




Basic key exchange

Trusted 3rd parties

Key management


Problem: n users. Storing mutual secret keys is difficult



Total: $O(n)$ keys per user

A better solution

Online Trusted 3rd Party (TTP)



Every user only remembers one key.

Generating keys: a toy protocol

Alice wants a shared key with Bob. Eavesdropping security only.

Bob (k_B)

Alice (k_A)

TTP

"Alice wants key with Bob"

choose
random k_{AB}

$E(k_A, "A,B" || k_{AB})$

$ticket \leftarrow E(k_B, "A,B" || k_{AB})$

ticket

k_{AB}

k_{AB}

(E,D) a CPA-secure cipher

Generating keys: a toy protocol

Alice wants a shared key with Bob. Eavesdropping security only.

Eavesdropper sees: $E(k_A, \text{"A, B"} \parallel k_{AB})$; $E(k_B, \text{"A, B"} \parallel k_{AB})$

(E,D) is CPA-secure \Rightarrow

eavesdropper learns nothing about k_{AB}

Note: TTP needed for every key exchange, knows all session keys.

(basis of Kerberos system)

Toy protocol: insecure against active attacks

Example: insecure against replay attacks

Attacker records session between Alice and merchant Bob

- For example a book order

Attacker replays session to Bob

- Bob thinks Alice is ordering another copy of book

Key question

Can we generate shared keys without an **online** trusted 3rd party?

Answer: yes!

Starting point of public-key cryptography:

- Merkle (1974), Diffie-Hellman (1976), RSA (1977)
- More recently: ID-based enc. (BF 2001), Functional enc. (BSW 2011)

End of Segment