

# An Analysis of RMAC

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## Abstract

A recent trend in message authentication is the use of a randomizing parameter, such that the authentication tag is based not only on the message and the key, but a public nonce which is changed for every authenticated message. This generally affords a better security proof. However, several new classes of attacks are made available by these techniques. We examine these attacks, and apply some of them to RMAC, a recently published MAC mechanism.

## 1 Introduction

Traditional techniques of confidentiality (such as a block cipher in CBC mode) do not provide authentication. While more recent methods (such as [9]) do provide both confidentiality and encryption in a single primitive, most confidentiality techniques require the use of an additional authentication mechanism. In addition, there is a wide variety of applications that have no need for confidentiality, but need authentication of messages.

Most common message authentication codes (MACs) are deterministic; they produce an authentication tag which is based only on the message and the secret key (for example [7]). A recent trend in MAC design is the use of a randomizing parameter or nonce, so that the tag is determined by the nonce as well as the key and message. These nonces often allow better security proofs as compared to standard MAC algorithms. However, it seems that very little thought has been given to the full ramifications of non-deterministic MAC functions.

## 2 General Attacks

There are some general classes of attacks applicable to randomized MACs precisely due to their non-deterministic nature. These are not general attacks in the sense that they necessarily apply to all non-deterministic MACs; whether they apply or not depends on the individual algorithms.

### 2.1 Repeated Messages

In the case of a deterministic MAC function (with a fixed key), a particular message will only have a single authentication tag. However, with a non-deterministic MAC, an attacker can collect a series of nonce/tag pairs (denoted by  $(R_i, T_i) : 0 \leq i \leq n$ ) for a single message  $M$ . The most common attacks that come from this seem to be faster methods of exhaustive key search, and creating a new tag  $T$  with a new nonce  $R \neq R_i : \forall i \in 0 \dots n$ . This second attack, at first glance, seems pointless, in that it is simply a replay attack. However, an application designer may well assume (particularly in the absence of statements to the contrary) that ensuring that nonces are never repeated is enough to prevent a replay attack when using a non-deterministic MAC.

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## 2.2 Repeated Nonce

Most, if not all, of the specifications for non-deterministic MACs require that a sender never authenticate two messages with a single nonce, and that receivers verify that nonces are non-repeating. However, as has been discussed elsewhere [5], application designers often misuse the cryptographic primitives they have available, sometimes to an astounding degree. The probability that at least some of them will be careless in ensuring that nonces are non-repeating is unity. So, while it unreasonable to expect that the MAC will retain it's full security when misused in such a way, they should be designed such that catastrophic failure is not the result of repeating nonces.

## 2.3 Other Possible Attacks

Other possible attacks, specific to non-deterministic MAC functions, include related nonce and chosen nonce attacks. Neither of these attacks are examined in detail in this paper.

## 3 RMAC

RMAC [6] is a recently published randomized MAC function, based on an underlying block cipher. It is essentially a simple CBC-MAC [2], with an extra operation at the end to randomize the authentication tag. For simplicity of discussion, we reuse the notations of [4], including that the block size of the underlying cipher is  $b$  bits.

To produce a MAC, RMAC uses two keys,  $K_1$  and  $K_2$ , and a randomizing parameter,  $R$ . The length of  $R$  (denoted as  $r$ ) can range from 0 to  $b$  bits. For simplicity, we will assume that  $|K_1| = |K_2| = k$ . RMAC is defined as:

RMAC( $K_1, K_2, R, M$ ) :

1. Divide  $M$  into  $b$  bit blocks  $M_1, \dots, M_n$  (padding as needed)
2.  $O_1 = E_{K_1}(M_1)$
3.  $O_i = E_{K_1}(M_i \oplus O_{i-1}), 2 \leq i \leq n$
4.  $K_3 = K_2 \oplus (R || 0^{k-r})$
5.  $T = E_{K_3}(O_n)$
6. Output  $(R, T)$  as an authenticator for  $M$

In later discussion we will often refer to  $O_n$  as  $Z$ .

### 3.1 A key recovery attack on RMAC

If  $K_1$  and  $K_2$  are specified independently (as allowed by [4]), then RMAC is keyed with a total of  $2k$  bits of key. From this, one might naively expect that it would take an average of  $2^{2k-1}$  MAC operations in order to recover the secret keys (via key search). We will now show that this is not the case, and that, even if  $K_1$  and  $K_2$  are independent, the complete RMAC key can be recovered with an estimated  $2^{k+1}$  work, and very little memory. In addition, no interaction with any legitimate user of the keys is necessary, beyond collection of a small number of message/nonce/tag triplets.

This attack only works in certain situations. In particular, we require that the complete tag, not a truncated version, be available to the attacker, and that  $r > 0$ . This requirement can be met within the limits set out in [4], and in fact is recommended for general use by that document.

Consider a single message,  $M$ , authenticated using several nonce/tag pairs,  $(R_i, T_i), 0 \leq i \leq n$ . We now describe how an attacker can recover the complete RMAC keys  $K_1$  and  $K_2$  using a simple divide and conquer attack.

For each key  $K$  in the space of  $K_2$ , compute  $Z_i = D_{K \oplus R_i}(T_i)$  for  $0 \leq i \leq n$ . If  $Z_i = Z_j, \forall i, j$ , then  $K$  is a probable  $K_2$ . For each key we have to compute at least 2 decryptions (in order to have some basis for comparison). There is no need to compute more values of  $Z_i$  unless the first two

match, and with very high probability this will not happen unless the  $K$  in question actually is  $K_2$ . Thus it should take about  $2 \cdot 2^{k-1} = 2^k$  decryptions to find  $K_2$ . Once  $K_2$  is determined, we also know  $Z = Z_1 = \dots = Z_n$ , which is simply the CBC-MAC of  $M$  using  $K_1$ . This key can be recovered using the obvious key search attack now that we know  $Z$ , which we can use to verify a guess.

### 3.1.1 Work Estimates

For a message consisting of  $n$  blocks, the number of block cipher executions is  $n + 1$  for computing RMAC, and 2, 4, or 6 more for deriving  $K_1$  and  $K_2$  from the master key. Assuming (optimistically) that only 2 block cipher executions are required for deriving the keys, the average cost of a brute force search will be  $2 \cdot 2^{k-1} \cdot (n + 1) = n \cdot 2^k + 2^k$ . Note this is the “easiest” case for a brute force attack: if  $K_1$  and  $K_2$  are independent, or if 4 or 6 applications of the block cipher are required to derive  $K_1$  and  $K_2$  from the master key, the costs will be even higher.

With our attack, the cost of searching for  $K_2$  is about  $2^k$ , and the cost of computing the CBC-MAC (searching for  $K_1$ ) is  $n$  block cipher encryptions. This leads to a work estimate for our attack of  $n \cdot 2^{k-1} + 2^k$  applications of the block cipher, which is significantly less than even the most optimistic estimate for brute force attacks on RMAC.

Finally, we note that these attacks are not at all inconsistent with the bounds of the security proof given by the designers of RMAC in [6]. In fact, further analysis may reveal them to be quite complimentary to the security proofs by providing a strong upper bound to RMAC’s strength.

## 3.2 A forgery attack

We can use a variation on the previous attack to create arbitrary nonce/tag pairs for a single message with very little effort, given an upfront computation. Starting with a situation similar to the previous attack, we recover  $K_2$  and  $Z$  with an estimated  $2^k$  work. Knowing these two values, we can generate a tag for  $M$  using any  $R$  of our choice with very little effort by computing  $T = E_{K_2 \oplus R}(Z)$ .

It might seem obvious that  $K_2$  can be recovered with  $2^{k-1}$  effort, but a brute force attack on  $K_2$  is actually harder than it seems, because at no point do we have a plaintext/ciphertext pair to base such an attack on.

## 3.3 Interactions between RMAC and DES

NIST’s RMAC draft specification recommends RMAC be used with either AES [3] or DES [1] in EDE mode with 2 or 3 keys. Recall that some of the bits of a DES key do not have any effect on the cryptographic operation of the cipher, so when using RMAC with DES, 8 bits of  $R$  have absolutely no effect on the output. Thus, even if the users of RMAC are conscientious about ensure that  $R$  is unique, it’s easy to generate a large series of “distinct” nonces that produce the same authentication tag for a given message.

The nature of DES-EDE’s key schedule also causes some concerns. In particular, for a 64-bit block cipher, such as DES-EDE,  $r$  is limited to 64, but  $k$  can be much larger (192 bits in the case of 3 key DES-EDE). Thus, much of the latter portion of  $K_3$  (in particular, the last 128 bits) are not affected by  $R$  at all. This means that only one of the three internal DES operations is dependent upon the value of  $R$ . The author knows of no attack which can make use of this property, but it is somewhat worrisome.

## 3.4 Workarounds for RMAC

While the attacks shown do not present serious concerns to the security of RMAC, considering the key lengths commonly supported by modern block ciphers, they do show that RMAC can be attacked faster than a brute force attack on the key. In addition, we have shown that, at least in some situations, little or no security benefit is gained from using two independent keys versus

deriving the two keys from a single secret key. However, relatively simple countermeasures enable RMAC to be used safely, such as always truncating the output of the MAC. This makes it much harder to take advantage of the fact that  $E$  is an invertible permutation (which our attacks rely on). The cautious may wish to avoid triple DES and use another cipher (such as AES).

If preventing replay attacks is a concern, relying solely on the RMAC nonce can be insufficient: include a serial number within the message body itself.

## 4 Conclusions

We first describe some general classes of attacks that can be applied to message authentication codes which make use of a nonce or randomization parameter in the generation of the authentication tag. We then applied some of these attacks to RMAC, showing several ways in which a simple divide and conquer attack can be used to break RMAC faster than brute force.

The properties of randomized MACs has, up to now, received very little attention, and it is hoped that this paper will spark further research in the area.

## 5 Acknowledgments

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