in their top priorities, like  
8       fighting poverty, fighting poverty in the developing world.  
9       But you have suggested that the United States should engage  
10      with the United Nations only when our vital interests are at  
11      stake.

12             Secretary Bolton, I think we have a vital interest, all  
13      of the time, in sustaining an effective institution where  
14      states can engage in the bargaining and the give and take  
15      necessary to sustain some sense of a shared global  
16      enterprise.

17             My first question is sort of a case in point. I  
18      understand that just last week in a public discussion among  
19      various countries at the Commission on Human Rights, a  
20      United States delegate objected to some language in the  
21      annual torture resolution. In particular, the delegate  
22      objected to language stressing that, quote, "Each state  
23      shall take effective measures to prevent acts of torture and  
24      other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment  
25      in any territory under its jurisdiction," unquote.

1           The delegate argued that, while the United States has  
2           an obligation under the Torture Convention to take effective  
3           measures to prevent torture, there is no obligation, no  
4           obligation, to take effective measures to prevent cruel,  
5           inhuman, or degrading treatment in the text of the treaty.  
6           Apparently, the Government of Pakistan was the only  
7           government present that actually supported this United  
8           States view.

9           Do you believe that the United States delegate took an  
10          appropriate, or even accurate, position in this case?

11          Mr. Bolton: Well, Senator, my honest answer is, this  
12          is the first I've heard of it. I don't -- I'd have to --  
13          I'd have to look at the words of the convention, and I'd  
14          have to understand what the nature of the debate was. And I  
15          will endeavor to do that and maybe try and get something  
16          over the lunch hour. I'm not --

17          Senator Feingold: Well --

18          Mr. Bolton: -- I'm not familiar with the --

19          Senator Feingold: Secretary, I gave you the words.  
20          The words state, "Each state shall take effective measures  
21          to prevent acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or  
22          degrading treatment or punishment in any territory under its  
23          jurisdiction." Our delegate, our representative from the  
24          United States, did not adhere to that position. That's very  
25          simple and straightforward. It's not a language issue. I

1 want you to tell me whether you believe that this is in the  
2 national security interest of the United States to take this  
3 kind of position.

4 Mr. Bolton: Senator, it's hard for me to believe that  
5 it is, but I think that -- but that's my opinion, sitting  
6 here today.

7 Senator Feingold: Let me switch to another issue  
8 involving issues concerning the U.N. in the past. We  
9 recently observed the 11th anniversary of the start of the  
10 Rwandan genocide. Much has been written about the decisions  
11 made by U.S. policymakers in the spring of 1994, when the  
12 Rwandan genocide began. I'd like you to comment a bit, if  
13 you could, on the manner in which the United States chose to  
14 use its influence at the U.N. in response to the emerging  
15 crisis, and on the manner in which the U.N. reacted to  
16 developments in Rwanda in 1994. Do you think that the U.S.  
17 and U.N. policymakers made mistakes in their responses?  
18 What should they have done differently?

19 Mr. Bolton: Well, I think there were mistakes all  
20 around, both on the part of the member governments and on  
21 the part of the United Nations. And I think that this is a  
22 case where the fallacy of false concreteness applies with  
23 particular force. I don't think that this is something that  
24 the United Nations, alone, was responsible for. I think the  
25 member governments had to take that responsibility.

1           Now, there is a lot of debate, and I've read articles  
2           on both sides about, logistically, when there was awareness  
3           of the genocide, what steps could have been taken, what our  
4           military could have done, that I think are unresolved. But,  
5           while there were clearly failures within the U.N.  
6           secretariat, I think that it's ultimately the Security  
7           Council that's responsible. The Security Council deployed  
8           the force into Rwanda, not the secretariat.

9           Senator Feingold: I want to pursue this more. I'm  
10          interested in how you think we should have done things  
11          differently. If you are confirmed, you would be at that  
12          Security Council.

13          Mr. Bolton: Yeah.

14          Senator Feingold: There are situations in Africa, at  
15          this moment, that some would argue -- in fact, our previous  
16          Secretary of State referred to it as genocide. What would  
17          you have done differently? Give me some sense of what you  
18          would do in these currently situations differently to try to  
19          avoid this kind of disaster.

20          Mr. Bolton: Well, I think the question, if you look at  
21          the contrasting situations in Burundi and Rwanda at about  
22          the same time, the mission of Ould Abdullah, the former  
23          Foreign Minister of Mauritania, in Burundi, was actually  
24          much more successful in working the politics inside Burundi  
25          and preventing the kind of tragedy that occurred inside

1 Rwanda.

2 I don't think that the dispatch of a U.N. peacekeeping  
3 force, alone, is indicative of -- necessarily, of success or  
4 failure. And I think, obviously, what happened inside  
5 Rwanda was a failure on multiple levels.

6 Senator Feingold: Let me try one more time. If you  
7 had been United States Ambassador to the U.N. at that time,  
8 knowing all that you know now, what action would you have  
9 taken?

10 Mr. Bolton: I'm not sure that I can honestly answer  
11 that, Senator, because we don't know, logistically, whether  
12 it would have been possible to do anything different than  
13 what the Administration did at the time. It is -- I think  
14 you have to ask the predicate question, What could have been  
15 done in the years beforehand that might have avoided the  
16 triggering of the genocide, itself? Once it started, as I  
17 say, there are serious people who argue that the bulk of the  
18 genocide was, and would have been, concluded before any  
19 outside presence could have been brought to bear. And I  
20 don't -- I know there are disagreements with that. I think  
21 it's not something I have the capability to --

22 Senator Feingold: Mr. Secretary, in theory, you could  
23 be sitting at that table very soon. I must say, your answer  
24 is amazingly passive considering what happened ten years ago  
25 and what may be happening in Sudan at this point.

1           Mr. Secretary, how do you think Secretary Powell's  
2       dramatic 2003 presentation to the United Nations regarding  
3       Iraq's weapons-of-mass-destruction programs affected United  
4       States credibility at the U.N. and in the international  
5       community? And what lessons can we draw from that episode?

6           Mr. Bolton: Well, if I could just add one word on the  
7       earlier point, on Sudan, I think the Administration has  
8       taken substantial effort. It was a very extensive  
9       diplomatic project to get the agreement between north and  
10      south that's now been signed, and the dispatch of the U.N.  
11      peacekeepers. And I think that's the kind of activity that  
12      was -- that might have made the difference in Rwanda. It's  
13      very hard to go back and secondguess, especially given the  
14      information that people had at the time.

15           In terms --

16           Senator Feingold: I don't -- let me just say, I don't  
17      think our actions to date -- this Administration's actions  
18      with regard to Sudan rise to that level, or even approach  
19      the efforts that need to be taken. But if you'd answer the  
20      question regarding Secretary Powell?

21           Mr. Bolton: Well, I think, unquestionably, the failure  
22      to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has led some  
23      people to question our goodwill and our credibility. We  
24      have worked hard, in the case, for example, of Iran and  
25      North Korea, to assure other governments that the

1 information that we have is the best that there is  
2 available. And I think that -- for those who deal with  
3 weapons-of-mass-destruction issues, that there is an  
4 understanding that the circumstances, the threat that we see  
5 from North Korea and Iran, is as real as is humanly possibly  
6 to know. But I also agree with the Silverman-Robb  
7 Commission conclusion that there is too little that we know  
8 about North Korea and Iran. That absence of information  
9 doesn't make me feel more comfortable, however.

10 Senator Feingold: That's a general answer, but I want  
11 to know, specifically, your reaction to the spectacle of  
12 Secretary Powell having presented this incorrect information  
13 to the world at -- in the United Nations, and what  
14 consequences that has had.

15 Mr. Bolton: I felt very sorry for him, after the fact.  
16 And I think it has had consequences. I think that there's  
17 no adverse consequences. There's no way of getting around  
18 it.

19 Senator Feingold: One more question. Are you arguing  
20 -- back to the Darfur issue -- are you arguing that the  
21 Administration has taken any effective action to stop  
22 genocide in Darfur?

23 Mr. Bolton: Well, I think the actions that have been  
24 taken have focused largely on locking in the North-South  
25 Agreement. I think that's critical, because the -- what's



1       happening in Darfur is not a subset of the North-South  
2       dispute, but that North-South dispute, as you know, went on  
3       for years and years and years. The question of the  
4       accountability of the government in Khartoum is critical, I  
5       think, to getting the situation in Darfur resolved, and it's  
6       why, contrary to what some have said, we did have, and  
7       pushed vigorously for, a mechanism to bring accountability.  
8       But we also pushed for the deployment of AU forces into the  
9       Darfur region, which was logistically the only option that  
10      we had available. And it would have been helpful, I think,  
11      if some of our colleagues on the Security Council had been  
12      more forthcoming on that score.

13           But this is something that the President has been --  
14      paid very close personal attention to. It's a matter -- it  
15      was a matter of highest priority for Secretary Powell, and  
16      it is for Secretary Rice.

17           Senator Feingold: I know my time's up, but let me just  
18      finish by saying, I happen to think that, as important as  
19      the North-South Agreement is with regard to Sudan, and it  
20      was very important that we focus on it, too often it's used  
21      as a reason not to address the Darfur issue, rather than as  
22      a foundation for dealing with it. So the notion that  
23      somehow this has been effective, in terms of putting in a  
24      situation to stop the genocide in Darfur, I think, is simply  
25      untrue.

1           Mr. Bolton: No, but I -- if I could, I think I agree  
2           with you on that point, Senator. I'm not saying that  
3           working about -- worrying about the North-South situation is  
4           an excuse for not doing anything in Darfur. I'm saying that  
5           if the North-South Agreement were to come unstuck, we would  
6           lose the advantage of that agreement and make it even more  
7           difficult than it's been to do anything about Darfur.

8           Senator Feingold: Well, that's a red herring. I asked  
9           about whether we've taken any effective action with regard  
10          to Darfur, and you did not indicate that we had, so I'm  
11          taking that as a no.

12          Mr. Bolton: But, if I could, because I think -- if I  
13          could just continue the answer -- I think that we have  
14          worked, in the Security Council and diplomatically, and  
15          certainly applied pressure to the Government of Khartoum.  
16          It's one of the reasons why we wanted the resolution on  
17          sanctions adopted by the Security Council, and why the  
18          Council's decision to adopt that resolution was so  
19          important.

20          I don't think we're satisfied. I don't want to leave  
21          the impression that we're satisfied that the situation has  
22          been addressed adequately. We've made some progress, but  
23          there is no dispute, Senator, that much more needs to be  
24          done.

25          Senator Feingold: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1           The Chairman: Thank you, Senator Feingold.

2           Senator Boxer?

3           Senator Boxer: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4           Senator Dodd is right when he said that we don't often  
5 vote no. I, myself, went back to the record. I've voted no  
6 three times out of hundreds that have come through this  
7 Committee, ambassadors and the rest, in the Bush  
8 Administration. So this is a serious moment for a lot of  
9 us. And I know it's difficult for you, Mr. Bolton, but --  
10 but we are where we are.

11          Mr. Chairman, I'm bewildered by this nomination, given  
12 the situation in the world, where the President has gone  
13 around the world to try to rebuild relationships, Secretary  
14 Rice has done that.

15          Mr. Bolton, I respect your commitment to public service  
16 -- I do -- and the good things you've done, among a whole  
17 list of things that maybe I didn't think were as good as  
18 some. But I have spent the last month extensively reviewing  
19 your writings, your public statements about the United  
20 Nations. And my overall assessment, Mr. Bolton, is that you  
21 have nothing but disdain for the United Nations.

22          Now, you can dance around it, you can run away from it,  
23 you can put perfume on it, but the bottom line is the bottom  
24 line. And I -- as Senator Biden said in his opening, it's  
25 hard for me to know why you'd want to work at an institution

1       that you said didn't even exist. You said, "It doesn't even  
2       exist." And you want to work there.

3               Now, there's a three-minute tape I would like to show,  
4       and use those three minutes of my time, because I think the  
5       American people need to see you away from this hearing,  
6       where you're parsing your words, and see you at this  
7       conference, where you were talking about the United Nations,  
8       Global Structures Convocation, Human Rights, Global  
9       Governance, and Strengthening the U.N. So I'd like us to  
10      watch that for the next three minutes and also make a point  
11      that I have all your whole statement here. They're brief.  
12      Everything you see here is not taken out of context at all.  
13      And I just think it's important for people to see this. So  
14      if we could roll that, it would be great.

15             [Presentation of video:]

16             Mr. Bolton [video]: Let me start off with what may  
17      seem a somewhat radical --

18             Senator Boxer: Louder, please.

19             The Chairman: Turn the volume up.

20             Senator Boxer: Louder.

21             Mr. Bolton [video]: -- if we could consider potential  
22      roles for the United Nations --

23             Senator Boxer: More.

24             Senator Biden: Get it all the way up.

25             Mr. Bolton [video]: -- that proposition is, there is

1 no such thing as the United Nations. There is an  
2 organization, which is composed of member governments. It  
3 does have an entity called the Security Council, which is  
4 principally responsible for international peace and security  
5 under the charter. But there is no "being" out there called  
6 the "United Nations." There is simply a group of member  
7 governments, who, if they have the political will every once  
8 in awhile to protect international peace and security,  
9 they're able to do it.

10 The point that I want to leave with you in this very  
11 brief presentation is where I started, is that there is no  
12 United Nations. There is an international community that  
13 occasionally can be led by the only real power left in the  
14 world, and that's the United States, when it suits our  
15 interest and when we can get others to go along. And I  
16 think it would be a real mistake to count on the United  
17 Nations as if it's some disembodied entity out there that  
18 can function on its own. When the United States leaves, the  
19 United Nations will fall. When it suits our interest to do  
20 so, we will leave. When it does not suit our interest to do  
21 so, we will not. And I think that is the most important  
22 thing to carry away tonight.

23 Second, if you think that there is any possibility in  
24 this country that a 51,000-person bureaucracy is going to be  
25 supported by most Americans, you'd better think again. The

1       secretariat building in New York has 38 stories. If you  
2       lost ten stories today, it wouldn't make a bit of  
3       difference.

4             The fact of the matter is that the international system  
5       that has grown up -- and, again, I leave out the World Bank  
6       and the IMF, because I do think they're in a separate  
7       category -- has been put into a position of hiring  
8       ineffective people who do ineffective things that have no  
9       real-world impact, and we pay 25 percent of the budget.

10            The League of Nations was a failure, because the United  
11       States did not participate. The United Nations would be a  
12       failure if the United States did not participate. And, in  
13       fact, I remember as vividly as if it were yesterday, right  
14       after Iraq invaded Kuwait, Jim Baker said to me, "We're  
15       going not make this United Nations work. We're going to  
16       find out whether it's a League of Nations or the U.N."

17            And that's the fact. And if you don't like it, then  
18       I'm sorry. The United States makes the U.N. work, when it  
19       wants to work, and that is exactly the way it should be,  
20       because the only question -- the only question for the  
21       United States is, What's our national interest? And if you  
22       don't like that, I'm sorry, but that is the fact.

23            [End of video presentation.]

24            Senator Boxer: Mr. Chairman, the reason I wanted to  
25       show that is many-fold. First, I think there's a little bit

1 of revisionist history going on here, in terms of the  
2 nominee's attitude toward the United Nations. I mean, I  
3 watch this, just as a human being, forget about the Senate  
4 part, and I see an anger, a hostility. Who would ever dream  
5 of saying, "If ten floors of a building were to disappear"?  
6 I mean, I wonder if you thought about the fact that 1400-  
7 plus Americans work in that building, who chose to in that  
8 building because they believe it's a worthy thing to try and  
9 bring peace to the world?

10 So I just feel that this nominee could do lots of other  
11 things for President Bush, I'm sure, and do them really  
12 well, but I don't see this. It just doesn't make sense.

13 And I guess, you know, this comparison that Secretary  
14 Rice made when she endorsed you and announced your  
15 appointment, she compared you to Jeanne Kirkpatrick and  
16 Daniel Moynihan. And I'd like to show you this comparison  
17 and see whether you think some of the things you said were  
18 inappropriate, wrong, or whatever.

19 This is what Dr. Rice said, "Through history, some of  
20 our best ambassadors have been those with the strongest  
21 voices, ambassadors like Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Daniel  
22 Patrick Moynihan."

23 And this is what Jeanne Kirkpatrick said, in 1981, "I  
24 do not think that one should ever seek confrontation. What  
25 I have every intention and hope of doing is to operate in a

1 low-key, quiet, persuasive, and consensus-building way."

2 And this is what you say, "The Secretariat building in  
3 New York has 38 stories. If you lost ten stories, it  
4 wouldn't make a bit of difference." You said, "There is no  
5 United Nations." "If we were redoing the Security Council,  
6 I'd have one permanent member, because that's the real  
7 reflection of the distribution of power in the world."

8 Now, do you disagree -- now, do you disagree with the  
9 statements that you made?

10 Mr. Bolton: Well, the tape that you just showed, and  
11 some of those statements, come from a panel discussion -- I  
12 think it was in 1994 -- before the World Federalists. The  
13 World Federalists believe in world government. And I do  
14 not.

15 Senator Boxer: I'm not interested in them. I'm  
16 interested in you.

17 Mr. Bolton: I was talking to that audience at the  
18 time, so that's what I'm trying to explain.

19 Senator Boxer: Well, you don't say different things to  
20 different audiences.

21 Mr. Bolton: I was -- no, I don't. What many of the  
22 World Federalists believe is that the U.N. is the nascent  
23 world government coming into being. And I don't agree with  
24 that, either. So what I was trying to do to that audience  
25 of World Federalists was get their attention, and the



1 comment about --

2 Senator Boxer: So you don't --

3 Mr. Bolton: -- the ten stories was a way of saying  
4 there's not a bureaucracy in the world that can't be made  
5 leaner and more efficient. I was --

6 Senator Boxer: Well, that isn't --

7 Mr. Bolton: -- trying to get their attention.

8 Senator Boxer: -- what you said. You said, "It  
9 wouldn't be missed." We can look at -- you know, what  
10 wouldn't be missed? Talk to us about that.

11 Mr. Bolton: I think a reduction in personnel is  
12 something that every manager and every government  
13 organization, every international organization should strive  
14 for, and that was the metaphor I was trying to come up with,  
15 as I say, to get their attention.

16 The question about -- as the -- you cut off the middle  
17 of my presentation in your showing of --

18 Senator Boxer: Well, I asked --

19 Mr. Bolton: -- the tape.

20 Senator Boxer: -- unanimous consent to put the entire  
21 statement in the record.

22 Mr. Bolton: I appreciate that.

23 The concept that I was addressing there is the problem  
24 of false concreteness, where many people say, "Well, the  
25 U.N. did that," or, "The U.N. did that." "The U.N. failed

1       here," or, "The U.N. succeeded here." And in the vast  
2       majority of cases, it's not a question of the U.N. qua U.N.  
3       succeeding or failing. It's a question of whether the  
4       member governments of the United Nations have made the  
5       correct decision. And that problem of false concreteness is  
6       something that I think is a very real problem. It's a --

7             Senator Boxer: Mr. Bolton, I don't mean -- I don't  
8       mean to cut you off, but you're getting away from the point.  
9       I read everything in here. You didn't talk about there  
10      being -- you need to fire certain people. You say, "The  
11      point I want to leave with you in this very brief  
12      presentation is where I started, there is no United Nations.  
13      There is an international community that occasionally can be  
14      led by the only real power left in the world, and that's the  
15      United States, when it suits our interest and when -- and  
16      when we can get others to go along. And I think it would be  
17      a real mistake to count on the U.N. as if it's some  
18      disembodied entity out there that can function."

19            Now, the point is, that's what you want to leave these  
20      people with, and we will put this in the record. So if this  
21      afternoon -- I want to be fair to you. I honestly do.  
22      There is nothing in there that I believe would change, in  
23      any way, your main points here. But, you know, I'm looking  
24      over the building, the secretariat building. The 36th floor  
25      where the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian

1       Affairs is located, that is the office that coordinates U.N.  
2       assistance in response to emergencies, like the recent  
3       tsunami that devastated part of Asia. Maybe they have too  
4       many people working there? Should they maybe fire the  
5       receptionist who's not good, just like we could do that  
6       around here, or you could in your office? That wasn't the  
7       stuff of what you were talking about. You said, "If there  
8       were ten floors gone."

9           And then I wonder if you were talking about the 31st  
10       floor, the U.N.'s Department for Disarmament Affairs, which  
11       works to strengthen the disarmament regimes with respect to  
12       weapons of mass destruction and promotes disarmament in the  
13       area of conventional weapons.

14          I wonder if you were talking about the Office of the  
15       Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict that  
16       works to stop the use of child soldiers.

17          So the point is that what we saw here, I think, is the  
18       real John Bolton. You know, basically, this is who -- what  
19       you believe. And for you to be going to the United Nations,  
20       when everyone knows you said these things, you know, "Hi,  
21       I'm John Bolton. I've come to the U.N." It's a very tough  
22       thing for those at the other end. And I think it would be a  
23       very tough thing for you, when you put so much of your  
24       passion and your anger into bringing down this particular  
25       institution.

1           Is my time up? I will save the rest. I'm sure you're  
2     delighted to know that.

3           Thank you.

4           [Laughter.]

5           Mr. Bolton: No, but I think that -- the Chairman's  
6     very courteous decision at the beginning was that I could  
7     answer the question even if the red light was on, and I will  
8     just say, in 25 words or less, the passage that you left out  
9     of the tape is my description of President Bush and  
10    Secretary Baker's very effective creation of the coalition  
11    after Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, in 1990, and  
12    their use of the Security Council to repel the invaders.

13          Senator Boxer: Well, if I --

14          The Chairman: The entire statement --

15          Senator Boxer: -- if I might say --

16          The Chairman: -- will be put in the record.

17          Senator Boxer: -- everyone should read it. It has  
18    nothing to do with your -- what you're leaving the people  
19    with. It is a small part of this. It is not the main body  
20    of this.

21          The Chairman: I thank the Senator.

22          Senator Obama?

23          Senator Obama: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

24          Mr. Bolton, thank you very much for appearing here. I  
25    know this is right before the break, so just bear with me.

1           First of all, I'd like unanimous consent to place my  
2       written statement into the record.

3           The Chairman: It will be placed in full.

4           [The prepared statement of Senator Obama follows:]

5           [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1           Senator Obama: You know, I was reflecting on the fact  
2           that some of the most distinguished Americans, Democrats and  
3           Republicans -- Daniel Patrick Moynihan, George H.W. Bush,  
4           Henry Cabot Lodge -- have served in the position to which  
5           you're now seeking confirmation. There's one particular  
6           person that I would like to mention, not only because he's  
7           an Illinoisian, but because I think he speaks to how important  
8           this position can be, and that's Adlai Stevenson.

9           I think some people may be aware of the fact that Adlai  
10          Stevenson served in this position during the Cuban Missile  
11          Crisis. And, as we all know, it was Stevenson's  
12          presentation to the U.N. Security Council that proved to the  
13          world that the Soviets were moving intermediate-range  
14          missiles into Cuba. He used charts and photos to build a  
15          compelling case, declared to Soviet Ambassador Zorin that he  
16          was prepared to wait until hell freezes over for Zorin's  
17          response to the U.S. charges.

18          You know, what many people don't recall is that  
19          Stevenson's presentation came on the heels of what might be  
20          considered a substantial intelligence failure on the part of  
21          the U.S. Government. A year earlier, Stevenson had been  
22          misled by the White House and the CIA into publicly stating  
23          that the United States was not behind the Bay of Pigs  
24          invasion. And you probably are aware of the fact that  
25          Stevenson almost resigned over that incident.

1           The reason I think that this is worth keeping mind is  
2           that, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, we were able to  
3           succeed diplomatically because of the stature and integrity  
4           of the Permanent Representative to the United Nations. In  
5           fact, President Kennedy said -- I'm quoting here -- "The  
6           integrity and credibility of Adlai Stevenson constitute one  
7           of our greatest national assets." And, as a result of that  
8           credibility, Stevenson was able to get tough, isolate the  
9           Soviets, be blunt, and convince the world that we were  
10          right.

11          I, personally, think we're facing a similar situation  
12          today with the rest of the world questioning our  
13          intelligence capabilities and nuclear proliferation threats  
14          from Iran to North Korea that may require action by the  
15          Security Council. We have to be able to convince the world  
16          that we're right.

17          And so, you know, we had occasion to meet in my office,  
18          and I very much appreciated our dialogue. You know, my  
19          overall impression is that you are extraordinarily capable,  
20          extraordinarily intelligent. And I have to say that most of  
21          the provocative statements that I've heard are ones that --  
22          some of them, I probably subscribe to; others, which, you  
23          know, I take as being part of an academic exercise or, you  
24          know, the process of speaking in panels. You're outside of  
25          government, you're speaking your mind. I don't hold each

1 and every one of these statements against you. The overall  
2 portrait, though, is of someone who may not be in a position  
3 to do what Stevenson did, which is persuade the world that  
4 America is right, and not simply partisan.

5 And I have to say, there's one quote in that tape that  
6 particularly disturbed me, and that was, "subscribe to the  
7 notion that we will lead when it suits our interests," the  
8 implication being that when it's convenient for us to engage  
9 in the United Nations, we shall do so; and when it's not  
10 convenient, we won't. As I think Senator Feingold  
11 mentioned, if that ends up being the standard, then it's  
12 going to be pretty hard for us to gain the kind of  
13 cooperation that we need on important issues like the war on  
14 terror.

15 But let me focus just on a couple of specific questions  
16 that may help clarify the record here.

17 I thought that you made an interesting statement, one  
18 that I was -- I actually wanted to get the precise  
19 transcript on -- in your assessment of the Silverman-Robb  
20 report, because you said that the principal problem that you  
21 gleaned from the report was that reasonable hypotheses  
22 became hardened in the minds of certain Administration  
23 analysts, intelligence officers, and so forth, that those  
24 then turned into presumptions that remained, despite the  
25 fact that they were not corroborated by hard facts. I don't



1 have the precise statement in front of me, but I think that  
2 was a pretty accurate -- I tried to write it down as fast as  
3 I can, because I thought it made a lot of sense. Would you  
4 say that's an accurate --

5 Mr. Bolton: I think that's a fair characterization.

6 Senator Obama: Okay. I think that the concern that --  
7 the concerns that have been raised with respect to these e-  
8 mails going back and forth and your relationship with Mr.  
9 Westermann and so forth is not a bunch of cheap shots. It's  
10 not bureaucratic infighting that we're trying to disclose.  
11 What -- it has to do with whether this is an example exactly  
12 of what you said the Silverman-Robb report warns against,  
13 which is that you had a particular perspective, you had an  
14 intelligence analyst who was concerned that your perspective  
15 was not quite right, and that, in that context, you were  
16 interested in shading or shaping the analysis to fit your  
17 reasonable hypotheses. That's, I think, the reason that  
18 we're concerned. Applying your test, that we don't want our  
19 intelligence to be not corroborated by hard facts.

20 And so, I understand that you're going to get the  
21 record of all the statements that have been made available.  
22 At this stage, since you haven't had a chance to review them  
23 all, I guess I would just ask you, If the record indicates  
24 that you were seeking to reject hard facts because they  
25 didn't neatly fit into a speech that you were making on

1       behalf of the United States Government, is it fair to say  
2       that that would be something that this panel should be  
3       concerned about, and that that might undermine your capacity  
4       to be a credible advocate for the United States in the  
5       United Nations?

6           Mr. Bolton: Yeah, I think failure to pay attention to  
7       reality and facts, however unpleasant they are, is an  
8       extremely undesirable characteristic. In this case, I don't  
9       remember what the alternative formulation was. It was not  
10      anything having to do with the substance of whatever it was;  
11      it was the fact I didn't think I had been dealt with  
12      squarely.

13          Senator Obama: Fair enough. I just want to pinpoint,  
14      though -- it may be that there's a dispute on the facts.  
15      But what I want to do is establish a common principle, which  
16      is that we want our intelligence analysts to give us  
17      information that's based on their best assessment of the  
18      facts, even if it doesn't fit our hypotheses. Is that a --

19          Mr. Bolton: I absolutely --

20          Senator Obama: -- fair principle?

21          Mr. Bolton: -- I absolutely agree with that.

22          Senator Obama: And if we have a situation where the  
23      higher-ups in our foreign-policy community are squelching  
24      dissent -- albeit internal -- squelching dissent that might  
25      impede the American people from getting the best possible

1 intelligence information to the people who are in decision-  
2 making positions, then that could potentially hamper our  
3 ability to fight the war on terrorism.

4 Mr. Bolton: We have to have the facts as they are,  
5 whether they're pleasant or not.

6 Senator Obama: Okay.

7 Mr. Bolton: There's simply no doubt about it.

8 Senator Obama: We don't have time before the break to  
9 make this determination. I think one of the things that  
10 we'll want to pursue, then, after the break, is whether that  
11 is, in fact, what happened here. My understanding is, you  
12 don't feel that's what happened here. I think some of the  
13 panel, based on the interviews we've seen, feels that it is  
14 what happened. But I just wanted to establish the principle  
15 that it would be troubling if we are discouraging analysts  
16 from giving us the best possible information.

17 Let me just move to a couple of other points. I have  
18 to watch out for my time here.

19 I want to talk to you a little bit about Iran, because  
20 that's obviously an area where, along with North Korea,  
21 we're going to have a lot of interest in making sure that  
22 the international community joins us in expressing concern  
23 and impeding the development of nuclear weapons there.  
24 What's your assessment, at this point, of our  
25 Administration's position with respect to the European

1        efforts of diplomacy with Iran and the fact that it appears,  
2        at least, that the President's made some contradictory  
3        statements with respect to whether or not we should be  
4        engaging in Iran?

5            And, finally, just let me close the loop by saying,  
6        What do you think the Security Council's role in this  
7        overall process should be?

8            Mr. Bolton: Well, I think, from the outset of our  
9        focus on Iran, there has been agreement between the United  
10       States and the EU-3 on the overall objective. And that is  
11       to say, it was unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear  
12       weapons capability. There had been, for the past year and a  
13       half, roughly, tactical disagreements between the EU-3 and  
14       the United States about how to proceed. There had also been  
15       discussions that we had conducted with Russia, in terms of  
16       the fueling or the Bushehr reactor in Iran, and discussions  
17       we've had with Japan and China on their interest in access  
18       to Iran oil and gas reserves. And one of the things that I  
19       think has troubled us from the outset on this is that Iran  
20       has split all of these different powers that I've mentioned,  
21       among which I think there really is broad agreement on the  
22       unacceptability of Iran achieving a nuclear-weapons status.

23            Now, it had been our view, and remains our view, that  
24        the Iranian effort to achieve nuclear weapons constitutes a  
25        threat to international peace and security, which is the

1 triggering threshold for Security Council jurisdiction.

2 What the President and Secretary Rice have accomplished  
3 in the past two months, I think, is a substantial closing of  
4 the tactical gap with the Europeans, and indirectly with the  
5 Russians, on that point. Having made a number of  
6 modifications in our position, we achieved from the European  
7 -- the three European foreign ministers, I think, a pretty  
8 clear statement that utilization of the Security Council at  
9 some point in dealing with the Iranian nuclear-weapons  
10 program was something that they would be willing to  
11 undertake.

12 The issue about the Security Council, from the outset,  
13 has been exactly what role it would have. And we have, over  
14 the course of the past year, roughly, exchanged thoughts  
15 with the three European countries, with Japan, with Russia,  
16 and with China, over how the Security Council might engage  
17 if the issue with Iran's nuclear-weapons program got on the  
18 Council's agenda. It was not a question simply of automatic  
19 resort to sanctions. There is a -- I think, a large measure  
20 of additional sunlight and pressure that's brought to bear  
21 by having Iran to try and answer in the Security Council,  
22 and that's been one of the reasons why it's been our view  
23 that it needs to get to the Security Council at some point.  
24 That's why we've been pressing in the IAEA Board of  
25 Governors for that referral.

Now, I think the ball is really in Iran's court at this point, that the Europeans have delivered the message about the what the President and the Secretary have said, they've made it clear that they need to see something from Iran, in terms of demonstrating that it's prepared to make the strategic decision to forego to the pursuit of nuclear weapons. I think there's some feeling that it's unlikely we will get a major substantive response from the Iranians before their elections in June. I don't know whether that's right or not. That's the feeling of many people. And that it may be that we're going to have to wait for some period of time after the elections.

So, we may be in something of a period of indeterminacy, but I do think that the President and the Secretary have achieved a significant success in closing the tactical gap that existed.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Senator Obama: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'll seek to pursue this a little bit longer next round.

The Chairman: Thank you, sir.

Senator Nelson?

Senator Nelson: Mr. Chairman, am I the only thing standing between us and lunch?

[Laughter.]

The Chairman: Yes.

1           Senator Nelson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be  
2 brief.

3           Mr. Bolton, I'm sure we would agree that it is  
4 important for us, the United States of America, to have the  
5 best representative for America to represent the interests  
6 of the U.S. in the world body, the United Nations. And I  
7 think ambassadors such as Ambassador Negroponte and  
8 Ambassador -- former Senator John Danforth, were forceful  
9 and effective advocates of U.S. interests in the United  
10 Nations. And what I worry about in your confirmation is  
11 that your history of somewhat inflammatory rhetoric and your  
12 speaking style is going to create an incentive for other  
13 nations to oppose us at the U.N.

14           Would you comment, please?

15           Mr. Bolton: Well, I hope that would not be true,  
16 Senator. I think -- as I believe Senator Lugar said in his  
17 opening remarks, I think you have different styles of  
18 speaking, depending on different circumstances. In close,  
19 tense, hard negotiations, I think you're pursuing one  
20 approach. I think if you're trying to engage in public  
21 diplomacy, you may engage in another approach.

22           You know, I can speak as a former Assistant Secretary  
23 of State for International Organizations. It's hardwired in  
24 me that the Permanent Representative in New York needs to  
25 follow instructions. And many of the statements that are

1       made on the record in New York are actually written here in  
2       Washington, written and cleared around here in Washington.  
3       And I don't anticipate that's going to change.

4           I think this is a heavy responsibility. I have no  
5       doubt about it. If confirmed, it would be a major task for  
6       me. But I think that, looking at the record that I've  
7       achieved in other diplomatic areas -- in the negotiation of  
8       the Proliferation Security Initiative, the negotiation of  
9       the Treaty of Moscow that President Bush and President Putin  
10      signed in May of 2002, the successful withdrawal from the  
11      ABM Treaty, the repeal of the Zionism is Racism Resolution,  
12      the G8 Global Partnership, and other things -- that that is  
13      a -- that is an indication of what is possible in New York.

14       Senator Nelson: Well, let's talk about that. Your  
15      job, for the last four years, has been arms negotiator.  
16      What success can you point to with regard to those  
17      negotiations in one of the major interests of the United  
18      States? And that is the nonproliferation of North Korea?

19       Mr. Bolton: I think that the policy that the President  
20      has pursued to have the major regional powers surrounding  
21      North Korea engaged in what we now call the Six-Party talks,  
22      as opposed to having the United States engaged bilaterally  
23      with North Korea, is precisely the right way to go. We've  
24      been trying now for two years to persuade the North Koreans  
25      that no one accepts that they are to have nuclear weapons.



1       The North Koreans have been refusing to negotiate. They  
2       have clearly not made the strategic choice to give up the  
3       pursuit of nuclear weapons. And, as I said a few moments  
4       ago, Secretary Rice, in her recent trip to Asia, I think,  
5       stressed, in China, South Korea, and Japan, the importance  
6       that we attach to getting North Korea back to the  
7       negotiating table.

8               Senator Nelson: Mr. Bolton, over the course of the  
9       last four years, has North Korea increased in its nuclear  
10      capability and/or increased its possession of nuclear  
11      warheads?

12             Mr. Bolton: There are some estimates to that effect,  
13      but I don't think we know for sure. The original estimate  
14      of North Korea having sufficient fissile material for one to  
15      two plutonium-based nuclear weapons was in, actually, 1991  
16      to 1992, based on open sources. What we don't know is how  
17      many -- how much fissile material for plutonium weapons they  
18      now may have, or whether any of it's been fashioned into  
19      weapons.

20             The major development, I think, in the North Korea  
21      matter, the tectonic shift that occurred, came in the summer  
22      of 2002, when all of our intelligence agencies concluded  
23      that North Korea had been engaged, for some period of time,  
24      in a production scope procurement to acquire a uranium  
25      enrichment capability, given them a separate route to

1 nuclear weapons. We don't know a lot about that, but it's a  
2 very troubling development, because a lot of this is simply  
3 -- involves processes that we don't know much about. We  
4 don't know what the real North Korean capacity is. And  
5 that's one of the reasons why President Bush has made the  
6 Six-Party talks the priority that he's had, why he's had any  
7 number of discussions with the Chinese leadership about the  
8 importance of pursuing it.

9 Senator Nelson: And the Six-Party talks are stalled,  
10 and we are getting nowhere, and the nuclear clock continues  
11 to tick, and, increasingly, North Korea gains the capability  
12 as a nuclear power, and we've seen that they have already  
13 had a history of peddling any kind of weapons system. And  
14 if we keep going on and don't draw to a successful  
15 conclusion, whether it be Six-Party or one-on-one  
16 negotiations, it's not a very good result for the United  
17 States. What makes you think that the current policy will  
18 change the North Koreans' minds over the next four years?

19 Mr. Bolton: Senator, I don't disagree at all with your  
20 assessment of the North Koreans and their propensity to  
21 proliferate weapons and technology of weapons of mass  
22 destruction. That is one of the most disturbing aspects  
23 about that government. We know, already, that the revenues  
24 that they obtained from the proliferation of ballistic-  
25 missile technology, for example, they used to support their

1 nuclear-weapons program. So -- and it was the North Korean  
2 activity, in large part, that led to the idea that became  
3 the Proliferation Security Initiative. That's why, over a  
4 year ago, I think, Dr. Rice was asked, "How long do you  
5 anticipate the Six-Party talks will go on?" And this was  
6 over a year ago. But she said, "As long as they're  
7 productive."

8         The real issue here, at the moment, is whether North  
9 Korea is going to come back to the table, because,  
10 obviously, if they're not there negotiating, we're not  
11 making much progress. And I don't -- you know, I don't --  
12 there's no deadline or anything like that, but I also think  
13 it's manifest that if we are not making progress, at some  
14 point you have to look at other possibilities.

15         We've been -- I don't mean to run on this answer; I'd  
16 just say one more thing -- we've been very grateful for the  
17 effort the Chinese have made to make the Six-Party talks  
18 effective. They're not the problem. The problem is North  
19 Korea.

20         Senator Nelson: I wanted you to run on, and I wasn't  
21 going to interrupt you, because I wanted to hear your answer  
22 as to why you think your job, as a negotiator, has been  
23 successful with regard to North Korea over the last four  
24 years.

25         And, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the

1 opportunity. And I told you I'd stay, not only within, but  
2 less than the allotted time.

3 The Chairman: Thank you, Senator.

4 And the hearing is recessed until 2:00 p.m.

5 [Whereupon, at 12:52 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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