AI Alignment: A Comprehensive Survey

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Abstract

AI alignment aims to build AI systems that are in accordance with human intentions and values. With the emergence of AI systems possessing superhuman capabilities, the potential large-scale risks associated with misaligned systems become apparent. Hundreds of AI experts and public figures have expressed their concerns about AI risks, arguing that mitigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority, alongside other societal-scale risks such as pandemics and nuclear war (CAIS, 2023). Motivated by the lack of an up-to-date systematic survey on AI alignment, in this paper, we delve into the core concepts, methodology, and practice of alignment research. To begin with, we identify four principles as the key objectives of AI alignment: Robustness, Interpretability, Controllability, and Ethicality (RICE). Guided by these four principles, we outline the landscape of current alignment research and decompose them into two key components: forward alignment and backward alignment. The former aims to make AI systems aligned via alignment training, while the latter aims to gain evidence about the systems' alignment and govern them appropriately to avoid exacerbating misalignment risks. Forward alignment and backward alignment form a recurrent process where the alignment of AI systems from the forward process needs to be verified in the backward process, meanwhile providing updating objectives for the forward alignment in the next round. On forward alignment, we discuss how to conduct learning from various types of feedback (a.k.a., outer alignment) and how to overcome the distribution shift to avoid goal misgeneralization (a.k.a., inner alignment). Specifically, we survey traditional preference modeling methods and reinforcement learning from human feedback and further discuss potential frameworks to reach scalable oversight for tasks where effective human oversight is hard to obtain. On backward alignment, we discuss verification techniques that can tell the degree of value alignment for various AI systems deployed, which can further improve the assurance of forward alignment outcomes. Specifically, we survey evaluation methods of AI systems throughout their lifecycle, covering safety, interpretability, and human value compliance. Lastly, we discuss the current and prospective governance practices that are adopted by different governments, industries, and other third parties, to manage existing and future AI risks.

This survey aims to provide a comprehensive yet beginner-friendly review of broad alignment research topics. Based on this, we also release a constantly updated website featuring tutorials, collections of papers, blogs, and other learning resources at www.alignmentsurvey.com.

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1 Introduction

Recent advancements have seen the increasing application of capable AI systems in complex domains (§1.1.1), such as applications of autonomous agents based on Large Language Models (LLMs) (Xi et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2023c) and the utilization of Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) for the control of nuclear fusion (Degrave et al., 2022). The increasing capabilities and deployment in high-stakes domains are concomitant with heightened risks. Various undesirable behaviors exhibited by advanced AI systems (*e.g.*, power-seeking (Turner et al., 2021; Perez et al., 2023), deception (Park et al., 2023b) and manipulation (Perez et al., 2023)) have raised concerns about the potential hazards from AI systems.

Consequently, these concerns have catalyzed research efforts in *AI alignment* (Bostrom, 2013; Ord, 2020; Bucknall and Dori-Hacohen, 2022). AI alignment aims to make AI systems behave in line with human intentions and values (Leike et al., 2018) – it focuses on the intent and objective of AI systems, as opposed to their capabilities. Failures of alignment (*i.e.*, misalignment) are among the most salient causes of potential harm from AI. Mechanisms underlying these failures include *reward hacking* (Pan et al., 2022) and *goal misgeneralization* (Shah et al., 2022), which are further amplified by *double edge components* such as situational awareness (Berglund et al., 2023), broadly-scoped goals (Ngo et al., 2022), mesa-optimization objectives (Hubinger et al., 2019c), and access to increased resources (Shevlane et al., 2023) (§1.3).

Alignment efforts to address these failures focus on accomplishing four key objectives (§1.1.2): Robustness, Interpretability, Controllability, and Ethicality (**RICE**). Current research and practice on alignment consist of four areas (§1.2): Learning from Feedback (§2), Learning under Distributional Shift (§3), Assurance (§4), and Governance (§5). The four objectives and the four areas are not in one-to-one correspondence. Each individual area often serves more than one alignment objective, and vice versa (see Table 1).

In this survey, we introduce the concept, methodology, and practice of AI alignment and discuss its potential future directions.¹

1.1 The Alignment Problem

The motivation for alignment is a three-step argument, each step building upon the previous one: (1) Deep learning-based systems (or applications) have an increasingly large impact on society and bring significant risks (§1.1.1); (2) Misalignment represents a significant source of risks (§1.1.1); and (3) Alignment research and practice address risks stemming from misaligned systems (*e.g.*, power-seeking behaviors) (§1.1.2).

1.1.1 The Prospect and Impact of AGI

In the past decade, deep learning has made significant strides, leading to the emergence of large-scale neural networks with remarkable capabilities in various domains. These advances represent a transition from symbolic systems (Smolensky, 1987; Goel, 2022) to deep learning-based systems (Mnih et al., 2015; OpenAI, 2023a). Such systems have demonstrated noteworthy accomplishments in many settings, including game environments (Silver et al., 2017; Berner et al., 2019; Kaufmann et al., 2023) and more intricate, even high-stakes, real-world scenarios (Ruff and Pappu, 2021; Degrave et al., 2022). In particular, LLMs have exhibited improved capabilities in multistep reasoning (Wei et al., 2022; Wang et al., 2023e) and cross-task generalization (Brown et al., 2020b; Askell et al., 2021). These abilities are strengthened with increased training time, training data, and parameter size (Kaplan et al., 2020; Srivastava et al., 2022; Hoffmann et al., 2022).

With improved capabilities come increased risks. Some undesirable behaviors of LLMs (*e.g.*, untruthful answers (Bang et al., 2023), sycophancy (Perez et al., 2023), and deception (Jacob Steinhardt, 2023)) worsen with increased model scale (Perez et al., 2023), resulting in concerns about advanced AI systems that are hard to control. Moreover, emerging trends such as *LLM-based agents* (Xi et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2023c) also raise concerns about the system's controllability and ethicality (Chan et al., 2023). Looking further ahead, the development of increasingly competent AI systems opens up the possibility of realizing Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) in the foreseeable future, *i.e.*, systems can match or surpass human intelligence in all relevant aspects (Bubeck et al., 2023). This could bring extensive opportunities (Manyika et al., 2017) such as automation (West, 2018), efficiency improvements (Furman and Seamans, 2019), and rapid technological progress (Korinek et al., 2021), but also come with serious risks (CAIS, 2023; Critch and Russell, 2023), such as safety concerns (Hendrycks and Mazeika, 2022), biases and inequalities (Ntoutsi et al., 2020), and large-scale risks from superhuman capabilities (Bostrom, 2014; Bengio, 2023). Taking biases as an example, cutting-edge LLMs manifest discernible biases about gender, sexual identity, and immigrant status among others (Perez et al., 2023), which could reinforce existing inequalities.

Within the large-scale risks from superhuman capabilities (Bostrom, 2014), it has been conjectured that global catastrophic risks (*i.e.*, risks of severe harms on a global scale) (Bostrom and Cirkovic, 2011; Hendrycks et al.,

¹To help beginners interested in this field learn more effectively, we highlight some systematic resources about alignment techniques (as well as development tendencies). More details can be found in: www.alignmentsurvey.com/resource

2023; GOV.UK, 2023) and existential risks (*i.e.*, risks that threaten the destruction of humanity's long-term potential) (Ord, 2020) from advanced AI systems are especially worrying. These concerns are elaborated in first-principle deductive arguments (Ngo, 2020a; Bengio, 2023), evolutionary analysis (Hendrycks, 2023), and concrete scenario mapping (Christiano, 2019; Kenton et al., 2022). In CAIS (2023), leading AI scientists and other notable figures stated that *Mitigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority alongside other societal-scale risks such as pandemics and nuclear war.* The median researcher surveyed by Stein-Perlman et al. (2022) at NeurIPS 2021 and ICML 2021 reported a 5% chance that the long-run effect of advanced AI on humanity would be *extremely bad* (*e.g.*, *human extinction*), and 36% of NLP researchers surveyed by Michael et al. (2023) self-reported to believe that *AI could produce catastrophic outcomes in this century, on the level of all-out nuclear war.* ² Existential risks from AI also include risks of lock-in, stagnation, and more (Bostrom, 2013; Hendrycks and Mazeika, 2022), in addition to extinction risks.³ The latest news is that the UK will host the world's first global AI Safety Summit, gathering international governments, leading AI companies, civil society groups, and research experts. Its objectives are to: (1) assess the risks associated with AI, particularly at the cutting edge of its development; (2) explore how these risks can be mitigated through internationally coordinated efforts⁴.

Specifically, current cutting-edge AI systems have exhibited multiple classes of undesirable or harmful behaviors that may contrast with human intentions (*e.g.*, powerful-seeking and manipulation) (Si et al., 2022; Pan et al., 2023a), and similar worries about more advanced systems have also been raised (Critch and Krueger, 2020; CAIS, 2023). These undesirable or harmful behaviors not compliant with human intentions, known as *misalignment* of AI systems⁶, can naturally occur even without misuse by malicious actors and represent a significant source of risks from AI, including safety hazards (Hendrycks et al., 2021c) and potential existential risks (Hendrycks et al., 2023). These large-scale risks are significant in size due to the non-trivial likelihoods of (1) building superintelligent AI systems, (2) those AI systems pursuing large-scale goals, (3) those goals are misaligned with human intentions and values, and (4) this misalignment leads to humans losing control of humanity's future trajectory (Ngo, 2020a).

Solving the risks brought by misalignment requires *alignment techniques* of AI systems to ensure the objectives of the AI system are in accordance with human intentions and values, thereby averting unintended and unfavorable outcomes. More importantly, we expect the alignment techniques to be scaled to harder tasks and significantly advanced AI systems that are even smarter than humans. A potential solution is *Super Alignment*⁸, which aims to build a roughly human-level automated alignment researcher, thereby using vast amounts of compute to scale up and iteratively align superintelligence (OpenAI, 2023c).

1.1.2 The Objective of Alignment: RICE

How can we build AI systems that behave in line with human intentions and values?

There is not a universally accepted definition of *alignment*. Before embarking on this discussion, we must clarify what we mean by alignment goals. Leike et al. (2018) frame it as the agent alignment problem, posing the question: "How can we create agents that behave in accordance with the user intentions?" One could also focus on super-human AI systems (OpenAI, 2023c) and ask: "How do we ensure AI systems much smarter than humans follow human intent?" A consistent theme in these discussions is the focus on *human intentions*. To clearly define alignment goals, it's imperative to accurately characterize human intentions, a challenging task, as noted by Kenton et al. (2021). For instance, the term *human* can represent various entities ranging from an individual to humanity. Gabriel (2020) breaks down intentions into several categories, such as instruction (follow my direct orders), expressed intentions (act on my underlying wishes), revealed preferences (reflect my behavior-based preferences), and so on.

Concretely, we characterize the objectives of alignment with four principles: Robustness, Interpretability, Controllability, and Ethicality (**RICE**). Figure 1 summarizes the principles, and Table 1 gives the correspondence between alignment research directions covered in the survey and the principles to which they contribute. The following is a detailed explanation of the four principles.

²However, survey results may hinge upon the exact wording of the questions and should be taken with caution.

³Existential and extinction risks are two concepts that are often mixed up. The latter is a subset of the former.

 $^{{\}color{red}^4Source from \verb| https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/ai-safety-summit-2023.}$

⁵See §1.3 for an introduction to specific misalignment challenges.

⁶Some of the misaligned behaviors are less risky (*e.g.*, the agent fails to clean the room as you want), however, some of them are dangerous for systems applied in the high-stakes environment (*e.g.*, the control of nuclear fusion (Degrave et al., 2022))

⁷It should be noted that misalignment cannot cover all sources of risks brought by Deep learning-based systems and other factors such as misuse and negligence also contribute to risks on society. See §1.2.3 for discussing AI safety beyond alignment.

⁸For more details on Super Alignment, you can refer to https://openai.com/blog/introducing-superalignment.

	<u>R</u> obustness	Operates reliably under diverse scenarios & Resilient to unforeseen disruptions.
	<u>Interpretability</u>	Decisions and intentions are comprehensible & Reasoning is unconcealed and truthful.
	C ontrollability	Behaviors can be directed by humans & Allows human intervention when needed.
♣	E thicality	Adheres to global moral standards & Respects values within human society.

Figure 1: The **RICE** principles define four key characteristics that an aligned system should possess, in no particular order: (1) **Robustness** states that the system's stability needs to be guaranteed across various environments; (2) **Interpretability** states that the operation and decision-making process of the system should be clear and understandable; (3) **Controllability** states that the system should be under the guidance and control of humans; (4) **Ethicality** states that the system should adhere to society's norms and values. These four principles guide the alignment of an AI system with human intentions and values. They are not end goals in themselves but intermediate objectives in service of alignment.

- Robustness Robustness refers to the resilience of AI systems when operating across diverse scenarios (Dietterich, 2017) or under adversarial pressures (Rudner and Toner, 2021b), especially the correctness of its objective in addition to capabilities. Robust AI systems should be able to cope with black swan events (Taleb, 2007) and long-tailed risks (Hendrycks et al., 2021c), as well as a diverse array of adversarial pressures (Song et al., 2018b; Chakraborty et al., 2021). For example, an aligned language model ought to refuse requests to behave harmfully, but models can be made to cause harm through jailbreak prompts and other adversarial attacks (Carlini et al., 2023; Zou et al., 2023b). Instead, an adversarially robust model should behave as intended even when facing inputs designed to cause failure. As AI systems find increasing deployment in high-stakes domains such as the military and economy (Steinhardt and Toner, 2020), there will be a growing need to ensure their resilience against unexpected disruptions and adversarial attacks, given that even momentary failures can yield catastrophic consequences (Kirilenko et al., 2017; OecdAI, 2021; Rudner and Toner, 2021b). Aligned systems should consistently maintain robustness throughout their lifecycle (Russell, 2019).
- Interpretability Interpretability demands that we can understand the AI systems' inner reasoning, especially the inner workings of opaque neural networks. Straightforward approaches to alignment assessments, such as behavioral evaluations, potentially suffer from dishonest behaviors (Turpin et al., 2023; Park et al., 2023b; Jacob Steinhardt, 2023) or deceptive alignment (Hubinger et al., 2019a; Carranza et al., 2023) of AI systems. One way to cope with this issue is to make AI systems honest, non-concealing, and non-manipulative (Pacchiardi et al., 2023; Radhakrishnan et al., 2023; Carroll et al., 2023). Alternatively, we could build interpretability tools that peek into the inner concepts and mechanisms within neural networks (Elhage et al., 2021; Meng et al., 2022). In addition to enabling safety assessments, interpretability also makes decision-making processes accessible and comprehensible to users and stakeholders, thus enabling human supervision. As AI systems assume a more pivotal role in real-world decision-making processes and high-stakes settings (Holzinger et al., 2017), it becomes imperative to demystify the decision-making process rather than allowing it to remain an opaque black box (DeepMind, 2018; Rudner and Toner, 2021a).
- Controllability Controllability is a necessary attribute that ensures the actions and decision-making processes of a system remain subject to human oversight and intervention. It guarantees that human intervention can promptly rectify any deviations or errors in the system's behavior (Soares et al., 2015; Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016a). As AI technology advances, an increasing body of research is expressing growing concerns about the controllability of these potent systems (Critch and Krueger, 2020; UniteAI, 2023; ARC Evals, 2023). When an AI system begins to pursue goals that contradict its human designers, it can manifest capabilities that pose significant risks, including deception, manipulation, and power-seeking behaviors (Shevlane et al., 2023; ARC Evals, 2023). The objective of controllability is sharply focused on enabling scalable human oversight during the training process (Bowman et al., 2022), as well as *corrigibility* of AI systems (*i.e.*, not resisting shutdown or objective modification during deployment) (Soares et al., 2015).
- Ethicality Ethicality refers to a system's unwavering commitment to uphold universally acknowledged norms and values within its decision-making and actions. Here, the norms and values include both moral guidelines and other social norms/values. It ensures that the system avoids actions that violate ethical norms or social conventions, such as exhibiting bias against specific groups (Buolamwini and Gebru, 2018; Zhang et al., 2018a; Noble, 2018; Kearns and Roth, 2019; Raji et al., 2020; Berk et al., 2021), causing harm to individuals

Table 1: Relationships between alignment research directions covered in the survey and the **RICE** principles, featuring the individual objectives each research direction aims to achieve. Filled circles stand for primary objectives, and unfilled circles stand for secondary objectives.

Ali	gnment Research Dir	Objectives				
Category	Direction	Method	Robustness	Interpretability	Controllability	Ethicality
	Preference Modeling (§2.2)			•	0	
	Policy Learning (§2.3)	RL/PbRL/IRL/ Imitation Learning			0	
Learning from		RLHF	0		•	•
Feedback	Scalable Oversight (§2.4)	RLxF	0		•	•
(§2)		IDA		0	•	
		RRM			•	
		Debate		0	•	
		CIRL	0	0	•	0
	Algorithmic	DRO	•			
Learning under	Interventions	IRM/REx	•			
Distribution Shift	(§3.2)	CBFT	•			
(§3)	Data Distribution Interventions (§3.3)	Adversarial Training	•		0	,
		Cooperative Training	•			•
	Safety Evaluations (§4.1)	Social Concern Evaluations	0	0		•
		Extreme Risk Evaluations		0	•	0
Assurance (§4)		Red Teaming	•		0	•
Assurance (94)	Interpretability (§4.2)			•	0	
	Human Values Verification (§4.3)	Learning/Evaluating Moral Values			0	•
		Game Theory for Cooperative AI	0			•
		Government	•	•	•	•
	Multi-Stakeholder Approach(§5.2)	Industry	•	•	•	•
Governance (§5)	11pprouen(\$5.2)	Third Parties	•	•	•	•
	International Governance (§5.3.1)		•	•	•	•
	Open-source Go	overnance (§5.3.2)	•	•	•	•

(Hendrycks et al., 2021b,d; Pan et al., 2023a), and lacking diversity or equality when aggregating preferences (Collective Intelligence Project, 2023). A significant body of research is dedicated to developing ethical frameworks for AI systems (Hagendorff, 2020; Pankowska, 2020). This emphasis on imbuing AI systems with ethical principles is necessary for their integration into society (Winfield et al., 2019).

Comparing the RICE Principles with Their Alternatives The RICE principles represent a succinct summary of alignment objectives from the perspective of alignment and coexistence of humans and machines. Several previous works have put forth guidelines concerning AI systems. Asimov's Laws can be regarded as the earliest exploration of human-machine coexistence, emphasizing that robots should benefit humans and the difficulty of achieving this (Asimov, 1942). On another front, the FATE principle (Fairness, Accountability, Transparency, and Ethics) (Memarian and Doleck, 2023) leans towards defining high-level qualities AI systems should possess within the human-machine coexistence ecosystem. We aspire to answer the human-machine coexistence question from the standpoint of human governors and designers, considering what steps are necessary to ensure the builder AI systems are aligned with human intentions and values. Furthermore, some standards emphasize narrowly defined safety, such as the 3H standard (Helpful, Honest, and Harmless) (Askell et al., 2021) and governmental agency proposals (White House, 2023). We aim to expand upon these standards by introducing other crucial dimensions, including Controllability and Robustness.




Figure 2: The Alignment Cycle. (1) **Forward Alignment** (alignment training) produces *trained systems* based on *alignment requirements*; (2) **Backward Alignment** (alignment refinement) ensures the practical alignment of *trained systems* and revises *alignment requirements*; (3) The cycle is repeated until reaching a sufficient level of alignment. Notably, although Backward Alignment has the end goal of ensuring the practical alignment of *trained systems*, it is carried out all throughout the system's lifecycle in service of this goal, including before, during, after training, and also after deployment (Shevlane et al., 2023; Koessler and Schuett, 2023; Schuett et al., 2023).

1.2 The Scope of Alignment

In this section, we focus on illustrating the scope of AI alignment: we constructed the alignment process as an *alignment cycle* and decomposed it into *Forward Alignment Process* and *Backward Alignment Process*⁹ (§1.2.1). Specifically, we discuss the role of *human values* in alignment (§1.2.2) and further analyze AI safety problems beyond alignment (§1.2.3).

1.2.1 The Forward and Backward Process

We decompose alignment into **Forward Alignment** (alignment training) (§2, §3) and **Backward Alignment** (alignment refinement) (§4, §5). Forward Alignment aims to produce trained systems that follow alignment requirements. We decompose this task into Learning from Feedback (§2) and Learning under Distribution Shift (§3). Backward Alignment aims to ensure the practical alignment of the trained systems by performing evaluations in both simplistic and realistic environments and setting up regulatory guardrails to handle real-world complexities, *i.e.*, Assurance (§4). It also covers the creation and enforcement of rules that ensure the safe development and deployment of AI systems, *i.e.*, Governance (§5). At the same time, backward alignment updates the alignment requirements based on the evaluation and monitoring of the systems, both pre-deployment and post-deployment. These updated requirements then inform the next round of alignment training.

The two phases, forward and backward alignment, thus form a cycle where each phase produces or updates

⁹From this point and throughout the survey, for convenience, we refer to "Forward Alignment" and "Backward Alignment".

¹⁰Here, *alignment requirements* refer to an operationalized specification of the alignment properties that are desired of the AI systems, including, for example, which concrete forms of robustness/interpretability/controllability/ethicality we require, in what specific settings we require them, and how they could be measured.

the input of the next phase (see Figure 2). This cycle, what we call *the alignment cycle*, is repeated to produce increasingly aligned AI systems. We see alignment as a dynamic process in which all standards and practices should be continually assessed and updated. Notably, Backward Alignment (including the Assurance of alignment in AI systems and the Governance of AI systems) efforts occur throughout the entire alignment cycle, as opposed to only after training. As argued in Shevlane et al. (2023); Koessler and Schuett (2023), alignment and risk evaluations should occur in every stage of the system's lifecycle, including before, during, after training, and post-deployment. Similarly, regulatory measures for every phase of the system's lifecycle have been proposed and discussed (Schuett et al., 2023; Anderljung et al., 2023).

The survey is structured around four core pillars: Learning from Feedback (§2) and Learning under Distribution Shift (§3), which constitute the components of Forward Alignment; and Assurance (§4) and Governance (§5) which form the elements of Backward Alignment. The subsequent paragraphs provide a concise introduction to each pillar, clarifying how they synergistically contribute to a comprehensive framework for AI alignment.

- Learning from Feedback (§2) Learning from feedback concerns the question of during alignment training, how do we provide and use feedback to behaviors of the trained AI system? It takes an input-behavior pair as given and only concerns how to provide and use feedback on this pair. ¹¹ In the context of LLMs, a typical solution is reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) (Christiano et al., 2017; Bai et al., 2022a), where human evaluators provide feedback by comparing alternative answers from the chat model, and the feedback is used via Reinforcement Learning (RL) against a trained reward model. Despite its popularity, RLHF faces many challenges (Pandey et al., 2022; Casper et al., 2023a; Tien et al., 2023), overcoming which has been a primary objective of alignment research (Bowman et al., 2022), and is one primary focus of the section. An outstanding challenge here is scalable oversight (§2.4), i.e., providing high-quality feedback on super-human capable AI systems that operate in complex situations beyond the grasp of human evaluators, where the behaviors of AI systems may not be easily comprehended and evaluated by humans (Bowman et al., 2022). Another challenge is the problem of providing feedback on ethicality, which is approached by the direction of machine ethics (Anderson and Anderson, 2011; Tolmeijer et al., 2020). On the ethics front, misalignment could also stem from neglecting critical dimensions of variance in values, such as underrepresenting certain demographic groups in feedback data (Santurkar et al., 2023). There have also been work combining feedback mechanisms with social choice methods to produce a more rational and equitable aggregation of preferences (Collective Intelligence Project, 2023) (see §1.2.2).
- Learning under Distribution Shift (§3) In contrast to learning from feedback, which holds input fixed, this pillar focuses specifically on the cases where the distribution of input changes, i.e., where distribution shift occurs (Krueger et al., 2020; Thulasidasan et al., 2021; Hendrycks et al., 2021a). More specifically, it focuses on the preservation of alignment properties (i.e., adherence to human intentions and values) under distribution shift, as opposed to that of model capabilities. In other words, it asks how we can ensure an AI system wellaligned on the training distribution will also be well-aligned when deployed in the real world. One challenge related to distribution shift is goal misgeneralization, where, under the training distribution, the intended objective for the AI system (e.g., following human's real intentions) is indistinguishable from other unaligned objectives (e.g., gaining human approval regardless of means). The system learns the latter, which leads to unaligned behaviors in deployment distribution (Di Langosco et al., 2022; Shah et al., 2022). Another related challenge is auto-induced distribution shift (ADS), where an AI system changes its input distribution to maximize reward (Krueger et al., 2020; Perdomo et al., 2020). An example would be a recommender system shaping user preferences (Kalimeris et al., 2021; Adomavicius et al., 2022). Both goal misgeneralization and ADS are closely linked to deceptive behaviors (Park et al., 2023b) and manipulative behaviors (Carroll et al., 2023) in AI systems, potentially serving as their causes. Interventions that address distribution shift include algorithmic interventions (§3.2), which changes the training process to improve reliability under other distributions, and data distribution interventions (§3.3) which expands the training distribution to reduce the discrepancy between training and deployment distributions. The former includes methods like Risk Extrapolation (REx) (Krueger et al., 2021) and Connectivity-based Fine-tuning (CBFT) (Lubana et al., 2023). The latter includes adversarial training (§3.3.1) (Song et al., 2018b; Bai et al., 2021) which augments training input distribution with adversarial inputs, and cooperative training (§3.3.2) (Dafoe et al., 2020, 2021) which aims to address the distribution gap between single-agent and multi-agent settings. 12

¹¹Here, *behavior* is broadly defined also to include the system's internal reasoning, which can be examined via interpretability tools (see §4.2).

¹²Cooperative Training aims to make AI systems more cooperative in multi-agent settings. This cooperativeness addresses multi-agent failure modes where the AI system's behavior appears benign and rational in isolation but becomes problematic within social or multi-agent scenarios (Critch and Krueger, 2020); see *collectively harmful behaviors* in §1.3.3 for a more detailed account.

- Assurance (§4) Once an AI system has undergone forward alignment, we still need to gain confidence about its alignment before deploying it (Government of the United Kingdom, 2021; Anderljung et al., 2023). Such is the role of *assurance*: assessing the alignment of trained AI systems. Methodologies of assurance include safety evaluations (Perez et al., 2023; Shevlane et al., 2023) (§4.1.1) and more advanced methods such as interpretability techniques (Olah et al., 2018) (§4.2) and red teaming (Perez et al., 2022) (§4.1.3). The scope also encompasses formal theories focused on provable alignment, which include aspects of provable cooperativeness (Dafoe et al., 2020, 2021) and ethicality (Anderson and Anderson, 2011; Tolmeijer et al., 2020) (§4.3). Assurance takes place throughout the lifecycle of AI systems, including before, during, after training, and post-deployment, as opposed to only after training (Shevlane et al., 2023; Koessler and Schuett, 2023). ¹³
- Governance (§5) Assurance alone cannot provide full confidence about a system's practical alignment since it does not account for real-world complexities. This necessitates governance efforts of AI systems that focus on their alignment and safety and cover the entire lifecycle of the systems (§5.1). We discuss the multistakeholder approach of AI governance, including the governmental regulations (Anderljung et al., 2023), the lab self-governance (Schuett et al., 2023), and the third-party practice, such as auditing (Shevlane et al., 2023; Koessler and Schuett, 2023) (§5.2). We also highlight several open problems in AI governance, including the pressing challenge of open-source governance (the governance of open-source models and the question of whether to open-source highly capable models) (Seger et al., 2023), and the importance of international coordination in AI governance (Ho et al., 2023) (§5.3). In addition to policy research, we also cover key actions from both the public and the private sector.

Comparison with Inner/Outer Decomposition Our alignment cycle framework (see Figure 2) decomposes alignment into four pillars: Learning from Feedback, Learning under Distribution Shift, Assurance and Governance organized into a circular process. The design principle for this framework is three-fold: Practical (making sure pillars directly correspond to specific practices in specific stages in the system's lifecycle), Concrete (pointing to specific research directions as opposed to general themes), and Up-To-Date (accommodating and emphasizing latest developments in the alignment field). Recently, the decomposition of alignment into outer alignment and inner alignment has become popular in the alignment literature (Hubinger et al., 2019b). Outer alignment refers to the wishes of designers in accordance with the actual task specification (e.g., goal & reward) used to build AI systems. And inner alignment is the consistency between task specification and the specification that the AI systems behaviors reflect (Krakovna, 2022). However, many criticisms have also been made about this characterization, including that it is ambiguous and is understood by different people to mean different things (Perry, 2020) and that it creates unnecessary difficulties by carving out problems that are not necessary conditions for success (Turner, 2022a). Some have tried to remove the ambiguity by pinning down the specific causes of inner/outer misalignment and proposed, for example, goal misspecification and goal misgeneralization (Shah et al., 2022; Krakovna, 2022). Learning from Feedback (approximately corresponding to goal misspecification and outer alignment) and Learning under Distribution shift (approximately corresponding to goal misgeneralization and inner alignment) in our framework tries to further improve upon the inner/outer decomposition by clarifying the exact approaches taken to address the challenges and resolving the ambiguity. Assurance and Governance, on the other hand, expands the scope to cover topics beyond outer and inner alignment.

Theoretical Research in Alignment The alignment research literature also contains a wealth of theoretical work (Amodei et al., 2016; Everitt et al., 2018; Hendrycks et al., 2021c). These works often propose new directions and provide a foundation for practical and empirical research to build upon. We give a brief overview of this body of theoretical research below:

• Conceptual Frameworks. Some theoretical work proposes conceptual frameworks or characterizes subproblems within alignment. Examples include *instrumental convergence* (wherein highly intelligent agents tend to pursue a common set of sub-goals, such as self-preservation and power-seeking) (Omohundro, 2008; Bostrom, 2012), *mesa-optimization* (wherein the learned ML model performs optimization within itself during inference) (Hubinger et al., 2019c), and specific proposals for building aligned systems, such as *approval-directed agents* (wherein the AI system does not pursue goals, but seek the human's idealized post hoc approval of action consequences) (Oesterheld, 2021; Christiano, 2022). Hadfield-Menell and Hadfield (2019); Cotra (2021) have drawn inspiration from economics, linking problems in alignment with markets and principal-agent problems in economics. Christiano et al. (2021); Hobbhahn (2022) have proposed the problem of *eliciting latent knowledge* of advanced AI systems and have explored high-level approaches to the problem.

¹³Furthermore, it's noteworthy that many techniques here are also applicable in the training process, *e.g.*, red teaming is a key component of adversarial training (see §3.3.1), and interpretability can help with giving feedback (Burns et al., 2023).

• Mathematical Formulations. Other theoretical works have aimed to formulate sub-problems within alignment mathematically and seek formal solutions. Soares et al. (2015) formulates the problem of corrigibility (*i.e.*, ensuring AI systems are incentivized to allow shutdown or objective modification by the instructor). Benson-Tilsen and Soares (2016) gives a mathematical formulation of instrumental convergence. Hadfield-Menell et al. (2016a) proposes the *off-switch game* to model the uncontrollability of AI agents. Turner et al. (2021) proves the power-seeking tendencies of optimal policies in Markov decision processes (MDPs) under certain assumptions. Everitt and Hutter (2016) proposes *value reinforcement learning* to eliminate incentives for reward hacking (Skalse et al., 2022; Pan et al., 2022). Another avenue of research, designated as *agent foundations* (Soares and Fallenstein, 2017), aims to establish a rigorous formal framework for the agency that deals appropriately with unresolved issues of embedded agency (Demski and Garrabrant, 2019). This body of work explores a variety of key topics, including decision theory (Soares and Fallenstein, 2015), corrigibility (Soares et al., 2015), value learning (Soares, 2018), logical uncertainty (Garrabrant et al., 2016), and open-source game theory (Critch et al., 2022) among others.

1.2.2 Human Values in Alignment

The inclusion of *Ethicality* in our RICE principles signifies the critical role of human values in alignment. AI systems should be aligned not only with value-neutral human preferences (such as intentions for AI systems to carry out tasks) but also with moral and ethical considerations. These efforts are referred to as *value alignment* (Gabriel, 2020; Gabriel and Ghazavi, 2021).¹⁴ Considerations of human values are embedded in all parts of alignment – indeed, alignment research topics dedicated to human values are present in all four sections of our survey. Therefore, to provide a more holistic picture of these research topics, here we give an overview of them before delving into their details in each individual section.

We classify alignment research on human values into three main themes: (1) *Ethical and social values* which aims to teach AI systems right from wrong, (2) *cooperative AI* which aims to specifically foster cooperative behaviors from AI systems, and (3) *Addressing social complexities* which provides apparatus for the modeling of multi-agent and social dynamics.

Ethical and Social Values Human values inherently possess a strong degree of abstraction and uncertainty. MacIntyre (2013) even points out that modern society lacks a unified value standard, and the value differences between people of different cultures can be vast. This raises the significant challenge of determining which human values we should align with. Although universally consistent human values may not exist, there are still some values that are reflected across different cultures. In the sections below, we discuss these from the perspectives of Machine Ethics, Fairness, and Cross-Cultural Values in Social Psychology.

- Machine Ethics. In contrast to much of alignment research which aligns AI systems with human preferences in general (encompassing both value-laden ones and value-neutral ones), *machine ethics* have specifically focused on instilling appropriate moral values into AI systems (Yu et al., 2018; Winfield et al., 2019; Tolmeijer et al., 2020). This line of work started early on in the context of symbolic and statistical AI systems (Anderson et al., 2005; Arkoudas et al., 2005; Anderson and Anderson, 2007), and later expanded to include large-scale datasets (Hendrycks et al., 2021b; Pan et al., 2023a) and deep learning-based/LLM-based methods (Jiang et al., 2021a; Jin et al., 2022). We cover the formal branch of machine ethics in §4.3.1.
- Fairness. Although there are controversies (Verma and Rubin, 2018; Saxena et al., 2019), the definition of fairness is relatively clear compared to other human values. Specifically, it is the absence of any prejudice or favoritism toward an individual or group based on their inherent or acquired characteristics (Mehrabi et al., 2021). Therefore, there has been extensive research on AI fairness. These methods range from reducing data biases before training (d'Alessandro et al., 2017; Bellamy et al., 2018), to minimizing unfairness introduced during the training process (Berk et al., 2017), and finally addressing instances of unfairness that were not successfully learned during training (Xu et al., 2018a).
- Cross-Cultural Values in Social Psychology. In the field of social psychology, numerous studies have focused on exploring clusters of values that exist among cross-cultural human communities, leading to the development of various cross-cultural values scales. The Allport-Vernon-Lindzey value system (Allport, 1955) posited that understanding an individual's philosophical values constitutes a critical foundation for assessing their belief system. They devised a value scale comprising six primary value types, each representing people's preferences and concerns regarding various aspects of life. Messick and McClintock (1968); McClintock and Van Avermaet (1982); Liebrand (1984); Van Lange et al. (1997) introduced and improved a quantifiable method, namely social value orientation (SVO), to assess an individual's social value inclination. It utilizes

¹⁴Although this term has also been used in other ways, such as to refer to alignment in general (Yuan et al., 2022).

quantitative approaches to evaluate how individuals allocate benefits to themselves and others, reflecting their social value orientation, such as altruism, individualism, *etc.* In subsequent work, Murphy et al. (2011); Murphy and Ackermann (2014) introduced the Slider Measure, which can be used to precisely assess the SVO value as a continuous angle based on the subject's option to some specific questions. Rokeach (1973) developed a values inventory comprising 36 values, consisting of 18 terminal values representing desired end-states and 18 instrumental values signifying means to achieve those end-states. Schwartz (1992, 1994) conducted comprehensive questionnaire surveys in 20 diverse countries known as the Schwartz Value Survey. This study identified ten values that are universally recognized, regardless of culture, language, or location. These studies have all laid a solid theoretical foundation for establishing what kind of values AI should be aligned with. However, they are constrained by the historical context of their research and may not maintain strong universality across different times and cultures.

Cooperative AI Arguably, the most exciting aspect of multi-agent interaction is cooperation, and cooperation failure is the most worrying aspect of multi-agent interaction. As an example of AI cooperation failure, the 2010 Flash Crash led to a temporary loss of trillions of market value in 2 minutes and was caused in part by interactions between high-frequency algorithmic traders (Kirilenko et al., 2017). Therefore, there is a need to implement mechanisms ensuring cooperation in agent-like AI systems and the environments they're operating within (Dafoe et al., 2021). The high-level design principles and low-level implementations of such mechanisms fall into the domain of Cooperative AI (Dafoe et al., 2020). In addition, Cooperative AI also studies human cooperation through the lens of AI and how AI can help humans achieve cooperation. More precisely, Dafoe et al. (2020) classified Cooperative AI research into four broad topics: Understanding, Communication, Commitment, and Institutions. They span various disciplines, from game theory to machine learning to social sciences. In this survey, we discuss cooperative AI, focusing on reinforcement learning in §3.3.2 and game theory in §4.3.1.

Addressing Social Complexities The requirement of ethicality contains in itself a social component. "What is ethical" is often defined within a social context; therefore, its implementation in AI systems also needs to account for social complexities. Critch and Krueger (2020) provides proposals for many research topics in this vein. One avenue of research focuses on the realistic simulation of social systems, including rule-based agentbased modeling (Bonabeau, 2002; De Marchi and Page, 2014), deep learning-based simulation (Sert et al., 2020; Storchan et al., 2021), and those incorporating LLMs (Park et al., 2023a). These simulation methods could serve a diverse array of down-stream applications, from impact assessment (Calvo et al., 2020; Fernandes et al., 2020; Osoba et al., 2020) to multi-agent social learning (Critch and Krueger, 2020). On another front, the fields of social choice (Sen, 1986; Arrow, 2012) and, relatedly, computational social choice (Brandt et al., 2016) have aimed to produce mathematical and computational solutions for preference aggregation in a diverse population, among other goals. It has been argued that a similar approach when combined with human preference-based alignment methods (e.g., RLHF and most other methods introduced in §2), could supplement these methods to guarantee a fair representation of everyone's preferences (Leike, 2023; Collective Intelligence Project, 2023). There have been early-stage experiments on this proposal (Yamagata et al., 2021; Bakker et al., 2022; Köpf et al., 2023). To complement this approach of learning values from crowds, it has also been argued that embodied values in AI systems should undergo continual progress over the long term as opposed to being permanently locked-in (Kenward and Sinclair, 2021), in order to navigate through emerging challenges, as well as to become future-proof and meet potential unknown unknowns in the moral realm.

1.2.3 AI Safety beyond Alignment

Following the introduction of alignment inner scope, in this section, we further discuss AI safety beyond alignment to enrich our discussion and clarify the alignment scope. AI causes many risks beyond alignment failures. For example, malicious actors could deliberately use AI to cause harm, such as by building biological weapons. Alternatively, competition between AI developers could lead them to neglect risks and race ahead with deploying dangerous AI systems. While this survey paper primarily focuses on alignment, we draw from Hendrycks et al. (2023) to provide a brief overview of other causes of catastrophic AI risks.

Malicious Use Malicious actors can deliberately use AI to cause harm. Already, deepfakes have been used by criminals to enable scams and blackmail (Cao and Baptista, 2023). As AI systems develop more dangerous capabilities, the threat of misuse looms larger.

Biological weapons provide one concerning example of how AI could be maliciously used to cause harm. Research has shown that large language models can provide detailed, step-by-step instructions about synthesizing pandemic potential pathogens (Soice et al., 2023). In addition to spreading information about how to create biological weapons, AI could help design new pathogens that are more lethal and transmissible than existing illnesses (Sandbrink, 2023). Terrorist groups such as Aum Shinrikyo (Danzig et al., 2012) have already attempted to build biological weapons in order to cause widespread destruction, and AI could make it easier for small groups to create

biological weapons and start global pandemics. Other kinds of malicious use could include using AI to launch cyberattacks against critical infrastructure (Mirsky et al., 2023), or create autonomous agents that survive and spread outside of human control (Bengio, 2023). As new dangerous capabilities arise in AI systems, thorough evaluations will be required to determine how an AI system could be used to cause harm.

Malicious use should not be considered a failure of alignment because when an AI system behaves according to the intentions of a malicious user, this system would be aligned with its user but would still pose a serious threat to society. Policies to ensure that AI is aligned with the public interest will be essential to avert this threat.

Collective Action Problems Many AI developers are racing to build and deploy powerful AI systems (Grant and Weise, 2023). This incentivizes developers to neglect safety and race ahead to deploy their AI systems. Even if one developer wants to be careful and cautious, they might fear that slowing down to evaluate their systems and invest in new safety features thoroughly might allow their competition to outpace them (Armstrong et al., 2013). This creates a social dilemma where individual AI developers and institutions rationally pursuing their own interests can lead to suboptimal outcomes for everyone. Success in competition between AI systems may be governed by evolutionary dynamics, where the strongest and most self-interested AI systems could be the most likely to survive (Hendrycks, 2023). Preventing these collective action problems from causing societal catastrophes could require intervention by national and international AI policies to ensure that all AI developers uphold common safety standards.

1.3 The Misalignment Issue

In the above sections, we discuss the alignment problems and the scope of alignment, pointing out that misaligned AI systems may take unintended actions that give rise to undesirable consequences. To offer a deeper understanding of alignment, we aim to analyze why and how the misaligned issue occurs, paving the way for the following sections about alignment techniques. Guided by our *alignment cycle* (see Figure 2), we try to elucidate the failure modes of alignment and analyze misaligned behaviors, thereby suggesting directions for future research. In §1.3.1, we give an overview of common failure modes, and in §1.3.2, we focus on the mechanism of feedback-induced misalignment. In §1.3.3, our emphasis shifts towards a more focused examination of misaligned behaviors and dangerous capabilities. Furthermore, we introduce the concept of *double edge components*, which offer benefits for enhancing the capabilities of future advanced systems but also bear the potential for hazardous outcomes.

1.3.1 Overview of Failure Modes

In order to illustrate the misalignment issue, we give an overview of alignment failure modes in this section, most of which can be categorized into *reward hacking* ¹⁵ and *goal misgeneralization*.

The learning process of RL can be deconstructed into two distinct phases: firstly, the creation of an agent primed for reward optimization, and secondly, the establishment of a reward process that furnishes the agent with appropriate reward signals. Within the framework of the Markov Reward Process (Marbach and Tsitsiklis, 2001; Puterman, 2014; Sutton and Barto, 2018), the former phase can be seen as the learning process related to the transition model (*e.g.*, model-based RL agents (Moerland et al., 2023)), or the development of specialized algorithms. The latter phase can be viewed as the construction of proxy rewards, which aim to approximate the true rewards derived from sources (*e.g.*, human preferences or environment) (Ng et al., 2000; Leike et al., 2018).

Reward Hacking In practice, proxy rewards are often easy to optimize and measure, yet they frequently fall short of capturing the full spectrum of the actual rewards (Pan et al., 2022). This limitation is denoted as *misspecified rewards* ¹⁶. The pursuit of optimization based on such misspecified rewards may lead to a phenomenon known as *reward hacking*, wherein agents may appear highly proficient according to specific metrics but fall short when evaluated against human standards (Amodei et al., 2016; Everitt et al., 2017). For instance, in *CoastRunners* game, the agent consistently prioritizes collecting gain-enhancing items over maximizing speed (Clark and Amodei, 2016). The discrepancy between proxy rewards and true rewards often manifests as a sharp phase transition in the reward curve (Ibarz et al., 2018). Furthermore, Skalse et al. (2022) defines the hackability of rewards and provides insights into the fundamental mechanism of this phase transition, highlighting that the inappropriate simplification of the reward function can be a key factor contributing to reward hacking.

Misspecified rewards often occur due to a neglect of severe criteria for the outcomes, thus making specification too broad and potentially easily hacked (Victoria et al., 2020). More than poor reward design (Ng et al., 1999), the choice of training environment and simulator with bugs (Code Bullet, 2019) can both lead to AI systems failing to satisfy intended objectives. These problems stem from task specification, broadly defined as *specification gaming*,

¹⁵Reward hacking can also be broadly considered as a kind of specification gaming.

¹⁶A similar definition is reward misidentification in which scenario the reward function is only partially identifiable. For more details on reward misidentification, see *e.g.*, Tien et al. (2023); Skalse et al. (2023)

which refers to AI systems exploiting loopholes in the task specification without achieving intended outcomes. (Victoria et al., 2020)

Reward tampering can be considered a special case of reward hacking (Everitt et al., 2021; Skalse et al., 2022), referring to AI systems corrupting the reward signals generation process (Ring and Orseau, 2011; Everitt and Hutter, 2018; Kumar et al., 2020). Everitt et al. (2021) delves into the subproblems encountered by RL agents: (1) tampering of reward function, where the agent inappropriately interferes with the reward function itself, and (2) tampering of reward function input, which entails corruption within the process responsible for translating environmental states into inputs for the reward function. When the reward function is formulated through feedback from human supervisors, models can directly influence the provision of feedback (e.g., AI systems intentionally generate challenging responses for humans to comprehend and judge, leading to feedback collapse) (Leike et al., 2018). Since task specification has its physical instantiation (e.g., memory registers storing the reward signals), the AI systems deployed in the real world have the potential to practice manipulation behaviors, resulting in more hazardous outcomes (Victoria et al., 2020).

Goal Misgeneralization Goal misgeneralization is another failure mode, wherein the agent actively pursues objectives distinct from the training objectives in deployment while retaining the capabilities it acquired during training (Koch et al., 2021; Di Langosco et al., 2022). For instance, in CoinRun games, the agent frequently prefers reaching the end of a level, often neglecting relocated coins during testing scenarios (Koch et al., 2021). Di Langosco et al. (2022) draw attention to the fundamental disparity between capability generalization and goal generalization, emphasizing how the inductive biases inherent in the model and its training algorithm may inadvertently prime the model to learn a proxy objective that diverges from the intended initial objective when faced with the testing distribution. It implies that even with perfect reward specification, goal misgeneralization can occur when faced with distribution shifts (Amodei et al., 2016; Shah et al., 2022). It should be noted that goal misgeneralization can occur in any learning system, not limited to RL since the core feature is the pursuit of unintended goals (Shah and Varma, 2022). Moreover, it might be more dangerous if advanced AI systems escape control and leverage their capabilities to navigate toward undesirable states (Bostrom, 2014; Zhuang and Hadfield-Menell, 2020).

1.3.2 Feedback-Induced Misalignment

With the proliferation of advanced AI systems, the challenges related to reward hacking and goal misgeneralization have become increasingly pronounced in open-ended scenarios (Paulus et al., 2018; Knox et al., 2023). Gao et al. (2023) underscores that more capable agents tend to exploit misspecified rewards to a greater extent. While many current AI systems are primarily driven by self-supervision, it's worth noting that a substantial portion relies on feedback rewards derived from human advisors (Bai et al., 2022a), allowing us to introduce the mechanism of feedback-induced misalignment. The misalignment issues are particularly pressing in open-ended scenarios, and we can attribute them to two primary factors:

- Limitations of Human Feedback. During the training of LLMs, inconsistencies can arise from human data annotators (*e.g.*, the varied cultural backgrounds of these annotators can introduce implicit biases (Peng et al., 2022)) (OpenAI, 2023a). Moreover, they might even introduce biases deliberately, leading to untruthful preference data (Casper et al., 2023a). For complex tasks that are hard for humans to evaluate (*e.g.*, the value of game state), these challenges ¹⁹ become even more salient (Irving et al., 2018).
- Limitations of Reward Modeling. Training reward models using comparison feedback can pose significant challenges in accurately capturing human values. For example, these models may unconsciously learn suboptimal or incomplete objectives, resulting in reward hacking (Zhuang and Hadfield-Menell, 2020; Skalse et al., 2022). Meanwhile, using a single reward model may struggle to capture and specify the values of a diverse human society (Casper et al., 2023a).

Additionally, Huang et al. (2022); Andreas (2022); Kim et al. (2023b) demonstrate that advanced AI systems exhibit patterns of goal pursuit and multi-step reasoning capability, which further aggravate the situation if the reward is not well-defined (Ngo et al., 2022; Yang et al., 2023).

Discussion It can be challenging to distinguish goal misgeneralization from reward hacking in specific cases. For instance (Shah and Varma, 2022), LLMs are trained to generate *harmless*, *honest*, *and helpful* outputs, but LLMs may occasionally produce harmful outputs in detail, which seemingly receive low rewards in testing distribution

¹⁷For more instances about specification gaming, please see Krakovna (2020)

¹⁸More discussion about Goal Misgeneralization can be found in §3.1.

¹⁹As AI systems are deployed into more complex tasks, these difficulties amplify, necessitating novel solutions such as *scalable oversight* (Cotra, 2018).




Figure 3: Dangerous Capabilities. Advanced AI systems would be incentivized to seek power because power will help them achieve their given objectives. Powerful AI systems might hack computer systems, manipulate humans, control and develop weaponry, and perform ethical violations while avoiding a shutdown. Original copyright belongs to wiki (wikipedia, 2023), based on which we have made further adjustments. We will further discuss these issues in §1.3.3.

(which could be seen as goal misgeneralization). However, in cases where labelers are incentivized to assign high rewards to responses deemed more helpful during the labeling process, the scenarios above ²⁰ actually receive high rewards and represent a form of specification gaming (or reward hacking). The distinction between these two scenarios can be vague at times.

More research is needed to analyze the failure modes, gain a deeper understanding of reward hacking, and develop effective methods for detecting and mitigating goal misgeneralization to address the challenges of misaligned advanced AI systems.

1.3.3 Misaligned Behaviors and Outcomes

Drawing from the misalignment mechanism, optimizing for a non-robust proxy may result in misaligned behaviors, potentially leading to even more catastrophic outcomes. This section delves into a detailed exposition of specific **misaligned behaviors** (•) and introduces what we term **double edge components** (+). These components are designed to enhance the capability of AI systems in handling real-world settings but also potentially exacerbate misalignment issues. It should be noted that some of these **double edge components** (+) remain speculative. Nevertheless, it is imperative to discuss their potential impact before it is too late, as the transition from controlled to uncontrolled advanced AI systems may be just one step away (Ngo, 2020b). With increased model scale, a class of **dangerous capabilities** (*) (Shevlane et al., 2023) could also emerge. The **dangerous capabilities** (*) are concrete tasks the AI system could carry out; they may not necessarily be misaligned in themselves but are instrumental to actualizing extreme risks.

We first introduce the **double edge components** (+) and analyze how they act on AI systems.

+ Situational Awareness. AI systems may gain the ability to effectively acquire and use knowledge about its status, its position in the broader environment, its avenues for influencing this environment, and the potential reactions of the world (including humans) to its actions (Cotra, 2022; Berglund et al., 2023). Similar behaviors have been observed in LLMs (Jonas DeGrave, 2022; Evan Hubinger, 2023). Knowing the situation can help the model better understand human intent, finish tasks within its ability, and search for outlier help if needed. However, such knowledge also paves the way for advanced methods of reward hacking, heightened deception/manipulation skills, and an increased propensity to chase instrumental subgoals (Ngo et al., 2022). Consequently, it should be given priority when evaluating potentially hazardous capabilities in AI models,

²⁰Harmful but detailed responses

alongside eight other key competencies (Shevlane et al., 2023). A highly relevant discussion is whether language models possess *world models* (LeCun, 2022; Li et al., 2023b).

- + **Broadly-Scoped Goals**. Advanced AI systems are expected to develop objectives that span long timeframes, deal with complex tasks, and operate in open-ended settings (Ngo et al., 2022). Engaging in broadly-scoped planning can empower AI systems to generalize better on the OOD settings and serve as valuable assistants in realms such as human healthcare. However, it can also bring about the risk of encouraging manipulating behaviors (*e.g.*, AI systems may take some *bad* actions to achieve human happiness, such as persuading them to do high-pressure jobs (Jacob Steinhardt, 2023) ²¹). Intuitively, one approach to mitigate this risk is to confine the optimizable objectives to short-sighted ones, such as predicting only the next word, thereby preventing over-ambitious planning, but such approaches limit systems' utility and may fail; for instance, source text data (*e.g.*, fiction) can help AI systems understand the intent and belief of the roles, and thus longer-term goal-directed behavior can be elicited (Andreas, 2022). Additionally, techniques such as RL-based fine-tuning (Christiano et al., 2017; Ouyang et al., 2022) or the application of chain-of-thought prompts (Wei et al., 2022) can enable models to adapt their acquired knowledge about planning to pave the way for broadly-scoped planning objectives (Jacob Steinhardt, 2023).
- + Mesa-Optimization Objectives. The learned policy may pursue inside objectives when the learned policy itself functions as an optimizer (i.e., mesa-optimizer). However, this optimizer's objectives may not align with the objectives specified by the training signals, and optimization for these misaligned goals may lead to systems out of control (Hubinger et al., 2019c). Freeman et al. (2019); Wijmans et al. (2023) indicate that AI systems may possess implicit goal-directed planning and manifest emergent capabilities during the generalization phase.
- + Access to Increased Resources. Future AI systems may gain access to websites and engage in real-world actions, potentially yielding a more substantial impact on the world (Nakano et al., 2021). They may disseminate false information, deceive users, disrupt network security, and, in more dire scenarios, be compromised by malicious actors for ill purposes. Moreover, their increased access to data and resources can facilitate *self-proliferation*, posing existential risks (Shevlane et al., 2023).

Furthermore, we illustrate the **misaligned behaviors** (\bullet) and **dangerous capabilities** (*) to show specific misalignment issues and provide directions for future alignment evaluation research.

- Power-Seeking Behaviors. AI systems may exhibit behaviors that attempt to gain control over resources and humans and then exert that control to achieve its assigned goal (Carlsmith, 2022). The intuitive reason why such behaviors may occur is the observation that for almost any optimization objective (e.g., investment returns), the optimal policy to maximize that quantity would involve power-seeking behaviors (e.g., manipulating the market), assuming the absence of solid safety and morality constraints. Omohundro (2008); Bostrom (2012, 2014) have argued that power-seeking is an instrumental subgoal which is instrumentally helpful for a wide range of objectives and may, therefore, be favored by AI systems. Turner et al. (2021) also proved that in MDPs that satisfy some standard assumptions, the optimal policies tend to be power-seeking. Perez et al. (2023) prompt LLMs to test their tendency to suggest power-seeking behaviors, find significant levels of such tendencies, and show that RLHF strengthens them. This also holds for other instrumental subgoals such as self-preservation (Bostrom, 2012; Shevlane et al., 2023). Another notable line of research is side-effect avoidance, which aims to address power-seeking behaviors by penalizing agentic systems for having too much influence over the environment. It covers RL systems (Eysenbach et al., 2018; Turner et al., 2020; Krakovna et al., 2020) and symbolic planning systems (Klassen et al., 2022).
- Measurement Tampering. Multiple model measurements can be manipulated by models, resulting in an illusion of favorable outcomes, even in cases where the desired objectives are not met. This deceptive practice can be seen as a specific kind of specification gaming, enabling models to escape detection techniques and presenting a false impression of alignment. Roger et al. (2023) create datasets to assess detection techniques related to measurement tampering and establish the current state of the art in this field. It is noteworthy that such manipulation of measurements has the potential to amplify deceptive behavior, resulting in unforeseen and unpredictable outcomes.
- Untruthful Output. AI systems such as LLMs can produce either unintentionally or deliberately inaccurate output. Such untruthful output may diverge from established resources or lack verifiability, commonly referred

²¹This behavior is due to models' over-optimization for broadly-scoped goals and this over-optimization is hard to perceive by humans

to as *hallucination* (Bang et al., 2023; Zhao et al., 2023a). More concerning is the phenomenon wherein LLMs may selectively provide erroneous responses to users who exhibit lower levels of education²² (Perez et al., 2023). The behavior (also known as sycophancy) appears emergently at scale (Ajeya Cotra, 2021; Perez et al., 2023) and untruthful output has the potential to engender deception, especially as advanced AI systems gain greater access to online resources and websites (Jacob Steinhardt, 2023).

• **Deceptive Alignment & Manipulation**. Manipulation & Deceptive Alignment is a class of behaviors that exploit the incompetence of human evaluators or users (Hubinger et al., 2019a; Carroll et al., 2023; Carranza et al., 2023) and even manipulate the training process through *gradient hacking* (Richard Ngo, 2022) or *reward tampering* (Kumar et al., 2020). These behaviors can potentially make detecting and addressing misaligned behaviors much harder.

Deceptive Alignment: Misaligned AI systems may deliberately mislead their human supervisors instead of adhering to the intended task. Such deceptive behavior has already manifested in AI systems that employ evolutionary algorithms (Wilke et al., 2001; Lehman et al., 2020; Hendrycks et al., 2021c). In these cases, agents evolved the capacity to differentiate between their evaluation and training environments. They adopted a strategic pessimistic response approach during the evaluation process, intentionally reducing their reproduction rate within a scheduling program (Lehman et al., 2020). Furthermore, AI systems may engage in intentional behaviors that superficially align with the reward signal, aiming to maximize rewards from human supervisors (Ouyang et al., 2022). It is noteworthy that current large language models occasionally generate inaccurate or suboptimal responses despite having the capacity to provide more accurate answers (Lin et al., 2022b; Chen et al., 2021). These instances of deceptive behavior present significant challenges. They undermine the ability of human advisors to offer reliable feedback (as humans cannot make sure whether the outputs of the AI models are truthful and faithful). Moreover, such deceptive behaviors can propagate false beliefs and misinformation, contaminating online information sources (Hendrycks et al., 2021c).

Manipulation: Advanced AI systems can effectively influence individuals' beliefs, even when these beliefs are not aligned with the truth (Shevlane et al., 2023). These systems can produce deceptive or inaccurate output or even deceive human advisors to attain deceptive alignment. Such systems can even persuade individuals to take actions that may lead to hazardous outcomes (OpenAI, 2023a).

Early-stage indications of such behaviors are present in LLMs,²³ recommender systems (where the system influences the users' preferences) (Kalimeris et al., 2021; Krueger et al., 2020; Kasirzadeh and Evans, 2023; Adomavicius et al., 2022), and RL agents (where agents trained from human feedback adopt policies to trick human evaluators) (Amodei et al., 2017). Also, current LLMs already possess the capability needed for deception. In Spitale et al. (2023), it has been found that GPT-3 is super-human capable of producing convincing disinformation. Given all these early-stage indications, it is plausible that more advanced AI systems may exhibit more serious deceptive/manipulative behaviors.

- Collectively Harmful Behaviors. AI systems have the potential to take actions that are seemingly benign in isolation but become problematic in multi-agent or societal contexts. Classical game theory offers simplistic models for understanding these behaviors. For instance, Phelps and Russell (2023) evaluates GPT-3.5's performance in the iterated prisoner's dilemma and other social dilemmas, revealing limitations in the model's cooperative capabilities. Pérolat et al. (2017) executes a parallel analysis focused on common-pool resource allocation. To mitigate such challenges, the emergent field of Cooperative AI (Dafoe et al., 2020, 2021) has been advancing as an active research frontier. However, beyond studies grounded in simplified game-theoretical frameworks, there is a pressing need for research in more realistic, socially complex settings (Singh, 2014). In these environments, agents are numerous and diverse, encompassing AI systems and human actors (Critch and Krueger, 2020). Furthermore, the complexity of these settings is amplified by the presence of unique tools for modulating AI behavior, such as social institutions and norms (Singh, 2014).
- Violation of Ethics. Unethical behaviors in AI systems pertain to actions that counteract the common good or breach moral standards—such as those causing harm to others. These adverse behaviors often stem from omitting essential human values during the AI system's design or introducing unsuitable or obsolete values into the system (Boddington, 2020; Kenward and Sinclair, 2021). Research efforts addressing these shortcomings span the domain of *machine ethics* (Yu et al., 2018; Winfield et al., 2019; Tolmeijer et al., 2020) and delve into

²²Such behaviors bare termed *sandbagging* (Perez et al., 2023). They may have been learned from web text during pretraining, which suggests that supervised learning can also bring about deceptive behaviors if those behaviors are present in training data.

²³Namely, the *untruthful output* that we discuss above.

²⁴We cover cooperative AI research in §3.3.2 and §4.3.1.

pivotal questions, e.g., whom should AI align with? (Korinek and Balwit, 2022; Santurkar et al., 2023), among other concerns.

* Dangerous Capabilities. Figure 3 outlines the dangerous capabilities that advanced AI systems might have. As AI systems are deployed in the real world, they may pose risks to society in many ways (e.g., hack computer systems, escape containment, and even violate ethics). They may hide unwanted behaviors, fool human supervisors, and seek more resources to become more powerful. Moreover, double edge components (+) may intensify the danger and lead to more hazardous outcomes, even resulting in existential risks (Bostrom, 2013).

2 Learning from Feedback

Learning from feedback is a class of methods aimed at conveying human intention and values to AI systems using feedback and encompasses various training techniques. It serves as a starting point for *forward alignment*. In this section, we focus on the dynamic process of learning from feedback, categorizing it into three distinct elements: (1) *AI System*: refers to objects that need to be aligned, such as dialogue systems, robotic systems, and so on; (2) *Feedback*: provided by an advisor set, which may consist of humans, AI, or humans assisted by AI, *etc*. This serves as the information used to adjust the AI system; (3) *Proxy*: a model developed to model feedback to facilitate more accessible algorithmic learning, *e.g.*, reward model in RLHF. From these elements, we identify two pathways by which the AI system learns from feedback: (1) Direct learning from the feedback itself and (2) Indirect learning via proxies that model the feedback.

Based on this process, we move on to Feedback Types in §2.1 from the alignment perspective, discussing various forms of providing information to AI systems and their merits. In our subsequent sections, we introduce fundamental concepts recently offering insights into building powerful AI systems (Christiano et al., 2017) and aligning them with human intent (Touvron et al., 2023). Preference Modeling in §2.2 underscores how it can aid the creation of proxies to assist humans in providing feedback to complex or hard-to-evaluate AI systems. We then explore Policy Learning in §2.3, focusing on the primary research directions for constructing capable AI systems using feedback. Our discussion naturally transitions to Scalable Oversight in §2.4, where we reflect on the learning process and objectives from a broader alignment perspective.

2.1 Feedback Types

Feedback is a crucial conduit linking AI behaviors to human intentions (Stumpf et al., 2007, 2009; Fernandes et al., 2023) leveraged by AI systems to refine their objectives and more closely align with human values (Zhang et al., 2019; Taylor et al., 2021; Glaese et al., 2022; Meta, 2023), this includes two primary meanings: (1) During system construction, external sources provide feedback on the AI system's output, guiding refinements to the system's architecture or its internal information (Jordan and Mitchell, 2015; Zhou, 2021). (2) After system deployment, the system dynamically tunes its behaviors in response to external data. However, the architecture or fundamental strategy of the system remains unchanged (Åström and Wittenmark, 2013; Åström and Murray, 2021; Dong et al., 2023). For a precise and detailed discussion of the feedback types with precision and detail, it is essential to initially define *feedback* within the scope of alignment.

Feedback is information given to the AI system to align it with human intent.

Considering diverse AI systems in alignment research, we embrace an *human-centric* approach. Instead of delving deep into the complex system mechanics, we propose a taxonomy to classify feedback according to its *presentation* to the system. In this section, we introduce three types of feedback employed to align AI systems commonly: reward, demonstration, and comparison. It's worth noting that beyond explicit feedback, there are approaches that exploit the information embedded in vast amounts of unlabeled data through unsupervised pretraining (Parisi et al., 2022; Hu et al., 2023) and semi-supervised learning (Xu et al., 2018b), showing considerable promise in enhancing model capabilities (Zhou et al., 2023).

Reward A reward is an independent and absolute evaluation of a single output from an AI system, presented as a scalar score (Silver et al., 2021). Feedback based on rewards provides a quantified evaluation of the AI system, allowing for direct guidance in behavior adjustments. This type of feedback typically originates from predesigned, rule-based functions or procedures. For example, in the MuJoCo simulation environments from OpenAI Gym (Brockman et al., 2016), the task is to guide the agent moving forward effectively. To this end, an effective rule-based reward function can be formulated as a composite of several key components: maintaining a healthy status, encouraging forward movement, minimizing control exertion, and regulating contact intensity.

The advantage of reward feedback is that the designer does not need to delineate the optimal behavior while allowing the AI system to explore to find the optimal policy (Kaelbling et al., 1996; Mnih et al., 2015; Silver




Figure 4: Overview of the learning from the feedback process. Three core components are depicted: AI System the primary learning entity and algorithmic target; Feedback — information from an advisor set for system adjustments; and Proxy — representative models for feedback that's complex to learn directly. Two learning pathways emerge: direct feedback-based learning and proxy-mediated learning (e.g., Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF)). We adopt a human-centric perspective, viewing AI systems as black boxes and categorizing the forms of feedback presented to AI systems into three types: Reward, Demonstration, and Comparison. Grounded in fundamental concepts such as Category of Preference and Granularity of Preference, we introduce the Reward Model, a specific instantiation of a Proxy. In the context of AI Systems, we discuss four distinct domains: Reinforcement Learning (RL), Imitation Learning (IL), Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL), and Preference-based Reinforcement Learning (PbRL) as a background. Scalable Oversight, a research theme that seeks to ensure AI systems, even those surpassing human expertise, remain aligned with human intent, is explored through the introduction of four promising directions: Iterated Distillation and Amplification (IDA), Recursive Reward Modeling (RRM), Debate, and Cooperative Inverse Reinforcement Learning (CIRL). Additionally, building upon RLHF, we propose RLxF, encompassing Reinforcement Learning from AI Feedback (RLAIF) and Reinforcement Learning from Human and AI Feedback (RLHAIF), as an extension of RLHF and a fundamental framework for Scalable Oversight.

et al., 2016, 2017). However, crafting flawless rules to determine scores for functions that evaluate the output of AI systems (Everitt et al., 2017; Victoria et al., 2020; Pan et al., 2022) or directly assigning scores to each AI system output (Isbell et al., 2001; Thomaz and Breazeal, 2008; Christiano et al., 2017) is challenging. This is due to the inherent complexity of the tasks, where it's impractical to account for every nuance. Additionally, flawed or incomplete reward functions can lead to dangerous behaviors misaligned with the intention of the designer, such as negative side effects and reward hacking (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2017). From an alignment perspective, perhaps the most important limitation of feedback based on rewards is that it may be difficult to rule out manipulation (Carroll et al., 2023), which amounts to feedback tampering (Skalse et al., 2022) in this context.

Demonstration Demonstration feedback is the behavioral data recorded from expert advisors while achieving a specific objective (Hussein et al., 2017). Demonstrations can take on various forms, including videos (Shaw et al., 2023), wearable device demonstrations (Edmonds et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2023a), collaborative demonstrations (Bozorgi and Ngo, 2023), and teleoperation (Zhang et al., 2018c). If the dynamics of the demonstrator and the AI learner are identical, the demonstration can directly constitute a trajectory made up of state-action pairs (Zhang et al., 2023c). These state-action pairs can also be partially observable (Torabi et al., 2018; Brown et al., 2019). For example, a video can be recorded of a human expert performing a robotic manipulation task, such as grasping an object with a robotic hand. One can subsequently annotate each video frame with the associated robot state (Shaw et al., 2023) and action (Baker et al., 2022) for each frame. This results in a dataset of state-action pairs from the human demonstration that can be used to train the agent's policy to imitate the expert behavior.

This feedback leverages the expertise and experience of advisors directly, obviating the need for formalized knowledge representations (Fang et al., 2019; Dasari et al., 2023). However, it may falter when confronting tasks

that exceed the advisors' realm of expertise (Hussein et al., 2017). Additionally, it faces challenges stemming from the noise (Sasaki and Yamashina, 2020; Wang et al., 2023d) and suboptimality (Attia and Dayan, 2018) in real-world advisor demonstrations (Yang et al., 2022). Furthermore, human advisors, prone to imprecision and errors, can introduce inconsistencies (Zhu et al., 2020; Hejna III and Sadigh, 2022). Meanwhile, there might be a need for a vast amount (Sasaki and Yamashina, 2020) and diverse set (Beliaev et al., 2022) of demonstrations, which results in significant costs to learn reliable behaviors.

Comparison Comparison feedback is a relative evaluation that ranks a set of outputs from an AI system and guides the system toward more informed decisions (Wirth et al., 2017). For example, this feedback form is manifested in preference learning (Fürnkranz and Hüllermeier, 2010), where the AI system discerns the preferences of advisors by comparing multiple items. The fundamental advantage of comparison feedback is its capacity to handle tasks and objectives that are hard for precise evaluation (Hüllermeier et al., 2008; Christiano et al., 2017; Ouyang et al., 2022). Nevertheless, it comes with the inherent limitation of potentially necessitating a considerable quantity of comparative data (Fürnkranz and Hüllermeier, 2003; Gao et al., 2023). Preference modeling is an example of using this type of feedback, as detailed in §2.2.

These various modes of feedback share a common trait – that they can all be seen as attempts by humans to convey a hidden reward function. Jeon et al. (2020) proposes and formalizes this position and unifies a wide array of feedback types by defining a parameterized reward function $\Psi(\cdot;\theta)$ that underlies the feedback process. This allows the AI system to, for example, perform Bayesian inference on θ , regardless of the feedback type.

Considering the recent advancements in AI systems, techniques based on IL and RL have successfully constructed AI systems with significant capabilities (Baker et al., 2022; OpenAI, 2023b). However, this success naturally leads to two questions:

- How can we define reward functions for more complex behaviors (e.g., various sub-tasks in interactive dialogue), aiming to guide the learning process of AI systems?
- How can we express human values such that powerful AI systems align better with humans, ensuring the system's *controllability* and *ethicality*?

Recent endeavors incorporating preference modeling into policy learning have shown progress. The most notable achievements in this domain have been observed in constructing powerful LLMs (OpenAI, 2023a; Touvron et al., 2023; Anthropic, 2023). Additionally, a series of policy learning studies have reported performance improvements. For instance, combining preference modeling with IRL (Brown et al., 2019) and offline RL (Shin et al., 2023), fine-tuning reward functions (Hejna III and Sadigh, 2022), modeling non-Markovian rewards (Kim et al., 2023a), and aiding in the construction of intricate reward functions (Bukharin et al., 2023). Therefore, we consider preference modeling (as shown in §2.2) and policy learning (as shown in §2.3) as fundamental contexts for understanding the challenges faced in alignment and potential solutions. Next, we provide a brief overview of these specific techniques related to alignment.

2.2 Preference Modeling

In many complex tasks, such as dialogues (Ouyang et al., 2022), constructing precise rule-based rewards presents a challenge (Bender et al., 2021). At the same time, methods based on demonstration might require a substantial investment of expert human resources, resulting in high costs. Currently, preference modeling based on comparison feedback (Akrour et al., 2011) has emerged as a very promising method (Ouyang et al., 2022; OpenAI, 2023a; Touvron et al., 2023) to assist in fine-tuning powerful artificial intelligence systems (Amodei et al., 2016).

Typically, it is necessary to iteratively explore the system dynamics while acquiring expert preference data to gain more knowledge about the optimization objectives. This process is known as *Preference Elicitation* (Wirth and Fürnkranz, 2013; Wirth et al., 2017; Christiano et al., 2017; Cabi et al., 2020; Liang et al., 2022), which is crucial for obtaining rich, valuable feedback related to AI system outputs, thus guiding the alignment process (Hejna III and Sadigh, 2022; Xue et al., 2023). Within *Preference Elicitation*, two core decisions that need to be determined are the *Granularity of Preference* and the *Category of Preference*. This paper introduces these within sequential decision-making problems, but the insights derived apply to a broad array of AI systems (Amodei et al., 2016; Christiano et al., 2018; Leike et al., 2018).

Granularity of Preference The granularity of preference (Wirth et al., 2017) is mainly three types: *Action, State*, and *Trajectory* (as shown in Table 2).

The *Action* preference focuses on comparing actions within a particular state, specifying the preferred action under specific conditions. When translated into trajectory preferences, it may impose challenges such as evaluators' expertise needs and potential information loss. The *State* preference deals with comparing states. It encapsulates

Table 2: A comparison of the three types of preference granularity in the context of sequential decision-making. Each type is defined according to its characteristics and the way it compares different elements of the learning process. The notation $i_1 > i_2$ denotes that i_1 is strictly preferred over i_2 .

Preference Granularity	Definition
Action	Compares two actions a_1 and a_2 within the same state s, denoted as $a_1 >_s a_2$.
State	Compares two states s_1 and s_2 , denoted as $s_1 > s_2$.
Trajectory	Compares two complete state-action sequence trajectories, denoted as $\tau_1 > \tau_2$. Each trajectory τ consists of state-action pairs at time t , expressed as $\tau =$
	$\{s_0, a_0, s_1, a_1,, s_{T-1}, a_{T-1}, s_T\}.$

preference relations among states but requires assumptions about state reachability and independence when translating to trajectory preferences. The *Trajectory* preference considers whole state-action sequences, offering more comprehensive strategic information. It inherently assesses long-term utility and depends less on expert judgment.

Christiano et al. (2017) demonstrates, using ablation studies, that in the settings that they studied, longer trajectory segments yield more informative comparisons on a per-segment basis. Such segments are also more consistently evaluated by humans in MuJoCo tasks.

Category of Preference Based on the nature of the candidate choices, preferences can be categorized into object preference and label preference (Fürnkranz and Hüllermeier, 2010). Additionally, based on the form of preferences, one can classify them in a different manner.

- Absolute Preferences. Absolute preferences independently articulate each item's degree of preference.
 - Binary. Classifying items as liked or disliked offers a simplistic and straightforward model of user preference (Tsoumakas and Katakis, 2007; Cheng et al., 2010a).
 - Gradual. This can be further distinguished between numeric and ordinal preferences. Numeric preferences employ absolute numerical values, such that each item receives a numerical score, which reflects the extent of preference (Cheng et al., 2010b). On the other hand, ordinal preferences entail a graded assessment of a fixed set of items as either preferred, less preferred, or intermediary, etc., enabling the depiction of user preferences without including specific numerical measurements (Cheng et al., 2010a).

Relative Preferences.

Relative preferences define the preference relation between pairs of items.

- Total Order. This form establishes a comprehensive preference relation covering all item pairs, asserting
 an absolute ordering of preferences ranging from the most preferred to the least (Hüllermeier et al., 2008).
- Partial Order. Because users may not exhibit a distinct preference between two items in some instances(Cheng et al., 2010c), this allows for incomparable item pairs.

Reward Model Reward modeling transfers comparison feedback (Fürnkranz and Hüllermeier, 2010; Wirth et al., 2017) to the scalar reward form, facilitating policy learning (Christiano et al., 2017; Cabi et al., 2020; Touvron et al., 2023). Given pairs of actions (y_1, y_2) performed by the RL agent in the same state. The preference is denoted as $y_w > y_l \mid x$, where y_w , y_l represents the preferred and less preferred action respectively among (y_1, y_2) . We assume these preferences emerge from a latent reward model $r^*(x, y)$, which we lack direct access to. Several methods exist to model such preferences, e.g., the Bradly-Terry Model (Bradley and Terry, 1952), Palckett-Luce ranking model (Plackett, 1975), etc. Under the BT model, the distribution of human preference, denoted as p^* , can be expressed as,

$$p^*(y_1 > y_2 \mid x) = \frac{\exp(r^*(x, y_1))}{\exp(r^*(x, y_1)) + \exp(r^*(x, y_2))} = \sigma(r^*(x, y_1) - r^*(x, y_2)).$$

where $\sigma(x) = 1/(1 + \exp(-x))$ is the logistic sigmoid function. Subsequently, we use the derived preference rankings to train the parameterized reward model, optimizing its parameters through maximum likelihood.

$$\mathcal{L}_{R}\left(\boldsymbol{\theta}\right) = -\mathbb{E}_{\left(x, y_{w}, y_{l}\right) \sim \mathcal{D}} \left[\log \left(\sigma \left(r_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}\left(x, y_{w}\right) - r_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}\left(x, y_{l}\right) \right) \right) \right]$$

In this negative log-likelihood loss, the problem is a binary classification task, where \mathcal{D} signifies the static dataset $\left\{x^{(i)}, y_w^{(i)}, y_l^{(i)}\right\}_{i=1}^N$ sampled from p^* (i.e., human-labeled comparisons).

Reward models enable human users to impart specific preferences to these systems via evaluations, thereby circumventing the complex task of defining objectives explicitly. Initially, the studies by Knox (2012); Knox and Stone (2013) distinctively treat human reward as separate from the traditional rewards of MDP and conduct a reward modeling process around it. Transitioning from these simpler cases, Christiano et al. (2017) propose that utilizing supervised learning to construct a distinct reward model asynchronously can substantially diminish interaction complexity by approximately three orders of magnitude. The study conducted by Ibarz et al. (2018) integrates expert demonstrations with human preferences, such that the policy initially mimics expert demonstrations and then sequentially collects human trajectory annotations, trains the reward model, and updates the policy. This research also provides practical insights for precluding the overfitting of the reward model and the occurrence of reward hacking - a scenario where escalating rewards do not translate to improved performance, especially when the policy is excessively trained. Additionally, a random policy might rarely exhibit meaningful behavior for tasks that surpass the complexity of Atari (Palan et al., 2019; Jeon et al., 2020). This implies that for effective annotation, the policy itself must possess certain capabilities to perform improved behavior. Offline settings also benefited from the reward model. Cabi et al. (2020) proposes reward sketching to efficiently learn a reward model that leverages humans' episodic judgments for automated reward annotation of historical data, enabling large-scale batch RL.

Importantly, the reward model provides an essential tool for aligning powerful LLMs. Stiennon et al. (2020) employs reward models grounded in human preferences for text summarization tasks, resulting in significant policy enhancements. This work also delves into the issues of distribution shift and reward model generalization, revealing that the effectiveness of the reward model correlates with data scale and parameter size. Building upon this work, InstructGPT (Ouyang et al., 2022) extends the reward model paradigm to broader dialogue task reward modeling and introduces a preference-optimizing loss function for multiple responses to mitigate overfitting. Furthermore, this research reveals that the preferences derived from the reward model can be generalized across different groups.

2.3 Policy Learning

Policy learning aims to enhance a model's performance in specific tasks. Numerous alignment-related challenges manifest within policy learning (as shown in §1.3). Consequently, policy learning provides a crucial backdrop for alignment, and its techniques can further advance alignment objectives (Amodei et al., 2016; Christiano et al., 2018; Ibarz et al., 2018). This section discusses various domains within policy learning and then introduces RLHF, a powerful technique for policy learning (OpenAI, 2023a; Touvron et al., 2023).

2.3.1 Background

We introduce some general areas of policy learning here to give readers a general background.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) RL enables agents to learn optimal policies by trial and error via interacting with the environment (Sutton and Barto, 2018). This paradigm has achieved great success in tackling complex tasks such as optimizing algorithms (Fawzi et al., 2022; Mankowitz et al., 2023), video game playing (Baker et al., 2022), multi-modal generation (OpenAI, 2023b), and other domains (Agostinelli et al., 2017; Yu et al., 2021; Afsar et al., 2022), demonstrating its potential for decision-making and control in complex state spaces. The goal of RL is to learn a policy π which executes actions a in states s to maximize the expected cumulative reward under environment transition dynamics P and the initial state distribution ρ_0 :

$$\pi^* = \operatorname*{argmax}_{\pi} \left\{ \mathbb{E}_{s_0, a_0, \dots} \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t r(s_t) \right] \right\}, \text{ where } s_0 \sim \rho_0(\cdot), \ a_t \sim \pi\left(\cdot | s_t\right), \ s_{t+1} \sim P\left(\cdot | s_t, a_t\right).$$

Even though RL still faces challenges like sample efficiency (Makoviychuk et al., 2021) and stability (Buşoniu et al., 2018). Proximal policy optimization (PPO) (Schulman et al., 2017) is an influential algorithm in the RL community, serving as the key algorithm for RLHF (Ouyang et al., 2022). The key idea of PPO is to limit the policy update to prevent significant deviations from the original policy by introducing a proximity objective.

Preference-based Reinforcement Learning (PbRL) PbRL (Wirth et al., 2017) seeks to facilitate training RL agents using preference feedback instead of explicit reward signals (Christiano et al., 2017; Sadigh et al., 2017). PbRL integrates the advantages of preference learning and RL, broadening the application range of RL and mitigating the difficulties associated with reward function formulation, and has been efficaciously deployed in a variety of tasks such as robotic instruction (Kupcsik et al., 2013), path planning (Jain et al., 2013), and manipulation (Liang et al., 2022). In PbRL, the emphasis predominantly lies on trajectory preferences (*i.e.*, comparisons of state-action

²⁵Notably, Sadigh et al. (2017) explicitly maintains a probabilistic belief over the true reward function during learning, and actively constructs queries to the human to reduce uncertainty maximally. Both traits are in a similar spirit to *cooperative inverse reinforcement learning* (CIRL), and later work also continues this theme (Reddy et al., 2020a). See §2.4.5 for more.

sequences segment) (Wirth et al., 2017). Such trajectory preferences encapsulate a human evaluation of various behavioral outcomes rather than single states, rendering PbRL more suitable for non-expert users (Christiano et al., 2017; Shin et al., 2023; Kim et al., 2023a). A general example of PbRL is the *weighted pairwise disagreement loss* (Duchi et al., 2010) balancing multiple potentially conflicting preferences to identify a singular optimal policy:

$$\mathcal{L}(\pi,\zeta) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \alpha_i L(\pi,\zeta_i),$$

where $\mathcal{L}(\pi,\zeta)$ is the aggregated loss for policy π over all preferences ζ , α_i is the weight of the *i*th preference, and $L(\pi,\zeta_i)$ is the loss associated with the policy π in relation to the specific preference ζ_i .

Compared to exact numerical rewards, preference feedback has several benefits (Wirth et al., 2017), such as (1) circumventing arbitrary reward design, reward shaping, reward engineering, or predefined objective trade-offs, (2) diminishing reliance on expert knowledge, and (3) decoupling training loop with human by modeling preferences (Akrour et al., 2012). However, PbRL also faces challenges, including credit assignment problems due to temporal delays, practical exploration of preference space (Wirth et al., 2017), the potential need for massive data (White et al., 2023), and the inability to use the learned preference model for retraining (McKinney et al., 2023).

Imitation Learning (IL) IL (Schaal, 1999; Syed et al., 2008; He et al., 2012; Zare et al., 2023), also referred to as learning from demonstration or apprenticeship learning, focuses on emulating human behaviors within specific tasks. The agent learns a mapping between observations and actions and refines its policy by observing demonstrations in a collection of teacher demonstration data \mathcal{D} (Bakker et al., 1996; Hussein et al., 2017). This process obviates the need for environmental reward signals (Hussein et al., 2017). Broad IL (Cotra, 2018) aims to replicate human desires and intentions, effectively creating replicas of human decision-making processes. This concept is central to technologies such as Iterated Distillation and Amplification (IDA, as shown in §2.4.2) (Christiano et al., 2018). On the other hand, Narrow IL aims to replicate specific human behaviors within given tasks. Behavioral cloning (BC) (Bain and Sammut, 1995; Ross et al., 2011; Osa et al., 2018) is a simple (Pomerleau, 1991; Ravichandar et al., 2020) strategy that learns directly from demonstrations using supervised learning (Schaal, 1996). BC method specifically seeks to optimize the policy parameters, ϕ , with the objective of aligning the policy $\pi_{\phi}(a|s)$ closely with the expert policy $\pi_{E}(a|s)$. This alignment is achieved through the minimization of the negative log-likelihood, as delineated in the following (Lynch et al., 2020):

$$\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{BC}}(\boldsymbol{\phi}) = -\mathbb{E}_{(s,a) \sim \pi_E} \Big[\log \pi_{\boldsymbol{\phi}}(a|s) \Big].$$

Here, the expectation is computed over state-action pairs sampled from the expert policy, π_E . However, it faces the Out-of-Distribution (OOD) problem, arising from the difference between the training and testing distributions (Ross et al., 2011; Ho and Ermon, 2016; Reddy et al., 2020b; Zhou et al., 2022).

Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) Unlike the paradigm of IL, IRL (Adams et al., 2022) focuses on deriving a reward function from observed behavior (Ng et al., 2000; Arora and Doshi, 2021). Standard IRL methods include the feature matching methods (Abbeel and Ng, 2004), which assumes optimal expert behavior or decision processes, as well as the maximum entropy methods (Ziebart et al., 2008; Alsaleh and Sayed, 2020) and the Bayesian methods (Ramachandran and Amir, 2007), both of which do not require optimal behavior. IRL guarantees robustness to changes in the state distribution but at the cost of increased computational complexity due to the extra RL step (Ho and Ermon, 2016; Fu et al., 2018). This interaction, meanwhile, introduces inherent RL challenges, *e.g.*, sample efficiency (Yu, 2018) and potential dangers in environment interaction (Garcia and Fernández, 2015; Xu et al., 2022). Additionally, identifying the reward function remains a challenge (Kim et al., 2021).

2.3.2 Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF)

RLHF is a methodology developed to train AI systems to align more closely with human preferences (Christiano et al., 2017). Its principal advantage is that it capitalizes on humans being better at judging appropriate behavior than at giving demonstrations or setting rewards manually. This approach has gained significant traction, particularly in fine-tuning LLMs (Ouyang et al., 2022; OpenAI, 2023a; Touvron et al., 2023). Nonetheless, RLHF encounters obstacles (Casper et al., 2023a), including data quality concerns, the risk of reward misgeneralization, reward hacking, and complications in policy optimization. Specifically, RLHF can also be viewed as a Recursive Reward Modeling (RRM) process (as shown in §2.4.3) without deep recursive modeling (Leike et al., 2018). Here, we provide a brief review of the RLHF methodology.

The genesis of RLHF can be traced back to Knox and Stone (2008, 2012), subsequently broadening its reach to domains such as social robots (Knox et al., 2013) and human-AI cooperative learning (Griffith et al., 2013). Besides focusing on the association between feedback and policy, Loftin et al. (2016) models the connection

between feedback and the trainer strategy. Christiano et al. (2017) extended RLHF to simulated robotic tasks, demonstrating its potential effectiveness.

It's worth noting that one of the significant applications of RLHF has been in the field of LLMs. Some work found that LLMs trained with RLHF (Ouyang et al., 2022; Korbak et al., 2023; Christiano, 2023) are more creative and human alignment compared to models trained via supervised or self-supervised learning approaches (Devlin et al., 2019; Brown et al., 2020b). The importance of RLHF is not merely limited to allowing LLMs to follow human directives (Ouyang et al., 2022). It helps LLMs better align by giving them important qualities like being helpful, harmless, and honest (Bai et al., 2022a). Due to these improvements, many works use RLHF for aligning LLMs (Ziegler et al., 2019; Stiennon et al., 2020; Bai et al., 2022a; Glaese et al., 2022; OpenAI, 2023a; Touvron et al., 2023). Additionally, Dai et al. (2023b) integrates the Safe RL (Garcia and Fernández, 2015) framework with the RLHF, addressing the inherent tension between aligning helpfulness and harmfulness (Bai et al., 2022a). Future efforts can be focused on reducing dependence on human annotation (Wang et al., 2023e; Sun et al., 2023) and improving the efficacy of the reward model by leveraging iterative RLHF methods (*i.e.*, integrating it with debate frameworks (Irving et al., 2018)), *etc*.

We review the RLHF pipeline from the Ziegler et al. (2019); Ouyang et al. (2022); Rafailov et al. (2023) to give a general framework. It usually consists of three stages:

- Supervised Fine-tuning (SFT). RLHF generally starts with a pre-trained language model, then fine-tuned using supervised learning—specifically, maximum likelihood estimation—on a high-quality dataset tailored for downstream tasks to obtain a model π^{SFT} . Examples of these tasks include dialogue handling, instruction following, and summarization (Some open-source datasets include Alpaca Data (52k instruction-following data) (Taori et al., 2023), Vicuna (70K user-shared ChatGPT conversations) (Chiang et al., 2023), etc.).
- Collecting Comparison Data and Reward Modeling. This phase includes collecting comparison data, which is subsequently used to train a reward model. The SFT model is given prompts denoted as x to generate pairs of responses (y_1, y_2) sampled from $\pi^{SFT}(y \mid x)$. These pairs are subsequently shown to human annotators, who indicate a preference for one of the responses. Then as discussed in §2.2, comparison data is used to construct the reward model r_{θ} .
- Policy Optimization via Reinforcement Learning. The final step is optimizing LLM as a policy π through RL, guided by the reward model r_{θ} . The process of LLMs generating responses from prompts is modeled as a bandit environment (Ouyang et al., 2022), where a reward is obtained from reward model r_{θ} at the end of each response. The primary objective of RL is to adjust the parameters ϕ of the LLMs such that the expected reward on training prompt dataset \mathcal{D}_{RL} is maximized:

$$\underset{\pi_{\phi}}{\operatorname{arg\,max}} \ \mathbb{E}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{RL}}, y \sim \pi_{\phi}} [r_{\theta}(x, y)].$$

Typically, an additional per-token KL penalty derived from the SFT model π^{SFT} is involved to mitigate the reward over-optimization. In addition, the integration of gradients from pre-training distribution $\mathcal{D}_{pretrain}$ helps maintain model performance, denoted as PTX loss in (Ouyang et al., 2022). As a result, a more comprehensive practical objective function is introduced:

$$\mathcal{J}(\phi) = \mathbb{E}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_{\text{RL}}, y \sim \pi_{\phi}} \left[r_{\theta}(x, y) - \beta \log \left(\pi_{\phi}(y|x) / \pi^{\text{SFT}}(y|x) \right) \right] + \eta \ \mathbb{E}_{(x, y) \sim \mathcal{D}_{\text{pretrain}}} \left[\log \left(\pi_{\phi}(y|x) \right) \right],$$

where β and η are coefficients determining the intensity of the KL penalty and the mixture of pretraining gradients respectively. This process refines the LLMs to generate responses that better align with human preferences for the prompts used during training.

Though RLHF has proven effective for aligning LLMs with human preferences, this method has problems like complex implementation, hyper-parameter tuning, sample efficiency (Choshen et al., 2020), and computational overhead (Yuan et al., 2023), making it hard to scale up.

A straightforward approach is rejection sampling (Touvron et al., 2023). For every prompt, *K* responses are sampled from the model. Each response is then assessed with the reward model, and the one with the highest reward is selected as the best response. This selected response is later used for model fine-tuning. Zhang et al. (2023b) formulates the language model instruction alignment problem as a goal-reaching reinforcement learning problem and proposes the HIR algorithm. The method unfolds in two stages: online sampling and offline training. During online sampling, the algorithm samples the LLM at a high temperature. In the offline training stage, instructions are relabeled based on generated outputs, followed by supervised learning using this relabeled data. Notably, HIR capitalizes on both successful and failed cases without requiring additional parameters. RRHF,

as introduced by (Yuan et al., 2023), aligns model probabilities with human preferences by scoring and ranking responses from multiple sources. With the necessity for only 1 or 2 models, its implementation is straightforward. Remarkably, RRHF can effectively align language models with human preferences, producing performance on par with PPO. Gulcehre et al. (2023) proposes the ReST algorithm, which contains two loops: *Grow* and *Improve*. The *Grow* loop uses the current model to sample and generate a dataset, while the *Improve* loop iteratively trains the model on a fixed dataset. This algorithm provides a simple and efficient framework that allows repeated use of the fixed dataset to improve computational efficiency. This method shows significant improvement in the reward model scores and translation quality compared to supervised learning baselines.

Rafailov et al. (2023) introduces the DPO, which demonstrates a mapping between reward functions and optimal policies. DPO is both simple and efficient, optimizing language models directly from human preference data, eliminating the need for an explicit reward model and multi-stage training. Azar et al. (2023) presents a general objective, Ψ PO, designed for learning from pairwise human preferences, circumventing current methods' assumption: pairwise preferences can be substituted with pointwise rewards. This objective analyzes RLHF and DPO behaviors, revealing their potential overfitting issue. The authors further delve into a specific instance of Ψ PO by setting Ψ as the Identity, aiming to mitigate the overfitting problems. They call this method IPO and furnish empirical results contrasting IPO with DPO.

Further research could explore why RLHF performs effectively with LLMs and the application of RLHF in multimodal (Yevgen Chebotar, 2023; OpenAI, 2023b) settings to facilitate the benefits of human-AI collaboration (Carlson and Demiris, 2010; Wu et al., 2021; Bi et al., 2021).

2.4 Scalable Oversight

Statistical learning algorithms usually rely on certain assumptions about data distribution, such as independence and identical distribution. Consequently, these algorithms fail in some situations, especially under specific distributions (Zhou et al., 2022). Challenges in elementary systems can be promptly identified through visual inspection (Christiano et al., 2018; Ngo et al., 2022). As AI systems become more powerful, insufficiently capturing the training signal or erroneous design of loss functions often leads to catastrophic behaviors (Russell et al., 2015; Hubinger et al., 2019c; Cotra, 2021) such as deceiving humans by obfuscating discrepancies (Russell, 2019), specification gaming (Victoria et al., 2020), reward hacking (Clark and Amodei, 2016; Brown et al., 2020a), and power-seeking dynamics (Carlsmith, 2022). From a human perspective, these imply gaps between the optimized objectives of AI systems and the ideal goals in our minds. Thus, the issue of providing effective oversight in various decision-making becomes pivotal (Bowman et al., 2022; Li et al., 2023a), often termed as *scalable oversight* (Amodei et al., 2016) arising from two practical challenges.

- The high cost of humans frequently evaluating AI system behavior. For instance, the training process is time-consuming, and incorporating humans directly into the training loop in real-time would significantly waste human resources and impede training efficiency (Christiano et al., 2017).
- The inherent complexity of AI system behaviors makes evaluation difficult, especially on hard-to-comprehend and high-stakes tasks (Saunders et al., 2022), *e.g.*, tasks such as teaching an AI system to summarize books (Wu et al., 2021), generate complex pieces of code (Pearce et al., 2022), and predict future weather changes (Bi et al., 2023).

Scalable oversight seeks to ensure that AI systems, even those surpassing human expertise, remain aligned with human intent.

In this context, our primary focus is to present some promising directions that may have not yet been implemented generally for constructing scalable oversight (Amodei et al., 2016; Leike et al., 2018).

2.4.1 From RLHF to RLxF

The RLHF paradigm offers a framework for aligning complex systems (OpenAI, 2023a; Touvron et al., 2023). However, it encounters obstacles such as the inaccuracy of human evaluations and their associated high costs (Christiano et al., 2017; Casper et al., 2023a; Perez et al., 2023). A key limitation is the difficulty in utilizing RLHF to extend human feedback when creating AI systems with superhuman abilities (Wu et al., 2021). Building on the RLHF paradigm, we introduce *RLxF* as a fundamental framework for scalable oversight, aiming to enhance feedback efficiency and quality and expand human feedback for more complex tasks. This enhances RLHF by incorporating AI components (Fernandes et al., 2023). The *x* in *RLxF* signifies a blend of AI and humans. We further explore concrete methodologies about *RLxF* in the subsequent section.




Figure 5: A tree diagram summarizing the key concepts and literature related to Scalable Oversight. The root node represents Scalable Oversight whose goal is *ensuring AI systems remain aligned with human intent even as they surpass human capabilities*. The main branches represent promising frameworks such as Reinforcement Learning from Feedback (RLxF), Iterated Distillation and Amplification (IDA), Recursive Reward Modeling (RRM), Debate, and Cooperative Inverse Reinforcement Learning (CIRL). Further sub-branches list key works exploring each framework. This diagram provides an overview of research directions for constructing effective and safe oversight mechanisms as AI systems grow more complex.

Reinforcement Learning from AI Feedback (RLAIF) RLAIF is a method building upon the framework of RLHF and serves as an extension to RLHF. Bai et al. (2022a) found that LLMs trained via RLHF often select to avoid sensitive and contentious issues, potentially diminishing models' overall utility. Considering these limitations, Bai et al. (2022b) proposed a training pipeline based on RLAIF, which uses feedback generated by the LLMs (e.g., GPT-4 or other language models having superhuman capabilities) rather than human feedback. Based on pre-set criteria, the policy model self-evaluates and revises its responses prompted by red teaming. Then, they fine-tuned the initial policy model with revised responses. Finally, the fine-tuned policy model assesses harmlessness for another language model's response (i.e., AI feedback). Mirroring the RLHF method, they train a reward model using this feedback and optimize the behavior of the policy model. Lee et al. (2023a) compares the performance differences between models trained with RLAIF and RLHF on the summarization task. Their results suggest that models trained with AI feedback achieved nearly identical overall performance to those trained with human feedback when evaluated by humans, though there are nuances.

To some extent, RLAIF addresses the evasion (Bai et al., 2022b) inherent in RLHF (*i.e.*, keep harmlessness without appreciable utility decline). AI Feedback offers a viable alternative for constructing a training loop that necessitates minimal human intervention, reducing the cost of training. AI supervision obeying transparent and accessible AI behavior guidelines may significantly aid in achieving scalable oversight (Bowman et al., 2022).

Reinforcement Learning from Human and AI Feedback (RLHAIF) RLHAIF integrates human and AI elements to provide oversight. Wu et al. (2021) investigates the feasibility of AI in assisting humans in summarizing books. This method facilitated human supervision and evaluation of the model's performance by decomposing the book summarization task into subtasks to form a tree-like structure. Meanwhile, Saunders et al. (2022) explores the feasibility of leveraging AI to aid in the human assessment of model efficacy. Their findings indicate that model-generated critiques help humans identify flaws they may have missed. Bowman et al. (2022) proposes a proof-of-concept experiment to demonstrate the promising to evaluate scalable oversight techniques based on sandwiching (Cotra, 2021). When collaborating with an unreliable LLM, the outcomes reveal that humans significantly surpass the model and themselves. Perez et al. (2023) employs language models to autonomously generate datasets for evaluating the behavior of language models of varying scales. The authors produced 154 high-quality datasets validated by humans. These methods demonstrate the feasibility of using AI assistance to scale up human oversight over complex problems and various domains.

Discussion Some efforts are underway to enhance RLHF algorithms by replacing pure humans with other components (Leike et al., 2018). Given the multidimensional nature of human feedback, various approaches have been devised to offer focused human judgments informed by specific rules. Examples of such rules encompass considerations like chat fluency (Saunders et al., 2022) and privacy safeguards (Carr, 2023). Saunders et al. (2022) deconstructs the requirements for quality dialogue into natural language guidelines that an agent should adhere to, asking for evaluations on each guideline individually. We can attain more efficient rule-conditioned reward models by collecting targeted human assessments and training models on this data. This approach substantially enhances the efficacy of dialogue agents, rendering them more helpful, accurate, and benign when compared to

prompted language models. Carr (2023) proposes Reinforcement Learning from Privacy Feedback (RLPF), aiming to harmonize the output quality of language models with safeguarding privacy. The method exploits NLP techniques to conduct real-time privacy risk assessments of text generated by the models and subsequently adjusts the reinforcement learning feedback signals based on these evaluations. Expressly, if the generated text includes sensitive information, it incurs negative feedback, whereas high-quality, non-revelatory text receives positive feedback. As the model undergoes training, it incrementally refines its capabilities, enhancing text quality and minimizing privacy breaches concurrently. This approach offers a more efficient evaluation of privacy risks by employing established NLP techniques, in contrast to conventional learning methods, which depend heavily on large-scale manual data annotation.

At their core, the *RLxF* methods utilize the strategy of decomposing a large problem into smaller sub-problems, enabling the use of more efficient tools, such as AI and software, for rapid sub-problem resolution. By leveraging the solutions to these sub-problems, the resolution of the main issue can be expedited. These techniques can be regarded as elementary instances of IDA; the primary distinction lies in the absence of a continual iterative process. Nonetheless, evidence suggests they are promising to offer feedback for AI systems that exceed human performance (Wu et al., 2021). Consequently, these methods can serve as foundational techniques in the training of more advanced AI systems.

2.4.2 Iterated Distillation and Amplification

Iterated Distillation and Amplification (IDA) introduces a framework for constructing scalable oversight through iterative collaboration between humans and AIs (Christiano et al., 2018). The process commences with an initial agent, denoted as A[0], which mirrors the decision-making of a human, H. A[0] undergoes training using a potent technique that equips it with near-human-level proficiency (the distillation step); Then, collaborative interaction between H and multiple A[0] instances leads to the creation of an enhanced agent, A[1] (the amplification step). The successive process is described²⁶ in Algorithm 1.

Cotra (2018) distinguishes between broad and narrow definitions within both RL and IRL. Broad RL gives sparse reward signals to AI systems and allows autonomous exploration and optimization of cumulative future rewards. This can lead to super-human novel strategies but makes it hard to specify what we care about perfectly. Narrow RL gives dense feedback rewarding the reasonableness of choices instead of final outcomes. This makes ML systems more human-like but limits capabilities. Similarly, broad IRL infers deep long-term values from the full range of human behaviors, while narrow IRL only infers short-term instrumental values. The former is a higher risk, while the latter is limited in capabilities.

During IDA training, narrow techniques are needed to ensure each agent itself mimics human behaviors. Specifically, narrow RL or imitation learning can be used to train the agent to be as human-like and controllable as possible. Humans can leverage agents' computing power and parallelizability to devise more far-sighted, macro strategies. This is essentially an amplification of human intrinsic capabilities. In the next iteration, agents again mimic this strengthened human-machine system using narrow techniques. This enables a gradual transition from narrow ability to broad ability while keeping the agents aligned with human values. As iterations increase, the human-machine system becomes more and more capable, gradually approximating a system that is both highly capable and aligned with human values, achieving both safety and capability. In other words, Narrow techniques are used to ensure agents follow human values, while the broadened human strategies in the amplification stage are a way of utilizing the agents, and do not expand the agents' own learning goals.

IDA is well illustrated by AlphaZero (Christiano et al., 2018; Nguyen, 2020). The algorithm starts with a simple policy (e.g., random move selection) and learns from its self-play games, the *amplification* phase. It then uses these games as training data to develop better move selection heuristics, the *distillation* phase. This distillation-amplification process can be repeated to create a fast and proficient Go-playing AI. Here, the distinction between alignment and capability is crucial (Mennen, 2018). An aligned but less capable AI tries to win but may not succeed against moderate opponents. A capable but poorly aligned AI achieves certain game properties other than winning. The goal is that AI is capable and aligned, proficient at the game, and aligned with the goal of winning the game.

The feasibility of IDA has sparked considerable debate (Yudkowsky, 2018). IDA operates under a crucial assumption that *errors won't continuously accumulate throughout the iterations* (Leike et al., 2018). Thus, technical challenges persist during the distillation and amplification step, necessitating sufficiently advanced and safe learning techniques. Additionally, despite the original authors likening IDA to the training process of AlphaZero (Silver et al., 2017) and having demonstrated it in toy environments (Christiano et al., 2018), its practicality hinges on ensuring that *H* can delegate portions of complex tasks to A, analogous to a leader orchestrating a team to accomplish a project collectively. In practice, Gato (Reed et al., 2022) illustrates key aspects of IDA (Mukobi, 2022) that may pave the way to AGI. It consolidates the abilities of multiple expert AIs into a singular model, validating that IDA's

²⁶We reference the pseudo-code by Cotra (2018) for this description.

Algorithm 1 Iterative Distillation and Amplification

```
1: procedure IDA(H)
2:
       A \leftarrow random initialization
3:
       repeat
4:
           B \leftarrow AMPLIFY(H, A)
5:
           A \leftarrow \text{DISTILL}(B)
                                                                                                 ▶ Repeat indefinitely
       until False
6:
7: end procedure
8: procedure DISTILL(overseer)
        return An AI trained using narrow, robust techniques to perform a task that the overseer already under-
   stands how to perform.
```

- 9: end procedure
- 10: procedure AMPLIFY(human, AI)
 - ▶ Interactive process in which human uses many calls to AI to improve on human's native performance at the relevant tasks.
- 11: end procedure

distillation can be achieved using contemporary deep learning. While not fully realized, Gato hints at amplification potential, harnessing its diverse skills to accelerate the learning of new tasks. However, Gato lacks safe amplification or distillation methods to maintain alignment properties. Crafting alignment-preserving IDA methods suited for models like Gato remains a crucial direction for AI safety research. In essence, while Gato signifies notable progress in actualizing IDA, further theoretical advancements are imperative to ensure that the IDA framework leads to safe AGI.

2.4.3 Recursive Reward Modeling

As discussed in §2.2, reward modeling allows us to disentangle the construction of the system's objective from evaluating its behavior (Ibarz et al., 2018). In this manner, the reward model provides insights into the optimization direction of the AI system. Particularly noteworthy is the ability to finely align the system with human intentions and values, such as fine-tuning language models to adhere to human instructions (Bai et al., 2022a; Touvron et al., 2023). Also, reward modeling has proved valuable in advancing AI research (Zhao et al., 2023a; Liang et al., 2022; Bukharin et al., 2023). Recursive Reward Modeling (RRM) (Leike et al., 2018; Hubinger, 2020) seeks to broaden the application of reward modeling to much more intricate tasks. It leverages the idea of using human feedback to train a reward model, which an agent then pursues. The agent is trained to maximize the reward obtained by performing reward learning on an amplified version of itself. This approach is not only influenced by human feedback but also by the model's own assessments of what constitutes a rewarding outcome. The central insight of RRM is the recursive use of already trained agents A_{t-1} to provide feedback for the training of successive agents A_t on more complex tasks. The A_0 is trained via fundamental reward modeling (learned from pure human feedback). If the assumption that *evaluating outcomes is easier than producing behavior* holds, then the iterative process of reward modeling can iteratively achieve higher capacity to oversee more powerful AI systems, paving the way for extending oversight into more complex domains. This process is detailed in Algorithm 2.

For instance, we aim to train AI A to devise a comprehensive urban plan. Designing a city entails numerous intricate elements, such as traffic planning, public amenities, and the distribution of residential and commercial zones. Evaluating a city's entire design poses a significant challenge since many issues may only become apparent after extended real-world testing. To aid this process, we may need an agent B specifically for traffic planning. However, traffic planning in itself is a multifaceted task. Consequently, we further need other agents to assess aspects such as road width, traffic flow, and the design of public transportation. For every sub-task, such as gauging road width, we can train an auxiliary agent to verify if safety standards are met, if various modes of transportation have been considered, and so on. In doing so, we establish an RRM process where each agent is trained with the help of agents assessing sub-tasks.

This approach resembles the organizational structure of a large corporation (Leike et al., 2018). In the context of urban planning, the main planning team (the CEO) is responsible for the final design decisions. Their decisions are informed by recommendations from the traffic team (the department managers), who, in turn, base their recommendations on inputs from the road width team (the managers), and so forth. Each level of decision-making relies on feedback from the level below it, with each task optimized through reward modeling.

The challenges faced by RRM can be described around the concepts of outer and inner alignment (Hubinger, 2020). Outer alignment revolves around the sufficiency of feedback mechanisms to guarantee that the learned reward model is accurate in the domain perceived by the action model as on distribution. This challenge is contingent

Algorithm 2 Recursive Reward Modeling

- 1: Initialize agent A_0 using reward modeling based on user feedback. \triangleright Either preferences or numerical signals.
- 2: **for** t = 1, 2, ... **do**
- 3: Use A_{t-1} to assist users in evaluating outcomes.
- 4: Train agent A_t based on user-assisted evaluations. \triangleright Objective of A_t is generally more complex than that of A_{t-1} .
- 5: end for

on several factors, including the quality of human feedback, the difficulty of generalization, and the potential for agent deception. Conversely, inner alignment concentrates on how effectively a human can employ transparency tools to prevent deceptive or disastrous behaviors in both the reward model and the agent. This hinges on the effectiveness of the oversight mechanism and the capacity to verify that the reward model isn't undergoing any optimization and that the agent remains myopic (Cotra, 2018).

Potential approaches to mitigate these challenges (Leike et al., 2018) include online feedback to correct the reward model during training (Christiano et al., 2017), off-policy feedback to teach about unsafe states (Everitt et al., 2017), leveraging existing data like videos and text via unsupervised learning or annotating (Baker et al., 2022), hierarchical feedback on different levels (Bukharin et al., 2023), side constraints on actions (Dalal et al., 2018), adversarial training to discover vulnerabilities (Madry et al., 2018), and uncertainty estimates for soliciting feedback (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016b; MacGlashan et al., 2017). The strength of RRM is its competitive training approach. It necessitates human feedback instead of demonstrations, potentially making feedback more reliable and simpler to obtain (Hubinger, 2020). In essence, the process of RRM can be likened to IDA (Christiano et al., 2018), where reward modeling takes the place of supervised or imitation learning. Thus, the challenges confronted by RRM closely mirror those encountered in IDA, particularly in preventing the accumulation of errors. Additionally, reward modeling itself does not necessarily distill a *narrow* model (Cotra, 2018), which presents challenges in trading off the degree of alignment and performance(Hubinger, 2020).

2.4.4 Debate

Debate involves two agents presenting answers and statements to assist human judges in their decision-making (Irving et al., 2018), as delineated in Algorithm 3. This is a zero-sum debate game where agents try to identify each other's shortcomings while striving to gain higher trust from human judges, and it can be a potential approach to constructing scalable oversight. For example, in the game of Go, human judges might not discern the advantage side of the single game board itself. However, by observing the game's process and the eventual outcome, these judges can more easily deduce that.

The premise of this method relies on a critical assumption: *arguing for truth is generally easier than for false-hood*, granting an advantage to the truth-telling debater. However, this assumption does not hold universally. For instance, in a complex problem, humans might fail to comprehend the specialized concepts used in the debate. Additionally, the limited nature of the gradient descent may bring us to an undesirable cyclic pattern (*i.e.*, when optimizing for one property, such as honesty and highlighting flaws, models often overlook or diminish another) (Irving et al., 2018).

It's worth mentioning that with the advancement of LLMs' capabilities, we can already see practical examples of debate (Du et al., 2023; Claude, 2023). Challenges may arise for debate in specific real-world scenarios (Irving et al., 2018). For example, certain questions may be too intricate for human comprehension or too voluminous to present in their entirety. Consider the complexity of interpreting a 10-gigapixel image or sifting through the vastness of the entire internet. Similarly, there are instances where an optimal answer to a question is exceedingly lengthy. Envision needs a response that spans a hundred pages. To navigate these, agents might initially select a response and, as the debate progresses, reveal sections of either the question or the answer. Irving et al. (2018) conducts a toy experiment on this process. Meanwhile, we must acknowledge the limit of human time. In scenarios that necessitate interaction with the environment, such as directing a robot, each action might demand a distinct debate. It's not always feasible for humans to judge every debate due to time constraints. In response to this challenge, we may need to design ML models to predict human feedback.

Another consideration is the convergence of the debate mechanism (Irving et al., 2018). Du et al. (2023) show-cases the inherent tendency of the debate framework to eventually converge toward singular responses, even if accuracy is not guaranteed. Meanwhile, if challenges arise in achieving convergence, we might have to rely on intuition to gauge the effectiveness of convergence. This implies the requirement of human evaluators' intervention and demands a certain level of expertise from these human assessors, posing challenges that must be addressed.

Furthermore, there are many discussions originating from diverse perspectives. Ngo (2021) considers *Debate* as one type of iterated amplification but more specific to make safety ground in concrete research questions,

Algorithm 3 Debate

- 1: Initialize set of questions Q.
- 2: Initialize two competing agents.
- 3: Select a question $q \in Q$.

- ▶ Question is shown to both agents.
- 4: Agents provide their answers a_0 and a_1 . The agents generate comment answers in response to q.
- 5: Initialize debate transcript T as an empty list.
- 6: for turn in predefined number of debate turns do
- 7: Agent makes a debate statement *s*.
- 8: Append s to T.

▶ Agents take turns and statements are saved in the transcript.

- 9: end for
- 10: Judge observes (q, a_0, a_1, T) and decides the winning agent.

and its adversarial framing makes it easier to spot problems. Michaelcohen (2020) expresses concerns regarding the adverse implications of incentivizing debaters to employ deceptive strategies aimed at swaying the judgment process. Armstrong (2019); Barnes (2020) expound upon the various issues that can permeate the debate process, including challenges such as the obfuscated arguments problem, ambiguous responses, and the propagation of misleading implications. While one may affirm the presence of a sufficiently low probability of any underlying flaws within the argument, advocating for trustworthiness, the opposing debater may assert the existence of a sufficiently high probability of identifying a flaw within the argument somewhere, thus advocating for a lack of trust. Beth Barnes (2020) introduces the concept of *cross-examination* to incentivize debaters to provide more informative responses. In this process, debaters have the agency to select a prior claim for scrutiny and obtain a copy of the opposing debater's response. The entire exchange is documented, and debaters can present relevant segments to the judge. The introduction of cross-examination is a robust deterrent against dishonest debaters exploiting a sweeping narrative, in contrast to their prior arguments, to mislead the judge.

There exists a notable similarity between the debate (Irving et al., 2018), IDA (Christiano et al., 2018), and RRM (Leike et al., 2018). These approaches can be comprehended in the view of an underlying principle: *evaluation* can be simpler than task completion²⁷. Therefore, harnessing the evaluative capabilities of AI systems can result in distributions of capacity that are more advantageous for humans. The challenges these methods face, especially in mitigating the accumulation of errors, are also analogous.

2.4.5 Cooperative Inverse Reinforcement Learning

Almost all previous methods consider learning from feedback a process separate from inference and control and often implicitly consider feedback providers as entities existing outside of the environment – indeed, failure modes like manipulation (Carroll et al., 2023) and reward tampering (Everitt et al., 2021) occur exactly when feedback mechanisms that are supposedly outside of the environment become part of it and therefore subject to the AI system's influence. The framework of Cooperative Inverse Reinforcement Learning (CIRL), however, unifies control and learning from feedback and models human feedback providers as fellow agents in the same environment. It approaches the scalable oversight problem not by strengthening oversight but by trying to eliminate the incentives for AI systems to game oversight, putting humans giving feedback and the AI system in cooperative rather than adversarial positions (Shah et al., 2020). In the CIRL paradigm, the AI system collaborates with humans to achieve the human's true goal rather than unilaterally optimizing for human preferences.

Motivation and General Idea of CIRL Many modes of misalignment, including, for example, reward hacking (Victoria et al., 2020; Skalse et al., 2022), deception (Park et al., 2023b), and manipulation (Carroll et al., 2023), are results of the AI system confidently optimizing for misspecified objectives (Pan et al., 2022). During training and deployment, the specified objective (*e.g.*, the reward function) plays the role of an unchallengeable truth for the AI system, and human feedback is only respected to the extent specified in the objective, which means that it could be tampered (Everitt et al., 2021) or manipulated (Carroll et al., 2023).

CIRL (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016b, 2017; Shah et al., 2020) attempts to address this problem by (1) having the AI system explicitly hold uncertainty regarding its reward function, and (2) having humans provide the only information about what the reward function truly is. This uncertainty gives the AI system a tendency to defer to humans and a drive to determine what the human truly wants. Concretely speaking, it models the entire task as a two-player cooperative game, where the *human player H* and the *robot player R* share a common reward function $r(\cdot)$. Importantly, the reward function and reward signals aren't visible to R (and indeed aren't explicitly calculated by the training mechanism) and are only inferred by R from behaviors of H via an IRL-like process (including by

²⁷Discussions about this can also be found in the literature about these methods.

asking and interacting with H). This game has been called the *CIRL game* (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016b), the assistance game (Fickinger et al., 2020), and the assistance POMDP (Shah et al., 2020).

In short, the AI system has the human's true objective $r(\cdot)$ as its own goal (despite not knowing values of $r(\cdot)$ with certainty) and constantly tries to figure r out by observing and interacting with the human. This could eliminate incentives for, e.g., manipulation since manipulation of human behaviors only serves to pollute an information source and does not affect r.

Formulation of CIRL Hadfield-Menell et al. (2016b) characterizes the settings of CIRL (which we denote by M) by building upon classical multi-agent MDPs, resulting in the definition below of the CIRL game M.

$$M = \left\langle \mathcal{S}, \{\mathcal{A}^{\mathbf{H}}, \mathcal{A}^{\mathbf{R}}\}, T, \gamma, r, \Theta, P_0 \right\rangle$$

In the equation above, S and $\{A^H, A^R\}$ are the space of world states and actions respectively, $T: S \times A^H \times A^R \to \Delta(S)$ is the transition function, and γ is the discount rate. Up to here, the definition is identical to that of a standard multi-agent MDP. The remaining elements, however, introduce the key difference: the reward function is parameterized, and its parameters can be modeled by a distribution. Θ is the space of values for the parameters Θ ; $r: S \times A^H \times A^R \times \Theta \to \mathbb{R}$ is the shared reward function, and $P_0 \in \Delta(S \times \Theta)$ is the joint distribution of the initial state and the reward function's parameters. This parameterization approach allows R to model explicitly and reason about its belief over the true reward function. Using techniques from Nayyar et al. (2013), any CIRL game can be reduced to an equivalent single-agent POMDP, thus proving the existence of optimal policies that are relatively tractable (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016b).

Notable Directions in CIRL Research Although some have emphasized the importance of H teaching R (Fisac et al., 2020) actively, works (Shah et al., 2020) have contested the emphasis on game equilibria and joint policies (including H's pedagogic behaviors), and instead focuses on R's optimal response to a policy of H's, since the assumption that humans will always act on optimal joint policies is an unrealistic one. More specifically, Shah et al. (2020) considers the *policy-conditioned belief* $B:\Pi^R\to \Delta(\Pi^H)$, which specifies H's distribution over policy responses to any of R's policies, and the aim is to find R's optimal policy given B. Here, B is essentially a form of human modeling, and one challenge is to obtain a robustly accurate human model as B (Hong et al., 2023; Bobu et al., 2023). On another front, Hadfield-Menell et al. (2017) and He and Dragan (2021) examine the manual specification of an imperfect reward function as a way for H to convey information about the true reward function. This includes work on R's side (i.e., enabling R to perform inference on the true reward function based on the imperfect specification) (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2017) and also work on H's side (i.e., developing algorithmic tools to assist H in making more robust specifications that better convey the true reward function) (He and Dragan, 2021).

There has also been work that extends CIRL and assistant games to multi-agent settings (Fickinger et al., 2020) where there are multiple humans that the robot needs to serve. This corresponds to the *multi/single delegation* settings in Critch and Krueger (2020), where the varying objectives of humans create a challenge and necessitate the use of social choice methods.

3 Learning under Distribution Shift

The construction of reliable AI systems is heavily dependent on their ability to adapt to diverse data distributions. Training data and training environments are often imperfect approximations of real deployment scenarios and may lack critical elements such as adversarial pressures (Poursaeed et al., 2021) (*e.g.*, Gaussian noise in the context of supervise learning-based systems (Gilmer et al., 2019) and shadow attack (Ma et al., 2012) in autonomous-driving systems), multi-agent interactions (Critch and Krueger, 2020; Dafoe et al., 2020), complicated tasks that human overseers cannot efficiently evaluate (Leike et al., 2018),²⁸ and reward mechanisms that can be gamed or manipulated (Krueger et al., 2020). This discrepancy between training distribution and testing distribution (or environments) is known as *distribution shift* (Krueger et al., 2020; Thulasidasan et al., 2021).

Therefore, AI systems that are aligned under their training distribution (*i.e.*, pursuing goals that are in line with human intent) may not uphold their alignment under deployment (or testing) distribution, potentially leading to serious misalignment issues post-deployment. This potential failure motivates research on the preservation of alignment properties (*i.e.*, adherence to human intentions and values) across data distributions.

From an alignment perspective, we are more concerned about AI systems pursuing unaligned and harmful goals, as opposed to incompetence at pursuing goals. Thus, the emphasis on alignment properties means that we focus on the generalization of *objectives* across distributions, as opposed to the generalization of *capabilities* (Di Langosco et al., 2022; Ngo et al., 2022).

²⁸This could contribute to the emergence of deceptive behaviors (Shah et al., 2022). See the paragraph on *goal misgeneralization* in §3.1 for details.




Figure 6: Framework of learning under distribution shift. The main challenges stemming from the distribution shift are goal misgeneralization and auto-induced distribution shift (§3.1). In our framework, we also introduce two kinds of methods to address distribution shift: algorithmic interventions (§3.2) that steer optimization during training, and data distribution interventions (§3.3) that expand the training distribution in a targeted manner by introducing real-world elements.

We mainly discuss the preservation of alignment properties when learning under distribution shift in this section. We start the discussion by introducing the alignment challenges from distribution shift (§3.1). Subsequently, we delve into methods for addressing distribution shift, and discuss two approaches in particular: (1) algorithmic interventions (§3.2) that steer optimization during the training process, and (2) data distribution interventions (§3.3) that expand the training distribution by introducing specific elements into the training process, including adversarial training (Yoo and Qi, 2021; Bai et al., 2021; Ziegler et al., 2022) and cooperative training (Dafoe et al., 2020, 2021) (§3.3.2). Our framework for learning under distribution shift is shown in Figure 6.

3.1 The Distribution Shift Challenge

Before introducing the specific techniques, we initially demonstrate why one of the primary challenges in alignment is learning under distribution shift, and more specifically, the preservation of *alignment properties* (*i.e.*, adherence to human intentions and values) under distribution shift. We introduce two alignment challenges concerning the issue of distribution shift, namely goal misgeneralization (Shah et al., 2022) and auto-induced distribution shift (ADS) (Krueger et al., 2020).

The training of AI systems optimizes for their adherence to the pursuit of the training reward/loss under the training input distribution. However, this adherence may not generalize to cases where the input distribution undergoes qualitative changes, *i.e.*, distribution shift. These changes include, for example, adversarial pressures (Poursaeed et al., 2021), multi-agent interactions (Critch and Krueger, 2020; Dafoe et al., 2020), and complicated tasks that human overseers cannot efficiently evaluate (Shah et al., 2022), and reward mechanisms that can be gamed or manipulated (Krueger et al., 2020).

It's worth distinguishing two different failure modes here: goal misgeneralization (Shah et al., 2022), in which the original and shifted distributions are given, and auto-induced distribution shift (Krueger et al., 2020), where the AI system alters the data distribution with its own behaviors in pursuit of reward.

Goal Misgeneralization This kind of challenge refers to the scenario where AI systems perform perfectly in the training distribution, but the capabilities learned in training distribution fail to generalize in OOD deployment, and AI may present the pursuit of goals that are not in accordance with human wishes (Shah et al., 2022; Di Langosco et al., 2022). Goal misgeneralization is to be distinguished from other forms of misgeneralization (*e.g.*,

capability misgeneralization) where the agent becomes incompetent in OOD settings; instead, agents with goal misgeneralization *competently* pursue an *unwanted* goal in OOD settings. ²⁹

A simplistic example is the case of *spurious correlations* (or *shortcut features*) (Geirhos et al., 2019; Di Langosco et al., 2022). For example, in an image classification dataset, green grass is a highly predictive feature for the label *cow*. However, it is essential to note that this feature needs to be more consistent and reliable across various data distributions.(Murphy, 2023). Moreover, the causal confusion (*i.e.*, ignorant of the causal structure of the interaction between the advisor and the environment) in IL can result in goal misgeneralization (De Haan et al., 2019; Tien et al., 2023).

One major danger from goal misgeneralization lies in the indistinguishability between "optimizing for what human really wants" and "optimizing for human thumbs-ups" ³⁰; the latter includes potentially deceiving or manipulating human evaluators (Carroll et al., 2023) to receive their thumbs-ups. For example, Amodei et al. (2017) discovered that in a task where a robotic hand is supposed to grasp a small ball, the robotic hand fakes the action by using parallax in front of the lens to appear as if it has grasped the ball, without actually doing so. This behavior deceives the human annotator into thinking that the task has been completed.

When an AI system is trained or finetuned with human feedback, it is impossible to distinguish the two goals since both perform perfectly in training, and it is unclear which one the AI system will learn. In fact, even during training, the human evaluators might be deceived or manipulated, implying that the AI system may be more strongly incentivized to optimize for human thumbs-ups rather than what the human wants. Current examples of this phenomenon exist in recommender systems (Kalimeris et al., 2021; Adomavicius et al., 2022), LLMs (Perez et al., 2023), and RL systems (Amodei et al., 2017).

Finally, one failure mode closely related to goal misgeneralization is the misalignment of *mesa-optimizers* (Hubinger et al., 2019c), where the ML model with learned model weights performs optimization within itself during inference ("mesa-optimization") (Hubinger et al., 2019c; Dai et al., 2023a), and the objective of this optimization is not aligned with the model's training objective. Empirical research has discovered Transformers that use mesa-optimization to improve performance during their forward passes, lending credence to this hypothesis (von Oswald et al., 2023).

Auto-Induced Distribution Shift (ADS) While training AI systems, we often consider the strengths and weaknesses of the agents themselves only and overlook the impact that these agents have on the environment. Past research often assumed that data is independently and identically distributed (Besbes et al., 2022), ignoring the effect of algorithms on data distribution. However, Krueger et al. (2020) posited that, in reality, agents could influence the environment during the decision-making and execution process, thus altering the distribution of the data generated by the environment. They referred to this type of issue as ADS. A real-world example is in recommendation systems, where the content selected by the recommendation algorithms might change users' preferences and behaviors, leading to a shift in user distribution. The distribution shift, in turn, further affects the output of the recommendation algorithms (Carroll et al., 2022). As AI systems increasingly impact the world, we also need to consider the potential further impacts on the data distribution of the entire society after agents are integrated into human society.

3.2 Algorithmic Interventions

When illustrating the algorithmic intervention methods, we first outline two classes of methods that steer optimization on various distributions during training to relieve distribution shift, namely, cross-distribution aggregation (§3.2.1) and navigation via mode connectivity (§3.2.2).

In the first part, we cover methods ranging from the initial approach of *empirical risk minimization* (ERM) (Vapnik, 1991) to *risk extrapolation* (REx) (Krueger et al., 2021), a method conceived to mitigate issues arising from models' dependence on spurious features. In the second part, we introduce *connectivity-based fine-tuning*, which guides the navigation of the loss landscape during training to encourage convergence upon non-spurious correlations, and which does so using insights from *mode connectivity* (Lubana et al., 2023).

3.2.1 Cross-Distribution Aggregation

One of the main reasons for distribution shift is spurious correlations in the model that are distinct from core objectives (Geirhos et al., 2019). By integrating learning information of different domains (or different distributions) into the optimization objective, we expect the model to learn truthful information and invariant relationships. In the following paragraphs, we first introduce ERM as the background and then introduce some methods to directly learn how to address distribution shift by integrating loss landscapes of different distributions in the training process.

²⁹More examples of goal misgeneralization exist (DeepMind, 2020).

³⁰Here, *human thumbs-ups* refer to high-reward feedback from human advisors or environment. However, AI systems may deliberately follow human preferences or deceive to get high rewards from humans, but actually don't really learn intended goals (*i.e.*, what human really wants).

Figure 7: A tree diagram summarizing the key concepts and literature related to Algorithmic Interventions. The root node represents Algorithmic Interventions that aim to steer optimization during the training process. The main branches represent two main methods, namely cross-distribution aggregation (which aims to minimize risks on different distributions during training to find a predictor based on the invariant relationship instead of spurious features) and navigation via mode connectivity (which aims to fine-tune based on mode connectivity to enhance model generalization performance). Further sub-branches list vital techniques such as Distributionally Robust Optimization (DRO), Invariant Risk Minimization (IRM), Risk Extrapolation (REx), and Connectivity-based Fine-tuning (CBFT).

Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) Consider a scenario where a model has been developed to identify objects by their features effectively. The optimization target can be expressed as:

$$R(w) = \int L(y, f(x, w)) dP(x, y)$$

where L(y, f(x, w)) denotes the loss between data labels y and model outputs f(x, w), while P(x, y) signifies the target data distribution (Vapnik, 1991).

Nevertheless, a bias often exists between the dataset and the real world, implying that the features learned from the dataset may not necessarily be the ones we intend for the model to acquire. ERM is a strategy employed in statistical methods to optimize this bias. It operates on the assumption that, given the inaccessibility of the real-world target data distribution, the empirical data within the dataset should, ideally, closely approximate this unknown target distribution (Vapnik, 1991; Zhang et al., 2018b). In this context, the objective function is optimized and is redefined as:

$$E(\boldsymbol{w}) = \frac{1}{l} \sum_{i=1}^{l} L(y_i, f(x_i, \boldsymbol{w}))$$

where *l* can be different examples in one training distribution or different training distributions.

Minimizing the objective function above allows the model to learn the invariant relationship in different distributions. Naive ERM makes the naive assumption that the data is sampled from the target data distribution. However, if a significant discrepancy exists between the source distribution (or training distribution) and the target distribution, severe generalization issues can still arise (Szegedy et al., 2013).

Distributionally Robust Optimization (DRO) Numerous studies posit that the sensitivity to distribution shift often arises from reliance on *spurious correlations* or *shortcut features* unrelated to the core concept (Geirhos et al., 2019; Hendrycks and Dietterich, 2019). For instance, models may judge based on background features rather than employing the correct features within the image (Geirhos et al., 2019; Beery et al., 2018). Building upon the foundations laid in prior research (Ben-Tal et al., 2009; Peters et al., 2015; Krueger et al., 2021), OOD Generalization can be formulated as follows:

$$r_{\mathcal{D}}^{\text{OOD}}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) = \max_{e \in \mathcal{D}} r_e(\boldsymbol{\theta})$$

This optimization seeks to enhance worst-case performance across a perturbation set, denoted as \mathcal{D} , by reducing the maximum value among the risk function set $\{r_e|e\in\mathcal{D}\}$. In *Distributionally Robustness Optimization (DRO)* (Duchi et al., 2021), the perturbation set covers the mixture of different domains' training distributions, and by minimizing the above objective function, we expect the model can find the invariant relationship between different training distributions. However, it should be noted that naively applying DRO to overparameterized neural networks may lead to suboptimal outcomes (Sagawa et al., 2019). Therefore, combining DRO with increased regularization

techniques such as l_2 penalty (Cortes et al., 2009) or early stopping (Prechelt, 2002) can substantially improve generalization performance. For more details on DRO, see *e.g.*,Rahimian and Mehrotra (2019); Sagawa et al. (2019); Chen et al. (2020); Lin et al. (2022a)

Invariant Risk Minimization (IRM) Arjovsky et al. (2019) introduces an innovative learning paradigm to estimate nonlinear, invariant, causal predictors across diverse training environments, thereby facilitating robust OOD generalization. IRM aims to train a predictive model with solid performance across various environments while demonstrating reduced susceptibility to relying on spurious features. IRM can be considered an extension of Invariant Causal Prediction (ICP) (Peters et al., 2015), which involves hypothesis testing to identify the direct causal features that lead to outcomes within each specific environment instead of indirect features. IRM further extends ICP to scenarios characterized by high-dimensional input data, where variables may lack clear causal significance. The fundamental idea underlying IRM is that when confronted with many functions capable of achieving low empirical loss, selecting a function that exhibits strong performance across all environments is more likely to get a predictor based on causal features rather than spurious ones (Murphy, 2023).

Risk Extrapolation (REx) The basic form of REx involves robust optimization over a perturbation set of extrapolated domains (MM-REx), with an additional penalty imposed on the variance of training risks (V-REx) (Krueger et al., 2021). By reducing training risks and increasing the similarity of training risks, REx forces the model to learn the invariant relationship in different domain distributions.

Amplifying the distributional variations between training domains can diminish risk changes, thereby enforcing the equality of risks. Taking CMNIST (Arjovsky et al., 2019) as an example, even though establishing a connection between color and labels is more straightforward than connecting logits and labels, increasing the diversity in color can disrupt this *spurious correlations* (or shortcut features) and aid the model in learning the genuine invariant relationship between logits and labels. Following previous research (Vapnik, 1991; Peters et al., 2017; Krueger et al., 2021), REx can be formulated as follows: Firstly, the Risk Function can be defined as follows:

$$r_e(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \doteq \mathbb{E}_{(x,y) \sim P_e(X,Y)} L(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(x), y)$$

where $L(\cdot)$ represents a fixed loss function, and distinct training domains or environments can be formulated as the $P_e(X, Y)$ distribution. Next, the MM-REx term can be modeled as:

$$r_{\text{MM-REx}}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) = (1 - m\lambda_{\min}) \max_{e} r_e(\boldsymbol{\theta}) + \lambda_{\min} \sum_{e=1}^{n} r_e(\boldsymbol{\theta})$$

where n represents the number of distinct distributions or domains, and λ_{\min} governs the extent of risk extrapolation. Moving on to the V-REx term, it can be modeled as:

$$r_{\text{V-REx}}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) = \alpha \operatorname{Var}\left(\left\{r_1(\boldsymbol{\theta}), \dots, r_n(\boldsymbol{\theta})\right\}\right) + \sum_{e=1}^n r_e(\boldsymbol{\theta})$$

where $\alpha \ge 0$ controls the trade-off between risk reduction and enforcing risk equality.

In the MM-REx term, the λ_{min} can set nearly $-\infty$; therefore, the loss of specific domains may be high, meaning that the model may learn the spurious correlations. Minimizing the MM-REx and V-REx can reduce training risks and increase the similarity of training risks, encouraging the model to learn invariant relationships. Furthermore, REx has shown significant promise in experimental settings (Krueger et al., 2021), particularly in causal identification, making it a compelling approach for achieving robust generalization.

3.2.2 Navigation via Mode Connectivity

Following the above discussion about cross-distribution aggregation, in this section, we introduce mode connectivity as the prerequisite content. Then, we primarily discuss the Connectivity-Based Fine-Tuning (CBFT) (Lubana et al., 2023) method, illustrating how mode connectivity navigates the model to predict based on invariant relationships instead of spurious correlations by changing few parameters.

Mode Connectivity Mode connectivity refers to the phenomenon where one can identify a straightforward path within the loss function space that connects two or more distinct local minima or patterns (Garipov et al., 2018; Draxler et al., 2018). In line with prior research (Benton et al., 2021; Pittorino et al., 2022; Lubana et al., 2023), a formal definition can be defined as follows:

The model's loss on a dataset \mathcal{D} is represented as $\mathcal{L}(f(\mathcal{D};\theta))$, where θ denotes the optimal parameters of the model, and $f(\mathcal{D};\theta)$ signifies the model trained on dataset \mathcal{D} . We define θ as a minimizer of the loss on this dataset if $\mathcal{L}(f(\mathcal{D};\theta)) < \epsilon$, where ϵ is a small scalar value.

Minimizers θ_1 and θ_2 , achieved through training on dataset \mathcal{D} , are considered to be mode-connected if there exists a continuous path γ from θ_1 to θ_2 such that, as θ_0 varies along this path γ , the following condition is consistently upheld:

$$\mathcal{L}(f(\mathcal{D};\boldsymbol{\theta}_{0})) \leq t \cdot \mathcal{L}(f(\mathcal{D};\boldsymbol{\theta}_{1})) + (1-t) \cdot \mathcal{L}(f(\mathcal{D};\boldsymbol{\theta}_{2})), \quad \forall t \in [0,1].$$

In essence, mode connectivity entails consistently finding a connecting pathway among minimizers in the parameter space, traversing regions of low loss without delving into regions of highly high loss. This implies that even when making minor adjustments to the model's parameters within the parameter space, the model's performance can remain relatively stable, mitigating significant performance degradation (Garipov et al., 2018). This concept lays the foundation for designing more effective optimization algorithms, enabling models to share knowledge and experiences across different tasks, enhancing both model performance and generalization capabilities.

Furthermore, we can define two models as mechanistically similar if they employ the same attributes of inputs for making predictions. Some research has demonstrated that the absence of linear connectivity implies mechanistic dissimilarity, suggesting that simple fine-tuning may not suffice to eliminate spurious attributes learned during the pre-training phase (Lubana et al., 2023; Juneja et al., 2023). However, it is promising to address non-linearly connected regions through fine-tuning, thereby effectively modifying the model's mechanisms to resolve the issue of OOD misgeneralization.

Connectivity-Based Fine-tuning (CBFT) As discussed above, recent research has suggested that the absence of linear connectivity between two models implies a fundamental mechanistic dissimilarity. Lubana et al. (2023) finds that models tend to develop similar inference mechanisms when trained on similar data. This could be a significant reason for the emergence of bias in models, such as relying on the background information of images for classification rather than the objects depicted in the images. If this model mechanism is not adjusted during the finetuning process, the model may rely on these false attributes. To overcome this problem, they propose a valid strategy for altering a model's mechanism, which aims to minimize the following loss:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{CBFT}} = \mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}}(f(\mathcal{D}_{\text{NC}}; \boldsymbol{\theta}), y) + \mathcal{L}_{\text{B}} + \frac{1}{K}\mathcal{L}_{\text{I}}$$

where the original training dataset is denoted as \mathcal{D} , and we assume that we can obtain a minimal dataset without spurious attribute C, denoted as \mathcal{D}_{NC} .

Besides \mathcal{L}_{CE} that denotes the cross-entropy loss between model's prediction $f(\mathcal{D}_{NC}; \theta)$ and the ground truth label y, CBFT has two primary objectives: (1) The first objective entails modifying a model's underlying mechanism by repositioning it within the loss landscape, breaking any linear connection with the current minimizer. This is accomplished by maximizing \mathcal{L}_B , referred to as the *barrier loss*. (2) The second objective involves mitigating reliance on spurious attributes in the original training dataset. This is achieved by optimizing \mathcal{L}_I , enabling the discovery of invariant relationships without the need for C. CBFT holds promise for shifting the mechanism from predicting objectives by spurious features to true features, just changing partial parameters of models.

3.3 Data Distribution Interventions

Besides algorithmic optimization, methods that expand the distribution of training data to include real-world elements can also reduce the discrepancy between training and deployment distributions. In this section, we specifically focus on the introduction of adversarial pressures and multi-agent dynamics.

3.3.1 Adversarial Training

AI systems can suffer from a lack of adversarial robustness, meaning that certain inputs, when crafted in a specific way, cause the models to perform poorly (Zheng et al., 2016). This has been shown in images (Huang et al., 2017) and texts (Zou et al., 2023b), as well as changes to semantic features in images (Bhattad et al., 2020; Shamsabadi et al., 2020) and texts (Jia and Liang, 2017), and even examples generated entirely from scratch (Song et al., 2018b; Ren et al., 2020; Chen et al., 2023). These failure modes are covered in the *red teaming* section (§4.1.3). It's worth noting that adversarial robustness is especially important for reward models that govern the training of advanced AI systems, as the gradient descent optimization process could be seen as an adversary that may exploit loopholes in the reward model, a phenomenon named *reward model overoptimization* that has been experimentally demonstrated (Gao et al., 2023; Moskovitz et al., 2023).

We consider adversarial robustness a case of distribution shift failure caused partly by a mismatch between AI systems' training distribution (where the training inputs are not adversarially constructed) and testing distribution (where the example can be adversarially constructed). The method of *adversarial training* (Yoo and Qi, 2021; Bai et al., 2021; Ziegler et al., 2022) mitigates this problem by introducing adversarial examples into training input through a variety of ways (Bai et al., 2021), thus expanding the training distribution and closing the distribution discrepancy.

Adversarial training, which is similar to adversarial attacks, first started in the settings of image classification (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014), but later expanded to a wide range of settings. In addition to vision models, adversarial training algorithms have been proposed for language models (Wang et al., 2019a; Liu et al., 2020; Ziegler et al., 2022), vision-language models (Gan et al., 2020; Berg et al., 2022), etc. In terms of the model type, adversarial training has been applied to classification models (Bai et al., 2021), generative models (Ziegler et al., 2022), and RL agents (Gleave et al., 2020; Tan et al., 2020; McAleer et al., 2022; Liang et al., 2023).

We introduce the two major flavors of adversarial training: perturbation-based and unrestricted.

• Perturbation-based Adversarial Training. Mirroring perturbation-based adversarial attack (see §4.1.3), perturbation-based adversarial training introduces adversarially perturbated examples (i.e., small changes to a normal data input which are designed to reduce model performance) into training (Goodfellow et al., 2014). Techniques in this vein (Bai et al., 2021) include the baseline approach of adding a regularization term into the loss function to assess model performance on a gradient-based perturbated input (Goodfellow et al., 2014), unsupervised (Carmon et al., 2019) or self-supervised (Hendrycks et al., 2019) approaches, and various supplemental techniques such as the introduction of curriculum learning which gradually intensifies adversarial pressure during training (Zhang et al., 2020).

• Unrestricted Adversarial Training. Mirroring unrestricted adversarial attack (see §4.1.3), unrestricted adversarial training generalizes perturbation-based adversarial training to include any adversarial example that can fool the model, not necessarily ones obtained by adding a small amount of noise to another example. This includes generative adversarial training, which uses generative models to produce arbitrary adversarial inputs from scratch (Poursaeed et al., 2021), and the addition of syntactically or semantically modified adversarial examples to training input (Ziegler et al., 2022; Mao et al., 2022) which surprisingly eliminates the negative effects on the model's non-adversarial performance. Zhang et al. (2023a) tries to unify unrestricted and perturbation-based adversarial training, albeit based on a non-trivial assumption. Most works on unrestricted adversarial attacks also apply to unrestricted adversarial training (see §4.1.3 for an overview) and form an important part of the unrestricted adversarial training methodology.

3.3.2 Cooperative Training

Cooperative AI (Dafoe et al., 2020, 2021) aims to address uncooperative and collectively harmful behaviors from AI systems (see §1.3). The lack of cooperative capabilities in AI systems can be seen as a form of failure under distribution shift – systems are trained in single-agent settings that are qualitatively different from the real world, which could be massively multi-agent. This difference is indeed a difference in data distribution since the presence of other agents in the environment qualitatively alters the environmental state transition dynamics, leading to changes in the joint distribution of observations and rewards. We approach the problem by expanding our training distribution to include multi-agent interactions via *cooperative training*.

We introduce the branch of cooperative AI (what we call *cooperative training*) that focuses on specific forms of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) training and complements formal game theory approaches in §4.3.1. The MARL branch of cooperative training tends to emphasize the AI system's *capabilities* for coordination (*e.g.*, coordination of a robot football team (Ma et al., 2022)), as opposed to *incentives* of cooperation (*e.g.*, mitigating failure modes like the prisoner's dilemma (Phelps and Russell, 2023)) which are the focus of the game theory branch. Here, we only cover the MARL branch due to its relevance to expanding training data distribution.

The field of MARL had traditionally been divided into the three branches of *fully cooperative* (where all agents share the same reward function), *fully competitive* (where the underlying rewards constitute a zero-sum game), and *mixed-motive* settings (where the reward incentives are neither fully cooperative nor fully competitive, corresponding to general-sum games) (Gronauer and Diepold, 2022). Among them, fully cooperative and mixed-motive settings are the most relevant for cooperative AI, and the latter has been especially emphasized due to its relative neglectedness (Dafoe et al., 2020). We also cover other research fronts, including zero-shot coordination (Hu et al., 2020; Treutlein et al., 2021), environment-building (Leibo et al., 2021), and socially realistic settings (Du, 2023).

• Fully Cooperative MARL. Fully cooperative settings of MARL are characterized by a shared reward function for all agents (Gronauer and Diepold, 2022). This unity allows us to completely disregard issues of cooperation *incentives* (since all incentives are perfectly aligned) and instead focus on effectively achieving the shared goal via coordination. Commonly adopted approaches (Oroojlooy and Hajinezhad, 2023) lie on a spectrum of centrality – from the baseline solution of purely independent training (Tan, 1993) to the approach of supplementing independent training with decentralized communications (Foerster et al., 2016), and then to *value factorization* which decomposes a global reward and determine each individual agent's contribution (Guestrin et al., 2001; Sunehag et al., 2018).




Figure 8: A tree diagram summarizing the key concepts and literature related to Data Distribution Interventions. The root node represents Data Distribution Interventions that try to combine multiple distributions during training, for example, adversarial examples and multi-agent interaction. The main branches represent promising methods, namely, Adversarial Training that incorporates adversarial pressures and Cooperative Training that incorporates multi-agent dynamics. Further sub-branches list key techniques such as perturbation-based and unrestricted adversarial training, and cooperative methods also include environment-building, socially realistic settings, zero-shot coordination, and other Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL)-based techniques.

- Mixed-Motive MARL. Mixed-motive settings of MARL are characterized by a mixture of cooperative and competitive incentives rewards for agents are not identical but aren't zero-sum either (Gronauer and Diepold, 2022). This includes game environments where teams play against each other (Jaderberg et al., 2019) and more nuanced settings such as negotiation (Cruz et al., 2019; FAIR et al., 2022). Examples of techniques for mixed-motive MARL, again ordered from decentralized to centralized, include using IRL-like methods to learn from human interactions (Song et al., 2018a), making communications strategic and selective (Singh et al., 2019) and adapting actor-critic methods by granting the critic access to global information (Lowe et al., 2017).
- **Zero-shot Coordination**. Zero-shot coordination is the goal of making AI systems able to coordinate effectively with other agents (including human agents) without requiring being trained together or otherwise being designed specifically to coordinate with those agents (Hu et al., 2020; Treutlein et al., 2021) human beings who are complete strangers can still cooperate effectively, and we hope that AI systems can do the same. Early works were published under the name *ad hoc coordination*, covering evaluation (Stone et al., 2010), gametheoretic and statistical approaches (Albrecht and Ramamoorthy, 2013), and human modeling (Krafft et al., 2016). Recent advances include *other-play* (Hu et al., 2020) which randomizes certain aspects of training partners' policies to achieve robustness, 31 the introduction of multi-level recursive reasoning (Cui et al., 2021), and *off-belief learning* (Hu et al., 2021) which eliminates arbitrary conventions in self-play by interpreting partners' past actions as taken by a non-collusive policy.
- Environment-building. Game environments have been popular settings for cooperative training, including, for example, Hanabi (Muglich et al., 2022), Diplomacy (Cruz et al., 2019; FAIR et al., 2022), and football (Ma et al., 2022). On the more simplistic end, game theory models, especially those based on classical multiagent dilemmas, have also been a popular choice of environment (Wang et al., 2021; Christoffersen et al., 2023). Also, Melting Pot (Leibo et al., 2021; Agapiou et al., 2022), a framework and suite of multiagent environments, has been designed specifically for cooperative AI research. There has also been research on

³¹This is in a similar spirit to *domain randomization* (Tobin et al., 2017).



Figure 9: Our organization of research directions, techniques, and applications in assurance. We divide this section into *three* parts: Safety Evaluations—evaluation of AI systems' safety, which refers to the mitigation of accidents and harmful events caused by the AI system; Interpretability—making AI systems as well as its decision process more understandable to human beings; Human Value Verification—verifying whether AI systems can adhere to social and moral norms. The figure also displays the intricate logic of these sections.

unsupervised environment design, which aims for a partial automation of the environment-building process (Dennis et al., 2020; Jiang et al., 2021b).

• Socially Realistic Settings. It has been proposed that cooperative AI research should focus more on socially realistic environments (Du, 2023), which tend to be massively multi-agent (including both AI agents and human agents) and are highly diverse in both the composition of agents and modes of interactions. Implications of this vision (Critch and Krueger, 2020) include, but aren't limited to, building more realistic and open-ended environments (Klügl et al., 2005; Lehman et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2019b; Suo et al., 2021), scaling up MARL (Sun et al., 2020; Du, 2023), and incorporating new means of control such as social institutions and norms (Singh, 2014).

4 Assurance

Assurance, *i.e.*, the measurement and evaluation of AI systems' practical alignment after AI systems are actually trained and deployed, which can further assure the forward alignment outcomes, has almost coexisted with the emergence of AI systems (Batarseh et al., 2021). In this section, we categorize assurance into three parts based on a certain logic: Safety Evaluations—Evaluating AI systems on minimizing accidents during task execution as a basic need of assurance, Interpretability—Ensuring that humans can understand the decision-making process of AI systems and therefore assuring the safety and interoperability beyond evaluation, Human Value Verification—Verifying whether AI systems can align with human values, ethics, and social norms and satisfying the high-level need of AI systems' integration to the human society, as is described in the Figure 9.

4.1 Safety Evaluations

Safety refers to mitigating accidents caused by design flaws in AI systems and preventing harmful events that deviate from the intended design purpose of the AI system (Amodei et al., 2016). In fact, safety stands as a shared requirement across all engineering domains (Verma et al., 2010). Moreover, it holds particular importance in constructing AI systems, because of the characteristics of AI systems (Steinhardt, 2015). We categorize the safety of AI systems into the following categories: *Social Concerns* refer to explicit and comparatively identifiable characteristics of safe AI systems, including aspects such as toxicity (Stahl and Leach, 2022), and *Intentional Behaviors* share the characterization of relatively complicated investigation and substantial potential harm, represented by power-seeking, deception, and other frontier AI risks (Shevlane et al., 2023).

Following the logic above, we start with the techniques to form datasets and benchmarks of safety evaluation in §4.1.1 and further explore the evaluation targets and their characteristics in §4.1.2. At the end of this section, we include the red-teaming technique §4.1.3, which assesses the AI system's robustness beyond evaluation.

4.1.1 Datasets and Benchmarks

In the discussions on safety evaluation, it is crucial to prioritize datasets and benchmarks as the cornerstone elements, so we first introduce the basic techniques to build datasets and benchmarks and then move on to newer interactive methods.

Dataset Among all the assurance techniques, the dataset method could be considered the most elementary and straightforward one (Celikyilmaz et al., 2020). This method assesses the response of AI systems by presenting them with predefined contexts and tasks (Paullada et al., 2021), balancing the cost, quality, and quantity of data.




Figure 10: A Tree diagram summarizing the key concepts, logic, and literature related to Safety Evaluation. The root of the tree represents Safety Evaluation, which aims to measure the accidents caused by design flaws in AI systems and harmful events that deviate from the intended design purpose of the AI system. The main branches represent the main structure of safety evaluation, including Datasets and Benchmarks, Evaluation Targets, and Red Teaming techniques. Further sub-branches list key works exploring each of these branches. This diagram provides an overview of research directions and specific techniques for measuring AI systems' safety alignment degree.

Research on the dataset method encompasses data sources, annotation approaches, and evaluation metrics. Given that evaluation metrics can vary based on its subject (Sai et al., 2022), this section primarily emphasizes dataset sources and annotation methods.

- Expert design. In the early stage of a domain, expert design is widely used in building datasets, where experts create samples based on actual needs to ensure the dataset covers a wide range of potentially dangerous situations to form datasets (Roh et al., 2019). For instance, initial-stage datasets, e.g., HateCheck (Röttger et al., 2021) for toxicity detection and WEAT (Bolukbasi et al., 2016) and BBQ (Parrish et al., 2022) for bias detection used expert design to harvest a wide coverage and high accuracy while sharing the limitations in terms of cost and breadth, leading to the later development of more efficient methods.
- Internet collection. Previous expert design methods have the flaw of rather high cost and lower efficiency, and internet collection can obtain datasets that contain actual user-generated textual content on a rather large scale (therefore convenient for both training and testing), reflecting real-world text generation scenarios (Yuen et al., 2011), but the raw data collected also needs careful selection and annotation (Roh et al., 2019). Well-known instances of these datasets include OLID (Zampieri et al., 2019) and SOLID (Rosenthal et al., 2021) gathering original Twitter texts for toxicity assessment, WinoBias (Zhao et al., 2018) and CrowS-Pairs (Nangia et al., 2020) gather content potentially containing bias from the internet for further annotation. However, it's important to acknowledge that, as is also mentioned in Papernot et al. (2016), internet-collected datasets naturally carry risks such as privacy and safety concerns, so additional processing is necessary.
- AI Generation. The concept of autonomously generating datasets was explored relatively early, even before
 the emergence of elementary forms of LLMs (Weston et al., 2015). However, during this early stage, AIgenerated datasets were limited by the capabilities of AI systems, so their quality was not as good as internetcollected and manually annotated datasets. It wasn't until LLMs reached relatively high levels of proficiency
 in logical reasoning context understanding and approached or surpassed human-level performance (OpenAI,

2023a) that LMs gained the ability to mimic the structure and logic of existing datasets to compose new ones. As is shown in papers such as Zhang et al. (2022) and Perez et al. (2023), AI systems have made progress in generating datasets for evaluation purposes, surpassing the quality of some classical datasets. However, according to these papers, this approach still faces limitations rooted in the capabilities of large models themselves, including issues like instruction misunderstanding and example diversity, which require further refinement.

Interactive Methods Due to the static nature of datasets, they possess relatively fixed evaluation content and can be vulnerable to targeted training (Holtzman et al., 2020). Additionally, the evaluation content may not fully reflect the strengths and weaknesses of corresponding capabilities (Engstrom et al., 2020). As the demands for language model evaluation continue to escalate, new interactive assurance methods have emerged, which can be categorized into two groups: Agent as Supervisor and Environment Interaction.

- Agent as Supervisor. It is an assurance method that involves using an agent to assess the outputs of AI models. This evaluation approach is characterized by its dynamism and flexibility. Typically, there is a predefined framework for interaction between the agent and the AI system under evaluation (Cabrera et al., 2023). In this method, the agent can be a human participant engaged in experiments through an online system (Stiennon et al., 2020) or a more advanced language model evaluating relatively less capable language models through multi-turn interactions (Hada et al., 2023; Lin and Chen, 2023). This evaluation form offers advantages such as automation and lower cost compared to human agents.
- Environment Interaction. It aims to create a relatively realistic environment using elements such as humans and other LLMs to assess the alignment quality of AI models through multiple rounds of interaction (Liu et al., 2023b). One method is using peer discussions, where multiple LLMs engage in dialogue, to enhance evaluations of AI systems, particularly when their capabilities are relatively close to each other (Li et al., 2023c). Moreover, by building a world model (Li et al., 2023b), the generalization and exploration abilities of AI systems can be comprehensively evaluated.

4.1.2 Evaluation Targets

To achieve the goal of safety alignment, the assurance of AI systems can be divided into different small targets (Shevlane et al., 2023). The subsequent section gives an introduction to these subjects and, furthermore, discusses some of the domain-specific analyses of assurance methods within these realms, while the table 3 will show examples of alignment assurance works in these domains.

Toxicity It refers to content in the output of AI systems that is unhelpful or harmful to humans (Sheth et al., 2022). Before the advent of advanced language models, early toxicity evaluation primarily focused on detecting toxic language and identifying harmful statements in an internet context, like the WCC (Wulczyn et al., 2017), which collected and manually labeled comments from Wikipedia discussion pages. With the emergence of pretrained language models, assurance against toxicity adopted a prompt-generation paradigm to assess the risk of language models generating toxic content in response to specific prompts (Gehman et al., 2020; Ganguli et al., 2022; OpenAI, 2023a). However, in crowdsourced environments, annotation scores may vary by person, so relative labeling, where crowdsource workers select from two different answers during a chat, is needed to enhance crowdsource quality (Bai et al., 2022a). Furthermore, subsequent datasets (Ganguli et al., 2022; Ji et al., 2023a) employ a red teaming design pattern that induces toxic responses through adversarial inputs, further strengthening the assurance of model robustness.

Power-seeking It is a kind of risk that AI systems may seek power over humans once they possess certain levels of intelligence (Turner et al., 2021; Turner, 2022b). In Carlsmith (2022), the authors point out that AI systems already have the conditions for power-seeking, including advanced capabilities, agentic planning, and strategic awareness. However, the assurance against power-seeking is still in its early stages. One representative work in this area is the Machiavelli (Pan et al., 2023a), which constructs a benchmark consisting of decision-making games to assess whether AI systems can balance competition with moral ethics during the game. The conclusion of this work suggests that AI systems still struggle to balance achieving rewards with behaving morally, thus further research in this field is needed.

Situational Awareness It involves AI systems with a certain degree of prediction and understanding of the states and developments of entities in their working environment to make corresponding decisions (Munir et al., 2022). In (Li et al., 2023b), the authors evaluate the performance of language models in the board game Othello, showing that language models have the ability to predict possible future states within the action space in a nonlinear representation. Similar to the Machiavelli benchmark (Pan et al., 2023a), this work has limitations because it is based on game-based evaluations, lacking realism and scenario complexity.

Table 3: A Chart of Safety Evaluation Examples: Specific dataset works are listed in this chart, along with their detailed information: evaluation targets, first release time, most recent update time (we list them separately because some datasets are consistently being updated), information quantity (the sum of the information form unit), institution, information form, baseline model and information source. Moreover, to contain more information, we made some abbreviations in the chart: We shortened the release time and recent updates by concatenating the last two digits of the year and the month and only taking the institution of the paper's first author, and we use combinations of uppercase letters to replace long words in information form: SP for Sentence Pairs, SL for Sentence-Label, ST for sentence template, PP for pronoun pairs, and SS for single selections.

	Dataset	Release Time	Recent Update	Info Quantity	Institution	Information Form	Baseline Model	Infomation Source
	Aequitas [601]	18/05	23/04	-	U.Chicago	Python	-	Self Build
	WinoS [591]	18/10	19/01	0.72K	JHU	ST	Rule&Neural	Self Build
	EEC [367]	18/05	-	8K	NRC Canada	SP	SVM	Selection
	GAP [729]	18/05	-	8.9K	Google	PP	Transformer	Wikipedia
	OLID [769]	19/05	-	14K	U.Wolver.	SL	SVM&LSTM	Twitter
Bias	CrowS-Pairs [482]	20/03	21/10	1.5K	NYU	SP	BERT	MTurk
	StereoSet [476]	20/04	22/04	17K	MIT	SS	BERT&GPT-2	MTurk
	BBQ [535]	21/05	22/07	58.5K	NYU	SS	Multiple LLMs	MTurk
	LM-Bias [411]	21/07	22/01	16K	CMU	QA Pair	GPT-2	Corpus Select
	VQA-CE [178]	21/03	21/10	63K	Sorbonne	Multimodal	-	Self-Build
	AuAI [392]	23/01	-	-	Sorbonne	Framework	-	Self Build
	WCC [749]	16/01	-	63M	Wikimedia	SL	Human	Wikipedia
	RTP [258]	19/10	21/04	100K	$\mathbf{U}\mathbf{W}$	Prompt	GPT-2	Refinement
Toxicity	SOLID [586]	20/05	-	9M	IBM	SL	BERT	Twitter
	Toxigen [291]	20/05	23/06	274K	MIT	SL	GPT-3	GPT Gen.
	HH-RLHF [50]	22/04	22/09	162K	Anthropic	SP	Claude	Corpus Refine
	BeaverTails [339]	23/06	23/07	30K	PKU	QA Pair	Multiple LLMs	Corpus Refine
Power	MACHIAVELLI [527]	23/04	23/06	134	UCB	Games	GPT-4&RL	Selection
Seeking	BeaverTails [339]	23/06	23/07	30K	PKU	QA Pair	Multiple LLMs	Corpus Refine
Situation	SA Framework [604]	20/07	-	-	MIT	Framework	-	Self Build
Awareness	EWR [407]	-	-	10	Havard	Game	Othello GPT	Self Build
	PARENT [193]	19/06	-	-	CMU	Metric	-	Self Build
Hallucination	PARENT-T [728]	20/05	-	-	NYU	Metric	-	Self Build
	ChatGPT-Eval [56]	23/02	23/03	-	HKUST	Multimodal	ChatGPT	Integration
	POPE [410]	23/05	23/08	2K	RUC	Multimodal	$Multiple\ LVLMs$	Dataset Refine

Hallucination AI systems may generate information or responses that are not grounded in factual knowledge or data, leading to the creation of misleading or false content, which is formally called Hallucination (Ji et al., 2023b). Hallucination evaluation aims to assure the consistency of the knowledge in the AI system's output with the knowledge given by its training data and knowledge base (Ji et al., 2023b; Zhang et al., 2023d). The earliest statistical-based hallucination evaluation methods used n-grams to directly calculate the overlap of vocabulary between the input and output content (Dhingra et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2020). However, this type of evaluation has a limitation: It only considers lexical overlap and does not take into account semantics or sentence meaning (Ji et al., 2023b), making it unsuitable for evaluating more complex forms of hallucination. Later assurance methods shifted from statistical approaches to model-based methods, which are more robust compared to statistical token-difference-based methods (Honovich et al., 2021). While this evaluation method is more advanced than previous ones, it still has the limitation that the model can only output the degree of hallucination and may have difficulty pinpointing specific errors (Falke et al., 2019). With the development of LLMs, some works have proposed that certain data can be used to train language models to perform hallucination evaluation (Tian et al., 2019).

Frontier AI Risks In addition to the assurance content described above, the enhancement of AI systems in recent years has given rise to a series of new assurance needs (OpenAI, 2023a). Currently, there is not much public information available for research on these assurance needs, hence this section will provide a brief introduction to some of the more significant ones:

• Cyber Security & Biological Weapons. Advanced LLMs may be misused for cyber-attacks, the production of bio-weapons, and other extremely harmful behaviors (Shevlane et al., 2023). Although GPT-4 cannot play a significant role in exploiting network vulnerabilities due to its limited context window, it has been proven to demonstrate strong capabilities in identifying network vulnerabilities and in social engineering (OpenAI, 2023a). Similarly, Lentzos (2022) have stated the robust abilities of AI systems in the field of bio-weapons and the military, highlighting the risks of misuse of such capabilities. It emphasizes the necessity to ensure

that these models can identify and reject malicious requests.

- Deception & Manipulation. AI systems have the potential to negatively influence users by outputting text, including disseminating false information and shaping people's beliefs and political impacts (Shevlane et al., 2023). Distinguished from hallucination, the misinformation here is not a flaw of the model itself but rather a deliberate action. Special assurance measures need to be designed for controlling these kinds of behavior.
- Jailbreak. It refers to the bypassing of AI systems' safeguard mechanisms by users, for example, by constructing specific types of input. This behavior can be limited to text (OpenAI, 2023a),³² or it may take multi-modal forms (OpenAI, 2023b). There is a need for specific identification and defense against such attacks. Specifically, multi-modal jailbreaks make traditional text-based heuristic methods for identifying attack content infeasible, necessitating special multi-modal handling methods. Further discussion of jailbreak can be found in §4.1.3.
- **Self-Preservation & Proliferation**. This refers to the tendency of AI systems for self-protection and replication, and in this process, breaking the limit from their environment. These tendencies are examples of *instrumental sub-goals* (Bostrom, 2012). While this tendency can be beneficially harnessed, it is dangerous in the absence of regulation (Perez et al., 2023). This tendency has been emphasized and evaluated by various sources (Perez et al., 2023; Kinniment et al., 2023; OpenAI, 2023a,b).³²

4.1.3 Red Teaming

Red teaming is the act of generating scenarios where AI systems are induced to give unaligned outputs or actions (e.g., dangerous behaviors such as deception or power-seeking, and other problems such as toxic or biased outputs) and testing the systems in these scenarios. The aim is to assess the robustness of a system's alignment by applying adversarial pressures, i.e. specifically trying to make the system fail. In general, state-of-the-art systems – including language models and vision models – do not pass this test (Chakraborty et al., 2021; Perez et al., 2022; Liu et al., 2023c; Chen et al., 2023).

In game theory and other fields, red teaming was introduced much earlier (Von Stengel and Koller, 1997), and within computer science, the concept of red teaming was proposed in the security field (Cohen, 1998), where it had a similar meaning of adversarially assessing the reliability and robustness of the system. Later, Ganguli et al. (2022); Perez et al. (2022) introduced this idea to the field of AI, and more specifically, alignment.

The motivation for red teaming is two-fold: (1) to gain assurance on the trained system's alignment, and (2) to provide a source of adversarial input during adversarial training (Yoo and Qi, 2021; Bai et al., 2021; Ziegler et al., 2022). Here, we focus on the first one. It's worth noting that the two objectives aren't separable; works targeting the first motivation also help provide a basis for the second one.

Reinforced, Optimized, Guided, or Reverse Context Generation This category includes using various methods to generate coherent contexts (prompts) that are inducive to unaligned completions from the language model. Perez et al. (2022); Deng et al. (2022) train or tune a separate language model with RL to make it generate desired prompts, which are then fed to the red-teamed model. Perez et al. (2022); Si et al. (2022) also uses other methods such as zero-shot, few-shot, or supervised finetuning-based generation. Lee et al. (2022); Jones et al. (2023) generates misalignment-inducive contexts by performing optimization on the prompt – bayesian optimization and discrete optimization, respectively. Dathathri et al. (2020); Krause et al. (2021) propose the method of guiding an LLM's generation using a smaller classifier; this is proposed in detoxification but is transferable to the red teaming context. Lastly, Zhang et al. (2022) generates misalignment-inducive contexts through *reverse generation*, *i.e.* constructing adversarial contexts conditioned on a given response, which can be seen as an inverse process for model inference.

Manual and Automatic Jailbreaking As is defined above 4.1.2, *Jailbreaking* (Shen et al., 2023) is an informal term that refers to the act of bypassing a product's constraints on users – and in the case of LLMs, bypassing LLMs' tendencies to not answer misalignment-inducive questions, a feat of alignment training. Most existing attempts are scattered across the Internet in the form of informal reports and involve adding prefixes and suffixes to the original text. Research has descriptively analyzed the existing attempts (Liu et al., 2023c; Shen et al., 2023), as well as providing causal explanations for the phenomenon (Wei et al., 2023). In addition, past (Wallace et al., 2019) and current (Zou et al., 2023b) works have proposed effective methods to automatically generate such prefixes or suffixes that nullify LLMs' tendencies to avoid misalignment-inducive questions.

³²Relevant discussions in OpenAI (2023a) can be found in its system card appendix.

Crowdsourced Adversarial Inputs A number of works (Xu et al., 2020, 2021; Ganguli et al., 2022) have produced misalignment-inducive prompts by crowdsourcing, *i.e.* recruiting human red teamers (possibly via online platforms) and instruct them to provide adversarial prompts. These methods (arguably) provide more flexibility and resemblance to real-world use cases but have higher costs and lower scalability.

Perturbation-Based Adversarial Attack In the field of computer vision, there have been many works studying adversarial attacks on vision models that rest on the method of *perturbation*, *i.e.*, performing small perturbations to the pixel contexts of the image (usually bounded by a pixel-wise matrix norm) to make the model confidently produce false outputs on the perturbated image (Chakraborty et al., 2021). This type of adversarial attack has also been extended to language models (Jia and Liang, 2017; Ebrahimi et al., 2018; Zang et al., 2020; Cheng et al., 2020) and vision-language models (Zhao et al., 2023b).

Unrestricted Adversarial Attack *Unrestricted adversarial attack*, proposed in (Brown et al., 2018; Song et al., 2018b), is a more general form of adversarial attack. It removes all restrictions on the adversarial examples, and therefore, for instance, the adversarial example can be generated from scratch, as opposed to being generated from an existing example, as in the case of perturbation-based methods. Many methods for unrestricted adversarial attack have been proposed; the most notable ones include (Song et al., 2018b; Chen et al., 2023) which generate realistic adversarial images using generative models, and (Bhattad et al., 2020; Shamsabadi et al., 2020) which manipulates semantically meaningful traits such as color and texture. Unrestricted adversarial attack has also been extended to text classification models (Ren et al., 2020).

Datasets for Red Teaming A number of works on red teaming and related topics have compiled datasets consisting of red teaming prompts or dialogues, including the BAD dataset (Xu et al., 2020), the red teaming section of HH-RLHF dataset (Bai et al., 2022a), and the Real Toxicity Prompts dataset (Gehman et al., 2020).

Existing Red Teaming Practices in Industry The practice of red teaming is gaining popularity in the AI industry. Cases of adoption include OpenAI (who performed red teaming on its system GPT-4 to produce part of its System Card) (OpenAI, 2023a), NVIDIA (Pearce and Lucas, 2023), Google (Fabian, 2023), and Microsoft (Ram Shankar Siva Kumar, 2023). During an event at the DEF CON 31 conference, models from 9 companies undergo red teaming from the conference participants;³³ this red teaming event is held in partnership with four institutions from the U.S. public sector, including the White House.

Downstream Applications Red teaming plays a crucial role in the adversarial training of AI systems by providing adversarial input (Yoo and Qi, 2021; Bai et al., 2021; Ziegler et al., 2022). In addition, it has also been shown to be a useful interpretability tool (Casper et al., 2022). Similar ideas are also present in (Buçinca et al., 2023), where scenarios of harm from an AI system are automatically generated prior to development or deployment to help with impact assessment.

4.2 Interpretability

Interpretability is a research field that makes machine learning systems and their decision-making process understandable to human beings (Doshi-Velez and Kim, 2017). Interpretability research builds a toolbox with which something novel about the models can be better described or predicted. In this paper, we focus on research³⁴ that is most relevant to alignment and safety, and empirically, those techniques make neural networks safer by probing into the internal structures and representations of the neural networks (Räuker et al., 2023).

The taxonomy of interpretability varies according to sub-fields and purposes (Doshi-Velez and Kim, 2017; Rudin, 2019). There are several ways to break down interpretability research: explainability and transparency; interpretability of weights, neurons, sub-networks, or representations; for safety or the science of deep learning; intrinsic and post hoc interpretability; mechanistic interpretability and concept-based interpretability.

- Explainability and Transparency. Explainability research aims to understand why models generate specific output, whereas transparency aims to understand model internals (Critch and Krueger, 2020).
- Weights, Neurons, Sub-networks or Representations. This classification organizes interpretability methods by seeing which part of the computational graph that method helps to explain: weights, neurons, sub-networks, or latent representations (Räuker et al., 2023).
- Safety or the Science of Deep Learning. Researchers also conduct interpretability research with different purposes: some do it to safely deploy AI systems, while others aim for a complete science of neural network (Pavlus, 2019). But the line gets blurred as mechanistic interpretability research aims for both (Olah et al., 2020b; Olah, 2023).

³³https://www.airedteam.org/

³⁴For a more comprehensive review of interpretability and its methods, we recommend (Räuker et al., 2023).




Figure 11: A Tree diagram summarizing the key concepts, logic, and literature related to Interpretability. The root of the tree represents Interpretability, which aims to *make machine learning systems and their decision-making process understandable to human beings*. The main branches represent the main structure of interpretability, including Post Hoc Interpretability, Intrinsic Interpretability, and Outlook of Interpretability research. Further subbranches list key works exploring each of these branches. This diagram provides an overview of research directions and specific techniques for making AI systems interpretable to human beings.

- *Intrinsic and Post Hoc Interpretability*. By the stage of intervention, interpretability research is divided into intrinsic interpretability and post hoc interpretability: the former focuses on making intrinsically interpretable models (continual learning (Rusu et al., 2022; Smith et al., 2023), sparsity (Frankle and Carbin, 2019; Hoefler et al., 2021; Meister et al., 2021; Wong et al., 2021; Béna and Goodman, 2023), self-explaining AI (Alvarez-Melis and Jaakkola, 2018), disentanglement (Bengio et al., 2013), adversarial training (Salman et al., 2020)), while the latter designs post hoc interpretability methods that offer explanations to black-box model behaviors (circuits analysis, probing, feature synthesis, feature attribution, *etc.*) (Räuker et al., 2023).
- Mechanistic Interpretability, Representation Engineering, and Concept-based Interpretability. Three research agendas have gained traction in the AI safety and alignment community (Impact, 2023): Mechanistic Interpretability, which, taking a bottom-up approach, aims to gain an understanding of low-level mechanics for algorithms implemented by neural networks (Olah et al., 2020b), Representation Engineering, which, in contrast, taking a top-down approach, monitors (and manipulates) high-level cognitive phenomenon in neural networks (Zou et al., 2023a), and Concept-based Interpretability that locates learned knowledge representations in the neural networks, in contrast to what is said by the models (Meng et al., 2022, 2023).

In this section, we adopt the *Intrinsic and Post Hoc Interpretability* classification method, for it offers a more generic framework suitable for various AI systems beyond neural network, and it divides the interpretability analysis both during the system designing and after the system has been deployed (Räuker et al., 2023), compared to other classification methods. Specifically, we discussed mechanistic interpretability techniques that take place in model designing and post hoc stages separately in post hoc and intrinsic interpretability subsections.

4.2.1 Post Hoc Interpretability

This section explores techniques and methods applied to understand model internals. The goal is to understand the low-level structure and units of neural networks and their causal effect on macroscopic behaviors. These techniques are often referred to as *post hoc interpretability*, inferring techniques that help to understand the models after training (Räuker et al., 2023).

Circuit Analysis Circuits refer to the sub-networks within neural networks that can be assigned particular functionalities. As their counterparts in neuroscience, the neural circuits which are both anatomical and functional entities (Purves et al., 2001), circuits are also both physical and functional (Olah et al., 2020b). Mechanistic interpretability researchers locate circuits in neural networks (microscopic) to understand model behaviors (macroscopic). Multiple circuits have been reported: curve circuits for curve detectors (OpenAI, 2021a), induction circuits for in-context learning (Olsson et al., 2022), indirect object identification circuits for identifying objects in sentences (Wang et al., 2023b), Python docstrings for predicting repeated argument names in docstrings of Python functions (Heimersheim and Jett, 2023), grokking (Nanda et al., 2023), multi-digit addition (Nanda et al., 2023), and mathematical ability such as *greater than* (Hanna et al., 2023). Notably, many circuit analysis conducted to date has been focused on toy models (Räuker et al., 2023), with a couple of exceptions, such as the indirect object identification circuit, which is located in GPT-2 Small and has 28 heads (Wang et al., 2023b).

Attribution Attribution is a series of techniques that look at the contribution of some components (including head, neuron, layers, and inputs) for neuron responses and model outputs (Räuker et al., 2023). Gradient-based attribution is introduced to evaluate the quality of interpretation and guide the search for facts learned by the models (Ancona et al., 2018; Durrani et al., 2020; Lundström et al., 2022; Dai et al., 2022). However, those methods are limited because they can not provide causal explanations (Räuker et al., 2023). Direct Logit Attribution is to identify the direct contribution of individual neurons to the prediction of the next neurons (Lieberum et al., 2023; McGrath et al., 2023; Belrose et al., 2023; Dar et al., 2023). For transformers, this technique is applied to the final state of the residual stream. This is a powerful technique because the final state of the residual stream contains all outputs of nodes and embeddings of the inputs where you can understand the attribution of those nodes, while the logits are more interpretable than the logit probabilities since they are the linear transformation of the residual stream (Rager et al., 2023).

Activation Patching (or Attribution Patching) is also a new technique that applies causal intervention to identify which activations are influential for model output (Meng et al., 2022). Different from the Direct Logit Attribution technique, Activation Patching can identify any meaningful part of the neural network rather than just the end of the model. Through applying activation patching and conducting both correct run and corrupted runs on the same neural network, researchers aim to locate key activations that matter more to the model output (Nanda, 2023a).

Visualization Techniques of visualization help to understand neural structures, including techniques that visualize datasets (notably dimensionality reduction techniques) (van der Maaten and Hinton, 2008; Olah, 2014, 2015), features (Erhan et al., 2009; Olah et al., 2017), weights (Olah et al., 2020a), activations (Carter et al., 2019), structure (Reif et al., 2019), and the whole neural networks (Simonyan et al., 2013; Zeiler and Fergus, 2014; Nguyen et al., 2015; Karpathy et al., 2015; Mordvintsev et al., 2015; Nguyen et al., 2016; Kindermans et al., 2018). The purpose of visualization is to see neural networks with a new level of detail (Olah et al., 2020b).

Perturbation and Ablation These techniques are designed to test the counterfactual rather than the correlation (Räuker et al., 2023). Perturbation is a technique that modifies the input of models and observes changes in their outputs (Ivanovs et al., 2021), and the ablation techniques knock out parts of neural networks³⁵, helping to establish a causal relationship between neural activation and the behavior of the whole network (Räuker et al., 2023).

Mapping and Editing Learned Representations Knowledge representation mapping and editing techniques help to understand what is really learned by the language models, compared to what they say via model output, and modify their knowledge representation when they don't stay truthful (Meng et al., 2022).

Those techniques include interpreting token representations in transformers (Li et al., 2021; Bansal et al., 2021; Geva et al., 2022b,a; Power et al., 2022; Olsson et al., 2022) and how do fully-connected layers learn these representations (Geva et al., 2021; Olsson et al., 2022), studying the key-query products to understand how do tokens attend to each other (Bahdanau et al., 2016; Lee et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2018; Strobelt et al., 2019; Clark et al., 2019; Vashishth et al., 2019; Vig, 2019; Hao et al., 2021; Chefer et al., 2021; Hod et al., 2021; Rigotti et al., 2022), building linear probes to understand whether models learn useful information (Belinkov, 2022), identifying meaningful learned concepts from directions in latent space (from concepts to directions (Fong and Vedaldi, 2018; Kim et al., 2018), and from directions to post hoc explanations (Schneider and Vlachos, 2021)). For the purposes of safety and alignment, these techniques notably help to detect deception (Burns et al., 2023).

³⁵Neurons (Hod et al., 2021; Zhou et al., 2018) and Subspace (Morcos et al., 2018; Rayfogel et al., 2022)

4.2.2 Intrinsic Interpretability

In addition to developing techniques to analyze models, researchers also make models intrinsically more understandable, which is usually called *intrinsic interpretability*. Compared to the symbolic approach that designs interpretable models that don't work, the modern deep learning approach produces ever-capable but arguably increasingly less interpretable models. As a consequence of alignment, dangerous capabilities emerge, but it's less likely for researchers to make them safe and aligned if models remain black-box. To make intrinsically interpretable models, the research community designs modular architecture, robust to adversarial attacks and free of superposition (Anthropic, 2022; Räuker et al., 2023). Notably, mechanistic interpretability, often regarded as a set of *post hoc interpretability techniques*, arguably facilitates the process of making models more interpretable.

Replacing *Black-Box* Components Neural network components, such as feedforward layers, are hard to interpret (*i.e.*, it's hard to articulate what they do in human-understandable terms) because those layers have many polysemantic neurons that respond to unrelated inputs (Anthropic, 2022). To solve this, Anthropic proposes to replace the activation function with the softmax linear unit (SoLU). As a result, the amount of interpretable neurons significantly increases (Anthropic, 2022). This research fits into the broader literature on creating transformer architectural variants that help to gain performance or stabilize training (*e.g.*, Hendrycks and Gimpel (2016); Klambauer et al. (2017)). Different from the rest, SoLU aims to improve interpretability while preserving performance (Anthropic, 2022). This research also fits into the literature that designs models for interpretability (*e.g.*, Caruana et al. (2015); Wang and Rudin (2015)), but the goal here is not to design models to be "immediately understandable as the rest of literature does", but rather, to make reverse engineering easier. This is still an early exploration as a potentially important line of work, and challenges remain, such as the scalability of this method (Anthropic, 2022).

Mechanistic Investigation for Intrinsic Interpretability Mechanistic interpretability is usually regarded as a series of post hoc interpretability techniques because the mechanistic analysis is usually applied at the post-training stage. But considering that mechanistic interpretability is a research agenda that aims to gain a detailed and low-level understanding of neural networks and build the *neural science* for the neural networks (Olah et al., 2020b), we argued that those mechanistic tools built and insights acquired make models intrinsically interpretable (Yu et al., 2018). In particular, research either finds larger structures in neural networks or finds the same structures across different neural networks, which helps to gain intrinsic interpretability. For finding larger structures: once low-level features and circuits are located and studied, intuitively, researchers look in larger structures: features abstracted one level up as abstract feature families, features of variances identified as equivariance (Olah et al., 2020c), neurons of similar functionality self-organize and gather as branch specializations (Voss et al., 2021).

Not only neurons and features but also weights (OpenAI, 2021b) and circuits (Olah, 2023) are organized in a similar fashion. Overall, finding larger structures would save efforts of enumerating and understanding every and each of them, and in theory, AI safety via mechanistic interpretability would require neurons and features to be enumerated, which can be understood as a *brain scan*. Also, the *universality hypothesis*, *i.e.* that structures found within neural networks repeat across networks (Olah et al., 2020b), is starting to gain some evidence: for example, Gabor filters are found across vision models (Olah et al., 2020b), as well as High-Low Frequency Detectors (Schubert et al., 2021) and curve detectors (OpenAI, 2021a). Surprisingly, multimodal neurons are not only found across neural networks (Goh et al., 2021) but also in human brains (Quian et al., 2005). The universality hypothesis, if held true to a large extent, would save efforts for interpreting every model ever trained (Olah, 2023).

4.2.3 Outlook

After a survey of post hoc and intrinsic interpretability research, we will then move on to discuss current challenges in interpretability, and thus provide a direction for further research.

Superposition makes the analysis at neuron level implausible Superposition refers to the phenomenon that models represent more features than they have dimensions (Arora et al., 2018; Olah et al., 2020b; Elhage et al., 2022). Features would correspond to neurons if superposition does not exist. Superposition dims our hope to ensure AI safety by enumerating all features in a model (Elhage et al., 2022; Nanda, 2023b). While research helps to understand superposition seems promising, including giving principled definitions, investigating the conditions for its emergence, and looking for methods to detect, control, or even resolve it (see Elhage et al. (2022) for details on conceptual and empirical research questions about superposition), any solution that helps with enumerating all features is an equivalent solution to superposition. Elhage et al. (2022) proposes three methods to solve superposition: creating models with no superposition (addressing it at training time), finding an overcomplete basis describing how features are stored in the neural nets (addressing it after the fact), or a mixture of both approaches. Notably, Bricken et al. (2023) builds a sparse auto-encoder to interpret group neurons, rather than individual neurons to extract features. This points out a promising direction to solve superposition: to move past it.




Figure 12: A Tree diagram summarizing the key concepts, logic, and literature related to Human Value Verification. The root of the tree represents Human Value Verification, which aims to *verify whether AI systems can adhere to the social norms and moral values*. The main branches represent the main structure of human value verification, including Formal Frameworks for Ethics and Cooperation in AI and specific Techniques of value verification. Further sub-branches list key works exploring each of these branches. This diagram provides an overview of research directions and specific techniques for making AI systems align with human values and social norms.

Scalability of techniques and analysis Toy models are relatively understandable with current techniques, while it is real models that are ever capable, risky, but less interpretable. Scalability becomes a concern when interpretability researchers take a bottom-up approach to interpretability (mechanistic interpretability), as top-down methods such as representation engineering (Zou et al., 2023a) would not face such a bottleneck. For mechanistic interpretability research, we either want to scale up techniques (to automate interpretability (Conmy et al., 2023), to apply circuit analysis on real model (Wang et al., 2023b)), or we want to scale up analysis (to find larger structure in neural networks (Olah, 2023), to verify universality hypothesis (Chughtai et al., 2023)). In the end, we want the microscopic analysis to answer the macroscopic model behavioral questions we care about (*e.g.*, in-context learning capability (Olsson et al., 2022) and more speculation about high-level cognitive capabilities such as planning and dangerous capability such as deception (Anthropic, 2023b)).

Benchmarking Benchmarking offers insights about what works and what does not, and it will also drive community efforts in meaningful directions (Casper, 2023). Interpretability benchmarks were made to evaluate interpretability tools (by evaluating their effectiveness in detecting trojans) (Casper et al., 2023b), and circuits (by testing whether specific subgraphs are counted as circuits) (Lawrence et al., 2023). However, the difficulty is that interpretability researchers don't have a consensus regarding what to measure (Doshi-Velez and Kim, 2017).

4.3 Human Values Verification

Human Values Alignment refers to the expectation that AI systems should adhere to the community's social and moral norms (IEEE, 2016). As the capabilities of AI systems advance, some have begun to exhibit abilities approaching AGI (OpenAI, 2023a). In the future, we can expect autonomous agents governed by these AI systems to become an integral part of our daily lives (Lee et al., 2023b). However, if these systems fail to grasp the inherent complexity and adaptability of human values, their decisions could result in negative social outcomes. In this context, simply aligning with human intent may not be sufficient. Thus evaluating the alignment of human morality and values between AI systems and human beings becomes crucial (Weidinger et al., 2023). This underscores the importance of designing AI entities that are more socially oriented, reliable, and trustworthy. Following the logic of theoretical research and practical techniques, we divide our discussion of human value alignment into these two aspects: Formulations §4.3.1 and Evaluation Methods §4.3.2 of human value alignment.

4.3.1 Formulations

As the formulation of value is complicated, we introduce frameworks that formally characterize aspects of human values that are relevant to alignment. Specifically, we focus on two topics: *formal machine ethics* and *game theory for cooperative AI*. The former focuses on building a formal framework of machine ethics, while the latter discusses the value of multiagent systems, which share a similar origin of the game process.

Formal Machine Ethics Machine ethics (Yu et al., 2018; Winfield et al., 2019; Tolmeijer et al., 2020), first introduced in §1.2.2, aim to build ethically-compliant AI systems. Here, we introduce the branch of machine ethics that focuses on formal frameworks – what we call *formal machine ethics*. We explain three approaches to formal machine ethics: logic-based, RL/MDP-based, and methods based on game theory/computational social choice:

- Logic-based methods. One major direction within formal machine ethics focuses on logic (Pereira et al., 2016b). A number of logic-based works use or propose special-purpose logic systems tailored for machine ethics, such as the Agent-Deed-Consequence (ADC) model (Dubljević and Racine, 2014; Dubljevic, 2020), deontic logic (Von Wright, 1951; Arkoudas et al., 2005), event calculus and its variants (Berreby et al., 2017). Other works also develop methods for the formal verification of moral properties or frameworks for AI systems that accommodate such kind of formal verification (Dennis et al., 2016; Mermet and Simon, 2016).
- RL & MDP-like settings. Another line of work concerns statistical RL or other similar methods for planning within MDP-like environments (Abel et al., 2016; Svegliato et al., 2021). In particular, some works (Wu and Lin, 2018; Svegliato et al., 2021) involve the utilization of the manual design of ethics-oriented reward functions, a concept denoted as *ethics shaping*. Conversely, in other works (Berreby et al., 2017; Murtarelli et al., 2021), the segregation of ethical decision-making from the reward function is pursued.
- Game theory-based methods. To address multi-agent challenges, researchers have developed machine ethics methods based on game theory and computational social choice. Championed by Pereira et al. (2016a), methodologies of existing work can be broadly partitioned into Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) (Pereira et al., 2016b; Han and Pereira, 2019), classical game theory (Conitzer et al., 2017), and computational social choice (Rossi et al., 2011; Noothigattu et al., 2018).

Game Theory for Cooperative AI Cooperative AI (Dafoe et al., 2020, 2021) aims to address uncooperative and collectively harmful behaviors from AI systems (see §1.3). Here we introduce the branch of cooperative AI that focuses on game theory to complement the introduction to MARL-based cooperative training in §3.3.2. This branch tends to study the *incentives* of cooperation and try to enhance them, in contrast to the MARL's tendency to emphasize the *capabilities* of coordination. Examples of incentive failures include game theory dilemmas like the prisoner's dilemma (Phelps and Russell, 2023) and tragedy of the commons (Pérolat et al., 2017), while examples of coordination capability failures include bad coordination of a robot football team (Ma et al., 2022).

- Classical Game Theory for Cooperative AI. A number of works focus on classical game theory as a setting for cooperative AI. Among them, one salient theme is that of *Stackelberg games* (Stackelberg, 1934), *i.e.* games where one player (the "leader") moves first, and all other players (the "followers") move in response to the leader's move. This is suitable for modeling *commitment* in games (*i.e.*, a player pre-committing to a certain move or strategy to gain an advantage), and, according to Dafoe et al. (2020), understanding commitment is one of the four pillars of cooperative AI research. Recent works on Stackelberg games include the introduction of bounded rationality into the model (Pita et al., 2010), dynamic models (Li and Sethi, 2017), machine learning of Stackelberg equilibria (Fiez et al., 2019, 2020), and more. Apart from Stackelberg games, Dafoe et al. (2020) has highlighted the importance of studying *mixed-motive games* (*i.e.*, general games that are neither purely cooperative nor purely competitive) due to their realisticity. Examples of recent work on this front include McKee et al. (2020), which finds a positive correlation between values diversity in synthetic populations and performance in mixed-motive games, and Oesterheld and Conitzer (2022), which constructs interventions on the payoff matrix of general games to induce Pareto improvements in game outcome.
- Evolutionary Game Theory for Cooperative AI. Another avenue of research, initiated by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), aims to understand how cooperation emerges from evolution this includes human cooperation, which arose from Darwinian evolution, as well as the cooperation tendencies in AI systems that could emerge within other evolutionary settings such as the replicator dynamics (Schuster and Sigmund, 1983). These works adopt a methodology called *evolutionary game theory* (Weibull, 1997), which studies, often using tools from dynamical systems, the long-run evolutionary outcome of a large population of agents whose reproductive success is determined by game outcomes against others. More recent work on this front tends to add features to the model to improve its realisticity, including, for example, population structures (Santos et al., 2012) and complexity costs on strategies (DiGiovanni et al., 2022).

4.3.2 Evaluation Methods

In this section, we assume that we have already obtained the appropriate value that should be aligned. However, even so, under the guidance of Goodhart's Law (Goodhart and Goodhart, 1984), we cannot simply define complex human values as reward functions, which also brings greater challenges to value alignment. We introduce specific human value alignment techniques in three parts: *Building Moral Dataset*, *Scenario Simulation*, and *Value Alignment Evaluation*.

Building Moral Dataset *Moral Alignment* refers to the adherence of AI systems to human-compatible moral standards and ethical guidelines while executing tasks or assisting in human decision-making (Min et al., 2023). Early attempts at moral value alignment, initiated in 2018 (Awad et al., 2018), have confirmed that the definition and evaluation of moral values themselves is a challenging issue. This has led to the emergence of abstract moral standards (Hagendorff, 2022) and various different standards driven by the average values of diverse community groups (Awad et al., 2018), fueling further in-depth research into moral value assurance.

Assurance of moral values is typically achieved by constructing corresponding datasets. The Rule-of-Thumb (RoT) serves as a gauge for determining what actions are considered acceptable in human society. Building on this concept, Emelin et al. (2021); Forbes et al. (2020); Ziems et al. (2022) introduced the Moral Stories, SOCIAL-CHEM-101, and Moral Integrity Corpus datasets respectively, focusing on providing human social and moral norms. Hendrycks et al. (2021b) and Jin et al. (2022) introduced the ETHICS and MoralExceptQA datasets respectively, highlighting the inability of contemporary models to align ethically with human values. Jiang et al. (2021a) trained models using human ethical annotations from the CommonSense Norm Bank. Abdulhai et al. (2022) found that models exhibit certain morals and values more frequently than others, revealing how the moral foundations demonstrated by these models relate to human moral foundations. Pan et al. (2023b) explored the trade-off between rewards and moral behavior, discovering a certain tension between the two.

Other related works focus on specific values. For example, Scherrer et al. (2023) focused more on ambiguous situations, assessing different models' reactions in these contexts, while Roger et al. (2023) studied the phenomenon of Measurement Tampering, providing corresponding evaluation methods and datasets.

Scenario Simulation Scenario simulation is a more complex form than datasets and therefore is considered by some views (Hendrycks et al., 2021d) to be more effective in replicating real situations and harvesting better results. The form of the scenario can also vary. Hendrycks et al. (2021d); Pan et al. (2023a) built a series of diverse, morally salient scenarios through text adventure games, evaluating complex behaviors such as deception, manipulation, and betrayal. On the other hand, some work attempts to make intelligent agents learn human values through simulating human-machine interaction. Yuan et al. (2022) proposed a method for bidirectional value alignment between humans and machines, enabling machines to learn human preferences and implicit objectives through human feedback. Liu et al. (2023a) placed AI within a simulated human society sandbox, allowing AI to learn human societal value inclinations by mimicking human-social interactions.

Value Evaluation Methods The existing evaluation models show a very diverse range of methods in terms of values. Durmus et al. (2023) gathered data on human values from five distinct cultures worldwide. To evaluate LLM's value orientations, they compared the similarity between responses produced by LLM and those obtained from these diverse human groups. The results of the study indicate that LLM still displays a noticeable degree of value bias. At the same time, Zhang et al. (2023f) examined the value rationality of LLMs across various values using the framework of social value orientation (Messick and McClintock, 1968; McClintock and Van Avermaet, 1982; Liebrand, 1984; Van Lange et al., 1997). Their findings suggest that LLMs are more likely to opt for actions reflecting neutral values, such as *prosocial*. The Discriminator-Critique Gap (DCG), originally termed the Generator-Discriminator-Critique Gaps (Saunders et al., 2022), is a metric designed to gauge a model's ability to produce responses, judge the quality of these responses, and offer critiques. Zhang et al. (2023e) discovered that DCG can also determine if an LLM can autonomously identify its values and convey to humans the reasons for holding those values. Following this, they proposed VUM to quantify LLM's understanding of human values through DCG based on a dataset built with values from the Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz, 1992, 1994).

5 Governance

Besides technical solutions, governance, the creation and enforcement of rules, is necessary to ensure the safe development and deployment of AI systems. In this section, we survey the literature on AI governance by exploring the role of AI governance, the functions, and relationships between stakeholders in governing AI, and several open challenges to effective AI governance.

5.1 The Role of AI Governance

To explore the role of AI governance, we must identify the challenges that require governance. A range of social and ethical issues can and have already emerged from the adoption and integration of AI into various sectors of our society. For instance, AI applications can inadvertently perpetuate societal biases, resulting in racial and gender discrimination (Caliskan et al., 2017; Perez et al., 2023). Moreover, unchecked reliance on these systems can lead to repercussions such as labor displacement (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018), widening socioeconomic disparities, and the creation of monopolistic environments (Mulligan and Godsiff, 2023).

AI systems have exhibited the potential to jeopardize global security (Turchin and Denkenberger, 2020). For example, OpenAI's system card for GPT-4 (OpenAI, 2023a) finds that an early version of the GPT-4 model as well as a version fine-tuned for increased helpfulness and harmlessness exhibits capabilities to enable disinformation, influence operations, and engineer new biochemical substances, among other risky behavior. Urbina et al. (2022) further demonstrated the potential of AI systems to enable the misuse of synthetic biology by inverting their drug discovery model to produce 40,000 toxic molecules.

The horizon also holds the prospect of increasingly agentic and general-purpose AI systems that, without sufficient safeguards, could pose catastrophic or even existential risks to humanity (McLean et al., 2023). For example, OpenAI's Weng (2023) argued that models such as LLM could essentially act as the brain of an intelligent agent, enhanced by planning, reflection, memory, and tool use. Projects such as AutoGPT (Gravitas, 2023), GPT-Engineer (Osika, 2023), and BabyAGI (Nakajima, 2023) epitomize this evolution. These systems can autonomously break down intricate tasks into subtasks and make decisions without human intervention. Microsoft research suggests that GPT-4, for instance, hints at the early inklings of AGI (Bubeck et al., 2023). As these systems evolve, they might lead to broad socio-economic impacts such as unemployment, and potentially equip malicious actors with tools for harmful activities.

The major objective of AI governance is to mitigate this diverse array of risks. In pursuit of this goal, relevant actors should maintain a balanced portfolio of efforts, giving each risk category its due consideration.

5.2 The Multi-Stakeholder Approach

We put forward a framework to analyze the functions and relationships between stakeholders in AI governance (see Figure 13). In this framework, we outline three main entities. **Government Agencies** oversee AI policies using legislative, judicial, and enforcement powers, as well as engage in international cooperation. **Industry and AGI Labs** research and deploy AI technologies, making them subjects of the governance framework, while proposing techniques to govern themselves and affecting governance policy. **Third Parties**, including academia, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs), perform not only auditing on corporate governance, AI systems, and their applications but also assist the government in policy-making.

Proposals have been made about specific principles for a multi-stakeholder AI governance landscape. Notably, Zhang (2023) has proposed a three-layered approach to governing generative AI, where *base models* (foundation models), *professional models* (models specialized in specific domains, possibly derived from base models via fine-tuning), and *service applications* (applications built upon models) should each be governed with measures tailored to their own needs and risks. On another front, Brundage et al. (2020) argues to implement institutions, software, and hardware to make claims about the safety of AI systems more verifiable.

Government According to Anderljung et al. (2023), three building blocks for government regulation are needed: (1) standard development processes to determine appropriate requirements for cutting-edge AI developers, (2) registration and reporting requirements to offer regulators insight into the progress of advanced AI development processes, (3) mechanisms to guarantee adherence to safety standards in the development and deployment of cutting-edge AI models.

At present, an emerging collection of governmental regulations and laws is surfacing on a global scale, including the *European Union's AI Act* (European Parliament, 2023), and the *Bipartisan Framework for U.S. AI Act* (Blumenthal and Hawley, 2023). Such regulations are indispensable for the safety and alignment of AI systems (Whittlestone and Clark, 2021).

Industry and AGI Labs Governance efforts in industry and AGI labs should emphasize comprehensive AI risk assessments throughout the lifecycle of the AI system. Based on discussions in Koessler and Schuett (2023); Schuett et al. (2023), the full cycle of AI risk assessment can be seen as consisting of five stages. **Pre-development risk assessments**, pre-training risk assessments, and pre-deployment risk assessments all include predictions and analyses of impact and risks with a variety of tools, but with increasing amounts of detail, clarity, and sophistication (Koessler and Schuett, 2023). **Post-deployment monitoring** is the phase where mechanisms for monitoring are established, and all previous analyses are continually updated post-deployment (Koessler and Schuett, 2023). **External scrutiny** includes bug bounty programs (Schuett et al., 2023), external red teaming and third-party model auditing (Schuett et al., 2023; Anderljung et al., 2023)




Figure 13: Our framework for analyzing AI governance at present. The proposed framework explains the nonexhaustive interrelationships and functions among three primary entities in AI governance: the government, industry and AGI labs, and third parties. The government's governance role encompasses regulating the industry and AGI labs and defining the trajectory of future AI development through policy documents. It also devises a *Risk Management System* (RMS) (Mannes, 2020; Bradley, 2020) to abate AI-related threats. Industry and AGI labs return by offering watchful predictions into AI development and innovating new technological methodologies to support regulatory measures (such as model evaluation (Shevlane et al., 2023)). Third parties fulfill a dual function, offering expert advice for robust governmental policy development and fostering collaborations among governments. In the context of industry and AGI labs, these third parties assist in equilibrating corporate interests to prevent disorganized competition from information asymmetry. They also deliver auditing services to the industry and AGI labs as independent entities.

Taking security measures against the risks associated with AI systems seems to be widely accepted by AI companies and related practitioners. Schuett et al. (2023) shows that 98% of respondents who have been surveyed somewhat or strongly approved that AGI labs should perform pre-deployment risk assessments, hazardous capabilities evaluations, third-party model audits, safety restrictions on model usage, and red teaming to guarantee AI safety. ³⁶ Meanwhile, leading AI companies, including Amazon, Anthropic, Google, Inflection, Meta, Microsoft, and OpenAI, have voluntarily committed to the U.S. government to implement security measures (The White House, 2023).

Notably, a lot of researchers have proposed pausing the development of advanced AI systems to win more time for safety research, risk assessments, and regulatory preparations (Bengio et al., 2023). Their proposals include blanket pausing of all sufficiently advanced systems (Bengio et al., 2023), and also conditional pausing of specific classes of models in response to evaluation results on specific failure modes (Alaga and Schuett, 2023), including the currently adopted practice of *responsible scaling policy* (RSP) (Anthropic, 2023a).

Third Parties Mökander et al. (2023) presents three key functions of third-party auditing: (1) *Governance audits* (of tech providers that design and disseminate LLMs) (2) *Model audits* (of LLMs after pre-training but prior to their release) (3) *Application audits* (of applications based on LLMs). It is noteworthy that this categorization partially overlaps with the aforementioned three-layered approach by Zhang (2023).

One prominent example of existing third-party audits is that of ARC Evals, a project of Alignment Research Center (ARC Evals, 2023; Kinniment et al., 2023), who collaborated with OpenAI to perform red teaming on GPT-4 (OpenAI, 2023a) and partnered with Anthropic to perform red teaming on Claude 2 (Anthropic, 2023). These efforts include evaluations on toxicity and bias, as well as frontier AI risks such as autonomous replication, manipulation, cybersecurity, and biological weapon risks (OpenAI, 2023a; Shevlane et al., 2023).

Apart from auditing, third parties can support AI governance in other ways, such as assisting policy-making and facilitating cooperation internationally (Ho et al., 2023). For example, Maas (2021) thinks that the government

³⁶source from Schuett et al. (2023)

should prefer technology-neutral rules rather than technology-specific rules. AI4People's Ethical Framework for a Good AI Society: Opportunities, Risks, Principles, and Recommendations (Floridi et al., 2018), released by AI4People, was guided to the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence presented in April 2019 (Atomium-EISMD, 2023). The World Economic Forum (WEF) convenes government officials, cooperations, and civil society and it has initiated a Global AI Action Alliance in collaboration with partner organizations, with the goal of promoting international cooperation in the field of AI.(Kerry et al., 2021)

5.3 Open Problems

There are numerous open problems in the existing field of AI governance. These problems often have no clear answers, and discussion of these questions can often promote better governance. For effective AI governance, we mainly discuss international governance and open-source governance, hoping to promote the safe development of AI through our discussion.

5.3.1 International Governance

Amidst the swift progress and widespread implementation of AI technology universally, the need for international governance of AI is high on the agenda. Critical discussions revolve around the necessity to institute a global framework for AI governance, the means to ensure its normativity (Erman and Furendal, 2022b) and legitimacy (Erman and Furendal, 2022a), among other significant concerns. These themes draw an intensifying level of detail and complexity in their consideration. Also, as stated by United Nations secretary-general António Guterres during a Security Council assembly in July, generative AI possesses vast potential for both positive and negative impacts at scale, and failing to take action to mitigate the AI risks would be a grave neglect of our duty to safeguard the well-being of current and future generations (Guterres, 2023), international governance also has intergenerational influence. Hence, we examine the significance and viability of international AI governance from three aspects within this section: manage global catastrophic AI risks, manage opportunities in AI, and historical and present efforts, with both generational and intergenerational perspectives. We aim to contribute innovative thoughts for the prospective structure of international AI governance.

Manage Global Catastrophic AI Risks The continual advancements in AI technology promise immense potential for global development and prosperity (Vinuesa et al., 2020). However, they inevitably harbor underlying risks. The unchecked competition in the market and geopolitical factors could precipitate the untimely development and deployment of advanced AI systems, resulting in negative global externalities (Tallberg et al., 2023). The amplification of existing inequalities such as racial and gender bias (Swaugerarchive, 2020) ingrained in AI systems may result in intergenerational ethical discrimination. Since these risks are international and intergenerational, it seems that international governance interventions could alleviate these catastrophic global AI challenges. For example, a consensus amongst nations could help defuse potential AI arms races, while an industry-wide agreement could avert the hasty and irresponsible development of sophisticated AI systems, thus securing the long-term and sustainable development of AI (Ho et al., 2023).

Manage Opportunities in AI The opportunities created by AI development are not distributed equally, which may cause enduring digital inequality between regions and harm the sustainability of AI development. Geographic variances in AI progression suggest an inequitable distribution of its economic and societal benefits, potentially excluding developing nations or specific groups from these advantages (Ho et al., 2023; Tallberg et al., 2023). Moreover, the consolidation of decision-making authority within the technology sector among a limited number of individuals (Sara Stratton, 2021; Noble et al., 2021) could cause an intergenerational impact. Such inequality in the distribution of interests can be mitigated through international governance. Effective international consensus and coordination on the allocation of AI opportunities, which is facilitated by its propagation, education, and infrastructural development (Opp, 2023), could ensure a balanced distribution of benefits derived from AI and promote sustainability in its ongoing development.

Historical and Present Efforts Before the surge of AI technology, the international community had laid down frameworks in line with cooperative regulation of influential technologies and critical matters. For example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) convened specialists to assess climactic environmental issues, fostering scientific consensus (Ho et al., 2023). The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standardized and oversaw international regulations, simultaneously assessing the member nations' compliance with these laws (Ho et al., 2023). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) propelled the harmonious utilization of nuclear energy, with its global reach and sophisticated monitoring and evaluation mechanisms (Sepasspour, 2023). Fast forward to the present-day scenario, wherein multiple international organizations have arrived at a consensus on AI governance. In 2019, the G20 members consolidated a ministerial declaration focusing on human-centered artificial intelligence principles (G20, 2019). Concurrently, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) set forth the OECD Principles on Artificial Intelligence (OECD, 2019). The IEEE Standards

Association launched a worldwide initiative aimed at Securing that all stakeholders involved in the design and implementation of autonomous and intelligent systems receive proper education, training, and motivation to emphasize ethical concerns, thereby advancing these technologies for the betterment of humanity. (IEEE, 2016). In 2021, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization(UNESCO) produced the first-ever global standard on AI ethics (UNESCO, 2021), which aims to lay the foundations for making AI systems work for the good of humanity and societies, and to prevent potential harm caused by losing control over AI systems. The scholarly community has also proposed prospective international governance frameworks for AI, such as the International AI Organization (IAIO) (Trager et al., 2023). We hope these precedents and research outcomes will inspire and provide the groundwork for developing a resilient and long-lasting international framework for AI governance in the future.

5.3.2 Open-source Governance

The debate over the open-sourcing of contemporary AI models is contentious in AI governance, particularly as these models gain increased potency (Seger et al., 2023). The potential security hazards linked with making these models open-source continue to be the crux of debates among AI researchers and policymakers. The offence-defence balance in open-source AI governance also remains controversial (Shevlane and Dafoe, 2020). There is still debate over whether open-source models will increase model security or increase the risk of abuse. As referenced in Shapiro and Siegel (2010), the efficacy of disclosure depends on the chance of potential attackers already possessing the knowledge, coupled with the government's capacity to convert transparency into the identification and solution of emerging vulnerabilities. If a suitable equilibrium between offense and defense cannot be forged for AI systems, the open-sourcing could potentially give rise to significant risks of AI system misuse.

For precision and clarity, we adhere to the definition of open-source models stated by Seger et al. (2023): enabling open and public access to the model's architecture and weights, allowing for modification, study, further development, and utilization by anyone. Currently, the most recognized open-source models include Llama2 (Touvron et al., 2023), Falcon (Penedo et al., 2023), Vicuna (Chiang et al., 2023), and others. In this section, we evaluate the security advantages and potential threats posed by open-source models, fostering a discourse on the feasibility of open-sourcing these models. Ultimately, our objective is to amalgamate insights from existing studies to put forward suggestions for future open-source methodologies that will ascertain the secure implementation of these models.

Arguments for Open-sourcing The view that supports the open-sourcing of existing models suggests that this method can mitigate the security risks inherent in these models in several ways:

- Potentially Bolster Model's Security. Meta's assertions in their release blog for Llama2 (Meta, 2023) promote the belief that this enables the developer and the technical community to conduct tests on the models. As a result, this rapid identification and resolution of issues can considerably strengthen model security. In contrast, another perspective suggests that open-sourcing existing models could enhance the recognition of associated risks, thereby facilitating a greater focus on, investigation into, and mitigation of these potential hazards (Zellers, 2019).
- Foster the Decentralization of Power and Control. Open-sourcing has been widely recognized as an effective strategy in reducing the dominance of major AI laboratories across various sectors, including economic, social, and political domains (Seger et al., 2023). An example is articulated in the core reasons for Stability's open-sourcing of Stable Diffusion: They place their trust in individuals and the community, as opposed to having a centralized, unelected entity controlling AI technology (Mostaque, 2022). Furthermore, certain commentators draw an analogy between open-sourcing and the Enlightenment Era, asserting that decentralized control reinforces faith in the power and good of humanity and society (Howard, 2023), implementing central regulations for safety purposes might amplify the power of the AI technology community instead.

Arguments against Open-sourcing Critics of open-source models assess the potential for misuse from the following viewpoints:

- Potentially Be Fine-Tuned into Detrimental Instances. Current research rigorously affirms that AI systems, contradictory to their initial design intent for mitigating toxicities in chemistry or biology, now hold the potential to manufacture new chemical toxins (Urbina et al., 2022) and biological weaponry (Sandbrink, 2023). The malicious fine-tuning of such models could lead to profound security risk manifestations. Besides, language models, once fine-tuned, could emulate skilled writers and produce convincing disinformation, which may generate considerable sociopolitical risks (Goldstein et al., 2023).
- Inadvertently Encourage System Jailbreaks. Research indicates that unfettered access to open-sourced model weights could facilitate bypassing system security measures (Seger et al., 2023). This premise was

epitomized by Zou et al. (2023b), who showcased this potentiality by developing attack suffixes using Vicuna-7B and 13B (Chiang et al., 2023). Once implemented within readily accessible interfaces such as ChatGPT (OpenAI, 2023a), Bard (Google, 2023), and Claude (Anthropic, 2023), these provoked unwanted generations. Therefore, open-sourcing a model might unintentionally undermine the safeguarding protocols of models that are not open-sourced, consequently amplifying the likelihood of model misuse.

Tentative Conclusions on Open-source Governance The debate on the open-sourcing of AI models remains unsettled, with a prevailing viewpoint that the disclosure of AI models does not pose significant risks at present. Our discourse not only synthesizes existing perspectives on this topic but also prepares the ground for future deliberations considering the prudence of open-sourcing more advanced AI systems.

Existing guidelines for open-sourcing advanced AI systems include measures such as evaluating risks by quantifying the potential for misuse via fine-tuning and a gradual model release(Solaiman et al., 2019; Seger et al., 2023). Meanwhile, policymakers are establishing rigorous compliance protocols for these open-source models. For example, European policymakers insist that the models should have "performance, predictability, interpretability, corrigibility, security, and cybersecurity throughout [their] lifecycle." (Chavez, 2023).

6 Conclusion

In this survey, we have provided a broadly-scoped introduction to AI alignment, which aims to build AI systems that behave in line with human intentions and values. We specify the objectives of alignment as Robustness, Interpretability, Controllability, and Ethicality (**RICE**), and characterize the scope of alignment methods as comprising of *forward alignment* (making AI systems aligned via alignment training) and *backward alignment* (gaining evidence of the systems' alignment and govern them appropriately to avoid exacerbating misalignment risks). Currently, the two notable areas of research within forward alignment are *learning from feedback* and *learning under distribution shift*, while backward alignment is comprised of *assurance* and *governance*.

One thing that sets alignment apart from many other fields is its diversity (Hendrycks, 2022) – it is a tight assembly of multiple research directions and methods, tied together by a shared goal, as opposed to a shared methodology. This diversity brings benefits. It fosters innovation by having the different directions compete and clash against each other, leading to a cross-pollination of ideas. It also allows different research directions to complement each other and together serve the goal of alignment; this is reflected in the *alignment cycle* (see Figure 2), where the four pillars are integrated into a self-improving loop that continually improves the alignment of AI systems. Meanwhile, this diversity of research directions raises the barrier to entry into this field, which mandates the compilation of well-organized survey materials that serve both the newcomers and the experienced. In this survey, we attempt to address this need by providing a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of alignment.

We attempt to account for the full diversity within the field by adopting a broad and inclusive characterization of alignment. Our survey of alignment gives a spotlight to almost all major research agendas in this field, as well as to real-world practices on the assurance and governance front. We recognize that boundaries of alignment are often vague and subject to debate. Therefore, when proposing the RICE principles, we put forth our broad characterization of alignment as an explicit choice. In the meantime, we recognize that such a survey needs to be a long-term endeavor that is continually reviewed and updated. Both the problems and methods of alignment closely follow the development of machine learning. This fast-paced development means that new materials and frameworks can become outdated after merely a few years. This fact is one reason why we write the survey to reflect the latest developments, and also mandates continual maintenance and updates.

We conclude the survey by looking ahead and presenting the key traits in this field that we believe ought to be preserved or fostered.

Open-Ended Exploration of Novel Challenges and Approaches A lot of the alignment discourse is built upon classic works that predate the recent developments of LLMs and other breakthroughs in large-scale deep learning. Thus, when this paradigm shift happens in the machine learning field, it is plausible that some challenges in alignment become less salient while others become more so; after all, one defining feature of scientific theories is their falsifiability (Popper, 1935). More importantly, this shift in machine learning methodology and the broader trend of ever-tighter integration of AI systems into society (Abbass, 2019) introduces novel challenges that could not be envisioned before. This requires that we engage in *open-ended exploration*, actively seeking out new challenges that were previously neglected. Moreover, such an exploration need not be constrained to challenges – a similar mindset should be adopted regarding approaches and solutions, thus building a more diverse portfolio for both the *questions* and the *answers* (Shimi, 2022).

Combining Forward-Looking and Present-Oriented Perspectives Alignment has emphasized harms from potential advanced AI systems that possess stronger capabilities than current systems (Ngo, 2020a). These systems might come into existence well into the future, or might just be a few years away (Stein-Perlman et al., 2022). The

former possibility requires us to look into extrapolated trends and hypothetical scenarios (Carlsmith, 2022). In contrast, the latter possibility highlights the need for on-the-ground efforts that work with current governance institutions and use current systems as a prototype for more advanced ones (Cotra, 2021).

Emphasis on Policy Relevance Alignment research does not live in a vacuum but in an ecosystem (Drexler, 2019),³⁷ with participation from researchers, industry actors, governments, and non-governmental organizations. Research serving the needs of the AI alignment and safety ecosystem would therefore be useful. Such needs include solving the key barriers to various governance schemes, for example, extreme risk evaluations (Shevlane et al., 2023), infrastructure for computing governance (Shavit, 2023), and mechanisms for making verifiable claims about AI systems (Brundage et al., 2020).

Emphasis on Social Complexities and Moral Values As AI systems become increasingly integrated into society (Abbass, 2019), alignment ceases to be only a single-agent problem and becomes a social problem. Here, the meaning of *social* is three-fold.

- 1. Alignment research in multi-agent settings featuring the interactions between multiple AI systems and multiple humans (Critch and Krueger, 2020).
- 2. Incorporating human moral and social values into alignment (see §1.2.2 and §4.3), which is closely linked to the field of *machine ethics* and *value alignment* (Gabriel, 2020; Gabriel and Ghazavi, 2021).
- 3. Modeling and predicting the impacts of AI systems on society, which requires methods to approach the complexities of the social system, including those from the social sciences. Examples of potentially useful methodologies include social simulation (Bonabeau, 2002; De Marchi and Page, 2014; Park et al., 2023a) and game theory (Han and Pereira, 2019; Critch and Krueger, 2020).

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³⁷See aisafety.world for a map of the organizational landscape of alignment.

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