Capstone Engagement

Assessment, Analysis, and Hardening of a Vulnerable System

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
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Hardening: Proposed Alarms and Mitigation Strategies



Network Topology



Network

Address Range: 192.168.1.0/24

Netmask: 255.255.255.0 Gateway: 192.168.1.1

Machines

IPv4: 192.168.1.1 OS: Windows

Hostname: Red V. Blue

IPv4: 192.168.1.100

OS: Linux Hostname: ELK

IPv4: 192.168.1.105

OS: Linux

Hostname: Capstone

IPv4: 192.168.1.90

OS: Linux

Hostname: Kali



Recon: Describing the Target

Nmap identified the following hosts on the network:

Hostname	IP Address	Role on Network
Red v Blue	192.168.1.1	Gateway/Jumpbox
ELK	192.168.1.100	ELK server
Kali	192.168.1.90	Attacker machine
Capstone	192.168.1.105	Webserver/Target Machine

Vulnerability Assessment

The assessment uncovered the following critical vulnerabilities in the target:

Vulnerability	Description	Impact
Weak Password Policy (CWE-521) & Improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts (CWE-307)	CWE-521, This system does not require that users have strong passwords therefore making it easier for attackers to compromise user accounts. CWE-307, The software doesn't implement sufficient measures to prevent multiple failed authentication attempts within a short time frame.	The combination of the two vulnerabilities makes it sufficiently easier for the hacker to brute force and gain access to user accounts.
Improper limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (CWE-22)	The software uses an external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory located beneath a restricted parent directory. The software doesn't properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory	This vulnerability allows the hacker to directly locate the secret file by searching for it via the URL.
Local File Inclusion (CWE-98)	The PHP application receives input from an upstream component but it doesn't restrict the input before its usage.	Allows the upload of a reverse shell php which once uploaded and accessed, allows the hacker unrestricted access.

By Briana Norman

Exploitation: Weak Password Policy and Improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts



02

Tools & Processes

This vulnerability was exploited with the use of Hydra.

Achievements

The exploit was able to determine the correct user credentials to gain access to the secret folder directory within the company server.



Command used:
Hydra -I ashton -P
/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
-s 80 -fvV 192.168.1.105
http-get
/company_folders/secret_folder

```
| Introduction | Internation |
```

End of the hydra output

Exploitation: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory



Tools & Processes


To exploit this vulnerability, attacker simply needs to enter the name of the specified files within the url of the application



Achievements

Grants access to the secret folder directory within the company folders





Exploitation: Local File Inclusion





Tools & Processes


The exploit for this file was completed by simply dragging and dropping the shell payload onto the webDAV server



Achievements

The exploit successfully allowed a way to remotely connect to the server by uploading an executable file with the desired payload Local File Inclusion






Click and drag



Successful upload


Blue Team Log Analysis and Attack Characterization

Analysis: Identifying the Port Scan




- The port scan occurred 05/03/22, time 12:00 am
- Packets sent from machine IP 192.168.1.90, total packets sent 16,767 bytes from Kali linux
- Multiple packets sent to the webserver at the same time are indicative of a port scan

Analysis: Finding the Request for the Hidden Directory



- There were a total of 16,518 requests made for the hidden directory
- A file within the secret folder was accessed, information contained was pertaining to gaining access
 to the corporate server
 - File located within directory connect_to_corp_server

Analysis: Uncovering the Brute Force Attack



- 16,512 unsuccessful attempts before determining the password
- 16,518 attempts total

Analysis: Finding the WebDAV Connection

o 10 HTTP requests [Packetbeat] ECS		
ırl.full: Descending 🗦	Count	
ttp://192.168.1.105/company_folders/secret_folder	16,518	
ttp://192.168.1.105/webdav	160	
ttp://192.168.1.105/webdav/passwd.dav	42	
ttp://192.168.1.105/webdav/shell.php	40	
ttp://192.168.1.105/company_folders/secret_folder/	7	

- Total requests for the webday directory 160
- Files requested were shell.php (40) and passwd.dav (42)

Blue TeamProposed Alarms and Mitigation Strategies

Mitigation: Blocking the Port Scan

Alarm

An alarm can be can be set to count the number of requested ports for each source IP, when a threshold is reached, it would then trigger an alert for a potential port scan and notify a SOC analyst to further investigate

Search Criteria:

Destination.ip 192.168.1.105 and source.ip: (not 102.168.1.105) and destination.port: (not 443 or 80)

Report criteria:

Number of ports accessed per source IP per second

Alert Criteria/Threshold:

Alert email and log when > 4

- Host can install a firewall to prevent future port scans from occurring
 - Specified firewalls can be determined on base of need and function
- ignore/block the ICMP echo requests that are sent to the host server
 - Effectively ensures that the server is not responding to ping requests
- Block all incoming/outgoing connections to ports except 80 (HTTP) and 443 (HTTPS)
 - Can block, forward to honeypot or delay port scan

Mitigation: Finding the Request for the Hidden Directory

Alarm

 An alarm can be set to alert if any machine that is not on the authorized list tries to access the hidden directory

Search Criteria:

Source.ip: (not 192.168.1.105 or 192.168.1.1) and url.path: *secret_folder*

Report Criteria:

Number of times "secret_folder" accessed from external IP

Alarm criteria/threshold:

Alert email and log when > 0 access is detected for "secret_folder" from IPs other than 192.168.1.1 and/or 192.168.1.105

- Host can remove the directory from the server and install a database that is a bit harder to exploit as long as the configurations are appropriately set
- MORE
- MORE
- MORE

Mitigation: Preventing Brute Force Attacks

Alarm

- Recommended to set an alarm for any time the user_agent.original is noted to be hydra within the Kibana logs
- As well as seven 401 HTTP responses have been returned from the server

Search Criteria:

Http.request.method: "get" and user_agent.original: "Mozilla(4.0) Hydra" and url.path: "/company_folders/secret_folder/" and status: (Error or OK)

Report Criteria:

Number of times error (401) response is detected in a 10 second interval

Alarm Criteria/threshold:

Alert email and log when, on protected files and folders, > 7 401 (Error) responses occur at any time OR any 200 (OK) responses occur from non-trusted IPs

- The system can be configured to block off any IP that triggers the alert by setting off the server to send more than seven 401 HTTP responses
- The rule can reset every day, therefore the block would only remain for 24 hours unless otherwise noted

Mitigation: Detecting the WebDAV Connection

Alarm

 An alarm can be set to to alert any time the directory is accessed from any machine that is not the authorized machine

Search Criteria:

Http.request.method: * and url.path: *webdav* and source.ip: (not 192.168.1.1 or 192.168.1.105)

Report Criteria:

Number of times the directory is requested from non-trusted IPs

Alarm Criteria/threshold:

Alert email and log when requests are received for protected files and folders from non-trusted IPs

- Switch the server to a SQL database and would not need to protect a file from being accessed
- Block unwanted access to the "webdav" from any IP other than the ones specified by modifying the configuration file

Mitigation: Identifying Reverse Shell Uploads

Alarm

 design an alarm for any time a file is uploaded to the server from non-trusted IPs

Search Criteria:

http.request.method: "put" and url.path: *webdav* and source.ip: (not 192.168.1.105 or 192.168.1.1)

Reverse shell signature for detection of reverse shell detection

Source.ip: 192.168.1.105 and destination.ip: (not 192.168.1.1 or 192.168.1.105) and destination.port > 0 and network.protocol: (not *) and http.response.body.bytes: (not *) and source.port: (not 80 or 22)

Report criteria

Count of "put" method from non-trusted IPs

Alarm criteria/threshold

Alert email and log when "put" request methods are made for protected folders sent from non-trusted IPs

System Hardening

 System configurations can be set to disable the uploading of files over the web interface from any IP other than the ones specified

