

# On Expected Probabilistic Polynomial-Time Adversaries: A suggestion for restricted definitions and their benefits

Oded Goldreich  
Department of Computer Science  
Weizmann Institute of Science  
Rehovot, ISRAEL.  
`oded.goldreich@weizmann.ac.il`

August 16, 2006

## Abstract

This paper concerns the possibility of developing a coherent theory of security when feasibility is associated with *expected* probabilistic polynomial-time (*expected* PPT). The source of difficulty is that the known definitions of *expected* PPT *strategies* (i.e., *expected* PPT *interactive* machines) do not support natural results of the type presented below.

To overcome this difficulty, we suggest new definitions of *expected* PPT strategies, which are more restrictive than the known definitions (but nevertheless extend the notion of *expected* PPT *non-interactive* algorithms). We advocate the conceptual adequacy of these definitions, and point out their technical advantages. Specifically, identifying a natural subclass of black-box simulators, called *normal*, we prove the following two results:

1. Security proofs that refer to all *strict* PPT adversaries (and are proven via normal black-box simulators), extend to provide security with respect to all adversaries that satisfy the restricted definitions of *expected* PPT.
2. Security composition theorems of the type known for *strict* PPT hold for these restricted definitions of *expected* PPT, where security means simulation by normal black-box simulators.

Specifically, a normal black-box simulator is required to make an expected polynomial number of steps, when given oracle access to *any strategy, where each oracle call is counted as a single step*. This natural property is satisfied by most known simulators and is easy to verify.

**Keywords:** Zero-Knowledge, secure multi-party computation, protocol composition, black-box simulation, reset attacks, expected probabilistic polynomial-time.

# Contents

|          |   |           |
|----------|---|-----------|
| <b>1</b> | <b>An Opinionated Introduction</b>            | <b>2</b>  |
| 1.1      | The history of related definitions . . . . .  | 2         |
| 1.2      | Towards new definitions . . . . .             | 4         |
| 1.3      | The new definitions . . . . .                 | 5         |
| 1.4      | The main results . . . . .                    | 6         |
| 1.5      | Organization . . . . .                        | 8         |
| <b>2</b> | <b>The Definitions</b>                        | <b>8</b>  |
| 2.1      | Known definitions . . . . .                   | 8         |
| 2.2      | New definitions . . . . .                     | 9         |
| 2.3      | Relating the definitions . . . . .            | 10        |
| <b>3</b> | <b>Results for Zero-Knowledge</b>             | <b>11</b> |
| 3.1      | Simulating expected PPT adversaries . . . . . | 12        |
| 3.2      | Sequential composition . . . . .              | 13        |
| <b>4</b> | <b>Results for General Secure Protocols</b>   | <b>14</b> |
| 4.1      | Simulating expected PPT adversaries . . . . . | 15        |
| 4.2      | Sequential composition . . . . .              | 16        |
| 4.3      | Concurrent composition . . . . .              | 18        |
| <b>5</b> | <b>Conclusions and Open Problems</b>          | <b>21</b> |
|          | <b>Bibliography</b>                           | <b>23</b> |

# 1 An Opinionated Introduction

The title of this introduction and the use of first person singular are meant to indicate that this introduction is more opinionated than is customary in our field. Nevertheless, I will try to distinguish facts from my opinions by use of adequate phrases.

In my opinion, the first question that should be asked when suggesting and/or reviewing a definition is what is the purpose of the definition. When reviewing an existing definition, a good way to start is to look into the history of the definition, since the purpose may be more transparent in the initial works than in follow-up ones.

Before turning to the history and beyond, let me state that I assume that the reader is familiar with the notion of zero-knowledge and the underlying simulation paradigm (see, e.g., [G01, Sec. 4.3.1]). In fact, some familiarity with general secure multi-party computation (e.g., at the overview level of [G04, Sec. 7.1]) is also useful. Indeed, this paper is not intended for the novice: it deals with subtle issues that the novice may (or even should) ignore.

## 1.1 The history of related definitions

To the best of my recall, the first appearance in cryptography of the notion of *expected* (rather than *strict*) probabilistic polynomial-time was in the seminal work of Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff [GMR]. The reason was that the simulators presented in that paper (for the Quadratic Residuosity and the Quadratic Non-Residuosity interactive proofs) were only shown to run in *expected* probabilistic polynomial-time.<sup>1</sup> Recall that these simulators were used in order to simulate the interaction of arbitrary *strict* probabilistic polynomial-time (adversarial) verifiers with the honest prover.

At first, the discrepancy between the *expected* probabilistic polynomial-time allowed to the simulator and the restriction of the adversary to *strict* probabilistic polynomial-time did not bother anybody. One reason for this lack of concern seems to be that everybody was overwhelmed by the new fascinating notion of zero-knowledge proofs, its mere feasibility and its wide applicability (as demonstrated by [GMR, GMW]). But as time passed, some researchers became bothered by this discrepancy, which seemed to violate (at least to some extent) the intuition underlying the definition of zero-knowledge. Specifically, relating the complexity of the simulation to the complexity of the adversary is the essence of the simulation paradigm and the key to the conclusion that the adversary gains nothing by the interaction (since it can obtain the same, essentially as easily, without any interaction). But *may we consider expected polynomial-time and strict (probabilistic) polynomial-time as being the same complexity?*

The original feeling was that the discrepancy between *strict* and *expected* polynomial-time is not very significant, and I do hold this view to this very day. After all, everybody seems quite happy with replacing one polynomial (bound of the running time) by another, at least as a very first approximation of the intuitive notion of similar complexity.<sup>2</sup> Still, I cannot deny that there

---

<sup>1</sup>Note that while a small definitional variation (cf. [G01, Sec. 4.3.1.1] versus [G01, Sec. 4.3.1.6]) suffices for obtaining a *strict* probabilistic polynomial-time (perfect) simulation for the QR protocol, this does not seem to be the case when the QNR protocol is concerned. The same dichotomy is manifested between the Graph Isomorphism and Graph 3-Colorability protocols (of [GMW]) on one hand and the constant-round zero-knowledge proof of [GK96] on the other hand. The dichotomy arises from two different simulation techniques; the first is tailored for “challenge-response” protocols, while the second refers to the use of “proofs-of-knowledge” (which may be implicit and trivial (as in [GK96])).

<sup>2</sup>It is telling that my advocacy of *knowledge tightness* [G01, Sec. 4.4.4.2], a notion aimed at quantitatively bounding the ratio of the running times of the simulator and adversary, has never gained much attention. (And yes, I am aware of the recent work of Micali and Pass [MP06] that introduces and advocates an even more refined notion.)

is something displeasing about this discrepancy. Following [KL05], let me refer to this issue as an aesthetic consideration.

Jumping ahead in time, let me mention a more acute consideration articulated in [KL05]: A different handling of adversaries and simulations (e.g., the discrepancy between expected polynomial-time and strict probabilistic polynomial-time) raises technical difficulties and, in particular, stands in the way of various desired composition theorems (e.g., of the type presented in [GO94, C00]). But let me get back to the story.

Faced with the aforementioned aesthetic consideration, a few researchers suggested a simple solution: extending the treatment of adversaries to ones running in expected polynomial-time. This suggestion raised a few problems, the first being how to define expected polynomial-time *interactive machines*? (In addition, there are other problems, which I will discuss later.)

Feige’s proposal [F90] was to consider the running-time of the adversary when it interacts with the honest party that it attacks, and require that the adversary runs in expected polynomial-time (in such a random interaction). My own proposal was to allow only adversaries that run in expected polynomial-time regardless with whom they interact; that is, the adversary is required to run in expected polynomial-time when interacting with any other strategy (even an uncomputable one). Feige objected to my proposal saying that it unduly restricts the adversary, which is designed to attack a specific strategy and thus should be efficient only when attacking this strategy. My own feeling was that it is far more important to maintain a coherent theory by using a “stand-alone” notion of expected polynomial-time; that is, a notion that categorizes strategies regardless of their aim (e.g., without reference to whether or not these strategies model adversaries (and which strategies these adversaries attack)). The rationale underlying this feeling is discussed in Section 1.2. (Furthermore, Feige’s definition also extends the standard definition of *strict* probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries by allowing adversaries that may not even halt when interacting with strategies other than the those they were designed to attack (see proof of Proposition 5).)

In any case, a major problem regarding the suggestion of extending the treatment of adversaries to ones running in expected polynomial-time is *whether such an extension is at all possible*. One specific key question is *whether known simulators can handle expected polynomial-time adversaries*. As pointed out in [KL05], in some cases (e.g., the simulator of [GK96]), the answer is negative even if one uses the more restricted notion of expected polynomial-time adversaries (which refers to interaction with any possible strategy). Another important question is *whether composition theorems that are known to hold for strict probabilistic polynomial-time* (strategies and simulators) *can be extended to the case of expected polynomial-time* (strategies and simulators).

Indeed, the “question of composition” became a major concern in the 1990’s and motivated a re-examination of many aspects of the theory of cryptography. Here I refer specifically to the Sequential Composition Theorem of Canetti [C00], which supports modular construction of protocols, and to the Concurrent Composition Theorem of Canetti [C01], which is aimed at preserving security in settings where numerous executions of arbitrary protocols are taking place concurrently. These composition results were obtained when modeling adversaries as *strict* probabilistic polynomial-time strategies and allowing only *strict* probabilistic polynomial-time simulators. One consequence of the lack of analogous results for the case of *expected* polynomial-time was that the modular construction of secure protocol had to avoid protocols that were only known to be simulatable in *expected* polynomial-time.<sup>3</sup>

Recently, Katz and Lindell [KL05] initiated a study of the possibility of simulating *expected* polynomial-time adversaries and/or obtaining composition theorems (or sufficiently good alter-

---

<sup>3</sup>For example, relatively efficient proofs-of-knowledge (which only guarantee *expected* polynomial-time extraction) were avoided (e.g., in [G04, Sec. 7.4.1.3]) and strong proofs-of-knowledge (cf. [G01, Sec. 4.7.6]) were used instead.

natives) for the *expected* polynomial-time case. They showed that in sometimes (e.g., when the simulator satisfies some additional properties and/or under some super-polynomial intractability assumptions) such partial results can be obtained.<sup>4</sup> These results do not provide a “free” transformation from the *strict* probabilistic polynomial-time model to the *expected* polynomial-time model, where “free” means without referring to additional assumptions. In my opinion, as long as this is the state of affairs, one better look for alternative directions.

## 1.2 Towards new definitions

My starting point (or thesis) is that *we should not care about expected polynomial-time adversaries per se*. As hinted by my historical account, researchers were perfectly happy with strict probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries and would have probably remained so if it were not for the introduction of expected polynomial-time simulators. Indeed, at the end of the day, the user (especially a non-sophisticated one) should care about what an adversary can obtain within a specific time (or various possible amounts of work), where the term ‘obtain’ incorporates also a quantification of the success probability. I claim that our goal as researchers is to provide such statements (or rather techniques for providing such statements), and that *expected polynomial-time machines may appear in the analysis only as intermediate steps* (or mental experiments).

My thesis is further enforced by the confusing and unintuitive nature of expected running-time especially when applied in the context of cryptography<sup>5</sup> and by numerous annoying phenomena related to expected time complexity. In particular, note that, unlike strict polynomial-time, expected polynomial-time is a *highly non-robust notion that is not preserved under changes of computational model and standard algorithmic compositions*.<sup>6</sup> These “features” are an artifact of the “bad interaction” between the expectation operator and many non-linear operators: for example, for a random variable  $X$ , we cannot upper-bound  $E[X^2]$  as a function of  $E[X]$ . Thus, if  $X$  is a random variable that represents the running-time of some process  $\Pi$  (where the probability space is that of the internal coin tosses of  $\Pi$ ), then we cannot bound the expected running-time of various modest variants of  $\Pi$  (e.g., which square its running-time) in terms of the expected running-time of  $\Pi$ . (See Footnote 19, which refers to a natural case in which this problem arises.)

The foregoing reservations regarding expected polynomial-time are of lesser concern when expected running-time is only used as an intermediate step (rather than as a final statement). Taking this approach to its extreme, I claim that for this purpose (of an intermediate step) it is legitimate to use any (reasonable) definition of expected polynomial-time strategies, and that among such possibilities we better select a definition that supports the desired results (e.g., simulation of corresponding adversaries and composition theorems). Thus, we should seek a definition of expected

---

<sup>4</sup>Roughly speaking, one of their results provides a transformation of some simulators that handle strict probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries into simulators that handle expected polynomial-time adversaries, while assuming that the original simulator’s queries are strongly indistinguishable from the messages of the real protocol. Another result provides a composition theorem for expected polynomial-time simulators (which handle strict probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries), while relying on strongly pseudorandom functions. In both cases, the term *strong* refers to versions of computational indistinguishability that are required to hold with respect to super-polynomial-time observers. This means that for obtaining (ordinary) computational security, somewhere along the way, one needs to make a super-polynomial-time intractability assumption. Also note that the simulators constructed in [KL05] use the corresponding adversaries in a “slightly non-black-box” manner in the sense that they terminate executions (of these adversaries) that exceed a specific number of steps.

<sup>5</sup>Indeed, things become even worse if we bear in mind the need to keep track of both the running-time and the success probability (which should be calculated with respect to various strict time bounds). That is, I claim that providing only the expected running-time and the overall success probability is quite meaningless, since the success is likely to be correlated with the running-time.

<sup>6</sup>See analogous discussion of average-case complexity in [G97].

polynomial-time strategies that enjoys the following properties:

1. The definition should include all strict probabilistic polynomial-time strategies (but should not extend “much beyond that”; e.g., super-polynomial-time computations may only occur with negligible probability).
2. When applied to non-interactive strategies (i.e., stand-alone algorithms) the definition of expected polynomial-time strategies should yield the standard notion of expected polynomial-time.

This property is not only a matter of aesthetic considerations but is rather important for composition theorems (as desired in Property 3b). Furthermore, when applied to the context of zero-knowledge, the current property implies that expected polynomial-time simulators are deemed admissible by this definition.<sup>7</sup>

3. The definition should allow to derive the results that we seek:
  - (a) Known simulators that handle strict probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries should also handle adversaries that satisfy the definition.<sup>8</sup>
  - (b) The definition should support natural composition theorems (e.g., of the type proven by Canetti [C00]).

With the foregoing properties in mind, let me suggest a couple of new definitions of expected polynomial-time strategies. These definitions will be more restrictive than the existing definitions of this notion (which were reviewed in Section 1.1).

### 1.3 The new definitions

Looking at the problem of simulating an “expected polynomial-time” adversary (cf. [KL05]), it becomes evident that the source of trouble is the fact that the bound on the running-time of the adversary (w.r.t any real interaction) is no longer guaranteed when the adversary is invoked by a simulator. The point being that the queries made by the simulator may have a different distribution than the messages sent in any real interaction (especially, since some of these queries may not appear in the transcript output by the simulator). Furthermore, the simulator is resetting the adversary, which may allow it to find queries that are correlated to the adversary’s internal coin tosses in ways that are unlikely to happen in any real interaction (see examples in [KL05] and in the proof of Proposition 5). Such queries may cause the adversary to run for a number of steps that is not polynomial on the average. Indeed, this problem does not occur in case of strict probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries because in that case we have an *absolute bound* on the number of steps taken by the adversary, regardless of which messages it receives.

Let me stress that assuming that the adversary runs in expected polynomial-time when interacting with any other party does not solve the problem, because the distribution of the simulator’s queries may not correspond to the distribution of an interaction with any standard interactive machine. The simulator’s queries correspond to a “reset attack” on the adversary, where reset attack are as defined in [CGGM] (except that here they are applied on the adversary’s strategy

---

<sup>7</sup>In fact, we should strengthen Property 2 by requiring that also in the context of secure multi-party computation (where the simulators are themselves interactive machines) the known “expected polynomial-time” simulators (of strict probabilistic polynomial-time) are deemed admissible by the selected definition.

<sup>8</sup>Actually, we may relax this condition by allowing a modification of the simulator but not of the protocol and/or the underlying intractability assumptions.

rather than on the honest party’s strategy). Specifically, in a **reset attack**, the internal coin tosses of the strategy are fixed (to a random value) and the attacker may interact several times with the resulting residual (deterministic) strategy.

The forgoing discussion suggests a simple fix to the problem. Just define expected polynomial-time strategies as ones that run in expected polynomial-time under any reset attack that interact with them for a polynomial number of times. Actually, we should allow attacks that interact with these strategies for an expected polynomial number of times.<sup>9</sup> (See Definition 3.)

It seems that any (black-box) simulator that handles strict probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries can also handle adversaries that run in expected polynomial-time under the foregoing definition. After all, this definition was designed to support such a result. However, I was not able to prove this result without further restricting the class of simulators (in a natural way). For details, see Section 1.4.

But before turning to the results, let me suggest an even more restricted notion of expected polynomial-time strategies. I suggest to consider strategies that run in expected polynomial-time when interacting with any (“magical”) machine that receives the strategy’s internal coin tosses as side information. Arguably, this is the most restricted (natural) notion of expected polynomial-time strategies (which, when applied to non-interactive machines, coincides with the standard definition of expected polynomial-time). Needless to say, this definition (which is more restrictive than the aforementioned resetting definition) also supports the extension of simulators that handle strict probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries to handle adversaries satisfying the current definition.

Clearly, both definitions satisfy the first two desirable properties stated in Section 1.2. As for the third desirable property, I was able to establish it only for a *natural* subclass of black-box simulators discussed next.

## 1.4 The main results

The main results establish the third desirable property, while assuming that the provided simulators (i.e., the simulators provided by the corresponding hypothesis) belong to a natural subclass of black-box simulators. Indeed, one could hope that these results would hold for all (universal) simulators or at least for all black-box simulators.<sup>10</sup>

Specifically, I consider black-box simulators that, when given oracle access to *any strategy*, make an *expected* number of steps that is upper-bounded by a polynomial in the length of the input, *where each oracle call is counted as a single step*. In contrast, the standard definition of black-box simulators only mandates such a step-bound in the case that the simulator is given oracle access to any probabilistic polynomial-time strategy. Still, every *strict* probabilistic polynomial-time black-box simulator can be modified to satisfy the extra condition, which I call *normality*. Furthermore (and more importantly), the known simulators that run in *expected* polynomial-time (e.g., [GK96]) are normal. For further discussion see the beginning of Section 3.

As stated in Section 1.3, the new definitions (or actually the “resetting-based” one) were devised to support the first main result (stated in Theorem 10). This result asserts that *any normal black-box simulator that handles strict probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries can also handle adversaries that run in expected polynomial-time under the new definition(s)*. In particular, it implies that normal black-box zero-knowledge protocols remain simulateable when attacked by adversaries

---

<sup>9</sup>When measuring the expected number of interactions, I refer to a variant of Feige’s notion of expected complexity with respect to the designated machine. Indeed, this widens the class of possible (reset) attackers, which further limits the class of admissible strategies (i.e., those that are expected polynomial-time under such attackers).

<sup>10</sup>Recall that a universal simulator is a universal machine that is given that the code of the adversary that it simulates. In contrast, a black-box simulator is only given oracle access to the corresponding strategy.

that satisfy the new definition(s) of expected polynomial-time. This applies, in particular, to the proof system of [GK96], for which analogous (“free”) results were not known under the previous definitions of expected polynomial-time.<sup>11</sup>

Note that the fact that the aforementioned normal black-box simulators run in *expected* polynomial-time also when given access to any *expected* polynomial-time adversary is quite obvious from the new definition(s). This follows from the fact that normal black-box simulators invoke the adversary strategy for an *expected* polynomial number of times, while the “resetting-based definition” upper-bounds the total *expected* time consumed by the adversary in such invocations. What should be shown is that, also in this case, the corresponding simulation produces good output (i.e., indistinguishable from the real interaction). This can be shown by using a rather straightforward “truncation” argument.<sup>12</sup>

Let us now turn to the question of composition, starting with the sequential composition of zero-knowledge protocols. The known result (of [GO94]) refers to *strict* probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries (and holds both with respect to strict and expected polynomial-time simulation).<sup>13</sup> However, the known argument does not extend to *expected* polynomial-time adversaries. Recall that the said argument transforms any adversary that attacks the composed protocol into a residual adversary that attacks the basic protocol. The source of trouble is that the fact that the former adversary is expected polynomial-time (under any definition) does not imply that the latter adversary is expected polynomial-time (under this definition). See the proof of Theorem 9 for details. Fortunately, there is an alternative way: just note that the simulator obtained by [GO94], which refers to *strict* probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries, can handle *expected* polynomial-time adversaries (i.e., by invoking Theorem 10 (or rather its zero-knowledge version – Theorem 8)).

The foregoing idea can also be applied to the general setting of secure multi-party computation, but additional care is needed to deal with the extra complexities of this setting (as described next). Specifically, the so-called *sequential composition theorem* of Canetti [C00] (see also [G04, Sec. 7.4.2]) refers to an oracle-aided (or “hybrid”) protocol  $\Pi$  that uses oracle calls to a functionality<sup>14</sup>  $f$ , which can be securely computed by a protocol  $\rho$ . (Note that the corresponding oracle-aided protocol was not mentioned in the context of zero-knowledge, because it is trivial (i.e., it merely invokes the basic protocol several times).) The theorem asserts that the security of  $\Pi$  (with respect to a specific functionality unmentioned here) is preserved when  $\Pi$  uses subroutine calls to  $\rho$  rather than oracle calls to  $f$ . *This result refers to security with respect to strict probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries that is demonstrated by strict probabilistic polynomial-time simulators.* One point to notice is that the proof of security of the resulting protocol, denoted  $\Pi'$ , proceeds by incorporating the simulator of  $\rho$  into an adversary for  $\Pi$ . Thus, if the simulator of  $\rho$  runs in *expected* polynomial-time then so does the resulting adversary (for  $\Pi$ ), and thus the simulator for  $\Pi$  has to handle *expected* polynomial-time adversaries (even if we only care of *strict* polynomial-time adversaries attacking  $\Pi'$ ). Indeed, having a simulator for  $\Pi$  that handles any *expected* polynomial-time adversaries

---

<sup>11</sup>Note that Katz and Lindell [KL05] showed that the simulator presented in [GK96] fails (w.r.t expected polynomial-time under the previous definitions). Their work implies that, if strongly hiding commitment schemes are used in the protocol, then an alternative simulator does work. In contrast, my result applies to the simulator presented in [GK96] and does not require strengthening the commitment scheme used in the protocol. Furthermore, the running-time is preserved also for no-instances (cf., in contrast, [KL05, Sec. 3.3]).

<sup>12</sup>Indeed, the running-time analysis relies on the hypothesis that the simulator is normal, whereas the analysis of its output only relies on the hypothesis that the simulator is black-box. In contrast, for the claim itself to make sense at all it suffices to have a universal simulator (as otherwise it is not clear what we mean by saying that a simulator that handles any  $A \in \mathcal{C}$  can handle any  $A' \in \mathcal{C}'$ ).

<sup>13</sup>The original proof (of [GO94]) refers to strict polynomial-time simulators, but it extends easily to expected polynomial-time simulators.

<sup>14</sup>A functionality is a randomized version of a multi-input multi-output function (cf. [G04, Sec. 7.2.1]).



suffices for a partial result that refers to *strict* probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries for the resulting protocol  $\Pi'$  and to *expected* polynomial-time simulators (for  $\rho$ ,  $\Pi$ , and  $\Pi'$ ). The general (sequential) composition theorem for the case of expected polynomial-time (which refers to expected polynomial-time adversaries and simulators) follows by applying Theorem 10.

Turning to the concurrent composition theorem of Canetti [C01], recall that it evolves around the notion of environmental security (a.k.a UC-security [C01]). Specifically, Canetti proved that any protocol that is environmentally secure preserves security under arbitrary concurrent executions, where the adversaries, simulators, and environments are all modeled as *strict* probabilistic polynomial-time strategies (with non-uniform auxiliary inputs for the environments). He then suggested the methodology of establishing environmental-security as a way of obtaining security under concurrent composition. Consequently, an extension of Canetti’s methodology to the *expected* polynomial-time setting requires (1) verifying that Canetti’s proof extends to this setting, and (2) obtaining environmental security for *expected* polynomial-time adversaries and environments. Using the new definitions of expected polynomial-time strategies, the first requirement follows analogously to the proof of the sequential composition theorem, while the second requirement follows by generalizing Theorem 10 (which may be viewed as referring to trivial environments).

The bottomline is that, for normal black-box simulators, the new definitions of expected polynomial-time strategies provide a “free” transformation from the *strict* probabilistic polynomial-time model to the *expected* polynomial-time model. In particular, *normal black-box simulators that work in the strict model extend to the expected model, and the most famous composition theorems extend similarly.*

## 1.5 Organization

Section 2 provides formal statements of the aforementioned (old and new) definitions as well as a demonstration of a hierarchy among them. Since the special case of zero-knowledge protocols provides a good benchmark for the general case of secure protocols, the main results are first presented in that setting (see Section 3). This simplifies things, because in that special case the simulators are standard algorithms rather than interactive strategies (for the so-called “ideal-model”; see, e.g., [G04, Sec. 7.2]). Nevertheless, I believe that the main ideas are already present in the zero-knowledge setting, and that this belief is supported by the treatment of general protocols (provided in Section 4).

## 2 The Definitions

We adopt the standard terminology of interactive machines, while occasionally identifying strategies (which specify the next message to be sent by an interactive machine given its view so far) with the interactive machines that activate them. We use the shorthand PPT for *probabilistic polynomial-time* whenever using the full term is too cumbersome; typically, we do so when contrasting strict PPT and expected PPT. For simplicity, we only consider the two-party case. We denote by  $x$  the common (part of the) input, and denote by  $y$  and  $z$  the corresponding private inputs of the two parties.

### 2.1 Known definitions

We start by formulating the two known definitions that were mentioned in Section 1.1.

**Definition 1** (Feige [F90]): *The strategy  $\sigma$  is expected PPT w.r.t a specific interactive machine  $M_0$  if, for some polynomial  $p$  and every  $x, y, z$ , the expected number of steps taken by  $\sigma(x, z)$  during an interaction with  $M_0(x, y)$  is upper-bounded by  $p(|x|)$ , where the expectation is taken over the internal coin tosses of both machines.*

We stress that  $\sigma$  may be expected PPT with respect to some interactive machines but not with respect to others.

**Definition 2** (attributed to Goldreich, e.g., in [KL05]): *The strategy  $\sigma$  is expected PPT w.r.t any interactive machine if, for some polynomial  $p$ , every interactive machine  $M$ , and every  $x, y, z$ , the expected number of steps taken by  $\sigma(x, z)$  during an interaction with  $M(x, y)$  is upper-bounded by  $p(|x|)$ .*

Here we may assume, without loss of generality, that  $M$  (which is computationally unbounded) is deterministic, and thus the expectation is only taken over the internal coin tosses of  $\sigma$ . The same convention is applied also in Definition 4 (but not in Definition 3; see discussion there).

## 2.2 New definitions

In the first new definition, we refer to the notion of a *reset attack* as put forward in [CGGM]. Such an attack proceeds as follows. First, we uniformly select and fix a sequence of internal coin tosses, denoted  $\omega$ , for the attacked strategy  $\sigma$ , obtaining a residual deterministic strategy  $\sigma_\omega$ . Next, we allow the attacker to interact with  $\sigma_\omega$  numerous times (rather than a single time). Specifically, for each possible value of  $\omega$ , the expected number of times that attacker interacts with  $\sigma_\omega$  is upper-bounded by a polynomial.<sup>15</sup>

Note that the attacker is not given  $\omega$  explicitly, but its ability to (sequentially) interact with the residual strategy  $\sigma_\omega$  for several times provides it with additional power (beyond interacting with  $\sigma$  itself for several times, *where in each interaction  $\sigma$  uses a fresh sequence of coin tosses*). As shown in [CGGM], such an attack is equivalent to a single interaction in which the attacker may (repeatedly) “rewind”  $\sigma$  (or rather  $\sigma_\omega$ ) to any prior point in the interaction and ask to resume the interaction from that point. Indeed, such an attack is reminiscent of the way that a (black-box) simulator uses an adversary strategy.

**Definition 3** (tailored for simulation): *A  $q$ -reset attack on  $\sigma$  is an attack that, for every  $x, y, z$  and  $\omega$ , interacts with  $\sigma_\omega$  for an expected number of times that is upper-bounded by  $q(|x|)$ . The strategy  $\sigma$  is expected PPT w.r.t any reset attack if, for some polynomial  $p$ , every polynomial  $q$ , every  $q$ -reset attack on  $\sigma$ , and every  $x, y, z$ , the expected total number of steps taken by  $\sigma(x, z)$  during this attack is upper-bounded by  $q(|x|) \cdot p(|x|)$ .<sup>16</sup>*

---

<sup>15</sup>Indeed, the restriction on the number of interactions is a hybrid of the spirit of Definitions 1 and 2. We are upper-bounding the (expected) number of interactions initiated by the attacker (rather than its running-time), but do so not with respect to the designated  $\sigma$  but rather with respect to each of the residual  $\sigma_\omega$ . Note that a simplified version that refers to the expected number of interactions with  $\sigma$  (i.e., the expectation is taken also over the coins of  $\sigma$ ) yield a “bad” definition. (For example, suppose that  $\sigma_\omega$  sends  $\omega$  and makes  $2^{|\omega|}$  steps if  $\omega = 1^{|\omega|}$  and halt immediately otherwise. Then, intuitively  $\sigma$  is expected PPT (and in fact it even satisfies Definition 4), but the reset attack that, upon receiving  $\omega$  in the first interaction, invokes  $\sigma_\omega$  for  $2^{|\omega|}$  additional times if and only if  $\omega = 1^{|\omega|}$ , causes  $\sigma$  to make an expected exponential number of steps.)

<sup>16</sup>The upper-bounded of  $q(|x|) \cdot p(|x|)$  seems natural, but an upper-bounded of  $p(|x| + q(|x|))$  would work just as well (for all results stated in this work) but would yield weaker quantitative bounds.

We stress that the number of invocations of  $\sigma$  (like the total number of steps taken by  $\sigma$ ) is a random variable defined over the probability space consisting of all possible interactions of the attacker and  $\sigma$ . Here (unlike in Definition 2), allowing the potential attacker to be probabilistic increases its power (and thus adds restrictions on strategies satisfying the definition). The reason is that, for each fixed  $\omega$ , the number of invocations of  $\sigma_\omega$  is allowed to be an arbitrary random variable with a polynomially bounded expectation (rather than being strictly bounded by a polynomial).

In the next (and last) definition, we consider a “magical” attacker that is given the outcome of the strategy’s internal coin tosses as side information. That is, such an attack proceeds as follows. First, we uniformly select and fix a sequence of internal coin tosses, denoted  $\omega$ , for the attacked strategy  $\sigma$ , obtaining a residual deterministic strategy  $\sigma_\omega$ . Next, we provide the attacker with  $\omega$  and allow it a single interaction with  $\sigma_\omega$ . We stress that this attacker is merely a mental experiment used for determining whether or not  $\sigma$  is expected polynomial-time (under the following definition).

**Definition 4** (seemingly most restrictive): *The strategy  $\sigma$  is expected PPT w.r.t any magical machine if, for some polynomial  $p$ , every interactive machine  $M'$  that is provided with the internal coin tosses of  $\sigma$  as side information, and every  $x, y, z$ , the expected number of steps taken by  $\sigma(x, z)$  during an interaction with  $M'(x, y)$  is upper-bounded by  $p(|x|)$ .*

Here as in Definition 2, we may assume, without loss of generality, that  $M'$  (which is computationally unbounded) is deterministic, and thus the expectation is only taken over the internal coin tosses of  $\sigma$ . Thus, Definition 4 refers to the expectation, taken uniformly over all choices of  $\omega$ , of the number of steps taken by (the residual deterministic strategy)  $\sigma_\omega(x, z)$  during an interaction with (the deterministic strategy)  $M'(x, y, \omega)$ . Indeed, a strategy  $\sigma$  that satisfies Definition 4 runs in expected polynomial-time even if each of the incoming messages is selected to maximize its running-time, when this selection may depend on the internal coin tosses of  $\sigma$ . This formulation is closest in spirit to the standard definition of strict PPT strategies.

### 2.3 Relating the definitions

It is easy to see that, for  $i = 1, 2, 3$ , Definition  $i+1$  implies Definition  $i$ . In fact, it is not hard to see that the converses do not hold. That is:

**Proposition 5** *For  $i = 1, 2, 3$ , the set of strategies that satisfies Definition  $i+1$  is strictly contained in the set of the strategies that satisfies Definition  $i$ .*

**Proof:** The first two containments (i.e., for  $i = 1, 2$ ) are plainly syntactic. To see that Definition 4 implies Definition 3 note that a reset attack does not add power to a computationally unbounded machine that gets  $\sigma$ ’s internal coin tosses. Formally, fixing an arbitrary  $q$ -reset attack  $A$ , denote by  $t_{A(r)}(\omega)$  the total time spent by  $\sigma_\omega$  when attacked by  $A$ , which in turn uses coins  $r$ . Likewise, denote by  $n_{A(r)}(\omega)$  the number of interactions of  $A$  with  $\sigma_\omega$ , when  $A$  uses coins  $r$ . By the hypothesis that  $A$  is a  $q$ -reset attack, for every value of  $\omega$ , it holds that  $E_r[n_{A(r)}(\omega)]$  is upper-bounded by  $q(\cdot)$ . On the other hand, if  $\sigma$  satisfies Definition 4 then letting  $t'_{A(r)}(\omega) = t_{A(r)}(\omega)/n_{A(r)}(\omega)$  it follows that  $E_\omega[\max_r\{t'_{A(r)}(\omega)\}]$  is upper-bounded by some polynomial  $p(\cdot)$ , because  $t'_{A(r)}(\omega)$  corresponds to the (average) time spend by  $\sigma_\omega$  in a single iteration with  $A(r)$ . Noting<sup>17</sup> that  $E_{r,\omega}[t_{A(r)}(\omega)]$

---

<sup>17</sup>We use the fact that  $E_{i,j}[a_{i,j}b_{i,j}]$  is upper-bounded by  $\max_j\{E_i[a_{i,j}]\} \cdot E_j[\max_i\{b_{i,j}\}]$ . This fact can be proved by noting that  $E_j[E_i[a_{i,j}b_{i,j}]] \leq E_j[\max_i\{b_{i,j}\} \cdot E_i[a_{i,j}]]$ , letting  $B_j = \max_i\{b_{i,j}\}$  and  $A_j = E_i[a_{i,j}]$ , and using  $E_j[B_j A_j] \leq \max_j\{A_j\} \cdot E_j[B_j]$ .

is upper-bounded by the product of  $\max_{\omega}\{E_r[n_{A(r)}(\omega)]\}$  and  $E_{\omega}[\max_r\{t'_{A(r)}(\omega)\}]$ , and using the foregoing upper-bounds, it follows that  $\sigma$  satisfies Definition 3.

To show that the foregoing containments are strict we present corresponding strategies that witness the separations. The following examples are rather minimal, but they can be augmented into strategies that make sense (even for natural protocols). For example, a strategy that halt immediately upon receiving the message 0 and runs forever upon receiving the message 1 witnesses the separation between Definition 1 and Definition 2. Note that this example has nothing to do with the issue of expected polynomial-time (although an example that does relate to the latter issue can be constructed similarly).

To separate Definition 3 from Definition 4 consider a strategy that uniformly selects an  $n$ -bit long string  $r$ , and upon receiving a message  $s$  halts immediately if  $s \neq r$  and halts after making  $2^n$  steps otherwise. Clearly, this strategy does not satisfy Definition 4, but it does satisfy Definition 3.

A small twist on the foregoing example can be used to separate Definition 2 from Definition 3: Suppose that upon receiving  $s$ , the strategy first sends  $r$ , and then halts immediately if  $s \neq r$  and halts after making  $2^n$  steps otherwise. In this case a 2-reset attack can cause this strategy to always run for  $2^n$  steps, while no ordinary interactive machine can do so. ■

### 3 Results for Zero-Knowledge

In the context of zero-knowledge, simulators are used to establish the security of predetermined prover strategies with respect to attacks by adversarial verifiers. We start by showing that (normal black-box) simulators that handle strict PPT adversaries also handle adversaries that are expected PPT (under Definitions 3 and 4). We next turn to an expected PPT version of the standard sequential composition theorem. (In Section 4, analogous results are proved for general secure protocols.) To shorthand the text, when we say that some quantity (referring to an interaction) is polynomial, we mean that it is polynomial in the length of the common input.

Since the notion of *normal black-box simulators* is pivotal to our results, let us start by briefly recalling the standard definition of *black-box simulators* (see, e.g., [G01, Def. 4.5.10]). Loosely speaking, a black-box simulator is a universal machine that is given oracle access to a deterministic strategy and provides a simulation of the interaction of this strategy with the party attacked by this strategy.<sup>18</sup> In extending this notion to randomized strategies, we refer to providing the simulator with oracle access to a residual (deterministic) strategy obtained by fixing random coin tosses to the given randomized strategy.

Typically, by saying that a black-box simulator is PPT one means that the total (expected or strict) number of steps taken both by the simulator itself and any (PPT) strategy that the simulator invokes is upper-bounded by a polynomial. Often a more restricted formulation is used, by referring only to the number of steps taken by the simulator itself and/or considering oracle calls as single steps (i.e., counting them at unit cost). In this case one mandates that, when given oracle access to *any PPT strategy*, the (expected) number of steps taken by the simulator itself is upper-bounded by a polynomial. Here we extend the latter requirement to *any strategy*.

**Definition 6** (normal black-box simulators): *A black-box simulator is called normal if, on any input and when given oracle access to any strategy, it make an expected number of steps that is*

<sup>18</sup>In typical use of a black-box simulator one refers to the quality of this simulation. Specifically, it is require that if the former strategy is efficient (in some adequate sense) then the simulation is computationally indistinguishable from the real corresponding interaction. Since the notion of efficiency will vary (i.e., from strict PPT to expected PPT), we shall not couple the operational aspect of the black-box simulator with the quality of the output that it produces, but rather separate the two.

upper-bounded by a polynomial in the length of the input, where each oracle call is counted as a single step.

Although it is possible to construct black-box simulators that are not normal (e.g., they run forever if the black-box manages to solve a hard problem), the standard black-box simulators (e.g., the ones of [GMR, GMW, GK96]) are all normal. Furthermore, normality seems a natural property and *it is easy to verify*. For example, if the running-time analysis of a simulator (unlike the analysis of the quality of its output) does not rely on any intractability assumptions, then it is probably the case that the simulator is normal.

**The total simulation time.** We will often refer to the (total) simulation time of the combined simulator  $S^{V^*}$ , which consists of a normal black-box simulator  $S$  that is given oracle access to an adversarial verifier  $V^*$ . Needless to say, for any normal simulator  $S$ , if  $V^*$  is *strict* PPT then the *expected* (total) simulation time of  $S^{V^*}$  is polynomial. As observed by Katz and Lindell [KL05], this is not necessarily the case if  $V^*$  is *expected PPT w.r.t Definition 2*. The key observation, which motivates Definition 3, is that the desired bound on the *expected* (total) simulation time of  $S^{V^*}$  does hold if  $V^*$  is *expected PPT w.r.t any reset attack*.

**Observation 7** *If  $S$  is a normal black-box simulator and  $V^*$  is expected polynomial-time w.r.t Definition 3 then the expected total simulation time of  $S^{V^*}$  is polynomial.*

**Proof:** Since  $S$  is a normal black-box simulator, there exists a polynomial  $q$  such that, for every setting of coins  $\omega$  for  $V^*$ , it holds that the expected number of times that  $S$  invokes the residual strategy  $V_\omega^*$  is upper-bound by  $q(\cdot)$ . Thus,  $S$  is a  $q$ -reset attack on  $V^*$ . Since  $V^*$  satisfies Definition 3, it follows that the expected (total) number of steps taken by  $V^*$  during the entire simulation is upper-bound by a polynomial. The claim follows. ■

### 3.1 Simulating expected PPT adversaries

Bearing in mind that (in the context of zero-knowledge) the simulator is a standard algorithm, it suffices to state the following result with respect to Definition 3, and its applicability to Definition 4 follows as a special case.

**Theorem 8** (extendability of normal black-box simulators, the zero-knowledge case): *Let  $(P, V)$  be an interactive proof (or argument) system for a set  $L$ , and  $\langle P, V^* \rangle(x)$  denote the output of the adversarial verifier strategy  $V^*$  on input  $x$  after interacting with the prescribed prover  $P$ . Let  $M$  be a normal black-box simulator that, on input in  $L$  and when given access to any strict PPT strategy  $V^*$ , produces output that is computational indistinguishable from  $\langle P, V^* \rangle$ . Then, when  $M$  is given oracle access to any strategy  $V^*$  that is expected PPT w.r.t any reset attack, the expected simulation time of  $M^{V^*}$  is polynomial and the output is computational indistinguishable from  $\langle P, V^* \rangle$ .*

Note that the hypothesis allows the simulator to run in expected PPT while simulating a strict PPT adversary. This makes the hypothesis weaker and the theorem stronger; that is, the theorem can be applied to a wider class of protocols (including protocols that are not known to have strict PPT simulators such as, e.g., the constant-round zero-knowledge proof of [GK96]).

**Proof:** Fixing any expected PPT w.r.t Definition 3 strategy  $V^*$ , we first note that (by Observation 7) the expected simulation time of  $M^{V^*}$  is polynomial. To analyze the quality of this simulation, suppose towards the contradiction that  $D$  distinguishes between the simulation and the

real interaction, and let  $p$  be a polynomial such that the distinguishing gap of  $D$  for infinitely many  $x \in L$  is at least  $\epsilon(|x|) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} 1/p(|x|)$ . Let  $t^*(x)$  denote the total (over all invocations) expected number of steps taken by  $V^*$  when invoked by  $M$ . Note that  $t^*(x)$  is upper-bounded by a polynomial in  $|x|$ , and assume (without loss of generality) that  $t^*(x)$  also upper-bounds the expected running time of  $V^*$  in the real interaction (with  $P$ ). Now, consider a *strict* PPT  $V^{**}$  that emulates  $V^*$ , while truncating the emulation as soon as  $3t^*/\epsilon$  steps are emulated. Then, the variation distance (a.k.a statistical difference) between  $M^{V^*}(x)$  and  $M^{V^{**}}(x)$  is at most  $\epsilon(|x|)/3$ , because  $\epsilon/3$  upper-bounds the probability that the number of steps taken by  $V^*$  in any of its invocation by  $M$  exceeds  $3t^*/\epsilon$ . Similarly, the variation distance between  $\langle P, V^* \rangle(x)$  and  $\langle P, V^{**} \rangle(x)$  is upper-bounded by  $\epsilon(|x|)/3$ . It follows that  $D$  distinguishes the simulation  $M^{V^{**}}$  from the real interaction  $\langle P, V^{**} \rangle$  with a gap that exceeds  $\epsilon/3$ , on infinitely many inputs in  $L$ , in contradiction to the hypothesis that  $M$  simulates all *strict* PPT verifiers. ■

**Discussion:** We believe that the fact that the proof of Theorem 8 is rather straightforward should not be counted against Definition 3, but rather the other way around. That is, we believe that the claim that the simulation of strict PPT adversaries extends (without modifications) to expected PPT adversaries is natural, and as such a good definition of expected PPT adversaries should support it. It may be that Theorem 8 can be generalized also to arbitrary black-box simulators and even to arbitrary universal simulators, but the current proof fails to show this.<sup>19</sup>

Note that the (expected PPT) combined simulator resulting from Theorem 8 is trivially expected PPT under reset attacks (and also under Definition 4), because it is a non-interactive machine. Things are not as simple when we move to the setting of secure protocols, where the simulator is an interactive strategy (which operates in a so-called ideal-model). See Section 4.1.

### 3.2 Sequential composition

Again, the setting of zero-knowledge provides a good warm-up for the general study of secure protocols. The following Theorem 9 is an expected PPT version of the standard result (of [GO94]) that refers to *strict* PPT adversaries and simulators (see also [G01, Lem. 4.3.11]). Note that the standard result does not require the simulator to be black-box (let alone normal). The reason for the extra requirement will become clear in the proof.

**Theorem 9** (expected PPT version of sequential composition for zero-knowledge:) *In this theorem zero-knowledge means the existence of a normal black-box simulator that handles any expected PPT w.r.t Definition 3 (resp., w.r.t Definition 4) adversarial verifier, where handling means that the corresponding combined simulator runs in expected PPT and produces output that is computationally indistinguishable from the real interaction. Suppose that  $(P, V)$  is a zero-knowledge protocol. Then, sequentially invoking  $(P, V)$  for a polynomial number of times yields a protocol, denoted  $(P', V')$ , that is zero-knowledge.*

---

<sup>19</sup>Recall that a universal simulator obtains the code of the adversary's strategy rather than a black-box access to it. Thus, it may be the case that such a simulator can distinguish the code of  $V^*$  from the code of  $V^{**}$  (i.e., the timed version of  $V^*$ ), and produce bad output in the latter case. Indeed, a “natural” simulator will not do so, but we cannot rely on this. Turning to a more natural example, we note that the known non-black-box simulator of Barak [B01] (as well as its modification [BG02]) may fail to simulate expected PPT verifiers, because the random variable representing its simulation time is polynomially related (rather than linearly related) to the running-time of the verifier. Recall that it may be the case that  $t(x)$  has expectation that is upper-bounded by a polynomial in  $|x|$  while  $t(x)^2$  has expectation that is lower-bounded by  $\exp(|x|)$ ; for example, consider  $t: \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$  such that  $\Pr[t(x) = 2^{|x|}] = 2^{-|x|}$  and  $\Pr[t(x) = |x|^2] = 1 - 2^{-|x|}$ .

**Proof:** The proof of the strict PPT version (see [G01, Sec. 4.3.4]) proceeds in two steps: First, any verifier  $V^*$  that attacks the composed protocol (or rather the prover  $P'$ ) is transformed into an verifier  $V^{**}$  that attacks the basic protocol (or actually the prover  $P$ ). This transformation is quite straightforward; that is,  $V^{**}$  handles a single interaction with  $P$  (while receiving the transcript of previous interactions as auxiliary input). Let  $M$  denote a (normal black-box) simulator for  $(P, V^{**})$ . Then, a simulator for the composed protocol (or rather for the attack of  $V^*$  on  $P'$ ) is obtained by invoking  $M$  for an adequate number of times (using a correspondingly adequate auxiliary input in each invocation).

Wishing to pursue the foregoing route, we merely need to check that any verifier  $V^*$  that is expected PPT w.r.t Definition 3 (resp., Definition 4) is transformed into a verifier  $V^{**}$  that is expected PPT w.r.t Definition 3 (resp., Definition 4). Unfortunately, this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, the expected running-time of  $V^{**}$  when given a *random* auxiliary input (i.e., one produced at random by prior interactions) is polynomial, but this does not mean that the expected running-time of  $V^{**}$  on *each possible value* of the auxiliary input is polynomial. For example, it may be the case that, with probability  $2^{-|x|}$  over the history of prior interactions, the current interaction of  $V^*$  (i.e.,  $V^{**}$  with the corresponding auxiliary input) runs for  $2^{|x|}$  steps. The bottomline is that  $V^{**}$  may not be expected PPT w.r.t any reasonable definition (let alone w.r.t Definition 3 or Definition 4).

In view of the foregoing, we take an alternative route. We only use the hypothesis that some normal black-box simulator can handle all *strict* PPT verifiers that attack the basic prover  $P$ . Next, we observe that the proof of [G01, Lem. 4.3.11] (i.e., the strict PPT version) can be extended to the case that the simulation of the basic protocol (w.r.t *strict* PPT adversaries) runs in *expected* PPT. The key observation is that  $V^{**}$  is not affected by the complexity of the simulator of the basic protocol (which simulates the interaction of  $V^{**}$  with  $P$ ). The only relation between  $V^{**}$  and the latter simulation is that the argument refers to the behavior of  $V^{**}$  when fed with various auxiliary inputs that are obtained by various invocations of the said simulator (but the length of this auxiliary input is determined by the protocol and not by the simulator). Thus, we obtain an *expected* PPT simulation that handles any *strict* PPT attack on  $P'$ . Furthermore, the simulation amounts to invoking  $M$  for a polynomial number of times (while providing it with black-box access to  $V^{**}$ , which in turn is implemented by a black-box access to  $V^*$ ). It follows that the simulation of  $(P', V^*)$  is performed by a normal black-box simulator (because  $M$  is normal). Hence, we have obtained a *normal black-box simulator that can handle any strict PPT attack on the composed protocol* (or rather on the prover  $P'$ ). The current theorem follows by applying Theorem 8 to the latter simulator. ■

**Discussion:** The proof of Theorem 9 is somewhat disappointing because it does not use the hypothesis that  $P$  is zero-knowledge w.r.t *expected* PPT verifiers. Instead, Theorem 8 is used to bridge the gap between strict and expected PPT verifiers. A similar (but not identical) phenomenon will occur in the sequential composition theorem for general protocols, presented in Section 4.2.

## 4 Results for General Secure Protocols

In this section we extend the treatment of zero-knowledge (provided in Section 3) to a treatment of arbitrary secure protocols. The extension is quite straightforward, once the key notions are properly extended. The main issue that deserves attention is that, in the context of arbitrary secure protocols, simulators are not standard algorithms but rather interactive strategies (for a

corresponding ideal-model – to be discussed next). Consequently, notions such as normal (black-box) simulators and expected PPT simulators will have to be clarified. For simplicity, we only consider the two-party case.

Recall that the standard (“simulation-based”) definition of secure protocols calls for comparing the real execution of the protocol (when certain parties are controlled by an adversary) to the affect of a corresponding adversary in an *ideal model* (see, e.g., [G04, Sec. 7.2]). The ideal model consists of the parties sending their inputs to a trusted party that provides each party with its corresponding output, where the trusted party computes these outputs according to the predetermined functionality that the protocol is supposed to securely compute. Thus, the actions of the adversary in the ideal model are confined to selecting the messages sent to the trusted party (by the parties controlled by the adversary) and computing its final output based on the messages it received from the trusted party (i.e., the messages received by the parties controlled by the adversary). In the two-party case, this adversary sends a single message to the trusted party and receives a single message in return. Note that this adversary is an interactive machine, although its interaction is very minimal, and thus the various definitions of *expected PPT strategies* should and can be applied to it.

Another point to note is that the ideal-model adversary is viewed as a simulator of the real-model adversary, and that (as in the case of zero-knowledge) the simulator is typically described as a universal machine that is given black-box access to the real-model adversary that it simulates. For simplicity, we shall refer to the ideal-model adversary as *the simulator* and to the real-model adversary as *the adversary*.

Turning to the notion of *normal black-box simulators*, let us first restate Definition 6 (which refers to non-interactive simulators). For any black-box simulator  $S$  and any adversary  $A$ , we consider an imaginary machine  $I$  that emulates  $S^A$  such that each oracle call to  $A$  is emulated in unit time. Then, Definition 6 mandates that for every adversary  $A$  the corresponding  $I$  is expected PPT. In our context, the simulator itself is an interactive machine and thus the imaginary machines will also be interactive. For  $i = 1, 2, 3, 4$ , we say that a black-box simulator  $S$  is **normal** w.r.t Definition  $i$  if, for every adversary  $A$ , the corresponding  $I$  is expected PPT w.r.t Definition  $i$ . We note that natural simulators used in security proofs are normal. This holds for simulators of simple protocols (cf., e.g., [G04, Sec. 7.4.3.1-7.4.3.3]) as well as for simulators of complex protocols obtained by composition (cf., e.g., [G04, Sec. 7.4.4]).

## 4.1 Simulating expected PPT adversaries

In continuation to Section 3.1, we prove that normal black-box simulation of strict PPT adversaries can be extended to expected PPT adversaries. Unlike in Theorem 8, here the result (i.e., Theorem 10) is stated for both the new definitions, because the combined simulator is an interactive machine (and thus Definitions 3 and 4 do not necessarily coincide when applied to it).

**Theorem 10** (extendability of normal black-box simulators, the case of general two-party protocols): *Let  $\Pi$  be a two-party protocol and  $\text{REAL}_A(\bar{x})$  denote the output of its execution, on input tuple  $\bar{x}$ , under an attack of the adversary  $A$ . Let  $S$  be a normal w.r.t Definition 3 (resp., Definition 4) simulator and  $\text{IDEAL}_F^A(\bar{x})$  denote the output of its execution, on input tuple  $\bar{x}$ , oracle access to the strategy  $A$ , and when the trusted party answers according to the functionality  $F$ . Suppose that for every strict PPT strategy  $A$ , it holds that  $\text{IDEAL}_F^A$  is computational indistinguishable from  $\text{REAL}_A$ . Then, for every strategy  $A$  that is expected PPT w.r.t Definition 3 (resp., Definition 4), the total simulation time of the combined simulator  $S^A$  is expected PPT w.r.t Definition 3 (resp., Definition 4) and  $\text{IDEAL}_F^A$  is computational indistinguishable from  $\text{REAL}_A$ .*



As in case of zero-knowledge, Theorem 10 asserts that known simulators that handle strict PPT adversaries can also handle adversaries that run in expected polynomial-time under the new definition(s). (Again, this holds even if the former simulators run in expected PPT.)

**Proof:** The current proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 8, except that the verification of the expected total running-time of the combined simulation is slightly less evident. The key point is that a definitional attack (i.e., as in Definitions 3 and 4) on the combined simulator  $S^A$  yields a corresponding attack on  $A$ , which satisfies Definition 3 (resp. Definition 4) by the hypothesis. Details follow.

We can focus on the total time spent by  $A$  in all its invocations by  $S$ , since the number of steps of  $S$  itself is upper-bounded by the normality hypothesis. Let us first consider the version that refers to Definition 4, denoting by  $n_{\omega_A}(\omega_S)$  the maximum number of invocations of  $A$  by  $S$ , when  $A$  (resp.,  $S$ ) uses coins  $\omega_A$  (resp.,  $\omega_S$ ) and the maximization is over all possible messages (supposedly by the trusted party) that can be provided to the simulator (maximized for these choices of  $\omega_A$  and  $\omega_S$ ). By the normality hypothesis (applied to the residual adversaries  $A_{\omega_A}$ ), it follows that  $\max_{\omega_A} \{E_{\omega_S}[n_{\omega_A}(\omega_S)]\}$  is upper-bounded by a polynomial. Denoting by  $t(\omega_A)$  the maximum running time of  $A$  when the maximization is over all possible messages sent to  $A$  (again maximized for this choice of  $\omega_A$ ), it follows that  $E_{\omega_A}[t(\omega_A)]$  is upper-bounded by a polynomial (since  $A$  is PPT w.r.t Definition 4). Now, the total time spent by  $A$  when  $S^A$  interacts with a magical machine (as in Definition 4) is upper-bounded by

$$\begin{aligned} E_{\omega_S, \omega_A}[n_{\omega_A}(\omega_S) \cdot t(\omega_A)] &= E_{\omega_A}[E_{\omega_S}[n_{\omega_A}(\omega_S)] \cdot t(\omega_A)] \\ &\leq E_{\omega_A}[\max_{\omega} \{E_{\omega_S}[n_{\omega}(\omega_S)]\} \cdot t(\omega_A)] \\ &= \max_{\omega} \{E_{\omega_S}[n_{\omega}(\omega_S)]\} \cdot E_{\omega_A}[t(\omega_A)] \end{aligned}$$

This establishes the claim for Definition 4. Turning to the version that refers to Definition 3, we apply an analogous analysis. Specifically, *fixing any reset attack on the simulator  $S^A$* , we let  $n_r(\omega_S, \omega_A)$  denotes the number of invocations of  $A(\omega_A)$  by  $S(\omega_S)$  when  $S^{A(\omega_A)}(\omega_S)$  is invoked by the reset attack that uses coins  $r$ . The admissibility of this reset attack on  $S^A$  means that, for any  $\omega_A$  and  $\omega_S$ , the expected number of invocations of  $S^{A(\omega_A)}(\omega_S)$  by this attack is upper-bounded by a polynomial. By the normality hypothesis regarding  $S$  (applied to the residual strategy  $A_{\omega_A}$ , for any fixed  $\omega_A$ ), it follows that  $\max_{\omega_A} \{E_{r, \omega_S}[n_r(\omega_S, \omega_A)]\}$  is upper-bounded by a polynomial (denoted  $q$ ). This means that the corresponding reset attack on  $A$  (i.e., obtained by combining the reset attack on  $S^A$  with  $S$  itself) is admissible (i.e., is a  $q$ -reset attack). Thus, by Definition 3 (applied to  $A$ ), it follows that the expected total amount of time spent by  $A$  in these interactions is upper-bounded by a polynomial. ■

## 4.2 Sequential composition

In continuation to Section 3.2, we turn to discuss the preservation of the security of general protocols under sequential composition. The formulation is more complex in the current setting, because sequential composition of general protocols refers to a model of oracle-aided protocols (a.k.a “hybrid” model). Thus, we need to extend our definitional treatment of expected PPT to that model.

Recall that an oracle-aided protocol  $\Pi$  that uses oracle calls to a functionality  $f$ , is a protocol augmented by special instructions by which the (two) parties may invoke the functionality  $f$  (several times). Each invocation is performed by sending inputs to  $f$ , via special (imaginary) channels, and

receiving corresponding outputs (again via special channels).<sup>20</sup> Thus, in the various definitions of expected PPT we need to refer also to the distribution of the messages obtained through the aforementioned special channels. Specifically, when considering a strategy in the oracle-aided model, the (definitional) attack<sup>21</sup> on this strategy controls both the ordinary channels (on which the strategy expects to get messages from other parties) and the special channels (on which the strategy expects to get outputs from the functionality). We stress that only under (the natural extension of) Definition 1, it is the case that the messages delivered over the special channels must fit the designated functionality  $f$ .

A sequential composition theorem refers to an oracle-aided protocol that uses oracle calls to some functionality, and to the effect of replacing these oracle calls by invocations of a secure protocol for the said functionality. In the standard results of this type (cf. [C00]), it is assumed that the proof of security of the sub-protocol (which replaces the oracle calls to the functionality) is via a strict PPT simulator. The difficulty addressed here is that allowing an expected PPT simulator for this sub-protocol requires considering expected PPT adversaries for the oracle-aided protocol (even if we only care about strict PPT adversaries for the composed protocol). But if the oracle-aided protocol is secure also with respect to expected PPT adversaries then we are fine (as far as strict PPT adversaries for the composed protocol are concerned). As in the proof of Theorem 9, if all the simulators guaranteed by the hypothesis are normal, then we can extend the result to expected PPT adversaries.

**Theorem 11** (expected PPT version of the standard sequential composition theorem<sup>22</sup>.) *In this theorem security means the existence of normal black-box simulators that can handle<sup>23</sup> any expected PPT adversary, where normality and expected PPT are defined as in either Definition 3 or Definition 4. Suppose that  $F$  can be securely computed by an oracle-aided protocol  $\Pi$  that is given oracle access to the functionality  $f$ , which can be securely computed by a standard protocol  $\rho$ . Then,  $F$  can be securely computed by a standard protocol  $\Pi'$ , which is composed of  $\Pi$  and  $\rho$ .*

Note that by Theorem 10 it suffices to have in the hypothesis expected PPT (normal black-box) simulators that can simulate any strict PPT adversary. Actually, the following proof invokes Theorem 10 anyhow, which in turn is the reason that the definition of security refers to simulators that operate in a black-box and normal fashion.

**Proof:** As in the proof of Theorem 9, the first idea that comes to mind is adapting the standard proof of the corresponding result (i.e., [G04, Thm. 7.4.3]) that refers to strict PPT. Specifically, the standard proof (as presented, say, in [G04, Sec. 7.4.2]) proceeds as follows: First, any adversary that attacks the standard protocol  $\Pi'$  is transformed into an adversary that attacks the standard protocol  $\rho$ . Next, the former adversary (i.e., of  $\Pi'$ ) as well as a simulator for the latter adversary (i.e., of  $\rho$ ) are combined and transformed into an adversary that attacks the oracle-aided protocol  $\Pi$  (which uses oracle calls to  $f$ ). A simulator of this adversary of  $\Pi$  yields the desired simulation.

---

<sup>20</sup>We stress that each invocation of  $f$  is performed instantaneously and no other protocol activity (i.e., neither an ordinary communication nor another invocation of  $f$ ) is performed concurrently. As usual, towards the time complexity, each invocation is considered a single step.

<sup>21</sup>Note that here we refer to the attacks used (as a mental experiment) in the various definitions of expected PPT strategies (especially in Definitions 3 and 4).

<sup>22</sup>This is an expected PPT version of the Sequential Composition Theorem of [C00] (see also [G04, Thm. 7.4.3]), which refers to security as the existence of strict PPT simulators that handle any strict PPT adversary. As in Theorem 9, our expected PPT version requires that the simulators in the hypothesis operate in a black-box (and normal) manner.

<sup>23</sup>As in Theorem 9, handling means that the corresponding combined simulator runs in expected PPT under the relevant definition and produces output that is computationally indistinguishable from the real interaction.

However, as in the proof of Theorem 9, it is not necessarily the case that if the adversary attacking  $\Pi'$  is expected PPT then the adversary obtained for  $\rho$  is also expected PPT. Thus, again, we take an alternative route, starting by establishing the current theorem for strict PPT adversaries attacking  $\Pi'$  and next applying Theorem 10 to extend the result to adversaries that are expected PPT w.r.t Definition 3 (resp., Definition 4). Now there is no problem with the first transformation (which transforms any strict PPT adversary attacking  $\Pi'$  into a strict PPT adversary attacking  $\rho$ ). Hence, we obtain a simulator for  $\rho$ , which runs in expected PPT w.r.t Definition 3 (resp., Definition 4). Combining this simulator with the former adversary (for  $\Pi'$ ), we obtain an adversary attacking  $\Pi$  that runs in *expected* PPT according to Definition 3 (resp., Definition 4).

The key point is that (by the hypothesis) we do have a (normal black-box) simulator that can handle any *expected* PPT adversary attacking  $\Pi$ . Thus, proceeding as in the proof of [G04, Thm. 7.4.3], we obtain a simulator for  $\Pi'$ , which is expected PPT w.r.t Definition 3 (resp., Definition 4). Using the fact that both simulators we used are normal black-box simulators (and so is the construction presented in the proof of [G04, Thm. 7.4.3]), we infer that the simulator obtained for  $\Pi'$  is a normal black-box simulator. This allows invoking Theorem 10, and thus extending the simulation to adversaries that are expected PPT w.r.t Definition 3 (resp., Definition 4). The theorem follows. ■

**Discussion:** Note that the partial result by which  $\Pi'$  is secure w.r.t *strict* PPT adversaries (via an expected PPT simulator) was established using the following two hypotheses: (1) the simulator for  $\Pi$  can handle *expected* PPT adversaries, and (2) the (expected PPT) simulator for  $\rho$  can handle *strict* PPT adversaries. That is, this partial result neither uses the hypothesis that the simulator for  $\rho$  can handle expected PPT adversaries nor the hypothesis that both simulators operate in a black-box (and normal) fashion. The latter hypothesis is used in order to guarantee that the simulator constructed for  $\Pi'$  is a normal black-box simulator, which in turn is used for extending the partial result to the general result stated in Theorem 11. The hypothesis that the simulator for  $\rho$  can handle expected PPT adversaries is never used.

### 4.3 Concurrent composition

Turning to concurrent composition theorems, we recall the pivotal role of environmental security (a.k.a UC-security [C01]) in that context. Specifically, Canetti [C01] put forward a robust notion of security (i.e., environmental security), and proved that any protocol that satisfies this notion also preserves security under arbitrary concurrent executions. Since environmental security refers to a single execution, an appealing methodology for providing protocols that are secure under arbitrary concurrent executions emerged: design your protocol to be environmentally secure and obtain (for free) security under concurrent executions. Our goal is to extend this methodology, which was developed for the strict PPT setting, to the expected PPT setting. This requires (1) showing that environmental security in the strict PPT setting implies environmental security in the expected PPT setting, and (2) verifying that Canetti's proof extends to the expected PPT setting. But let us start by recalling Canetti's notion of environmental security [C01] (see also [G04, Sec. 7.7.2]), while confining ourselves to standard (non-reactive) functionalities.<sup>24</sup>

---

<sup>24</sup>Recall that a (non-reactive) functionality is a randomized version of a multi-input multi-output function (cf. [G04, Sec. 7.2.1]). In contrast, Canetti's exposition of environmental security [C01] is dominated by reactive functionalities, which are of natural (secondary) interest also when the basic notion of (stand-alone) security is concerned (cf. [G04, Sec. 7.7.1.3]). We see no reason to couple environmental security with reactive functionalities.

**A brief introduction to environmental security.** Loosely speaking, environmental security<sup>25</sup> is aimed at representing the preservation of the protocol’s security when executed within any (feasible) *environment*. The notion of an environment is a generalization of the notion of an auxiliary-input; that is, the environment is an auxiliary oracle (or rather a state-dependent oracle) that the adversary may access. In particular, the environment may represent other executions of various protocols that are taking place concurrently (with the execution that we consider). We stress that the environment is not supposed to assist the proper execution of the protocol (and, in fact, honest parties merely obtain their inputs from it and return their outputs to it). In contrast, the environment may assist the adversary in attacking the protocol. Following the simulation paradigm, we say that a protocol (for computing a functionality  $F$ ) is *environmentally-secure* if any feasible *real-model adversary attacking the protocol, with the assistance of any feasible environment*, can be simulated by a corresponding *ideal-model adversary that uses the same environment* (and communicates with a trusted party that represents  $F$ ). We stress that both adversaries interact with an environment that is selected after they are fixed (i.e., they “use” the environment in a black-box manner). For sake of simplicity, the environment is also responsible for providing the parties with inputs and for trying to distinguish the real-model execution from the ideal-model execution. In the standard formulation (see [G04, Sec. 7.7.2]), the environment is implemented by a (non-uniform) family of polynomial-size circuits (or, equivalently, by strict PPT with arbitrary auxiliary inputs). As usual, the real-model and ideal-model adversaries are modeled as strict PPT interactive machines.

**The expected PPT version.** Firstly, we apply our definitions of expected PPT (i.e., Definitions 3 and 4) to the real-model and ideal-model adversaries, hereafter referred to as *adversaries* and *simulators* respectively. Note that the (definitional) attacks on these strategies control both the ordinary channels (on which such a strategy expects to get messages from other parties) and the channels used for communication with the environment. Secondly, we apply our definitions of expected PPT (i.e., Definitions 3 and 4) to the environment itself, which after all is merely a strategy.<sup>26</sup> Lastly, we extend the notion of normal black-box simulators such that its “net” time bound (i.e., counting only its own steps) refers to interaction with *any environment*.

**Theorem 12** (extendability of simulators, the case of environmental security): *In this theorem, an expected PPT strategy is one that satisfies Definition 3 (resp., Definition 4). Suppose that  $\Pi$  is environmentally secure in the sense for every strict PPT adversary there exists an expected PPT simulator such that, for every strict PPT environment, the corresponding real-model and ideal-model executions are computationally indistinguishable. Further suppose that the simulator runs in expected PPT even when interacting with an arbitrary environment. Then, there exists a normal black-box simulator such that, for every expected PPT adversary and every expected PPT environment, the following holds:*

1. *The expected total simulation time is polynomial, where the total simulation time includes the steps taken by the simulator itself, the steps taken by the black-box adversary in all invocations, and all steps taken by the environment.*

---

<sup>25</sup>The term used by Canetti [C01] is *Universally Composable*, abbreviated UC-secure, but we believe that a reasonable sense of “universal composability” is merely a corollary of the suggested definition. Furthermore, as indicated by subsequent research (e.g., [L03]), it is beneficial to distinguish the desired “universal composability” property from the specific way it is formulated.

<sup>26</sup>In fact, since the simulator cannot “rewind” the environment, we may allow that latter to be expected PPT according to Definition 2. However, in the main application (i.e., Theorem 13) we shall only use environments that are expected PPT according to Definition 3 (resp. Definition 4).

2. *The corresponding real-model and ideal-model executions are computationally indistinguishable.*

Note that the hypothesis allows the simulator to run in expected PPT while simulating a strict PPT adversary and that the simulation is guaranteed to be computationally indistinguishable with respect to strict PPT environments. Unlike in the previous extendability theorems (i.e., Theorems 8 and 10), here we did require the simulator to use the adversary in a black-box manner, because without loss of generality (in the environmental setting) it suffices to consider a fixed (and rather trivial) adversary (cf. [C01]). We did require, however, that the simulator of that adversary runs in *expected* PPT when interacting with any environment.

**Proof:** By the last comment, the hypothesis actually yields a *normal black-box* simulator that handles any *strict* PPT adversary and any *strict* PPT environment. Proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 10, which in turn builds on the proof of Theorem 8, we note that the same simulator can handle any *expected* PPT adversary and any *expected* PPT environment. The current theorem follows. ■

**Security under concurrent executions.** For any protocol  $\Pi$ , we wish to consider numerous executions of  $\Pi$  that take place concurrently, where the scheduling of messages in the various executions is up to the adversary.<sup>27</sup> In addition, other numerous executions of other protocols (sometimes referred to as “arbitrary network activity”) can take place concurrently, but our concern is with the security of the copies of  $\Pi$ . Loosely speaking, this should mean that these actual executions of  $\Pi$  can be simulated in a corresponding ideal-model (where a trusted party answers according to the desired functionality). Needless to say, the simulator control the same parties that are controlled by the adversary in the real-model. For simplicity, consider the case that all executions of the (two-party) protocol  $\Pi$  are played by the same pair of parties (and that the adversary controls a single party).

Canetti [C01] prove that if  $\Pi$  is environmentally secure then the concurrent execution of multiple copies of  $\Pi$  is secure, where security refers to strict PPT adversaries and simulators (as well as such environments when relevant). Loosely speaking, Canetti’s proof consists of *simultaneously* replacing all the (real-model) concurrent executions by copies of the simulator (of the environmental security hypothesis) while emulating the adversary’s attack on the concurrent system by using the channels of the corresponding environments. (A hybrid argument that refers to partial replacements of real executions by simulations is used for showing that the behavior is maintained.) Here we claim an expected PPT version of Canetti’s result.

**Theorem 13** (environmental security implies concurrent composability, an expected PPT version (roughly stated)): *Suppose that  $\Pi$  is environmentally secure with respect to adversaries, simulators and environments that are expected PPT w.r.t Definition 3 (resp., Definition 4). Further suppose that the simulator runs in expected PPT even when interacting with an arbitrary environment. Then the concurrent execution of polynomially many copies of  $\Pi$  is secure with respect to adversaries and simulators that are expected PPT w.r.t Definition 3 (resp., Definition 4).*

The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 11. Specifically, we define an imaginary protocol  $\Pi'$  that consists of polynomially many concurrent copies of  $\Pi$ , each initiated by any party at any

---

<sup>27</sup>Note that this differs from sequential composition (treated in Section 4.2) in that these executions take place concurrently rather than sequentially. Furthermore, additional activity (which is referred to next) takes place concurrently rather than before and/or after these executions.

time and proceeding at arbitrary pace (i.e., at each time, each party decides whether to initiate a new copy or advance an active copy by sending a corresponding message). Adapting the proof of Canetti [C01], we first prove a partial result in which we only consider an arbitrary *strict* PPT adversary that attacks  $\Pi'$  (i.e., polynomially many copies of  $\Pi$ ). We note that the simulator constructed by Canetti (for  $\Pi'$ ) uses the simulator for environmental security of  $\Pi$  in a black-box and normal manner. Thus, the former simulator runs in expected PPT provided that the latter simulator runs in expected PPT, which is definitely the case when simulating residual adversaries and environments that are derived from the *strict* PPT adversary that attacks  $\Pi'$ . Proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 11, we extend the result to any *expected* PPT adversary that attacks  $\Pi'$ . Theorem 13 follows.

## 5 Conclusions and Open Problems

We believe that the new definitions of expected PPT (i.e., Definitions 3 and 4) are satisfactory. Indeed, our belief is supported by the results presented in this paper; that is, by the fact that normal black-box simulators that handle strict PPT adversaries also handle adversaries that satisfy our definitions, and that these definitions support various natural composition theorems.

We note that both definitions arise naturally. As we saw, Definition 3 arises as the natural answer to the problem caused by dealing with adversaries that are expected PPT under Definition 2. As for Definition 4 it is simplest to state, and, contrary to our initial feeling, it works just as well. A natural question that arises is *which definition is preferable: Definition 3 or Definition 4?* At this point we feel no urge to address this question. In our opinion, a choice will have to be made only once we reach applications that work with one definition but not with the other.

We note that normal black-box simulators are pivotal to our main results. It may be that the same results (or equally satisfactory modifications of them) hold also for arbitrary black-box simulators and even for any universal simulators, but the current proofs fail to show this (see Footnote 19). We leave the resolution of this issue as an open problem. A good place to start may be getting rid of the normality condition.

We note that throughout the discussion we ignored the question of what is a good definition of expected PPT for standard algorithms, and merely assumed and extended the naive one. However, as advocated by Levin in a somewhat different context (see [G97]), a better starting point is *defining expected PPT as time that is polynomial in a random variable that has expectation that is linear in the length of the input*.<sup>28</sup> This issue is orthogonal to the issues discussed in the current paper: Needless to say, Levin’s definitional approach to expected PPT algorithms can be extended to strategies (analogously to the extensions applied to the naive notion of expected PPT algorithms).<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>28</sup>This definitional approach eliminates the technical difficulties exemplified at the end of Footnote 19, and provides a robust definition of expected PPT (i.e., if an algorithm is deemed “expected PPT” then also a modification that squares its running time will yield an “expected PPT” algorithm). This guarantees that the running-time of Barak’s non-black-box simulator [B01] (when applied to “expected PPT” verifiers) remains “expected PPT” and an extension of Barak’s result to “expected PPT” strategies follows as in the proof of Theorem 8 (while noting that this simulator does not react to the replacement of the code of  $V^*$  by the code of  $V^{**}$ ).

<sup>29</sup>The same applies to alternative ways of handling the issues that motivated the introduction of expected PPT to Cryptography (i.e., the fact that some intuitively secure protocols do not have strict PPT simulators). For example, in the context of zero-knowledge, it was suggested (cf. [DNS]) to use simulators that, for every desired noticeable deviation  $\epsilon$  (from the real interaction), run in time that is strictly bounded by a polynomial in  $1/\epsilon$ . An alternative suggestion (of Vadhan [V06]) is allowing (standard) simulation with varying running-time such that the probability that the simulation takes more than  $t$  steps is upper-bounded by  $\text{poly}(\cdot) \cdot t^{-\Omega(1)} + \mu(\cdot)$ , where  $\mu$  is a negligible function. Note that, in both cases, the definition (stated here for standard algorithms) will have to be extended to interactive machines, and the issues and approaches presented in this paper will apply. More details will be provided in the next

## Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Salil Vadhan for a discussion that inspired this work (and in particular Definition 3). I should be equally grateful to Yehuda Lindell for a discussion that inspired Definition 4, but I only understood this in retrospect. Finally, I wish to thank Salil and Yehuda for many insightful discussions and helpful comments on earlier drafts of this write-up.

## References

- [B01] B. Barak. How to Go Beyond the Black-Box Simulation Barrier. In *42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science*, pages 106–115, 2001.
- [BG02] B. Barak and O. Goldreich, Universal arguments and their applications. In the *17th IEEE Conference on Computational Complexity*, pages 194–203, 2002.
- [BL02] B. Barak and Y. Lindell. Strict Polynomial-time in Simulation and Extraction. In *34th ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing*, pages 484–493, 2002.
- [C00] R. Canetti. Security and Composition of Multi-party Cryptographic Protocols. *Journal of Cryptology*, Vol. 13, No. 1, pages 143–202, 2000.
- [C01] R. Canetti. Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols. In *42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science*, pages 136–145, 2001. Full version is available from the author.
- [CGGM] R. Canetti, O. Goldreich, S. Goldwasser, and S. Micali. Resettable Zero-Knowledge. In *32nd ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing*, pages 235–244, 2000.
- [DNS] C. Dwork, M. Naor, and A. Sahai. Concurrent Zero-Knowledge. In *30th ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing*, pages 409–418, 1998.
- [F90] U. Feige. *Alternative Models for Zero-Knowledge Interactive Proofs*. Ph.D Thesis, Weizmann Institute of Science, 1990.
- [G97] O. Goldreich. Notes on Levin’s Theory of Average-Case Complexity. *ECCC*, TR97-058, Dec. 1997.
- [G01] O. Goldreich. *Foundation of Cryptography: Basic Tools*. Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- [G04] O. Goldreich. *Foundation of Cryptography: Basic Applications*. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- [GK96] O. Goldreich and A. Kahan. How to Construct Constant-Round Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems for NP. *Journal of Cryptology*, Vol. 9, No. 2, pages 167–189, 1996. Preliminary versions date to 1988.
- [GMW] O. Goldreich, S. Micali and A. Wigderson. Proofs that Yield Nothing but their Validity or All Languages in NP Have Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems. *Journal of the ACM*, Vol. 38, No. 1, pages 691–729, 1991. Preliminary version in *27th FOCS*, 1986.
- [GO94] O. Goldreich and Y. Oren. Definitions and Properties of Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems. *Journal of Cryptology*, Vol. 7, No. 1, pages 1–32, 1994.
- [GMR] S. Goldwasser, S. Micali and C. Rackoff. The Knowledge Complexity of Interactive Proof Systems. *SIAM Journal on Computing*, Vol. 18, pages 186–208, 1989. Preliminary version in *17th STOC*, 1985.
- [KL05] J. Katz and Y. Lindell. Handling Expected Polynomial-Time Strategies in Simulation-Based Security Proofs. In *2nd Theory of Cryptography Conf.*, 2005. To appear in *J. of Crypto.*



- [L03] Y. Lindell. General Composition and Universal Composability in Secure Multi-Party Computation. In *44th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science*, pages 384–393, 2003.
- [MP06] S. Micali and R. Pass. Local Zero-Knowledge. In *38th ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing*, 2006.
- [V06] S. Vadhan. Alternatives to expected probabilistic polynomial-time. Private communication, 2006.