

# Causal manipulation of early noise biases numerosity judgements towards adaptive prior means








Brenden Eum \*slides

Antonio Rangel


Michael Woodford

RNL Lab Meeting - SDN Proseminar

# Choices exhibit randomness




# Modeling randomness: Softmax



Glascher, Daw, Dayan, and O'Doherty (2010)


# Modeling randomness: Random utility models

$$U = V(X; \beta) + \epsilon$$



Walker and Ben-Akiva (2002)




# Modeling randomness: Drift-Diffusion-Model



Forstmann, Ratcliff, and Wagenmakers (2016)


# “Late” noise

Noise is added at the time of decision making.




+

Guess how many blue dots there are on each of the following screens.
















54


Is noise entering into the decision-making process solely at the late stage?

Where else might it be entering at?


# “Early” noise

Noise is added at the time of stimulus encoding.

*high-noise stimulus*



Wei and Stocker (2012)




Newsome, Britten, and Movshon (1989)

“Can you do Addition?” the White Queen asked. “What’s one and one and one and one and one and one and one and one and one and one and one?”  
“I don’t know,” said Alice. “I lost count.”  
“She can’t do Addition,” the Red Queen interrupted.

Quote from *Through the Looking Glass* by Lewis Carroll  
Example from *The Number Sense: How the Mind Creates Mathematics* by Stanislas Dehaene




# Encoding-decoding models



Wei and Stocker (2017)

# Encoding-decoding models




Polania, Woodford, and Ruff (2019), with edits

# Model Class 1: Stable naturalistic priors

In perception: Olshausen and Field (1996); Simoncelli and Olshausen (2001); Olshausen and Field (2004); Geisler (2011); Girshick, Landy, and Simoncelli (2011)

In numerosity perception: Dehaene (1997); Cheyette and Piantadosi (2020)



# Model Class 1: Stable naturalistic priors

In perception: Olshausen and Field (1996); Simoncelli and Olshausen (2001); Olshausen and Field (2004); Geisler (2011); Girshick, Landy, and Simoncelli (2011)

In numerosity perception: Dehaene (1997); **Cheyette and Piantadosi (2020) [CP (2020)]**

How often is numerosity  $x$  encountered and represented follows a power law:  $P(x) \propto \frac{1}{x^2}$  (Piantadosi and Cantlon 2017)

# CP (2020): Efficient encoding

$Q(r|x)$  is the probability that observed numerosity  $x$  is represented internally with quantity  $r$ .

Optimize:  $Q(r|x)$  is chosen to minimize expected squared error between  $r$  and  $x$ .

$$E[(x - r)^2] = \sum_x P(x) \sum_r Q(r|x)(x - r)^2$$

Cost: KL divergence between natural prior and likelihood.

$$D_{KL}[P(x)||Q(r|x)] \leq \min(B, Rt)$$

# CP (2020): Decoding


Analytical solution:

$$Q(r|x) \propto P(r) \exp \left( - \left( \frac{P(x)}{\lambda_x} \right) (x - r)^2 \right)$$




which ends up **looking like a weighted Gaussian** with variance  $\frac{\lambda_x}{2P(x)}$ .

\* Because  $P(x)$  follows a decreasing power law, this variance grows in  $x$ .

# CP (2020)




# CP (2020)






# CP (2020)



# Model Class 2: Efficient coding, Bayesian decoding (ECBD)

## Why can't the prior adapt to different contexts?

[Prat-Carrabin et al. (2021), **Prat-Carrabin and Woodford (2022)**]



# ECBD: Efficient coding

Remember  $x$  is the numerosity,  $r$  is its representation.

$r = (r_1, \dots, r_n)$  where  $\forall i, r_i \sim p(r_i|x)$ .

Optimize the amount of information your representation carries about the true magnitude by minimizing expected error...

$$\min \int \hat{P}(x) I(r|x)^{-\frac{\rho}{2}} dx$$

Subject to a bound on informativeness...

$$\int \sqrt{I(r|x)} dx \leq B$$

# ECBD: Bayesian decoding


The optimal Fisher information:

$$I^*(r|x) \propto \hat{P}(x)^{\frac{2}{\rho+1}}$$


If  $\frac{d}{dx} \hat{P}(x) > 0$ , then  $\frac{d}{dx} \text{bias}(x) < 0$ .

The approximate distribution of estimates: If  $\frac{d}{dx} \hat{P}(x) < 0$ , then  $\frac{d}{dx} \text{bias}(x) > 0$ .


$$\hat{x}(r) \sim N\left(x + \underbrace{f\left(\frac{d}{dx} \frac{1}{I^*(r|x)}\right)}_{\text{bias}}, \underbrace{\frac{1}{I^*(r|x)}}_{\text{noise}}\right)$$



# ECBD




$\approx$




Prat-Carrabin and Woodford (2022)


# ECBD



It looks like people are adapting their priors to the context, not just using stable naturalistic priors.



$\approx$



Prat-Carrabin and Woodford (2022)

# ECBD: (Over)simplified Bayesian decoding

If...

$$\text{Prior: } x \sim N\left(\mu, \frac{1}{p_x}\right) \quad \text{Representation: } r \sim N\left(x, \frac{1}{p_r}\right)$$

Then the posterior is...



$$\hat{x}(r) \sim N\left(\mu + \beta(r - \mu), \frac{\beta^2}{p_r}\right)$$

$$\text{where } \beta = \frac{p_r}{p_x + p_r}$$

see Woodford (2020) for detailed explanation

# Simple ECBD



Fix  $x = 2.2$ ,  $\mu = 2$ ,  $p_x = 1$ .








# Simple ECBD


Fix  $x = 2.2$ ,  $\mu = 2$ ,  $p_x = 1$ .



# ECBD vs. Stable naturalistic priors



# ECBD vs. Stable naturalistic priors



So which is it?



# Task

100 trials

**B**

100 trials

**R**

100 trials


**B**

100 trials


**R**

+

Fixation  
1500 ms



Stimulus  
 $t$  ms



Mask  
100 ms

Response  
 $\leq 2000$  ms

$t \in \{100, 300, 500, 750, 1000, 3000\}$

90 trials: 54-46

10 trials: 80-20



# Precommitment to high quality data

Drop if...

- Accuracy on “sanity check” trials is  $<90\%$ .



# Results

# Quality check





Dropped 1 out of 10 total subjects.

# Basic psychometrics











# Response time







# Effects of signal precision on estimates



# Quick note (\*\*TAKE THIS OUT FOR ACTUAL TALKS)



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


# Take-aways from pilot study

1. We should be focused on looking at average variance over stimulus duration as our test between competing classes of models, not average estimate.
2. We should be focusing on shorter stimulus durations, perhaps based on the times from CP (2020) (40, 80, 160, 320, 640, 1280 ms).
3. How can we check if 54-46 dot splits are a reasonable amount of difficulty? Average estimates do look like they're properly separating in stimulus duration.





Why does any of this matter?

# Range normalization for value neurons



Padoa-Schioppa (2009)

# Risk aversion results from perceptual bias





Khaw, Li, and Woodford (2021)

Frydman and Jin (2022)




# Under- and over-reaction in probabilistic inference





Prat-Carrabin and Woodford (2022, wp)

# Non-linear weighting of numbers in an average



Prat-Carrabin and Woodford (2022, Nat Hum Behav)

# Choice variability in in value-based choice



Polania, Woodford, and Ruff (2019)