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# Incentive Mechanism for Reliable Federated Learning: A Joint Optimization Approach to Combining Reputation and Contract Theory

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**Abstract**—Federated learning is an emerging machine learning technique which enables distributed model training using local datasets from large-scale nodes, e.g., mobile devices, but shares only model updates without uploading raw training data. This technique provides promising privacy preservation for mobile devices while simultaneously ensuring high learning performance. The majority of existing work focused on designing advanced learning algorithms with an aim to achieve better learning performance. However, the challenges such as incentive mechanisms for participating in training and worker (i.e., mobile devices) selection schemes for reliable federated learning, have not been explored yet. These challenges have hindered the widespread adoption of federated learning. To address the above challenges, in this paper, we first introduce reputation as the metric to measure the reliability and trustworthiness of the mobile devices. We then design a reputation-based worker selection scheme for reliable federated learning by using a multi-weight subjective logic model. We also leverage the blockchain to achieve secure reputation management for workers with non-repudiation and tamper-resistance properties in a decentralized manner. Moreover, we propose an effective incentive mechanism combining reputation with contract theory to motivate high-reputation mobile devices with high-quality data to participate in model learning. Numerical results clearly indicate that the proposed schemes are efficient for reliable federated learning in terms of significantly improving the learning accuracy.

**Index Terms**—Federated learning, blockchain, contract theory, security and privacy, reputation, mobile networks.

## I. INTRODUCTION

With the rapid development of machine learning technologies, many novel mobile applications, e.g., autonomous driving, are emerging with machine learning which brings great service experience to mobile users [1]. Although the machine

learning techniques significantly improve the performance of mobile applications, most of the machine learning techniques need to aggregate massive user data with personal information into a central server to perform model training. This causes excessive computation and storage cost, and the mobile devices also suffer from serious privacy leakage risk [2]. To address these challenges, federated learning as an emerging distributed machine learning paradigm has been introduced to allow the mobile devices to collaboratively train a global model in a decentralized manner. The mobile devices only need to iteratively send local model updates trained on their local raw data to the task publisher instead of uploading the raw data outside, thus decoupling the machine learning from acquiring, storing and training data in a central server [3].

Despite with the aforementioned great benefits, federated learning is still facing with critical challenges. On the one hand, existing studies have an optimistic assumption that all the mobile devices contribute their resource unconditionally [4], [5], which is not practical in the real world due to resource cost incurred by model training [6]. Without well-designed economic compensation, the self-interested mobile devices are reluctant to participate in model training [3], [5], [7]. Therefore, it is necessary to design an effective incentive mechanism for stimulating mobile devices to become workers for federated learning tasks [1], [8]. On the other hand, an unreliable worker may perform intentionally or unintentionally undesirable behaviours to mislead a global model training of a federated learning task. For the intentional behaviors, the worker may launch a poisoning attack that sends malicious updates to influence the global model parameters leading to the failure of current collaborative learning mechanism. Moreover, much more dynamic mobile networking environments indirectly cause some unintentional behaviors of mobile devices. Due to the high mobility or energy constraints, the worker may indeliberately update some low-quality parameters that adversely affect federated learning tasks. Thus it is of vital importance to develop efficient schemes to select workers without unreliable local model updates for the federated learning. Furthermore, these two challenges cannot be solved separately due to their couplings [3].

Accordingly, we are motivated to address incentive issues about high-quality worker selection and reliable model training. To achieve high-quality worker selection, a fair metric is essential to evaluate the reliability of a worker. Previous work has utilized reputation as the metric to rate the reliability or trustworthiness of an entity in certain activities

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according to its past behaviors [9], [10], [11], [12]. Inspired by this, we also apply the reputation as the metric to assess the reliability of a federated learning worker candidate, thus ensuring reliable worker selection. Note that the high-reputation workers bring high-quality data (i.e., high-accuracy and reliable data) to model training and generate reliable local model updates for federated learning tasks [11], [13]. Therefore, for better performance of the federated learning tasks, every task publisher chooses high-reputation worker candidates that have high-accuracy and reliable local data as the workers to reduce the impacts from unreliable attackers [4]. Each task publisher calculates reputation opinions on interacting workers by using a subjective logic model, in which direct reputation opinions generated from past interactions and indirect reputation opinions from other task publishers are integrated into a compositive reputation for worker selection.

To ensure secure reputation management and reliable reputation calculation, unlike conventional centralized management structure with the risk of single point of failure, we manage reputation opinions from task publishers in a decentralized manner through a consortium blockchain with the properties of non-repudiation and tamper-resistance. The consortium blockchain is a more efficient, practical blockchain technology with light-weight and faster consensus process controlled by pre-selected miners. With the above advantages, the consortium blockchain is especially suitable for reputation management in mobile network with federated learning [14].

Moreover, to stimulate the workers to join model training and share their resources, the task publisher employs contract theory to design an incentive mechanism that specifies the contributed resources (e.g., data, computation and communication resources) and the corresponding rewards. The higher-reputation workers that have larger accuracy of local data or more reliable behaviours can obtain more rewards from the task publisher. Each worker chooses its desired contract item to maximize its profit [6].

The main contributions of this paper are listed as follows:

- We introduce reputation as a fair metric to select reliable workers for federated learning to defend against unreliable model updates in mobile networks.
- We utilize a multi-weight subjective logic model to efficiently calculate the worker reputation and manage the reputation in a decentralized manner through the consortium blockchain.
- We design an effective incentive mechanism using contract theory to stimulate high-reputation workers with high-quality data to participate in model training for preventing the poisoning attacks in federated learning.
- We perform experiments on real-world dataset to show that the proposed model is practically applicable to real federated learning applications. The numerical results validate that the proposed incentive mechanism outperforms the traditional ones. The blockchain scheme can ensure accurate reputation calculation thus significantly improving the learning accuracy.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We present the related work in Section II and the preliminary in Section III. Section IV describes the reputation-based worker selection

scheme based on consortium blockchain. Section V illustrates the reputation calculation using multi-weight subjective logic model. An incentive mechanism for reliable worker selection using contract theory is proposed in Section VI, followed by the performance evaluation in Section VII. Finally, we summarize the paper in Section VIII.

## II. RELATED WORK

Google first introduced the federated learning technology and also used it to design a virtual keyboard application for smart phones named Gboard [15]. Along with this direction, the concept, architecture and potential applications about federated learning are further discussed in [1]. From the perspective of optimization, the authors in [16] combined deep reinforcement learning, federated learning framework into mobile edge systems to upgrade federated learning architecture for achieving mobile edge computing, caching and communication optimization. The authors in [3] formulated an optimization problem of federated learning over wireless networks to obtain optimal learning time, accuracy level, and energy cost. The authors in [17] employed federated learning to estimate the tail distribution of network-wide queues, thus minimizing network wide power while ensuring ultra-reliable and low-latency vehicular communication. The authors in [8] utilized a deep Q learning algorithm to solve the optimal data and energy management problems of federated learning without prior knowledge of network dynamics. Considering clients with heterogeneous resources, the authors in [18] proposed a client selection scheme for federated learning based on a greedy algorithm.

From the perspective of security, the authors in [4] stated that mobile devices may perform poisoning attacks on model updates or information leakage attacks against a target mobile device. Therein, they utilized Reject on Negative Influence (RONI) defense to remove the poisoning model updates and used a differential privacy scheme for privacy preservation. The model updates are stored and aggregated in a blockchain platform. Similarly, the authors in [5] stored and verified local model updates using blockchain, but further analyzed the end-to-end learning completion latency to optimize the block generation rate. The authors in [19] introduced the sybil-based poisoning attacks and then identified these attacks according to client contribution similarity.

The above work has specifically focused on optimizing performance of learning algorithms, e.g., learning time or training security, in federated learning. However, the majority of the work made the same assumption that all the mobile devices contribute data, communication or computation resources unconditionally for the federated learning [1]. Although the authors in [18] have considered the resource limitation and worker selection issues, the reliability of workers is ignored. Moreover, the resource-rich workers are reluctant to join model training without proper incentive mechanisms. Furthermore, the incentive mechanisms and worker selection issues are coupled and should be solved jointly for the federated learning. In this paper, we therefore consider both incentive mechanism and selection scheme for reliable workers. To the best of our

knowledge, this is the first work to employ contract theory into model training for federated learning, which brings desirable economic and resource allocation benefits.

### III. PRELIMINARIES

In this section, we briefly introduce the basics of federated learning followed by the system model and the adversary model under our consideration. The main mathematical notations used in this paper are listed in Table I.

#### A. Federated Learning

Federated learning is a promising distributed privacy-preserving machine learning technique that enables mobile devices to collaboratively train a shared global model without the need of uploading private local data to a central server. Each mobile device obtains a shared global model  $\Phi$  from a task publisher and trains the model over its local data. Then, the mobile device uploads the new weights or gradients (i.e., local model update) to the task publisher for updating the global model. Specifically, each mobile device  $n$  has a local training dataset with  $s_n$  data samples for federated learning. The total size of data samples from  $N$  mobile devices is  $\sum_{n=1}^N s_n = S$ . The federated learning aims to optimize a global loss function  $\ell(\Phi)$  through minimizing the weighted average of every mobile device  $n$ 's local loss function  $\ell_n(\Phi)$  [20] on its local dataset, i.e.,

$$\min_{\Phi} \ell(\Phi) = \sum_{n=1}^N \frac{s_n}{S} \ell_n(\Phi), \text{ where } \ell_n(\Phi) = \frac{1}{s_n} \sum_{i \in s_n} f_i(\Phi). \quad (1)$$

Here  $f_i(\Phi)$  is the loss function of a sample data  $i$  in the local dataset for mobile device  $n$  [3].

At a global training iteration  $t$ , every mobile device computes its average gradient  $\Lambda_n$  on its local dataset with the current global model  $\Phi^{(t)}$  by using optimization algorithms. Without loss of generality, we utilize the Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) algorithm that iteratively selects a batch of training samples to calculate their gradients against  $\Phi^{(t)}$  and takes gradient steps in the direction that minimizes  $\ell_n(\Phi)$  [4], [15]. Given a learning rate  $\hat{h}_n$  of the mobile device  $n$ , the local model update is expressed by

$$\Phi_n^{(t+1)} = \Phi^{(t)} - \hat{h}_n \Lambda_n. \quad (2)$$

Thus, the task publisher updates the shared global model  $\Phi^{(t+1)}$  through a weighted aggregation of all the local model updates [15], which is denoted as

$$\Phi^{(t+1)} = \sum_{n=1}^N \frac{s_n}{S} \Phi_n^{(t+1)}. \quad (3)$$

Note that, according to (1), the high-quality mobile devices with high-accuracy and reliable local training data can lead to faster convergence of the local loss function  $\ell_n(\Phi)$  and the global loss function  $\ell(\Phi)$  [3]. Both the local model update  $\Phi_n$  of the worker in (2) and the shared global model update  $\Phi$  in (3) can be more quick to converge to the target value with fewer iterations. Consequently, the training time and energy consumption of a worker in a global iteration are decreasing.

TABLE I: Main Symbols

Notation	Definition
$\Phi$	A shared global model
$s_n$	Data size of data samples
$\ell_n(\cdot)$	The local loss function of a model device $n$
$t_y$	The $y$ -th time slot in a time window
$\{b_{i \rightarrow j}, d_{i \rightarrow j}, u_{i \rightarrow j}\}$	Reputation opinion vector $\omega_{i \rightarrow j}$ of task publisher $i$ for worker $j$
$T_{i \rightarrow j}$	Reputation of task publisher $i$ for worker $j$
$\alpha_i^{t_y}, \beta_i^{t_y}$	The number of positive / negative interactions in $t_y$ between task publisher $i$ and worker $j$
$\kappa, \eta$	Weight of positive / negative interactions
$\vartheta(t_y)$	Freshness fading function of interaction events in a time slot $t_y$
$\theta_n, n \in \{1, \dots, N\}$	The types of workers
$f_n$	CPU-cycle frequency of type- $n$ worker
$R_n$	Reward for type- $n$ worker
$c_n$	The CPU cycles for training one data sample
$E_n^{cmp} / T_n^{cmp}$	CPU energy consumption / computation time of a local model iteration for worker $n$
$E_n^{com} / T_n^{com}$	Energy consumption / Transmission time of local model update transmission for worker $n$
$l$	Unit resource cost of rewards for the workers
$\mu$	Weight parameter about energy consumption
$p_n$	Probability of a worker belonging to type- $n$

Therefore, the high-quality mobile devices with high accuracy and reliable local training data can significantly improve the learning efficiency of the federated learning, e.g., less training time and less energy consumption [3], [4], [18].

#### B. System Model

Figure 1 shows a federated learning system with a consortium blockchain including an application layer and a blockchain layer. For the application layer, we consider a universal mobile network consisting of wireless communication infrastructures (e.g., roadside units in vehicular networks or base stations with edge computing in cellular networks) and a set of mobile devices (such as vehicles or mobile phones). **The widely deployed communication infrastructures can be treated as edge nodes.** The mobile devices equipped with advanced computation and communication devices can not only **generate diverse user data from mobile applications but also collect a lot of sensing data.** In the mobile networks, multiple task publishers with federated learning tasks execute model training based on these data from the mobile devices, without data collection, for the sake of privacy protection. Each task publisher designs contract items for incentivizing reliable mobile devices acting as workers for model training (Step *a* in Fig. 1). **Every worker iteratively trains a shared global model  $\Phi$  by its local data and generate local model updates  $\Phi_n$  (Steps *b, c, d* in Fig. 1).** Then, all the workers upload their local model updates to the task publisher for updating the global model (Step *e* in Fig. 1). The training process is repeated until the accuracy of the global model achieves a pre-defined, desirable value. The widely distributed edge nodes enable the workers to communicate with the task publishers in a timely fashion. The task publishers will evaluate the quality of local model updates and generate reputation opinions for the interacted workers according to their model updates and training behaviours. More details about the local



model update evaluation and reputation calculation are given in Section IV and Section V, respectively. These reputation opinions are maintained by a consortium blockchain named **reputation blockchain** with the properties of tamper-proof and non-repudiation, and are shared among the task publishers.

In the blockchain layer, the edge nodes are easy to be connected by mobile devices and the federated learning task publishers, thus working as the pre-selected miners of consortium blockchains because of having sufficient computation and storage resources [9], [11], [21]. The details of the pre-selected miner selection scheme for the reputation blockchain are not the focus of this paper. Nonetheless, we can straightforwardly adopt some of the most popular ones: random selection [5] and reputation-based miner selection [9]. The reputation opinions are stored into data blocks after verification by the miners via performing a consensus algorithm. Due to the decentralized and tamper-proof nature of blockchains, the reputation opinions in the data blocks are persistent and transparent evidence even when a dispute and destruction occurs [9]. **For a specific mobile device, the task publisher integrates its direct reputation opinion with the latest indirect reputation opinions from other task publishers to generate a compositive reputation value for the mobile devices.** The reputation value is an important metric for reliable worker selection during the federated learning.

### C. Adversary Model

For federated learning, due to the openness and complexity of mobile network architectures, mobile devices acting as workers may perform malicious and unreliable model updates. On the one hand, the unreliable model updates may be generated from the following intentional reasons. Malicious or tampered devices train the data with deceptive information or transmit the data through unsafe communication channels [2]. Hence, a malicious data owner (i.e., malicious worker) may intentionally launch serious attacks, e.g., poisoning attacks [4]. The poisoning attack means that malicious workers deliberately inject poisonous data points into training datasets or modify the training datasets to degrade the accuracy of training data, thus increasing the probability of incorrect classification and manipulating the results of their local model updates in (2). On the other hand, the workers may unintentionally generate unreliable local updates caused by unreliable wireless communication channel conditions, poor data sensing environments due to high mobility or energy constraints [18]. As a result, both the intentional and unintentional behaviors degrade the local data accuracy and local model update quality, hence negatively affecting the accuracy and convergence time of the global model in (3). Therefore, it is essential to design a reliable worker selection scheme for the federated learning.

## IV. REPUTATION-BASED WORKER SELECTION SCHEME WITH CONSORTIUM BLOCKCHAIN

To address the aforementioned challenges, as shown in Fig. 1, we design a reputation-based worker selection scheme for reliable federated learning and also utilize a consortium




Fig. 1: The system model of reliable federated learning based on a consortium blockchain.

blockchain to manage the reputation. The reputation management mainly include (i) reputation calculation by using multi-weight subjective logic model, and (ii) secure reputation storage in a decentralized manner through consortium blockchain technologies. More details of the worker selection scheme are given as follows.

- **Step 1: Publish federated learning tasks and contract items:** Task publishers first design contract items according to data and computation resource requirements of their federated learning tasks. **Each task publisher broadcasts its federated learning task with specific resource requirements (e.g., data types, data sizes and accuracy, time range and CPU cycles) and the contract items to mobile devices.** The mobile devices satisfying the requirements may become the model training worker candidates to join the federated learning tasks, and also give a response including resource information back to the task publisher.
- **Step 2: Calculate candidate reputation:** The task publisher chooses the qualified worker candidates according to the resource information. Then, the task publisher calculates reputation values of the worker candidates by a multi-weight subjective logic model according to (i) direct reputation opinions from interaction histories and (ii) indirect reputation opinions from other task publishers (i.e., recommended reputation opinions). The recommended reputation opinions are stored and managed on the open-access reputation blockchain. The reputation

blockchain is a public ledger that records reputation opinions of worker candidates into data blocks. For each worker candidate, the task publisher first downloads the latest recommended reputation opinions from the reputation blockchain. Thus, the task publisher combines its direct reputation opinion with the recommended reputation opinions to generate a compositive value as the final reputation for each candidate. More details about the reputation calculation are presented in Section V.

- **Step 3: Select workers for federated learning:** After reputation calculation, the worker candidates with reputation larger than a threshold can be selected as the workers. These workers make their own optimal decisions to select a contract item given by the task publisher according to their types related to accuracy of local dataset and resource conditions. The accuracy of local dataset directly determines the quality of local model updates [4]. The details about contract designing are given in Section VI.
- **Step 4: Perform federated learning and evaluate quality of local model updates:** After worker selection, the federated learning tasks can be trained by different optimization algorithms, e.g., SGD. Specifically, an initial SGD model (i.e., initial parameters) is randomly chosen from pre-defined ranges as the shared global model. After receiving this model, the workers collaboratively train the model over their own local data and upload their local model updates to the task publisher. To evaluate the reliability of the local model updates, the task publisher performs quality evaluation of local model updates through attack detection schemes, e.g., **Reject on Negative Influence (RONI) scheme** in [4] for Independent-and-Identically-Distributed (IID) data scenarios and FoolsGold scheme in [19] for non-IID data scenarios, to identify the poisoning attacks and unreliable workers (Step 1 in Fig. 1). Here, **RONI is a typical poisoning attack detection scheme that validates a local model update by comparing the effects with and without the local model update on a pre-defined database from the task publisher.** If the performance of the local model update on the database degrades beyond a specified threshold given by the system, this local model update will be rejected when integrating all local model updates [4]. FoolsGold scheme identifies unreliable workers according to the gradient update diversity of local model updates in non-IID federated learning in that the training data of each worker has a unique distribution. The unreliable workers can be detected as they repeatedly upload similar-looking gradients as local model updates in each iteration [19]. With the above unreliable worker and attacker detection schemes, the task publisher can remove unreliable local model updates from the unreliable workers as well as malicious updates from poisoning attacks. **The task publisher integrates all the reliable local model updates into an average value and sets the average value as the new global model for the next iteration.** The task publisher pushes this new model to the selected workers for the next model iteration until the latest global model satisfying a pre-defined convergence condition. Then the

workers obtain rewards from the task publisher according to the pre-set rewards in the contract items based on resource contribution and model training behaviors [4], [5]. In every iteration, the interaction either with unreliable workers or with poisoning attackers is treated as a negative interaction and recorded by the task publisher. Finally, the task publisher generates direct reputation opinions for all the workers in the federated learning task according to past interactions (Steps 2 and 3 in Fig. 1).

- **Step 5: Update reputation opinions to the reputation blockchain:** After finishing a federated learning task, the task publisher updates its direct reputation opinions for the interacted workers according to the interaction histories (Step 4 in Fig. 1). **These reputation opinions with digital signatures for the workers are recorded as “transactions” and uploaded to the miners of the reputation blockchain.** The miners put the reputation opinions into a data block and add the block to the reputation blockchain after block verification and executing consensus schemes, e.g., Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT). Finally, all the task publishers can choose reliable workers with high-reputation for their federated learning tasks with the help of the reputation blockchain.

## V. REPUTATION CALCULATION USING MULTI-WEIGHT SUBJECTIVE LOGIC

Since high-reputation workers with high-accuracy and reliable training data play vital roles in model training process, efficient and accurate reputation calculation is essential for reliable federated learning. In this section, we apply a subjective logic model to generate compositive reputation values of worker candidates. The subjective logic is a widely-adopted framework of probabilistic reasoning that evaluates trustworthiness or reliability level of different entities. The subjective logic uses the term named “opinion” to denote the representation of a subjective belief through positive, negative, and uncertainty statements [10], and can also combine and relate different opinions from a large amount of logical operators. In this paper, to obtain more accurate reputation value of worker candidates, every task publisher combines its direct reputation opinions with the indirect reputation opinions to generate compositive reputation values for the candidates.

### A. Reputation Opinion Representation for Subjective Logic

For a time window with a series of time slots  $\{t_1, \dots, t_y, \dots, t_Y\}$ , the reputation opinions of task publisher  $i$  for worker  $j$  in a time slot  $t_y$ , e.g., 60 minutes, can be expressed by a tuple vector  $\Upsilon_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y} := \{b_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y}, d_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y}, u_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y}\}$ . Here,  $b_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y}$ ,  $d_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y}$ , and  $u_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y}$  are belief, disbelief and uncertainty, respectively [22].  $b_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y} + d_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y} + u_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y} = 1$ , and  $b_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y}, d_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y}, u_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y} \in [0, 1]$ . Based on the subjective logic model [9], [12], we can obtain

$$\begin{cases} b_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y} = (1 - u_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y}) \frac{\alpha_i^{t_y}}{\alpha_i^{t_y} + \beta_i^{t_y}}, \\ d_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y} = (1 - u_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y}) \frac{\beta_i^{t_y}}{\alpha_i^{t_y} + \beta_i^{t_y}}, \\ u_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y} = 1 - q_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y}. \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

$\alpha_i^{t_y}$  ( $\beta_i^{t_y}$ ) is the number of positive (negative) interactions during the time slot  $t_y$ . The task publisher treats a training iteration as a positive interaction event between itself and a worker if the publisher perceives that the local model update provided by the worker is useful, trusted and reliable by verification using attack detection schemes presented in Step 4 of Section IV, and vice versa.  $q_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y}$  represents the success probability of data packet transmission, i.e., the communication quality, that affects the uncertainty of the reputation opinion. According to the reputation opinion vector, the direct reputation value of the task publisher  $i$  for the worker  $j$  in a time slot  $t_y$  is denoted as

$$T_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y} = b_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y} + a u_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y}, \quad (5)$$

where  $a \in [0, 1]$  is the coefficient representing the degree of uncertainty effect on reputation [9].

Note that reputation opinions are affected by many factors. Traditional subjective logic is evolved towards multi-weight subjective logic when taking different factors into consideration. Here, we consider the following factors to calculate the reputation opinions.

- **Interaction effects:** There exist positive and negative interaction results of the interaction events through quality evaluation of local model updates presented in Step 4 of Section IV. The positive interactions increase the reputation of worker candidates, and vice versa. To discourage negative interaction events, the negative interactions have a higher weight on the reputation calculation than that of the positive interactions. We denote the weights of positive and negative interactions as  $\kappa$  and  $\eta$ , respectively.  $\kappa \leq \eta$  and  $\eta + \kappa = 1$ . Hence, the expression in (4) can be rewritten as

$$\begin{cases} b_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y} = q_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y} \frac{\kappa \alpha_i^{t_y}}{\kappa \alpha_i^{t_y} + \eta \beta_i^{t_y}}, \\ d_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y} = q_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y} \frac{\eta \beta_i^{t_y}}{\kappa \alpha_i^{t_y} + \eta \beta_i^{t_y}}, \\ u_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y} = 1 - q_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y}. \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

- **Interaction freshness:** The trustworthiness of a worker is changing with the time and a worker will not be always trusted and reliable during interactions between task publishers and workers. The recent interaction events with more freshness have larger weight than that of past events. To reflect the time effect on reputation, a freshness fading function is defined to illustrate the freshness of interaction events:  $\vartheta(t_y) = \vartheta_y = z^{Y-y}$ , where  $z \in (0, 1)$  is a given fade parameter about event freshness and  $y \in [1, Y]$  is the time slot  $y$  that determines the fade degree of the event freshness. Therefore the reputation opinion and the reputation value of the task publisher  $i$  for the worker  $j$  in a time window are denoted as

$$\begin{cases} b_{i \rightarrow j} = \frac{\sum_{y=1}^Y \vartheta_y b_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y}}{\sum_{y=1}^Y \vartheta_y}, \\ d_{i \rightarrow j} = \frac{\sum_{y=1}^Y \vartheta_y d_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y}}{\sum_{y=1}^Y \vartheta_y}, \\ u_{i \rightarrow j} = \frac{\sum_{y=1}^Y \vartheta_y u_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y}}{\sum_{y=1}^Y \vartheta_y}, \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

$$\text{and } T_{i \rightarrow j} = \frac{\sum_{y=1}^Y \vartheta_y T_{i \rightarrow j}^{t_y}}{\sum_{y=1}^Y \vartheta_y}.$$

## B. Weighting Reputation Opinions from Recommenders

Each task publisher has its own interacted workers in mobile networks. Similar to social networks, the more commonly interacted workers between two task publishers bring larger credibility of indirect reputation opinions for them. The reputation opinions of every task publisher for the workers are denoted as an individual vector. The similarity of reputation opinions between the task publishers can be measured by the similarity of the vectors through using the amendatory cosine function. To measure the credibility of indirect reputation opinions, we define a **similarity factor** between the task publisher  $i$  and the task publisher  $x$  as weight by using an amendatory cosine function as follows [23]:

$$\text{Sim}(i, x) = \frac{\sum_{j \in \mathbb{C}} (D_{i \rightarrow j} - \bar{D}_i)(D_{x \rightarrow j} - \bar{D}_x)}{\sqrt{\sum_{j \in \mathbb{I}} (D_{i \rightarrow j} - \bar{D}_i)^2} \sqrt{\sum_{j \in \mathbb{X}} (D_{x \rightarrow j} - \bar{D}_x)^2}},$$

where  $\mathbb{I}$  and  $\mathbb{X}$  are the set of workers that have interacted with the task publishers  $i$  and  $x$ , respectively.  $\mathbb{C} = \mathbb{I} \cap \mathbb{X}$  is the set of workers that both have interacted with the task publisher  $i$  and task publisher  $x$ .  $\bar{D}_i$  and  $\bar{D}_x$  are the average values of direct reputation opinions for their interacted workers in  $\mathbb{C}$ , respectively.  $D_{i \rightarrow j}$  and  $D_{x \rightarrow j}$  are the reputation opinions for the worker  $j$  from task publishers  $i$  and  $x$ , respectively. A larger similarity factor represents that the reputation opinions from the recommender, i.e., task publisher  $x$ , are more trusted. Hence, the overall weight of indirect reputation opinions from recommender  $x$  is denoted as  $\varpi_{i \rightarrow x} = \delta_{i \rightarrow x} \times \text{Sim}(i, x)$ , where  $0 \leq \delta_{i \rightarrow x} \leq 1$  is a pre-defined parameter on behalf of the weight of recommended opinions from  $x$  for the task publisher  $i$  during calculation.

All the indirect reputation opinions from recommenders for the worker  $j$  can be integrated into an overall recommended reputation opinion in the form of  $\Upsilon_{x \rightarrow j}^{rec} := \{b_{x \rightarrow j}^{rec}, d_{x \rightarrow j}^{rec}, u_{x \rightarrow j}^{rec}\}$ . We can obtain

$$\begin{cases} b_{x \rightarrow j}^{rec} = \frac{1}{\sum_{x \in X} \varpi_{i \rightarrow x}} \sum_{x \in X} \varpi_{i \rightarrow x} b_{x \rightarrow j}, \\ d_{x \rightarrow j}^{rec} = \frac{1}{\sum_{x \in X} \varpi_{i \rightarrow x}} \sum_{x \in X} \varpi_{i \rightarrow x} d_{x \rightarrow j}, \\ u_{x \rightarrow j}^{rec} = \frac{1}{\sum_{x \in X} \varpi_{i \rightarrow x}} \sum_{x \in X} \varpi_{i \rightarrow x} u_{x \rightarrow j}, \end{cases} \quad (8)$$

where  $x \in X$  is the set of recommenders that had interacted with worker  $j$ . Hence the indirect reputation opinions from different recommenders are combined into an overall recommended reputation opinion according to the corresponding weight  $\varpi_{i \rightarrow x}$  of task publisher  $i$  [11].

## C. Combining Direct Reputation Opinions with Recommended Reputation Opinions

When forming the compositive reputation value as the final reputation for the worker candidate  $j$ , the task publisher  $i$  considers not only the recommended reputation opinions, but also the direct reputation opinions to avoid cheating by other task publishers [10]. The final reputation opinion is denoted

as  $\Upsilon_{x \rightarrow j}^{final} := \{b_{x \rightarrow j}^{final}, d_{x \rightarrow j}^{final}, u_{x \rightarrow j}^{final}\}$ , where,

$$\begin{cases} b_{i \rightarrow j}^{final} = \frac{b_{i \rightarrow j}^{rec} + b_{x \rightarrow j}^{rec} u_{i \rightarrow j}}{u_{i \rightarrow j} + u_{x \rightarrow j}^{rec} - u_{x \rightarrow j}^{rec} u_{i \rightarrow j}}, \\ d_{i \rightarrow j}^{final} = \frac{d_{i \rightarrow j}^{rec} + d_{x \rightarrow j}^{rec} u_{i \rightarrow j}}{u_{i \rightarrow j} + u_{x \rightarrow j}^{rec} - u_{x \rightarrow j}^{rec} u_{i \rightarrow j}}, \\ u_{i \rightarrow j}^{final} = \frac{u_{x \rightarrow j}^{rec} u_{i \rightarrow j}}{u_{i \rightarrow j} + u_{x \rightarrow j}^{rec} - u_{x \rightarrow j}^{rec} u_{i \rightarrow j}}. \end{cases} \quad (9)$$

Hence, similar to (5), the final reputation value of task publisher  $i$  for the worker candidate  $j$  is  $T_{i \rightarrow j}^{final} = b_{i \rightarrow j}^{final} + a u_{i \rightarrow j}^{final}$ .

After reputation calculation in the above steps, the task publishers can select high-reputation worker candidates with high-accuracy and reliable data as the workers for model training in federated learning tasks. As mentioned in Step 5 presented in Section IV, the task publishers also upload their reputation opinions for worker candidates to the reputation blockchain, which will work as recommended reputation opinions for other task publishers. This reputation calculation scheme can recognize malicious worker candidates and avoid collusion cheating by their compromised task publishers [10]. More details are given in Section VII.

## VI. INCENTIVE MECHANISM FOR RELIABLE FEDERATED LEARNING

For reliable federated learning, we design an incentive mechanism to motivate high-reputation workers with high-quality local data to join model training. Note that the high-quality data means high-accuracy and reliable local training data. Each task publisher offers a reward to the high-reputation workers that make contributions to federated learning tasks. However, there exist the following information asymmetry issues for the task publishers to do so [24], [25]. I) A task publisher does not know which mobile devices would like to join the model training due to the lack of prior knowledge. II) The accurate reputation value and the local data quality of a worker are unknown to the task publisher. III) The task publisher does not know the amount of available computation resource and the data sizes from workers for model training. As a result, the task publisher may suffer from too much cost when providing incentives to the mobile devices. It is essential for the task publishers to design an efficient incentive mechanism for reducing the impact of information asymmetry. Moreover, the workers with more contributions should be rewarded more. Therefore, contract theory as an efficient and powerful incentive mechanism is employed in this section [9], [25], [26], [27].

### A. Computation Model for Federated Learning

We consider a federated learning task as a monopoly market with a monopolist operator (a task publisher) and a set of mobile devices  $\mathcal{N} = \{1, \dots, N\}$ . Each worker  $n \in \mathcal{N}$  with a local training dataset uses a size  $s_n$  of its local data samples to participate in the federated learning task. There is an input-output pair in each data sample, in which the input is a sample vector with various data features and the output is the label value for the input generated through mobile apps [3]. The contributed computation resources for local model training, i.e., CPU cycle frequency, from the worker  $n$  is denoted as

$f_n$ . The number of CPU cycles for a worker  $n$  to perform one sample of data<sup>1</sup> in local model training is denoted by  $c_n$ . Hence, for worker  $n$ , the computation time of a local iteration in local model training is  $\frac{c_n s_n}{f_n}$ . According to [3], the CPU energy consumption of the worker for one local iteration is expressed as follows:

$$E_n^{cmp}(f_n) = \zeta c_n s_n f_n^2, \quad (10)$$

where  $\zeta$  is the effective capacitance parameter of computing chipset for worker  $n$  [26].

### B. Communication Model for Federated Learning

For a federated learning task, all the workers (i.e., high-reputation mobile devices with high-quality data) collaborate to train a shared global model and achieve a global accuracy level of learning by an iterative method with a number of communication rounds (i.e., global iterations). During a global iteration, the workers send their own local model updates to the task publisher through wireless communications. Each local model update has a local accuracy  $\varepsilon_n$  corresponding to the local data quality of worker  $n$ . Note that a larger local accuracy leads to fewer local and global iterations [28]. When the global accuracy is fixed, the number of local iterations is  $\log(\frac{1}{\varepsilon_n})$  [3], [28]. There are computation time of a local iteration and uplink communication time<sup>2</sup> of a local model update during a global iteration. The computation time of a local iteration of the worker  $n$  is denoted by  $T_n^{cmp} = \frac{c_n s_n}{f_n}$ . For the communication time of local model updates, time-sharing multi-access protocols, e.g., Time-Division Medium Access (TDMA) technology, can be taken into consideration in this paper. We consider that the locations of workers are fixed during transmitting local model parameters. The transmission rate of worker  $n$  is denoted as  $r_n = B \ln(1 + \frac{\rho_n h_n}{N_0})$ . Here,  $B$  is the transmission bandwidth and  $\rho_n$  is the transmission power of the worker  $n$ .  $h_n$  is the channel gain of peer-to-peer link between the worker  $n$  and the task publisher.  $N_0$  is the background noise. We consider the data size of a local model update is  $\sigma$  that is a constant with the same value for all workers. The transmission time of a local model update with the data size of  $\sigma$  is expressed by  $T_n^{com} = \frac{\sigma}{B \ln(1 + \frac{\rho_n h_n}{N_0})}$ .

Therefore, the total time of one global iteration for the worker  $n$  is denoted as

$$T_n^t = \log(\frac{1}{\varepsilon_n}) T_n^{cmp} + T_n^{com}. \quad (11)$$

According to [3], the energy consumption of the worker  $n$  to transmit local model updates in a global iteration is  $E_n^{com} = T_n^{com} \cdot \rho_n = \frac{\sigma \rho_n}{B \ln(1 + \frac{\rho_n h_n}{N_0})}$ .

Therefore, for a global iteration, the total energy consumption of the worker  $n$  is denoted as follows:

$$E_n^t = \log(\frac{1}{\varepsilon_n}) E_n^{cmp} + E_n^{com}. \quad (12)$$

<sup>1</sup>We consider that all the data samples have the same size.

<sup>2</sup>We consider that the downlink time between the task publisher and the workers is negligible compared with the uplink time as typically the downlink bandwidth is much larger than the uplink bandwidth.



### C. Profit Function of the Task Publisher

To attract more workers with high-quality data (i.e., high-accuracy and reliable local data), we define a parameter about data quality as the type of the workers, which is denoted as

$$\theta_n = \frac{\psi}{\log(\frac{1}{\varepsilon_n})}. \quad (13)$$

Here,  $\psi$  is the coefficient about the number of local model iterations affected by the local data accuracy. The workers are divided into  $N$  types, which are sorted in an ascending order of data quality:  $\theta_1 < \dots < \theta_n < \dots < \theta_N, n \in \{1, \dots, N\}$ . The larger  $\theta_n$  means the better quality of local data with higher accuracy, which brings fewer local model iterations [9], [18]. Although the task publisher does not know exactly true type of a given worker, it has the knowledge of the probability that a worker belongs to a certain type- $n$  [29], and  $\sum_{n=1}^N p_n = 1$ . The task publisher can obtain the distribution of worker types from observations and statistics of previous behaviours of the workers [26], [27].

Due to information asymmetry, the task publisher should design specific contracts for different types of workers with different levels of data quality to increase its profits. The task publisher offers different resource-reward bundles to the workers according to their types. For different workers with different computation resources, i.e., CPU cycle frequency, the task publisher provides the contract  $(R_n(f_n), f_n)$  including a series of resource-reward bundles to the workers. Here,  $f_n$  is the computation resource of type- $n$  worker and  $R_n(f_n)$  is the corresponding reward for the worker. The more computation resource contributed by the worker leads to faster local model training, thus bringing higher reward. The workers choose and sign one of the provided contracts at will and finish the given federated learning task. If the workers cannot finish the learning task or misbehave, the task publisher treats this interaction event as a negative event for reputation calculation in (4) and withhold payment.

For a signed contract  $(R_n(f_n), f_n)$ , we define the profit of the task publisher obtained from a type- $n$  worker as follows:

$$U_{TP}(R_n) = \omega \ln(T_{\max} - T_n^t) - lR_n, \quad (14)$$

where  $\omega > 0$  is the satisfaction degree parameter of task publisher.  $T_{\max}$  is the task publisher's maximum tolerance time of federated learning, and  $l$  is the unit cost about the rewards for the workers. Without loss of generality,  $[\omega \ln(T_{\max} - T_n^t)]$  is denoted as the satisfaction function of the task publisher regarding the total time of one global iteration for type- $n$  worker, which can also be extended to more sophisticated expressions [6]. The satisfaction of the task publisher will increase when the total time of one global iteration decreases. Note that both the higher accuracy (higher type) and larger CPU cycle frequency can decrease the global iteration time thus improving the profit of the task publisher, i.e.,  $\frac{\partial U_{TP}}{\partial \varepsilon_n} > 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial U_{TP}}{\partial \theta_n} > 0$  and  $\frac{\partial U_{TP}}{\partial f_n} > 0$ . Moreover, for the task publisher, the more high-type workers joining the federated learning leads to more profit, but also causes larger reward cost  $lR_n$ . Apparently, the task publisher will not accept a negative profit when performing the federated learning task, i.e.,  $U_{TP}(R_n) \geq 0$ .

The objective of the task publisher is to maximize its profit in the federated learning task defined as follows:

$$\max_{(R_n, f_n)} U_{TP} = \sum_{n=1}^N N p_n \cdot w \ln[T_{\max} - (\frac{\sigma}{B \ln(1 + \frac{\rho_n h_n}{N_0})} + \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} \cdot \frac{c_n s_n}{f_n})] - lR_n. \quad (15)$$

### D. Utility Function of Workers

The utility function of a type- $n$  worker for the signed contract  $(R_n(f_n), f_n)$  is defined as:

$$\begin{aligned} U_D(f_n) &= R_n - \mu E_n^t \\ &= R_n - \mu \left[ \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} \zeta c_n s_n f_n^2 + \frac{\sigma \rho_n}{B \ln(1 + \frac{\rho_n h_n}{N_0})} \right], \end{aligned} \quad (16)$$

where  $\mu$  is a pre-defined weight parameter for energy consumption. We consider that every worker is self-interested and the valuation of  $U_D$  is zero when there is no reward [29]. Intuitively, the higher-type workers have larger utility since they provide better quality data. The types of the workers are determined by their local data accuracy. The workers with high-accuracy local data can obtain larger utility. Poisoning attacks launching by the malicious workers degrade their local data accuracy thus affecting the quality of local model updates. With the help of contract theory, the malicious workers will not choose to sign the contract items higher than their types due to individual rationality (More details about the individual rationality are provided in Section VI-E). Therefore, the utility function of the workers based on contract theory can incentivize high-quality workers without adverse behavior to join the federated learning.

The worker wishes to minimize energy consumption when performing the federated learning task for maximizing its utility. The overall goal of a type- $n$  worker is expressed by

$$\max_{(R_n, f_n)} U_D = R_n - \mu \left[ \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} \zeta c_n s_n f_n^2 + \frac{\sigma \rho_n}{B \ln(1 + \frac{\rho_n h_n}{N_0})} \right]. \quad (17)$$

### E. Optimal Contract Design

In the case of information asymmetry, to make contracts feasible, each contract must satisfy the following constraints: i) Individual Rationality (IR) and ii) Incentive Compatibility (IC) in order to ensure that each type of workers are fully motivated [29].

**Definition 1.** Individual Rationality: Every worker only participates in the federated learning task when the utility of the worker is not less than zero, i.e.,

$$U_D = R_n - \mu \left[ \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} \zeta c_n s_n f_n^2 + \frac{\sigma \rho_n}{B \ln(1 + \frac{\rho_n h_n}{N_0})} \right] \geq 0. \quad (18)$$

**Definition 2.** Incentive Compatibility: To maximize utility, every worker can only choose the contract designed for itself, i.e., type  $\theta_n$ , instead of any other contracts  $(R_m, f_m)$ , i.e.,

$$\begin{aligned} R_n - \mu \left[ \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} \zeta c_n s_n f_n^2 + \frac{\sigma \rho_n}{B \ln(1 + \frac{\rho_n h_n}{N_0})} \right] &\geq R_m - \mu \left[ \frac{\psi}{\theta_m} \zeta c_n s_n f_n^2 \right. \\ &\quad \left. + \frac{\sigma \rho_n}{B \ln(1 + \frac{\rho_n h_n}{N_0})} \right], \forall n, m \in \{1, \dots, N\}, n \neq m. \end{aligned} \quad (19)$$

In what follows, for simplicity, we consider  $\mu = 1$ . Without loss of generality, we consider the transmission bandwidth, transmission power, and the channel gain of all the workers are identical due to similar wireless communication environment [3], and thus we have  $E_1^{com} = \dots = E_n^{com} = \frac{\sigma \rho_0}{B \ln(1 + \frac{\rho_0 h_0}{N_p})}$ ,  $n \in \{1, \dots, N\}$ . For ease of presentation, the optimization problems in (15) and (17) can be reformulated as

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{(R_n, f_n)} U_{TP} &= \sum_{n=1}^N N p_n \left[ w \ln(T_{\max} - T_n^{com} - \frac{\psi T_n^{cmp}}{\theta_n}) - l R_n \right], \\ \text{s.t.} \quad &R_n - (\frac{\psi}{\theta_n} E_n^{cmp} + E_n^{com}) \geq 0, \forall n \in \{1, \dots, N\}, \\ &R_n - (\frac{\psi}{\theta_n} E_n^{cmp} + E_n^{com}) \geq R_m - (\frac{\psi}{\theta_m} E_m^{cmp} + E_m^{com}), \\ &\forall n, m \in \{1, \dots, N\}, n \neq m, \\ &\frac{c_n s_n}{f_n} \leq T_{\max}, \forall n \in \{1, \dots, N\}, \\ &\sum_{n=1}^N N \cdot p_n \cdot R_n \leq R_{\max}, \forall n \in \{1, \dots, N\}, \end{aligned} \quad (20)$$

where  $R_{max}$  is the total amount of the given reward from the task publisher. Although the problem in (20) is not a convex optimization problem, its solution can be found by performing the following transformation.

According to the above definitions, we have the following lemmas.

**Lemma 1 (Monotonicity).** For contract  $(R_n, f_n)$  and  $(R_m, f_m)$ , we have  $f_n \geq f_m$  and  $R_n \geq R_m$ , if and only if  $\theta_n \geq \theta_m$ ,  $n \neq m$ , and  $n, m \in \{1, \dots, N\}$ .

**Proof:** Based on the IC constraints of type- $n$  workers and type- $m$  workers, we have

$$R_n - \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} E_n^{cmp} \geq R_m - \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} E_m^{cmp}, \quad (21)$$

$$R_m - \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} E_m^{cmp} \geq R_n - \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} E_n^{cmp}. \quad (22)$$

By summing up the above inequalities (21) and (22) together, we have  $(\frac{\psi}{\theta_n} - \frac{\psi}{\theta_m})(E_n^{cmp} - E_m^{cmp}) \geq 0$ . Note that  $E_n^{cmp}(f_n)$  is a monotonically increasing valuation function with respect to  $f_n$ . It is easy to find that  $(E_n^{cmp} - E_m^{cmp}) \geq 0$ , i.e.,  $f_n \geq f_m$  holds if  $\theta_n \geq \theta_m$ . When  $f_n \geq f_m$ , we have  $(E_n^{cmp} - E_m^{cmp}) \geq 0$ , then  $\theta_n \geq \theta_m$  must be satisfied [9].

**Proposition 1:**  $R_n \geq R_m$  if and only if  $f_n \geq f_m$ .

**Proof:** According to the IC constraints in (21) and (22), we have the following inequalities:

$$R_n - R_m \geq \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} (E_n^{cmp} - E_m^{cmp}), \quad (23)$$

$$R_n - R_m \leq \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} (E_n^{cmp} - E_m^{cmp}). \quad (24)$$

When  $f_n \geq f_m$ , we have  $E_n^{cmp} \geq E_m^{cmp}$ . Thus, we can deduce  $R_n \geq R_m$  from (23). In addition, as  $R_n \geq R_m$ , we can deduce  $E_n^{cmp} \geq E_m^{cmp}$ , i.e.,  $f_n \geq f_m$ , from (24). According to **Proposition 1**, we know that an incentive compatibility contract requires a higher reward when the workers contribute faster CPU-cycle frequency for federated learning tasks.  $\square$

**Lemma 2.** If the IR constraint of type- $I$  is satisfied, the other IR constraints will also hold.

**Proof:** According to the IC constraints,  $\forall n \in \{2, \dots, N\}$ , we can obtain

$$R_n - \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} E_n^{cmp} \geq R_1 - \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} E_1^{cmp}. \quad (25)$$

Given that  $\theta_1 < \dots < \theta_n < \dots < \theta_N$ , we can also obtain

$$R_1 - \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} E_1^{cmp} \geq R_1 - \frac{\psi}{\theta_1} E_1^{cmp}. \quad (26)$$

Combing (25) and (26), we have

$$R_n - \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} E_n^{cmp} \geq R_1 - \frac{\psi}{\theta_1} E_1^{cmp}.$$

Since all the energy consumption of transmitting local model for workers are the same, we have

$$R_n - \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} E_n^{cmp} - E_n^{com} \geq R_1 - \frac{\psi}{\theta_1} E_1^{cmp} - E_1^{com}. \quad (27)$$

The (27) implies that when the IR constraint of type- $I$  worker is satisfied, the other IR constraints will automatically hold. Hence, the other IR constraints can be bounded into the IR condition of type- $I$  worker [9], [30]. Note that the (28) is tight for the optimization problem in (21).  $\square$

**Lemma 3.** According to the monotonicity in **Lemma 1**, the IC condition can be reduced as the Local Downward Incentive Constraints (LDIC) that is expressed as follows:

$$R_n - \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} E_n^{cmp} \geq R_{n-1} - \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} E_{n-1}^{cmp}, \forall n \in \{2, \dots, N\}. \quad (28)$$

**Proof:** The IC constraints between type- $n$  and type- $m$ ,  $\forall m \in \{1, \dots, n-1\}$  are defined as Downward Incentive Compatibility (DIC), which is expressed as  $R_n - \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} E_n^{cmp} \geq R_m - \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} E_m^{cmp}$ .

The IC constraints between type- $n$  and type- $m$ ,  $\forall m \in \{n+1, \dots, N\}$  are defined as Upward Incentive Compatibility (UIC), which is expressed as  $R_n - \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} E_n^{cmp} \geq R_m - \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} E_m^{cmp}$ .

We first prove that DIC can be reduced as two adjacent types in DIC, called LDIC. Given  $\theta_{n-1} < \theta_n < \theta_{n+1}$ ,  $n \in \{2, \dots, N-1\}$ , we can obtain

$$R_{n+1} - \frac{\psi}{\theta_{n+1}} E_{n+1}^{cmp} \geq R_n - \frac{\psi}{\theta_{n+1}} E_n^{cmp}, \quad (29)$$

$$R_n - \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} E_n^{cmp} \geq R_{n-1} - \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} E_{n-1}^{cmp}. \quad (30)$$

By utilizing the monotonicity, i.e.,  $R_n \leq R_m$  if and only if  $\theta_n \leq \theta_m$ ,  $n \neq m$ , and  $n, m \in \{1, \dots, N\}$ , we can obtain

$$\theta_{n+1}(R_n - R_{n-1}) \geq \theta_n(R_n - R_{n-1}). \quad (31)$$

Combing (30) and (31), we have

$$R_n - \frac{\psi}{\theta_{n+1}} E_n^{cmp} \geq R_{n-1} - \frac{\psi}{\theta_{n+1}} E_{n-1}^{cmp}. \quad (32)$$

Combing (29) and (32), we have

$$R_{n+1} - \frac{\psi}{\theta_{n+1}} E_{n+1}^{cmp} \geq R_{n-1} - \frac{\psi}{\theta_{n+1}} E_{n-1}^{cmp}. \quad (33)$$

The (33) can be extended to prove that all the DIC can be held until type- $I$ :

$$\begin{aligned} R_{n+1} - \frac{\psi}{\theta_{n+1}} E_{n+1}^{cmp} &\geq R_{n-1} - \frac{\psi}{\theta_{n+1}} E_{n-1}^{cmp} \geq \dots \\ &\geq R_1 - \frac{\psi}{\theta_{n+1}} E_1^{cmp}, \forall n \in \{1, \dots, N-1\}. \end{aligned} \quad (34)$$

Hence, with the LDIC, all the DICs hold and can be reduced. Similarly, we can prove that by using the monotonicity, given the Local Upward Incentive Compatibility (LUIC) hold, all the UICs can automatically hold [9], [30].  $\square$

Based on the analysis in **Lemmas 1, 2, 3** and the LDIC is tight at the optimal point, the optimization problem in (20) is simplified as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{(R_n, f_n)} U_{TP} &= \sum_{n=1}^N N p_n \left[ w \ln(T_{\max} - T_n^{\text{com}} - \frac{\psi T_n^{\text{cmp}}}{\theta_n}) - l R_n \right] \\ \text{s.t.} \quad &R_n - \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} E_n^{\text{cmp}} - E_n^{\text{com}} = 0, \forall n \in \{1, \dots, N\}, \\ &R_n - \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} E_n^{\text{cmp}} = R_{n-1} - \frac{\psi}{\theta_n} E_{n-1}^{\text{cmp}}, \forall n \in \{2, \dots, N\}, \\ &\frac{c_n s_n}{f_n} \leq T_{\max}, \forall n \in \{1, \dots, N\}, \\ &\sum_{n=1}^N N \cdot p_n \cdot R_n \leq R_{\max}, \forall n \in \{1, \dots, N\}. \end{aligned} \quad (35)$$

To derive the optimal contracts in the problem (35), we first solve the relaxed problem in (35) without monotonicity constraint. Subsequently, this acquired solution is checked whether it satisfies the monotonicity condition. By using the iterative method on *IC* and *IR* constraints, we can obtain the reward which is expressed as:

$$R_n = E_n^{\text{com}} + \frac{\psi E_1^{\text{cmp}}}{\theta_1} + \sum_{k=1}^n \Delta_k, \quad (36)$$

where  $\Delta_k = \frac{\psi E_k^{\text{cmp}}}{\theta_k} - \frac{\psi E_{k-1}^{\text{cmp}}}{\theta_{k-1}}$  and  $\Delta_1 = 0$ . By substituting  $R_n$  into  $\sum_{n=1}^N N \cdot p_n \cdot l R_n$ , we can obtain

$$\sum_{n=1}^N N \cdot p_n \cdot l R_n = N l E_n^{\text{com}} + N l \zeta \sum_{n=1}^N g_n c_n s_n f_n^2, \quad (37)$$

$$\text{where } g_n = \begin{cases} \frac{\psi P_n}{\theta_n} + (\frac{\psi}{\theta_n} - \frac{\psi}{\theta_{n+1}}) \sum_{i=n+1}^N p_i, & n < N, \\ \frac{\psi P_N}{\theta_N}, & n = N. \end{cases}$$

By substituting (37) into the problem in (35) and also removing all  $R_n$ , we can rewrite (35) as

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{(R_n, f_n)} U_{TP} &= \sum_{n=1}^N N p_n \left[ w \ln(T_{\max} - \frac{\sigma}{B \ln(1 + \frac{\rho_n h_n}{N_n})} - \frac{\psi c_n s_n}{f_n \theta_n}) \right. \\ &\quad \left. - \frac{N l \sigma \rho_n}{B \ln(1 + \frac{\rho_n h_n}{N_n})} - N l \zeta \sum_{n=1}^N c_n s_n g_n f_n^2 \right] \\ \text{s.t.} \quad &\frac{c_n s_n}{T_{\max}} \leq f_n, \forall n \in \{1, \dots, N\}, \\ &\frac{N \sigma \rho_n}{B \ln(1 + \frac{\rho_n h_n}{N_n})} + N \zeta \sum_{n=1}^N c_n s_n g_n f_n^2 \leq R_{\max}, \forall n \in \{1, \dots, N\}. \end{aligned} \quad (38)$$

By differentiating  $U_{TP}$  with respect to  $f_n$ , we can obtain  $\frac{\partial^2 U_{TP}}{\partial f_n^2} < 0$ , and thus  $U_{TP}$  is concave. The summation of concave functions ( $U_{TP}$ ) is still a concave function, and hence the problem in (38) with affine constraints is a concave optimization problem. With the help of convex optimization tools, e.g., CVX, we can calculate the optimal computation resource, i.e., contributed CPU-cycle  $f_n^*$  and the corresponding incentive  $R_n^*$  [9]. In addition, the monotonicity can be automatically met when the types of workers follow uniform distribution [31].

If the distribution of the workers' type is not uniform, we can utilize the infeasible sub-sequence replacing algorithm to meet the final optimal computation resource requirement [30], [32].

## VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

### A. Simulation Setting

In the simulation, we utilize a well-known digit classification dataset named MNIST and a widely-used software environment TensorFlow 1.12.0 to perform a digit classification task to evaluate the proposed incentive schemes. There are 60000 training examples and 10000 test examples in the MNIST dataset, which is widely adopted in machine learning evaluation, e.g., federated learning [19], [26]. There exist 20 task publishers, 90 well-behaved workers, and 10 unreliable workers in the federated learning tasks. These unreliable workers include 8 workers with unintentionally unreliable local update caused by their low-quality data and 2 malicious workers launching poisoning attacks. Specifically, each well-behaved worker is randomly assigned a training set following a uniform distribution over 10 classes as its local training data, while every unreliable worker only receives a certain number of classes randomly. To quantify the data quality of local training data in the unreliable workers, we use the Earth Mover's Distance (EMD) as an index. The EMD is denoted by the probability distance for a worker's training data distribution compared with the actual distribution for the whole population [33]. For the malicious workers with poisoning attacks, they randomly have training data with 10 classes. Nevertheless, some labels of the training examples are deliberately modified to mislead the global model training. The modified label percentage of the training examples indicates the attack strength of a poisoning attack. Each model is trained for 5 synchronous iterations among workers, and the workers use a batch of 32 randomly sampled training examples to generate a local SGD update [19]. For simplicity, we set all the transmission rates of local model updates as the same value, thus the transmission time and energy consumption for all the workers are the same.

For reputation calculation, we consider that the task publishers consist of 15 honest task publishers and 5 compromised task publishers. The compromised task publishers provide fake recommended reputation opinions to other task publishers for misleading reputation calculation. We compare the proposed multi-weight subjective logic scheme with a Traditional Subjective Logic (TSL) scheme presented in [9], [11]. The initial reputation of the unreliable workers is 0.49. A reputation blockchain is established on Corda V4.0 that provides reliable transaction services [34]. We employ PBFT as the consensus algorithm running on 30 pre-selected miners. SHA-256 is used as the secure hash algorithm and the data size of a reputation opinion is from 200B to 400B. The block size limit of reputation opinions is 1MB. The average block generation time is 10s [35]. For the incentive mechanism, the worker candidates are initially classified into 10 types according to accuracy-related parameters of local training data, and the probability for a candidate belonging to a certain type is 0.1 [9]. More parameters used in the simulation are given in Table II [9], [11], [30].

TABLE II: Parameter Setting in the Simulation

Parameter	Setting
Interaction frequency between a task publisher and workers	[15, 30] federated learning tasks a week
Weight parameters	$\kappa = 0.4, \eta = 0.6$
Successful transmission probability of data packets	[0.8, 1]
Local accuracy $\varepsilon_n$	[0.2, 0.92]
CPU cycles for performing a data sample	$c_n = c_0 = 5$
The size of data samples	$s_n = s_0 = 20$
The transmission time and energy consumption of transmitting a local model update	$T_n^{com} = 10, E_n^{com} = 20, n \in \{1, \dots, N\}$
The maximum tolerance time of a federated learning task	$T_{max} = 600$
The total amount of given reward	$R_{max} = 10000$
Pre-defined parameters	$a = 0.5, z = 0.8, \delta_{i \rightarrow x} = 0.9, \zeta = 2, \psi = 15, w = 800, \mu = 1, l = 1$




Fig. 2: The accuracy of federated learning tasks under different data quality levels and attack strengths.

### B. Performances of the Proposed Reputation Scheme

We first evaluate the effects of the unreliable workers on accuracy of federated learning tasks with different levels of data quality, i.e., EMDs and poisoning attack strengths. From Fig. 2, we can observe that the increasing EMD, larger attack strength, or more attackers can bring decreasing federated learning accuracy. Consequently, both the unreliable workers with low-quality training data (i.e., large EMD) and attackers with poisoning attack cause negative effects on the learning accuracy. For example, when the EMD is 1.6 and the attack strength is 0.9, the accuracy of federated learning with two attackers is 78.07 %, which is 5% lower than that with one attackers. When the attack strength is 0.9 and the EMD is 1.6, the accuracy is 6.6% lower than that with zero EMD in the case of two attackers.

To illustrate the performance of different reputation calculation schemes with and without reputation blockchain, we consider that an unreliable worker intentionally well behaves to improve its reputation value in the former 6 federated tasks. Thereafter, this worker randomly misbehaves to 15 task publishers with the probability of 0.8, which trains local models on local data with poisoning or unreliable examples. For the schemes without the reputation blockchain, we consider that all reputation opinions are centralizedly stored in a cloud serv-




Fig. 3: The reputation values of an unreliable worker.




Fig. 4: The accuracy under different reputation thresholds of successful detection (EMD=1.6, attack strength=0.8).

er. However, there exists an internal attack in the central cloud that an attacker may manipulate the stored reputation opinions for the unreliable worker into good reputation opinions with a probability of 50%.

Figure 3 shows that, when performing misbehaviours, the reputation of the unreliable worker in all the schemes with reputation begins to decrease. However, for the baseline scheme without reputation protection, the reputation is still linearly increasing. The reputation in the proposed reputation calculation schemes with & without the reputation blockchain has a sharper and larger decrease than those in the TSL schemes with & without the reputation blockchain in a short time period because of the weight effects of interaction effects and freshness. Moreover, when the unreliable worker pretends to behave well again, its reputation in TSL schemes with & without the blockchain increases faster than those in the proposed reputation calculation schemes with & without the reputation blockchain. After four more learning tasks, the worker becomes trusted in TSL scheme with the blockchain when the reputation threshold of trusted worker is 0.5, while the worker is still untrusted in the proposed reputation calculation scheme with the blockchain. Here, the reputation threshold of the trusted worker represents that a worker candidate with higher reputation than a given threshold is treated as a trustable candidate in the reputation calculation schemes. Moreover, compared with the schemes without the reputation blockchain, the reputation in the both schemes with the blockchain is more accurate and reliable because of the reputation blockchain with






Fig. 5: The utilities of workers with different contract items.




Fig. 6: The profit of a task publisher under different total number of worker types

the nature properties of tramper-resistance and decentralization that can defend against the internal attack.

To show the effects of reputation threshold on federated learning accuracy, we evaluate the accuracy of a federated learning task with respect to different reputation thresholds of successful detection and different reputation schemes. Here, the reputation threshold of successful detection means that a maliciously unreliable worker with the calculated reputation value from different schemes below the given reputation threshold is detected successfully. Figure 4 shows that the higher reputation threshold leads to a higher training accuracy. For the schemes with the reputation blockchain, the accuracy of the proposed reputation scheme is higher than that of the TSL scheme when the reputation threshold ranges from 0.35 to 0.45. By contrast, for the schemes without the blockchain, the accuracy of the federated learning tasks is not lower than those with the blockchain until the reputation threshold of successful detection being higher than 0.65. The reason is that, with the help of the reputation blockchain, the reputation opinions from the honest task publishers can be securely stored and protected without manipulation, leading to more accurate reputation calculation and more reliable worker selection for better learning performance. Nevertheless, all the schemes cannot completely detect the unreliable workers when the reputation threshold is relatively low, such as lower than 0.3. The reason is that the unreliable workers can disguise themselves well through good behaviours during some federated learning tasks, and thus they cannot be detected in a short time.




Fig. 7: Utility under different unit costs about rewards.




Fig. 8: The profit of the task publisher under different accuracy levels of local training data.

### C. Performances of the Contract-based Incentive Mechanism

To validate the feasibility, i.e., IR and IC, of the proposed scheme under information asymmetry, we present Fig. 5 to show the utilities of workers with types 2, 4, 6 and 8, respectively [30]. From Fig. 5, we observe that all types of workers can only achieve their own maximum utility when they choose the contract item exactly designed for their types, which explains the IC constraint [9]. Moreover, each worker can obtain nonnegative utility when selecting the contract item corresponding to its type, which validates the IR constraint.

We compare the profit of the task publisher obtained from the proposed contract theory model, and that from the Stackelberg game model in [30]. Figure 6 shows that a larger total number of worker types leads to the larger profit of a task publisher. The more worker types bring more contract item choices to high-type (high-reputation) workers, thus ensuring more reliable federated learning. For a certain number of worker types, the profit of the task publisher in the proposed contract model is higher than that of the Stackelberg game model. The reason is that, in the monopoly market, the task publisher working as the monopolist only provides limited contract items to the workers and extracts more profit from the workers. Nevertheless, in the Stackelberg game model, rational workers can optimize their individual utilities resulting in less profit for the task publisher. Although the task publisher needs to consider the IR and IC constraints during designing the contract items, these constraints have a small impact on maximizing the utilities of the workers compared with the

Stackelberg game model [36]. As a result, the task publisher can obtain the higher profit than that in the Stackelberg game models [9]. Moreover, the Stackelberg game model with symmetric information has better performance than that of Stackelberg game model with asymmetric information. The reason is that the game leader (the task publisher) in the Stackelberg game with symmetric information can optimize its profit because of knowing the actions of followers (workers), i.e., the symmetric information, and set the utilities of the followers to zero [30].

For the task publisher, there exists unit cost about rewards for workers during federated learning tasks. Figure 7 shows that in the contract-based incentive scheme, both the profit of the task publisher and the social welfare decrease with the increase of unit cost about rewards. The total utility of all workers increases with the increase of unit cost about rewards because of receiving larger reward from the task publisher. To illustrate the impacts of the variation range of local training data accuracy on the profit of task publisher, we vary the upper limit of local data accuracy (i.e., a parameter related to the worker type) from 98% to 88%, and 78%, respectively. As shown in Fig. 8, the profit of the task publisher decreases with the decrease of the upper limit of local data accuracy. As reducing upper limit of the local data accuracy means that the number of high-reputation workers is decreasing. Therefore, the low-quality of local training data has a negative impact on the profit of the task publisher. In summary, the proposed schemes achieve more accurate reputation calculation and stimulate high-reputation workers with accurate as well as reliable data to join learning tasks, hence leading to the more reliable federated learning.

## VIII. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we have focused on the worker selection and incentive mechanism issues for reliable federated learning in mobile networks. We have first introduced a reputation-based worker selection scheme for reliable worker selection. To ensure efficient and secure reputation management, we have employed a multi-weight subjective logic model to calculate the reputation of the workers according to direct interaction histories and recommended reputation opinions, and thus utilized a consortium blockchain to manage the reputation of workers in a decentralized manner without repudiation. Furthermore, to enable reliable federated learning, we have designed contract theory-based incentive mechanism to stimulate high-reputation workers that have high-accuracy and reliable local training data to join the learning processes. Numerical results have confirmed that the contract-based incentive scheme can attract more high-reputation workers with high-quality local training data to ensure reliable federated learning and also optimize the utilities of both the task publishers and the workers.

In the future work, to further improve the accuracy of reputation calculation, more weight parameters can be taken into consideration to optimize the reputation calculation. Motivated by the success of machine learning in security protection, we can utilize advanced machine learning techniques to detect and remove compromised task publishers or malicious workers for further enabling reliable federated learning.

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


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