

# Exposure Analytics in DROP

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**Modeling Counterparty Credit Exposure in the Presence of Margin Agreements**

**Abstract**

1. Margin Based Credit Exposure Reduction: Margin agreements as a means of reducing counterparty credit exposure.
2. Calculating MPoR Collateralized Exposures:
   1. Collateralized Exposure and Margin Period of Risk
   2. Semi-analytical Method for calculating collateralized EE
3. Analysis of Basel Exposure Methods: Analysis of Basel *Shortcut* method for Effective EPE.

**Margin Agreements as a Means of Reducing Counterparty Credit Exposure**

1. Definition of Counterparty Credit Risk: *Counterparty Credit Risk* is the risk that a counterparty in an *OTC* derivative transaction will default prior to the expiration of the contract and will be unable to make all contractual payments. *Exchange-traded* derivatives bear no counterparty risk.
2. Counterparty vs. Lending Risk Difference: The primary feature that distinguishes counterpart risk from lending risk is the uncertainty of exposure at any future time. For a loan, the exposure at any future date is the outstanding balance, which is certain – not taking into account pre-payments. For a derivative, the exposure at any future date is the replacement cost, which is determined by the market value at that date, and is, therefore, uncertain.
3. Bilateral Nature of the Counterparty Risk: Since derivative portfolio value can be both positive and negative, counterparty risk is *bilateral*.
4. Spot/Forward Contract Market Value: Market value for counter with counterparty is known only at the current date

For any future date this value is uncertain and should be assumed random.

1. Replacement Cost at Counterparty Default: If a counterparty defaults at a time prior to the contract maturity, the economic loss is equal to the replacement loss of the contract. If

the dealer does not receive anything from the defaulted counterparty, but has to pay to another counterparty to replace the contract. If

the dealer receives from another counterparty, but has to forward this amount to the defaulted counterparty.

1. Forward Exposure at Contract Level: Combining these two scenarios the contract-level exposure at time is specified according to
2. Definition of Counterparty Level Exposure: *Counterparty level exposure* at a future time can be defined as the loss experienced by the dealer if the counterparty defaults at time under the assumption of no recovery.
3. Unmitigated Counterpart Level Positive Exposure: If the counterparty risk is not mitigated in any way, the *counterparty level* exposure equals the sum of *contract-level* exposure:
4. Counterparty Level Exposure under Netting: If there are *netting agreements*, derivatives with positive values at the time of the default offset the ones with negative values within each netting set so that the *counterparty-level exposure* is

Each non-nettable trade represents a netting set.

1. Purpose of a Margin Agreement: Margin agreements allow for further reductions to counterparty level exposure.
2. Bilateral Posting under Margin Agreements: Margin agreement is a legally binding contract between two counterparties that requires one or both counterparties to post collateral under certain conditions. A margin threshold is defined for one (unilateral agreement) or both (bilateral agreement) counterparties. If the difference between the net portfolio value and the already posted collateral exceeds the threshold, the counterparty must provide sufficient collateral to cover this excess (subject to the minimum transfer amount).
3. Threshold Value in Margin Agreements: The threshold value depends primarily on the margin value of the counterparty.
4. Netting Set Level Margin Agreement: Assuming that every margin agreement requires a netting agreement, the exposure to the counterparty is

where is the market value of the collateral for the netting set at time . If the netting set is not covered by a margin agreement, then

1. Netting Set Collateralized Portfolio Value: To simplify the notations, consider a single netting set

where is the collateralized portfolio value at time given by

**Collateralized Exposure and Margin Period of Risk**

1. Collateral as Excess Portfolio Value: Collateral covers the excess portfolio value over the threshold :
2. Expression for the Collateralized Portfolio Value: Therefore, the collateralized portfolio value is
3. Floor/Ceiling of the Collateralized Exposure:

is limited from above and by zero from below.

1. Margin Period of Risk (MPoR): Even with a daily margin call frequency, there is a significant period delay known as the *margin period of risk (MPoR)* between a margin call that the counterparty does not respond to and the start of the default procedures. Margin calls can be disputed, and it may take several days to realize that the counterparty is defaulting rather than disputing the call. Further there is a grace period after the counterparty issues a notice of default. During this grace period the dealer and/or the counterparty may still post collateral.
2. Counterparty Variation Margin Posting Delay: Thus, the collateral available at time is determined by the portfolio value at time .
3. Delay Dependence - Call Frequency and Product Liquidity: While is not known with certainty, it is usually assumed to be a fixed number. The assume value of depends on the margin call frequency and the trade liquidity.
4. MPoR Start - Collateral/Portfolio Values: Suppose that at time the unilateral collateral value is and the portfolio value is .
5. Posted Counterparty Collateral at : Then the amount that should be posted at time is

negative means that the collateral will be returned to the counterparty.

1. Unilateral Counterparty Collateral at : The unilateral counterparty collateral available at time is
2. The Total Collateralized Portfolio Value: The collateralized portfolio value is

where

1. Monte Carlo Primary Simulation Points: Suppose one has a set of *primary* simulation points for modeling non-collateralized exposure.
2. Monte-Carlo Look-back Points: For each

define a lookback point at time

1. Monte Carlo Primary Plus Lookback: The task is to simulate the non-collateralized portfolio value along the path that includes both the *primary* and the *lookback* simulation times.
2. Collateral PLUS Collateralized/Uncollateralized Portfolio Values: Given and one calculates:
   1. Uncollateralized Portfolio Value at the next lookback time
   2. Uncollateralized Portfolio Value at the next primary time
   3. Collateral at :
   4. Collateralized Portfolio Value at :
   5. Collateralized Exposure at :
3. Simulating the Collateralized Portfolio Value: Collateralized threshold can go above the threshold due to MPR and MTA.

**Semi-Analytical Method for Collateralized EE**

1. Portfolio Value at Primary Points: Assume that the simulation is only run for the primary time points and the portfolio distribution has been obtained in the form of quantities , where (from to ) designates different scenarios.
2. Evaluating the Unconditional Portfolio Distribution: From the set once can estimate the unconditional expectation and standard deviation of the portfolio value, as well as any other distributional parameter.
3. Collateralized EE at Lookback Points: Can the collateralized EE profile be estimated without simulating the portfolio value at the lookback time points ?
4. Collateralized EE Conditional on Path: Collateralized EE can be represented as

where is the collateralized EE conditional on :

1. The Conditional Collateralized Portfolio Value: The collateralized portfolio value is
2. Goal - Computing the Collateralized EE Analytically: If can be computed analytically, the *unconditionally collateralized EE* can be obtained as a simple average of across all scenarios
3. Assumption of Normal Portfolio Value: Assume that the portfolio value at time is normally distributed with mean and standard deviation .
4. Brownian Bridge for Secondary Nodes: One can construct a *Brownian Bridge* from to .
5. Mean and Standard Deviation: Conditional on , has a *normal distribution* with *expectation*

and *standard deviation*

1. Closed Form Conditional Collateralized EE: *Conditional Collateralized EE* can be obtained in a closed form.
2. Piece-wise Constant Local Volatility: It is assumed that, conditional on , the distribution of is normal, but will be replaced by the local quantity .
3. Portfolio Value Monotonically Increasing with : The portfolio value at time is described using

where is a monotonically increasing function of the standard normal random variable .

1. The *Equivalent Normal* Portfolio Process: A *normal equivalent* portfolio process is defined as
2. Density Scaling to determine : To obtain , will be scaled by the probability densities of and .
3. Standard Deviation Scaled Probability Density: The probability density of the quantity is denoted via and the standard deviation is scaled according to
4. Changing Variables from to : Changing the variables from and to , one gets
5. Substitution to the Definition of : Substituting to the definition of above gives
6. Estimating CDF - The Base Methodology: The values of corresponding to can be obtained from
7. Estimating the CDF - Sorting the Realizations: One sorts the array in increasing order so that

where is the sorting index.

1. Estimating CDF - Piecewise Constant Jump: From the sorted array, one can build a piecewise constant CDF that jumps by as crosses any of the simulated values.

where is the de-facto bias reducer.

1. Estimation of the Weiner Wanderer: Now one can obtain corresponding to as
2. Estimating the Local Standard Deviation: Local standard deviation can be estimated as
3. Choice of the Different Amount : The offset should not be too small (too much noise) or too large (loss of *locality*). This range works apparently well (Pykhtin (2009)):
4. The Brownian Bridge Mean and : Similar to the above it is assumed that, conditional on , has a *normal distribution* with *expectation*

and *standard deviation*

1. The Collateralized Exposure Mean and : The *collateralized exposure* depends on , which is also normal conditional on with the same standard deviation and expectation given by
2. Collateralized EE Conditional on : Collateralized EE conditional on scenario at time is
3. Collateralized EE on Negative Exposure: equals *zero* whenever

so that

1. Integral Form for Collateralized EE: Since has a normal distribution, one can write
2. Conditional Collateralized EE Closed Form: Evaluating the integrals, one obtains

where

**Analysis of Basel “Shortcut” Method for Collateralized Effective EPE**

1. Basel 2 Exposure Capital Requirements: Basel 2 minimal capital requirements for the counterparty risk are determined by wholesale exposure rules with exposure at default obtained from expected exposure profile as follows.
2. Exposure at Default - Basel Variants:
   1. Expected Exposure (EE) – Expected Exposure Profile (EE)
   2. Expected Positive Exposure (EPE) –
   3. Effective EE -
   4. Effective EPE –
   5. Exposure at Default (EAD) –
3. Incorporating the Margin Agreement: For collateralized counterparties, the netting set level Effective EPE must incorporate the effect of margin agreement.
4. Effective EPE using Internal Model of Collateral: Collateralized Effective EPE can be calculated using an *internal model of collateral*.
5. Basel 2 Simple and Conservative Shortcut: Alternatively, dealers can use a *simple and conservative approximation* to the effective EPE, and sets the effective EPE for a margined counterparty equal to the lesser of:
   1. The *Threshold*, if positive, under the margin agreement *plus* an *add-on* that reflects the potential increase in exposure over the margin period of risk. The *add-on* is computed as the *expected increase in the netting set’s exposure* beginning from the current exposure of zero over the margin period of risk.
   2. *Effective EPE without a margin agreement*.
6. Derivation of the “Shortcut” Method: The Basel “Shortcut” method can be obtained as follows:
7. Enhancing the Exposure Conservativeness: Time averaging adds more conservativeness:

**Conclusion**

1. Margin Agreements for Risk Mitigation: Margin agreements are important risk mitigation tools that need to be modeled accurately.
2. Complete MC Doubles Simulation Time: Full Monte Carlo is the most flexible approach, but requires simulating trade values at secondary time points, thus doubling the simulation time.
3. Semi-Analytical Approach Avoids That: Pykhtin (2009) has presented an accurate semi-analytical approach of calculating the EE that avoids doubling of the simulation time.
4. Basel 2 Shortcuts are too Conservative: Basel 2 “Shortcut” method for Effective EPE has sound theoretical grounds, but is too conservative.

**References**

* Pykhtin, M. (2009): [Modeling Counterparty Credit Exposure in the Presence of Margin Agreements](http://www.risk-europe.com/protected/michael-pykhtin.pdf)

**Estimation of Margin Period of Risk**

**Abstract**

1. Enhanced CSA Collateral Exposure Model: Andersen, Pykhtin (2017) describe a new framework for collateral exposure modeling under an ISDA Master Agreement with Credit Support Annex. The proposed model captures the legal and the operational aspects of default in considerably greater detail than models currently used by most practitioners, while remaining fully tractable and computationally feasible.
2. Legal Rights Exercise/Deferral Choices: Specifically, it considers the remedies and the suspension rights available within these legal agreements; the firm’s policies of availing itself of these rights; and the typical time it takes to exercise them in practice.
3. Significantly Higher Credit Exposure Revealed: The inclusion of these effects is shown to produce a significantly higher credit exposure for representative portfolios compared to the currently used models. The increase is especially pronounced when dynamic initial margin is also present.

**Introduction**

1. Margin Period of Risk Overview: In modeling the exposure of collateralized positions, it is well recognized that credit default cannot be treated as a one-time event. Rather the entire sequence of events following up to the default and beyond need to be considered, from the last successful margin call in advance of the eventual default to the time when the amount of loss becomes known – in the industry parlance, *crystallized*. These events unfold over a period of time called the *margin period of risk* (MPoR).
2. Range of Model Applicability: To properly identify the exposure during the MPoR, a detailed understanding of the contractual obligations is essential. In their paper, Andersen, Pykhtin, and Sokol (2017) focus on collateralized exposures under bilateral trading relationships governed by the *ISDA Master Agreement* (IMA) and its *Credit Support Annex*. The IMA, by far, is the most common legal contract for bilateral over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives trading, although other agreements are sometimes used (such as national forms of agreements used in some jurisdictions for domestic trading). The analysis by Andersen, Pykhtin, and Sokol (2017) is expected to apply to a broad class of contracts, although the model assumptions should be re-examined to confirm that the key legal provisions remain substantially the same as IMA.
3. Refinement for Legal/Operational Impact: It should be noted that the modeling of default exposure and close-out risk arising from a non-zero MPoR has received a fair amount of attention in the past (see, e.g., Gibson (2005), Pykhtin (2009, 2010), and Brigo, Capponi, Pallavicini, and Papatheodorou (2011)), although most past analysis has been conducted under very strong simplifying assumptions about the trade and the margin flows during the MPoR. One exception is Bocker and Schroder (2011), which contains elements of a more descriptive framework, including recognition of the role played by the cash flows close to the default event. Andersen, Pykhtin, and Sokol (2017) use a more detailed framework for legal and operational behavior to refine the classical models for collateralized exposure modeling.
4. Variation Margin Operational Timelines: This chapter is organized as follows. The fundamentals of variation margin posting are first outlined, and the classical collateralized exposure model is then presented. The full timelines of events likely to transpire during a credit default are then discussed from both legal and operational perspectives. This sets the stage for the proposal of a condensed representation of the timeline suitable for analytical and numerical work. The resulting setup results in a more significantly nuanced and flexible definition of the collateralized trading exposure. As fixing the actual model parameters (i.e., *calibrating* the MPoR model) requires taking a stance on operational procedures and corporate behavior, the next section discusses how such parametrizations may be done in practice, for various levels of overall model prudence and counterparty types.
5. Numerical Computation of Collateralized Exposure: Subsequently, the model is fleshed out in more detail, especially as it pertains to numerical implementations and quantitative comparisons with the classical model. As a starting point, exposure models are formulated in mathematical terms, and the key differences to the classical models are highlighted by means of brute-force Monte-Carlo simulations. Computational techniques permitting efficient model implementation are introduced subsequently, along with several test results. Applications to portfolios with risk-based initial margins are briefly discussed, and conclusions are finally drawn.

**The Fundamentals of Variation Margin: Basic Definitions**

1. Types of Margin: Initial/Variation: In bilateral OTC derivatives trading, it is common for parties to require posting of collateral to mitigate excessive exposures. Although the initial margin is discussed briefly in a later section, this section focuses primarily on the variation margin (VM) as a form of collateral that is regularly re-adjusted based on the changing value of the bilateral portfolio. The VM is calculated and settled in time according to a set of CSA rules discussed a few sections down.
2. Dealer and Client VM Timelines: For concreteness, throughout this chapter, the exposure of dealer to a client with whom engages in bilateral OTC trading under the IMA/CSA legal framework is considered. is referred to as the *defaulting party*, and is *the dealer* or the *non-defaulting* party. All present value and exposure amounts throughout this chapter will be calculated from the viewpoint of . Let the default-free market value to of the securities portfolio at time be and let and be the collateral support amounts stipulated by the CSA to be posted to and respectively. In the absence of initial margin, it is virtually always the case that only one of or is positive, i.e., only one party will be required to post margin at a given point in time.
3. Net Collateral and its Posting: Assuming that collateral is netted (rather than posted by both parties in full and held in segregated accounts or by a third party), the total collateral amount in ’s possession may be calculated as of time as

Assuming also that the collateral may be treated as *pari passu* with the derivatives portfolio itself for the purposes of bankruptcy claim, it is common to denote the positive part of the difference as the *exposure* :

where the notation

is used. Normally both the collateral and the portfolio would be treated together as a senior unsecured claim of against the bankruptcy estate of . There are several time lags and practical complications that render the above exposure and collateral expressions an imprecise measure, and they shall be substantially refined later on. In particular it is emphasized that the collateral computed at time is generally not transferred to until several days after .

1. VM Designated to Track Portfolio Value: The type of VM encountered in the CSA is typically designed to broadly track the value of the portfolio between the parties, thereby ensuring that in

does not grow to be excessive. However, to avoid unnecessary operational expenses, it is common to introduce language in the CSA to relax margin transfer requirements if the amounts are sufficiently small.

1. Reducing the Collateral Posting Events: To that end the typical CSA language for collateral calculations will stipulate:
   1. Collateral posting requirements by each party, and , representing the minimum amount of exposure before or , respectively, is required to post collateral
   2. A minimum transfer amount (MTA) establishing a minimum valid amount of a margin call
   3. Rounding, which rounds collateral movements to some reasonable unit (say $1,000).
2. Incorporating Thresholds into Collateral Expressions: Formally the effects of thresholds on the stipulated collateral may be written as

with the net stipulated credit support amount assigned to being

as before. The actual availability of this amount is then subject to the path dependent effects on collateral by MTA and rounding, of which the former has significant effect only for zero or very small thresholds, and the latter is usually negligible. Both have been omitted in the equation above.

1. Unilateral and Asymmetric Collateral Requirements: Most CSAs are bilateral in nature, but unilateral CSAs do exist in which only one of the two parties is required to post collateral. A CSA may be formally bilateral, but highly asymmetric, requiring both parties to post collateral but with vastly different thresholds, e.g.

vs.

Typically, even for asymmetric CSAs, the MTAs and the rounding are the same for both parties.

**Margin Calls and Cash Flows**

1. Margining Frequency of the Collateral Process: From an exposure perspective, the frequency with which the amount of collateral is adjusted – the *re-margining frequency* – is a critical component of the CSA. Following the financial crisis, most new IMA/CSAs, especially between major financial institutions, have been using daily re-margining frequency in order to reduce the amount by which the exposure can change relative to the collateral between the margin calls. However, many small financial institutions or buy-side clients may not be able to cope with the operational burden of frequent margin calls and will often negotiate longer re-margining frequencies, e.g., weekly, monthly, or even longer.
2. Events Constituting the Margining Process: The amount of collateral held by the parties is adjusted to their stipulated values and via the mechanism of a margin call. Many models for exposure treat the margin call as an instantaneous event, taking place on the re-margining date and completed instantaneously. In practice the margin call is a chain of events that takes several days to complete. With daily re-margining, several such chains run concurrently in an *interlaced* manner; even as one margin call is yet to be settled, another one already may be initiated. The time lag of this settlement process, long with the inherent lag of the re-margining schedule, means that the changes in the VM are always running behind the changes in the portfolio value. This, in turn, implies that the idealized expressions such as

are inaccurate. The detailed events involved in an initiation and the eventual settlement of a margin call will be discussed in a later section.

1. Underlying Trade Cash Flow: With both default processes and margin settlements being non-instantaneous events, it becomes relevant to track what payment flows take place – or not – during the periods close to a default. Two types of payments are needed here. The first type – called using the term *trade flows*, covers the contractual cash flows, physical settlements, and other forms of asset transfers related to the trade themselves. These terms are spelt out in trade documents and *term sheets* for each trade. The term *trade flows* rather than *cash flows* is used to emphasize that term sheets may involve flows other than cash – such as transfers of other non-cash assets, e.g. commodities, physical settlements resulting from the creation of new trades from old ones, e.g. exercise of a physically settled swaption into a swap. A missed trade flow is a serious event under the IMA, and a failure to pay can rapidly result in a default and trade termination unless cured properly. Any missed trade flow is, of course, part of the non-defaulting party’s claim.
2. CSA Specified Margin Cash Flow: The second type of flows is that that arises from the exchange of collateral between the parties – *margin flows*. The legal treatment of the margin flows is determined by the IMA/CSA, rather than by the trade documentation between the parties. For purposes of this treatment, the most important aspect of the IMA/CSA is the relatively mild treatment it affords to a party that misses a margin flow. Indeed, partially missing a margin payment is a common occurrence, as disputes about margin amounts happen regularly, and sometimes persist for years.
3. Delays causing the Default Termination: During a collateral dispute, the CSA protocol calls for the payment of the undisputed components of the collateral, but there is of course the possibility that there will be no undisputed component at all, if one party’s counter-proposals are sufficiently frivolous. Should suspicious about *gaming* arise, the CSA does contain a methodology to stop disputes through market quotations, but the resulting leakage of the position information is often a good deterrent to its use. As such, there is potential for abuse by firms experiencing financial difficulties, and a good possibility that such abuse can go on for some time before the dealer takes further efforts to end it. This, in turn, may result in a fairly long period of time between the last fully settled margin call and the eventual termination of a portfolio due to default.

**Revised Exposure Definition**

1. Stipulated vs. Realized Collateral Amount: In light of the discussion above, this section makes a first effort at improving

For this consider a default of at time following an early termination of the trade portfolio at time

At time , let be the collateral can *actually* rely on for the portfolio termination; this amount will very likely differ from the CSA stipulated amount – and from for that matter – due to the margin transfer time lags and some degree of non-performance by .

1. Exposure Enhanced by Trade Flow: In addition, it is possible that some trade flows are missed; denote their value at time , including accrued interest, as . The exposure generated by a default at time

may be re-defined as

Notice that the expression anchors the exposure at the termination date rather than at the default date - this will be treated at a later section. For later use, the time- expectation of the future time- exposure is defined as

where is the expectation operator in a relevant probability measure.

1. Impact of the Margin Timelines: Determining how can differ from , and how large can realistically be, will require a more detailed understanding of the settlement and the margining processes, a topic that will be treated in detail in a later section. The next goes about determining how classical approaches go about modeling and in

**Classical Model for Collateralized Exposure – Assumptions about Margin Flows**

1. The Naïve Collateralized Exposure Model: A naïve, and now outdated, model for collateralized exposure follows the definition

literally, and assumes that the collateral available is exactly equal to its prescribed value at time . That is, in the language of

it is assumed that

In addition, the parties are assumed to pay off all of the trade flows as described

and it is assumed that the termination date in

is the default date , i.e., there is no lag between the default date and the termination date. In this model, the assumption of loss crystallized at a time is the function of the portfolio value at a single point and does not depend on the earlier history In the limit of *perfect CSA* where

the collateralized exposure in such a model is exactly zero.

1. Lag Induced Classical Exposure Model: Assuming

is an idealization that ignores the non-instantaneous nature of collateral settlement protocols and does not capture the fact that firms under stress may stop fully honoring margin calls, resulting in a divergence between the portfolio value and the collateral value at some time lag before the termination of the portfolio. In what is denoted here as the *Classical Model* (see, for example, Pykhtin (2010)), this particular lag effect is captured by modifying

to

So, for instance, for a CSA with thresholds and and from

one gets

1. Drawbacks of the Classical Exposure Model: Having a mechanism for capturing the divergence between the collateral and the portfolio value is an important improvement over the older method described above, and the classical model has gained widespread acceptance for both the CVA (Credit Valuation Adjustment) and the regulatory calculations. Nevertheless, it hinges on a number of assumptions that are unrealistic. For instance,

assumes that both and will simultaneously stop paying margin at time freezing the margin level over the entire MPoR. In reality, if the party due to post collateral at happens to be the non-defaulting party , it will often continue doing so for some time even in the presence of the news about the possible impending default of . And should miss a few margin payments (maybe under the guise of a dispute), would often continue to post collateral while it evaluates its options. This creates an asymmetry between posting and receiving collateral that the classical model fails to recognize.

1. Impact of Lag on Exposure: In

the lag parameter is clearly critical; the larger is, the more may pull from the frozen margin value at time and bigger the expected exposure will become. In practice, the determination of will often be done in a simplistic manner, e.g. by using a fixed lag ( is common), or, more realistically, by adding a universal time delay to the re-margining frequency of the CSA in question. This practice is echoed in regulatory guidelines, e.g., in Basel 3 accord where MPoR is set to the re-margining frequency minus plus an MPoR floor that defaults to . The MPoR floor must be increased in certain cases, e.g., for large netting sets, illiquid trades, illiquid collateral, and recent collateral disputes – however, the increase is specified as a multiplier relative to the same default. With a high proportion of individually negotiated and amended features in real life IMA/CSAs, using a *one size fits all* assumption may, however, lead to significant inaccuracies.

**Assumptions about Trade Flows**

1. The Classical+ Collateral Exposure Model: Because large trade flows after the start of MPoR may no longer be followed by collateral adjustment, they have the potential to either extinguish or exacerbate the exposure. For this reason, the model assumptions with respect to the date when either party suspends the trade flows are likely to have a significant impact on the counterparty credit loss. In one common interpretation of the classical model, it is simply assumed that both and will continue to pay all the trade flows during the entire MPoR. As a consequence, the unpaid trade flow term in

will be zero, consistent with

For ease of reference this version of classical model is denoted as Classical+.

1. The Classical- Collateral Exposure Model: In another, less common, version of the Classical Model, the assumption is that both and will stop paying trade flows at the moment the MPoR commences, i.e., at time . In this case, the unpaid trade flows are set equal to

where is the time value of all net trade flows scheduled to be paid in the interval . Note that the time is measured in discrete units of business days, such that the notation is equivalent to . Further, if is after the margin flow date, the trade flow value accrues from the payment date to at a contractually specified rate. This version of the classical model is denoted Classical-; it is associated with an exposure definition of

1. Inadequacies of the Classical Exposure Models: In practice neither the Classical+ exposure equation

nor the Classical- exposure equation

are accurate representations of reality. Trade flows are likely to be paid at least by at the beginning of the MPoR, and are likely not to be paid by at least at its end. For instance, due to the CSA protocol for collateral calculations (next section), there is typically a lag between the start of an MPoR – the market observation date for the last full margin payment – and the date when definitely observes that has missed paying a margin flow; during this period would always make all trade payments unless commits any additional contract violations. Even after has determined that has missed a margin payment, ’s nominal rights to suspend payments following a breach would, as mentioned earlier, not always be exercised aggressively. Legal reviews, operational delays, and grace periods can further delay the time when stops paying trade flows to .

1. Accrual of Missed Trade Flows: Another trade flow effect arises during the last days of the MPoR (just prior to termination) where has already defaulted and neither party is likely making trade payments. Here, the IMA stipulates that the missed trade flows within this period accrue forward at a contractually specified rate and become part of the bankruptcy claim. This gives rise to a termination period in addition to the term, in turn leading to an adjustment of the exposure.

**Full Timeline of IMA/CSA Events**

1. Details of the IMA/CSA Processes: Loosely speaking, the IMA concerns itself with the events of default, termination, and close out, and the CSA governs the collateral exchanges, including the concrete rules for collateral amount calculations and posting frequencies. While this chapter so far has touched on the workings of the IMA/CSA in the previous sections, model construction hereafter will require more detailed knowledge of certain provisions regarding the normal exchange of collateral, the legal options available in the case of missed payments, and the common dealer policies with respect to availing itself of these options. A detailed exposition of the IMA and the CSA legal complexities can be found in multiple sources, including at <http://www.isda.org>; here only a brief summary to the extent necessary to develop the model is provided. The focus is on the development of a plausible timeline of events taking place around the default, and the subsequent portfolio termination.

**Events Prior to Default**

1. Calculated vs. Actual Collateral Amounts: It is assumed that the dealer is the Calculation Agent for the computation of the collateral amounts. As before, and denote the *prescribed* collateral amounts for and ; as discussed, they may differ from the *actually* available collateral amounts and if one of the parties fails to make the margin flow or changes the prescribed amount.
2. CSA Specified Margin Process Timelines: The following list describes the complete sequence of events taking place at times The next section simplifies and condenses these into a tractable model.
3. Collateral/Portfolio Valuation Date : The timeline begins at , the as-of-date at which the value of the portfolio and its collateral are measured, for usage in the evaluation of the formulas for the Credit Support Amount – plainly, the amount of collateral. Typically, is the close of business on the business day before .
4. Honored Collateral Invocation Date : For the purposes of this treatment, is used to refer to the last *undisputed and respected* Valuation Date prior to default. At time , besides officially determining and , the dealer calculates the incremental payment amounts to itself and to as

and

respectively. Taking into account any minimum transfer amounts, the transfer amounts and should normally be communicated by to prior to a Notification Time (e.g., local time).

1. Collateral Transfer Initiation Date : After receiving the notice of the calculated collateral amount, must initiate the transfers of the sufficient amount of eligible collateral on the payment date . Assuming that managed to have the collateral notification sent to prior to the Notification Time, defaults to after . If is late in its notification, would be after . It is assumed here that the required amounts – recalling that they were calculated at using market data at time – are all settled without incident at . However, will be the *last* time that margin flows settle normally before the default takes place.
2. Non-honored Collateral Calculation Date : Let denote the next scheduled valuation date after . If is the average scheduled time between collateral calculations, one approximately has – ignoring business calendar effects –

At – hopefully before the Notification Time - will be able to send payment notice to , but has fallen into financial distress and will not be able – or willing – to pay further margin flows. Should simply fail to pay collateral at the next payment date, a *Credit Support Default* could be triggered shortly thereafter (non-payment of collateral is associated with a grace period). To prevent this from happening, it is, as discussed earlier, likely that would attempt to stall by disputing the result of the collateral calculation by .

1. Potential Event of Default : Exactly how long the margin dispute is allowed to proceed is a largely a behavioral question that requires some knowledge of ’s credit policies and its willingness to risk legal disputes with . Additionally, one needs to consider to what extend is able to conceal its position of financial stress by using dispute tactics, or, say, blaming operational issues on its inability to pay collateral. Ultimately, however, will conclude that is in default of its margin flows (a Credit Support Default), or will commit a serious contract violation such as failing to make a trade-related payment. At that point will conclude that a *Potential Event of Default* (PFD) has occurred. The time of this event is identified as the true *default time* .
2. Client PED Communication Date : Once the PED has taken place, needs to formally communicate it to , in writing. Taking into account mail/courier delays, legal reviews, and other operational lags, it is likely that the communication time, denoted , takes place at a slight delay to the PED.
3. Event of Default Date : After the receipt of the PED notice, will be granted a brief period of time to cure the PED. The length of this *cure period* is specified in the IMA and depends on both the type of the PED and the specific IMA. For instance, of the PED in question is Failure to Pay, the default cure period is in the 1992 IMA and in the 2002 IMA – this may very well be overridden in the actual documents. At the end of the cure period – here denoted – and *Event of Default* (ED) formally crystallizes. It is emphasized here at the (the *official* default time) is *not* associated with the true default time ; instead is equated to the time of the actual default (the PED) that, after contractual formalities, will lead to the default of .
4. ED Communication () and ETD Designation Dates (): After the ED has taken place, will inform of the ED at time

and may, at time

elect to designate an *Early Termination Date* (ETD).

1. Early Termination Date : The ETD is denoted ; per the IMA it is required that The ETD constitutes the as-of-date for the termination of ’s portfolio and collateral positions. Many dealers will aim for speedy resolution in order to minimize market risk, and will therefore aim to set the ETD as early as possible. There are, however, cases where this may not be optimal, as described in the Section below.
2. Post Client ETD Establishment Events: Once the portfolio claim has been established as of the ETD, the value of any collateral and unpaid trade flows held by is added to the amount owed to . Paragraph 8 of the CSA then allows to liquidate any securities collateral in its possession and to apply the proceeds against the amount it is owed. Should the collateral be insufficient to cover what is owed to , the residual amount will be submitted as a claim in ’s insolvency. The claim is usually challenged by the insolvency representative, and where parties cannot agree, may be referred to court. It can sometimes take a long time before the claim is resolved by the bankruptcy courts and the realized recovery becomes known. The interest on the recovery amount for this time is added to the awarded amount. Note that this chapter focusses exclusively on modeling the magnitude of exposure and bankruptcy claim, and does not challenge the established way of modeling the amount and the timing of the eventual recovery using a loss-given-default (LGD) fraction.

**Some Behavioral and Legal Aspects**

1. Margin Exposure Modeling Parametrization Components: With the timeline just having been established, it remains for it to be tied with a proper model for exposure. In order to do so, as already mentioned, the timeline needs to be combined with coherent assumptions about the dealer and the client behavior in each sub-period. The assumptions should be determined not only by the rights available under the IMA/CSA, but also by the degree of operational efficiencies in serving notices and getting legal opinions, and also by the level of prudence injected into the assumptions about the dealer ability and willingness to strictly uphold contractual terms within each client group as it pertains to margin flows and disputes.
2. Issues with Exercising Suspension Rights: From a legal rights perspective, the most important observation is that once notice of a PED has been served (time ) the so called *suspension rights* of IMA (Section 2(a)(iii)) and the CSA (Paragraph 4(a)) will allow to suspend all trade- and collateral- related payments to until the PED has been cured. The extent to which the suspension rights are actually exercised, however, is quiet situational. A particular danger is that exercises its suspension rights due to a Potential Event of Default (PED), but that subsequently the PED is ruled to be not valid. Should this happen, the dealer can inadvertently commit a breach of contract which, especially in the presence of cross-default provisions, can have serious consequences for the dealer.
3. Choice of Designating an ETD: Another, somewhat counter-intuitive, reason for not to enforce its suspension rights is tied to IMA Section 2(a)(iii), which can sometimes make it favorable for to *never* designate an ETD. Indeed, if owes money, it would seem a reasonable course of action for to simply:
   1. Never designate and ETD, and
   2. Suspend all the payments in the portfolio until the default gets *cured* – which most likely will never happen.

This tactic basically allows to walk away from its obligations on the portfolio when defaults, effectively making a windfall gain.

1. Jurisdiction Legality of the ETD Delays: The strategy of delaying the ETD is perpetuity has been tested by UK courts and found legal – although contract language has been proposed by ISDA to prevent the issue. In the US, however, local *safe haven* laws have been ruled to prevent ETD’s for more than about one year. Still a one-year delay may prove tempting if has a big negative exposure to and is unwilling to immediately fund the large cash flow needed to settle. As most large dealers are presumably unlikely to play legal games with the ETD, this topic shall not be considered further here, but note that there is room to make more aggressive model assumptions around the ETD’s than is done here.

**Simplified Timeline of IMA/CSA Events**

1. Motivation for the Timeline Simplification: It should be evident from the preceding section that the full timeline of IMA/CSA reviewed earlier is in many ways different, and more complex, than what is assumed in the Classical- and the Classical+ versions of the classical model. However, it is equally evident that the timeline is too complex to be modeled in every detail. This section offers a simplification of the timeline designed to extract the events most important for exposure modeling. The resulting model offers several important improvements over the classical model, while remaining practical and computationally feasible.

**Identification of Key Time Periods**

1. Classical MPOR Start/End Dates: To recap, first the classical model only considers two dates in the timeline of default; the start and the end of the MPoR. The start of the MPoR, denoted by , is defined as the last observation date for which the margin was settled in full (a few days after the observation date). The end of the MPoR, denoted by , is the observation date on which ’s claim is established. Note that coincides with the IMA’s *Early Termination Date* (ETD) discussed earlier.
2. Classical Model Lag Length Error: In the classical model there is no clear distinction between the observation and the payment dates, making it difficult to cleanly capture the trade flow effects. For instance, in the classical version of the model, denotes both the last observation date as well as the dates on which all trade flows cease. In reality, the last margin observation date is unlikely to be contentious and trigger stoppage of trade flows, as the margin payment to which the observation corresponds to will only be missed by several business-days later. Specifically, if the market data is observed on day , the valuation is performed in day , then only on day (or if the notification was late) is the initiation of the actual payment expected to take place. The length of this lag is of the same order of magnitude as typical assumptions for the length of the MPoR, and can be a source of considerable model error if not handled properly.
3. Delineating Observations and Payment Dates: In the simplified timeline proposed here, care is kept to take care of the distinction between the observation and the payment dates, and also to consider the possibility that may take the action of stopping a particular type of flow at a different time than does. Accordingly, the model includes two potentially different observation dates for which and later settle their margin flows in full for the last time; and two potentially different dates when they pay their trade flows respectively for the last time. The end of the MPoR is defined as in the same way as in the classical model, to coincide with the ETD. The table below summarizes the notation for the five dates in the simplified timeline.
4. Notation for the Dates in the Simplified Timeline:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Event** | **Date Type** | **Notation** |
| Observation Date for the Last Margin Flow from | Observation |  |
| Observation Date for the Last Margin Flow from | Observation |  |
| Observation Date for the Last Trade Flow Payment from | Settlement |  |
| Observation Date for the Last Trade Flow Payment from | Settlement |  |
| ETD | Observation |  |

1. Current Scheme MPoR Start Date: The start of the MPoR in the current model is , which in the notation of table above may be defined symmetrically as

is always expected to stop posting margin no later than the non-defaulting party , and therefore on would very likely have

and

1. Exposure Model Timeline Lag Choices: The second column in the table above specifies which of the dates is the observation date, and which is the settlement or the payment date. According to the notation established in the table, and are the lengths of time preceding the ETD during which changes in the portfolio values no longer result in collateral payments by and , respectively. Similarly, and are the lengths of time preceding the ETD during which the respective parties do not pay trade flows. In, say, a Classical 10-day MPoR model

with

for Classical+ and

for Classical-.

**Establishing the Sequence of Events**

1. Order of the MPoR Events: *A priori*, the four events in the Table between the start event and the end event of the MPoR can occur in any order. However, this section will now explain why the table very likely shows the proper sequence of events.
2. Time Lag between Margin/Trade Flows: As discussed earlier, missing trade flows are recognized as a more serious breach of contractual obligations than missing margin flows, especially since the latter may take the form of a margin valuation dispute. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that neither party will stop paying the trade flows before stopping the payment of margin flows. Accounting for the margin settlement lag between the observation date and the payment date, this yields
3. Lag between Dealer/Client Events: It is also reasonable to assume that either of the two types of flows is first missed by the defaulting party , and then only by the non-defaulting party . This leads to the following additional constraints on the sequence of events within the timeline:
4. Client Settlement vs. Dealer Observation: Except in rare and unique situations such as outright operational failures, would not continue to pay margin flows once commits a more serious violation by missing a trade flow, resulting in

Combining these inequalities results in the chronological order of events shown in the table above.

**Evaluation of the Client Survival Probability**

1. Client Survival at MPoR Start: As was the case for the classical model, the setup anchors the exposure date at the termination date ETD, at the very end of the MPoR. The ETD is the same for both parties, and constitutes a convenient reference point for aligning the actions of one party against those of the other. It needs to be emphasized that the ETD for which the exposure is evaluated does not coincide with the date at which the survival probability is evaluated, e.g. for the computation of the CVA. In the simplified timeline, the counterparty survival probability should be evaluated for , the last date when stops paying trade flows – effectively assuming that the default is due to failure-to-pay. Hence, if is the expected exposure anchored at the ETD , then the incremental contribution to the unilateral CVA from time is, under suitable assumptions, where is the survival probability under the model’s measure – later sections contain concrete examples.
2. Client Survival at MPoR End: Evaluating the default probability at the anchor date rather than at will introduce the slight error in computing the survival probability. While this error is relatively small and is often ignored by practitioners, it takes virtually no effort, and has no impact on model efficiency, to evaluate the survival probability at the right date.

**Timeline Calibration**

1. Client Customization of IMA/CSA Specifications: As mentioned earlier, the specific IMA/CSA terms for a given counterparty should always be ideally examined in detail, so that any non-standard provisions may be analyzed by their impact on the timeline. For those cases where such bespoke timeline construction is not practical (typically for operational reasons), two standard (*reference*) timelines are proposed here. This will allow the demonstration of the thought process behind the timeline calibration, and will provide some useful base cases for later numerical tests.
2. Parametrizing the Client and the Dealer Timelines: While factors such as portfolio size and dispute history with the counterparty should, of course, be considered in establishing the MPoR, an equally important consideration in calibrating the model is the nature of expected response by to a missed margin or trade flow by . Even under plain vanilla IMA/CSA terms, experience shows that the reactions to contract breaches are subject to both human and institutional idiosyncracies, rendering the MPoR quiet variable.
3. Aggressive vs. Conservative Timeline Parametrization: Recognizing that “one size does not fit all”, two different calibrations shall therefore be considered; one *aggressive* which assumes the best case scenario for rapidly recognizing the impending default, and taking swift action; and one *conservative*, which takes into consideration not only a likely delay in recognizing that the counterparty default is imminent, but also the possibility that the bank may not aggressively enforce its legal rights afforded under IMA and CSA in order to avoid damaging its reputation. In both scenarios, daily re-margining is assumed – if a CSA calls for less frequent margin calls than this, the MPoR must be lengthened accordingly.

**Aggressive Calibration**

1. Applicability of the Aggressive Calibration: The aggressive calibration applies to trading relationship between two counterparties that both have string operational competence, and where there is little reputational risk associated with swift and aggressive enforcement of the non-defaulting party’s legal rights against the defaulting party.
2. Inter-dealer Monitoring and Call-outs: A good example would be trading between two large dealers, both willing to aggressively defend against a possible credit loss. The credit officers here are assumed to be diligent in the monitoring of their counterparties, and generally be able to see a default developing, rather than be caught by surprise.
3. Full Application of Operational Sophistication: Under aggressive calibration, the event of missing or disputing a margin call by any non-trivial amount will, given ’s sophistication, immediately alert that an impending default is likely. will not be misled by claims of valuation disputes or other excuses, and will send a Notice of Credit Support Default under the IMA/CSA the next business day after the breach of the margin agreement. At the same time, to protect itself further, will stop both the margin and the trade flows. The counterparty is assumed to simultaneously stop paying margin and trade flows as well, so that no further payments of any kind are exchanged by the parties.
4. Elimination of Settlement/Herstatt Risk: The simultaneous action by both parties in the Aggressive scenario to stop paying the trade flows at the earliest possible moment results in the elimination of all *settlement* risk – the possibility that the dealer may continue paying on its trade flow obligations while not receiving promised payments in return. In the context of cross-currency trades, this type of settlement risk is frequently referred to as the *Herstatt* risk, after the bank that caused large counterparty losses in this manner (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Settlement_risk>). Such risk shall be captured in the Conservative Calibration case below, and shall be discussed in more detail in a later section.
5. Timeline of the corresponding MPoR: Despite ’s immediate and aggressive response, the MPoR will still be fairly long due to the way the IMA/CSA operates in practice. In particular, notice that the first period in the simplified timeline is between the last observation date for which the margin was fully settled, and the first date for which misses a margin flow.
6. Breakdown of the CSA Steps: As it takes at least 2 business days to settle a margin payment, plus 1 business day between the last margin that was successfully settled and the first margin payment that was not, a minimum of 3 business days will accrue from the start of an MPoR and a margin-related PED. Further, once the margin flow is missed, must send at least 2 notices and permit a grace period – usually 2 business days – to cure the violation before an event of default (ED) has officially taken place and an ETD has been designated.
7. Comparison with Classical MPoR Timeline: Since an ETD cannot be designated prior to the event of default, it is unlikely that an MPoR can ever be less than 7 business days. It is remarkable that even under the most aggressive set of assumptions, the MPoR is still only 3 business days shorter than the classical 2-week MPoR.
8. Detailed Breakdown of the Aggressive Timeline: The detailed taxonomy of the aggressive timeline is listed in the table down below, and essentially splits the MPoR into two sections; a margin delay period of 3 business days, and a default resolution period of 4 business days. During the latter period, and cease paying on the first day, leaving a period of 3 business days where neither party makes any payments. Notice that it is assumed that the ETD is declared to coincide with the ED, i.e., the dealer will terminate as quickly as legally possible.

**Conservative Calibration**

1. Non-aggressive Enforcement of CSA Rights: The conservative calibration is intended to cover the situation where the dealer’s enforcement of its rights under the IMA/CSA is deliberate and cautious, rather than swift. There may be several reasons for such a situation, sometime acing in tandem.
2. Applicable Clients - Less Sophisticated Participants: First, a dealer, if overly trigger-happy, can gain a market-wide reputation as being rigid and litigious, potentially causing clients to seek other trading partners. In fact, should aggressive legal maneuvers be applied to counterparties that may be considered “unsophisticated”, there is even a potential for the dealer to be perceived as predatory by the larger public.
3. “Leakage” of Dealer Positions: Second, there are situations where exercising the legal rights would cause an unattractive leakage of information into the broader market. As indicated earlier, this may happen for instance if the formal collateral dispute methodology of Paragraph 5 of the IDSA CSA is activated; the market poll inherent in the methodology would inevitably reveal the positions held with the counterparty to competing dealers.
4. Ramification of Aggressive Legal Exercise: Third, sometimes an aggressive interpretation of the legal rights can backfire in the form of lawsuits and counter-measures by the counterparty. For example, even when the dealer may have the rights to withhold payments (e.g., under Section 2(a)(iii)), it would often elect to not exercise this right immediately out of concern that a counter-ED would be raised against it or that withholding payments would exacerbate the liquidity situation of the counterparty potentially exposing the dealer to liabilities and lawsuits.
5. Damage from “Improper PED” Rulings: As mentioned, a particular danger is that the dealer exercises its suspension rights due to a Potential Event of Default (PED), but that subsequently the PED is ruled to not be valid. Should this happen, the dealer can inadvertently commit a breach of contract.
6. Limitations with the Dealers’ Operational Capacity: Of course, even if a dealer may potentially be willing to aggressively exercise its rights, it may not have the operational capacity to do so quickly. For example, the dealer may not be able to perform the required legal review on a short notice, or may not always have the efficiency to get the notices mailed out at the earliest possible date. On top of this there is always potential for technology related and human errors and oversights.
7. Timeline Incurred by Conservative Calibration: While it is harder to get concrete data to estimate a reasonable timeline for the Conservative case (this case being dependent not only on the IMA/CSA details, but also on the specifics of the dealer’s reputational considerations), under a perfectly reasonable set of assumptions the MPoR ends up being more than twice as long as for the Aggressive case above. Under this calibration choice, the Conservative scenario assumes that the totality of the margin dispute negotiations, operational delays, human errors, legal reviews etc., adds up to 8 business days, yielding an MPoR of a total of 15 business days.
8. Typical Conservative CSA Event Timeline: One plausible scenario with daily re-margining could be:
   1. observes the portfolio value as needed for the margin transfer amount #1 as of .
   2. sends margin call #1 to ; observes a margin transfer amount #2.
   3. sends margin call #2 to ; honors margin call #1; observes a margin transfer amount #3.
   4. fails to honor margin call #2 and initiates dispute; tries to resolve the dispute while still paying and calculating the margin.
   5. fails to make a trade payment.
   6. stops paying margin and sends a PED notice.
   7. receives PED; keeps making trade payments.
   8. The PED is not cured.
   9. stops making trade payments and sends an ED notice to , designating as the ETD.
   10. ETD.
9. Current/Interlacing Outstanding Margin Process: Notice that a number of different margin processes are simultaneously active (denoted #1, #2, and #3), reflecting the interlacing nature of the daily margin calls. Also, unlike the earlier Aggressive Calibration, the above scenario explicitly involves settlement risk, as a time period exists only where pays trade flows (from to , both dates inclusive).
10. Dealer/Client Payment/Settlement Lags: To translate the scenario above into the notation of the earlier sections, first notice that

since the observation date of the last margin call (#1) honored by is . Second, as makes its last possible margin call at based on an observation at time

Third, as fails to make a trade payment at , ’s last payment date is , and therefore

And, finally, since stops its trade payments at

**Summary and Comparison of Timelines**

1. Classical+/Classical-/Aggressive/Conservative Parametrizations: Using the notation above, the Aggressive and the Conservative scenarios are presented in the table below. For reference, the Classical+ and the Classical- versions of the classical model are presented in the table as well. Note that the assumption of the classical MPoR lies between the two calibration choices proposed, and is closer to the Aggressive scenario.
2. MPoR Periods for CSA’s with Daily Re-margining:

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Parameter** | **Conservative** | **Aggressive** | **Classical+** | **Classical-** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

1. Caveats over Aggressive/Conservative Parameters: The Aggressive and the Conservative parameter choices represent two opposite types of dealer-client relationships, and may also be used as two limit scenarios for materiality and model risk analysis. Of course, the best approach would always be to set the model parameters based on prudent analysis of the firm’s historical default resolution timelines, to the extent that it is practically feasible. The model could also conceivably treat the various time lags as random variables to be simulated as part of the exposure computations; yet it is debatable whether increasing the number of model parameters this way is warranted in practice.

**Unpaid Margin Flows and Margin Flow Gap**

1. Margin and Trade Flow Gaps: To formulate the model in more precise mathematical terms, this section returns to

and considers how to draw the analysis of the previous sections to reasonably specify both the collateral amount as well as the value of net unpaid cash flows.

1. Client Last Margin Posting Date: As with the classical model, it is assumed that the MPoR starts at time

the portfolio observation date associated with the last regular collateral posting by . Recall that the classical model further assumes that will stop posting collateral simultaneously with so that

where denotes the CSA prescribed collateral support amount calculated from the market data observed at time . This is to be compared with

1. Definition of the Margin Flow Gap: In contrast to

this model assumes that will continue posting and returning collateral to for all contractual margin observations dates whenever required by the CSA, after

and up to and including the observation date

The presence of an observation period of non-zero length for which is posting and returning collateral but is not is referred to as *margin flow gap*.

1. Choosing the Collateral Computation Date: Here, it is always expected that

which therefore in effect assumes the possibility of a time interval where only honors its margin requirements. In this interval, can match its contractually stipulated amounts only when they involve transfers from to . This asymmetry results in holding at time the *smallest* collateral computed in the observation interval i.e.

1. Implications of the Collateral Date Choice: The *worst-case* form of the above provides a less optimistic view on available collateral than on classical modeling, resulting in larger exposure whenever there are multiple collateral observation dates in – it is assumed that one of the observation dates always coincides with the start of the MPoR . All other things being equal, the difference in exposure relative to the classical model will increase with . If is kept constant, the difference will increase with more frequent re-margining. Note that

matches

when

**Unpaid Trade Flows and Trade Flow Gap**

1. Origin of the Trade Flow Gap: According to the assumptions in the earlier sections, the last date when is still paying the trade flows is

and the last date when is still trade flows is

The period when is still paying trade flows while does not is referred to as the *trade flow gap*.

1. Projecting the Unpaid Trade Flow Value: The value of the net trade flows unpaid by the termination date can be expressed using the notation established so far as

where an arrow indicates the direction of the trade flows and () trade flows have positive (negative) sign.

1. Same Date Dealer/Client Flows: In calculating the above equation, care needs to be taken on how the trade flows are aggregated and accrued to the termination date . Cash flows of opposite direction scheduled to be paid in the same currency on the same date (for instance, the two legs of an ordinary single-currency interest-rate swap) in the period are aggregated (netted) at the cash flow date, therefore only the aggregated amount – their difference – enters in to the above equation. The aggregated amount of the missed cash flows should be accrued to time at the interest rate of the currency in question, and then converted to ’s domestic currency.
2. Different Currency Dealer/Client Flows: Cash flows in opposite direction scheduled to be paid in *different* currencies on the same date (for instance, the two legs of a cross-currency interest rate swap) are *not* netted at the cash flow date. The missed cash flow amounts in each currency should be accrued to time at the relevant interest rates, and then converted to ’s domestic currency.
3. Physically Settled Dealer/Client Flows: The value of each asset flow (for instance, a swap that would result from exercising a physically settled swaption) should be obtained through pricing at time of the undelivered asset in ’s domestic currency. Generally, asset flows are not aggregated.
4. Collateral available at Termination Date: To analyze the impact of these assumptions on the expression for above, consider for simplicity a zero-threshold margin agreement with no MTA/rounding. Then, from

the collateral available to at the termination date can be written as

1. Corresponding CSA Implied Client Exposure: Substituting

and

into

yields, for the simple CSA considered

1. CSA Implied Client Exposure Components: above implies that trading flows from to can occur within the MPoR. Thus, trade flows have the potential to generate large spikes in the exposure profiles – especially in the presence of a trade flow gap where only pays trade flows. To see this, the exposure components of can be further drilled down as follows. First, ignoring the minor discounting effects inside the MPoR, the portfolio value at time can be represented as a sum of the portfolio’s forward value to time and the value of all the trade flows taking place after and up to and including :
2. Trade Flow Post Collateral Date: This may be further re-written as

which, together with

allows re-stating

in the following form:

1. The Market Driven Portfolio Change : The terms in

have been re-arranged into five separate components, corresponding to the five different contributions to the exposures. The first is

- the change of the portfolio forward value to time driven by the change in the market factors between and . This term is driven by the volatility of the market factors between and ; it produces no spikes in the expected exposure profile.

1. The Market Driven Trade Flow :

represents the change of the value of the trade flows scheduled to be paid – but actually unpaid – by in the interval resulting from the change of the market factors between and . This term is driven by the volatility of the market factors between and ; it produces no spikes in the expected exposure profiles.

1. The Market Driven Trade Flow :

is the change of the value of the net trade flows between and scheduled to be paid – but actually unpaid – in the interval resulting from the change in the market factors between and . This term likewise produces no spikes in the expected exposure profile.

1. Net Trade Flow between :

is the negative value of the net trade flow between and scheduled to be paid – and actually paid – in the interval . Paths where is the net payer – so that is negative – contribute to the upward spikes in the EE profile.

1. Dealer Trade Flow across : The negative value of the trade flows scheduled to be paid – and actually paid – by to in the interval . Whenever such trade flows are present is always the payer, leading to upward spikes in the EE profile. Furthermore, in some cases, the spikes arising from this term can be of extreme magnitude, e.g., the scheduled notional exchange in a cross-currency swap where pays the full notional, but receives nothing.

**Numerical Examples**

1. Illustrative Exposures and CVA Magnitudes: To gain intuition for the model, this section presents exposure profiles and CVA metrics for several trade and portfolio examples, using both the Aggressive and the Conservative calibrations. The focus is on ordinary and cross-currency swaps, as these instruments are the primary sources of exposures in most dealers. For all the numerical examples, the stochastic yield curves are driven by one-factor Hull-White model; for cross-currency swap examples, the FX rate is assumed to follow a Black Scholes model.
2. Single Swap Classical/Conservative Exposures: Andersen, Pykhtin, and Sokol (2017) first examine how the model differs from the classical exposure approach. They use Monte Carlo simulation on a USD 10 MM 1-year par-valued vanilla interest rate swap to compare exposures of the Conservative calibration with those computed against the Classical+ and the Classical- models – see the Table above. To make comparisons more meaningful, they override the default setting of 10 business days for the Classical model, and instead set it equal to 15 business days – the length of the MPoR for the Conservative calibration.
3. Single Swap - Classical Exposure Estimations: As they note in their figures, the Classical- calibration is, of course, the least conservative setting, as it ignores both the effect of trade flows and that of the margin asymmetry. The Classical+ calibration tracks the Classical- calibration at most times, but contains noticeable spikes around the last 3 cash flow dates. No spikes occur in their figure on the first quarterly cash flow date, as they assume that the floating rate is fixed at the fixed rate, making the net cash flow zero in all scenarios.
4. Single Swap Conservative Model - MPoR End: The conservative calibration results also contain spikes around the cash flow dates, although these differ from the Classical+ calibration in several ways. First, the Conservative calibration always recognizes that there will be a part towards the end of the MPoR (after time ) where and will both have stopped paying margin and coupons; as a result, the spikes of the Conservative calibration start later (here: 3 business days) than those of the Classical+ calibration.
5. Single Swap Conservative Model - Trade Flows: Second, the initial part of the spike – in the period from to - is substantially higher for the Conservative calibration due to the assumption of only paying cash flows in this sub-period. The remainder of the spike is comparable in height to the Classical+ spike.
6. Single Swap - Classical vs. Conservative: *Between* spikes the Conservative calibration produces higher exposures than both the Classical- and the Classical+ methods – by around . This is, of course, a consequence of the *worst-case* margin asymmetry mechanism in

the effect of which will grow with the diffusion volatility of the rate process. Of course, the last coupon period again has no exposure between spikes, since the volatility of swap prices vanishes after the last coupon rate fixing.

1. Single Swap: Aggressive Calibration Exposures: Comparison the Aggressive calibration to the Classical+ and the Classical- calibrations are qualitatively similar. A detailed comparison is therefore skipped here, but Andersen, Pykhtin, and Sokol note that the pick-up in exposure from margin asymmetry falls to about 15%, rather than the 40% observed for the Conservative calibration – a result of the fact that, for Aggressive calibration, the *worst-case* margin result is established over much fewer days. Andersen, Pykhtin, and Sokol (2017) demonstrate the comparison of the exposure profiles for the Aggressive and the Conservative calibrations in their graphs; as expected, the Conservative calibration leads to both bigger and wider exposure spikes, as well as to higher exposure levels between spikes.
2. Single Swap - Maturity/Coupon Effect: While instructive, the 1-year vanilla swap example is quiet benign exposure-wise; not only is the instrument very short-dated, it also allows for netting of coupons on trade-flow dates, thereby reducing the effects of trade flow spikes. Andersen, Pykhtin, and Sokol (2017) relax both effects by increasing the maturity of the swap, and by making the fixed and the floating legs pay on different schedules – and illustrate the exposure results in a separate figure.
3. Single Swap - Coupon Payment Mismatch: The upward exposure spikes occur twice per year, whenever the dealer must make a semi-annual fixed payment. On the dates when the counterparty makes a quarterly floating payment that is not accompanied by a fixed payment by the dealer, a narrow *downward* spike emerges, due to the delay in transferring the coupon back to the counterparty through the margin mechanism.
4. Single Swap - Impact of Maturity: The exposure between spikes is also much larger, a consequence of the higher volatility of the 10-year swap compared to the 1-year swap. Of course, as the swap nears its maturity, its duration and volatility die out, so the non-spike exposure profile predictably gets pulled to zero at the 10-year date. Also, as predicted, the Aggressive calibration produces much lower exposures than the Conservative calibration, by nearly a factor of 2.
5. Single Cross-Currency Swap - Herstatt Risk: A more extreme form of trade flow spikes will occur for cross-currency swaps, where neither the coupon nor the final payment can be netted. The notional payment, in particular, can induce a very significant payment exposure spike (the Herstatt Risk), whenever the exposure model allows for a trade flow gap. To recall, the Conservative calibration has a trade flow gap, but the Aggressive calibration does not.
6. Single Cross-Currency Swap - Coupon Mismatch: As confirmed by Andersen, Pykhtin, and Sokol (2017), the exposure for a conservative calibration has a very large spike that is not present in the Aggressive calibration. Like Conservative calibration, Aggressive calibration will, of course, still produce spikes at the cash flow dates, due to margin effects.
7. Single Cross-Currency Swap - Principal Mismatch: As a consequence, the principal exchange is likely fa away from break-even, resulting in a large exposure spike at maturity. Although smaller than for the Conservative calibration, the spike at maturity is also present for the Aggressive calibration; while both and pay the principal exchange, does not make the margin transfer for the balance of the principal payments.

**Portfolio Results**

1. Single Swap Portfolio: Setup Overview: For individual trades, the presence of localized spikes in the exposure profiles may ultimately have a relatively modest impact on the credit risk metrics, such as the CVA – after all, the likelihood of the counterparty default in a narrow time interval around quarterly or semi-annual cash flow event is typically low. For a *portfolio* of swaps, however, the spikes will add up and affect the net exposure profile nearly everywhere.
2. Single Swap Portfolio - Draw Algorithm: To illustrate this, Andersen, Pykhtin, and Sokol (2017) picked 50 interest rate swaps with quarterly floating rate payments and semi-annual fixed rate payments of 2%. The terms of the swap were randomized as follows:
   1. Notionals of the swap are sampled uniformly on the interval from 0 to USD 1 MM.
   2. Duration of the fixed leg payments – payer or receiver – is random.
   3. Start date of each swap is subject to a random offset to avoid complete MPoR overlaps.
   4. Swap maturities are scaled uniformly on the interval from 1 to 10 years.
3. Single Swap Portfolio: Aggressive vs Conservative: They also illustrate the resulting exposure profile in a separate figure. Both the Conservative profile, and to a lesser extent, the Aggressive profile include frequent spikes around the trade-flow times above the *baseline* exposure level. As seen in the next section, these spikes make a significant contribution to the CVA metrics. As before, the exposure under the Conservative calibration is twice as large as that under the Aggressive calibration.
4. XCCY Swaps Portfolios Generation Algorithm: To repeat the portfolio results with a cross-currency swap, Andersen, Pykhtin, and Sokol (2017) constructed a 50-deal portfolio by randomization, using the following rules.
   1. EUR notionals are sampled uniformly in the interval from 0 to USD 10 MM
   2. USD notionals are 1.5 times the EUR notionals
   3. EUR leg has a fixed semi-annual coupon of 3%, and the USD leg floating quarterly coupon
   4. Direction of the fixed leg payments (payer or receiver) is random
   5. Start date of each swap is subject to a random offset to avoid complete MPoR overlaps
   6. Swap maturities are sampled uniformly in the interval from 1 to 10 years
5. XCCY Swap Portfolio: Conservative vs. Aggressive: As shown in their figure for an expected exposure for a 10Y cross-currency swap, Andersen, Pykhtin, and Sokol (2017) generated the swaps within the portfolio such that the principal exchanged and the fixed coupon are not at-the-money, to mimic a typical situation corresponding to a portfolio of seasoned trades. As demonstrated in another figure for the expected exposure of the cross-currency swap portfolio, the exposure for the conservative calibration is, as expected, dominated by a series of Herstatt risk spikes, one per swap in the portfolio.

**CVA Results**

1. CVA Computation from Expected Exposure: As mentioned earlier, a common use of the expected exposure results is the computation of the CVA. Under suitable assumptions, ’s unilateral CVA may be computed from the expected exposure (EE) profile as

where is the recovery rate, is the time- discount factor to time , and is the time- survival probability of to time . As discussed before, the exposure profile here is offset by to properly align it with the default events.

1. CVA Metrics Dealer/Client Settings: The CVA metric serves as a convenient condensation of the exposure profiles of the previous two sections into single numbers, and Andersen, Pykhtin, and Sokol (2017) tabulate the CVA numbers for the corresponding instruments/portfolios. The CVA integral was discretized using a daily grid, assumed at

and the forward default intensity is left constant at such that

For reference, the table also includes the results of the Classical method, with the MPoR length equal to both that of the Aggressive calibration (7) and the Conservative Calibration ().

1. CVA Comparison - Classical/Conservative/Aggressive: Their results confirm what was seen earlier. For instance, the CVA for the Aggressive calibration is to smaller than that for the Conservative calibration. In Addition, the CVA of the Conservative calibration is between 50% and 100% larger than that of the Classical+ calibration – at similar MPoR – which in turn is larger than the CVA for the Classical- calibration by around 5% to 25%. Not surprisingly the CVA results for the XCCY portfolio are particularly high in the Conservative calibration due to the Herstatt risk.

**Improvement of the Computation Times**

1. Computation Speed-Up using Coarse Grids: In exposure calculations for realistic portfolios, horizons can be very long, often exceeding 30 years. For such lengthy horizons, brute-force Monte-Carlo exposures on a daily, or even weekly, time grid will often be prohibitively slow. It is therefore common to use daily simulation steps only for the earliest parts of the exposure profile (e.g., the first month), and then gradually increase the step-length over time to monthly or quarterly, in order to keep the total number of simulation dates manageable. Unfortunately, such a coarsening of the time-grid will inevitably fail to capture both the *worst-case* margin effect and the trade spikes that are key to the exposure model.
2. Coarse Grid Lookback Analysis: The next two sections look at ways to capture exposure without having to resort to brute-force daily simulation. A common speed-up technique for the Classical model – the Coarse Grid Look-back Model – is first reviewed, and its shortcomings and pitfalls are highlighted. An improved practical technique based on Brownian Bridge is the proposed.

**The Coarse Grid Lookback Method and its Shortcomings**

1. Layout of the Coarse Grid: Assume that the portfolio is not computed daily, but instead on a coarse grid where runs from to . This section uses rather than to distinguish the model grid from the daily margin calculation grid.
2. Points on the Coarse Grid: In the classical model, the collateral depends only on the portfolio value at the start and at the end of the MPoR, i.e., and , as is seen from

where MPoR is usually around

for CSA’s with daily margining. To achieve acceptable computational performance, the time step of the coarse model grid must be significantly greater than the length of the MPoR. This, however, would preclude one from establishing a portfolio value at .

1. Introducing a Lookback Node: The coarse grid lookback method deals with this issue by simply adding a second *lookback* time point to all *primary* measurement times , in effect replacing each node on the coarse model grid by a pair of closely spaced nodes. For each simulated portfolio path, the portfolio value at the lookback point is then used to determine the collateral available at the corresponding primary time point.
2. Slowdown due to the Lookback: The Coarse Grid Lookback Scheme causes, at worst, a factor of slowdown relative to valuing the portfolio once per node of the Coarse model grid. If even a performance loss is not acceptable, a Brownian Bridge constructed between the primary coarse grid nodes can be used to interpolate the value of the portfolio at each lookback point, see, for example, Pykhtin (2009). Notice that the use of the Brownian Bridge for this purpose should not be confused with its use in the next section.
3. Shortcoming of the Model: The Coarse Grid Lookback method is a common way of addressing the mismatch between the long time-step of the coarse model grid and the much shorter MPoR. Similar to the commonly used models of uncollateralized exposure, the method produces accurate – with respect to the underlying assumptions of the Classical model – exposure numbers at the coarse grid time points, but provides no information on the exposure between the grid points.
4. Collateralized vs. Uncollateralized Grid Exposures: For uncollateralized positions, the exposure profiles are reasonably smooth, so one can safely interpolate between the grid points for calculating integral quantities, such as the CVA. In collateralized case, however, one cannot rely on such interpolations because the true exposures, as has been seen above, is likely to have spikes and jumps between the grid points. The Coarse Grid Lookback method has no means to determining the position or the magnitude of the irregularities between the grid points, and thus, is not suitable for CVA or capital calculations.
5. Classical+ Model - Coarse Grid Impact: To briefly expand on this, consider the Classical+ version of the classical model. Here it is assumed that all trade flows are paid within the MPoR, where, as shown before, trade flows often result in exposure spikes. Exposure profiles computed from daily time steps would consequently show spikes from all trade flows until the maturity of the portfolio.
6. Trade Flows outside the Simulated MPoR’s: In contrast, in a typical implementation with sparsely spaced MPoR’s, only trade flows that happen to be within a sparsely simulated MPoR’s may result in spikes; the exposure profile would then miss all other flows.
7. Simulation Calendar Impact on Exposure: Furthermore, as the location of the simulation point will likely change with the advancement in the calendar time, trade flows would move in and out of the simulated MPoR’s, and the exposure profile one report on any given day may very well differ significantly from those that were reported the day before. This in turn causes CVA or risk capital to exhibit significant, and entirely spurious, oscillations.
8. Classical- Model - Coarse Grid Impact: While the Classical- exposure model does not exhibit outright spikes its exposure profiles still exhibit jumps around significant trade flows. The classical coarse-grained implementation would not be able to resolve the position of these jumps, instead only showing the conservative jumps between two exposure measurement points often separated by many months. This creates another source of instability, present in both the Classical- and the Classical+ versions of the classical model.
9. Illustration using the Forward CVA: To illustrate the effects described above, Andersen, Pykhtin, and Sokol (2017) define the concept of time forward CVA, denoted , obtained by
   1. Changing the lower integration limit in

from to , and

* 1. Dividing the result by .

Using the same portfolio of 50 EUR-USD cross-currency swaps, they show the -dependence of on a daily grid to portfolio maturity.

1. Spurious Oscillations from Moving Windows: As CVA is an integral of exposures, spikes in exposure profile profiles should result in jumps rather than oscillations in . However, when one of the Coarse Grid Lookback method’s sparsely located *MPoR window* moves past a large trade flow, the contribution to the CVA temporarily increases only to drop back when the window moves past the large trade flow. As illustrated by Andersen, Pykhtin, and Sokol (2017), such oscillations are spurious and their presence is highly unattractive when CVA is computed and reported as part of daily P&L.

**Brownian Bridge Method**

1. Brute Force Portfolio Value Simulation: Overcoming the deficiencies outlined in the previous section is, unfortunately, prohibitively expensive for large portfolios, mostly due to the expense of repricing the entire portfolio at each simulation path and each observation date.
2. Daily Simulation of Risk Factors: On the other hand, merely simulating the risk factors at a daily resolution is generally feasible, as the number of the simulated risk factors is typically relatively small (i.e., several hundred) and the equations driving the risk factor dynamics are usually simple.
3. Generation of Daily Trade Flows: Furthermore, having produced risk factors on a daily grid, one can normally also produce all realized trade flows along each path because trade flows, unlike trade prices, are usually simple functions of the realized risk factors.
4. Risk Factors under Daily Resolution: Based on these observations, Andersen, Pykhtin, and Sokol (2017) propose the following algorithm for generating paths of portfolio values and trade flows on a daily time grid. First, simulate paths of market risk factors with daily resolution.
5. Trade Flow under Daily Resolution: For each path , use the simulated market risk factors to calculate trade flows on the path with daily resolution.
6. Coarse Grid Path Portfolio Valuation: For each path and each coarse portfolio valuation time point use the simulated risk factors to calculate portfolio value on the path
7. Trade Flow Adjusted Forward Value: For each path and each time point use the trade flows realized on the path between times and to calculate the *forward* to portfolio value :

Note that is not a true forward value because the realized trade flows are subtracted from the portfolio value rather than the true forward value being calculated at time .

1. Portfolio Value Local Variance Estimation: For each path and each portfolio measurement time point compute the local variance for the portfolio value *diffusion* via a kernel regression estimator – e.g., the Nadaraya-Watson Gaussian kernel estimator (Nadaraya (1964), Watson (1964)) conditional on the realized value of . The selection of bandwidth for the kernels is covered in, e.g., Jones, Marron, and Sheather (1996). In their numerical results, Andersen, Pykhtin, and Sokol (2017) use the *Silverman’s Rule of Thumb* (Silverman (1986)). The term *diffusion* is used to indicate that the portfolio value change has been defined to avoid any discontinuities resulting from trade flows.
2. Brownian Bridge Local Interpolation Scheme: For each path and each exposure measurement time point , simulate an independent, daily sampled, Brownian Bridge process (see, for instance, Glasserman (2004)) that starts from the value at time and ends at the value at time . The volatility of the underlying Brownian motion should be set to .
3. Brownian Bridge Portfolio Value Approximation: For each path and each exposure measurement time point , the portfolio values for each time of the daily grid in the interval are approximated from the simulated Brownian bridge by adding the trade flows realized along the path between the times and :
4. Rational behind Brownian Bridge Methodology: In a nutshell, the algorithm above uses a Brownian bridge process to interpolate portfolio values from a coarse grid in a manner that ensures that intermediate trade flow events are handled accurately. The algorithm produces paths of portfolio values and trade flows in a daily time grid, wherefore exposure can be calculated as described earlier with daily resolution and overlapping MPoR’s. Furthermore, daily sampling allows for further refinements of the proposed model by consistently incorporating thresholds, minimum transfer amount, and rounding.
5. Brownian Bridge Portfolio Weiner Increment: A key assumption made by the Brownian Bridge algorithm is that the portfolio value process within the interpolation interval is a combination of an approximately normal *diffusion* overlaid by trade flows. For Weiner process models without risk factor jumps, this approximation is accurate in the limit of infinitesimal interpolation interval, and is often a satisfactory approximation for monthly or even quarterly interpolation steps.
6. Brownian Bridge Approximation Error #1: Nevertheless, the presence of trade flows that depend on the values of the risk factors between the end points introduces two types of errors. Suppose that there is a trade flow at an end point that depends on the risk factor value at the date when it is paid. The independence of the Brownian Bridge process from the risk factor processes that drive that trade flow would result in an error in the expected exposure profile around the trade flow date. This error is largest for trade flows in the middle of the interpolation interval and disappears for trade flows near the ends of the interval.
7. Brownian Bridge Approximation Error #2: Suppose that there is a trade flow that occurs at the end point of an interpolation interval, but whose values depend entirely on the realization of the risk factor within the interpolation interval. A typical example would be a vanilla interest rate swap where the floating leg payment being paid at the end of the interpolation interval depends on the interest rate on a date within the interval. Even in the absence of a trade flow within the interpolation interval, the volatility of the swap value drops at the floating rate fixing date as some of the uncertainty is resolved. Thus, the *true* swap value process has two volatility values; a higher value before the rate fixing date and a lower value after the rate fixing date. In contrast the approximation algorithm assumes a single value of volatility obtained via kernel regression between the end points. Similar to the de-correlation error discussed above, the error resulting from this volatility mismatch is largest for fixing dates in the middle of the interpolation interval and disappears for fixing dates near the end points.
8. Trade Flow at Mid-Interval: To illustrate the two errors above, Andersen, Pykhtin, and Sokol (2017) compute the expected exposure profile for a one-year interest rate swap when a monthly grid for full valuation is situated so that the payments/fixing dates sit roughly in the middle of the interpolation interval, thus maximizing the error of the Brownian Bridge algorithm.
9. Unbiased Nature of the Error: While there are, as expected, some error around the trade flow dates, they are acceptable in magnitude and overall unbiased, in the sense that the over-estimation of the exposure is about as frequent as the under-estimation of the exposure. For, say, CVA purposes, the Brownian Bridge results would therefore be quite accurate.
10. Trade Flows at Interval End: Andersen, Pykhtin, and Sokol (2017) also compute the expected exposure profiles when the monthly valuation points are aligned with the rate fixing/payment dates. In this case, Brownian Bridge approximation is nearly exact.
11. Choice of Valuation Grid Location: Of course, in practice such alignment is only possible for a single trade or a small netting set, and not for large portfolios where trade flows will occur daily. Yet, even for large netting sets the calculation accuracy will improve if the interpolation pillars are aligned with the largest trade flows (e.g., principal exchange dates for the largest notional amounts). In practice, errors can be typically expected to be somewhere between the two extremes discussed above.
12. Performance Gains from Brownian Bridge: While the exact speed up provided by the Brownian Bridge method depends on the implementation, for most portfolios the overhead of building the Brownian Bridge at a daily resolution is negligible compared to computing the exposure on the model’s coarse grid.
13. Comparison with Coarse Grid Lookback: In this case, the computational effort of the daily Brownian Bridge method is about half the computational effort of the Coarse Grid Lookback method, as the former does not require adding a *lookback* point to each of the primary coarse grids. Thus, the Brownian Bridge is both faster and significantly more accurate than the Standard Coarse Grid Lookback method.

**Initial Margin**

1. Role of IM: Extra Protection: The posting of initial margin (IM), in addition to the regular variation margin collateral (VM), provides dealers with a mechanism to gain additional default protection. The practice of posting IM has been around for many years, typically with IM being computed on trade inception on a trade level basis.
2. Modeling Static Initial Margin Exposure: This type of IM is entirely deterministic and normally either stays fixed over the lifetime of a trade or amortizes down according to a pre-specified schedule. As a consequence, modeling the impact on the exposure is trivial; for the exposure points of interest all trade level IM amounts are summed across the netting set and the total – which is the same for all paths – is subtracted on the portfolio value from each path.
3. Dynamically Refreshed Initial Margin (DIM): A more interesting type of IM is dynamically refreshed to cover portfolio-level close-out risk at some high percentile, often 99%. This type of margin is routinely applied by Clearinghouses (CCPs) and by margin lenders, and will also soon be required by regulators for inter-dealer OTC transactions.
4. BCBS IOSCO Initial Margin Rules: In particular, in 2015 BCBS and IOSCO issued a final framework on margin requirements (BCBS and IOSCO (2015)) under which two covered entities that are counterparties in non-centrally cleared derivatives are required to:
   1. Exchange VM under a zero-threshold margin agreement, and
   2. Post IM to each other without netting the amounts.

Covered entities include all financial firms and systematically important non-financial firms. Central banks and sovereigns are not covered entities.

1. Third Party Management of IM: IM must be held in a default remote way, e.g., by a custodian, so that IM posted by the counter-party should be immediately available to it should the other counter-party default.
2. Internal Model/Standardized Schedule IM: Under the BCBS and IOSCO rules, regulatory VM can be calculated by an internal model or by lookup in a standardized schedule.
3. Internal Models Based IM Calculation: If an internal model is used, the calculation must be made at the netting set level as the value-at-risk at the 99% confidence level. The horizon used in this calculation equals 10 business days for daily exchange of VM or 9 business days plus a re-margining period for less frequent exchange of VM.
4. Denial of Cross-Asset Netting: Diversification across distinct asset classes is not recognized, and the IM internal model must be calibrated to a period of stress of each of the asset classes.
5. Handling Adjustments to the IM: The required levels of IM are changed as the cash flows are paid, new trades are booked, or markets move. To accommodate this, dealers would call for more IM or return the excess IM.
6. Complexities Associated with the IM Estimation: For trades done with CCPs or under the new BCBS-IOSCO rules, one must find a way to estimate the future IM requirements for each simulated path. No matter how simple the IM VaR model is, it will likely be difficult to perform such calculations in practice if one wants to incorporate all the restrictions and twists of the IM rules; stress calibration, limited diversification allowance, and, for CCP’s, add-ons for credit downgrades and concentration risk.
7. Estimating Simplified Version of IM: However, it is possible to utilize the model in this chapter to calculate the counter-party exposures if one ignores these complications. Note that ignoring such complications is conservative, as it will always lead to a *lower* of IM, and therefore, to a *higher* level of exposure*.*
8. as IM Delivery Date: To calculate the exposure at time the assumption here is that the last observation date for which C would deliver VM to D is

It is reasonable to assume that this date is also the last date at which C would deliver IM to a custodian.

1. Simplified IM Mechanics Timeline: To simplify modeling, it is assumed that the custodian would not return any amount to C for observation dates after . Thus, to calculate exposure at time , IM on a path has to be estimated from the dynamics of the exposure model as of time
2. IM Estimate using Gaussian Portfolio Evaluation: Assuming, as is common in practice, that the portfolio values are locally Gaussian, it suffices to know the local volatility for the portfolio value for the period estimated at . Denoting the IM horizon by and the local volatility of the portfolio value at time on path via , the IM available to D at the ETD date on path is given by

where is a confidence level – often - and is the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution function.

1. Kernel Regression Based Local Volatility: Estimating the local volatility can be done via kernel regression, as in the previous section. If the portfolio value is simulated at both and , the kernel regression for could be run on the *P&L* conditional on the realization of the portfolio value on path at the beginning of the . If one does not calculate the portfolio value at the beginning of the but uses the fast approximation outlined earlier instead, can be set equal to the local volatility estimated for the time interval that encloses the given .
2. Brownian Bridge IM Plus VM: Thus, the Brownian Bridge framework can now produce not only the collateralized exposure under VM alone, but also a reasonable estimate of the collateralized exposure under a combination of VM and IM.
3. IM Timing and Transfer Mechanics: In calculating the IM, an important consideration is the timing and the mechanics of the adjustment to the IM when C misses a margin flow or a trade flow.
4. Assumption - IM Return to the Client: For instance, when a large trade reaches maturity, the portfolio VaR may be reduced, in which case, some of the IM posted by C must be refunded. The issue of whether this refund can be delayed due to an ongoing margin dispute is not yet fully resolved. To simplify the calculations, it is assumed that no part of the IM is returned to C during the .
5. 10Y OTC Swap VM + IM EE: To show some numerical results, Andersen, Pykhtin, and Sokol (2017) consider the individual trades and portfolios of the earlier section. They use the case of a 10Y vanilla swap for which they calculate the impact of IM on exposure.
6. Time Horizon IM Mechanism Impact: As is evident from their calculations, the IM mechanism strongly reduces exposures away from trade flows, but near the trade flow dates the protection gets progressively weaker and disappears almost completely for the last couple of trade flows. The reason for this uneven benefit of IM on this trade is that the day of this trade bears no direct relationship to the size of the trade flows that determines the exposure spikes in the model.
7. Inter/Intra-Spike IM Exposures: The variance of the reduces as the swap approaches maturity so that the amount of IM on a given path is also reduced. However, the size of the trade flows is not reduced, but can actually grow with simulation time as larger and larger realizations of the floating rates are possible. Thus, when the swap approaches maturity the amount of IM is greatly reduced relative to the trade flows, so exposure spikes grow larger, while the *diffusion* component of the exposure becomes smaller.
8. Cross-Currency Swap VM + IM EE: Andersen, Pykhtin, and Sokol (2017) compute the impact of IM on the vanilla swap and the cross-currency swap portfolios described earlier. As can be seen there the IM strongly suppresses the diffusion component of the portfolio value changes, but proves inadequate in reducing the spikes of exposure for both single currency, and especially, cross-currency portfolios.

**Conclusion**

1. Fully Collateralized Counterparty Exposure: Industry standard models for collateralized credit risk are well-known to produce non-negligible counterparty credit risk exposure, even under full collateralization of the variation margin. This exposure essentially arises due to the inevitable operational and legal delays (margin period of risk, or ) that are *baked into* the workings of ISDA contracts that govern OTC trading.
2. Classical Implementations of the : In the most common industry implementation, the length of the , and precisely what transpires inside it, is, however, often treated in a highly stylized fashion. Often the is set equal to 10 business days for little reason other than tradition, and often counter-parties are assumed to have oddly synchronized behavior inside the .
3. The Classical+ and Classical- Implementations: For instance, one common approach – denoted Classical- - assumes that the and the trade flows by both counter-parties terminate at the beginning of the , but the trade flows terminate simultaneously at the end of the . Surprisingly, the Classical+ and the Classical- approaches continue to co-exists in the market, and neither has become the sole market practice.
4. Reasons for the Popularity of the Classical Models: One reason for this state of affairs is that the two models correspond to different choices for the trade-off between implementation complexity and the model stability; Classical+ is easier to implement but is prone to spurious spikes in the daily CVA P&L – as demonstrated earlier – whereas Classical- is more difficult to implement, but is free from such spikes.
5. Objectives of *Well*-Designed Models: Ultimately, of course, a model should be selected not on the basis of the implementation ease or on the properties of a specific numerical technique, but on the basis of how well the model captures the legal and the behavioral aspects of the events around a counter-party default. The term *well* means different things in different applications of the exposure model. For regulatory capital purposes, prudence and conservatism may, for instance, be as important as outright precision.
6. Inadequacies of the Classical Approach: To this end, even a cursory analysis suggests that the perfect synchronicity of the Classical models cannot be supported in reality. For instance, due to the way the CSA works in practice, the non-defaulting party will need at least 3 days after a portfolio valuation date to determine for sure that the corresponding margin payment by its counterparty will not be honored.
7. Detailed Analysis of Timeline: This chapter carefully dissects the into a full timeline around the default event, starting with the missed margin call and culminating at the post-default valuation date at which the termination value of the portfolio is established.
8. Model Parameters of the Timeline: For modeling purposes, the timeline of the model has been condensed into 4 model parameters, each specified as the number of days prior to the termination for the events below – in contrast the classical model has only one parameter – the full length of the .
9. Dealer/Client Trade/Margin Dates:
   1. The last market data measurement for which the margin flow is received () and paid () as prescribed.
   2. The last date when the defaulting party () and the dealer ( make the trade payments as prescribed.
10. Legal Operational Basis behind the Parameters: As shown, each of these parameters has a legal and/or operational interpretation, enabling calibration from the CSA and from the operational setup of the dealer. Note that the proposed model parameterization includes the Classical+ and the Classical- models as the limit cases.
11. Aggressive CSA Timeline for the : For indicative purposes, two particular models are described – Aggressive and Conservative. For former assumes that the non-defaulting dealer always operates at an optimal operational level, and will enforce the legal provisions of the ISDA legal contracts as strictly as possible.
12. Conservative CSA for Timeline: The latter will allow for some slack in the operations of the dealer, to allow for manual checks of calculations, legal reviews, *gaming* behavior of the counterparty, and so forth.
13. Aggressive/Conservative Timeline Exposure Comparison: The Conservative model setting obviously produces higher exposures than the Aggressive setting, for the following reasons.
    1. The Conservative setting has a longer overall length of
    2. The Conservative setting has a margin flow period where the dealer pays, but does not receive, margin flows
    3. The Conservative setting, unlike the Aggressive setting, contains a trade flow gap period where the dealer pays, but does not receive, trade flows
14. Comparison of Margin Flow Exposures: In their numerical tests, Andersen, Pykhtin, and Sokol (2017) found that the first two factors of the Conservative setting to have approximately twice the exposure of both the Aggressive and the Classical settings away from the dates of large trade flows.
15. Comparison of Trade Flow Exposures: The last factor, i.e., the presence of a large trade flow gap may cause exposure spikes of extremely large magnitudes under the Conservative calibration. Despite the fairly short duration of these spikes, they may easily add up to very significant CVA contributions, especially for cross-currency trades with principal exchange – the Herstatt risk.
16. Past Realizations of Trade Flow Default: Credit losses due to trade flow gaps materialized in practice during the financial crisis – especially due to the Lehmann Brothers’ default – so their incorporation into the model is both prudent and realistic.
17. Impracticality of Daily Simulation Schemes: Detailed tracking of the margin and the trade flow payments requires the stochastic modeling of the trade portfolio on a daily grid. As brute-force simulations at such a resolution are often impractically slow, it is important that numerical techniques be devised to speed up the calculations.
18. Kernel Regression on *Stripped* Cash Flows: While the focus of this chapter was mainly on establishing the fundamental principles for margin exposure, it also proposed an acceleration method based on kernel regression and applied Brownian Bridge to portfolio values *stripped* of cash flows.
19. Impact on Different Product Types: For ordinary and cross-currency swaps this chapter demonstrates that this method is both accurate and much faster than either brute-force simulation or standard acceleration techniques of the desired model. Further improvements in the acceleration techniques, and expansion of applicability into more exotic products, is an area of future research.
20. Initial Margin – Classical- Settings Impact: Under suitable assumptions, kernel regression may also be used to embed risk-based initial margin into exposure simulations. As demonstrated in the final section of the chapter, initial margin at 99% exposure greatly succeeds in reducing bilateral exposure for the Classical- calibration.
21. Initial Margin Trade Flow Impact: For all other calibration choices, and especially for the Conservative setting, the reduction in counterparty exposure afforded by initial margin fails around the time of large trade flows, when a sudden change of exposure following an initial trade flow exceeds the initial margin level.
22. Initial Margin Maturity Decay Impact: Note that the already inadequate level of IM protection deteriorates around the maturity of the portfolio, where the local volatility of the trade flow value decreases, but the trade flows themselves do not. Overall accurate modeling of the events within the becomes critically important for portfolios covered by dynamic IM.

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