


# The graph of transactions in the IOTA cryptocurrency


Quentin Bramas [bramas@unistra.fr](mailto:bramas@unistra.fr)

Jun, 20<sup>th</sup>, 2018, Clermont-Ferrand

# Talk Chain




Data is distributed :




Data is distributed :

- ▷ no single point of failure




Data is distributed :

- ▶ no single point of failure
- ▶ no central Authority



Data is distributed :


- ▶ no single point of failure
- ▶ no central Authority
- ▶ no need to trust the others




Data is distributed :

- ▶ no single point of failure
- ▶ no central Authority
- ▶ no need to trust the others


I want to add some data



Blockchain:




Blockchain:



Basic principle of the Bitcoin Protocol :


Blockchain:



Basic principle of the Bitcoin Protocol :

- Choose randomly one node

Blockchain:




Basic principle of the Bitcoin Protocol :

- Choose randomly one node

The more computing power, the more chance you have to be selected

Blockchain:



Basic principle of the Bitcoin Protocol :

- Choose randomly one node
- This node decides what to write in the Blockchain

The more computing power, the more chance you have to be selected

Introduction



The Tangle

## Problem

It does not scale


Introduction



The Tangle

## Problem

It does not scale



## The Tangle (IOTA)




## The Tangle (IOTA)


Each transaction is a small block that reference two previous ones



## The Tangle (IOTA)


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## The Tangle (IOTA)

Each transaction is a small block that reference two previous ones




You come up with a DAG  
(Directed Acyclic Graph)




## The Tangle (IOTA)

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
You come up with a DAG  
(Directed Acyclic Graph)

You're only limited by bandwidth and storage



## The Tangle (IOTA)

Each transaction is a small block that reference two previous ones




## The Tangle

Unconfirmed Transactions

# The Tangle (IOTA)


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


## The Tangle (IOTA)

Each transaction is a small block that reference two previous ones





A new site and its parents should not create conflicts.



## The Tangle (IOTA)

How to read a value?







## The Tangle (IOTA)

How to read a value?

If you take a tip, you can order transactions and do the same as in a blockchain






## The Tangle (IOTA)


How to read a value?


What if tips are conflicting?






## The Tangle (IOTA)






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


Tip Selection Algorithm (TSA):

- so we know how to read values
- so we know where to extend the Tangle



## The Tangle (IOTA)



Tip Selection Algorithm (TSA):

- so we know how to read values
- so we know where to extend the Tangle

In Bitcoin, we read values from, and we try to extend, the longest chain. If you don't follow this, you'll lose money.



## The Tangle (IOTA)

In the Tangle, forks are ok if not conflicting



## The Tangle (IOTA)

In the Tangle, forks are ok if not conflicting


But conflicting forks are worst in this case



## The Tangle (IOTA)

In the Tangle, forks are ok if not conflicting

But conflicting forks are worst in this case






## The Tangle (IOTA)


In the Tangle, forks are ok if not conflicting

So its better to have something like this






## The Tangle (IOTA)





## The Tangle (IOTA)


Should be chosen with higher probability





## The Tangle (IOTA)

Compute cumulative weight to each site




## The Tangle

Unconfirmed Transactions

# The Tangle (IOTA)

Compute cumulative weight to each site




## The Tangle

Unconfirmed Transactions

# The Tangle (IOTA)


Compute cumulative weight to each site  
Perform a random walk






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
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




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
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




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
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




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
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
Compute cumulative weight to each site

Perform a random walk

Transition function:

$$P(A \rightsquigarrow B) = \frac{f(\Delta_{A,B})}{f(\Delta_{A,B}) + f(\Delta_{A,C})}$$






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
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MCMC


$$f(\Delta) = e^{-\alpha \Delta}$$



## The Tangle (IOTA)

Compute cumulative weight to each site  
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
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
$$f(\Delta) = \Delta^{-\alpha}$$

gle



How many tips are left behind ?

gle



## How many tips are left behind ?

How many tips over the time ?


ngle

Unconfirmed Transactions

Parasite Chain Attack

## How many tips are left behind ?

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
gle

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
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
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
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


gle



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
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How many tips are left behind ?

- theoretical analysis, assuming random tip selection

gle



How many tips are left behind ?

- theoretical analysis, assuming random tip selection
- by simulation, for other tip selection


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Unconfirmed Transactions

Parasite Chain Attack

## Theoretical analysis, assuming random tip selection

Discrete time model. At each round: Poisson( $\lambda$ ) new sites




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Unconfirmed Transactions

Parasite Chain Attack

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
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
Unconfirmed Transactions

Parasite Chain Attack

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
Theoretical analysis, assuming random tip selection

Tangle

Unconfirmed Transactions

Necessary Security Assumptions

Theoretical analysis, assuming random tip selection



Tangle

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


Tangle

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


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


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Necessary Security Assu

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


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



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
Unconfirmed Transactions

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Theoretical analysis, assuming random tip selection







$$P_N \xrightarrow{k} N' =$$



$$P_N \xrightarrow{k} N' =$$

# outcomes





$P_N \xrightarrow{k} N' =$

Probability of 1 outcome      # outcomes

A handwritten equation  $P_N \xrightarrow{k} N' =$  is shown. Above it, a curved arrow points from the text "Probability of 1 outcome" to the "P" in  $P_N$ . Another curved arrow points from the text "# outcomes" to the " $\xrightarrow{k}$ " symbol.

Tangle

Unconfirmed Transactions

Necessary Security Assumptions

$$P_{N \rightarrow N'} = \frac{\text{Probability of 1 outcome}}{\# \text{ outcomes}}$$
$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 2^k \\ N - N' - k \end{array} \right.$$

Tangle

Unconfirmed Transactions

Necessary Security Assumptions

$$P_{N \rightarrow N'} = \frac{\text{Probability of 1 outcome}}{\#\text{ outcomes}}$$
$$\binom{2k}{N-N'-k}$$

partition  $2k$  in  
 $N-N'-k$  subsets.

Tangle

Unconfirmed Transactions

Necessary Security Assumptions

$$P_{N \rightarrow N'} = \frac{N!}{(N'-k)!} \cdot \frac{2^k}{\binom{N-N'-k}{2k}}$$

Probability of 1 outcome

# outcomes

partition  $2^k$  in  $\binom{N-N'-k}{2k}$  subsets.

Tangle

Unconfirmed Transactions

Necessary Security Assumptions

$$P_{N \rightarrow N'} = \frac{N!}{(N'-k)!} \cdot \binom{2k}{N-N'-k}$$

Probability of 1 outcome

# outcomes

$P_{N \rightarrow N'} =$

distribute those subsets in the  $N$  tips

partition  $2k$  in  $N-N'-k$  subsets.

Tangle

Unconfirmed Transactions

Necessary Security Assumptions

$$P_{N \rightarrow N'} = \frac{1}{N^{2k}} \frac{N!}{(N'-k)!} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 2k \\ N-N'-k \end{array} \right\}$$

Probability of 1 outcome

# outcomes

$\nearrow$

distribute those subsets in the  $N$  tips

$\nearrow$


partition  $2k$  in  $N-N'-k$  subsets.

Tangle

Unconfirmed Transactions

Necessary Security Assumptions

$$k \sim \text{Pois}(\lambda)$$




Tangle

Unconfirmed Transactions

Necessary Security Assumptions

$$k \sim \text{Pois}(\lambda)$$




Tangle

Unconfirmed Transactions

Necessary Security Assumptions

$$k \sim \text{Pois}(\lambda)$$



Tangle

Unconfirmed Transactions

Necessary Security Assumptions

$$\sum_k P(Pois(\lambda)=k) P_{N \xrightarrow{k} N'}$$




Tangle

Unconfirmed Transactions

Necessary Security Assumptions


Stationary distribution for different values of  $\lambda$




Tangle

Unconfirmed Transactions

Necessary Security Assumptions



gle




By simulation, for other tip selection

ngle

Unconfirmed Transactions

Parasite Chain Attack

By simulation, for other tip selection





gle


Unconfirmed Transactions

Parasite Chain Attack


By simulation, for other tip selection








## Double Spending Attack




## Double Spending Attack

- ▶ Alice send 10 IOTA to Bob for a sandwich




## Double Spending Attack

- ▶ Alice send 10 IOTA to Bob for a sandwich
- ▶ Bob waits to see the transaction in the Tangle




## Double Spending Attack

- ▶ Alice sends 10 IOTA to Bob for a sandwich
- ▶ Bob waits to see the transaction in the Tangle
- ▶ Bob gives Alice the sandwich



## Double Spending Attack

- ▶ Alice sends 10 IOTA to Bob for a sandwich
- ▶ Bob waits to see the transaction in the Tangle
- ▶ Bob gives Alice the sandwich
- ▶ Alice generates a lot of transactions so that her first transaction is discarded



## Double Spending Attack


- ▶ Alice sends 10 IOTA to Bob for a sandwich
- ▶ Bob waits to see the transaction in the Tangle
- ▶ Bob gives Alice the sandwich
- ▶ Alice generates a lot of transactions so that her first transaction is discarded
- ▶ Alice eats the sandwich

imed Transactions

Parasite Chain Attack

Conclusion

## The parasite chain attack




imed Transactions

Parasite Chain Attack

Conclusion

## The parasite chain attack




imed Transactions

Parasite Chain Attack

Conclusion

## The parasite chain attack





imed Transactions


Parasite Chain Attack

Conclusion


## The parasite chain attack







## Theoretical analysis



Theoretical analysis


Simulations

Valid Transactions

Parasite Chain Attack

Conclusion

## Theoretical analysis




Valid Transactions

Parasite Chain Attack

Conclusion

## Theoretical analysis





Valid Transactions

Parasite Chain Attack

Conclusion

## Theoretical analysis






## Theoretical analysis

### Theorem


An attack is possible if  
hashing power of the adversary  $>$  hashing power used by the all nodes.

### Corollary

An attack is possible if  
hashing power of the adversary  $>$  hashing power of the all nodes  
if all the honest nodes constantly  
generates new sites



# By simulation




How many red site so that:

$$P(TSA(g) \in \text{parasite}) \geq \frac{1}{2}$$

imed Transactions

## Parasite Chain Attack

Conclusion



ite Chain Attack

Conclusion

## Conclusion

ite Chain Attack

Conclusion

## Conclusion

The Tangle (*Theoretical Protocol*) : Security based on PoW  
IOTA (*Current Implementation*) : Central coordinator

ite Chain Attack

Conclusion

## Conclusion

The Tangle (*Theoretical Protocol*) : Security based on PoW  
IOTA (*Current Implementation*) : Central coordinator

How to attach the parasite chain?

ite Chain Attack

Conclusion

## Conclusion

The Tangle (*Theoretical Protocol*) : Security based on PoW  
IOTA (*Current Implementation*) : Central coordinator

How to attach the parasite chain?

Number of tips      ?      Resistance to parasite chain attack