

Pancake Swap

Predictions V2

Security Audit Report



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1. INTRODUCTION	3
1.1 Disclaimer.....	3
1.2 Security Assessment Methodology.....	3
1.2.1 Code and architecture review:.....	3
1.2.2 Check code against vulnerability checklist:.....	3
1.2.3 Threat & Attack Simulation:	4
1.2.4 Report found vulnerabilities:	4
1.2.5 Fix bugs & re-audit code:.....	4
1.2.4. Deliver final report:.....	4
Severity classification	5
1.3 Project Overview.....	5
1.4 Project Dashboard	6
Project Summary	6
Project Last Log	6
Project Scope	6
1.5 Summary of findings	7
2. FINDINGS REPORT	7
2.1 Critical.....	7
2.2 High.....	8
2.2.1 Oracle Freshness Check Does Not Work (Stale Price Accepted)	8
2.3 Medium	9
2.3.1 Strict RoundID Check May Cause DoS	9
2.4 Low.....	10
2.4.1 TimeSeriesViewer Array Index Out-of-Bounds.....	10
CONCLUSION.....	12
REFERENCES.....	12

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Disclaimer

The audit makes no statements or warranties about utility of the code, safety of the code, suitability of the business model, investment advice, endorsement of the platform or its products, regulatory regime for the business model, or any other statements about fitness of the contracts to purpose, or their bug free status. The audit documentation is for discussion purposes only. The information presented in this report is confidential and privileged. If you are reading this report, you agree to keep it confidential, not to copy, disclose or disseminate without the agreement of the Client. If you are not the intended recipient(s) of this document, please note that any disclosure, copying or dissemination of its content is strictly forbidden.

1.2 Security Assessment Methodology

BugBlow utilized a widely adopted approach to performing a security audit. Below is a breakout of how our team was able to identify and exploit vulnerabilities.

1.2.1 Code and architecture review:

- Review the source code.
- Read the project's documentation.
- Review the project's architecture.

Stage goals

- Build a good understanding of how the application works.

1.2.2 Check code against vulnerability checklist:

- Understand the project's critical assets, resources, and security requirements.
- Manual check for vulnerabilities based on the auditor's checklist.
- Run static analyzers.

Stage goals

- Identify and eliminate typical vulnerabilities (gas limit, replay, flash-loans attack, etc.)

1.2.3 Threat & Attack Simulation:

- Analyze the project's critical assets, resources and security requirements.
- Exploit the found weaknesses in a safe local environment.
- Document the performed work.

Stage goals

- Identify vulnerabilities that are not listed in static analyzers that would likely be exploited by hackers.
- Develop Proof of Concept (PoC).

1.2.4 Report found vulnerabilities:

- Discuss the found issues with developers
- Show remediations.
- Write an initial audit report.

Stage goals

- Verify that all found issues are relevant.

1.2.5 Fix bugs & re-audit code:

- Help developers fix bugs.
- Re-audit the updated code again.

Stage goals

- Double-check that the found vulnerabilities or bugs were fixed and were fixed correctly.

1.2.4. Deliver final report:

- The Client deploys the re-audited version of the code
- The final report is issued for the Client.

Stage goals

- Provide the Client with the final report that serves as security proof.

Severity classification

All vulnerabilities discovered during the audit are classified based on their potential severity and have the following classification:

Severity	Description
Critical	Vulnerabilities leading to assets theft, fund access locking, or any other loss of funds.
High	Vulnerabilities that can trigger contract failure. Further recovery is possible only by manual modification of the contract state or replacement.
Medium	Vulnerabilities that can break the intended contract logic or expose it to DoS attacks, but do not cause direct loss funds.
Low	Vulnerabilities that do not have a significant immediate impact and could be easily fixed.

1.3 Project Overview

Pancake Prediction V2 is a decentralized prediction market built on BNB Chain, where users place bets on whether the price of an asset (typically BNB/USD from Chainlink) will rise or fall within a fixed time interval. The protocol runs continuous rounds: each round has a start, lock, and close phase, during which users place bull or bear bets and later claim rewards based on the final oracle price. The system distributes winnings proportionally among users on the winning side while collecting a fee for the protocol treasury. Designed to be fully automated and trust-minimized, Pancake Prediction V2 relies on Chainlink oracles and transparent smart-contract logic to ensure fairness and security.

1.4 Project Dashboard

Project Summary

Title	Pancake Predictions Security Audit
Client name	Pancake
Project name	Predictions V2
Timeline	7.05.2025 - 21.05.2025
Number of Auditors	2

Project Last Log

Date	Commit Hash	Note
01.04.2022	d8f55093a43a7e8913f7730cff3589a46f5c014	All open, yay!

Project Scope

The audit covered the following smart contract files.

File name
projects/predictions/v2/contracts/PancakePredictionV2.sol
projects/predictions/v2/contracts/utils/TimeSeriesViewer.sol

1.5 Summary of findings




Figure 1. Findings chart

Severity	# of Findings
CRITICAL	0
HIGH	1
MEDIUM	1
LOW	1

2. FINDINGS REPORT

2.1 Critical

2.2 High

2.2.1 Oracle Freshness Check Does Not Work (Stale Price Accepted)

Severity: High

Status: Fixed

Location: `_getPriceFromOracle()`

Description

The freshness check for the oracle price contains a critical logical flaw that causes the contract to accept stale oracle data – including prices from minutes, hours, or even days ago.

As a result, the protocol may settle rounds using outdated prices, leading to incorrect payouts and direct financial loss for users.

This also opens an attack vector commonly known as a **stale update / oracle freeze exploit**, which is severe because the oracle price is the single source of truth for the prediction market.

Chainlink guarantees the *accuracy* of data, but Chainlink explicitly does **not** guarantee *freshness* of timestamps.

Technical Analysis

Problematic code:

```
uint256 leastAllowedTimestamp = block.timestamp + oracleUpdateAllowance;
require(timestamp <= leastAllowedTimestamp, "Oracle update exceeded max timestamp allowance");
```

This logic is inverted.

`block.timestamp + allowance >= timestamp` is **always true** unless the aggregator submits a timestamp in the future.

The correct check must ensure that:

$$(block.timestamp - timestamp) \leq oracleUpdateAllowance$$

Because:

- `block.timestamp` = current block time
- `timestamp` = last time the oracle updated
 - may be 10 seconds old
 - 50 seconds old
 - yesterday

Impact

- Rounds are settled using stale prices
- Users receive incorrect payouts
- Predictable stale-price windows allow for profitable manipulation
- Protocol trust assumptions break entirely

Fix

Replace the incorrect freshness check with a proper staleness validation:

```
- uint256 leastAllowedTimestamp = block.timestamp + oracleUpdateAllowance;
- require(timestamp <= leastAllowedTimestamp, "Oracle update exceeded max timestamp allowance")
+ require(block.timestamp - timestamp <= oracleUpdateAllowance, "Oracle price is stale");
```

2.3 Medium

2.3.1 Strict RoundID Check May Cause DoS

Severity: High

Status: Acknowledged

Location: `_getPriceFromOracle()`

Description

The contract enforces a strict requirement that the Chainlink roundId must always increase:

```
require(uint256(roundId) > oracleLatestRoundId, ...);
```

However, Chainlink does NOT guarantee that `roundId` always increases [1]:

- If price did not change, roundId may stay the same
- Some feeds update sparsely or aggregate several on-chain pushes
- Certain feeds update internal aggregator phases, which may reuse roundId patterns

This creates a scenario where:

- Chainlink updates the price
- roundId remains the same

- The contract rejects the update
- And **freezes** the prediction market

Technical Analysis

Impact

Round DoS (Denial of Service):

- executeRound() stops working
- Rounds never close
- Rounds never lock
- Rewards are never calculated
- Users cannot claim
- Contract becomes permanently stuck after the first occurrence of equal roundId

This is a **failure mode**.

Fix

Use a non-strict check:

```
- require(
-   uint256(roundId) > oracleLatestRoundId,
-   "Oracle update roundId must be larger than oracleLatestRoundId "
-);

+ require(
+   uint256(roundId) >= oracleLatestRoundId,
+   "RoundId must not decrease"
+);
```

2.4 Low

2.4.1 TimeSeriesViewer Array Index Out-of-Bounds

Severity: Low

Status: Acknowledged

Location: TimeSeriesViewer.viewHistoricalPrices()

Description

The function uses this cycle

```
for (uint80 i = firstRoundId; i <= lastRoundId; i++) {  
    (roundIds[i], prices[i], , timestamps[i], ) = AggregatorV3Interface(aggregator).getRoundData(i);  
}
```

The roundIds array is of size:

```
numberRounds = lastRoundId - firstRoundId + 1;  
roundIds = new uint80[](numberRounds); // indexes: 0 .. numberRounds-1
```

But indexing $[i]$ is performed through $[firstRoundId \dots lastRoundId]$:

```
roundIds[i] = ...
```

This means:

Valid indices: $[0 \dots numberRounds - 1]$

Accessed indices: $[firstRoundId \dots lastRoundId]$

For typical parameters (firstRoundId doesn't start with 0):

$firstRoundId = 100$

$lastRoundId = 110$

$numberRounds = 11$

$valid\ indexes = [0..10]$

but code uses indexes $[100..110] \rightarrow$ ALWAYS out of bounds

Impact

- The function always reverts unless $firstRoundId == 0$
- Any frontend or analytics tool relying on this contract cannot retrieve historical data
- Makes the contract unusable for its intended purpose

Fix

Fix the index mapping:

```
- for (uint80 i = firstRoundId; i <= lastRoundId; i++) {
-     (roundIds[i], prices[i], , timestamps[i], ) =
-         AggregatorV3Interface(aggregator).getRoundData(i);
- }

+ for (uint80 i = firstRoundId; i <= lastRoundId; i++) {
+     uint256 idx = i - firstRoundId;
+     (roundIds[idx], prices[idx], , timestamps[idx], ) =
+         AggregatorV3Interface(aggregator).getRoundData(i);
+ }
```

CONCLUSION

The reviewed contracts contain several high-priority correctness and oracle-integration flaws that directly affect protocol safety and liveness. Incorrect handling of Chainlink price freshness and roundId logic can lead to stale-price settlements and even a protocol DoS. Additionally, indexing errors in the TimeSeriesViewer contract prevent reliable historical data retrieval, indicating gaps in testing and validation of auxiliary components. Fixing these issues will significantly increase the protocol's reliability and security.

REFERENCES

[1] <https://docs.chain.link/data-feeds/historical-data>