The order of encryption and authentication for protecting communications (Or: how secure is SSL?)*

Hugo Krawczyk†

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Abstract

We study the question of how to generically compose *symmetric* encryption and authentication when building "secure channels" for the protection of communications over insecure networks. We show that any secure channels protocol designed to work with any combination of secure encryption (against chosen plaintext attacks) and secure MAC must use the encrypt-then-authenticate method. We demonstrate this by showing that the other common methods of composing encryption and authentication, including the authenticate-then-encrypt method used in SSL, are not generically secure. We show an example of an encryption function that provides (Shannon's) perfect secrecy but when combined with any MAC function under the authenticate-then-encrypt method yields a totally insecure protocol (for example, finding passwords or credit card numbers transmitted under the protection of such protocol becomes an easy task for an active attacker). The same applies to the encrypt-and-authenticate method used in SSH.

On the positive side we show that the authenticate-then-encrypt method is secure if the encryption method in use is either CBC mode (with an underlying secure block cipher) or a stream cipher (that xor the data with a random or pseudorandom pad). Thus, while we show the generic security of SSL to be broken, the current standard implementations of the protocol that use the above modes of encryption are safe.

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†EE Department, Technion, Haifa, Israel. Email: hugo@ee.technion.ac.il

1 Introduction

The most widespread application of cryptography in the Internet these days is for implementing a *secure channel* between two end points and then exchanging information over that channel. Typical implementations first call a key-exchange protocol for establishing a shared key between the parties, and then use this key to authenticate and encrypt the transmitted information using (efficient) symmetric-key algorithms. The three most popular protocols that follow this approach are SSL [11] (or TLS [9]), IPSec [18, 19] and SSH [26]. In particular, SSL is used to protect a myriad of passwords, credit card numbers, and other sensitive data transmitted between Web clients and servers, and is used to secure many other applications. IPSec is the standard for establishing a secure channel between any two IP entities for protecting information at the network layer.

As said, all these protocols apply both symmetric authentication (MAC) and encryption to the transmitted data. Interestingly, each of these three popular protocols have chosen a *different* way to combine authentication and encryption. We describe these three methods (here x is a message; $\mathcal{E}nc(\cdot)$ is a symmetric encryption function; $\mathcal{A}uth(\cdot)$ is a message authentication code; and ',' denotes concatenation — in this notation the secret keys to the algorithms are implicit):

SSL: $a = \mathcal{A}uth(x)$, $C = \mathcal{E}nc(x, a)$, transmit C

IPSec: $C = \mathcal{E}nc(x)$, $a = \mathcal{A}uth(C)$, transmit (C, a)

SSH: $C = \mathcal{E}nc(x)$, $a = \mathcal{A}uth(x)$, transmit (C, a).

We refer to these three methods as *authenticate-then-encrypt* (abbreviated AtE), *encrypt-then-authenticate* (EtA), and *encrypt-and-authenticate* ($E\&A$), respectively.

This disparity of choices reflects lack of consensus in the cryptography and security communities as for the right way to apply these functions. But is there a "right way", or are all equally secure? Clearly, the answer to this question depends on the assumptions one makes on the encryption and authentication functions. However, since protocols like the above are usually built using cryptographic functions as replaceable modules, the most useful form of this question is obtained by considering both functionalities, encryption and authentication, as *generic cryptographic primitives* with well defined (and independent from each other) properties. Moreover, we want these properties to be commonly achieved by the known efficient methods of symmetric encryption and authentication, and expected to exist in future practical realizations of these functions as well.

Specifically, we consider generic MAC functions secure against *chosen-message attacks* and generic symmetric encryption functions secure against *chosen-plaintext attacks*. These security properties are the most common notions used to model the security of these cryptographic primitives. In particular, chosen-message security of the authentication function allows to use the MAC in the above protocols independently of the encryption in cases where only integrity protection is required but not secrecy. As for encryption, chosen-plaintext security is the most common property under which encryption modes are designed and analyzed. We note that a stronger property of encryption is resistance to chosen-ciphertext attacks; while this property is important against active attacks it is NOT present in the prevalent modes of symmetric encryption (such as in stream ciphers or CBC mode even when the underlying block cipher is chosen-ciphertext secure) and therefore assuming this strong property as the basic secrecy requirement of the encryption function would exclude the use of such standard efficient mechanisms.

Rather than just studying the above ways of composing encryption and authentication as an independent composed primitive, our focus is on the more comprehensive question of whether these methods provide for truly secure communications (i.e., secrecy and integrity) when embedded in a

protocol that runs in a real adversarial network setting (where links are controlled by the attacker, where some of the parties running the protocol may be corrupted, where multiple security sessions are run simultaneously and maliciously interleaved, etc.).

Recent results. In a recent work, Canetti and Krawczyk [8] describe a model of secure channels that encompasses both the initial exchange of a key between pairs of communicating parties and the use of the resultant shared key for the application of symmetric encryption and authentication on the transmitted data. The requirements made from secure channels in this model include protecting the data's integrity (in the sense of simulating ideally authenticated channels) and secrecy (in the sense of plaintext indistinguishability) in the presence of a network attacker with powerful and realistic abilities of the type mentioned above. A main result in [8] is that if the key is shared securely then applying to the data the encrypt-then-authenticate method achieves secure channels provided that the encryption function is semantically secure (or plaintext-indistinguishable) under a chosen-plaintext attack and the authentication function is a MAC that resists chosen message attacks. This provides one important answer to the questions raised above: *it proves that encrypt-then-authenticate is a generically secure method for implementing secure channels.*

Our results. In this paper we complement the above result on the encrypt-then-authenticate method with contrasting results on the other two methods.

THE GENERIC INSECURITY OF *AtE*. We show that the authenticate-then-encrypt method (as in SSL) *is not generically secure* under the sole assumption that the encryption function is secure against chosen plaintext attacks and the MAC secure against chosen message attacks. We show an example of a simple encryption function that enjoys perfect (in the sense of Shannon) secrecy against chosen plaintext attacks and when combined under the *AtE* method with any MAC (even a perfect one) results in a *totally breakable implementation of secure channels.* To illustrate the insecurity of the resultant scheme we show how passwords (and credit card numbers, etc) transmitted under such a method can be easily discovered by an active attacker that modifies some of the information on the links. A major issue to highlight here is that the attack is not against the authenticity of information but against its secrecy! This result is particularly unfortunate in the case of SSL where protection of this form of sensitive information is one of the most common uses of the protocol.

THE GENERIC INSECURITY OF *E&A*. The above example is used also to demonstrate the insecurity of the encrypt-and-authenticate method (as in SSH) where the same attack (and consequences) is possible. It is worth noting that the *E&A* is obviously insecure if one uses a MAC function that leaks information on the data. However, what our attack shows is that the method is not generically secure even if one assumes a stronger MAC function with secrecy properties as commonly used in practice (e.g. a MAC realized via a pseudorandom family or if the MAC's tag itself is encrypted).

THE SECURITY OF *AtE* WITH SPECIFIC ENCRYPTION MODES. This paper does not bring just bad news. We also show that the authenticate-then-encrypt method *is secure* under two very common forms of encryption: CBC mode (with an underlying secure block cipher) and stream ciphers (that xor the data with a random or pseudorandom pad). We provide a (near optimal) quantified security analysis of these methods. While these positive results do not resolve the "generic weakness" of the authenticate-then-encrypt method (and of SSL), they do show that the common implementations currently in use do result in a secure channels protocol.

In conjunction, these results show a quite complete picture of the security (and lack of security) of these methods. They point to the important conclusion that any secure channels protocol designed to work with any combination of secure encryption (against chosen plaintext attacks) and secure MAC must use the encrypt-then-authenticate method. On the other hand, protocols that use the authenticate-then-encrypt method with encryption in either stream cipher or CBC modes are safe.

However, we note the fragility of this last statement: very simple (seemingly innocuous) changes to the encryption function, including changes that do not influence the secrecy protection provided by the encryption when considered as a stand-alone primitive, can be fatal for the security of the implemented channels. This is illustrated by our example of a perfect cipher where the sole use of a simple encoding before encryption compromises the security of the transmitted data, or by the case of CBC encryption where the join encryption of message and MAC results in a secure protocol but separate encryption of these elements is insecure. Thus, when using a non-generically secure method one has to be very careful with *any* changes to existing functions or with the introduction of new encryption mechanisms (even if these mechanisms are secure as stand-alone functions).

Related work. While the interaction between symmetric encryption and authentication is a fundamental issue in the design of cryptographic protocols, this question seems to have received surprisingly little explicit attention in the cryptographic literature until very recently. In contrast, in the last year we have seen a significant amount of work dealing with this and related questions.

We already mentioned the work by Canetti and Krawczyk [8] that establishes the security of the encrypt-then-authenticate method for building secure channels. Here, we use this result (and some extensions of it) as a basis to derive some of our positive results. In particular, we borrow from that paper the formalization of the notion of secure channels; a short outline of this model is presented in Section 2.3 but the reader is referred directly to [8] for the (many missing) details.

A recent, independent, work that deals directly with the ordering of generic encryption and authentication is Bellare and Namprempre [5]. They study the same three forms of composition as in this paper but focus on the properties of the composed function as an independent primitive rather than in the context of its application to secure channels as we do. The main contribution of [5] is in providing careful quantitative relations and reductions between different methods and security notions related to these forms of composition. These results, however, are insufficient in general for claiming the security, or demonstrating the insecurity, of channels that use these methods for protecting data. For example, while [5] show that authenticate-then-encrypt is not necessarily CCA-secure, it turns out (by results in [8] and here) that the lack of this property is no reason to consider insecure the channels that use such a method (even the specific non-CCA example in [5] does provide secure channels!). This demonstrates that the consideration of secure channels requires a finer treatment of the question of encryption/authentication composition. In particular, none of our results is claimed or implied by [5]. This comparison, however, is important for pointing out to the fact that while CCA security is a useful security notion it is certainly too strong for some (fundamental) applications such as secure channels (see discussion at the beginning of Section 4.2 and in Section 6.2).

A related subject that received much attention recently is the construction of encryption modes that provide integrity in addition to secrecy. Katz and Yung [16] suggest a mode of operation for block ciphers that provides such functional combination; for their analysis (and for its independent interest) they introduce the notion of "unforgeable encryption". A very similar notion is also introduced in [5] and called there "integrity of ciphertexts" (INT-CTXT). We use this notion in our work too (see Section 3) as a tool in some of our proofs. In another recent work, An and Bellare [1] study the use of redundancy functions (with and without secret keys) as a method for adding authentication to encryption functions. They show several positive and negative results about the type of redundancy functions that are required in combination with different forms of encryption and security notions. Our results concerning the authenticate-then-encrypt method with stream ciphers and CBC modes contribute also to this research direction since these results provide sufficient and necessary conditions on the redundancy functions (viewed as MAC functions)

required for providing integrity to these important modes of encryption. Of particular interest is our proof that a secure *AtE* composition that uses CBC encryption requires a strong underlying MAC; this contradicts a common intuition that (since the message and MAC are encrypted) weaker "redundancy functions" could replace the full-fledge MAC.

Recently, Jutla [15] devised an elegant CBC-like scheme that provides integrity at little cost beyond the traditional CBC method, as well as a parallel mode of encryption with integrity guarantee (a related scheme is presented in [25]). We note that while schemes such as [15] can be used to efficiently implement secure channels that provide secrecy and authenticity, generic schemes like encrypt-then-authenticate have several design and analysis advantages due to their modularity and the fact that the encryption and authentication components can be designed, analyzed and replaced independently of each other. In particular, generic schemes can allow for faster implementations than the specific ones; even today the combination of fast stream ciphers with a fast MAC function such as UMAC [6] under the encrypt-then-authenticate method results in a faster mechanism than the one proposed in [15] which requires the use of block ciphers. Also, having a separate MAC from encryption allows for much more efficient authentication in the cases where secrecy is not required. Last, but not least, we note that the schemes in [15] apply encryption and authentication to the exact same data. Most channel protocols, however, include under the authentication also unencrypted data (e.g., headers, payload descriptors, etc.) or even non-transmitted data (e.g., a message sequence number, state information, etc.). Such authentication is often instrumental for the security of the resultant protocol.

Organization In the next section we outline definitions, and set some notation and terminology, for the basic underlying cryptographic notions in this paper. In Section 3 we define "ciphertext unforgeability" a notion that we use in proving our positive results of Section 5. Section 4 presents the generic security (and insecurity) of the three authentication/encryption composition methods studied here. Section 5 presents our positive results concerning the authenticate-then-encrypt method when used with CBC mode and stream ciphers. Finally, Section 6 presents some further remarks and discussion on the results of the paper.

2 Preliminaries

We informally outline some well-known notions of security for MAC and encryption functions as used throughout the paper, and introduce some notation. References are given below for formal treatment of these notions. We also sketch the model of "secure channels" from [8].

2.1 Secure message authentication

Functions that provide a way to verify the integrity of information (for example, against unauthorized changes over a communications network) and which use a shared secret key are called *MAC* (*message authentication codes*). The notion of a MAC and its security definition is well understood [4]. Here we outline the main ingredients of this definition as used later in the paper.

A MAC scheme is described as a family of (deterministic) functions over a given domain and range. (We will usually assume the domain to be $\{0,1\}^*$ and the range $\{0,1\}^n$ for fixed size n.). The key shared by the parties that use the MAC scheme determines a specific function from this family. This specific function is used to compute an *authentication tag* on each transmitted message and the tag is appended to the message. A recipient of the information that knows the MAC key can re-compute the tag on the received message and compare to the received tag. Security of a MAC

scheme is defined through the inability of an attacker to produce a *forgery*, namely, to generate a message, not transmitted between the legitimate parties, with its valid authentication tag. The formal definition of security provides the attacker with access to a *MAC oracle* $\mathcal{O}_{\mathrm{MAC}}$ that on input a message x outputs the authentication tag corresponding to that message. The oracle uses for its responses a key that is generated according to the probability distribution of keys defined by the MAC scheme. The attacker succeeds if after this interaction with the oracle it is able to find a forgery (for a message not previously queried). To quantify security we say that *a MAC scheme has security* $\mathcal{E}_M(q,Q,T)$ *if any attacker that works time* T *and asks* q *queries from* $\mathcal{O}_{\mathrm{MAC}}$ *involving a total of* Q *bits has probability at most* $\mathcal{E}_M(q,Q,T)$ *to produce a forgery.*

Remark 2.1 In the case of MAC functions (e.g., randomized ones) where there may be multi-valued valid tags for the same message, we extend the definition of security as follows. If the messages queried to $\mathcal{O}_{\mathrm{MAC}}$ are $x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_q$ and the responses from $\mathcal{O}_{\mathrm{MAC}}$ are $t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_q$ then a forgery (x,t) output by the attacker is considered valid if $(x,t) \neq (x_i, t_i)$ for all $i = 1, \ldots, q$. (Namely, we consider the attacker successful even in case its forgery includes a queried message as long as the tag t was not generated by the oracle for that message.) This technical strengthening of the definition is used in some of our results. This notion appears (due to similar reasons) also in [5].

2.2 Secure symmetric encryption

We do not develop a formal definition of encryption security here as the subject is well established and treated extensively in the literature. Yet, we summarize informally the main aspects of the security notions of symmetric encryption that are relevant to our work and establish some notation. For formal and precise definitions see the references mentioned below.

An encryption scheme is a triple of (probabilistic) algorithms $(\mathit{KEYGEN}, \mathit{ENC}, \mathit{DEC})$ where *KEYGEN* defines the process (and resultant probability distribution) by which keys are generated, while *ENC* and *DEC* are the encryption and decryption operations with the usual inverse properties. To simplify notation we use *ENC* to denote the encryption operation itself but also as representing the whole scheme (i.e., a triple as above). The main notion behind the common definitions of security of encryption is *semantic security* [13], or its (usually) equivalent formulation via *plaintext indistinguishability*. In this formulation an attacker against a scheme *ENC* is given a *target ciphertext* y and two candidate plaintexts x_1, x_2 such that $y = \mathit{ENC}(x_i)$, $i \in_R \{0,1\}$.[1] The encryption scheme has the indistinguishability property if the attacker cannot guess the right value of i with probability significantly better than 1/2. The security of the scheme is quantified via the time invested by the attacker and the probability beyond 1/2 to guess correctly.

The above describes the goal of the attacker but not the ways of attack it is allowed to use. Two common models of attack are CPA (chosen plaintext attack) and CCA (chosen ciphertext attack). In the first the attacker has access to an *encryption oracle* $\mathcal{O}_{\mathrm{ENC}}$ to which it can present plaintexts and receive the ciphertexts resulting from the encryption of these plaintexts. In the second model the attacker can, in addition to the above queries to the encryption oracle, also ask for decryptions of arbitrary ciphertexts (except for the target ciphertext y) from a *decryption oracle* $\mathcal{O}_{\mathrm{DEC}}$. We note that both $\mathcal{O}_{\mathrm{ENC}}$ and $\mathcal{O}_{\mathrm{DEC}}$ use the same key for their responses which is also the key under which the target ciphertext y, as described above, is produced. In both cases the queries to the oracles can be generated adaptively by the attacker[2], i.e. as a function of previous responses from

[1] We use the notation $a \in_R A$ to denote that the element a is chosen with uniform probability from the set A.

[2] Thus, our notion of CCA corresponds to CCA2 in the terminology of [3].

the oracles and of the target ciphertext y (actually, also the candidate plaintexts x_1, x_2 on which the target ciphertext y is computed can be chosen by the attacker). Under these formulations two new parameters enter the quantification of security: the number of queries to $\mathcal{O}_{\mathrm{ENC}}$ and the number of queries to $\mathcal{O}_{\mathrm{DEC}}$ (the latter is 0 in the case of CPA). A finer quantification would also consider the total number of bits in these queries.

As it is customary we denote the above two notions of encryption security as IND-CPA and IND-CCA. Extensive treatment of these notions can be found among other works in [13, 12, 2] and [22, 23, 3, 17], respectively. A notion strongly related to IND-CCA is non-malleability of ciphertexts [10] which we do not use directly here. We also note that we are only concerned with symmetric encryption; asymmetric encryption shares many of the same aspects but there are some important differences as well (in particular, in the asymmetric case encryption oracles are meaningless since everyone can encrypt at will any plaintext).

2.3 Secure Channels

In order to claim our positive results, i.e. that a certain combination of encryption and authentication provides secure communications, we need to define what is meant by such "secure communications". For this we use the model of secure channels introduced by Canetti and Krawczyk [8] and which is intended to capture the standard network-security practice in which communications over public networks are protected through "sessions" between pairs of communicating parties, and where each session consists of two stages. First, the two parties run a key-exchange protocol that establishes an authenticated and secret session key shared between the parties. Then, in the second stage, this session key is used, together with symmetric-key cryptographic functions, to protect the integrity and/or secrecy of the transmitted data. The formalism of [8] involves the definition of a key-exchange protocol for implementation of the session and key establishment stage, as well as of two functions, snd and rcv, that define the actions applied to transmitted data for protection over otherwise insecure links. A protocol that follows this formalism is called in [8] a "network channels protocol", and its security is defined in terms of authentication and secrecy.

These notions are defined in [8] in the context of communications controlled by an attacker with full control of the information sent over the links and with the capability of corrupting sessions and parties. We refer to the full version of [8] for a complete description of the adversarial model and security definitions. Here we only mention briefly the main elements in this definition concerning the functions snd and rcv. The function snd represents the operations and transformations applied to a message by its sender in order to protect it from adversarial action over the communication links. Namely, when a message m is to be transmitted from party P to party Q under a session s established between these parties, the function snd is applied to m and, possibly, to additional information such as a message identifier. The definition of snd typically consists of the application of some combination of a MAC and symmetric encryption keyed via the session key. The function rcv describes the action at the receiving end for "decoding" and verifying incoming messages, and it typically involves the verification of a MAC and/or the decryption of an incoming ciphertext.

Roughly speaking, [8] define that authentication is achieved by the protocol if any message decoded and accepted as valid by the receiving party to a session was indeed sent by the partner to that session. (That is, any modification of messages produced by the attacker over the communications links, including the injection or replay of messages, should be detected and rejected by the recipient; in [8] this is formalized as the "emulation" of an ideally-authenticated channel.) Secrecy is formalized in the tradition of semantic security: among the many messages exchanged in a session the attacker chooses a pair of "test messages" of which only one is sent; the attacker's

goal is to guess which one was sent. Security is obtained if the attacker cannot guess correctly with probability significantly greater than 1/2. A network channels protocol is called a secure channels protocol if it achieves both authentication and secrecy in the sense outlined above.

In this paper we focus on the way the functions snd and rcv are to be defined to achieve secure channels, i.e. to provide both authentication and secrecy in the presence of an attacker as above. We say that any of the combinations $EtA, AtE, E\&A$ implements secure channels if when used as the specification of the snd and rcv functions the resultant protocol is a "secure channels protocol". Note that we are not concerned here with a specific key-exchange mechanism, but rather assume a secure key-exchange protocol [8], and may even assume an "ideally shared" session key.

3 CUF-CPA: Ciphertext Unforgeability

In addition to the traditional notions of security for an encryption scheme outlined in Section 2.2 we use the following notion of security that we call ciphertext unforgeability. A similar notion has been recently (and independently) used in [16, 5] where it is called "existential unforgeability of encryption" and "integrity of ciphertexts (INT-CTXT)", respectively.

Let *ENC* be a symmetric encryption scheme, and k be a key for *ENC*. Let $P(k)$ be the set of plaintexts on which ENC_k is defined, and $C(k)$ be the set of ciphertexts $\{y : \exists x \in P(k) \text{ s.t. } y = ENC_k(x)\}$ (note that if *ENC* is not deterministic then by $y = ENC_k(x)$ we mean that there is a run of *ENC* on x that outputs y). We call $C(k)$ the set of valid ciphertexts under key k. For example, under a block cipher only strings of the block length are valid ciphertexts while in the basic CBC mode only strings that are multiples of the block length can be valid ciphertexts. We assume that the decryption oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\mathrm{DEC}}$ outputs a special "invalidity symbol" $\perp$ when queried with an invalid ciphertext (and otherwise outputs the unique decrypted plaintext x).

We say that an encryption scheme is ciphertext unforgeable, and denote it CUF-CPA, if it is infeasible for any attacker $\mathcal{F}$ (called a *"ciphertext forger"*) that has access to an encryption oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\mathrm{ENC}}$ with key k to produce a valid ciphertext under k not generated by $\mathcal{O}_{\mathrm{ENC}}$ as response to one of the queries by $\mathcal{F}$. More precisely, we quantify ciphertext unforgeability by the function $\mathcal{E}_U(q, Q, T)$ defined as the maximal probability of success for any ciphertext forger $\mathcal{F}$ that queries q plaintexts totalling Q bits and spends time T in the attack. We stress that this definition does not involve access to a decryption oracle and thus its name CUF-CPA (this is consistent with other common notations of the form X-Y where X represents the goal of the attacker and Y the assumed abilities of the attacker).

Our main use of the CUF-CPA notion is for proving (see Section 5) that under certain conditions the AtE composition is secure, i.e., it implements secure channels. However, the notion of CUF-CPA while sufficient for our purposes is actually stronger than needed. For example, any scheme *ENC* that allows for arbitrary padding of ciphertexts to a length-boundary (e.g., to a multiple of 8-bits) will not be CUF-CPA (since given a ciphertext with padded bits any change to these bits will result in a different yet valid ciphertext). However, such a scheme may be perfectly secure in the context of implementing secure channels (see [8]); moreover, schemes of this type are common in practice. Thus, in order to avoid an artificial limitation of the schemes that we identify as secure for implementing secure channels we present next a relaxation of the CUF-CPA notion that is still sufficient for our purposes (we stress that this is not necessarily the weakest relaxation for this purpose and other weakenings of the CUF-CPA notion are possible).

Let ρ be any *polynomial-time computable* relation on pairs of strings with the property that if c and c' are two valid ciphertexts computed under encryption function ENC_k, for some key k,

and $\rho(c, c')$ holds then c and c' decrypt to the same plaintext under k. We say that the encryption scheme *ENC* is CUF_ρ-CPA if for any valid ciphertext c that a ciphertext forger attacker $\mathcal{F}$ (as defined above) can feasibly produce there exists a ciphertext c' output by the encryption oracle under one of $\mathcal{F}$'s queries such that $\rho(c, c')$. We will refer to this security notion as loose ciphertext unforgeability. (Note that valid ciphertexts produced by a "loose CUF" attacker always decrypt to plaintexts already queried to the encryption oracle; moreover, it is easy to determine to which of the queried plaintexts they decrypt.)

For instance, in the above example of a scheme that allows for arbitrary padding of ciphertexts, if one defines $\rho(c, c')$ to hold if c and c' differ only on the padding bits, then the scheme can achieve CUF_ρ-CPA. We note that while CUF-CPA implies CCA-security, loose CUF-CPA does not (as the above "padding example" shows). Indeed, as we pointed out in the introduction (see also Section 4.2) CCA-security is not a necessary condition for a MAC/encryption combination to implement secure channels.

4 Generic composition of encryption and authentication

In this section we study the security of the three methods, $EtA, AtE, E\&A$, under generic symmetric encryption and MAC functions where the only assumption is that the encryption is IND-CPA and the MAC is secure against chosen message attacks. Our focus is on the appropriateness of these methods to provide security to transmitted data in a realistic setting of adversarially-controlled networks. In other words, we are interested in whether each one of these methods when applied to adversarially-controlled communication channels achieve the goals of information secrecy and integrity. As we will see only the encrypt-then-authenticate method is generically secure.

4.1 The known security of encrypt-then-authenticate

The results in this subsection are from [8] and we present them briefly for completeness. We refer the reader to that paper for details. In particular, in the statement of the next theorem we use the notion of "secure channels" as introduced in the above paper and sketched in Section 2.3.

Theorem 1 [8] *If ENC is a symmetric encryption scheme secure in the sense of IND-CPA and MAC is a secure MAC family then method* $EtA(ENC, MAC)$ *implements secure channels.*

Following our terminology from Section 2.3, the meaning of the above theorem is that if in the network channels model of [8] one applies to each transmitted message the composed function $EtA(ENC, MAC)$ (as the snd function) then the secrecy and authenticity of the resultant network channels is guaranteed. More precisely, in proving the above theorem, [8] specify the snd function as follows. First, a pair of (computationally independent) keys, κ_a and κ_e, are derived from each session key. Then, for each transmitted message, m, a *unique* message identifier *m-id* is chosen (e.g., a sequence number). Finally, the function snd produces a triple (x, y, z) where $x = m\text{-}id$, $y = ENC_{\kappa_e}(m)$, $z = MAC_{\kappa_a}(m\text{-}id, y)$. On an incoming message (x', y', z') the rcv function verifies the uniqueness of message identifier x' and the validity of the *MAC* tag z (computed on (x', y')); if the checks succeed y' is decrypted under key κ_e and the resultant plaintext accepted as a valid message.[3]

[3] Protocols that use a synchronized counter as the message identifier, e.g. SSL, do not need to transmit this value; yet they must include it under the *MAC* computation and verification. If transmitted, identifiers are not encrypted under ENC_{κ_e} since they are needed for verifying the *MAC* value before the decryption is applied.

A main contribution of the present paper is in showing (see next subsections) that a *generic* result as in Theorem 1 cannot hold for any of the other two methods, AtE and $E\&A$ (even if the used keys are shared with perfect security). Therefore, any secure channels protocol designed to work with *any* combination of secure encryption (against chosen plaintext attacks) and secure MAC must use the encrypt-then-authenticate method. However, we note in Section 5 that the above theorem can be extended in the setting of method AtE if one assumes a stronger property on the encryption function; in particular, we show two important cases that satisfy the added security requirement.

Remark 4.1 Note that the authentication of the ciphertext provides plaintext integrity as long as the encryption and decryption keys used at the sender and receiver, respectively, are the same. While this key synchrony is implicit in our analytical models [8], a key mismatch can happen in practice. A system concerned with detecting such cases can check the plaintext for redundancy information (such redundancy exists in most applications: e.g., message formats, non-cryptographic checksums, etc.). If the redundancy entropy is significant then a key mismatch will corrupt this redundancy with high probability.

4.2 Authenticate-then-encrypt is not generically secure

Here we show that the authenticate-then-encrypt method $AtE(ENC, MAC)$ is not guaranteed to be secure for implementing secure channels even if the function ENC is IND-CPA and MAC provides message unforgeability against chosen message attacks. First, however, we discuss shortly why this result does not follow from [5] where it is shown that the AtE composition (viewed as an encryption scheme) does not necessarily provide IND-CCA. The reason is simple: as demonstrated in [8] IND-CCA *is not a necessary condition for a combination of encryption and MAC functions to implement secure channels.* An example is provided by the main construction of secure channels in [8] (see Theorem 1): if the MAC used in this scheme enjoys regular MAC security, rather than the strengthened notion described in Remark 2.1, then this construction guarantees secure channels but not necessarily CCA security. (For example, if the MAC function has the property that flipping the last bit of an authentication tag does not change the validity of the tag, then the scheme in [8] is not IND-CCA yet it suffices for implementing secure channels; see Remark 5.2 for an additional example.) Moreover, the specific example from [5] of a non-CCA $AtE(ENC, MAC)$ scheme[4] can by itself be used to show an example of a non-CCA scheme that provably provides secure channels. Therefore, the result in [5] does not say anything about the suitability of $AtE(ENC, MAC)$ for implementing secure channels; it rather points out to the fact that while CCA security is a useful security notion it is certainly too strong for some (fundamental) applications such as secure channels.

Thus if we want to establish the *insecurity* of authenticate-then-encrypt channels under generic composition we need to show an explicit example and a successful attack. We provide such example now. In this example the encryption scheme is IND-CPA (actually, it enjoys "perfect secrecy" in the sense of Shannon) but when combined with *any* MAC function under the AtE method the secrecy of the composed scheme breaks completely under an active attack.

The encryption function ENC^*. We start by defining an encryption scheme ENC^* that can be based on any stream cipher ENC (i.e. any encryption function that uses a random or pseudorandom pad to xor with the data). The scheme ENC^* preserves the IND-CPA security of the underlying scheme ENC. In particular, if ENC has perfect secrecy (i.e., uses a perfect one-time pad encryption) so does ENC^*. Next, we define ENC^*.

[4] Just append an arbitrary one-bit pad to the ciphertext and discard the bit before decryption.

Given an n-bit plaintext x (for any n), ENC^* first applies an encoding of x into a $2n$-bit string x' obtained by representing each bit x_i, $i = 1, \ldots, n$, in x with two bits in x' as follows:

1. if bit $x_i = 0$ then the pair of bits (x'_{2i-1}, x'_{2i}) is set to $(0, 0)$;
2. if bit $x_i = 1$ then the pair of bits (x'_{2i-1}, x'_{2i}) is set to $(0, 1)$ or to $(1, 0)$ (by arbitrary choice of the encrypting party).

The encryption function ENC is then applied to x'. For decrypting $y = ENC^*(x)$ one first applies the decryption function of ENC to obtain x' which is then decoded into x by mapping a pair $(0, 0)$ into 0 and either pair $(0, 1)$ or $(1, 0)$ into 1. If x' contains a pair (x'_{2i-1}, x'_{2i}) that equals $(1, 1)$ the decoding outputs the invalidity sign $\perp$.

The attack when only encryption is used. For the sake of presentation let's first assume that *only* ENC^* is applied to the transmitted data (we will then treat the AtE case where a MAC is applied to the data before encryption). In this case when an attacker $\mathcal{A}$ sees a transmitted ciphertext $y = ENC^*(x)$ it can learn the first bit x_1 of x as follows. It intercepts y, flips (from 0 to 1 and from 1 to 0) the first two bits (y_1, y_2) of y, and sends the modified ciphertext y' to its destination. If A can obtain the information of whether the decryption output a valid or invalid plaintext then A learns the first bit of x. This is so since, as it can be easily seen, the modified y' is valid if and only if $x_1 = 1$. (Remember that we are using a stream cipher to encrypt x'.) Clearly, this breaks the secrecy of the channel (note that the described attack can be applied to any of the bits of the plaintext). One question that arises is whether it is realistic to assume that the attacker learns the validity or invalidity of the ciphertext. The answer is that this is so for many practical applications that will show an observable change of behavior if the ciphertext is invalid (in particular, many applications will return an error message in this case).

To make the point even clearer consider a protocol that transmits passwords and uses ENC^* to protect passwords over the network (this is, for example, one of the very common uses of SSL). The above attack if applied to one of the bits of the password (we assume that the attacker knows the placement of the password field in the transmitted data) will work as follows. If the attacked bit is 1 then the password authentication will succeed in spite of the change in the ciphertext. If it is 0 the password authentication will fail. In this case success or failure is reported back to the remote machine and then learned by the attacker. In applications where the same password is used multiple times (again, as in many applications protected by SSL) the attacker can learn the password bit-by-bit. The same can be applied to other sensitive information such as to credit card numbers where a mistake in this number will be usually reported back and the validity/invalidity information will be learned by A.

The attack against the $AtE(ENC^*, MAC)$ scheme. Consider now the case of interest for us in which the encryption is applied not just to the data but also to a MAC function computed on this data. Does the above attack applies? The answer is YES. The MAC is applied to the data before encoding and encryption and therefore if the original bit is 1 the change in ciphertext will result in the same decrypted plaintext and then the MAC check will succeed. Similarly, if the original bit is 0 the decrypted plaintext will have a 1 instead and the MAC will fail. All the attacker needs now is the information of whether the MAC succeeded or not. Note that in a sense *the MAC just makes things worse* since regardless of the semantics of the application a failure of authentication is easier to learn by the attacker: either via returned error messages, or by other effects on the application that can be observed by the attacker.

Discussion: what have we learned? The example using ENC^* is certainly sufficient to show that the method AtE can be insecure even if the encryption function is IND-CPA secure and the

MAC unforgeable (note that this conclusion does not depend on any specific formalization of secure communications; any reasonable definition of security must label the above protocol as insecure). Therefore, if one wants to claim the security of $AtE(ENC, MAC)$ for particular functions ENC and MAC one needs to analyze the combination as a whole or use stronger or specific properties of the encryption function (see Section 5). An interesting issue here is how plausible it is that people will ever use an encryption scheme such as ENC^*. We note that although this scheme does not appear to be the most natural encryption mechanism some (equally insecure) variants of it may arise in practice. First the application of an encoding to a plaintext before encryption is used many times for padding and other purposes and is a particularly common practice in public key encryption algorithms. Second, encodings of this type can be motivated by *stronger* security requirements: e.g. to prevent an attacker from learning the exact length of transmitted messages or other traffic analysis information. In this case one could use an encoding similar to ENC^* but with variable size codes. (Just to make the point: note that a good example of traffic analysis arises in the above examples where the attacker has a lot to learn from error-reporting messages; even in cases where this information is encrypted it can usually be learned through the analysis of packet lengths, etc.) Another setting where plaintext encoding is introduced in order to improve security is for combating timing and power analysis attacks.

The bottom line is that it is highly desirable to have schemes that are robust to generic composition and are not vulnerable when seemingly innocuous changes are made to an algorithm (or when a new, more secure or more efficient, algorithm or mode is adopted)[5].

4.3 Encrypt-and-authenticate is not generically secure

The first observation to make regarding the encrypt-and-authenticate method is that under the common requirements from a MAC function this method cannot guarantee the protection of secrecy (even against a passive eavesdropper). This is so since a MAC can be secure against forgeries but still leak information on the plaintext. Thus, the really interesting question is whether the method becomes secure if we avoid this obvious weakness via the use of a "secrecy protecting" MAC such as one implemented via a pseudorandom function or when the MAC tag is encrypted (we observe that most, if not all, MAC functions used in practice are believed to protect secrecy). Unfortunately, however, the attack from the previous section applies here too, thus showing the (generic) insecurity of the $E\&A$ method even under the above stronger forms of MAC. See also Remark 5.4.

5 Authenticate-then-encrypt with CBC and OTP modes

In Section 4.2 we saw that authenticate-then-encrypt cannot guarantee secure channels under the sole assumption that the encryption function is IND-CPA, even if the MAC function is perfectly secure. In this section we prove that for two common modes of encryption, CBC (with a secure underlying block cipher) and OTP (stream ciphers that xor data with a (pseudo) random pad), the AtE mode does work for implementing secure channels.

5.1 A sufficient condition for the security of AtE

We start by pointing out to the following Theorem that can be proven in the security model of [8] (see Section 2.3).

[5] See Remark 5.4 for another example where seemingly harmless changes transform a secure protocol into an insecure one.

Theorem 2 (derived from [8]) *Let ENC be an IND-CPA encryption function and MAC a MAC function. If the composed function AtE(ENC, MAC), considered as an encryption scheme, is (loose) CUF-CPA, then AtE(ENC, MAC) implements secure channels.*

That is, under the assumptions on the *ENC* and *MAC* functions as stated in the Theorem, applying the function $AtE(ENC, MAC)$ to information transmitted over adversarially-controlled links protects the secrecy and integrity of this information. More specifically, the Theorem implies the following definition of the function snd in the network channels model of [8] (see Section 2.3). For each transmitted message m with unique message identifier *m-id* the function snd produces a pair (x, y) where $x = m\text{-}id$ and $y = ENC_{\kappa_e}(m, MAC_{\kappa_a}(m\text{-}id, m))$, where the keys κ_e and κ_a are computationally independent keys derived from the session key. On an incoming message (x', y') the rcv function verifies the uniqueness of message identifier x', decrypts y' under key κ_e, verifies the validity of the decrypted *MAC* tag, and if all tests succeed the recipient accepts the decrypted message as valid. We note that if the message identifier is maintained in synchrony by sender and receiver (as in SSL) then there is no need to send its value over the network. On the other hand, if sent, the message identifier can be encrypted too. The above Theorem holds in either case.

We stress that Theorem 2 holds for strict CUF-CPA as well as for the relaxed "loose" version (see Section 3). Its proof is similar to the proof of security for the *EtA* composition as presented in [8] (i.e., their "secure channels" theorem), and is omitted here.

Based on this Theorem, and on the fact that OTP and CBC are IND-CPA [2], we can prove the security of *AtE* under OTP and CBC by showing that under these forms of encryption the resultant *AtE* scheme is CUF-CPA. The rest of this section is devoted to prove these facts.

5.2 *AtE* with OTP

The OTP scheme. Let F be a family of functions with domain $\{0,1\}^\ell$ and range $\{0,1\}^{\ell'}$. We define the encryption scheme $OTP(F)$ to work on messages of length at most ℓ' as follows. A key in the encryption scheme is a description of a member f of the family F. The OTP encryption under f of plaintext x is performed by choosing $r \in_R \{0,1\}^\ell$ and computing $c = f(r) \oplus x$ where $f(r)$ is truncated to the length of x. The ciphertext is the pair (r, c). Decryption works in the obvious way. If F is the set of *all* functions with the above domain and range and f is chosen at random from this family we get perfect secrecy against chosen-plaintext attacks as long as there are no repetitions in the values r chosen by the encryptor (after encrypting q different messages a repetition happens with probability $q^2/2^\ell$); we denote this scheme by $OTP_\$$. If F is a family of pseudorandom functions then the same security is achieved but in a computational sense, i.e., up to the "indistinguishability distance" between the pseudorandom family and a truly random function. A formal and exact-security treatment of this mode of encryption can be found in [2].

We note that while our main formalization of the OTP scheme uses pads produced by a (pseudo) random function applied to a random IV our results hold for other forms of stream ciphers; for example, those that produce the encrypting pad via a pseudorandom function applied to a (non-repeating) counter, or those using a pseudorandom generator for which sender and receiver maintain a synchronized state.

The $AtE(OTP_\$, MAC)$ composition. Let *MAC* be a MAC family with n-bit outputs, and k a key to a member of that family. Let f be a random function with domain and range as defined above. The $AtE(OTP_\$, MAC)$ function with f and k acts as follows: (i) it receives as input a message x of length at most $\ell' - n$, (ii) computes $t = MAC_k(x)$, (iii) appends t to x, (iv) outputs the OTP encryption under f of the concatenated message (x, t).

The following theorem establishes the CUF-CPA security of $AtE(OTP_\$, MAC)$ as a function of the security $\mathcal{E}_M(\cdot,\cdot,\cdot)$ of MAC.

Theorem 3 *If MAC is a MAC family that resists one-query attacks then $AtE(OTP_\$, MAC)$ is CUF-CPA (and then by Theorem 2 it implements secure channels).*
More precisely, any ciphertext forger $\mathcal{F}$ against $AtE(OTP_\$, MAC)$ that runs time T has success probability $\mathcal{E}_U$ of at most $q^2/2^\ell + \mathcal{E}_M(1, p, T')$, where ℓ is a parameter of $OTP_\$$, q is the number of queries $\mathcal{F}$ makes during the attack, p is an upper bound on the length of each such query and on the length of the output forgery, and $T' = T + cqp$ for some constant c.

The proof of Theorem 3 is presented in Appendix A.

Using standard techniques one can show that the theorem holds also for a OTP scheme realized via a family of pseudorandom functions if we add to the above probability bound the distinguishability distance between the pseudorandom family and a truly random function. Also, the term $q^2/2^\ell$ can be eliminated if one uses non-repeating nonces instead of random r's (such as in counter mode or via a stateful pseudorandom generator used to generate a pseudorandom pad).

Remark 5.1 (*Tightness: one-query resistance is necessary*) Here is an example of a MAC that *does not* resist one-queries and with which valid ciphertext can be forged against $AtE(OTP_\$, MAC)$. Assume MAC allows for finding two same-length messages with the same MAC tag. (For example, MAC first zeros the last bit of the message and then applies a secure MAC function on the resultant message. Thus, MAC resists zero-queries but fails to one-queries: ask for a MAC on a message, then forge for the message with last bit flipped.) The strategy of the ciphertext forger against $AtE(OTP_\$, MAC)$ is to find such pair of messages x_1, x_2. Then, it queries the first one and gets the ciphertext (r, c). Finally, it outputs the forgery (r, c') where c' is obtained from c by xor-ing x_2 to the first $|x_2|$ bits of c. It is easy to see that (r, c') decrypts to $(x_2, MAC(x_2))$.

Remark 5.2 (*Multi-valued MAC*) In Remark 2.1 we strengthened the regular security definition of a MAC function in the case that the function allows for different valid authentication tags for the same message. This extended definiton is used (explicitly) in the proof of Theorem 3 and is essential for ensuring the CUF-CPA property of $AtE(OTP_\$, MAC)$. To see this, let MAC be a secure single-valued MAC function and define MAC' to be the same as MAC except that an additional arbitrary bit is appended to each authentication tag; the verification procedure will just ignore this bit. It is easy to see that in this case $AtE(OTP_\$, MAC')$ will not be CUF-CPA. However, if one examines the proof of Theorem 3 it can be seen that $AtE(OTP_\$, MAC')$ achieves loose CUF-CPA (see Section 3) and then it is sufficient for implementing secure channels (which is what we care about). So can we dispense of the strengthened notion of MAC when multi-valued MACs are used? The answer is no. It is possible to build a multi-valued function MAC' that satisfies the regular MAC definition, but not the strengthened version, for which $AtE(OTP_\$, MAC')$ is *insecure* for building secure channels[6].
Here is an example: let MAC be a secure single-valued MAC, and define MAC' to be identical to MAC except that on the all-zeros string it allows the last bit of the tag to be set arbitrarily (i.e., for this string the verification function will accept as valid two different tags). An attacker against a channels protocol that implements $AtE(OTP_\$, MAC')$ can distinguish between a ciphertext that encrypts the all-zeros message and the ciphertext of any other message as follows. It just flips

[6] In contrast, in the case of using *EtA* composition for implementing secure channels the regular security notion of MAC suffices for any IND-CPA encryption scheme [8]

the last bit of the ciphertext and watches for acceptance or rejection of the message; clearly, the message is accepted if and only if it was the all-zeros message.

Remark 5.3 (*Sufficiency of redundancy functions*) In [1] An and Bellare investigate the question of whether simple redundancy functions (such as combinatorial hash functions) applied to a plaintext before encryption suffice for providing ciphertext unforgeability. In the case of *AtE* with OTP it seems natural to assume that a simple combinatorial property of the redundancy function such as AXU [20, 24] should suffice. (In particular, this seems so since such a property is sufficient [20] if one only considers *plaintext integrity* where only the output of the redundancy function is encrypted under an OTP scheme.) However, this turns out not to be true in the case of ciphertext unforgeability. We can show an example of an $\mathcal{E}$-AXU (and also $\mathcal{E}$-balanced [20]) *MAC* family for which $AtE(OTP_\$, MAC)$ is not CUF-CPA. It seems plausible, however, that a more involved combinatorial property (involving the length of messages) of the *MAC* function could suffice to guarantee ciphertext unforgeability in the case of *AtE* with OTP. Actually, it is interesting to note that if the authentication tag is positioned *before* the message, instead of at the end as defined above, the AXU property is indeed sufficient (assuming fixed-length and single-valued valid authentication tags).

Remark 5.4 (*Beware of "slight changes": separate encryption*) To highlight the "fragility" of the result in Theorem 3 we note that the proof of this theorem uses in an essential way the fact that the encryption is applied as a whole on the concatenated message and *MAC* tag. If we were to encrypt these two values *separately* (i.e., using separate IVs for the encryption of the message and of the MAC) even under a truly random function we would not get CUF or CCA security. More significantly, such separate encryption results in *insecure channels*. Indeed, under this method an active attacker can get to learn whether two transmitted messages, possibly with different message identifiers, are the same, something clearly unwanted in a secure protocol (the attack is described in Appendix C). We stress that this weakness allows for actual attacks on practical applications, in particular several forms of "dictionary attacks"[7]

In addition, this observation shows another weakness of the encrypt-and-authenticate method (Section 4.3) since it exhibits the insecurity of this method even under the use of a standard stream cipher for encryption and even when the MAC tag is encrypted.

5.3 *AtE* with CBC

The CBC scheme. Let ℓ be a positive integer and F be a family of permutations over $\{0,1\}^\ell$. We define the encryption scheme $CBC(F)$ to work on messages of length a multiple of ℓ. A key in the encryption scheme is a description of a member f of the family F. The CBC encryption under f of plaintext x is performed by partitioning x into blocks $x[1], \ldots, x[p]$ of length ℓ each, then choosing $r \in_R \{0,1\}^\ell$ (called the IV) and computing the ciphertext $c = c[0], c[1], \ldots, c[p]$ as $c[0] = r, c[i] = f(c[i-1] \oplus x[i]), i = 1, \ldots, p$. Decryption works in the obvious inverse way. If F is the set of *all* permutations over $\{0,1\}^\ell$ and f is chosen at random from F then we denote the scheme by $CBC_\$$. A formal and exact-security treatment of this mode of encryption can be found in [2] who in particular prove it to be IND-CPA also in the case where F is a pseudorandom family (in this case the security depends on the "indistinguishability distance" between the pseudorandom

[7] One such example would be finding passwords sent in the `telnet` protocol even if the protocol is run over a secure channel protected as above; this is particularly facilitated by the fact that in this case *individual password characters* are transmitted separately, and thus a dictionary attack can be mounted on individual characters.

family and a truly random function).

The $AtE(CBC_\$, MAC)$ composition. Let MAC be a MAC family with ℓ-bit outputs, and k a key to a member of that family. Let f be a random permutation over $\{0,1\}^\ell$. The $AtE(CBC_\$, MAC)$ function with f and k acts as follows: (i) it receives as input a message x of length multiple of ℓ, (ii) computes $t = MAC_k(x)$, (iii) appends t to x, (iv) outputs the CBC encryption under f of the concatenated message (x,t) (note that the resultant output is two blocks longer than x due to the added block t and the prepended IV r).

The following theorem establishes the CUF-CPA security of $AtE(CBC_\$, MAC)$ as a function of the security $\mathcal{E}_M(\cdot,\cdot,\cdot)$ of MAC.

Theorem 4 *If MAC is a secure MAC family then $AtE(CBC_\$, MAC)$ is CUF-CPA (and then by Theorem 2 it implements secure channels). More precisely, any ciphertext forger $\mathcal{F}$ against $AtE(CBC_\$, MAC)$ that runs time T has success probability $\mathcal{E}_U$ of at most*

$$Q^2/2^\ell + 2q\mathcal{E}_M(0,0,T') + \mathcal{E}_M(1,p\ell,T') + 2\mathcal{E}_M(q^*,q^*p\ell,T')$$

where q is the number of plaintexts queried by $\mathcal{F}$, p is an upper bound on the number of blocks in each of these queries, p^* is the length in blocks of the forgery y^* output by $\mathcal{F}$, $q^* = \min\{q,p^*\}$, Q is the total number of blocks in the responses to $\mathcal{F}$'s queries plus p^*, and $T' = T + cQ$ for constant c.

The proof of Theorem 4 is presented in Appendix B.

Using standard techniques one can show that the theorem holds also for a CBC scheme realized via a family of pseudorandom permutations if we add to the above probability bound the distinguishability distance between the pseudorandom family and a truly random function. However, we note, that in this case the distinguisher not only gets access to an oracle that computes the function but also to an oracle that computes the inverse function (that is, we need to assume the family of permutations to be "super pseudorandom" [21]).

Remark 5.5 (*Tightness: the necessity of strong MAC*) The most "expensive" term in MAC security in the expression of the theorem is the value $\mathcal{E}_M(q^*)$ since other terms only require protection against one-query or zero-query. Since an attacker $\mathcal{F}$ does not get to see any of the MAC values one could wonder why such a strong security from the MAC is required. We show here that, in contrast to the $AtE(OTP_\$, MAC)$ case, this requirement is unavoidable. Specifically, we present for any $i = 0,1,2,\ldots$, an example of a MAC function MAC that is secure against i queries but yields an insecure $AtE(CBC_\$, MAC)$ scheme with $q = i+1$ (and $p^* = 2i+4$). We describe the example for $i = 1$, the extension to other values is straightforward.

Let $\{g_k\}_k$ be a family of pseudorandom functions from $(\{0,1\}^\ell)^*$ to $\{0,1\}^{\ell/2}$. Define a MAC family MAC' on the same domain as $\{g_k\}_k$, and with ℓ-bit outputs as follows: $MAC'_{(k_1,k_2)}(x) = (g_{k_1}(x), g_{k_2}(g_{k_1}(x)))$. Define a second MAC family MAC that uses the same set of keys as MAC' and such that on key (k_1,k_2):

1. if the input x contains two ℓ-bit blocks b_i and b_j, $i < j$, such that $b_i \neq b_j$ and both have the property that applying g_{k_2} to the first half of the block yields the second half of the block then output b_i as the MAC value for x.
2. otherwise, output $MAC'_{(k_1,k_2)}(x)$

It is easy to see that the so defined MAC has security of roughly $2^{\ell/2}$ against single queries (but is totally insecure after two queries since the output of MAC provides the block format that makes

the authentication tag "trivial"). We show that it yields a $AtE(CBC_\$, MAC)$ scheme whose ciphertexts are forgeable after two queries even if the encryption permutation f is purely random. The ciphertext forger $\mathcal{F}$ against $AtE(CBC_\$, MAC)$ proceeds as follows:

1. Choose two arbitrary one-block long plaintexts x_1, x_2 as the two queries.
2. Let the responses y_1, y_2 be the triples: $(r_1, c_1 = f(r_1 \oplus x_1), m_1 = f(c_1 \oplus MAC(x_1)))$ and $(r_2, c_2 = f(r_2 \oplus x_2), m_2 = f(c_2 \oplus MAC(x_2)))$.
3. Output forgery $y^* = (c_1, m_1, c_2, m_2, c_1, m_1)$.

A simple examination shows that y^* is a valid ciphertext.

One consequence of the above lower bound on the required security of MAC is that, somewhat surprisingly, the MAC function cannot be replaced by a simple combinatorial hash function, such as one enjoying AXU (see Remark 5.3). Indeed, had AXU been sufficient then one-query resistant MACs would suffice too (since one-query resistance implies AXU). We note that a modified CBC-like mode for which AXU is sufficient is presented in [1].

In contrast to the above lower bound, we do not know if the term $q\mathcal{E}_M(0)$ in the bound of the theorem is necessary or not; we do not have so far an example that shows this term to be unavoidable. Thus, it may well be the case that a more careful analysis could lower the factor q (actually, even with the current analysis it is possible to replace the factor q with q^* by a slightly more involved argument).

Remark 5.6 (*Non-adaptive security of MAC suffices*) It is interesting to note that the requirement from the security of the MAC in Theorem 4 is for *non-adaptive* queries only. This can be seen by inspecting the proof of the theorem, where the MAC forger $\mathcal{G}$ that we build makes non-adaptive queries only.

Remark 5.7 (*Beware of "slight changes"*) Similarly to the case of $AtE(OTP_\$, MAC)$ the proof of Theorem 4 uses in an essential way the fact that the encryption is done as a whole on the concatenated message and MAC. It is easy to build a ciphertext forgery attack in case the encryption of the plaintext and of the MAC tag are done separately (i.e. with independently chosen IVs). More significantly, such separate encryption usually results in *insecure channels* as demonstrated in Appendix C.

6 Concluding remarks

This paper answers some basic questions in cryptography but also raises many other questions and issues. Some refer to the well-known (yet easy to forget) misleading effect of intuition in the design of cryptographic protocols, others have to do with the effect of seemingly-technical subtleties in the actual security of protocols, and others relate to the formalization of some basic cryptographic notions. In this section we compile and highlight some of these issues.

6.1 The subtleties of cryptographic design

A few observations on the relation between our results and some commonly accepted intuitions.

1. Why isn't the AtE method secure? Beyond the technical demonstration of this fact here, the more fundamental reason is that the MAC is not needed just to authenticate the data

but also to protect the ciphertext itself from changes by an active attacker. The intuition that changes to the ciphertext will be necessarily discovered by the underlying MAC is just not true (as our counter-example from Section 4.2 and the separate-encryption case from Section 5.2 demonstrate).

2. When first seeing the counter-example to the security of the *AtE* method from Section 4.2 one could be tempted to conclude that the weakness in this example comes from the trivial "malleability" of one-time-pad encryption (i.e., the easiness to change the plaintext via the flipping of ciphertext bits). However, this is certainly not the case: as we show (Section 5.2) a direct one-time-pad encryption of the (unencoded data) makes the *AtE* method secure.

3. After showing that the *AtE* method is secure when one-time-pad encryption is applied to the concatenated pair (message,mac), one could reasonably expect that encrypting each of the message and mac components with independent one-time pads should still be secure. However, we show in Section 5.2 that such a conclusion is false and that separate encryption can completely break security.

4. One "intuitive advantage" of *AtE* is that the encrypted MAC is hard to attack since in this case the attacker does not get to see the authentication tags or even the plaintexts. Therefore, it seems, much less than a full-fledge MAC should suffice in this case. It turns out that this intuition is justified when using one-time pad encryption in which case we show that MAC functions resistant to a single-query are sufficient. In contrast, however, this intuition is strongly misleading in the case of CBC encryption for which we prove that a fully-secure MAC is required in order to achieve security of *AtE* under CBC. This is particularly interesting (and counter-intuitive) since CBC is usually regarded as providing far better "integrity guarantee" than stream ciphers.

5. Yet another subtlety regarding the requirements from a MAC function in the case of *AtE* with OTP is that the (non-standard) strengthened security notion for multi-valued MACs as described in Section 2.1 is necessary here (see Section 5.2). This is in strong contrast to the *EtA* case where the (weaker) standard MAC security notion suffices also in case of multi-valued MACs.

The moral is simple: do not (over) trust intuition, do not take security as an obvious property of anything, and mind every little change to a secure method.

6.2 Secure channels and the role of CCA security

One interesting issue that arises in comparing our work to [5] is the importance of considering the problem of encryption/authentication composition in the specific context of implementing secure channels, rather than as the design of an independent (composed) primitive. In particular, this comparison highlights the question of the suitability of CCA security as the notion that captures the security requirements from such composition. Certainly, from the results in [8] and here it follows that CCA is not a necessary requirement to achieve secure channels. On the other hand, when proving (as we do in Section 5) that specific schemes implement secure channels, it is very convenient to have a simple security notion applicable to the composed function (as a stand-alone primitive) and which frees our analysis from the more complex details of the "secure channels" model of [8].

Here, we use the notion of ciphertext unforgeability (or CUF-CPA), introduced in Section 3, for this purpose. However, while relatively easy to work with, this notion does not resolve the over-kill nature of CCA-security (actually, CUF-CPA is even stronger than CCA [5]). Indeed, this notion excludes as secure perfectly good schemes. It is the more relaxed notion of "loose ciphertext unforgeability" that lets us capture a sufficient requirement for implementing secure channels and allows for the proof of some of the non-CCA implementations of secure channels mentioned here. However, there are schemes that implement secure channels and are not loose ciphertext unforgeable. Therefore, finding a full characterization of these schemes in the form of a *simple to state and use* definition would be an important contribution in this research area.

In this regard, it is interesting to make the following observation. One aspect of loose CUF is that it limits the ciphertext forgeries allowed to the attacker to ciphertexts that decrypt to previously queried plaintexts. A natural question is whether this property is already sufficient for guaranteeing secure channels. The answer is not. Our attacker against the $AtE(ENC^*, MAC)$ scheme from Section 4.2 is able to break the security of the channels without ever producing a valid ciphertext that decrypts to an unseen ciphertext.

6.3 Open questions

As said, there are many issues and questions raised by our work. We mention here two questions that seem especially interesting. Their resolution may provide a better understanding of the formal and practical security issues involved here.

One is the question raised before: find a *simple characterization* of composed mac/encryption functions that implement secure channels. In particular, we would like to have a property to replace loose CUF in Theorem 2 such that an "if and only if" statement can be proven. (Related questions include finding other uses to the notion of loose ciphertext unforgeability, or is a notion of "loose CCA" similar to the above useful in any way?)

The other question relates to the encryption schemes that make the AtE method secure. While we proved the security of this method for stream-cipher and CBC modes the technicalities involved in these proofs (especially in the case of CBC) and the suceptibility to small changes show that the approach of proving specific cases is not the most desirable one and far from straightforward. Certainly, given our results the best way to avoid these problems is to only use the EtA approach. Yet, considering the current use of AtE in practice and some of its advantages (for example, its direct authentication of the plaintext) it would be interesting to find a property that is enjoyed by common modes of encryption and is sufficient to ensure the security of the authenticate-then-encrypt method when combined with a secure MAC. Note that we are looking for a property that is stronger than IND-CPA but significantly weaker than chosen-ciphertext security since the latter is *not* achieved by most symmetric encryption modes, and also because our results show that this condition is not really necessary.

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A Proof of Theorem 3

Theorem 3 *If MAC is a MAC family that resists one-query attacks then $AtE(OTP_\$, MAC)$ is CUF-CPA (and then by Theorem 2 it implements secure channels).*
More precisely, any ciphertext forger $\mathcal{F}$ against $AtE(OTP_\$, MAC)$ that runs time T has success probability $\mathcal{E}_U$ of at most $q^2/2^\ell + \mathcal{E}_M(1, p, T')$, where ℓ is a parameter of $OTP_\$$, q is the number of queries $\mathcal{F}$ makes during the attack, p is an upper bound on the length of each such query and on the length of the output forgery, and $T' = T + cqp$ for some constant c.

Proof: We show how to convert a successful ciphertext forger $\mathcal{F}$ against $AtE(OTP_\$, MAC)$ into a MAC forger $\mathcal{G}$ against MAC. From our definitions of $AtE(OTP_\$, MAC)$ and CUF-CPA such a ciphertext forger $\mathcal{F}$ works by querying (possibly in an adaptive way) q different plaintexts $x_1, \ldots, x_q$ (each of length $\ell' - n$ at most — recall that n is the length the MAC output) from an oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\mathrm{AtE}}$ that responds with pairs $(r_1, R_1), \ldots, (r_q, R_q)$ where $r_i \in_R \{0,1\}^\ell$ and $R_i = f(r_i) \oplus (x_i, MAC_k(x_i))$. Here the function f and the MAC key k are fixed through all responses by $\mathcal{O}_{\mathrm{AtE}}$ and are determined as follows: f is a random function with domain and range as specified by the $OTP_\$$ scheme, and the key k is distributed according to the probability distribution of keys determined by the MAC scheme. After getting responses to its queries, $\mathcal{F}$ outputs a forgery (r, R) which is considered successful if and only if (i) $r \in \{0,1\}^\ell, |R| \leq \ell'$; (ii) $(r, R) \neq (r_i, R_i), i = 1, \ldots, q$; and (iii) $R = f(r) \oplus (x, MAC_k(x))$ for some x of length $\ell' - n$ at most.
Given $\mathcal{F}$ we construct the MAC-forger $\mathcal{G}$ as shown in Figure 1.

Note that $\mathcal{G}$'s responses to $\mathcal{F}$'s queries are purely random. This is the case also in a real interaction between $\mathcal{F}$ and the $AtE(OTP_\$, MAC)$ oracle *as long as there are no repetitions in the values of* $r_i, i = 1, \ldots, q$. Thus, the forgery output by $\mathcal{F}$ under $\mathcal{G}$'s run is distributed identically to the forgeries output under the interaction of $\mathcal{F}$ with the real oracle if we condition these probability distributions on the event that no collisions happen in the r_i values. In addition note that when the ciphertext forgery (r, R) output by $\mathcal{F}$ is successful so is the MAC forgery output by $\mathcal{G}$. This can be seen by inspection of the actions of $\mathcal{G}$ in step 2 which result in a "decryption" of (r, R) that is distributed identically to a decryption under the random function f in a real interaction between $\mathcal{F}$ and the $AtE(OTP_\$, MAC)$ oracle. Thus, if (r, R) was a successful ciphertext forgery then its decryption into values (x, t) as computed by $\mathcal{G}$ is a correct MAC forgery. There is one point that needs to be argued more carefully and it is that the output (x, t) by $\mathcal{G}$ in step 2(c) does not equal to (x_j, t_j) as returned by the MAC oracle in response to $\mathcal{G}$'s query (otherwise this is not a successful MAC forgery). But this is also easy to see since the encryption of (x_j, t_j) under $OTP_\$$, i.e., $(x_j, t_j) \oplus f(r_j)$, is (r_j, R_j) and we are assuming $R \neq R_j$. (Note that if MAC is a multi-valued function then it could be that $x = x_j$ and $t \neq t_j$ so we are using the fact that such an output is considered a successful MAC forgery – see Section 2.1.) This reasoning implies the following

From OTP ciphertext forgeries to MAC forgeries

Let $\mathcal{F}$ be a ciphertext forger against $AtE(OTP_\$, MAC)$. We build a forger $\mathcal{G}$ against MAC with access to a MAC oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{MAC}}$.

1. $\mathcal{G}$ runs $\mathcal{F}$ and answers its queries x_i (in lieu of the AtE oracle) with pairs (r_i, R_i) where $r_i \in_R \{0,1\}^\ell$, $R_i \in_R \{0,1\}^{|x_i|+n}$.
2. When, after some number q of queries, $\mathcal{F}$ outputs a forgery (r, R) then $\mathcal{G}$ proceeds as follows.
   (a) If $\forall i \in \{1,\ldots,q\}, r \neq r_i$: choose $x \in_R \{0,1\}^{|R|-n}, t \in_R \{0,1\}^n$ and output (x,t) as a MAC forgery.
   (b) If $\exists j \in \{1,\ldots,q\}, r = r_j$ and $R = R_j$: output FAIL (* this is just a replay by $\mathcal{F}$ *)
   (c) If $\exists j \in \{1,\ldots,q\}, r = r_j$ and $R \neq R_j$: **query** $t_j \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathcal{O}_{\text{MAC}}(x_j)$ and output (x,t) as a MAC forgery where x and t are computed as

      if $|R| \leq |R_j|$ set:
      R'_j = prefix of R_j of length $|R|$; y = prefix of (x_j, t_j) of length $|R|$;
      $y' = R \oplus R'_j \oplus y$
      x = prefix of y' of length $|R| - n$; t = suffix of y' of length n
      if $|R| > |R_j|$ set:
      R' = prefix of R of length $|R_j|$; $y = (x_j, t_j)$
      y' = the concatenation of $R' \oplus R_j \oplus y$ and $|R| - |R_j|$ random bits
      x = prefix of y' of length $|R| - n$; t = suffix of y' of length n

Figure 1: The security of $AtE(OTP_\$, MAC)$

equality:

$$Prob(\mathcal{F} \text{ succeeds} : \text{no } r_i \text{ collision}) = Prob(\mathcal{G} \text{ succeeds} : \text{no } r_i \text{ collision})$$

From this we get:

$$\begin{aligned}
Prob(\mathcal{F} \text{ succeeds}) &= Prob(\mathcal{F} \text{ succeeds} \wedge r_i \text{ collision}) + Prob(\mathcal{F} \text{ succeeds} \wedge \text{no } r_i \text{ collision}) \\
&\leq Prob(r_i \text{ collision}) + Prob(\mathcal{F} \text{ succeeds} : \text{no } r_i \text{ collision}) Prob(\text{no } r_i \text{ collision}) \\
&= Prob(r_i \text{ collision}) + Prob(\mathcal{G} \text{ succeeds} : \text{no } r_i \text{ collision}) Prob(\text{no } r_i \text{ collision}) \\
&= Prob(r_i \text{ collision}) + Prob(\mathcal{G} \text{ succeeds} \wedge \text{no } r_i \text{ collision}) \\
&\leq q^2/2^\ell + \mathcal{E}_M(1, p, T')
\end{aligned}$$

The last inequality is derived as follows. The first part is a simple birthday bound on the probability that an r_i collision happens after q queries. The second part is a bound on the probability of event $Prob(\mathcal{G} \text{ succeeds} \wedge \text{no } r_i \text{ collision})$ since under this event $\mathcal{G}$ is a successful MAC-forger which makes at most one query of length at most p and works time T'. This probability is then at most $\mathcal{E}_M(1, p, T')$. □

B Proof of Theorem 4

Theorem 4 *If MAC is a secure MAC family then $AtE(CBC_\$, MAC)$ is CUF-CPA (and then by Theorem 2 it implements secure channels). More precisely, any ciphertext forger $\mathcal{F}$ against $AtE(CBC_\$, MAC)$ that runs time T has success probability $\mathcal{E}_U$ of at most*

$$Q^2/2^\ell + 2q\mathcal{E}_M(0,0,T') + \mathcal{E}_M(1,p\ell,T') + 2\mathcal{E}_M(q^*,q^*p\ell,T')$$

where q is the number of plaintexts queried by $\mathcal{F}$, p is an upper bound on the number of blocks in each of these queries, p^* is the length in blocks of the forgery y^* output by $\mathcal{F}$, $q^* = \min\{q, p^*\}$, Q is the total number of blocks in the responses to $\mathcal{F}$'s queries plus p^*, and $T' = T + cQ$ for constant c.

Proof: Let $\mathcal{F}$ be a forger against $AtE(CBC_\$, MAC)$; we show that its success probability is bounded as in the theorem's statement. For this we show how to convert $\mathcal{F}$ into a forger $\mathcal{G}$ against MAC. The upper bounds on the success probability of $\mathcal{G}$ guaranteed by the security of MAC allow us to establish the claimed bounds on the success probability of $\mathcal{F}$.

We start by introducing some notation for describing the work of a ciphertext forger $\mathcal{F}$. We denote by $x_i, i = 1, \ldots, q$ the plaintexts that $\mathcal{F}$ queries from its $AtE(CBC_\$, MAC)$-oracle, and by $y_i, i = 1, \ldots, q$ the responses given by this oracle (i.e., the CBC encryption of $(x_i, MAC_k(x_i))$ under a random permutation f where k is a randomly chosen MAC key). We denote each y_i as a triple (r_i, c_i, m_i) where r_i is the random IV, c_i is of the length of x_i, and m_i is the ciphertext block corresponding to $MAC_k(x_i)$. The output of $\mathcal{F}$, i.e. a candidate forgery, is denoted by $y^* = (r^*, c^*, m^*)$; this forgery is successful if the CBC decryption of y^* under f results in a pair (x^*, t^*) such that $t^* = MAC_k(x^*)$. By $c_i[u]$ we denote the u-th block of c_i (and r_i if $u = 0$) and by $c_i[last]$ the last block of c_i; we use similar notation for for c^*.

The forger $\mathcal{G}$ is presented in Figure 2. We provide some explanations of the rationale behind $\mathcal{G}$ under comments marked by $(* \cdots *)$. The idea of the forger is to simulate the responses given to $\mathcal{F}$ by a real $AtE(CBC_\$, MAC)$-oracle under a truly random permutation. Then, when $\mathcal{F}$ outputs a forgery y^*, to try and "decrypt" it to obtain the MAC forgery (x^*, t^*). The decryption uses the fact that $CBC_\$$ uses a truly random permutation in its computation, that $\mathcal{G}$ knows the inputs for ciphertext blocks that appear in previous responses it provided to $\mathcal{F}$, and that missing information for decrypting m_i blocks (i.e., the encryption of MAC values) can be obtained by querying $\mathcal{O}_{\mathrm{MAC}}$. Yet this has to be done carefully so that the number of queries to $\mathcal{O}_{\mathrm{MAC}}$ is kept to a minimum, and to ensure that the plaintext output as a forgery was not input as a query to $\mathcal{O}_{\mathrm{MAC}}$.

We define three types of events related to the interaction between $\mathcal{F}$ and an $AtE(CBC_\$, MAC)$-oracle.

Event CL ("collision"): We define CL as the union of two events CL_0 and CL_1 defined as follows. We say that event CL_0 happens if there is equality between any two blocks appearing in the ciphertexts $y_i, i = 1, \ldots, q$. Event CL_1 relates to the following experiment: at the end of $\mathcal{F}$'s attack we choose p^* (the length of y^* in blocks) random values in $\{0,1\}^\ell$. We say that event CL_1 happens if any of these p^* values coincides with any block that appeared in the ciphertexts $y_i, i = 1, \ldots, q$.

Event NM ("no m_i"): We say that event NM happens if *no* block in the c^* part of y^* equals to one of the blocks m_i in the responses y_i provided to $\mathcal{F}$.

Event KP ("known plaintext"): We say that event KP happens if the plaintext x^* under $\mathcal{F}$'s forgery y^* equals a previously queried plaintext by $\mathcal{F}$.

From CBC ciphertext forgeries to MAC forgeries

Let $\mathcal{F}$ be a ciphertext forger against $AtE(CBC_\$, MAC)$. We build a forger $\mathcal{G}$ against MAC with access to a MAC oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\mathrm{MAC}}$.

1. $\mathcal{G}$ runs $\mathcal{F}$. On each query x_i by $\mathcal{F}$, forger $\mathcal{G}$ returns a response (r_i, c_i, m_i) where $r_i \in_R \{0,1\}^\ell, c_i \in_R \{0,1\}^{|x_i|}, m_i \in_R \{0,1\}^\ell$. If there is any repetition in the blocks chosen by $\mathcal{G}$ as responses to $\mathcal{F}$, then $\mathcal{G}$ aborts and fails to forge.

   (* If no such repetitions happen then we think, for the sake of presentation, of a permutation f that is partially defined by the responses of $\mathcal{G}$ to $\mathcal{F}$'s inputs. *)

2. When $\mathcal{F}$ outputs ciphertext $y^* = (r^*, c^*, m^*)$, say after q queries $x_1, \ldots, x_q$, the forger $\mathcal{G}$ computes a forgery (x, t) against MAC in the following way:

   (* The main idea is to try to set $(x,t) = (x^*, t^*)$ by "decrypting" y^* using known input-output's of f and using queries to $\mathcal{O}_{\mathrm{MAC}}$; the rationale for specific "decryptions" is explained in the comments below *)

   (a) If c^* contains no block that equals one of the values m_i from the previous step then:

      i. For each block $c^*[u]$ in c^*: (* set the corresponding block $x[u]$ of x *)
      If the block $c^*[u]$ equals a block appearing in one of the ciphertexts $c_i, i = 1, \ldots, q$ produced in step 1, say $c^*[u] = c_i[v]$, then set $x[u] = x_i[v] \oplus c_i[v-1] \oplus c^*[u-1]$

      (* $x[u] = f^{-1}(c^*[u]) \oplus c^*[u-1] = f^{-1}(c_i[v]) \oplus c^*[u-1] = x_i[v] \oplus c_i[v-1] \oplus c^*[u-1]$ *)

      Else (* i.e., the block $c^*[u]$ does not appear in any $c_i, i = 1, \ldots, q$ *)
      set $x[u]$ to a random value in $\{0,1\}^\ell$ not used as an input to f so far.

      ii. If the value m^* did not appear as a block in the responses y_i provided by $\mathcal{G}$ then set t to a random value in $\{0,1\}^\ell$ not used as an input to f so far;

      If for some i and u, $m^* = c_i[u]$ then set $t = x_i[u] \oplus c_i[u-1] \oplus c^*[last]$;

      (* $t = f^{-1}(m^*) \oplus c^*[last] = f^{-1}(c_i[u]) \oplus c^*[last] = x_i[u] \oplus c_i[u-1] \oplus c^*[last]$ *)

      If for some i, $m^* = m_i$ then **query** $MAC(x_i)$ and set $t = MAC(x_i) \oplus c_i[last] \oplus c^*[last]$

      (* $t = f^{-1}(m^*) \oplus c^*[last] = f^{-1}(m_i) \oplus c^*[last] = MAC(x_i) \oplus c_i[last] \oplus c^*[last]$ *)

   (b) If one of the blocks in c^* equals a block $m_i, 1 \le i \le q$, then with probability $1/2$ follow Step (i) below and with probability $1/2$ follow Step (ii) below:

   (* (i) produces a forgery if $x^* = x_i$ for some i, while (ii) forges if x^* is new. *)

      i. Say $c^*[u] = m_i$. Choose $j \in_R \{1, \ldots, q\}$; set $x = x_i$ and $t = x_j[u] \oplus c_i[last] \oplus c^*[u-1]$.

      (* if $x^* = x_j$ then $f^{-1}(m_i)$ equals $x_j[u] \oplus c^*[u-1]$ and also equals $MAC(x_i) \oplus c_i[last]$; thus as defined, $t = MAC(x_i)$ *)

      ii. Compute (x,t) as in Step 2a except for blocks $c^*[u]$ that equal some block m_i. In these cases, **query** $MAC(x_i)$, and set $x[u] = MAC(x_i) \oplus c_i[last] \oplus c^*[u-1]$.

      (* $x[u] = f^{-1}(m_i) \oplus c^*[u-1] = MAC(x_i) \oplus c_i[last] \oplus c^*[u-1]$ *)

Figure 2: The security of $AtE(CBC_\$, MAC)$

The probability that $\mathcal{F}$ outputs a successful forgery can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned} Prob(\mathcal{F} \text{ succeeds}) &= Prob(\mathcal{F} \text{ succeeds } \wedge CL) + Prob(\mathcal{F} \text{ succeeds } \wedge (\neg CL \wedge NM)) + \\ & \quad Prob(\mathcal{F} \text{ succeeds } \wedge (\neg CL \wedge \neg NM \wedge KP)) + \\ & \quad Prob(\mathcal{F} \text{ succeeds } \wedge (\neg CL \wedge \neg NM \wedge \neg KP)) \end{aligned}$$

From this expression and the proof of the next lemma, Theorem 4 follows. □

Lemma 5 *The following inequalities hold for the success probability of forger $\mathcal{F}$ as described in the proof of Theorem 4. (For clarity of notation, we omit below the time parameter under the $\mathcal{E}_M$ expression.)*

1. $Prob(\mathcal{F} \text{ succeeds } \wedge CL) \leq Q^2/2^\ell$
2. $Prob(\mathcal{F} \text{ succeeds } \wedge (\neg CL \wedge NM)) \leq \mathcal{E}_M(1, p\ell)$
3. $Prob(\mathcal{F} \text{ succeeds } \wedge (\neg CL \wedge \neg NM \wedge KP)) \leq 2q\mathcal{E}_M(0, 0)$
4. $Prob(\mathcal{F} \text{ succeeds } \wedge (\neg CL \wedge \neg NM \wedge \neg KP)) \leq 2\mathcal{E}_M(q^*, q^* p\ell)$

Proof: Part 1: Clearly $Prob(\mathcal{F} \text{ succeeds } \wedge CL) \leq Prob(CL)$. Thus, it suffices to bound $Prob(CL)$, i.e., the probability that either CL_0 or CL_1 happen. That is, either there exist two blocks among the blocks in the ciphertexts $y_i, i = 1, \ldots, q$ that are equal, or there is a collision between one of the p^* blocks, denoted $z_1, \ldots, z_{p^*}$, chosen in the experiment defined under event CL_1 and one of the blocks in $y_i, i = 1, \ldots, q$. It is easy to see that as long as there are no collisions, the blocks in the ciphertexts y_i are all independent from the underlying plaintexts (this is due to the choice of a random independent IV in the generation of y_i and the randomness of the permutation f) and then the probability for a first collision among these blocks is the same as in a standard birthday calculation. Moreover, if we extend the collision condition to require that no collision will happen among the blocks in y_i and among these blocks and the elements $z_1, \ldots, z_{p^*}$ chosen in the setting of event CL_1, then we are guaranteed that neither CL_0 nor CL_1 occur. The total number of blocks for which we check for collisions is then Q (which we defined to include the number of blocks in the ciphertexts y_i as well as the number p^* of blocks in p^*). Thus, the probability that no collision occurs among these Q blocks is as in a regular birthday problem in which Q elements are randomly drawn from a set of 2^ℓ elements, and this probability is at least $1 - Q^2/2^\ell$. Thus, the probability that either CL_0 or CL_1 happen is less than $Q^2/2^\ell$, i.e. $Prob(CL) < Q^2/2^\ell$.

In all the following cases we assume that CL (and thus CL_0) *does not happen*. Under this assumption, the queries by $\mathcal{F}$ and the answers provided to $\mathcal{F}$ by $\mathcal{G}$ are distributed identically as in a real interaction between $\mathcal{F}$ and the $AtE(CBC_\$, MAC)$-oracle. Therefore, under the $\neg CL$ condition also the forgeries output by $\mathcal{F}$ in a run by $\mathcal{G}$ are identically distributed as the forgeries of $\mathcal{F}$ in a real interaction with the $AtE(CBC_\$, MAC)$-oracle. We use this fact throughout the rest of the proof. The exclusion of event CL_1 will also be used, but in a more technical way, in the proof of part 2.

Part 2: We start by showing that under the assumption that event CL does not happen and event NM does happen then the probability that $\mathcal{G}$ outputs a valid forgery against MAC is identical to the probability (under the same $\neg CL \wedge NM$ assumption) that $\mathcal{F}$ outputs a successful forgery y^*. Remember that since CL does not happen (and thus CL_0 does not happen) then the ciphertext y^* output by $\mathcal{F}$ in its activation by $\mathcal{G}$ is distributed identically as in an interaction with the $AtE(CBC_\$, MAC)$-oracle in which event CL does not happen. Also by assuming event NM we know that no m_i block appears in c^* and in this case $\mathcal{G}$ follows the actions described in step 2a of Figure 2. In this case, the blocks in c^* are either blocks that appeared in $\mathcal{G}$'s responses to $\mathcal{F}$'s queries, in

which case the decryption is known to $\mathcal{G}$, or previously unseen blocks in which case all unseen input blocks have equal probability to serve as decryption. The only problem is that when $\mathcal{G}$ chooses a random input for an unseen ciphertext block it cannot exclude those input blocks encrypted under the m_i blocks for which the plaintext block is unknown to $\mathcal{G}$. That is, by choosing a random unseen input, $\mathcal{G}$ could choose an input of the form $c_i[last] \oplus \mathit{MAC}(x_i)$ for some $i = 1, \ldots, q$. However, this event is excluded by our assumption that event CL_1 does not happen (to see the equivalence between these events think of the preimages chosen by $\mathcal{G}$ for unseen blocks as preimages of the values $z_1, \ldots, z_{p^*}$ in the experiment defined under event CL_1).

Thus we get that the probability distribution of the plaintext x as output by $\mathcal{G}$ in its forgery (x, t) and the distribution of the plaintext x^* defined by $\mathcal{F}$'s forgery y^* is the same. The same holds for the forgery tag t output by $\mathcal{G}$ (but here $\mathcal{G}$ may need to query $\mathcal{O}_{\mathrm{MAC}}$ to decrypt m^* in case that $m^* = m_i$, for some i). In particular, we get that the probability that (x, t) is a correct forgery is the same as the probability that y^* is a valid ciphertext, i.e. the probability that $\mathcal{F}$ succeeds. However, in the case that $\mathcal{G}$ queries $\mathcal{O}_{\mathrm{MAC}}$ on x_i before producing its output (x, t) we need to argue that if y^* is a successful ciphertext forgery then $x \neq x_i$ (otherwise, this output would not be considered a MAC forgery for $\mathcal{G}$). Assume to the contrary that $\mathcal{G}$ queried $\mathit{MAC}(x_i)$ and that $x = x_i$. In this case, if (x, t) is indeed a successful forgery then $t = \mathit{MAC}(x) = \mathit{MAC}(x_i)$[8]. But by computation $t = \mathit{MAC}(x_i) \oplus c_i[last] \oplus c^*[last]$, and thus $c_i[last] = c^*[last]$. On the other hand we have that $f^{-1}(c_i[last]) \oplus c_i[last-1] = f^{-1}(c^*[last]) \oplus c^*[last-1]$ since the first equals $x_i[last]$ and the second $x[last]$ which are the same as $x = x_i$. Thus we get that $c_i[last-1] = c^*[last-1]$. Using the same inductive step we get to see that for all $u = 0, 1, \ldots, last$ $c_i[u] = c^*[u]$, and also $m_i = m^*$. But then $y^* = y_i$ in contradiction to the assumption that y^* was a successful forgery for $\mathcal{F}$.

Thus, we have showed that under the assumptions $(\neg CL \wedge NM)$ the probability that $\mathcal{G}$ outputs a successful forgery is the same as the probability (under the same assumptions) that $\mathcal{F}$ succeeds. In other words,

$$Prob(\mathcal{F} \text{ succeeds } : \neg CL \wedge NM) = Prob(\mathcal{G} \text{ succeeds } : \neg CL \wedge NM)$$

On the other hand, whenever conditions $\neg CL \wedge NM$ hold and $\mathcal{G}$ succeeds in a *MAC* forgery we have a break of the *MAC* function with a *single query* of length at most $p\ell$ an event whose probability is at most $\mathcal{E}_M(1, p\ell)$. That is,

$$Prob(\mathcal{G} \text{ succeeds } \wedge\ (\neg CL \wedge NM)) \leq \mathcal{E}_M(1, p\ell)$$

We can put these two expressions together to finish our proof.

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{E}_M(1, p\ell) &\geq Prob(\mathcal{G} \text{ succeeds } \wedge\ (\neg CL \wedge NM)) \\
&= Prob(\mathcal{G} \text{ succeeds } : (\neg CL \wedge NM))\ Prob(\neg CL \wedge NM) \\
&= Prob(\mathcal{F} \text{ succeeds } : (\neg CL \wedge NM))\ Prob(\neg CL \wedge NM) \\
&= Prob(\mathcal{F} \text{ succeeds } \wedge\ (\neg CL \wedge NM))
\end{aligned}$$

which proves item 2 of the lemma.

Part 3: In this analysis we assume the joint event $(\neg CL \wedge \neg NM \wedge KP)$. As already explained, under the condition $\neg CL$ the forgery y^* as output by $\mathcal{F}$ in the run by $\mathcal{G}$ is identically distributed as in the interaction with a real $\mathit{AtE}(\mathit{CBC}_\$, \mathit{MAC})$-oracle. Also, note that under the event $\neg NM$

[8] If *MAC* is a multi-valued function then the last equality is not guaranteed. However, in this case $t \neq \mathit{MAC}(x_i)$ and then even if $x = x_i$ we have a forgery since the pair (x, t) is not the result of a previous query (see Section 2.1).

the forger $\mathcal{G}$ executes Step 2b in Figure 2. Thus, if $\mathcal{F}$ succeeds under assumption KP (i.e., the forgery y^* decrypts to a value x^* and $x^* = x_j$, for some $j \in \{1, \ldots, q\}$) when interacting with the $AtE(\mathit{CBC}\$, \mathit{MAC})$-oracle then it succeeds under that assumption also in the run by $\mathcal{G}$, and if $\mathcal{G}$ chooses to play step (i) and it happens to choose the correct value j then $\mathcal{G}$ is guaranteed to output a good forgery against MAC since the known decryption provides the value of $\mathit{MAC}(x_i)$ (without having to query $\mathcal{O}_{\mathrm{MAC}}$ and, in particular, we do not have to worry about "replays"). In other words,

$$Prob(\mathcal{G} \text{ succeeds} : (\neg CL \wedge \neg NM \wedge KP) \wedge D) \geq Prob(\mathcal{F} \text{ succeeds} : (\neg CL \wedge \neg NM \wedge KP))$$

where D is the event that $\mathcal{G}$ chooses to play step (i) and it chooses the correct value j. Note that $Prob(D) \geq 1/2q$.

On the other hand, we have that

$$Prob(\mathcal{G} \text{ succeeds} \wedge (\neg CL \wedge \neg NM \wedge KP) \wedge D) \leq \mathcal{E}_M(0,0)$$

since under all these events we get an attack against MAC that uses 0 queries.

We can use the above expressions to prove item 3 in the lemma, as follows.

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{E}_M(0,0) &\geq Prob(\mathcal{G} \text{ succeeds} \wedge (\neg CL \wedge \neg NM \wedge KP) \wedge D) \\
&= Prob(\mathcal{G} \text{ succeeds} \wedge (\neg CL \wedge \neg NM \wedge KP) \ : \ D)\ Prob(D) \\
&\geq Prob(\mathcal{G} \text{ succeeds} \wedge (\neg CL \wedge \neg NM \wedge KP) \ : \ D)\ 1/2q \\
&= Prob(\mathcal{G} \text{ succeeds} \ : \ (\neg CL \wedge \neg NM \wedge KP) \wedge D)\ Prob(\neg CL \wedge \neg NM \wedge KP) \ \ 1/2q \\
&\geq Prob(\mathcal{F} \text{ succeeds} : (\neg CL \wedge \neg NM \wedge KP))\ Prob(\neg CL \wedge \neg NM \wedge KP) \ \ 1/2q \\
&= Prob(\mathcal{F} \text{ succeeds} \wedge (\neg CL \wedge \neg NM \wedge KP))\ 1/2q
\end{aligned}$$

Part 4: Here we assume the joint event $(\neg CL \wedge \neg NM \wedge \neg KP)$. As before this assumed joint event guarantees that the success probability of $\mathcal{F}$ in the run by $\mathcal{G}$ is the same as in an interaction with the $AtE(\mathit{CBC}\$, \mathit{MAC})$-oracle, and that under these conditions $\mathcal{G}$ executes Step 2b in Figure 2. Also, it is easy to inspect that in case that $\neg KP$ holds and that $\mathcal{G}$ chooses to run step (ii), then $\mathcal{G}$ can correctly decrypt y^* into (x,t) with the same distribution as (x^*, t^*) (the missing information for $\mathcal{G}$ to decrypt is the value of decryptions of m_i blocks which it gets by querying the $\mathcal{O}_{\mathrm{MAC}}$, or the pre-images of unseen blocks which $\mathcal{G}$ simulates perfectly assuming event $\neg CL$ which implies $\neg CL_0$). Thus, we have that under these events and the choice by $\mathcal{G}$ to run step (ii) a successful forgery by $\mathcal{F}$ implies a successful forgery by $\mathcal{G}$. That is,

$$Prob(\mathcal{G} \text{ succeeds} : (\neg CL \wedge \neg NM \wedge \neg KP) \wedge E) \geq Prob(\mathcal{F} \text{ succeeds} : (\neg CL \wedge \neg NM \wedge \neg KP))$$

where E is the event that $\mathcal{G}$ chooses step (ii) when running step 2b. Note that $Prob(E) = 1/2$.

On the other hand, we have that

$$Prob(\mathcal{G} \text{ succeeds} \wedge (\neg CL \wedge \neg NM \wedge \neg KP) \wedge E) \leq \mathcal{E}_M(q^*, q^* p\ell)$$

since under all these events we get a successful attack against the function MAC that uses at most $q^* = \min\{p^*, q\}$ queries (this is so since the number of queries is as the number of different m_i blocks in y^* and this number can be at most p^* and at most q).

As in previous cases, we can use the above expressions to prove item 4 in the lemma. □

C Separate encryption of message and MAC is insecure

We show that, as claimed in Remarks 5.4 and 5.7, if the message and MAC's tag are encrypted separately (e.g., using random independent IV's) then the resultant protocol is not secure. Specifically we show how an attacker can learn whether two transmitted messages are equal. Assume a session between parties P and Q who share an encryption key κ_e and a *MAC* key κ_a. Consider first the case where message identifiers are not transmitted (i.e., these unique identifiers are maintained in synchrony between sender and receiver as in SSL). When P wants to transmit to Q a message m with message identifier *m-id*, it sends a pair (c_1, c_2) where c_1 is the encryption of m and c_2 is the encryption of $MAC_{\kappa_a}(\textit{m-id}, m)$. Let m, m' be two such messages (with identifiers *m-id* and *m-id'*, respectively). If the attacker wants to learn whether m' is the same as m it does the following. It does not interfere with the sending of m (i.e., it lets the unchanged pair (c_1, c_2) reach Q). However, when the pair (c'_1, c'_2) that corresponds to m' is sent, it replaces c'_1 with c_1 and waits to see if the pair (c_1, c'_2) is accepted as valid. If it is, then the attacker learns that $m' = m$ (otherwise the *MAC* verification would have failed!). Note that the above works for *any* encryption and MAC schemes.

In the case that the message identifier is transmitted in the clear then the attack works in the same way. If the identifier is sent encrypted (but the attacker knows its value – or the difference between values – as it is usually the case of sequence numbers) then the attack still works in the following cases.

1. If the encryption is OTP then the attacker does not directly replace c'_1 with c_1 but with a modified c_1 in which the message identifier *m-id* encrypted under c_1 is changed to *m-id'* (just needs to flip the corresponding ciphertext bits in c_1 with the difference $\textit{m-id} \oplus \textit{m-id}'$).

2. If the encryption is CBC, then the feasibility of the attack may depend on more implementation details. In particular, if the value of *m-id* is included in the first plaintext block then the above change to c_1 can be done via changes to the encryption IV.

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