

$$\begin{array}{c}
 t_1 \in \text{UserTable} \\
 \frac{(t_1, t_2 :: c_2) \in \text{OwnerModel} \vee (t_1, -, t_2, -) \in \text{MemberModel} \quad (t_2, t_3 :: c_3) \in (\text{OOR} \cup \text{ONR})}{(t_1, t_3 :: c_3) \in \text{HierarchyModel}} \quad [\text{HI-MODEL-INIT}] \\
 \\
 \frac{(t_1, t_2 :: c_2) \in \text{HierarchyModel} \quad (t_2, t_3 :: c_3) \in (\text{OOR} \cup \text{ONR})}{(t_1, t_3 :: c_3) \in \text{HierarchyModel}} \quad [\text{HI-MODEL-TRAN}]
 \end{array}$$

Figure 13: Rules for hierarchical model inference.

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \frac{(t_1, t_3 :: c_3) \in \text{HierarchyModel} \quad I^C : \langle -, t_3, -, - \rangle}{(t_1, t_3 :: c_3, C) \in \text{SafeC}} \quad [\text{HI-CHECK}] \\
 \\
 \frac{(t_1, t_3 :: c_3) \in \text{HierarchyModel} \quad (t_1, t_2 :: c_2) \in \text{HierarchyModel} \quad (t_2, t_3 :: c_3) \in (\text{OOR} \cup \text{ONR}) \quad (t_2 :: c_p, t_3 :: c_3) \in C \quad (t_1, t_2 :: c_2, C) \in \text{SafeC}}{(t_1, t_3 :: c_3, C) \in \text{SafeC}} \quad [\text{HI-CHECK-RECURSIVE}] \\
 \\
 \frac{(t_1, t_3 :: c_3) \in \text{HierarchyModel} \quad (t_1, t_2 :: c_2) \in \text{OwnerModel} \quad (t_2, t_3 :: c_3) \in (\text{OOR} \cup \text{ONR}) \quad (t_2 :: c_p, t_3 :: c_3) \in C \quad (t_1 :: c_p, t_2 :: c_2) \in C}{(t_1, t_3 :: c_3, C) \in \text{SafeC}} \quad [\text{HI-CHECK-OWNER}] \\
 \\
 \frac{(t_1, t_3 :: c_3) \in \text{HierarchyModel} \quad (t_1, t_4 :: c_4, t_2, t'_4 :: c'_4) \in \text{MemberModel} \quad (t_2, t_3 :: c_3) \in (\text{OOR} \cup \text{ONR}) \quad (t_2 :: c_p, t_3 :: c_3) \in C \quad (t_1 :: c_p, t_4 :: c_4) \in C \quad (t_2 :: c_p, t'_4 :: c'_4) \in C}{(t_1, t_3 :: c_3, C) \in \text{SafeC}} \quad [\text{HI-CHECK-MEMBER}]
 \end{array}$$

Figure 14: Rules for missing hierarchical check.

A INFERRING AND CHECKING RULES FOR HIERARCHICAL MODELS

Figure 13 presents the rules for inferring hierarchical models. According to its definition (Section 3), we initially use [\[HI-MODEL-INIT\]](#) to build hierarchical models based on existing ownership or membership models. The model between table user and table notice (Figure 2) is such a case. Next, hierarchical models are transitively deduced via 1:1 and 1:n relationship, as demonstrated by [\[HI-MODEL-TRAN\]](#).

Figure 14 illustrates the principle of detecting missing hierarchical checks. The set **SafeC** is a set of triples like $(t_1, t_3 :: c_3, C)$, indicating that C properly checks the hierarchical model between t_1 and $t_3 :: c_3$. Rule [\[HI-CHECK\]](#) is intuitive, reducing the safety check of sensitive operation I^C to verifying the existence of $(t_1, t_3 :: c_3, C) \in \text{SafeC}$. The three remaining rules “inductively” verify a given hierarchical model:

- Basis: Rule [\[HI-CHECK-OWNER\]](#) and [\[HI-CHECK-MEMBER\]](#) handle a root hierarchical model based on ownership and membership models, respectively.
- Induction: Rule [\[HI-CHECK-RECURSIVE\]](#) validates the hierarchical model layer by layer. Interestingly, this rule operates in the opposite direction of [\[HI-MODEL-TRAN\]](#).