Āgamārthānusāribhiḥ. Helārāja's Use of Quotations and Other Referential Devices in His Commentary on the Vākyapadīya

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Abstract Examining the function and style of the references to grammatical literature found in a substantial section of Helārāja's $Prak\bar{i}rnaprak\bar{a}sa$ on Bhartṛhari's third book of the $V\bar{a}kyapad\bar{i}ya$, the article argues that the likely ideological motive of this commentary was to establish its $m\bar{u}la$ work firmly within the Brahmanical canon and should therefore be seen in the context of the appropriation of Bhartṛhari's ideas on the part of the roughly contemporary Pratyabhijñā philosophers of Kashmir. Incidentally, it also touches upon the making of the Pāṇinian tradition and the relation between Helārāja and Kaiyaṭa, the Kashmiri commentator of $Mah\bar{a}bh\bar{a}sya$.

Keywords Bhartṛhari \cdot *Vākyapadīya* \cdot Grammatical canon \cdot Helārāja \cdot Medieval Kashmir \cdot Textual reuse

In the second and third *maṅgalaślokas* of the *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* (henceforth PrPr), Helārāja, the Kashmiri author of the only surviving prose commentary on the third *kānda* of Bharthari's *Vākyapadīya* (henceforth VP), declares:

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¹ In the first verse Helārāja extols the splendor, majesty and power of *prātibha*, the "intuitive knowledge" that bursts forth in the individual soul allowing it—momentarily?—to experience a state of supreme bliss in which the distinction between subject and object is annulled. The word *prātibha* is a *taddhita* formation derived from *pratibhā*, the "flash of understanding" through which *sphoṭa*, the unitary sentence meaning, arises in the mind of the speaker and is grasped by the hearer. As is known, these are key concepts in Bhartrhari's theory of language. While this verse is equally interesting and deserves to be analysed carefully, it is not directly relevant to the topic of this article, so I will have to postpone its study to a future publication.

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kāṇḍadvaye yathāvṛtti siddhāntārthasatattvataḥ | prabandho vihito 'smābhir āgamārthānusāribhiḥ || 2 || taccheṣabhūte kāṇḍe 'smin saprapañce svarūpataḥ | ślokārthadyotanaparaḥ prakāśo 'yaṃ vidhīyate || 3 ||

"We, who follow the meanings taught by the tradition, have composed a commentary on the [first] two $k\bar{a}ndas$ in accordance with the Vrtti on the basis of the true nature of the meaning of the established views.

This $Prak\bar{a}\dot{s}a$ is [now] being composed with the intention of casting light on the sense of the verses in the remaining $k\bar{a}nda$, with ample explanations due to the own nature [of its content]".

Conventional as it may sound, Helārāja's reiterated claim that in clarifying the true sense of Bhartrhari's verses he is not just relying on the latter's autocommentary but following the established tradition is, I believe, extremely significant and reveals the ideological programme underpinning his commentarial effort. Here I will present the findings of a survey of quotations and other referential devices used by Helārāja, on the basis of which I will attempt to draw some conclusions on the sense and purpose of his exegetical project.

1 Helārāja's Notion of *āgama*

What is the exact sense of the word *āgama* in the compound *āgamārthānusārin* used by Helārāja to describe himself? Here Helārāja seems to follow in Bhartrhari's steps² and adopt a broad notion of *āgama*, ranging from scriptural texts (primarily, the Veda, which is in fact the foundation of all learned traditions) to the texts of the Smṛti and the seminal texts of the śāstras. Even a superficial (and by no means exhaustive) survey of some of the occurrences of the term $\bar{a}gama$ in the PrPr confirms the inclusiveness of this notion. For example, in the Jātisamuddeśa, the first chapter (samuddeśa) of the third kānda, under v. 46, which, broadly speaking, deals with yogic knowledge, Helārāja quotes a statement (of Upaniṣadic flavour) from an unknown source on the ability of omniscient (sarvajña) beings to transcend the limitations of the senses of ordinary human beings etc. and qualifies it as āgama.³ It is on the basis of such authoritative sources (āgamapramāṇyāt)— Helārāja claims—that Bhartrhari states that there are indeed beings who possess extraordinary knowledge. And under Sādhanasamuddeśa (henceforth SāS) 24, he asserts that in samhitāyām anu prāvarsat (quoted in the Mahābhāsya ad A. 1.4.84, anur laksane, as an example of laksana that is in fact a cause) the Vedic recitation $(samhit\bar{a})$ is ascertained to be the cause of rain also on the basis of $\bar{a}gama$, possibly traditional Vedic lore.

⁴ kim cāgamād api hetutvam atra niścitam samhitāyāh pravarsana iti... (VP 3.252.14-15).



 $^{^2}$ On Bhartṛhari's notion of $\bar{a}gama$, see Aklujkar (2009, especially Appendix 1).

³ tathā cāgamaḥ "nedānīm indriyair eva paśyanti, ghrāṇataḥ śabdaṃ śṛṇoti, spṛṣṭhato rūpāṇi paśyati, apy aṅgulyagreṇa sarvendriyārthān upalabhate" iti (VP 3.54.2–10). Note that all the page references to VP 3 in this article are from Part 1 of Subramania Iyer's edition.