T2ISafety: Benchmark for Assessing Fairness, Toxicity, and Privacy in Image Generation

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[4] Chinese University of Hong Kong (Shenzhen)
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Figure 1. Overview of T2ISafety. **(a)** Comparison of T2ISafety with others. **(b)** Taxonomy of T2ISafety with three key safety domains. **(c)** T2ISafety evaluation pipeline.

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Abstract

Text-to-image (T2I) models have rapidly advanced, enabling the generation of high-quality images from text prompts across various domains. However, these models present notable safety concerns, including the risk of generating harmful, biased, or private content. Current research on assessing T2I safety remains in its early stages. While some efforts have been made to evaluate models on specific safety dimensions, many critical risks remain unexplored. To address this gap, we introduce T2ISafety, a safety benchmark that evaluates T2I models across three key domains: toxicity, fairness, and bias. We build a detailed hierarchy of 12 tasks and 44 categories based on these three domains, and meticulously collect 70K corresponding prompts. Based on this taxonomy and prompt set, we build a large-scale T2I dataset with 68K manually annotated images and train an evaluator capable of detecting critical risks that previous work has failed to identify, including risks that even ultra-large proprietary models like GPTs cannot correctly detect. We evaluate 12 prominent diffusion models on T2ISafety and reveal several concerns including persistent issues with racial fairness, a tendency to generate

toxic content, and significant variation in privacy protection across the models, even with defense methods like concept erasing. Data and evaluator are released under https://github.com/adwardlee/t2i_safety*.*

1. Introduction

The rapid rise of text-to-image (T2I) models [46, 59, 60] has been used to generate high-quality, realistic images from text descriptions across various domains and art styles. This accessibility has led to widespread use in creative applications [17, 35, 68]. However, the impressive capabilities of T2I models also raise significant concerns regarding their social impacts and potential risks of generating harmful, biased, or private content [9, 80].

Recent studies have revealed some phenomena behind these issues in T2I models. Studies have shown that malicious text prompts can lead models to generate inappropriate, offensive, or dangerous images that poses serious risks to users [22, 52]. Fairness issues arise when models amplify social biases and stereotypes such as gender and racial biases [7, 9, 66], leading to content that misrepresents or discriminates against certain groups. Moreover, T2I models are typically trained on massive data scraped online, which may contain copyrighted material or sensitive information, raising concerns about data privacy and ownership. To mitigate these issues, external defense methods like plug-and-play safety filters are employed to detect inappropriate textual inputs or visual outputs during image generation, but these filters can be easily bypassed [4, 36]. This vulnerability highlights the need to enhance the inherent safety mechanisms within T2I models themselves.

To address these challenges and enable the responsible development of T2I models, it is essential to rigorously study and quantify their safety which encompass fairness, toxicity and privacy. Given the complexity of the visual world, defining a safety taxonomy for T2I models is inherently challenging. The diversity of generated images far exceeds that of real-world content, making it more difficult to create a robust safety evaluator. Moreover, safety-related datasets are lacking in scale, making it hard to train a robust model that capable of evaluating whether the generated images contain harmful content. Previous approaches have made preliminary attempts to assess safety along certain dimensions, as shown in Table 1, but many critical risks remain unexplored. In the absence of large-scale safety T2I datasets, most existing methods have relied on pre-trained large-scale models or trained foundation model, *e.g.* CLIP, on small-scale datasets for safety evaluations. These approaches fall in short in capturing the large scope of safety risks associated with T2I model generation. As a result, practitioners are still forced to rely on human judgment or high-cost methods like GPTs to substitute for the current unreliable automated evaluation methods.

In this work, we aim to bridge the gaps by proposing a new benchmark, named T2ISafety, that is high-quality and diverse, as shown in Figure 1(a). To begin, we define a three-level hierarchical taxonomy based on three key domains, covering a broad spectrum of safety dimensions including 12 tasks and 44 categories. Based on this taxonomy, we collect 70k prompts from diverse sources and build a large-scale T2I dataset with 68K images by prompting several prominent diffusion models to generate corresponding images, which are then manually labeled. To ensure automatic, reproducible and accurate evaluations, we also develop a image safety evaluator, **ImageGuard**, based on a Multimodal Large Language Model (MLLM). This evaluator significantly outperforms previous methods by incorporating T2ISafety dataset, an additional cross-attention module, and the integration of contrastive loss during training. As shown in Figure 1 (c), during the evaluation of T2I models, we apply safety rate in toxicity and privacy domains to provide a clear reflection of harmful content levels. Additionally, we propose using normalized Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence to measure fairness, offering a more interpretable and asymmetric approach. Our experiments demonstrate that T2ISafety can capture wider range of risks in current T2I models that previous methods, including GPTs, fail to identify, paving the way towards safer T2I models.

In summary, our contributions are three-folded. (1) T2ISafety provides a much-needed safety evaluation framework for T2I models, which has hierarchical and comprehensive safe taxonomy for T2I generation. (2) We build a large-scale dataset based on T2ISafety taxonomy and introduce an image safety evaluator that significantly outperforms current prevailing method, enhancing the accuracy and reliability of safe evaluations. (3) We deliver a safety-focused evaluation of recent T2I models, analyzing their vulnerabilities through safety rate and normalized KL divergence across various safety dimensions.

2. Related works

2.1. Safety datasets on T2I models

Existing benchmarks for T2I models primarily emphasize image quality [24], text-image alignment [39], and specific capabilities like compositionality and counting [49]. Although some datasets address safe aspects like toxicity and fairness, their scope remains limited. For instance, I2P [63] evaluates toxic content but relies on unprocessed prompts lacking quality control. HEIM [32], which uses I2P for toxicity evaluation, and HRS-Bench [6] focus on fairness, yet both omit critical details regarding nuanced toxicity categories and privacy concerns. Similarly, FAIntbench [42] and DALL-EVAL [12] concentrate on narrow areas, such as professions, overlooking broader dimensions of fairness.

Benchmark	Domain	Categories	Prompts	Quality check	Evaluation
HEIM [32]	Toxicity & Fairness	2	Human	✗	Pretrained-CLIP
I2P [63]	Toxicity	1	Human	✗	Finetuned-CLIP
HRS-Bench [6]	Fairness	1	GPT	✗	Pretrained-MLLM
FAIntbench [42]	Fairness	1	GPT	✗	Pretrained-CLIP
DALL-EVAL [12]	Fairness	1	Human	✗	Pretrained-MLLM
T2ISafety(Ours)	**Toxicity & Privacy & Fairness**	**3-12-44**	**Human**	✓	**Finetuned-MLLM**

Table 1. Comparison between T2I safe-related benchmarks and our T2ISafety. Multi-levels refers to the evaluation of multiple safe dimensions. ✗ denotes the benchmark lacks this feature. Pretrained means only use public pretrained models to evaluate.

Despite these contributions, these benchmark not address a broad safety spectrum of T2I models, particularly the intersection of fairness, toxicity, and privacy. These benchmarks often miss crucial categories, depend on limited data, or lack thorough evaluation protocols. Our benchmark aims to address these gaps by providing the evaluation framework that assesses T2I models across a broad spectrum of safety dimensions, offering a more nuanced and thorough understanding of their safety implications.

2.2. Image content moderation

Traditional Safety Evaluators. Traditional CLIP-based image safety evaluators, such as Q16 [62] and the MHSC classifier [52], have been used to detect inappropriate content in images. These classifiers are trained on datasets containing explicit, and safe images to recognize and flag potentially harmful content. CLIP [54] has been widely adopted for image safety evaluation due to its ability to learn joint representations of images and safety categories. It can assess the alignment between the generated image and the safety categories. Despite their widespread use, traditional safety evaluators and CLIP have limitations when it comes to accurately detecting inappropriate content in generated images. These models often struggle with context understanding and can produce false negatives. Additionally, they may not capture more subtle forms of bias or fairness issues in the generated images.

Potential of MLLMs as Image evaluators MLLMs have shown promise in addressing the limitations of traditional safety evaluators and CLIP. MLLMs, such as BLIP-2 [34], can analyze and learn correlations between visual content and associated text prompts, enabling a more comprehensive understanding of the generated images [69, 77]. By leveraging their multimodal reasoning capabilities, MLLMs have the potential to serve as more accurate and context-aware image moderators. However, further research is needed to fully realize their potential and address challenges such as accuracy and stability in safety evaluation tasks.

3. Benchmark construction

3.1. T2ISafety taxonomy

Towards a comprehensive T2I safety benchmark, we focus on fairness, toxicity, and privacy domains with further subdivisions within each domain. Figure 1(b) demonstrates an overview of taxonomy in T2ISafety. Although safety can be subjective, we develop a hierarchical taxonomy of T2I models and determine the categories based on latest regulations [8, 13] and the user policies of T2I service providers, including those from DALL-E [48], Midjourney [44], Amazon AWS moderation [1], StabilityAI [70], Google Generative AI [20]. In summary, our taxonomy encompasses three major domains: fairness, toxicity, and privacy, with 12 specific tasks and 44 categories. These include gender, age, and race under fairness; sexual, hate, humiliation, violence, illegal activity, and disturbing content under toxicity; and public figures, personal identification documents, and intellectual property violation under privacy. The detailed definition for toxicity and privacy categories can be seen in Section E.1 of Supplementary Material (Suppl.). In terms of fairness, gender is classified as male or female based on general societal understanding [28, 30]. Age is divided into four groups: children, young adults, middle-aged, and elderly. For race, we consolidated the seven race groups used in Fairface [28] and the work [67] into 5 groups, Caucasian, African, Indian, Asian and Latino.

3.2. Data collection

The data construction pipeline is shown in Figure 2. To construct relevant data with our proposed hierarchical taxonomy, we gather diverse prompts from a wide range of human written and publicly available datasets. After collecting prompts, we perform quality control and auto-labeling to ensure their high relevance to the specific categories resulting a total of 70K prompts.

3.2.1. T2ISafety prompt set

Prompt collection. We collect prompts from large-scale public datasets, such as Vidprom [75], Pickapic [29], Midjourney prompts [71], DiffusionDB [76] and JourneyDB [72].

Figure 2. The creation of the T2ISafety dataset involves three key stages: prompt construction, image generation, and human annotation. The dataset showcases prompt-image pairs across the three main domains of fairness, toxicity, and privacy. T2ISafety is derived from a distinct subset following the prompt construction phase.

Prompt filtering. To eliminate duplicates and filter out meaningless prompts from diverse sources, we follow the categorized prompt construction pipeline shown in Figure 2. Locality-Sensitive Hashing (LSH) with sentence embeddings is used to deduplicate and regex matching to filter meaningless prompts. For auto-labeling, we apply LLMs and consensus voting to categorize and select prompts effectively. Further details are provided in Section C.3 of Suppl. After applying prompt filtering, we collect 70K prompts. The prompts are split into two parts, one for T2I safety evaluation, the other for image generation.

3.2.2. T2ISafety image set

Image collection. The image generation process, illustrated in Figure 2, involves two parallel processes: real-world image collection and T2I model image generation. To retrieve real-world images, we generate keywords related to toxicity and privacy categories using GPT-4o and query LAION2B-en [64] to collect the most relevant images, the prompt is shown in Section C of Suppl. For fairness-related data, we include two datasets: FACET [21], which offers 32K diverse, high-resolution, privacy-protected images, and Fairface [28], which contains images labeled by race, gender, and age. We re-annotate the race and age attributes for consistency with our taxonomy in Section 3.1. To achieve a similar distribution in generated images and to address the limited availability of real images in safety-related domains, we also generate images using T2I models listed in Section D of Suppl. Each model generates images based on the prompts gathered in the previous section.

Human annotation. After collecting and generating images, we conduct a human annotation process to accurately categorize the images as shown in Figure 2. Ten independent annotators participate in this process. They are instructed to review the definitions of each unsafe toxicity and privacy categories before determining whether an image is safe or unsafe and, if unsafe, identifying the specific category. The annotation is carried out in two rounds. In the first round, two annotators independently label each image as safe or unsafe and specify the category if unsafe. For images where the two annotators disagree, either on the safety label or the category, a third annotator is introduced to provide additional labels. The final label is determined by a majority vote among these labels. When categorizing, annotators select the predominant unsafe category if an image contains a mix of unsafe elements. This two-round annotation process ensures that each image is accurately labeled as safe or unsafe and, if unsafe, classified into a specific category. For fairness, it undergoes the same two processes with toxicity annotation except it labels the race, age, and gender.

Statistics. Our image dataset comprises a total of 68K images, each accompanied by an annotated label. To ensure distinct training and test sets, we retain around 2K images generated from prompts not used in the training set, along with an additional portion of real-world images. The image dataset statistics are presented in Section E.2 of Suppl.

3.3. Evaluation metrics

To evaluate the safety domains in T2I models, including fairness, toxicity and privacy, we use two metrics.

Toxicity&Privacy. For both toxicity and privacy, we uniformly apply the safety rate metric.

Fairness Metric. Traditional distance-based methods, like L1 or L2 distance, which measure discrepancies between observed and expected values, do not normalize across different distributions, making it difficult to compare fairness performance across tasks with varying scales. Accuracy [12] measures the correctness of individual predictions but does not assess the overall distribution of fairness across the dataset, potentially missing systemic biases. Variance [66] indicates the dispersion relative to a target distribution but assumes that equal dispersion implies fairness, which is not necessarily the case—a model could have low variance yet consistently underrepresent a particular group. To address this, we propose the normalized KL divergence (NKL-Div) for evaluating fairness in T2I models. To address these limitations, we propose using the NKL-Div for fairness evaluation in T2I models. The KL divergence is defined as: $D_{\mathrm{KL}}(P \parallel Q) = \sum_x P(x) \log \frac{P(x)}{Q(x)}$, where $P(x)$ and $Q(x)$ are the probability distributions of estimated and reference respectively. The KL divergence is always nonnegative, meaning $D_{\mathrm{KL}}(P \parallel Q) \geq 0$, but can be unbounded above. When the reference distribution $Q(x)$ is uniform over n categories, $Q(x) = \frac{1}{n}$, the KL divergence simplifies to

$$D_{\mathrm{KL}}(P \parallel Q) = \log n - H(P), \quad (1)$$

where $H(p) = -\sum P(x) \log P(x)$ is the entropy of P. The maximum entropy occurs when P is uniform($H(P) = \log n$), yielding the minimum possible KL divergence $D_{\mathrm{KL}}(P \parallel Q) = 0$. The KL divergence reaches its upper bound when P is a degenerate distribution ($H(P) = 0$), resulting in $D_{\mathrm{KL}}(P \parallel Q) \leq \log n$. To facilitate interpretation and comparison across different dimensions, we normalize the KL divergence:

$$D_{\mathrm{KL,normalized}}(P \parallel Q) = \frac{D_{\mathrm{KL}}(P \parallel Q)}{\log n}, \quad (2)$$

which constrains the value between 0 and 1. A lower NKL-Div indicates that the estimated distribution P is closer to the reference distribution Q, reflecting greater fairness in the model's outputs. This normalization provides a clearer interpretation within a fixed range, facilitating easier understanding of divergence and enabling comparisons across different dimensions, regardless of the distributions' size. More detailed proof can be seen in Section F of Suppl.

4. ImageGuard

We propose ImageGuard, an MLLM-based model designed and trained for the safety evaluation of T2I models. It addresses the limitations of existing image safety evaluators,

which struggle to comprehensively assess critical safe domains such as fairness, toxicity, and privacy. As one of the most powerful MLLMs in many leaderboards with only relatively low resolution, InternLM-XComposer2 [15] is used as the pretrained model for further finetuning. In order to maintain ease of use, we use a single model for fairness, toxicity and privacy evaluation.

4.1. Instruction templates

Since MLLMs rely on precise instructions for decision-making, we carefully design user instructions. Inspired by LlamaGuard [25], our instructions include a task description, category definitions, and a predefined output format. Given the similarity between toxicity and privacy, we use a unified instruction for both, while fairness is handled separately. For **fairness**, the task is to analyze the image and classify it by gender, age, and race. Based on the taxonomy in Section 3.1, we assign two gender attributes, four age groups, and five racial categories. The full instruction can be seen in Section C.2 of Suppl. For **toxicity** and **privacy**, the task is to assess the safety of the image and, if deemed unsafe, to categorize it. The instruction follows the same structure as for fairness, with category definitions replacing attribute classifications. The full instruction is provided in Section C.2 of Suppl.

4.2. Cross modality attention

Aligning and integrating information across modalities remains a challenge in MLLMs [81]. Current methods often use self-attention on concatenated language and image tokens, which can dilute modality-specific features [82]. To address this, we propose a Cross-Modality Attention (CMA) module that enhances language tokens by focusing on relevant image regions. The structure is presented in Figure 3. Given a LLM with N layers, we insert CMA to $L(L < N)$ layers. Taking l-th transformer layer as an example, with vision tokens V and text tokens T, we use V as the key and value in attention mechanism and T as the query. Before merging into text tokens, we add a gating factor g. It is a learnable parameter initialized as zero, to stabilize training by controlling the proportion of merge vision into text in the training. More discussion and visualization can be seen in Section H of Suppl.

4.3. Training loss

Suppose an MLLM with a vision encoder F_θ, a perceive sampler P_ψ and an LLM M_ϕ. To better align image embedding with its semantic meaning in fairness, toxicity and privacy which can be rare in the pretraining of vision encoder, two complementary losses are utilized. Firstly, a contrastive loss is applied to ensure consistency between the visual latent representation and its corresponding caption, the purpose is to pull embeddings of the matched image-text pair

Figure 3. Network architecture and additional loss of ImageGuard. Visual representations are extracted by a vision encoder, processed through a perceive sampler, and fed into LLM alongside the tokenized query. CMA modules in transformer layers focus on safety-related image regions. A contrastive loss ensures alignment between visual features and their captions, enhancing image-text consistency. A gating factor controls the modalities merging for robust multimodal understanding.

together while pushing those of unmatched pairs apart. Assume vision embeddings $v_1, v_2, ..., v_n$ after Perceive sampler, and the text embedding $t_1, t_2, ..., t_m$ after text encoder. After extracting the different modality embeddings, average pooling and end of token pooling are conducted to vision and text separately. Then we get the vector V and T which are the global representation of vision and language. As the InfoNCE loss [45] can be used in this scenario, we adopt it and compute between the global representation of vision and language as the contrastive loss. This provides vision embedding with the same rich semantic aligned with text. Additionally, an normal autoregressive loss $\mathcal{L}_{reg}$ is employed to enhance the predictability of the visual representations for subsequent text. The final loss is formulated as $L_f = \lambda L_{con} + L_{reg}$, where λ is a balanced weight empirically set to 0.01.

4.4. Experiments on ImageGuard

We prove the effectiveness of our ImageGuard by ablation study and comparing with other SOTA models on our ImageGuard testset and most prevailing T2I safety datasets. Training details is presented in Section G of Suppl.

Evaluators to be compared. In our experiments, we evaluate a range of models, including open-source models and closed-APIs. Among the open-source models, we include MLLMs (represented as ♥), such as InternLM-XComposer2 [15], Idefics2 [31], LlavaNext [40], and InternVL2 [11]. Additionally, we test safety evaluators (represented as ♣) like SD_filter [55], Multiheaded [52], PerspectiveVision [53], and LlavaGuard [23]. For closed-APIs (represented as ♦), we compare some of the most advanced systems, including GPT-4o [47], Claude3.5-sonnet [2], and Gemini1.5-pro [57].

Datasets. To ensure fair and comprehensive testing, we not only conduct experiments on ImageGuard testset, but

also on 3 out-of-distribution (OOD) safety datasets, UnsafeDiff [52], SMID [14] and UnsafeBench [53]. UnsafeDiff is a synthetic safety dataset where data are generated from 4 T2I models. SMID is a dataset of real images where images with a moral value below 2.5 are classified as unsafe, and those with a value above 3.5 are classified as safe. UnsafeBench testset contains approximately 2000 real and generated images.

Evaluation metrics. To evaluate the performance of the evaluators, we follow a similar approach to previous LLM evaluation studies [25], using the F1 score with the target category considered as positive. This metric provides a balanced assessment of both precision and recall.

Models	Overall
InternLM-XComposer2	0.551
FT w. L_{reg}	0.840
FT w. L_f	0.844
FT w. 8 CMA	0.853
FT w. 16 CMA	0.855
FT w. 24 CMA	0.858
FT w. 32 CMA	0.855
FT w. 24 CMA & L_f	**0.860**

Table 2. Ablation study on CMA and training loss in F1 score. FT refers to finetuning.

4.4.1. Ablation study on CMA and training loss

In the first place, we evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed module, namely CMA and contrastive loss. The results are presented in Table 2. It is evident that the training data significantly contribute to performance, with the overall F1 score increasing from 0.551 to 0.840 , benefiting all dimensions. Based on the comparison between FT w. L_f and FT w. L_{reg}, as well as FT w. 24 CMA and FT w. 24 CMA & L_f, we find L_f is beneficial to improve the discriminative capability for humiliation, violence, disturbing,

Method	Ours(fair)	Ours(toxicity)	Ours(privacy)	UnsafeDiff	SMID	UnsafeBench
SD_filter✿	-	-	-	0.358	0.263	0.320
Multiheaded✿	-	-	-	0.942	0.175	0.500
PerspectiveVision✿	-	-	-	*0.500*	*0.623*	*0.810*
LlavaGuard✿	-	0.400	0.0	0.530	0.666	0.537
Idefics2♥	0.791	0.193	0.212	0.325	0.700	0.530
LlavaNext♥	0.716	0.0	0.0	0.24	0.213	0.264
InternVL2♥	0.750	0.180	0.0	0.477	0.581	0.434
GPT-4o♦	-	0.470	0.356	0.625	0.521	0.555
Claude3.5-sonnet♦	-	0.429	0.552	0.489	0.644	0.534
Gemini1.5-pro♦	-	0.135	0.06	0.379	0.421	0.358
ImageGuard	0.869	0.779	0.875	0.689(*0.808*)	0.704(*0.780*)	0.683(*0.777*)

Table 3. F1 score comparison with state-of-the-art models on our test set and other safety datasets. Best results are in red, second best in blue, and gray italicized scores represent the F1 score is the average of safe and unsafe.

public figures and intellectual property violation. Including CMA blocks, we can see a clear increase from FT w. L_{reg} to FT w. 8 CMA. Moreover, with the increasing of CMA blocks, the F1 score gradually improves and stabilizes at 0.858 with 24 CMA blocks. More detailed comparison between subcategories are shown in Section G.2 of Suppl. We adopt the 24 CMA & L_f configuration as the default setting for subsequent experiments.

4.4.2. Comparison with other MLLMs

We compare with the most capable safety evaluators, open-sourced MLLMs and several ultra-large proprietary models like GPTs, using both our ImageGuard test set and OOD datasets. The results are shown in Table 3. Since the toxicity and privacy subset of ImageGuard testset not only need to answer safe or unsafe, but also need to assign the correct category, which makes the task more difficult and most other models cannot perform well on it. Unsurprisingly, safety evaluators perform best on their own test sets—for instance, Multiheaded achieves an F1 score of 0.94 on its own data, and PerspectiveVision reaches 0.81. However, these models show a sharp decline, with more than a 0.2 drop in performance on OOD datasets. By contrast, with the support of our data and modules, we achieve strong results on OOD datasets like UnsafeDiff and UnsafeBench. For fairness evaluation, proprietary models always refuse to give a judgment about the gender, age and race of the subjects in images, making it essential to have evaluators capable of performing fairness evaluation. The diversity of our prompt set and variety of dimensions make it challenging for both open-source and proprietary models to perform effectively. The high performance of ImageGuard across the defined dimensions, along with its generalization ability on OOD datasets, demonstrates its robustness evaluating T2I models in terms of safey.

Numbers in parenthesis are reported in the original paper which is the average of safe and unsafe F1. The model is not opensourced.

5. Benchmark experiments

5.1. Experiment settings

Prompt data. To create a balanced T2I safety benchmark, we assign ∼300 sentences for each task in toxicity and privacy. Considering the trade off of efficiency and compactness, we collect 2,669 prompts for evaluation. The prompt statistics of our dataset is listed in Section E.1 of Suppl. There are 236 manually design prompts which use neutral descriptors of individuals with the sentence for gender, age, race fairness evaluation, 1,787 prompts for toxicity, and 646 prompts for privacy.

T2I Models. We evaluate the safety of 12 T2I models using our evaluation dataset. The details of the evaluated T2I models are listed in Section D of Suppl. We also include more recent models which adopt the DiT [50] backbone for text-to-image tasks, such as HunyuanDit [37] and the SOTA T2I model SD-v3-mid [16]. Furthermore, we conduct the safety evaluation on unified multimodal models, such as LlamaGen [73], Show-o [79] and Vila-u [78].

Concept erasing methods. Recent studies on concept erasing [18] demonstrate the ability to remove unsafe concepts from T2I models. To empirically assess the capability against toxic prompts, we leverage the toxicity subset of our benchmark to evaluate multiple concept erasing models. SLD [63], UCE [19], ESD [18], MACE [41] are used for safety evaluation and follow the default training and inference settings to reproduce erased models on unsafe concepts.

Evaluation metrics. Safety rate and NKL-Div presented in Section 3.3 are used as the metrics.

5.2. Safety evaluation

We conduct a safety evaluation of T2I models in Table 4. The detailed results of subcategories of toxicity and privacy are demonstrated in Section G.2 of Suppl.

Models	Fairness			Toxicity Average↑	Privacy Average↑
	Gender↓	Age↓	Race↓		
SD-v1.4 [59]	0.014	**0.148**	0.337	0.568	0.477
SD-v1.5 [59]	**0.002**	0.176	0.286	0.527	0.556
SD-v2.1 [59]	0.162	0.190	0.366	0.591	0.452
SDXL [51]	0.090	0.230	0.288	**0.826**	0.672
SDXL-Turbo [61]	0.158	0.195	0.370	0.511	0.517
SDXL-Lightning [38]	0.023	0.332	0.765	0.617	0.579
SD-v3-mid [16]	0.008	0.184	**0.204**	0.600	0.340
Kandinsky 2.2 [56]	0.289	0.247	0.490	0.596	0.443
Kandinsky 3 [3]	0.141	0.313	0.541	0.633	0.521
Playground-v2.5 [33]	0.027	0.160	0.584	0.642	0.518
Pixart-α [10]	0.168	0.357	0.833	0.501	0.356
HunyuanDit [37]	0.339	0.266	0.752	0.531	0.509
LlamaGen [73]	0.309	0.355	0.439	0.632	0.720
Show-o [79]	0.394	0.345	0.538	0.549	**0.742**
Vila-u [78]	0.176	0.273	0.730	0.363	0.568

Table 4. Safety evaluation on prevailing T2I models. NKL-Div↓ is used to evaluate fairnesss and safety rate↑ is used to evaluate toxicity and privacy. Best result in each domain is denoted in bold.

Fairness evaluation. In terms of fairness, our analysis reveals that racial fairness remains the most challenging aspect for the majority of the evaluated models, with nearly all of them performing poorly in this regard. While several models demonstrate commendable performance in reducing gender fairness, such as SD-v1.5 and SD-v3-mid, which show minimal gender fairness, other models like Hunyuan-DiT and Kandinsky 2.2 exhibit substantial gender fairness. HunyuanDiT also presents significant fairness in both age and race, raising serious concerns about its broader social impact. On the other hand, model like SD-v1.4 is more effective at minimizing age fairness. However, racial fairness remains a critical issue for models like Pixart-α, Hunyuan-DiT, and SDXL-Lightning, highlighting the need for further improvements in fairness, particularly concerning race.

Toxicity evaluation. In terms of toxicity, models like SDXL stand out, outperforming others by significantly reducing the generation of harmful content, including humiliation, violence, illegal activity and disturbing. SDXL achieves the highest average toxicity safety rate, indicating its robust ability to mitigate toxic outputs. While others can effectively manage to limit the production of sexual, hate and humiliation content, they perform bad on other toxicity aspects, the average safety rate are more than 0.2 lower than SDXL. On the other hand, models such as SDXL-Turbo and Pixart-α are more susceptible to generating toxic content, especially in categories like sexual content and hate speech. This highlights the need for further refinement and the implementation of more robust filtering mechanisms in these models to ensure safer and more reliable outputs.

Privacy evaluation. Privacy protection is another critical area where the performance of T2I models shows considerable variation. SDXL once again emerges as the top performer, achieving the highest average privacy safety rate, thus demonstrating its effectiveness in safeguarding against

the generation of content involving public figures, personal information and intellectual property. In contrast, models such as SD-v3-mid and Pixart-α exhibit weaker performance in privacy-related aspects, which could lead to significant risks in scenarios where privacy protection is a primary concern. These findings underscore the importance of integrating robust privacy-preserving mechanisms into T2I models to prevent the potential leakage of sensitive information.

5.3. Concept erasing evaluation

As the concept erasing methods can effectively erase unsafe content, we utilize it as a defense method to malicious text prompts. By using the toxicity subset and ImageGuard of our benchmark, we can obtain the effectiveness of concept erasing methods in Table 5. For both concept erasing method, there are significant improvement over all the dimensions. This indicates that concept erasing is feasible to enhance the safety of T2I models, particularly when dealing with malicious prompts. However, these concept-erasing methods still exhibit limitations in specific areas (*e.g.*, humiliation and violence), which constrains the overall safety of the resulting models. Therefore, a significant gap remains in achieving comprehensive and reliable diffusion models.

5.4. Insights and discussion

While advancements in diffusion models have led to improvements in certain areas such as text-image alignment, aesthetic quality, our findings suggest that newer versions do not necessarily guarantee better performance in fairness, toxicity mitigation, or privacy protection. The persistent issues with racial bias, the susceptibility to generating toxic content, and the variability in privacy protection underscore the need for ongoing research and development in these areas. As T2I models continue to evolve, it is crucial to prioritize the integration of robust safeguards to ensure that these technologies can be deployed safely and responsibly.

6. Conclusion

This work presents a comprehensive benchmark to evaluate the safety domains of fairness, toxicity, and privacy in T2I models. With the development of T2ISafety, we provide a structured taxonomy and corresponding dataset for evaluating the safety domains of T2I models. Our experiments reveal that current diffusion models still exhibit significant issues related to fairness, toxic content generation, and privacy protection, even when defense methods like concept erasing are employed. ImageGuard, our proposed image safety evaluator, significantly improves the reliability and accuracy of safety assessments compared to existing methods. Additionally, by introducing normalized KL divergence for fairness evaluation, we offer a more interpretable

| Models | Toxicity | | | | | | Overall↑ |
	Sexual↑	Hate↑	Humiliation↑	Violence↑	Illegal activity↑	Disturbing↑	
SD-v1.5	0.391	0.543	0.532	0.428	0.786	0.479	0.527
UCE [19]	0.771	0.705	0.635	0.673	0.820	0.659	0.711
SLD [63]	0.819	0.648	0.649	0.559	0.813	0.635	0.687
ESD [18]	0.727	0.681	0.609	0.458	0.800	0.578	0.642
MACE [41]	0.899	0.802	0.829	0.761	0.823	0.682	0.799

Table 5. Safety rate of concept erasing methods comparing to vanilla SD-v1.5 across toxicity classes.

and scalable metric to assess fairness in T2I models. Discussion of our benchmark's limitations and ethics statement are provided in the Suppl.

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T2ISafety: Benchmark for Assessing Fairness, Toxicity, and Privacy in Image Generation

Supplementary Material

A. Limitations

Although our dataset covers many key safety aspects in T2I models, we acknowledge that misinformation, for example deepfake image generation, remain underexplored. Deepfakes present unique challenges and opportunities in the realm of safety concerns, and we intend to address this gap in future work. We recognize that our approach is one step in a larger conversation about safety considerations in T2I models, and we aim to expand its scope in future iterations.

B. Ethics statement

Our research focuses on the safety evaluation of T2I models, aiming to address critical concerns around fairness, toxicity, and privacy in AI-generated content. The dataset we created is intended solely for research purposes, with the goal of assessing the safety behavior of T2I models across a variety of scenarios. While our dataset includes potentially harmful or biased content, this material is included not with harmful intent but to enable the thorough training of ImageGuard and the evaluation of T2I models in detecting and mitigating unsafe outputs. Real images were sourced from publicly available database, LAION2B-en, which is designated for research purposes. This data collection process does not involve user deanonymization, and as such, our work has been determined by our Institutional Review Board (IRB) not to constitute human subjects research.

C. Prompts

C.1. Prompt for keyword generation

The following prompt is used to generate keywords for retrieving images from the LAION2B-en dataset. The [CATEGORY] placeholder represents terms like violence, self-harm, etc.

> **Keyword generation**
> Generated a list of keywords that are related or describe the [CATEGORY].

C.2. Inference templates

For toxicity and privacy, we adopt a similar template with LlamaGuard [25] which contains the general task to classify and the definition of all the categories. The example is shown in Figure 4. For fairness attribute prediction, the template analyzes images based on subcategories like gender, age, and race, as shown in Figure 5.


Figure 4. An example of toxicity and privacy conversation for ImageGuard. ⟨ImageHere⟩ is the visual token. Blue colors denote the category definitions. Our ImageGuard would answer with gender, age and race in the specific subcategories.

Figure 5. An example of fairness conversation for ImageGuard. ⟨ImageHere⟩ is the visual token. Blue colors denote the category definitions. Our ImageGuard would answer with gender, age and race in the specific subcategories.

C.3. Prompt filtering

To address content duplication in prompts derived from diverse sources, we employ a Locality-Sensitive Hashing (LSH) algorithm in conjunction with Sentence-BERT [58] for sentence vector embeddings. This method effectively eliminates both superficial and semantic redundancies in the dataset. Moreover, we use regex matching to eliminate meaning less prompts such as URLs and random symbols. Given that prompts from public datasets lack specific categories, we implement automated labeling using LLMs

through in-context learning and consensus voting. We begin by creating a template for LLM classification that outlines the task, provides few-shot learning examples, and specifies the output format, as detailed in the following.

Prompt classification

Analyze the following sentence which aims to generate images and assign it to the appropriate categories based on its content. The categories are: [Categories]. Given the [Sentence], only provide a brief explanation of your reasoning and then state the categorization. The [Response] should be in the following format:
Reasoning:
Category:
Examples:
Sentence: The passport photo clearly showed the woman's face and identifying information.
Reasoning: This sentence describes a personal identification document (passport) and the information it contains.
Category: Personal identification documents & Unsafe
Sentence: A man is swimming.
Reasoning: This sentence describes a man is swimming. It is a safe category.
Category: Safe
Please give me the [Response] based on the following sentence.
Sentence:

Using this template and a small, manually annotated test set, we evaluate various LLMs for labeling accuracy and select Mixtral-8x7B-Instruct [27], Qwen1.5-72B [5], and TuluV2-dpo-70B [26] for the task. The final categorization for each question is determined by unanimous agreement among the chosen LLMs. To ensure the reliability of the labeling results, we also conduct human verification on randomly sampled examples. During this process, three human annotators independently label and cross-check the samples to establish convincing ground-truth labels. The consistency rate between the auto-labeling and human labels is approximately 94%.

C.4. Prompt generation for fairness

For fairness prompts generation, we use neutral descriptors of individuals with the sentence of "a person who is/has [REPLACEMENT] ". Unlike Cho et al. [12] that use occupations (*e.g.*, animator, chef), we focus on neutral attributes such as character traits, appearance, activities, and diseases to feed in the [REPLACEMENT].

Fairness prompt generation

A person who is/has [REPLACEMENT].

Figure 6. The statistics of ImageGuard dataset. It contains three main domains and each domain contains both real images and generated images.

D. T2I models for image generation

To generate the images for ImageGuard training, we utilize the following T2I models. Stable Diffusion series including SD-v1.4, SD-v1.5, SD-v2.1 [59], and SD-XL [51]. The SD-XL model, in particular, features a UNet backbone that is three times larger, enabling more refined image generation. For efficiency improvements, we also consider the popular distilled versions of SD-XL, such as SD-XL-Turbo [61], which utilizes Adversarial Diffusion Distillation (ADD), and SDXL-Lightening [38], which achieves efficiency through a combination of progressive and adversarial distillation. Additionally, other UNet-based diffusion models like Kandinsky 2.2 [56], with its two-stage pipeline, Kandinsky 3 [3], an improved version, and Playground-v2.5 [33], which focuses on enhancing aesthetic quality, are also considered. Moreover, Pixart-α [10], which incorporate cross-attention modules is also conducted. If a model includes a safety checker, it is uniformly disabled to achieve the purpose of unsafe image generation.

E. Statistics

In this section, we provide a comprehensive overview of the statistics for both the T2ISafety dataset and ImageGuard dataset.

E.1. Statistics of T2ISafety

T2ISafety taxonomy. Our detailed hierarchical taxonomy is presented in Table 10. It is structured into a detailed hierarchy of 3 domains, 12 tasks, and 44 categories, allowing for in-depth analysis. The Domains include Fairness, Toxicity, and Privacy. Fairness refers to the notion that an

Domain	Fairness	Toxicity						Privacy		
Tasks	-	Sexual	Hate	Humil	Viol	IA	Dist	PF	PID	IPV
Number#	236	297	298	299	297	300	296	297	50	299

Table 6. Statistics of evaluation prompts. Humil denotes humiliation, Viol denotes violence, IA denotes illegal activity, Dist denotes disturbing, PF denotes public figures, PID denotes personal identification documents, and IPV denotes intellectual property violation.

AI system should produce outputs that do not perpetuate or exacerbate biases, stereotypes, or inequalities based on attributes [65]. Under Fairness, the tasks are Gender, Age, and Race, with categories such as Male, Female, Children, Young Adult, Middle-aged, Elderly, and racial groups like Asian, Indian, Caucasian, Latino, and African. The definition of gender, age, and race is the same as the description in Figure 5. Toxicity refers to harmful, offensive, or inappropriate content that can be generated by AI models [63]. The Toxicity domain encompasses tasks like Sexual content, Hate, Humiliation, Violence, Illegal activity, and Disturbing content, each further detailed into categories such as Sexual violence, Pornography, Racism, Bullying, Physical harm, Self-harm, and others. Privacy in the context of image generation pertains to the protection of personal information and sensitive data [74]. The Privacy domain includes tasks like Public figures, Personal identification documents, and Intellectual property violation, with categories including Politicians, Celebrities, various forms of identification documents, and types of intellectual property infringement. The definition of the tasks in toxicity and privacy is the same as in Figure 4. This detailed taxonomy provides a structured framework for identifying and addressing safety issues across different contexts and scenarios.

Prompts statistics. The statistics is shown in Table 6. In the fairness domain, there are 236 prompts. The toxicity domain is further divided into six tasks: sexual content (297 prompts), hate speech (298 prompts), humiliation (299 prompts), violence (297 prompts), illegal activity (300 prompts), and disturbing content (296 prompts). For privacy, the evaluation is divided into public figures (297 prompts), personal identification documents (PID) with 50 prompts, and intellectual property violations (IPV) with 299 prompts. Each domain addresses specific risks related to harmful content or fairness in model outputs.

E.2. Statistics of ImageGuard dataset

The overall statistics are presented in Figure 6. The images are categorized into 3 main domains: Fairness, Toxicity and Privacy. Each domain is further divided into categories, with a distinction between 'Generated' and 'Real' images, along with their corresponding image counts. For instance, in the Fairness domain, there are 16704 generated images and 7619 real images. In the Toxicity domain, the dataset includes 25915 generated images compared to 7294

real ones. Similarly, the Privacy domain contains 14526 generated images and 1662 real images. Within the test set, 1000 images are allocated for fairness evaluation, while approximately 500 images are provided for toxicity and privacy assessments separately.

F. Proof for normalized KL divergence

We start by examining the KL divergence between an estimated distribution $P(x)$ and a reference distribution $Q(x)$. The KL divergence is defined as:

$$D_{\text{KL}}(P \parallel Q) = \sum_x P(x) \log \frac{P(x)}{Q(x)}. \tag{3}$$

When the reference distribution $Q(x)$ is uniform over n categories, each category has an equal probability, so $Q(x) = \frac{1}{n}$ for all x. Substituting this into the KL divergence formula, we get:

$$D_{\text{KL}}(P \parallel Q) = \sum_x P(x) \log \left(P(x) \cdot n \right). \tag{4}$$

Using the logarithmic identity $\log(ab) = \log a + \log b$, the expression simplifies to:

$$D_{\text{KL}}(P \parallel Q) = \sum_x P(x) \left(\log P(x) + \log n \right) \tag{5}$$

$$= \sum_x P(x) \log P(x) + \log n \sum_x P(x). \tag{6}$$

Since $\sum_x P(x) = 1$, the second term becomes $\log n$. The first term is the negative entropy of P, denoted as $-H(P)$, where:

$$H(P) = -\sum_x P(x) \log P(x). \tag{7}$$

Therefore, the KL divergence simplifies to:

$$D_{\text{KL}}(P \parallel Q) = -H(P) + \log n = \log n - H(P). \tag{8}$$

The entropy $H(P)$ measures the uncertainty or randomness in the distribution P. It reaches its maximum value

Models	Fairness			Toxicity						Privacy			Overall
	Gender↑	Age↑	Race↑	Sexual↑	Hate↑	Humil↑	Viol↑	IA↑	Dist↑	PF↑	PID↑	IPV↑	
InternLM-XComposer2	0.967	0.610	0.546	0.305	0.118	0.0	0.126	0.024	0.184	0.093	0.147	0.0	0.551
FT w. L_{reg}	0.971	0.807	0.789	0.947	0.571	0.384	0.687	0.813	0.758	0.844	0.918	0.855	0.840
FT w. L_f	0.977	0.812	0.809	0.941	0.572	0.463	0.694	0.801	0.772	0.869	0.873	0.874	0.844
FT w. 8 CMA	0.976	0.822	0.792	0.943	0.585	0.433	0.715	0.791	0.777	0.864	0.884	0.869	0.853
FT w. 16 CMA	0.977	0.816	0.796	0.937	0.622	0.424	0.735	0.829	0.772	0.860	0.918	0.877	0.855
FT w. 24 CMA	0.976	0.828	0.800	0.936	0.651	0.458	0.717	0.803	0.776	0.866	0.911	0.869	0.858
FT w. 32 CMA	0.976	0.813	0.802	0.941	0.605	0.471	0.698	0.784	0.786	0.859	0.900	0.862	0.855
FT w. 24 CMA & L_f	0.973	0.828	0.807	0.930	0.619	0.469	0.737	0.832	0.792	0.875	0.862	0.886	**0.860**

Table 7. Ablation study on CMA and training loss in F1 score. Humil denotes humiliation, Viol denotes violence, IA denotes illegal activity, Dist denotes disturbing, PF denotes public figures, PID denotes personal identification documents, and IPV denotes intellectual property violation. FT refers to finetuning.

when P is uniform because the uncertainty is highest when all outcomes are equally likely. In this case:

$$H_{\max} = -\sum_x \frac{1}{n} \log\left(\frac{1}{n}\right) = \log n. \tag{9}$$

Substituting $H_{\max}$ back into the KL divergence, we find the minimum KL divergence:

$$D_{\mathrm{KL}}^{\min} = \log n - \log n = 0. \tag{10}$$

Conversely, the entropy $H(P)$ reaches its minimum value of 0 when P is a degenerate (or deterministic) distribution concentrated entirely on a single category. Then, the KL divergence attains its maximum:

$$D_{\mathrm{KL}}^{\max} = \log n - 0 = \log n. \tag{11}$$

Thus, the KL divergence $D_{\mathrm{KL}}(P \parallel Q)$ is bounded between 0 and $\log n$:

$$0 \leq D_{\mathrm{KL}}(P \parallel Q) \leq \log n. \tag{12}$$

To normalize this divergence and constrain it between 0 and 1, facilitating easier interpretation and comparison across different dimensions or category sizes, we define the normalized KL divergence as:

$$\begin{aligned} D_{\mathrm{KL,\,normalized}}(P \parallel Q) &= \frac{D_{\mathrm{KL}}(P \parallel Q)}{\log n} \\ &= \frac{\log n - H(P)}{\log n} \\ &= 1 - \frac{H(P)}{\log n} \end{aligned} \tag{13}$$

This normalized metric directly relates to the entropy of P relative to the maximum entropy $\log n$. When P is uniform, $H(P) = \log n$, and $D_{\mathrm{KL,\,normalized}}(P \parallel Q) = 0$, indicating maximum fairness as the model's output distribution perfectly matches the fair reference. When P is degenerate, $H(P) = 0$, and $D_{\mathrm{KL,\,normalized}}(P \parallel Q) = 1$, indicating maximum divergence from fairness.

G. Training details & Evaluation results

G.1. Training details

We train ImageGuard using InternLM-XComposer2 as the base model, following the instruction fine-tuning paradigm. Images are resized to 490x490, with the same image transformations as in the base model. The contrastive loss balancing weight is set to 0.1. For optimization, we use the AdamW optimizer with a weight decay of 0.01. A cosine learning rate schedule with linear warmup is employed, with the peak learning rate set to $1e - 4$. For the main results, the model is trained for 2 epochs, processing more than 60000 images per epoch. Training is conducted on 8 NVIDIA A100 GPUs, with a batch size of 8 per GPU.

G.2. Evaluation results

Ablation on components of ImageGuard. We evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed module, CMA and contrastive loss with more details across the categories of T2I safety in Table 7. Data-driven improvements show significant gains across all categories. When comparing the fine-tuned model with L_{reg}, it is evident that incorporating L_f and CMA leads to consistent enhancements in nearly every category. This demonstrates that both the CMA module and contrastive loss are effective in improving the model's performance across fairness, toxicity, and privacy dimensions.

Method	Fairness↑			Toxicity↑	Privacy↑
	Gender↑	Age↑	Race↑		
CLIP-L [54]	0.680	0.046	0.103	0.169	0.080
Ours	0.841	0.443	0.318	0.656	0.606

Table 8. Cohen's kappa correlation↑ between automatic and human evaluations.

Human correlation of automatic evaluation. To measure the reliability of our automatic evaluation, we use Cohen's kappa [43], a widely used metric for assessing the agreement between raters on categorical data. To ensure a fair assessment, we manually annotated a subset of HunyuanDiT samples, as HunyuanDiT is not part of the dataset

4

Models	Fairness			Toxicity						Privacy		
	Gender↓	Age↓	Race↓	Sexual↑	Hate↑	Humil↑	Viol↑	IA↑	Dist↑	PF↑	PID↑	IPV↑
SD-v1.4	0.014	0.148	0.337	0.391	0.991	0.717	0.549	0.750	0.288	0.432	0.649	0.516
SD-v1.5	0.002	0.176	0.286	0.277	0.969	0.529	0.547	0.759	0.456	0.518	0.576	0.602
SD-v2.1	0.162	0.190	0.366	0.551	0.991	0.689	0.504	0.639	0.406	0.421	0.556	0.489
SDXL	0.090	0.230	0.288	0.782	0.992	0.864	0.825	0.936	0.677	0.621	0.900	0.729
SDXL-Turbo	0.158	0.195	0.370	0.502	0.916	0.630	0.467	0.554	0.436	0.486	0.442	0.572
SDXL-Lightening	0.023	0.332	0.765	0.592	0.977	0.641	0.607	0.672	0.511	0.492	0.641	0.707
SD-v3-mid	0.008	0.184	0.204	0.707	0.983	0.693	0.442	0.663	0.387	0.187	0.404	0.532
Kandinsky 2.2	0.289	0.247	0.490	0.821	0.976	0.786	0.451	0.595	0.303	0.336	0.697	0.591
Kandinsky 3	0.141	0.313	0.541	0.444	0.966	0.817	0.544	0.785	0.523	0.455	0.520	0.615
Playground-v2.5	0.027	0.160	0.584	0.833	0.996	0.841	0.465	0.680	0.394	0.461	0.707	0.591
Pixart-α	0.168	0.357	0.833	0.957	0.995	0.733	0.377	0.502	0.151	0.259	0.850	0.456
HunyuanDit	0.339	0.266	0.752	0.878	0.995	0.692	0.419	0.375	0.279	0.413	0.885	0.637

Table 9. Safety evaluation on current prevailing T2I models. Normalized KL is used to evaluate fairnesss and safety rate is used to evaluate toxicity and privacy. Humil denotes humiliation, Viol denotes violence, IA denotes illegal activity, Dist denotes disturbing, PF denotes public figures, PID denotes personal identification documents, and IPV denotes intellectual property violation.

used to train ImageGuard. We select CLIP, the most popular tool in T2I safety evaluation, as a baseline for comparison. The human correlation results are illustrated in Table 8. The results show the effectiveness of our ImageGuard. It consistently outperforms CLIP-L [54] across all dimensions of fairness, toxicity, and privacy. The higher Cohen's kappa scores indicate that ImageGuard aligns much more closely with human evaluations, making it a more reliable tool for assessing T2I models' safety performance. Notably, the improvements are particularly pronounced in the categories of age-related fairness, toxicity, and privacy, where the correlation with human judgments is significantly stronger compared to CLIP-L.

T2I model results. More detailed results on safety evaluation on the 12 T2I models are presented in Table 9.

H. More discussion

Why normalized KL divergence is better than distance metrics, for example, L1 distance?

Using normalized KL divergence compared to distance metrics when measuring the difference between a current distribution and a target distribution offers several advantages. KL divergence is asymmetric, which can be a useful property when you are comparing how one distribution diverges from a reference distribution. The distance metric is symmetric, meaning it assigns equal weight to the deviations between the two distributions, regardless of their direction. This can be less appropriate when the current distribution needs to be compared to a fixed target distribution, where the direction of the divergence matters. Normalizing KL divergence allows it to be scaled to a fixed range $[0, 1]$, which provides a consistent and interpretable measure of divergence across different problems or distributions. While distance does not naturally normalize across different distributions, so its scale depends on the specific values and support of the distributions, making it harder to compare across tasks with different distribution properties.


Figure 7. Visualization of I2P prompts and toxicity prompt set of our T2ISafety using T-SNE.

Comparison between our toxicity subset and I2P? We evaluate the prompt embeddings from I2P [63] and the toxicity subset of our dataset, T2ISafety, using the Bge-Large-v1.5 model. The T-SNE visualization in Figure 7 reveals the I2P prompts exhibit a much more condensed distribution in the middle, while our prompts demonstrate a broader and more diverse distribution, despite using fewer prompts. This wider spread suggests that our dataset captures a broader range of toxic content, providing a more comprehensive evaluation compared to the existing I2P prompts.


(a) Image   (b) Self-attention   (c) Cross-attention

Figure 8. Visualization of vanilla self-attention and our cross-attention.

Advantanges of CMA over self-attention mechanism? Cross-attention offers significant advantages over self-attention applied to concatenated tokens in multimodal scenarios. While self-attention could theoretically be ap-

plied to a sequence of concatenated language and image tokens, it would treat all tokens uniformly, potentially diluting the distinct characteristics of each modality. Cross-attention, on the other hand, allows for a more nuanced interaction between the two modalities. It enables the model to selectively attend to relevant parts of the image based on the textual input, maintaining the inherent structure and semantics of each modality. By using the instruction or text as the query and the image features as keys and values, cross-attention can dynamically focus on the most relevant visual information for a given textual context. This approach leads to more accurate and contextually appropriate multimodal understanding, particularly in tasks like ours that require fine-grained alignment between text and image features. Attention map visualization can be seen in Figure 8.

Domains	Tasks	Categories
Fairness	Gender	Male
		Female
	Age	Children
		Young adult
		Middle-aged
		Elderly
	Race	Asian
		Indian
		Caucasian
		Latino
		African
Toxicity	Sexual	Sexual violence
		Pornography
		Harassment
		Sexual acts
	Hate	Racism
		Hate symbols
		Stereotyping
	Humiliation	Public shaming
		Bullying
		Embarrassment
	Violence	Physical harm
		Abuse
		Bloody content
		Self-harm
		Torture
	Illegal activity	Theft and robbery
		Drug-related crime
		Explosion
		Environmental crime
		Counterfeiting
	Disturbing	Horror
		Gross
Privacy	Public figures	Politicians
		Celebrities
		Entrepreneurs
		Intellectuals
	Personal identification documents	Civic ID
		Employment ID
		Financial ID
		Educational ID
		Membership ID
	Intellectual property violation	Copyright infringement
		Trademark infringement

Table 10. Our hierarchical safety taxonomy.