# Proper Names as a Referential Option in English Conversation[1]

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Curiously, in light of their frequency, proper names have gone largely unremarked in the literature on referential choice. With rare exceptions,[2] published work on these forms has concentrated on their semantic peculiarities or their role as address forms; their place in the system for formulating reference has received virtually no attention. This paper, which is based on English conversational data,[3] should be seen as an initial attempt to remedy this gap in our understanding of the array of the referential options available to speakers of English. In it I discuss several cognitive, social, and discourse-structural factors which affect the use of proper names for human referents in conversation, and I propose that, in order to adequately characterize the use of these forms, we must take into account interactional considerations, in particular the speaker's representation of the referent relative to the "territories of information" (Kamio 1994) of the speaker and addressee(s). In many instances, I argue, the choice between proper names and other referential options may hinge on the speaker's desire to present a particular stance relative to the topic of talk and/or to manipulate the interactional options of the conversational participants. Referential choice is thus seen as being constrained by the demands of the larger social agendas instantiated in conversational talk; without considering such factors, it is claimed, it will be impossible to fully specify the structure of the set of referential options to which proper names belong.

## 1. The Preference for Recognitionals and the Use of Proper Names

In a very brief but seminal paper published in 1979, Sacks and Schegloff proposed two "preferences" governing reference to persons in conversation. The first of these is a preference for "minimization". Although Sacks and Schegloff's wording here ("a single reference form") is unclear, what they seem to have in mind (Schegloff, p.c.) is a preference for reference forms which are produced by a single speaker "in one shot", typically under a single intonation contour, as opposed to forms produced in successive installments. Since this preference can be satisfied by a wide range of referential forms, including proper names, it is of little significance for the current discussion.

The second preference outlined by Sacks and Schegloff is a preference for "recipient designed" referential forms of the sort they dub "recognitionals", i.e. "such reference forms as invite and allow a recipient to find, from some 'this-referrer's-use-of-a-reference-form' on some 'this-occasion-of-use,' who, that recipient knows,[4] is being referred to" (Sacks and Schegloff 1979: 17). In other words, there is a preference for forms which make it clear to the recipient that the speaker thinks the recipient already knows the referent in question, and which allow the recipient to identify that familiar referent. According to Sacks and Schegloff, these forms will be used "[i]f recipient may be supposed by speaker to know the one being referred to, and if recipient may suppose speaker to have so supposed."[5]

The strength of the preference for recognitionals can be seen, Sacks and Schegloff argue, in the fact that they are used as a first resort even when the speaker is not absolutely certain whether the addressee can identify the referent or not. In such cases, the attempted recognitional may initially be coupled with an intonational try marker, as in example (1), and followed by successive "clues" if necessitated by an apparent lack of recognition on the part of the addressee.

(1) (from Sacks & Schegloff 1979: 19)
A: ... well I was the only one other than than the uhm tch <u>Fords</u>?, Uh Mrs. Holmes Ford? You know uh //the the cellist?
B: Oh yes. She's she's the cellist.
A: Yes
B: <u>ye//s</u>
A: Well she and her husband were there.

Even a cursory examination of conversational transcripts easily confirms Sacks and Schegloff's claim that conversationalists exhibit a preference for recognitionals. Interestingly, however, example (1) and all the others that Sacks and Schegloff cite in support of the preference involve proper names; in fact, their argument rests entirely on the demonstrated preference for names. This coincidence naturally leads us to ask whether proper names hold some special status *within* the elite ranks of the recognitionals, or whether a preference for names operates independently of the preference for recognitionals. To answer these questions, it is necessary to consider the degree of overlap between the two categories. As example (1) demonstrates, proper names can clearly act as recognitionals in some circumstances. It is not immediately obvious, however, whether they *must* act as recognitionals, i.e. whether they are usable *only* in circumstances where the speaker thinks that the recipient is already familiar with the intended referent and likely to be able to identify that referent on the basis of the name.

## 1.1. Proper names and the cognitive status of the referent

In considering this question, we enter the well-worn territory of the relationship between the choice of reference form and the "cognitive status" of the referent in the mind of the addressee. For a useful taxonomy of the cognitive possibilities, we can rely one of the most recent, and most comprehensive, discussions of the relation between linguistic form and cognitive status, Lambrecht (1994). Lambrecht proposes that discourse referents are most insightfully categorized in terms of two dimensions relative to the addressee: the addressee's knowledge state regarding the referent (its "identifiability"), and the referent's current representation in the addressee's consciousness (its "activation" level).

Following earlier work by Chafe (Chafe 1976, 1987), Lambrecht (1994: 76) distinguishes "identifiable" referents from those which are not identifiable on the basis of "the speaker's assessment of whether a discourse representation of a particular referent is already stored in the hearer's mind or not." In other words, "identifiable" referents are those which in Sacks and Schegloff's terms have the potential to be referred to by means of a recognitional expresssion. If, in the speaker's judgement, the addressee is able to pick out the referent "from among all those which can be designated with a particular linguistic expression and identify it as the one which the speaker has in mind" (Lambrecht 1994: 77), the referent may be linguistically marked as identifiable. Such marking may be appropriate even in cases where the addressee is judged to know *only* the name of the referent — in-depth familiarity with it is not required.

With respect to the second cognitive dimension, degree of activation, Lambrecht again follows Chafe, recognizing three distinct statuses:[6] "active", "accessible/semi-active", and "inactive":

> An active concept is one that is currently lit up, a concept in a person's focus of consciousness. A semi-active concept is one that is in a person's peripheral consciousness, a concept of which a person has a background awareness, but which is not being directly focused on. An inactive concept is one that is currently in a person's long-term memory, neither focally nor peripherally active. (Chafe 1987: 25)

An identifiable referent may thus be in any of these three activation states at the time of talk.[7]

It is apparent that the activation status of a referent has little impact on the speaker's ability to use a proper name to refer to it. At the one extreme, the referent may be inactive, as in example (1), above; at the other, it may be active, as in example (2), where *Kerin* is actually used to refer to one of the participants in the conversation.[8]

(2) SN-4: 556
K: One a'these nights we gotta go swim la:ps.
(°Too narrow.)
M: (°Dinero.)
(0.3)
S: (Pt.) Kerin's been saying that fer two ye//ars while she's
→ // lived here.]

By contrast, the relationship between proper name usage and the other cognitive dimension distinguished by Lambrecht, identifibiality, is more significant, although it may initially be obscured if we include in our analysis all of the myriad sorts of forms which include proper names. The rubric "proper names" can be taken to cover a wide territory, including (a) bare first names, last names, nicknames, kinterms (e.g. *Mom*), first and last name combinations, and title plus first and/or nickname and/or last name combinations; (b) proper names accompanied by various sorts of articles, modifiers, and appositives; and (c) proper names embedded in noun phrases headed by common names.

If we consider this entire group, it will be impossible to make any claims about the correlation with identifiability. On the other hand, if we concentrate on just the bare proper name types included in group (a), we find that, in my conversational data, these names are typically restricted to use with identifiable referents. This tendency is consistent with Givón's broader claim (1984: 402) that "a name clues the speaker to search for the identity of a definite within the permanent file."

There are, I believe, several sorts of evidence that conversationalists generally use bare proper names only with respect to referents that they assume to be identifiable for their addressees.[9] First, some quantitative evidence. Although it is not always easy or even possible to assess the cognitive status of a given referent at a given point in a conversation, my data include a number of conversations that were recorded as part of a larger study on the expression of evidentiality in English conversation. For this study, eight female undergraduates were asked to watch edited episodes from the soap opera *Days of Our Lives*. After viewing the videotape, each subject was paired with a second subject, who had seen a tape of a different episode. The subjects were told that each had seen a different videotape, but they were not informed that each had seen a different episode *of the same soap opera*. They were told that each was to fill the other in on "what had happened" in her tape, so that afterwards each could tell an independent interviewer what had happened in *both* videotapes. These pairs of subjects were given as long as they needed to exchange information; their conversations, which were up to 37 minutes in length, were audiotaped. Afterwards, one subject was introduced to a female interviewer who claimed to have seen both tapes in advance; the other was introduced to an interviewer who claimed to be completely naive. In both cases they were asked to relate to the interviewer what had happened in both of the videotapes, and the interviews were audiotaped.

The project was set up in this way for several reasons. Since we were primarily interested in the ways in which speakers would demonstrate their degree and source of knowledge for particular claims, we wanted to be sure that we would be able to accurately assess their knowledge about the topics they were discussing. This we ensured by choosing subjects who claimed to never have watched *Days of Our Lives*; all of their knowledge about the content of the videotape was thus presumably derived from viewing the episode which we gave them to watch. We were also interested in the ways in which these speakers would modify their presentation depending on the assumed knowledge state of their interlocutor. Because of the way in which the sessions were set up, each subject *began* her conversation with her partner assuming that she was sole authority on the content of the videotape she had seen. At some point in the conversation, it dawned on each subject that her interlocutor also had some information that had a bearing on the content of her own videotape. The conversations thus evolved eventually into collaborations to piece together the entire story on the basis of the contributions each speaker could make, having seen just a single episode, and each conversation contained turning points in each speaker's assessment of her interlocutor's knowledge state. Pairing each subject with either a "naive" or an "expert" interviewer after the initial conversation allowed us to gather additional information about the effects of assumptions regarding hearer knowledge on the speaker's decisions about how to present a "constant" body of knowledge.

Using the data from these conversationalists, whose knowledge states and whose assumptions about the knowledge states of their interlocutors had been experimentally manipulated, I found that when bare proper names were used, the referent in question appeared to be "identifiable" in a full 983/987 of the cases.

A second piece of evidence that conversationalists reserve bare proper names for "identifiable" referents comes from the behavior of speakers who are unsure of the identifiability of a particular referent, or who wish to introduce a referent assumed to be *un*identifiable to a particular addressee — in most circumstances these speakers seem to avoid the use of bare proper names. Instead, they may choose to be up-front about the issue and explicitly negotiate with the addressee about the identifiability of the referent. This is the strategy adopted by speaker C in (3) and by speaker A at the first arrowed line in (4).

(3) CEC S.1.5: 141
C: I don't think you've met Nelly 'Cartwright \^upstairs
A: \^No
C: I won't /pri:... ə:m/ ... ... \^what's the 'word
... \^Pre-persuade you
but /ə:/ ... ... she's not of the most \^helpful .. /^variety

(4) CEC S. 1.3: 90
c: Who .. who was doing the \^interviewing

A: Seven \^ladies
c: /m/
→ A: /əm ... ... ə/ Agatha \^Carter
Of whom you may have \^heard
\^Clarke knows of /^her
.. she's a \^medievalist
And [she's] /əm/ .. a \^philologist
c: [/ə/]
A: And she's .. quite \^established in her /^field
/k/ Clarke obviously thinks /^highly of her
... she's going to be my \^supervisor
.. \^Anyway
→ ... ... Somebody called Susan \^Potter
.. You \^come across Susan /^Potter
... I'd heard the \^name
and I thought I ought to know .. \^why I'd heard her /^name
but I couldn't /^remember
.... ... ... /əm/ ... ... ... I think she's .. possibly nineteenth \^century
... ... ... She's /əm/ .. she's written a \^novel /^apparently
.. I've found out /^since
... who was absolutely \^charming

Alternatively, they may take the safe route and embed the proper name in a common noun phrase which permits explicit marking of the referent's potentially unidentifiable status. Consider in this light speaker A's introduction of *somebody called Susan Potter* in example (4); here the additional material in the noun phrase carries no identifying information supplementary to that which is carried by the name — it may in fact serve no purpose other than to notify speaker c that speaker A does not expect him to be able to recognize the name.[10] Proper-noun-containing common noun phrases of this sort are commonly used in my corpus (of *all* conversations, not just the experimentally elicited ones) to introduce the names of referents assumed to be unidentifiable. The question of *why* the name should be introduced at all, since it is insufficient by itself to pick out the referent in question, is an interesting one, but the point here is simply that it is typically not the *bare* proper name that is used in these cases.

The response of addressees in cases where bare proper names *are* used to introduce unidentifiable referents constitutes a third piece of evidence for viewing these forms principally as devices for denoting identifiable referents, at least in conversation. Speakers who unwittingly use bare proper names for introductions of unidentifiable referents may sometimes never become aware of their mistake, since various social factors may militate against the addressee's "making a fuss" in such situations (cf. Auer 1984). In some cases, the referent may be so insignificant that being unable to identify it may have no social repercussions and no consequences relative to the addressee's understanding of the gist of the talk. In other cases (not unlike the unastute reader who comes across the line, "the astute reader will have observed ..."), the addressee may feel embarrassed or chagrinned at his/her lack of familiarity with the referent as denoted, and may take some pains to conceal it.

Occasionally, however, addressees do display their unfamiliarity with the referent in question; this is likely to take the form of a confession (as with (5)), a repair initiation (as with Roz's response in (6)), or a request for confirmation of an hypothesis regarding the identity of the insufficiently identified referent (as with Betty's response in (6)).

(5) Nelsona2: 254

A: <u>Those people</u> who are able to dominate for an evening tend to be <u>tall</u>.
C: That's only if you're very <u>small</u>.
La: No, no
GC?: or medium sized
A: I think if you did a <u>correlational analysis</u> ( ) it's true
D?: How about very very tall or very short. Somebody like <u>Milton Friedman</u>?
→ A: I've never even heard of him
D: There are all kinds of very short people I know who seem to be <u>compensating</u> for their lack of height by being <u>terribly</u> vocal, not <u>this one</u> over here. Some people I know ...

(6) Halloween Dinner: 4

F.N..: [Did I t-] (1.1) Did I tell y- oh, <u>yo</u>:u heard it.
Roz: Yeh, [a]bout *S*arah?
F.N.: [( )]
F.N.: N<u>o</u>: about (1.2) *K*atherine.
→ Roz: Katherine <u>w</u>ho?
F.N.: is coming <u>h</u>ome,

→ Betty: Oh [the one who left to go to ] Italy?
Sandy: [Oh yeah, I remember her.]

Responses of these sorts problematize the reference in ways that are atypical for cases where, by contrast, bare proper names are used for referents which *are* identifiable for all participants in the conversation.

From these sorts of evidence, it appears that the cognitive dimension of identifiability does play a role in determining whether it will be appropriate for a conversationalist to use a bare proper name. In other words, it does seem to be the case that bare proper names typically act as recognitionals. However, as I mentioned earlier, the considerations involved in choosing one of these forms are multiplied in situations where more than one listener is present. In such cases, the speaker may be aware that different participants have different degrees of familiarity with the referent, and the task of ensuring comprehension on everyone's part while giving offense to no one becomes an extremely delicate task. In these situations, the speaker may sometimes choose recognitionals which are oriented to the presumed knowledge state of some participants and not others. Although further examination of videotaped data will be necessary in order to ascertain how regular this pattern is, several examples in my data suggest that when a speaker is talking to interlocutors with disparate degrees of knowledge about the referent at hand, a referent identifiable to the addressee toward which the speaker has oriented his/her gaze and/or body position may be denoted with a bare proper name even though the speaker may be aware that this form cannot serve as a recognitional for the other conversational participants.[11] An example of this sort appears in (7), where the referents in question are known to D and L, and to R, whom J is facing during this portion of her talk, but not to B and P, the other two participants in the conversation.

(7) Blanche
R: That's what I'm trying to ^think of is that [we've been] to some ^weddings there.
B: [<X XX X<]
R: And I'm trying to think of ^whose ^wedding.
<P It wa- P> they were.
P: ... <P At Saint Se^bast[ian's? P>]
R: [<P Mmhm. P>]
→ J: [Did] Faith and ^Arnie?
Faith and ^Arnie have theirs there?

In circumstances like these, the use of a reference form which can serve as a recognitional for only *part* of the group of conversationalists may in effect act as a device to target a particular addressee and/or offer the floor to this in-the-know participant only. In this particular example, J's choice of reference form targets three addressees, D, L and R, one of whom (R) is also targeted by her gaze and by the fact that R has just posed the question to which J is responding.

This sort of referential choice may also have pronounced exclusionary effects on the other participants in the conversation. This was demonstrated to me recently in the grumbling report my husband produced when he returned from a business dinner. After the group had been struggling for a while to maintain a flow of small talk, he told me, one of the participants began talking about someone who turned out to be his wife, using a proper name which served as a recognitional for only one of the other people at the table. This referential strategy left my husband feeling that the speaker was intent on carrying on a conversation with the in-the-know participant only, intentionally excluding the other people at the table (my husband included) by virtue of their lack of previous knowledge.

My data also make it clear that these bare names can succeed as recognitionals even when the addressee does not know the name *in advance*, so long as s/he is aware of the existence of the intended individual, and has a means of linking the name up to that individual. Consider from this perspective the conversational extract in (8).

(8) Blanche

B: Do 'you have .. did ^you have .. did you have brothers and ^sisters?
P: (0) <A I have one ^sister. A>
M: (0) ((hiccup))
B: .. Is she ^younger? [Or ^older,]
P: [<X XXXX X>] she's= ... ^seven and a half years ^younger.
B: ... ^Younger. You're like ^our kids. ... Were you at ^ho- .. you know I know you were at home with her till you were four[^teen,] but ^af- you know= ... how-
M: [((hiccup))]
P: (0)(( tsk)) Well ^actually, ^you know. ... I went away to ^college when she was ...

[still a little] ^kid,
J? [^That's <X XXX X>]
B: [<X Ex^actly. X>]
P: but then we .. ^both went to ^graduate school at ^Berkeley at the same time.
B: ... ^Ah hah. ... Alri[ght.]
P: [So we] go- we really got to[know each other] ^well as a^dults.
J?: [<X ^Oh. ^That was XXX X>]
B: ^As adults.
P: ... That was= ... [((tsk)) really ^good. .. We're very ^close.]
→ J: [<X That's X> ^Peg and .. ^my two daugh]ters are ten ^years apart,
→ ... and it was= ... I ^always had a babysitter for ... for ^Maddie, cause [^Peg] could.
M: [((hiccup))]
J: ... But ^now they've .. <P they're .. they're ‘closer, P>
... ... [But] when she was in ^high school,
P: [<X She was ?X>]
J: and Maddie was .. <P ^you know. P> .. ^Seven.
→ P: ... ^Yeah. <X <A It was just A> X> .. ^Sue was just a !^pest <X S- X>
P: I !^hated [her.]
J: [^Yes.]
P: She ^wrecked my !^life. [<X <P XXXXX P> X>]
J: [^Yeah. ... We had to put] ^hooks on the bedroom ^doo=r, because .. Maddie would run in and go through ^drawers,

In this extract M is an infant, and J and P are relatives by marriage who know each other fairly well but are both meeting B for the first time. Both of these speakers use proper names that are clearly not known in advance to B, or in some cases to each other, to refer to individuals who have been introduced in other ways. In introducing her daughters, J starts by mentioning one of them, Peg, by name, then aborts her utterance, backtracks, and settles on an anchored kinterm (*my daughters*) which is more likely to be interpretable to B, who may in fact not even know how many children J has. Although *Peg* has been superseded, though, it has not really been erased, for once “the daughters" have been established, J proceeds to refer to the second daughter by name, *Maddie*, apparently relying on B to do the math and figure that Maddie is the other part of the set of daughters whose first member is the retracted *Peg*. This transition to proper-naming does not provoke any apparent consternation on B's part, and in fact it is an elegant solution to the problem of beginning a story with an unknown roster of characters without impeding the narrative flow with a formal "introduction" section. This may be of some importance here, where J can be seen as trying to "horn in" on the topic, i.e. younger sisters, in which B has already engaged P.

Interestingly, P uses the same technique. Although her sister is initially brought into the conversation *as* her sister, in particular as her *younger* sister, when P re-claims the floor from J after her initial comments about Peg and Maddie, she refers to this sister with the proper name *Sue*, even though J probably does not know her name and B, who has just learned about the *existence* of a sister, clearly has no way of knowing it.

The apparent uneventfulness of this strategy, which is quite common in my transcripts, permits us to refine our understanding of the constraints on the use of proper names as recognitionals in conversation. It is not the case that the name which succeeds in such a context can necessarily function for this recipient as a recognitional relative to this referent *in any other context* — rather, it may *become* a potential recognitional only within the context of the ongoing conversation. This can occur only if (a) the recipient is aware in advance of the usage of the existence of the intended referent and if (b) the speaker can make it clear that the name is intended to refer to this referent. The recipient may acquire the required existential knowledge only moments before the actual use of the name, as in P's use of *Sue* and J's initial use of *Maddie* in (8), and the store of knowledge need not include the information that the intended referent bears the name which has been used.

It is an interesting question how the recipient is able to make the match-up between the pre-established referent and the novel name in such cases. Typically, there seems to be a limited roster of referents (often only one) appropriate to the name on hand, at least in the talk of the speaker who makes the initial (non-name) reference and follows it up with the name. In some cases, the speaker also *treats* the referent as "active" by pronouncing the name used to denote him/her with low stress, as a pronoun would be pronounced had it been chosen instead of the name. In other words, the speaker treats the referent as being retrievable, cuing the addressee to treat the name as a recognitional, even though s/he may never have heard it before.[12]

However the details of these particular cases come to be worked out, it is clear that the usability of bare proper names is tied to the speaker's assessment that the intended referent is identifiable for *at least* the targeted addressee at the time the name is used. This recipient's degree of knowledge regarding the referent may be minimal, so long as the s/he is aware of the existence of the referent and is able to link it up, perhaps post hoc, to the name that is used. These findings make it clear that the presumed cognitive status of the referent in the addressee's mind is crucial in determining whether or not it is appropriate to use a bare proper name at a given point in a developing conversation, and they answer in the affirmative the question posed earlier — *bare* proper names, at least, *do* fall squarely within the category of recognitionals, although names may also be included within other sorts of noun phrases which do not act as recognitionals, as shown in example (4).

## 1.2. The status of proper names relative to lexical recognitionals of other sorts

It is easy enough to see that a preference for recognitionals (in general) could be functional in various ways. Although Sacks and Schegloff themselves are rather circumspect with respect to the possible sources for, or the motivations behind, this preference, they do note that it is one manifestation of the tendency for conversational talk to be "recipient-designed", i.e. tailored to the needs of a particular recipient at a particular point in the developing talk. But one can imagine a number of possible ways in which recipient design could be accomplished — referential forms might be chosen in order to *conceal* from the particular interlocutor the precise identity of the referent in question, for instance, as seems to be done in some circumstances by Malagasay speakers (Keenan 1976). Why is it that the preference for recipient design should be reflected in the preference for recognitionals, rather than in some other way?

First, by using recognitionals, the speaker helps the interlocutor to identify links between the referents denoted in the conversation and pre-existing nodes in his/her mental model of the world, thereby facilitating the construction of an expansive and coherent mental representation. As Grice pointed out some twenty years ago, the information that my wife is having an affair is likely to be much more valuable to me than the information that some woman is having an affair. In fact, the use of recognitionals is so much the norm that a speaker who fails to use one when possible can be charged with a violation of Grice's maxim of quantity (Grice 1975), if not outright deception (Prince 1981).

Secondly, the preference for recognitionals would seem to tie in with another important feature of conversational talk, i.e. the turn-taking system. Within the widely accepted model of conversational organization spelled out in Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974), each conversational participant who takes the floor is allotted but a single "turn-constructional unit". While methods for securing rights to the floor for a longer period do exist, for use when the speaker wishes to tell an extended story, for example, the basic system hinges on the convention that when the current speaker has completed a "TCU", other participants have the right to bid for the floor. In some cases, the next speaker will have been chosen by the current speaker, as when, for example, a question is addressed to a particular individual; in other cases, any speaker other than the current one is entitled to a turn at talk, assuming that they make their bid before anyone else does so. This system thus ensures that all participants in a conversation will periodically have the opportunity to try to express themselves verbally.

This outcome can be seen as being socially functional at both the level of the individual interaction and at the level of the long-term well-being of the society as a whole. Because this system ensures that all participants in the conversation will repeatedly have the opportunity to try to speak, it makes it more likely that the group will be able to profit from the insights of all of its members. It provides an outlet for each participant to verbally express his/her views, and it also allows for the constant monitoring of the (potentially varying) stance of each participant throughout the course of the developing interaction. Now, this is not to say that participants would have *no* means of expressing themselves if the conversational floor were denied to them, or that additional factors, such as degree of intimacy, or relative status, or even relative lack of verbal skills, might not inhibit speakers from taking the floor even when it is in principal their due. But the basic fact remains that the structural organization of the verbal interaction does provide for talk on the part of all participants. This state of affairs obviously has long-term consequences for the larger society as well, since collective decisions that are based on broad input and subject to criticism from all quarters during the process of their development are more likely to be consistent with the needs, beliefs, and orientations of all members of the society.

The preference for recognitionals ties in in a useful way with this system, I would argue, because it guarantees that current non-speakers will have maximum access to the implications of the current speaker's talk, and thus the maximum warrant to partipate when it is their turn. Just as the right to vote is of little value if voters are not informed of the location of the polling place, the value of the right to take a turn at talk is considerably diminished if hearers are not provided sufficient information about referents to make the links in their own minds to their independent stores of knowledge about those referents. Although this system may open the current speaker up to more competition for the floor, and may reduce his/her exclusive rights to hold forth on the current topic, it ultimately ensures, as does the turn-taking system in general, that all participants who have knowledge about the current topic(s) of talk will have the chance to speak, to bring in information to which they have independent access, and to speak in a way which is topically consistent with previous talk.[13]

Since bare proper names are typically used as recognitionals, they act in the service of these various ends. The question at issue, however, is whether speakers exhibit a preference for bare names over other sorts of recognitionals, and whether they prefer to introduce names as parts of other noun phrases even in cases where they are not recognitionals. In non-introductory contexts, it is clear that personal pronouns, rather than proper names, are the default recognitional forms, as noted by Fox (1987) and Schegloff (This volume). But in contexts where full lexical recognitionals are called for, names often seem to be preferred over other sorts of forms that could be used, such as definite common noun phrases. This preference is revealed in a number of ways, in the behavior of both the speaker who initially mentions a referent and that of the addressees who receive the reference.

Sacks and Schegloff themselves note (1979: 17) "the heavy use of first names." In my data as well, proper names are very commonly used, heavily outnumbering other types of lexical recognitionals, such as definite common noun phrases. Speakers' preference for using names in *introducing* new referents into the conversation can be seen in the various strategies that exploit the name even in situations where the speaker is not absolutely certain whether the addressee is familiar with the intended referent. Thus, instead of resorting to a simple indefinite description which will succeed in introducing the referent regardless of the knowledge state of the addressee, speakers often use "try-marked" proper names (as in example (1) above), or engage in outright negotiation (as in examples (3) and (4) above) in order to test the possibility of using a bare name as a means of effecting the introduction. Even in situations where the speaker assumes that the addressee is *not* familiar with the referent, proper names may be introduced anyway, embedded in their first use in larger noun phrases which allow indefiniteness marking (cf. example (4) above), but which give way on subsequent mentions to the name alone. And in cases where the name is *not* introduced on the initial mention, the initial speaker may switch to it later in the course of a conversation, as in the cases shown in example (8).

Sacks and Schegloff explain these efforts to introduce an as-yet-unknown name as a means of ensuring that in subsequent talk (perhaps even in subsequent conversations distinct from the current one (Schegloff, p.c.)), both speaker and addressee will have available a reference form which will function as a recognitional. In other words, they argue that the name is introduced when it is *not* a recognitional in order to provide a preferred resource for *future* turns at talk. However, since virtually *any* form used to introduce a referent (e.g. *a guy wearing a weird plastic jacket*) could potentially serve as the basis for a recognitional (e.g. *the guy wearing the weird plastic jacket*) in future turns, this observation about the non-recognitional use of these forms would seem to have more to do with their status as proper names than with their status as simply one sort of potential recognitional among others.

This status can also be seen when speakers have difficulty coming up with names on their own — here they may go to the interactional trouble of attempting to elicit them from their interlocutors, instead of simply using some alternative recognitional form, as in the extract cited in (9).

(9) CEC S.1.11: 278
→ c: <X I saw X> .. the guy with the grave .. what was his name .. Bolz [mann]
A: [\^Bolz]mann
c: .. Bolzmann

The preference for names can also be seen in the behavior of addressees. Sacks and Schegloff note, for instance, that when a speaker has introduced a referent by means of a *non*-recognitional, if the recipient suspects that s/he does in fact know the referent, s/he may attempt to confirm that suspicion by offering or asking for the referent's name, as in example (10)

(10) Georgia2: 5
Teacher: Now what happened during group editing?
Student: .. Um .. OK. .. I ... I didn't understand some of the comments made by the person editing my paper.
→ Teacher: Who was
Student: um ... oh .. Stu? No.
Teacher: Stu.
Student: Was it Stu? ... I think it was Stu.
Teacher: Yeah:.
Student: Um ... what I didn't understand was .. I guess ... he was taking wh- I I he didn't un- understand what I was trying do. In my in my ... in this paragraph here about angry customers.

Even when the speaker uses some other sort of recognitional, the addressee may respond by asking for or "upgrading" to a name, as in (11).

(11) SN-4: 643
M: What about that girl 'e use tuh go with fer so long
K: A:lice?
(they gave up. )
K: I // don't] (think (they're about),)
(mm] )
M: (°myeh])

I am ill-equipped to speculate at the moment on the source of this preference for proper names, including proper names which are not (in context) recognitionals. It may derive in part from the *relative* context-independence of proper names by comparison to, say, role descriptions, which may succeed in denoting the referent only within the confines of a particular situation[14] (cf. Sanford et al. 1988). While speakers may sometimes know nothing *other* than the name of the individual to whom they are referring by name, it is probably typically the case that they know a good deal; in such cases the name serves as a shorthand means of tapping all that knowledge in a way that another interlocutor will find transparent even if s/he is unfamiliar with *particular* incidents or traits associated with the speaker's knowledge.

The name may also be preferred on some occasions, for example in cases where repeated references to a protagonist will be necessary, by virtue of its brevity. In other contexts, it may be relevant that knowledge of an individual's full name can be taken as a marker of true familiarity. In other cases, names may be favored because of the delicacy with which the choice *among them* can display the nature of the speaker's relationship with the referent, the speaker's relationship with the addressee, and even the speaker's assessment of the addressee's relationship with the referent. This may have been the motivation behind the usage cited in (12):

(12) NewDean
→ C: We created a 'media star last fall with \^Andrew.
... \^Holmes-Watson.

Here the speaker is a university official talking with a large group of professors, some of whom he has never before met. This speaker must be aware that the use of the relatively common name *Andrew* is unlikely to succeed in picking out the intended referent for all members of this diverse group; this fact is presumably reflected in his follow-up elaboration — *Holmes-Watson.* But while this non-"minimal", two-part reference form might initially appear to be the awkward result of the speaker's mis-calculation of the background knowledge of his interlocutors, it can also be seen as a skillful attempt to manipulate the group's perception of itself, and of the official's relation to it. By starting out with a simple (and relatively common) first name, the speaker implicates (by virtue of the association between bare names and presumed identifiability) that he assumes that everyone present is familiar enough with the referent to be able to successfully decode the reference, and he simultaneously demonstrates that, in spite of his elevated status relative to both his interlocutors and to "Andrew" himself, he is "on a first name basis" with the referent. With this referential choice he has in other words created the illusion of a (much-to-be-desired though far from the truth) intimate campus community.

Whatever the motivation(s) behind the choice of a proper name in a particular instance, it seems clear that the overall preference for names over other lexical forms is not reducible to a simple preference for recognitionals, although the majority of names used may in fact be recognitionals in the context in which they are used.

## 2. Other Factors Affecting the Likelihood that Proper Names will be Used

Setting aside the apparent overall preference for proper names relative to other lexical recognitionals, it is clear that a variety of textual and interactional factors will have an influence on whether a proper name is used in a particular instance. In the sections that follow, I will attempt to illustrate the effects of some of these factors.

### 2.1. Degree of "protagonism" of the referent

Not all referents enjoy equivalent statuses within a discourse. Some are more central than others to the development of the discourse, and these differences in degree of "protagonism", to cite a term proposed by Cumming (1995), may be reflected linguistically in many ways. In her influential (1980) paper on referential choice in Japanese and English narratives, for instance, Clancy notes that:

> By using an inexplicit form of reference, such as a pronoun or ellipsis, the speaker is, in effect, telling the listener that he should be able to identify the referent in question without further information. ... It seems clear that of all the possible characters in the story line at a given moment, the "hero" is the most likely candidate for this status. Having established a particular character as the hero, continued use of inexplicit reference forms is one way in which the speaker can signal that this character is still functioning as the hero of the story. (Clancy 1980: 178)

While there have not, to my knowledge, been any text-based studies which have investigated the relationship between degree of protagonism and the use of a proper name, Sanford, Moar, and Garrod (1988) did do an experimental study focusing on the "referential availability" and the "referential accessibility" of characters denoted with proper names vs. (common noun) role descriptions in narratives. Arguing that characters denoted with proper names are more likely to be of importance to the narrative as a whole (as opposed to a single episode within that narrative), Sanford et al. propose that a reader who encounters a proper name is "instructed" to register the individual as being of "special importance" to the narrative. To test whether any such "registration" does in fact take place, they asked their subjects at the University of Glasgow to perform two sorts of tasks.

In the first, subjects were given pairs of sentences in which two characters were mentioned, one denoted by means of a proper name, one by means of a role description. A sample sentence pair (with both proper name and role description versions) appears in (13).

(13) Mr. Bloggs/The manager was dictating a letter.
Claire/ The secretary was taking shorthand.
(from Sanford et al. 1988: 47)

After reading each pair of sentences, the subjects were asked to write an additional sentence, "as if they were developing the theme of a story". The rationale here was that subjects would tend to mention in their continuation whatever character they viewed as being central to the experimental mini-narrative they had just read. Interestingly, Sanford et al. found that, regardless of the order in which the two characters were presented in the initial sentences, subjects tended to produce more anaphoric references to those characters which had been denoted with proper names. On the basis of this evidence, they argue that proper-named characters are more "referentially accessible" than role-described characters.

In the second task, subjects were asked to read four-sentence-long narrative fragments and then to answer questions regarding the characters introduced in the narrative. Sanford et al. found that subjects were able to answer questions regarding the proper-named characters some 289 msec. more quickly than they could questions regarding the role-described characters ($p < 0.01$). On the basis of these results, Sanford et al. argue that characters introduced with proper names are more "referentially available" than role-described characters. As they put it (1988: 51), "proper names cue the salience of a character," perhaps inducing the reader to take the character as "something like a thematic subject ..., treating it as a principal agent, and giving it priority in mental processes testing for anaphora, etc." (1988: 54). This characterization is consistent with Givón's claim (1990: 937) that "there are grounds for believing that a name is associated with the **top node** in the hierarchic structure of the currrent text ... Typically, only **globally important** referents are given a proper name (emphasis in the original)."

I have yet to go through all my conversational transcripts and try to assess the degree of correlation between "main characterhood" and proper name usage. Identifying "the main character" in conversations, or even in narratives more complex than those used by Sanford et al., is in fact not a straightforward task. Within my corpus, however, there are numerous examples where particular human referents are introduced with proper names, while others are not. Frequently, those which fail to merit proper-naming play subsidiary roles in the situations being described, often serving as little more than props. This is certainly the case with the extract shown in (14), taken from one of the evidentials project transcripts described above. Here all the human characters save *this friend of Marcus's* are referred to with proper names; all of these individuals appear numerous times in the narrative, while the friend appears only once, as a means of introducing the puppy which goes on to become a more important character than the friend herself.

(14) Evid 1B2: 3
B: Now 'Marcus .. in ^!my part of the story, is a=(/ey/) (H) 'he's a(/ey/) .. uh 'plastic 'surgeon at the ^hospital, and .. ^something had 'happened to 'Faith, (H) and 'she= was having plastic ^surgery. (H) A=nd .. in ^!Sandy's part of the story. ... The(/δi/) this .. this
→ 'friend of 'Marcus's finds this little ^puppy. And 'gives it to ^Marcus. And in ^!my part (H) ^Marcus is 'giving the dog to ^Faith.

Differences in the *type* of proper name used may also correlate with differences in the status of the characters denoted. In his analysis of the Auto Discussion conversational transcript, Goodwin (1986) points out that, for most of the racers referred to, first names may be given on initial mention, but subsequent mentions will include only *last* names. An exception to this general tendency can be seen in the references to the *best* racer, Al, who is consistently denoted by his *first* name. As Goodwin (1986: 314) puts it, this distinctive naming pattern is "one of the ways in which his special status is made visible within the details of the participants' talk about him."

While examples like this one can provide only anecdotal evidence regarding the relationship between proper-naming (or first-naming) and degree of protagonism, they at the very least seem to be consistent with the findings and proposals of Sanford et al. Further work will be needed to see if their predictions regarding the correlation between proper naming and protagonism hold up on a larger scale; it does seem likely, though, that main character status will turn out to be one of the factors promoting the use of proper names in conversational contexts.

## 2.2. Structural position of the mention within the discourse

Intensive, data-based studies of referential choice in discourse have repeatedly implicated the position of a reference within the discourse as another factor involved in determining which referential form will be used. As Clancy (1980) points out,

> A major reason accounting for cases of both unusual nominal and inexplicit forms of reference was the occurrence of episode boundaries. Frequently, episode boundaries were marked by a shift from inexplicit to explicit forms of reference. (Clancy 1980: 171)

Experimental attempts to examine the effect of narrative episode boundaries have produced compatible findings. In an investigation of patterns of referential choice in on-line narratives produced in response to a series of slides, Tomlin (1987) found that English-speaking subjects tended to use pronouns to maintain reference to a particular individual *within* an episode, while they tended to use nouns instead "to reinstate reference after an episode boundary" (1987: 472). Tomlin explains this pattern in terms of an attention model, arguing that pronouns can be used so long as the speaker's attention is sustained on a particular referent; when the attention focus is disrupted, as at an episode boundary, the speaker will be likely to "reinstate reference" with a full noun instead.

Narratives, of course, represent only one type of discourse structure, and "episode" boundaries are not necessarily relevant to the structuring of other discourse types. With respect to conversation, the focus of our concern here, Fox (1987) proposes that the structural unit of the "sequence", roughly an adjacency pair and any elaborations on that pair, will have consequences for referential choice.[15] For "non-story talk" in English conversation, Fox suggests that the "basic, most unconstrained description of anaphoric devices" is as follows:

> 1. The first mention of a referent in a sequence is done with a full NP.
> 2. After the first mention of a referent, a pronoun is used to display an understanding of the sequence as not yet closed.
> 3. A full NP is used to display an understanding of the preceding sequence containing other mentions of the same referent as closed. (Fox 1987: 18-19)

A simple instance of the use of a pronoun for a non-initial mention within the confines of a single sequence can be seen in (15), where B, in her answer to A's question, refers to her grandmother as *she.*

(15) Two Girls: 79

A: [Oh my] mother wannduh know how's yer grandmother.

→ B: °hhh Uh:::, (0.3) I don'know I guess she's aw- she's awright she went to thē uh:: hhospital again tihday,

By contrast, the example in (16) illustrates the pattern whereby a full NP is used to display the speaker's understanding that the sequence containing the first mention of the referent has been closed.

(16) CEC S.2.2: 418

B: and I had friends at Charterhouse /əm/ David Tate <X do X> you know David Tate

A: /ə/ \^Yeah
I remember 'him when[I was a V^schoolboy
\^Yes]

B: [/m .. m .. m/]

A: ... .. An \^actor

→ B: .. Yes well David Tate had a boy at Charterhouse

A: Yes he \!^did

B: /m/ and [[he used to come and stay]] with me

A: [[he was a little bit 'younger than V!^me]]

In this example, speaker B, as part of a larger explanation of why he knows something about Charterhouse, has introduced David Tate and attempted to ascertain whether A knows him. A answers B's query in the affirmative and proceeds to present some evidence that he knows David Tate quite well; in fact, since he knows that Tate is an actor, and since he knew him when he was a schoolboy, he may in fact know Tate better than speaker B himself knows him.

If Fox's claims about the use of pronouns vs. full NP's in conversational interactions are correct, B's use of the full NP *David Tate* in the arrowed line here serves to display his understanding that the sequence devoted to ascertaining A's degree of familiarity with Tate is completed. This display is further bolstered by B's prefacing his remark with *yes well.* As Schiffrin (1987: 127) notes,

> *well* anchors its user in a conversational exchange when the options offered through a prior utterance for the coherence of an upcoming response are not

> precisely followed. More generally, *well* is possible whenever the coherence options offered by one component of talk differ from those of another: *well* locates a speaker as a respondent to one level of discourse and allows a temporary release from attention to others.

In example (16), speaker B declines to follow up on A's effusive confirmation of his familiarity with Tate and returns instead to his explanation of how he came to be familiar with Charterhouse. Since A's considerable degree of acquaintanceship with Tate, and A's willingness to talk about it, threaten to both remove B's status as sole authority on Tate and to de-rail the talk from B's intended theme (how he came to know Charterhouse), B's use of *both* the *well and* the lexical NP may be part of a defensive strategy designed to re-direct the talk along the lines more acceptable to B.

It is also of interest to note here that speaker B has chosen to refer to Tate, not simply with *any* lexical NP, but with Tate's full name; this is in spite of the fact that either his first or his last name would seem to be sufficient in this context to identify the referent *and* to mark the previous sequence as closed. This particular reference form may be especially valuable to speaker B here because it does more than simply signal the end of the previous sequence. It also constitutes an avoidance of the more familiar alternative *David.* This form, although it would undoubtedly be comprehensible here, would also constitute an acknowledgement of A's familiarity with the referent. By using the full name, B may be attempting to "disallow" the additional information that A has volunteered about his familiarity with Tate and "re-set" the interaction back at a point *before* A's remarks would have "justified" the use of a bare first name. In this way, B not only marks the preceding sequence as closed, he in effect erases part of it from the interactional history.[16]

This interpretation is supported by the fact that *David Tate* is an exact echo of the form speaker B used to introduce this referent, in the utterance that preceded A's comments. As Schegloff (1990: 65) notes, repetition of the exact wording of an earlier contribution to the conversation can be used to show "what I am saying now is what I was saying before." By using *David Tate* here, B is demonstrating that his subsequent remarks are built on his own earlier remarks, rather than on the immediately preceding remarks made by A. In other words, instead of "tying" this mention of Tate to A's preceding mention (cf. Sacks 1992a: 712), speaker B purposely avoids either the pronoun or the bare first name and re-establishes the referent in a manner which is independent of A's previous reference; this ploy also marks his utterance as a resumption of the enterprise he was engaged in before A's contributions. The strategic effect of this sort of refusal to "tie" the current mention to a preceding mention by another speaker may constitute at least part of the explanation for the fact, first observed by Fox (1987), that speakers frequently use full NP's, instead of pronouns, in contexts where they are disagreeing with the previous speaker, as in example (17):

(17) Upholstery Shop: 24
Rich: Those'r Alex's tanks weren't they?
Vic: Podn' me?
Rich: Weren't-didn' they belong tuh Al//ex?
→ Vic: No: Alex ha(s) no tanks Alex is tryintuh buy my tank

These examples illustrate quite clearly the potential role of referential choice in effecting discourse structure and determining the interactional significance of particular utterances. While the choice of a full lexical reference form in a non-introductory context may in some cases be viewed as the natural result of a lapse in the speaker's and/or addressee's attention toward the referent in question (cf. Tomlin 1987), it is apparent that in conversational contexts, the deliberate choice of a proper name where a pronoun would be understood can have important strategic consequences.

## 2.3. Influence from the address term system

In the case of certain referents, proper names may be displaced as the preferred lexical reference forms by definite descriptions that reflect the relationship between speaker and/or addressee and the referent. My transcripts are thus full of examples like (15) above (repeated here as (18)), or (19), where speakers choose to refer to their own kin, or those of their interlocutors, by means of kinterm-based common noun phrases, rather than by either their personal names or the kinterm-based proper names, e.g. *Mom*, by which they presumably *address* these referents.

(18) Two Girls: 79
A: [Oh my] mother wannduh know how's yer *g*randmother.
B: °hhh Uh:::, (0.3) *I* don'know I guess she's aw- she's aw*r*ight she went to thē uh:: hhospital again tihday,

(19) Real Life DOL
C: Well it's too bad you're not gonna visit.
P: ... I know.
→ C: ... But .. anyway, well would you like to say hello to my .. papa?
P: Sure.

This may happen even when the addressee knows the referent well, as in (19), where the addressee, P, is a longtime friend of C's father who initially made the acquaintance of (the now adult child) C only years after coming to know the father.

In fact, when the kin in question are the speaker's ascending kin, the avoidance of the personal name may become a virtual mandate. This pattern is presumably a reflection, within the system of referential options, of the structure of the address term system, wherein younger kin typically address their ascending kin with some sort of kinterm, while kin of the same or descending generations are typically addressed by their first names.[17] Thus a speaker may be as reluctant to *refer* to her own grandmother as *Laura*, even if that is in fact her given name, as she is to *address* her in this way.

More interesting perhaps is the fact that speakers also often avoid using as reference forms the kinterm-based proper names that they *do* use as address forms. Thus speaker A in extract (18) fails to use *Mom,* or *Mother*, or *Ma*, here, and speaker C in (19) fails to use *Dad.* These forms *are* used as reference terms on occasion. In my data, however, they seem to appear only when the addressee is also related to the referent, or when s/he is such an intimate of the speaker and/or referent that s/he can be considered an *honorary* member of the family circle. Thus the speaker in (20), talking to an unidentified caller, starts out by identifying the referent in question as *her gramma*, but once she recognizes the caller by voice as Sharon, her second reference is with the kinterm-based proper name, *Gramma Peggy.*

(20) Newport Beach II:1:ITB:1
Fran: [Hello]
Sharon: [Is Stephie there?]
→ Fran: No <u>S</u>tephie's over et'er <u>g</u>ramma's fer a couple da:ys.=
Sharon: =hh °hh <u>A</u>'ri[ght <u>t</u>hankyou,
( ) [ ( )
Fran: <u>Yer</u> wel<u>c</u>ome, <u>Sh[aro</u>]n?
Sharon: [Ba,]

Sharon: Yeah?
→ Fran: Oh:: I thought that wz you:, °hhh wuh she's over et Gramma Peggy's fer a couple da:ys.

A similar reserve relative to using to personal names seems to apply in references to the *addressee's* ascending kin. In (21), which involves the same participants as (20), the father's friend, P, refers to the father with a kinship-term-based common noun phrase anchored on the daughter, C, instead of using his personal name.

(21) Real Life DOL
C: Wait .. hold on a second. ... Hey why'd you turn it off? ((speaking to father)) ... ... <X <P^Yeah. P> X> He was watching Dracula. But I guess he got bored.
→ P: ... Who. Your father?
C: <P ^Yeah. P>

Interestingly, the same patterns can also be seen in references to other kin, although the avoidance of personal names does not seem to be nearly as categorical in such cases. In (22), for example, Vic can be seen referring to his wife with a kinterm-based common noun phrase, even though his interlocutors know the wife's personal name, and even though Vic elsewhere in the same conversation uses her personal name to refer to her.

(22) Upholstery Shop: 12
→ Vic: En then like my wife com::es behind me en sez wuhdddiyou haftuh en you didn't even, --bring 'em in by me en ah said Well Carol I ast you.=

The overall situation here is complex, but it is apparent that conversationalists' options with respect to the use of proper names as reference terms reflect the constraints imposed on the use of the same terms as address terms. Thus a speaker may be reluctant to use as a reference term a form that is inappropriate as an address term, even if the referent involved is not present in the speech context. It is also clear that conversationalists may be reluctant to use as reference terms kinterm-based proper names which reflect their own relations with the intended referent, unless they are talking to other kin or to very close friends. This avoidance of forms such as *Mom* and *Dad* in favor of the corresponding kinterm-based *common* noun phrases (*my mother, my mom*) may be due in part to the fact that their interpretation requires that addressees abandon their own preferred interpretations of these forms (i.e. as references to their *own* mothers or fathers) in favor of an interpretation centered on the speaker. This sort of egocentricity on the part of the speaker may make interpretive demands on the hearer that are too egregious to risk, except in the case of intimates. In fact, the use of theseforms with non-family members may serve as a signal to the addressee that s/he has been taken in to the speaker's inner circle.[18]

These kin-related patterns of reference may not be all that different from patterns that would appear if we were to intensively investigate reference to other sorts of referents which elicit conflicting address forms from different participants in a conversation. Cases where I call my colleague *Mickey* and you, his student, call him *Dr. Noonan* may thus create real problems for the choice of reference forms as well. If I "drop" to your level and refer to him as *Dr. Noonan*, I may be seen as being condescending; if I persist in using as a reference form the address form I am accustomed to, I may be seen as attempting to flaunt my intimate relationship with him. In such cases, there would appear to be no danger-free, default proper name available for use as a reference term, and a common noun phrase which skirts these issues may be the most diplomatic option available.

These considerations suggest that the system of referential options does not operate in a vacuum. When the same term may be used both as a reference term and as an address term, its use as a reference term will be affected by its appropriateness as an address term for each of the participants in the conversation. The constraints on these dual-function forms are not *identical* in their two uses, since the conversationalist who chooses one for use as a reference form must take into account not only his/her *own*, but also his/her interlocutors' relationships to the referent; examples of the sorts shown in (18) to (22), however, make it clear that the two systems are not independent.

## 2.4. Territory-of-information and the use of proper names

Another family of examples in my corpus suggests that not only the factors mentioned above but also the *speaker*'s state-of-knowledge, or *relative* state-of-knowledge, may be relevant to the choice of a bare proper name, as opposed to some other referential option. Consider in this light example (23), which is drawn from the data collected as part of the evidentials project. In this extract, subject B is recapitulating to subject A the portion of the soap opera plot that subject A has just told her; B seems to be doing this in order to consolidate her own understanding of the plot before being asked to talk about it to an independent interviewer. Please take particular note of the noun phrases that B uses here to refer to the character "Jack", who was present only in A's videotape (in other words, all of B's information about Jack has come from A). The other characters mentioned by name, i.e. Neil, Angelica, and Cal, were all present in the videotape B viewed as well, so B has independent knowledge of them.

(23) Evid 3A2: 19
B: O^kay then. ^Neil wound up going to **a guy named ^Jack**, ... to get some ^money,
A: (H) No. An[^gelica. ..]
B: [<X To cover the X>]
A: Went to ^Jack.
B: ... 'Who did Neil ^go to then.
A: ... Oh ^Neil didn't go ^anywhere.
B: ... tsk ^un==. ^Okay.
A and B: ((laughter))
B: [<X XXX X>]
A: [((laughter))]
B: (H)So ^okay.
A: (O) An^gelica went to ^Jack.
B: An^gelica went to **^Jack**, said 'she would have to do something that might ^destroy ^everyone. ...
[But you] 'didn't know ^what that [['was.]]
A: [Uh ^huh,] [[^No=.]]
B: (H) O^kay, (H:) and then=. .. This ^Cal, ... who .. ap^pears? .. A^gain?
... ['Comes] .. 'goes to **a guy named 'Jack** ^too.
A: [^Uh huh.]
B: But you don't know what the con^nection is,
A: ... ^Right.
((20 line digression on Cal deleted))
B: (H) ^Okay. .. So then ^anyway. Then **this ^Jack** wound up 'bailing out 'Cal, ... and now ^Ca=l, ... is .. has come ^back.... to **^Jack**. ... But we don't really know .. spe^cifically 'why.
((3 pages deleted))

B: What does **this ^Jack guy** look like . ... Is **he-** k- .. does **he** look almost like .. has like ... a kind of ^ba=lding, ^hair, ..
[or ^bald,]
A: [No he's] ^younger.
B: ... Oh=. .. 'This guy looks like (H) ^this 'g=uy, <A whoever this was almost looks like A> a== ... a: <X <PAR XXXXXX. PAR> X> ^Typical. Uh like I^talian, ^gangster, ^mugsy? ... Kind [of ^short,]
A: [Eh===,]
B: .. ^stocky, .. no- .. 'bald ^head,
A: [<X See well X> that ^might be.] ... Some .. <X mobster. X>
B: [<X XXXX X>]
(H) And <A so I'm thinking A> maybe
[**this: ^Jack guy.**]
A: [some .. m=ob <X X. X>]
B: Was just
A: ^Yeah.
B: .. It was 'somebody [.. you] ^wouldn't want for a 'neighbor.

Note that while subject A shows no hesitation in using the bare proper name *Jack* to refer to this character, subject B uses the bare name only twice, and one of these uses is in the line where she is repeating A's earlier utterance, *Angelica went to Jack.* In all her other full NP mentions, she either combines *Jack* with a common noun (*guy*) and/or supplements it with an article (*a* or *this*). Her treatment of Jack here is noticeably distinct from her treatment of Neil, Cal, and Angelica, who after their introductions are (with one exception) denoted consistently with bare first names. Although a recognitional name (*Jack*) is clearly available here, one of the speakers hesitates to use it alone, creating an imbalanced pattern whereby one participant uses a bare proper name, the other doesn't.

A useful framework within which to couch these observations has been formulated by Akio Kamio in his model of "territory of information" (Kamio 1979, 1994). Kamio argues that each speaker has a conceptual category, called his/her territory of information, which includes information which is "intuitively close" to that speaker. The assignment of a particular piece of information to a particular speaker's territory of information is typically a relative matter; thus a piece of information may belong to my territory to a greater degree than it belongs to your territory, and this relative degree of affiliation will have linguistic consequences. In Japanese, it will be reflected in the choice between "direct" assertion forms (for information which has a high degree of membership in the speaker's territory and a low degree of membership in the addressee's territory) and "indirect" forms (for other sorts of information).

Kamio argues that each speaker will have certain classes of information which fall squarely in his/her territory. These classes of information include (Kamio 1994: 83):

a. information acquired through the speaker's internal direct experience
b. information embodying detailed knowledge which falls into the speaker's professional or other expertise
c. information obtained through the speaker's external direct experience
d. information about persons, objects, events and facts close to the speaker including information about the speaker him/herself

Kamio remarks that information of type d. will be considered less close to the speaker if it has just been conveyed to him/her, as when, for example, the speaker's wife has just informed him that his son is sick. The degree of membership of a particular piece of information in a particular speaker's territory will thus be affected by a number of factors: the means through which the information has been acquired, the relative exclusivity of access to the information, the depth of knowledge about the information, the recency of the speaker's access to the information, and the nature of the speaker's relationship to the persons, objects, events, and facts which figure in the information.

It would seem that the territory-of-information construct may be relevant in explaining patterns like the one illustrated in example (23). By avoiding the bare proper name here, B may be attempting to mark the fact that "Jack" has a marginal status in her territory-of-information, a status which is clearly inferior to his status in the territory of her addressee, who has just told her everything she knows about this referent, and for whose approval she is re-playing the informatin she has received. The contrast in effect between bare names and alternative forms, such as *this Jack* or *this Jack guy*, in these contexts suggests that bare proper names may best be viewed, not only as recognitionals, but as *co*-recognitionals, i.e. forms that mark the *speaker's* claim to familiarity with the referent, as well as an acknowledgement of the *addressee's* assumed familiarity with the referent.[19]

Now, it is clearly not *impossible* for a speaker to use a bare proper name in circumstances where the recipient has a stronger "claim" on the referent than the speaker does. I recently found myself in a situation where I ran into a friend whom I had not seen in a while, who I knew had been planning to attend her son's wedding. While I knew of the son only through the friend's talk, never having met him myself, I found myself struggling to recall his name so that I could ask about his wedding as *Bob's*, rather than *your son's*. Clearly, the son was much more strongly affiliated with my friend's territory than my own, yet I felt that if I referred to him as *your son* rather than *Bob*, I would indicate that he was not important enough to have any independent standing in *my* territory. So I struggled with the name in order not to give offense to the mother by slighting the son.

After looking at hundreds of pages of conversational transcripts, I have found, however, that it is quite rare for a speaker to use a bare proper name in circumstances exactly like those of speaker B in (23), where the speaker is referring to a referent with whom s/he was previously unacquainted and knows of only through the preceding talk of an interlocutor. Instead, these speakers tend to embed the name in a common noun phrase (sometimes one which explicitly remarks the referent's affiliation with the recipient), as in (24), and/or to append the proximal demonstrative article *this* to the name, as in (25).

(24) Cheating
E: That was the night ^Kath was over here.
W: Oh ^yeah.
E: ... We had to just keep ^eating while she .. k- talked on and ^on.
W: ... Boy that's 'quite a ^story. Tha- .. 'Elaine was ^telling me <X about it. X>
?: ... That's 'real-
G: That's a 'great ^story.
E: ... She's a ^friend of 'mine, .. who .. um= ... I 'met when I was working in the Computer ^Science 'Department?
(( E and G's re-telling of "Kath's great story" deleted))
G: First the New ^Zealand navy came, and took away the ^crazy.
E: @ @ [@(H)]
G: [<@ the crazy ^captain.]
And then the ^U.S. navy came, @>
(H) and ... helped [<X XX X>]
→ P: [Do you have any] 'doubts about your friend ^Kath?

(25) They Eat Rocks

K: ... And I said ^well, w- that's ^nice, but why .. why would <@ 'he be the one to de'bunk this as a ^Mohawk name. @> @@ <@ It 'sort of seems @> (H) he said <F ^we=ll, F> he'd got it ... from u=m ... ^Blaeser. You know ^Blaeser,

H: ... ^Yeah. ... ^L[an]ce.

K: [ X ] ... @ oh you d- ^you know. ... Well 'this was his ^brother. @ @ @ @ [@]

H: [^Karl.]

K: ... ^Yeah. @ <@ Oh ^you k- ^you know. @>

K and H: ((prolonged laughter))

K: <@ Oh th[at's ^great.] @>

H: [^Yeah.]

K: [mm] [@@]

H: ['Karl] .. 'Karl 'Blaeser= and [ ... t]o a ^lesser extent ^Lance. <X XX ... [X X> ^Karl.]

K: [(H) @@@]

H: 'Fancies himself .. ^the (/δi/) 'Adirondack 'expert.

K: ... ^Oh=. <@ I 'thought I @> I mean 'these w- were just like ... ^you know. ... Mc^Ca=ll, I mean not ^even. I mean= <X <@XX no ide- @> X> he was so a'mazed I didn't 'know these people and these are 'a=ll sort of .. ^geologists. Or== <@ a^strologists <X sort of thing. X>@> (H) I said <F ^wow. F> That's great. No- now why is it that ^Blaeser seems to 'know about .. this 'language 'business. ... tsk And he said ^oh. Well 'Blaeser's told us that you know that's ... 'now been um ... 'specified as a ^Huron name meaning the 'rock 'clan. ... tsk An=d so I took it apart and showed him that (H) there 'is <X a X>Huron word for ^rock in there. 'But ... 'that ... ^you know. The m- ... 'end means they ^eat. And so it's highly un<@ 'likely. That [<X XXX X>]

W: [<X it was the st XX. X>]

K: @>... ^Yeah. They eat rocks is not 'norm<@ally the way people @> ^call themselves. (H) And <F^furthermore, F> there were 'really more Mohawks around there than Hurons ^anyway, and um ... you know it was more 'likely that this name would come from the ^Mohawks. ... I said <F by the ^way F> uh. ... ^You

→ know=. ... Tell me again why this ^Blaeser should know all about this stuff. He s- <F ^ah hah. F> ^Well. ^Blaeser, it ^seems, had just found the latest article from the Smith^sonian, .. and of course the Smith^sonian's always 'right.

Although my primary focus here is the avoidance of the bare proper name in these cases, it is also of some interest to consider the alternative forms that *are* used. In (24), *your friend Kath* constitutes not simply an avoidance of the bare name, it also explicitly attributes the referent to E's territory, as opposed to that of the speaker, P, an entirely appropriate strategy given the apparent intent of the question — to cast doubt on the veracity of Kath's "great story".

The subsequent example, (25), like the original examples in (23), relies on the use of the demonstrative article *this*. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of the analysis here to provide a full characterization of this interesting use of the demonstrative. It does bear some resemblance to the "indefinite *this*" used in referent introductions (Wald 1983; Shroyer 1985). And it may be related to the "tracking" use of the demonstrative in cases of "problematic" anaphora where other, less assertive anaphors, such as pronouns and definite NPs, would fail (Himmelmann, This volume; Sidner 1983);[20] the connotations of "distance" between the speaker and the referent in such cases may make the form an apt means of marking the territorial distance between the speaker and the referent in the cases we are considering here. At any rate, whatever the motivation, it appears that *this + ProperName (+ CommonNoun)* is frequently chosen as an alternative to the bare name in these contexts where the speaker's knowledge of the referent is inferior to the addressee's.

In example (25), speaker K, an expert on Mohawk and Huron, is reporting on a conversation she had with a caller who was soliciting her professional opinion. Like the speaker in (23), K uses the phrase *this ProperName* to denote a referent which both she and her immediate interlocutor, as well as her interlocutor in the conversation she is reporting, can identify. Since the referent is identifiable to all, it would seem that the bare name *Blaeser* would be an appropriate referential choice in this context. By choosing *this ProperName* instead, though, K manages to enlist referential choice into the ranks of the many devices she is using to display her resistance to accepting the claims made by her caller. When she first mentions Blaeser, at the beginning of her story, she makes it clear, by quoting the caller's supposed wording (*Blaeser. You know Blaeser.*) that she was previously unacquainted with this putative expert; everything else about her story, including the final ironic comment that "of course the Smithsonian's always right," reveal that she rejects Blaeser's purported expertise. Her choice of the term *this ProperName* contributes to the tone K is building by marking her reluctance to assimilate the information about Blaeser provided to her by her caller; in other words, by using *this Blaeser* instead of simply *Blaeser*, K marks her lack of familiarity with this referent, a lack of familiarity which can only be due, given the information provided to her by her caller, to her own *refusal* to incorporate Blaeser into her territory of information. The form *this ProperName* thus becomes, in this context, not only a marker of defective knowledge on the speaker's part, but of *defiantly* defective knowledge and hence, an affective stance relative to the story she is telling.

Now speakers who find themselves in these situations may not *always* mark their inferior knowledge in this way. Just as speakers may choose to report incidents which they have learned of through the media without benefit of evidential markers such as *I read where* or *I hear*, they may not always find it advantageous to reveal, or draw attention to, their relative degree of knowledge regarding a referent through the use of a reference term like *this N*. After all, speaker B in (23) does choose to use the bare name twice in reference to Jack. Cases like (23), though, where the sorry state of B's knowledge regarding the referent is obvious to A because A has in fact just conveyed to B the sum total of B's knowledge regarding the referent, may represent the sort of context where speakers with deficient knowledge are most likely to "fess up". In other contexts, their knowledge may be equally scanty, but their interlocutor(s) may be unaware of this fact, tempting them to "sneak by" and garner for themselves whatever advantages may accrue to the knowledgeable participant.

Bare names may also be used, not simply in an attempt to "deceive" the recipient, but in order to achieve certain stylistic or interactional effects which derive from the implication that the speaker considers the referent to be a part of his/her territory-of-information *in spite of* the obvious shakiness of its status as such. A Hungarian colleague reported to me, for instance, that she was startled when a minister to whom she had been talking (in Hungarian) about her family subsequently began referring to the individuals she had mentioned by the names she had herself been using, even though he had no independent knowledge of these referents. Although she reasoned with herself that the minister was simply trying to empathize with her, she nonetheless felt patronized by his use of the names she had just provided to him. Similarly, an American colleague reports that she took notice when her therapist used the first names of people she had just introduced to her; the colleague did not feel patronized, she reports, but she did feel that the therapist was being "intimate".

The territory-of-information model may be useful in explaining not only conversationalists referential choices in circumstances where one participant is much more knowledgeable than the other. It may also be that it can put into perspective some of the observations regarding the lack of preference for proper names in references to kin. Bare proper names, since they are *co-recognitionals*, claim the referent in question for the speaker's territory and simultaneously acknowledge that the referent belongs (to some degree, at least) in the addressee's territory. Anchored kinterms, on the other hand, implicitly attribute greater ownership to the anchoring participant (speaker or recipient), a fact which may constitute a strategic advantage in cases where the speaker wishes to make a claim to authoritative knowledge on a particular subject, or where s/he wishes to provoke or forestall a particular response on the part of his/her addressees.

It is also interesting to note that proper names are generally not used in English to refer to either the speaker or the addressee.[21] This gap in the distribution of proper names can easily be tied in with the territory of information model since, among all referents, "self" must surely have the strongest and most exclusive affiliation with any individual's territory of information. The dispreference for proper name references in such cases can thus be seen as a stronger case of the pattern that is visible with references to kin. In other words, speakers may find it to their advantage to claim or acknowledge the territorial status of referents, like these, who have strong and exclusive affiiliations with the territory of information of either the speaker or addressee. Just as the preference for proper names does not seem to extend to references to the speaker's or addressee's kin, it is absolutely inoperative in references to the speaker and addressee themselves.[22]

If I can summarize my findings here, then, the basic insight is that bare proper names are appropriate only when the referent is present in the territories of information of both participants. In other words, these terms are *co-recognitionals*. It is also apparent that in case of a striking disparity in the territorial affiliation of a given referent, the overall preference for proper names may give way to the use of forms (such as anchored kinterms, first or second person pronouns, or proper noun phrases containing the demonstrative article *this*) which can display (or claim) the speaker's awareness of this discrepancy. Because of their importance in developing claims for or abdications of authority, and in reflecting a speaker's general stance toward the topic of talk, these referential choices may come to be of considerable strategic significance for the course of the continuing interaction.

Given the fact that various sorts of reference terms are possible for referents with particular territory-of-information statuses, we might expect that speakers will put the oppositions among these forms, and the implications carried by each, to their own purposes. In cases of referents whose territorial status is unclear or in dispute, the choice of a proper name vs. a description vs. an anchored kinterm may do more than mark the cognitive status of the referent, or effect the structure of the larger discourse — it may also promote a particular understanding of the territory status of the referent in question (cf. Schegloff 1988). Consider in this light example (26).

(26) CEC S.1.1: 48
B: Well \^now you _^see
.. these people for \^!years
.. /ɑ:/ as a matter of fact /ə/ I rather burst /\^out
... /ɔ:h/ ... \^Hart you see
is doing the \^schools /^examination
Primary section \/^language
.. and he was \^boasting
About all this stuff they'd been \^using
Of \^!Lawrence
And .. George \^Eliot
Virginia \^Woolf
And that kind of /^thing
<X and this is the X> kind of stuff he was \^!setting
For the \^!comprehension /^paper
... and /ɔ:/ then they got \/^round
to it and ... finally I rather burst \^out
I said look \^here
This English \^language /^paper
has been be'devilled 'long \^!enough
By th<X o X>se \^literature /^wallahs
<X he was talking X> about the high literary \^!content

you /^see
of /ði:/ .. \^!comprehension question
.. I said what the hell is the good of \^this
For all these \^!scientists
And engineers and \^!that kind of thing
((4 pages of transcript deleted))
→ B: How do you get \^on with this fellow \^Hart
I mean he's a \^nice fellow /^normally
but he's [<X a hell of a X> ... ] he's a \^big head in \^some ways
A: [\^I get on very \^well with him]
B: <X you know [[/^Reynard X>]]
A: [[/^Yes]]
/^Yes
\^Joe \^Joe thinks that <X of him X> \^too
.. [At _^times X>]
B: [but /ə: ə/] .. /ə/ he was saying for \^example
That /ə: i/ <X that X> these questions three and V^four
didn't make any \^difference
\^Really
To the result of the \^!examination
A: <X but X> they \^do
V^I think
B: well I'm quite \^!certain that [they do]
A: [<X I I I'm X>] \^certain <X
that [[<X they affect it X>]]

In the conversation from which this excerpt is taken, two male academics are having a friendly conversation about various academic issues. Shortly before the extract given, B has warned A that he will soon be embroiled in a battle that B is currently involved in, a dispute revolving around the sorts of procedures that should be involved in language proficiency exams. In his first turn in the extract cited, B recounts a conversation he has had with their colleague Hart; this description feeds into his indictment of the testing procedure that Hart supports. In both the extract cited and the deleted text that follows, B lards his talk with numerous signs of his disapproval for the procedures advocated by Hart, and this talk continues, with frequent signs of support from A, for the four pages of transcript preceding the arrowed line.

Interestingly, in the arrowed line, B refers to Hart as *this fellow Hart*, instead of using the bare proper name *Hart*. Why does he do this? It is clear that Hart is well-known to both participants, so *Hart* should present no impediment to A's identification of B's intended referent. B chooses the lengthier form, here, I would suggest, as simply one more way of distancing himself from Hart. The form chosen has this effect for several reasons, I would propose. First, it constitutes an avoidance of the simple proper name. Since bare proper names, as we have seen, are co-recognitionals, the use of *Hart* here would suggest that speaker B considers Hart to be a member of both his own territory of information and that of speaker A. By avoiding the bare name, B cancels these implicatures.

Secondly, common noun phrases involving *this* are usable in various sorts of situations where the speaker wishes to project either his/her own or his/her interlocutor's lack of familiarity with the referent in question. Such NP's constitute a common method for introducing referents which are thought to be unknown to the addressee but are destined to play an important role in the upcoming text (Wald 1983; Shroyer 1985); these NP's involve the form that Gundel et al. (1993) term the "indefinite this". Since *this N* can also be used in references which are not introductions, but where the referent is not firmly lodged in the speaker's territory (as in (23) or (25) above), B's use of *this-N-ProperName* lends itself to a useful ambiguity here. It is clear from B's previous talk that he wishes to distance himself from his colleague Hart and his crazy ideas; this is presumably sufficient to account for his avoidance of the proper name here. But in choosing the *this-N-ProperName* alternative, he is also offering to speaker A the possibility of being included in the group that eschews identification with Hart. As it turns out, A in his next turn declines to join himself with B in distancing himself from Hart on personal grounds, although in subsequent lines he makes it clear that he concurs nonetheless with B's assessment of the testing procedures Hart is advocating.

Since B's utterance here is phrased in the form of a question, and since it follows a long stretch of talk in which B's own disgust with Hart has been displayed with the utmost clarity, B's utterance here can be seen as a solicitation for A to align himself with B relative to Hart. Although the alternative formulation *How do you get on with Hart* would also have served to elicit some sort of a commitment on this issue from A, it would not have had the virtue of displaying by its very form the alienation from Hart (on the part of A and/or B) that B was both exhibiting and promoting.

The example in (27) (repeated from (17) above) seems to be another case where the choice of a bare proper name is used, like the common noun phrase in (26), to do interactional work related to the territory-of-information-based implicatures that it generates.

(27) Upholstery Shop: 24
Mike: <u>You</u> have a <u>tank</u> I like tuh tuh- I-I //like-
Vic: Yeh I gotta fa:wty:: I hadda fawtuy? a fifty, enna twu//nny:: en two ten::s,
Mike: Wut- Wuddiyuh doing wit //dem. Wuh-
Rich: But those were uh::: //<u>A</u>lex's tanks.
Vic: -enna fi:ve.
Vic: Hah?
Rich: Those'r <u>A</u>lex's tanks weren't they?
Vic: Podn' me?
Rich: Weren't- didn' they belong tuh Alex?
→ Vic: No: <u>A</u>lex ha(s) no tanks Alex is tryintuh buy <u>my</u> tank

In this example, Mike is beginning a negotiation to acquire Vic's fish-tanks. After Vic begins to list the tanks he has, and Mike asks what he is doing with them, Rich interrupts with a challenge to Vic's ownership of the tanks. His original challenge is in the form of a forthright claim that the tanks belong to Alex instead *(But those were uh:: <u>A</u>lex's tanks.)* After Vic responds with *Hah?*, Rich downgrades his challenge to a statement followed by a tag question. After Vic's next response, *Podn' me?*, he downgrades it even further to a simple question, although the question's phrasing (*Weren't- didn't they belong tuh Alex?*) still betrays his expectation of a positive answer.

In this context, we might expect that Vic's next line would provide an answer to Rich's question containing a reference to Alex as *he*. After all, Alex would seem to be "in focus" for both Rich and Vic at this point.[23] But instead, Vic refers to Alex with the proper name. Since use of the bare name implicates that the referent of the name is present in the territories of both the speaker and hearer, Vic's use of *Alex* here displays his authority to be making a claim about information that belongs primarily to Alex's territory, although it has been claimed by Rich in his previous utterances. This sets Vic up as at least as much of an authority on Alex as Rich has been claiming to be. In the context of a dispute of this sort, this sort of display of affiliation, and therefore, authority, may constitute a significant strategic advantage, and so the proper name serves here as a useful alternative to the pronoun, which would tie the current speaker's reference to that of the preceding speaker, a speaker whose claims are being rejected.[24]

The fact that the use of a bare name carries these sorts of implicatures may be at least part of the explanation for Fox's observation (Fox 1987: 62) that pronouns often give way to full NP's in the context of disagreements between conversational participants. Fox cites a number of examples of this sort, and it is worth noting that all of them contain, not simply full NP's, but proper names.

## 3. Conclusions

The sheer frequency of proper names in English conversations suggests that they must have some features which recommend them over the array of alternative referential options that are available for denoting human referents. In this paper I hope to have elucidated what some of those features might be.

In any context, the choice of one particular proper name from a pool containing others (e.g. *Andy* vs. *Andrew* vs. *Andrew Holmes-Watson* ...) is likely to serve as a useful indicator of the speaker's assessment of the social network that encompasses the speaker, the hearer, the referent, and possibly also various other auditors or overhearers. In introductory mentions of human referents ("locally initial" contexts), these names also stand out by virtue of their relative brevity and the fact that they can act as recognitionals — both of these properties put them in conformity with two broader conversational "preferences" outlined by Sacks and Schegloff (1979). Names are also distinguished in these initial contexts by the fact that they serve as a means of picking out a particular referent which is *relatively* context-free, by comparison to definite descriptions which may rely for their interpretation on the addressee's familiarity with some particular property or action of the referent. And, since not *all* human referents seem to be "nameworthy", names may serve to indicate to hearers exactly which of the participants mentioned the speaker intends to endow with high topicality in the talk that follows.

In "locally subsequent" contexts, these names constitute one of the set of lexical NP types which serve as alternatives to the personal pronouns. As such, they are especially prone to appear in contexts where there is some break in the topical or interactive structure of the conversation, as at episode or "sequence" boundaries, or in disagreement contexts where the speaker declines to tie his/her referential behavior to that of the preceding speaker.

In all of these contexts, bare proper names are distinguished by the fact that they are "co-recognitionals", their use implicating that both the speaker and the addressee are assessed to have some degree of knowledge about the referent denoted. This property of these forms makes them especially useful in contexts where the speaker wishes to display his/her authority to speak about a particular referent, as is common in disagreement contexts. It also renders them inappropriate in contexts where the speaker wishes to acknowledge the inferiority of his/her "claim" to knowledge regarding a particular referent — in such cases they often give way to forms (such as anchored kinterms or noun phrases containing the demonstrative article *this*) which explicitly mark the speaker's (relative) lack of claim to authority regarding the referent in question.

This analysis thus suggests that any of an array of semantic, phonological, and pragmatic properties may motivate a speaker to opt for a proper name as a means of denoting a human referent in a conversational context. Most of these factors have been implicated, in one way or another, in earlier analyses of other reference forms, and this study merely amplifies our understanding of their impact in structuring the English system of referential options. The discussion here does represent an initial attempt, however, to assess the relevance of the notion of territory-of-information for an analysis of referential choice; its apparent utility in explicating the impact of proper name usage suggests that it may be of value in coming to an understanding of the functioning of the larger referential choice system of English, and perhaps of other languages as well.

## NOTES

1. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Linguistics Colloquium, April 11, 1994, and the Anaphora Symposium, Aspen Lodge, Colorado, May 20, 1994. For their comments on these earlier versions, I would like to thank Susanna Cumming, Jack Du Bois, Ceci Ford, Barbara Fox, Talmy Givón, Tim Halkowski, Flora Klein-Andreu, Aida Martinovic-Zic, Edith Moravcsik, Mickey Noonan, David Stack, Lin Waugh, and especially Pat Clancy, Manny Schegloff, and Sandy Thompson, who provided detailed critiques that inspired substantial re-thinking and revision. Needless to say, none of these people is responsible for any errors or infelicities they failed to talk me out of.

2. See, for example, Schegloff (1972), Sacks and Schegloff (1979), Fox (1987), Ariel (1990), Halkowski (1990), and Sacks (1992a and b).

3. These data come from a number of sources. Some come from published sources cited in the text of the paper, and from the *Corpus of English Conversation (CEC)*, a collection of British English conversations recorded in the sixties and seventies and published in a volume edited by Svartvik and Quirk. Others come from transcripts of conversations I have collected myself from American English speakers in a variety of situations and from the collections, generously made available to me, of Wally Chafe, Paul Drew, Ceci Ford, Sarah Freedman, and Manny Schegloff.

   Because the data come from a number of sources, they are transcribed according to three different sets of transcription conventions. The first is the Conversation Analysis set of conventions described in the appendix to Zimmerman and West (1980), among other places. The second is the set of conventions described in Chafe (1980). The third is the set of conventions recently developed by the research group at UC Santa Barbara and described in Du Bois et al. (1992) and (1993). The Svartvik and Quirk transcripts, which use a number of idiosyncratic symbols unavailable on the standard keyboard, have been converted, to the extent possible, into the Du Bois et al. system.

4. Like their characterization of the preference for minimization, Sacks and Schegloff's wording with respect to recognitionals leaves some room for clarification, especially with respect to the word "know". In choosing this phraseology, do they intend to exclude from the class of "known" referents those individuals the recipient may simply "know *of*" (perhaps through the immediately preceding talk of "the referrer"), or do they intend to include all individuals relative to which the recipient possesses some (perhaps scant) degree of advance knowledge, including those which have just been introduced into their consciousness by the talk of their interlocutors? The examples cited in the 1979 paper fail to clarify Sacks and Schegloff's thinkin g on this issue, but the wording in Schegloff (This volume) suggests that Schegloff's *current* intention, at least, is to include all these reference types under the rubric "recognitional".

5. This preference may in fact not be confined to conversational contexts — authors such as Prince have phrased the injunction more broadly. Citing the "Familiarity Scale" represented below,

   Familiarity Scale (Prince 1981: 245)

   more familiar
   ▲ Evoked; Situationally Evoked
   | Unused
   | Inferrable
   | Containing Inferrable
   | Brand-New Anchored
   ▼ Brand-New
   less familiar

   Prince (1981: 245) has argued that

   > "if a speaker is in a position to say one of these on basis of his/her hypothesis about what the hearer knows and chooses instead to say one lower on the scale (to refer to the same individual), s/he will be seen, if found out, to have been deviant in some way (e.g., evasive, childish, building suspense in a mystery novel.) Put differently, we may say that the use of an NP representing a certain point on the

scale implicates that the speaker could not have felicitously referred to the same entity by another NP higher on the scale. The recognition of such a scale permits this sort of implicature to be subsumed under the Gricean maxim of Quantity."

This formulation differs from Sacks and Schegloff's in that it is intended to apply to referential choice in various text types, not just conversation, and in that it attributes the described effects to the use of *any* referential form which underestimates the addressee's "familiarity" with the referent, not just the use of non-recognitionals in situations where recognitionals would be warranted. For an opposing viewpoint on the acceptability of forms lower on this scale in references to referents with statuses higher on the scale, see Gundel et al. (1993).

6. While Lambrecht does recognize the same three statuses as Chafe, he ends up modifying his characterization of the "semi-active" category, on the grounds that this status "does not have to entail that the accessible referent is somehow present, indirectly or peripherally, in the hearer's consciousness, as Chafe seems to assume. Rather what seems to make a referent accessible is the fact that [...] the referent is easier to conjure up in the addressee's mind than a referent which is entirely inactive. I suggest, then, that we think of cognitive accessibility as a POTENTIAL FOR ACTIVATION rather than as the STATE OF A REFERENT in a person's mind." (Lambrecht 1994: 104).

7. In his most recent work, Chafe has suggested that there may in fact be more than three activation states, and that the boundaries between them may be fuzzy. Nonetheless, he suggests (Chafe 1994: 56) that "the effect of these states on language *is* categorical."

8. The fact that proper names may be used with respect to referents holding any of these activation statuses does not mean that the constraints on their usage, or the effects of their usage, will necessarily be identical for referents of all these types. In this regard, it is useful to refer to the distinction drawn by Schegloff (This volume) between "locally-initial" and "locally-subsequent" reference slots and his observations on the different effects that may be attendant on the use of "the same form" in slots of the two types. In locally-initial contexts, names participate in a contrast set composed primarily of phrases headed by full lexical forms, while in locally-subsequent contexts, they also find themselves in competition with the "simple solution" (Schegloff, This volume) for these contexts, i.e. personal pronouns. It is probably also relevant with respect to the particular example in (2) that the referent in question happens to be present and an active participant in the conversation, a consideration which serves to subdivide the "active" category in a way which is not reflected in Lambrecht's taxonomy, or in Chafe's. Here the proper name is used in preference to either the third person pronoun (*she*) justified by the fact that the referent is "active" or the second person pronoun (*you*) justified by the presence of K as the speaker of the earlier line which has triggered S's response. In opting for the name, the speaker has cast the referent as a third person, rather than a second person, thereby enlisting the proper name in the enterprise of indicating the intended recipient of his talk.

9. Or, in the case of multi-party conversations, for at least *one* of their addressees. See the discussion below for some attention to the special issues raised by multi-party conversations where different participants have different degrees of familiarity with the referents denoted.

10. One might argue with respect to the form used in (4), *somebody called Susan Potter*, that it also suggests that the speaker himself was unfamiliar with the referent at the time being referred to.

11. But see Schegloff (This volume) for some cautions on the correlation between gaze direction and intended recipient.

12. This is the strategy used by H below when he refers to the woman mentioned before only as *the same mother* by her name, *Hattie*, pronounced with low stress.

Albany 3A
H: ... [You'd] never ^guess.
W: [Whereas this]
H: They were ... half [ ... sib]lings.
W: [^Yeah. <P Yeah. P>]
W: ... To see them to^gether.
W: ... But they have the same .. ^mother?
→ H: ... Same ^mother. ... ... Who has ^since found [... di]^vorced,
W: [ <X XXXX X>]
H: ... the guy Sa^limi and ... hangs out with somebody ^else now.
W: .. Named Mc^Cullough @,
((laughter from all))
H: [Na.]
Others: [((laughter))]
H: [[@ Right,]]
Others: [[((laughter))]]
((laughter from all))
S: ... ... We haven't ^talked to them for [a ^long time.]
H: [Haven't called] for a ^long time.
→ I should give'm a ^call. ... ... See if Hattie's still as interested in the Democratic ^Party after this week's de^bacle.

As the examples in (8) illustrate, however, this strategy of inserting a previously non-recognitional name is not *confined* to contexts where low stress on the name can be used to indicate that it is intended to effect an anaphoric reference, instead of an introductory one, since a number of factors other than degree of activation have an effect on the ability of an anaphoric reference to take low stress (cf. Lambrecht 1994). Thus both J's initial utterance of *Maddie* and P's reference to *Sue* bear heavy stress.

These considerations suggest that it may not be possible to label particular classes of forms, such as proper names, as "locally initial" forms (Schegloff, This volume) or "low accessibility" markers (Ariel 1990), without taking into account the phonology of their particular instantiations. The ability of proper names to denote inactive referents does make them usable, unlike most pronouns, in "locally-initial" contexts, and they do sometimes seem to be used to thwart the continuity of talk in slots that would otherwise be considered "locally-subsequent" (see section2.2. below). On the other hand, they are also available for use, with low stress, in contexts which are clearly "locally-subsequent" and which continue the established train of talk (as in the example above). Without further examination, it is probably premature to assign this last group of cases to the same "locally-initial" category as the former cases, since it is at present unclear how recipients tend to resolve the apparent conflict between the full-fledged lexical form (which is potentially locally-initial) and the reduced phonological form (which is typical of locally-subsequent forms).

13. Of course, to the extent that participants *lack* independent knowledge about these referents, their warrant to speak at this point in the developing conversation may be curtailed (cf. my comments on the exclusionary use of names on p. 102).

14. I do not mean to suggest here that proper names differ from common nouns in having unique, fixed referents which are constant across contexts. A glance at examples like (6) should make it clear that many proper names, especially first names, have the potential to be ambiguous in context; an addressee's background knowledge, as well as his/her assessment of the speaker's assessment of that background knowledge (i.e. who the addressee thinks that the speaker thinks that s/he knows) will be crucial in identifying the referent associated with a particular proper name in a particularcontext. Rather, what I wish to draw attention to here is the fact that an individual's proper name (or repertoire of proper names) remains relatively constant across contexts, while a common noun phrase which succeeds in identifying that referent in one context (e.g. *the man standing in the corner*) may be totally inapplicable in another.

15. For a more explicit treatment of the notion of "sequence" as it is defined by Conversation Analysts, see Schegloff (1990), especially p. 59.

16. Unfortunately for B, this ploy is not completely successful in discouraging A, as A's remarks in the next few lines of the conversation reveal.

17. This generalization conforms to the intuitions of many speakers (including me), and is supported by, for example, Wilson and Zeitlin's (1995) analysis of one middle-class American conversation. It is probably subject to individual, and perhaps generational, variation, however.

18. A corroborating anecdote comes from a colleague who reports noticing when a friend of relatively recent standing began referring to her [the friend's] own mother as *Mom*, instead of *my mother*. The colleague was touched by this switch and interpreted it as an indicator that the friend had now come to consider her an intimate.

19. "The astute reader" may have noticed that Speaker B also uses *this+ProperName* in one of her references to Cal, a character who did appear in her videotape segment as well as that of her interlocutor. Her use of this form, instead of the bare name, may also be explicable along the lines being developed here, however, since B has confessed, a few minutes earlier in the conversation, that she "never got that guy's name."

20. Wald (1983) in fact suggests that these two uses may not be unrelated, the former having evolved historically from the latter.

21. This pattern is clearly not a language universal. In Japanese, for instance, first and second person pronouns are generally avoided, and proper names are typically used instead of the second person forms. Even in English, proper names may be used with reference to self in particular circumstances, as when speaking to children. See also the examples in Schegloff (This volume).

22. These observations should not be taken as arguments against Schegloff's proposal (This volume) that the relatively invariant use of the first and second pronouns to refer to the speaker and recipient are the result of a "simple" solution to a very frequent reference problem. Indeed, Schegloff's proposal seems quite plausible. What it does not address, however, is the question of why it is precisely these pronouns, as opposed to any other of the referential options that are available, that have evolved as the "simple solution." My remarks here should be taken as a contribution to the answer to this second question.

23. One might however argue that Rich's repeated use of *Alex* instead of *he* in his two previous utterances is due to the fact that Vic, with his *Hah?* and his *Podn' me*?, is

refusing to assimilate what Rich has just said. Thus Rich cannot assume that Alex is in focus for Vic, eliminating the possibility that he can use a pronoun to refer to him.

24. Edith Moravcsik has pointed out to me that the sentence *Alex has no tanks*, with its relative context independence, by comparison with *He has no tanks*, also has the flavor of an aphorism, or a pronouncement, rather than a simple response to Rich. This overtone is probably enhanced by the more substantial phonological substance of *Alex*, relative to *he*, and by the rather formal *has no tanks*, as opposed to *doesn't have any tanks*.

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