

Public Key Encryption from trapdoor permutations

Constructions

Goal: construct chosen-ciphertext secure public-key encryption

## Trapdoor functions (TDF)

<u>**Def**</u>: a trapdoor func.  $X \rightarrow Y$  is a triple of efficient algs. (G, F, F<sup>-1</sup>)

- G(): randomized alg. outputs a key pair (pk, sk)
- $F(pk, \cdot)$ : det. alg. that defines a function  $X \longrightarrow Y$
- $F^{-1}(sk, \cdot)$ : defines a function  $Y \to X$  that inverts  $F(pk, \cdot)$


More precisely:  $\forall$  (pk, sk) output by G

$$\forall x \in X$$
:  $F^{-1}(sk, F(pk, x)) = x$ 

## Secure Trapdoor Functions (TDFs)

(G, F, F<sup>-1</sup>) is secure if F(pk, ·) is a "one-way" function:

can be evaluated, but cannot be inverted without sk



**<u>Def</u>**:  $(G, F, F^{-1})$  is a secure TDF if for all efficient A:

$$Adv_{OW}[A,F] = Pr[x = x'] < negligible$$

## Public-key encryption from TDFs

- (G, F, F<sup>-1</sup>): secure TDF  $X \rightarrow Y$
- (E<sub>s</sub>, D<sub>s</sub>): symmetric auth. encryption defined over (K,M,C)
- H:  $X \rightarrow K$  a hash function

We construct a pub-key enc. system (G, E, D):

Key generation G: same as G for TDF

## Public-key encryption from TDFs

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## E(pk, m): $x \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} X$ , $y \leftarrow F(pk, x)$ $k \leftarrow H(x)$ , $c \leftarrow E_s(k, m)$ output (y, c)

$$\frac{D(sk, (y,c))}{x \leftarrow F^{-1}(sk, y),}$$

$$k \leftarrow m \leftarrow D_s(k, c)$$
output m

In pictures: 
$$E_s(H(x), m)$$
 header body

#### **Security Theorem**:

If  $(G, F, F^{-1})$  is a secure TDF,  $(E_s, D_s)$  provides auth. enc. and  $H: X \longrightarrow K$  is a "random oracle" then (G,E,D) is CCA<sup>ro</sup> secure.

### Incorrect use of a Trapdoor Function (TDF)

**Never** encrypt by applying F directly to plaintext:

```
E(pk, m):

output c \leftarrow F(pk, m)
```

```
\frac{D(sk, c)}{\text{output } F^{-1}(sk, c)}
```

#### **Problems:**

- Deterministic: cannot be semantically secure!!
- Many attacks exist (next segment)

Next step: construct a TDF

# **End of Segment**