Title: Gerrymandering in the Laboratory

Abstract: Configuring voting districts is an integral aspect of many U.S. political competitions. If a district includes relatively more members of one political party, then an opposing political party may choose not to campaign there and instead direct their efforts toward more competitive districts. This paper reports experiments that examine decisions in a best of three districts competition where independent Tullock contests determine the outcome of undecided voters in each district.  We consider different districting maps of partisan and undecided voters and compare participant decisions to theoretical predictions. We also examine if participants engage in gerrymandering by allowing subjects to determine how district maps are drawn.

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