

Research Proposal

Introduction

On October 10, 1911, an armed uprising erupted in Wuhan, a city situated at the heart of China. This event subsequently marked the inception of a nationwide revolution that brought an end to the Chinese imperial era, which had lasted for over two-thousand years. Nevertheless, the revolution in 1911 was not the sole task faced by the last Chinese imperial dynasty, the Qing dynasty. Since 1840s, constant colonial wars took place between Qing and foreign powers. Qing's resistance, and concession in the following decades, to the colonial power led to many unpleasant results for the monarchy. In 1842, The long-standing policy of sea ban was subsequently terminated in five southeastern coastal cities, which were later known as the treaty ports, as one of a series of indemnity granted to Britain. Then, in the following century, the Late Qing China was heavily undermined by the concession to foreign power and the climax of social unrest reached in the years after 1895, the year when the empire and its people realized that how modernization had transformed their neighbor, Japan, to an inevitable threat. Subsequently, a group of reformers who called for nationalist rise up to the public, including who later became the "founding father" of modern China, Sun Yat-sen. Sun was initially accompanied by a group of activists who were named as the "Four Bandits" by the imperial government: Chan Siu-bak, Yau Lit, and Yrung Hok-Ling. Beyond these four individuals, more figures and parties emerged at the time to call for political transition and most of them had been characterized as southern intellectual elites (Wang 2011:41-43). The reason behind this identification is also straightforward, these reformists outside the government like the "Four Bandits", even including those who share similar reform impulse in the bureaucracy, mostly came and educated from southern coastal provinces like Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang.

Therefore, I intend to conduct this research to answer this the question: "why nationalist reformists and their initiated movement mostly appeared in southern provinces?" In other words, what was the uniqueness among southern provinces that distinguish them from the northern

provinces where gave birth to seldom nationalist reformists who dare to challenge the rule of monarchist state? Or what is the essential impetus for people to question the rulership and how can they be satisfied with a specific type of domination? More importantly, how such sentiment is related and thus be amplified by geographic variation?

In the following section of this research proposal, I will firstly present a literature review and my tentative theoretical framework. Afterwards, a preliminary data collection progress report will be mentioned following a preliminary regression test as well as the discussion upon adjustment plan for the next phase.

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

To experience the rule of the state is a common affair to the individuals across the world, in different levels or forms, and this is also not an uncommon topic to the academia. As Max Weber addressed, social actions that are bonded to social relationships may “be oriented by the actors to a belief in the existence of ‘legitimate order’” that is validated for many reasons (1947:124). Therefore, the rule, or the domination, of the state, in a modern sense, to its fellow people shall certainly follow a given validated order, constituting the essential element of the political landscape in a state. Exposure to such order can be the base for routinize the recognition of rulership, which is fundamental to the legitimacy of the rule of state. However, the interpretation on the “validity” of an order can varies among different communities or even by the same individual at distinctive time periods and thus conflicts over the justification or enforcement of the “order” may then appear (Weber 1947:126, 132). This is a way to understand the general pattern of how political violence could appear in society between different segments within it.

In my research, I seek to construct a theoretical framework based on this underlying logic that differentiated perception of the “order”, especially the existing “order” or status quo, is the source of conflict between actors within the society. In the case of late Qing dynasty, the most notable conflict, as the Xinhai revolution of 1911, appeared to include more radical and physically violent context and the competitors in the conflict were mainly the reformists and the monarchy (as well as the monarchists). Then, based on Weber’s statement, differentiated perception can rise among different communities, which implies that different communities may have unidentical standard in evaluating the social fact of order. The tasks here are then to target

which community at the time and what were their standards. Historically, Xinhai revolution and the preceding violent nationalist movements was commonly considered as the challenge to the conception of “Chinese-ness” and thus the “people” of China, and their “right”, which is the determinant to one’s political status in this country during the process of modernization (Karl 2002:53).

However, how shall we understand the idea of identity proposed here, and also the concept of “people” with assigned “right” specifically to resolve the tasks raised previously? In comparative social science study, scholars who specialized in the social solidarity and its political implication among modern states had argued that awareness of common national identity and thus to uphold a strong sense of belonging to a specific national community is a key prerequisite to the political development in the last centuries (Wimmer 2017:605). Studies had also shown that such sense of belonging would impose positive influence on issues like diminishing corruption, enhancing institutional performance, and even economic growth in macro-level (Miguel 2004:1). Therefore, this field of study, commonly perceived as the “nation-building”, well regards national unity in terms of the homogenous conception of shared identity and other sources of commonality as a crucial factor in establishing stable political environment in modern state system. Such conception then echoes to Weber’ theory as the “legitimate order” that stresses on the recognition upon it derives from various communities. Nevertheless, the sense of awareness here cannot be merely interpreted from the perspective of being a social-psychological proposition and thus to examine its effect on political stability. Rather, it is necessary to see how it was coded in consciousness. In other words, the task of nation-building study is not only the analysis of its outcome at the end but also the procedure of it in various environments, or mechanism.

Exchange Theory and Social Mobility

One particular theoretical approach to understand nation-building as a mechanism in the political development is the idea of exchange theory. As Charles Tilly discusses, cohesion in society is related to the trust network which is the interpersonal connections consist mainly of “set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes, or failures of others” (2005:11). The credits given to different people have their distinctive sources and commonality is one particular form. To be straightforward, people are more likely to trade or exchange with familiar individuals. The items for exchange are not

necessarily restricted to physical items or economic, and most importantly monetary, benefits, but rather a conformity as the social capital to the patron-clientelism in the individual-state relation. Tilly believes that the effect of producing social capital in trust network is to increase the capacity in dealing with collective tasks for a state (2005:26). The accumulation and transaction of social capital indicates the rising level of commitment. State would commit to ensure the provision of resources like public goods or prestige while individuals would commit to pledge loyalty to the state. Tilly also raises the point that in this process, fairness and justice matter for citizens to willingly believe in the reliability of state and other members of the state (2005:19). Thus, if the exchange in trust network happens to be biased when participants' community origin, or other standard of identification, varies, it would be likely to diminish the utility of the exchange action and the trust per se. As a result, according to Andreas Wimmer, discriminated-against group will be less likely to pledge their loyalty and thus their pride in national identification and even induce political instability (2017:610). For instance, in a democratic system, politicians who run for election may offer benefits in prospective policy decision to the constituencies. Politicians' reassertion to the promise after inauguration might then consolidate the support from the constituencies while failing to do so for the promise with a specific cluster of the affirmative voters can be the potential factor in reducing support from this cluster. Therefore, trust network and the exchange activity follow a pattern of reproduction of trust due to the accumulation of social capital.

In Wimmer's study of national pride and power configuration, he employs Tilly's theory in high-level trust network to present the model as below (2017:611):




Figure 1. Polity Model of Charles Tilly, by Andreas Wimmer

Wimmer's argues that high level of political representation, retaining sufficiently large amount of politics-related social capital (or political capital), indicates strong trust network between citizens and the state and thus form the sphere of polity (2017:610-611). Within the boundary of polity where senior partner and junior partner lie in, is where the most supportive advocates of the state exist. Meanwhile, staying outside the polity is not the indicator of none-exchange status between citizens and the state. Wimmer and Tilly's proposition shows that regional power, upheld by personnel in administrative divisions like province, can also obtain power granted from the state, or national government specifically but they wouldn't display equivalent concentration of loyalty to the state as members dominated within the polity. In addition, Wimmer also manages to use survey data to further support the above argument and discovers the pattern that the influence of political configuration in consolidating trust network is far more significant than commonly perceived factors like demographic size and linguistic heterogeneity of diverse ethnic communities (2017:633). Thus, this structure reflects the hierarchical structure in typical cases that regional government holds asymmetrical power compared to the central national government. The task for the state, especially for the modern nation state or traditional monarchist system that seeks to adopt modernization, to conduct successful nation-building program is how to raise the sense of conformity of citizens who are closer to the boundary of the state, as shown in the Figure 1.

The polity model then leads to my first hypothesis in the study of nationalist movements in Late Qing China:

Hypothesis 1: political underrepresentation leads to rising political instability, especially the nationalist reform impulse, between 1895-1911.

However, why nationalist particularly instead of other ethnic violence? A simple answer is that Xinhai revolution, as the one among many popular revolts by the time, was the most widespread while influential violent movement that fundamentally subverted the political institution of China and was essentially based upon nationalist discourse (Karl 2002:3).

Therefore, nationalist movement in Late Qing China can offer a valuable experience to how we shall regard and analyze the emergence of nationalism ideology, especially in the process of modernization at regions bear colonial influence, and how it was implemented in reality to form subversive reform momentum.

In the general theoretical framework, effective political representation and strong trust network is characterized by one's connection to the national government. One practical method to evaluate the political representation is then to examine who are serving in the national government. In China, there has been a longstanding centralized political system. China's model of politics was contrast to the Greek model of dialectical democracy but rather a hierarchical bureaucracy dedicated to the monarchist ideology while admitted potentiality in upward mobility for the common people (Ho 1964:1-2). Eventually, a system called *keju* exam, or imperial exam, was adopted. The idea of *keju* was to introduce a civil servant selection, and thus it is to certain extent similar to the contemporary civil service entrance exam. *Keju* exam took place routinely in each dynasty since Sui and Tang. It consists of a series of exam which was held from provincial-level to national-level. Eligible candidates who passed elementary level exam at provincial-level would acquire the title as *juren*. *Juren* will then be eligible to take intermediate level exam at the capital to retain the title as *gongshi*. If one is succeeded in retaining the *gongshi* title, this individual would be allowed to take the final exam at the palace to compete for the *jinshi* title, the highest rank in the *keju* exam. Each level of ranking indicates hierarchical criteria for bureaucratic appointment so that those who were *jinshi* will be more likely to be placed in superior position in the bureaucracy. Passing the elementary level exam can grant individuals the status as being a *shishen*, or "gentry", which is superior to others with only economic capital as the traditional Chinese society upheld cultural and social capital as more significant than being a successful businessman (Ho 1964:91-92). Therefore, in theory, recognized performance in *keju* exam can be the key for ordinary people to enter the polity of ancient China for acquiring scarce resources. Meanwhile, since the exam appeared to be possessing no barrier to the ordinary people so that such "order" shall be regarded with fairness quality.

However, this model of social mobility had long been a myth. The eligibility to the officialdom in ancient China was actually following a pattern of social reproduction. The materials tested in the exam were related to the ancient philosophical texts and the exam also requires candidates to write in mandarin Chinese, though many candidates came from regions

were used other regional vernacular Chinese dialects (Ho 1964:16). In reality, the cultural and linguistic education resources available were mostly accessed by limited number of families and student candidates with no prominent family background can be relatively more difficult to compete with candidates from noble families. Thus, although people from various status groups were able to compete for the upward mobility to the polity, their access to cultural capital that is necessary for the success in the exam was not fair. Statistically, among candidates who passed elementary level exam and became *juren*, the percentages of individuals within “whose immediate ancestors had commoner status for at least three generations before they passed the exam” were 53%, 49.5%, and 37.6 respectively during Song, Ming, Qing dynasty (Elman 1911:19). Not to mention the statistical results focused on immediate ancestors while included no collateral lines of relatives. Meanwhile, engaging in the merit transaction with the national government regularly in China can also push individuals to follow the empire’s intention to adopt “greater Chinese nationalism”, interpreting Chinese-ness beyond Han narrative, and thus be less likely to challenge the status quo from ethnic diversity perspective (Zhao 2006:22).

Therefore, how ordinary people were actually incorporated in the nation-building program of ancient China through *keju* was yet controversial and thus it offers a valuable topic for testing to analyze the nationalist movement in Late Qing China, to whom who might be outrageous for the reality of restrained upward mobility.

Borderland Politics and Diffusion Studies

In addition to the analysis of status of political representation presented by Tilly and Wimmer, their research also inspires me consider another issue: echoing to the previous discussion regarding the perception of “legitimate order”, what might be other factors that would add on the conception of the absence of fairness? With Late Qing China’s case, if the statistical results show that the social reproduction and restrained upward mobility had a longstanding history, why nationalist movement that challenged the *ancien regime* fundamentally only occurred by late 19th century but not before. Therefore, my strategy to dive into the variation of communities comparatively since the differentiation in perception of fairness is essentially related to the unidentical conditions of each community per se.

In 19th century, a prominent divergence of Chinese history compared to the past was the arrival at the colonial age. As mentioned previously, the First Opium War opened up this closed

empire and the influx of foreign capital and culture was enormous, if we can quantify. However, this didn't indicate that the influence of foreign material existed everywhere in China, same as the fact that urbanization and industrialization didn't occur everywhere in Europe or North America in 19th century. Existing research had long argued that the emergence of nationalism in China shall be considered in a global context since it's a reflection of global interconnected historical formation of nation and social transformation (Karl 2002:10). Therefore, if the ideological onset of Chinese nationalism was embedded in global context, its geographic onset may also be related to the global context, which is the place where witness the influx of foreign material. Specifically, these places were identical in China as being the city with treaty port and foreign concession. Foreign concession here refers to the land in China, usually appeared in urban area or close to the urban center, that was granted to the foreign power and was thus administrated by foreign institution, while treaty port indicates the city where were opened by treaty for trade, though not necessarily being coastal one (Johnstone 1937:942)(Nield 2015:2-3).

According to Benedict Anderson, nation is an "imagined community" for the evidence that many people in the same "national community" had never communicate to others from distant geographic region who shared the same identification (2006:6). Anderson's theory is to consider soft power like language and cultural root and how their diffusion contributed to the cohesion within the society. Following Anderson's effort, more studies emerge as to understand the operationalization of national cohesion and nation-building. For instance, Kenneth Bollen and Juan Diez Medrano used survey data in 1990s to test the sense of belonging in different regions of Spain and found out that regions with distinct cultural root while, more importantly, being more economically developed are more likely to respond negatively, like Basque and Catalonia (1998:608, 613). Theoretical overview on the border politics also argues for idea that population inhabit in borderland region has more chance to engage with foreign material and their transnational access may amplifies the diminishing boundary of cultural root and linguistic diversity (Braun and Kienitz 2022:307). Meanwhile, economic activity can also be more complex in borderland in both legitimate methods, like specialized trade zone, and illegal ones, like smuggle. World society theorists further postulate the statement that through witnessing the success of western model of modernization, nation-state template and modern nationalism had long become the standard format for political legitimacy, especially advocated by elites in distinct regions while being detached from the political center (Meyer et al. 1997:174-175)

(Wimmer 2021:1421-1422). In sum, these existing studies show that many variables would influence the sense of attachment to the society and the absence of sense of belonging particularly in borderland regions can even lead to questioning the legitimacy, or the “legitimate order” as mentioned, of the national government.

Hence, I would like to move on to propose the following set of hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2: Existence of treaty ports and foreign concession further promotes political instability, especially the nationalist reform impulse, between 1895-1911.

Hypothesis 2a: Regions with treaty ports or foreign concession are economically more developed than other regions between 1895-1911.

Hypothesis 2b: Regions that are economically more developed experienced more political instability, especially the nationalist reform impulse, between 1895-1911.

With the theoretical framework of borderland politics and disengagement in the national community, I intend to argue that treaty ports and foreign concession establishes new border, which contemporary studies haven't focused much, apart from the commonly studied land border or seashore. The most striking characteristics of the treaty ports and foreign concession is that they appeared in many prominent urban centers in China and thus shall impose substantial influence on the local population, especially the elites who are excluded from the polity and thus be more willing to challenge the monarchist template with nationalism. Moreover, I also seek to find out whether regions with treaty ports or foreign concession have direct relation to better economic performance and whether economic performance indeed contributes to nationalist sentiment in China.

Therefore, addressing the preceding two sets of hypotheses together, nationalist movement shall occur in regions where the local population was both political unrepresented in the political resource-exchange relation with the national government and bear more frequent engagement with global context of nationalism.

Data Pretest

To better support my argument, I intend to collect two categories of data: the geographic and socio-economic information of provinces and counties, biographical data of nationalist elites and bureaucratic elites. For the former one, I seek to use the information available in either primary source or secondary source and code them under a singular list with organized independent variables and variables. For the latter one, I want to examine quantitatively over the social network of nationalist elites, who were sought to emerge in borderland, and thus evaluating their actual pattern of rising to power and how they mobilize each other. Meanwhile, for bureaucratic elites as those who passed *keju* exam and entered polity of the Late Qing China, how they remained in trust network with the state whether their inclination can be change will also be the tasks waiting for being addressed.

At the early stage of this project, I've preliminarily gathered data relating to the foreign influence and political representation in provincial level. Based on existing studies, I code the history of existence of treaty ports and foreign concession in each province, as *tpy* and *concey*, with the notes on whether a province contain concession ceded to specific foreign country (Johnstone 1937:947-948) (Nield 2015:xxxi-xxxvi). In detail, these two variables are coded with continuous number, with "7" indicates the province had hosted the treaty port or foreign concession during 1840s, and "1" indicates the province only had their existence in 1900s. As for political representation, I use *jinshi* variable to record the amount of *jinshi* recognized from each province throughout the history of Qing dynasty (161-1905, 1905 was the year of cessation of *keju* exam) (Li 2005:65).

Provincial Models				
Dependent variable:				
	xinhai OLS			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>msprov</i>	0.804*** (0.121)		0.879*** (0.136)	
<i>costal</i>	-0.126 (0.130)		0.072 (0.193)	
<i>tpy</i>		-0.018 (0.049)	-0.049 (0.034)	
<i>concey</i>		0.041 (0.049)	-0.002 (0.029)	0.072 (0.195)
<i>conceah</i>				-0.245 (0.959)
<i>concebel</i>				
<i>concefr</i>				0.605 (0.602)
<i>conceger</i>				-0.064 (0.906)
<i>conceit</i>				0.459 (0.706)
<i>concejp</i>				0.175 (0.451)
<i>concerus</i>				-0.547 (0.408)
<i>conceuk</i>				-0.488 (0.890)
<i>conceus</i>				-0.851 (1.081)
Constant	0.238** (0.098)	0.604*** (0.189)	0.328** (0.114)	0.597*** (0.154)
Observations	22	22	22	22
R ²	0.701	0.037	0.736	0.388
Adjusted R ²	0.669	-0.064	0.674	-0.071
Residual Std. Error	0.283 (df = 19)	0.508 (df = 19)	0.281 (df = 17)	0.510 (df = 12)
F Statistic	22.225*** (df = 2; 19)	0.365 (df = 2; 19)	11.854*** (df = 4; 17)	0.845 (df = 9; 12)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 2. Preliminary Test of Provincial Data

In Table 2, I use *xinhai* as the independent variable that represents whether a province responded successfully to the Xinhai revolution. For “successful response”, my standard is that a province shall be de facto independent from the empire while upholding its own revolutionary government (Xinhai map !!). Provinces that fulfill this standard are assigned with “1” and the other provinces are assigned with “0”. Then, based on the data I’ve collected at this stage, I use geographic determinants like *msprov*, whether or not the province locates in central or south China (including eastern provinces like Jiangsu and Zhejiang), and *coastal*, whether or not the province is coastal region. In addition, I also include the variables relate to foreign engagement. As discussed previously, in hypothesis, foreign exposure where shall impose positive influence

on the nationalist sentiment and thus induce radical anti-monarchist nationalist movement. Therefore, the longer the institutional foreign existence existed, the more influence local community might experience.

Nevertheless, the result from the initial provincial models does not echo to my anticipation. Although, in model 1, geographic location presents a statistically significant relation in promoting nationalist movement impulse, it lacks explanatory capacity to respond to the inquiry of the mechanism behind the provocation of nationalist movement impulse. Thus, in model 2 and 3, I test and combine the variables regarding foreign engagement to examine preliminarily how the influence of foreign power's existence would escalate nationalist movement. However, the result shows that both variables of foreign engagement are not statically significant while they even appeared to diminish the potentiality of revolutionary impulse. In model 4, I test how the existence of specific country's foreign concession may impose differentiated impact on nationalism emergence, but the test results also show no sign of significance.

Adjusted Provincial Models				
	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	xinhai OLS			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
msprov	0.411** (0.148)		0.291* (0.157)	
costal	0.175 (0.158)		-0.047 (0.224)	
tpy		0.004 (0.033)	0.001 (0.039)	0.005 (0.007)
concey		0.080** (0.033)	0.069* (0.034)	0.061** (0.024)
conceah				0.360*** (0.116)
concebel				
concefr				1.005*** (0.074)
conceger				-0.032 (0.113)
conceit				1.021*** (0.088)
concejp				0.309*** (0.060)
concerus				-0.201*** (0.049)
conceuk				-0.429*** (0.118)
conceus				-2.375*** (0.134)
Constant	-0.052 (0.119)	0.010 (0.128)	-0.092 (0.132)	0.004 (0.025)
Observations	22	22	22	22
R ²	0.325	0.332	0.462	0.988
Adjusted R ²	0.254	0.262	0.335	0.977
Residual Std. Error	0.346 (df = 19)	0.344 (df = 19)	0.326 (df = 17)	0.061 (df = 11)
F Statistic	4.571** (df = 2; 19)	4.721** (df = 2; 19)	3.647** (df = 4; 17)	89.672*** (df = 10; 11)
<i>Note:</i>			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 3. Preliminary Test of Adjusted Provincial Data

Based on the test of Table 2, I assume that the binary indicator of Xinhai revolution response but has less statistical power and thus adjust it to include a “0.5” value. Within few months after the revolution, each province in China that were independent established their own provincial government. However, not all governments were controlled by nationalist revolutionary as some of them were ruled completely by old bureaucratic elites or had coalition government between

these two groups. Thus, I use “0.5” value to indicate the status of coalition government and “1” for provinces with revolutionary domination (Wang 2011: 42-44). Then, “0” indicates the absence of revolutionary elites in the government.

The test result is displayed in Table 3, with a significant change that especially appear among *concey*. In model 2-4, following the method tested in Table 1, foreign concession indeed exerted great influence in the nationalist movement

Political Representation Models		
	Dependent variable:	
	xinhai	
	OLS	
	(1)	(2)
msprov		0.429** (0.155)
costal		0.306 (0.195)
jinshi	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.014 (0.012)
Constant	0.266 (0.173)	0.067 (0.168)
Observations	21	21
R ²	0.002	0.366
Adjusted R ²	-0.051	0.255
Residual Std. Error	0.417 (df = 19)	0.351 (df = 17)
F Statistic	0.035 (df = 1; 19)	3.277** (df = 3; 17)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 4. Preliminary Test of Provincial Political Representation Data

In Table 4, I move beyond to the key inquiry of this project, to understand how political representation affects regional sentiment on nationalist movement. The political representation model 1 indicates that with increasing amount of *jinshi* (every 100) alone the Qing dynasty, provinces would be less likely to respond to the Xinhai revolution. However, both the low R-square value and the fact of the coefficient as being non-statistically significant point out the crucial shortcoming of this model in being unpersuasive. Subsequently, I then include geographic variables addressed previously to see whether incorporating more variables would

solve potential endogeneity issues. In result, although we can see an obvious increase of R-square from 0.002 to 0.366, *jinshi* variable remains non-statistically significant, but its coefficient appears to indicate more influence on the revolutionary impulse that would support the argument.

Regarding the biographical data, I've managed to access to the membership list and brief description of Sun Yat-sen's first nationalist party, the Reviving China Party. However, the dataset would require further adjustment especially over the indicator of social network, which I intend to explore the more detailed mobilization pattern after the initial onset of nationalist sentiment among regional elites.

Discussion

For all sets of models listed above, there are undoubtedly vast rooms for improvement. A fundamental factor that led to the low statistical power might be the limited amount of sample. At this stage, my sample used is based on all established provincial-level administrative units that were composed of 22 cases. In political representation models, the sample size even drops by one due to the missing information of Xinjiang from my source, which is secondary since the more comprehensive dataset on imperial examination candidates is still in progress. Thus, a solution to this issue is that the sample collection can be diverted from provincial level to lower-level administrative units like *dao* and *fu*, which the raw data has also mentioned, and thus the increasing sample size may help to enhance the generalizability while diminishing excessed potentiality in random variability. For instance, there had been scholars like Yan Hongzhong and Wei Xin who collected biographical data of bureaucrats served in *fu*-level district, the third-level administrative unit, between 1900-1911 and allocate each case to their location of service, combining with other variables, for testing the causal relation with response to Xinhai Revolution (2017:126). They also used variables like “whether a *fu* was a treaty port” and “whether a *fu* was coastal”. Their results then displayed the fact that treaty port exhibits strong while statistically significant utility in nurturing nationalist revolution tendency. Thus, adjusting the sample size through reinterpreting the observed objects might be the method to optimize the test result. In addition, the independent variable tested might also be insufficient to display regional variation in nationalist sentiment. A solution to this issue is to try new dependent

variables that include discrete data like number of revolts or nationalist organizations in a specific time span to reflect the local nationalist sentiment or political instability.

Finally, more variables that respond to the theoretical framework and more well-designed models would surely need to be included. The tentative future plan for data collection is listed as following:

Dependent Variables

Number of revolts	(small / medium / large / nationalist revolt)
Number of nationalist organizations	
Xinhai revolution response	

Independent Variables

Geography	(distance to the capital, coastal)
Economic development	(trade value, taxation)
Population	
Literacy	(linguistic diversity, literacy rate)
Foreign engagement	(treaty port trade value/size/age, foreign concession size/age, foreign population, foreign printing industry)
Number of schools	(traditional school, western-model school)
War experience	(interstate war, intrastate war – Taiping Rebellion)
Political representation	(amount of jinshi (1645-1905)/(1840-1905)/(1895-1905))

Table 5. Data Collection Plan

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