



## Public Key Encryption from trapdoor permutations

### The RSA trapdoor permutation

# Review: trapdoor permutations

Three algorithms:  $(G, F, F^{-1})$

- $G$ : outputs  $pk, sk$ .  $pk$  defines a function  $F(pk, \cdot): X \rightarrow X$
- $F(pk, x)$ : evaluates the function at  $x$
- $F^{-1}(sk, y)$ : inverts the function at  $y$  using  $sk$

**Secure** trapdoor permutation:

The function  $F(pk, \cdot)$  is one-way without the trapdoor  $sk$

# Review: arithmetic mod composites

Let  $N = p \cdot q$  where  $p, q$  are prime

$$\mathbb{Z}_N = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, N-1\} \quad ; \quad (\mathbb{Z}_N)^* = \{\text{invertible elements in } \mathbb{Z}_N\}$$

Facts:  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_N$  is invertible  $\iff \gcd(x, N) = 1$

– Number of elements in  $(\mathbb{Z}_N)^*$  is  $\varphi(N) = (p-1)(q-1) = N - p - q + 1$

Euler's thm:

$$\forall x \in (\mathbb{Z}_N)^* : x^{\varphi(N)} = 1$$

# The RSA trapdoor permutation

First published:     Scientific American, Aug. 1977.

Very widely used:

- SSL/TLS: certificates and key-exchange
- Secure e-mail and file systems
- ... many others

# The RSA trapdoor permutation

**G()**: choose random primes  $p, q \approx 1024$  bits. Set  $\mathbf{N} = pq$ .


choose integers  $\mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}$  s.t.  $\mathbf{e} \cdot \mathbf{d} = \mathbf{1} \pmod{\varphi(\mathbf{N})}$

output  $\mathbf{pk} = (\mathbf{N}, \mathbf{e})$  ,  $\mathbf{sk} = (\mathbf{N}, \mathbf{d})$

---

$\mathbf{F}(\mathbf{pk}, \mathbf{x}) : \mathbb{Z}_N^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*$  ;  $\mathbf{RSA}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{x}^{\mathbf{e}}$  (in  $\mathbb{Z}_N$ )

---

$\mathbf{F}^{-1}(\mathbf{sk}, \mathbf{y}) = \mathbf{y}^{\mathbf{d}}$  ;  $\mathbf{y}^{\mathbf{d}} = \mathbf{RSA}(\mathbf{x})^{\mathbf{d}} = \mathbf{x}^{\mathbf{ed}} = \mathbf{x}^{k\varphi(\mathbf{N})+1} = \left(\mathbf{x}^{\varphi(\mathbf{N})}\right)^k \cdot \mathbf{x} =$  

# The RSA assumption

RSA assumption: RSA is one-way permutation

For all efficient algs.  $A$ :

$$\Pr[ A(N,e,y) = y^{1/e} ] < \text{negligible}$$

where  $p, q \xleftarrow{R} n\text{-bit primes}$ ,  $N \leftarrow pq$ ,  $y \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_N^*$

# Review: RSA pub-key encryption (ISO std)

$(E_s, D_s)$ : symmetric enc. scheme providing auth. encryption.

$H: Z_N \rightarrow K$  where  $K$  is key space of  $(E_s, D_s)$

- **G()**: generate RSA params:  $pk = (N, e)$ ,  $sk = (N, d)$
- **E**(pk, m):
  - (1) choose random  $x$  in  $Z_N$
  - (2)  $y \leftarrow \text{RSA}(x) = x^e$ ,  $k \leftarrow H(x)$
  - (3) output  $(y, E_s(k, m))$
- **D**(sk, (y, c)): output  $D_s(H(\text{RSA}^{-1}(y)), c)$

# Textbook RSA is insecure

Textbook RSA encryption:

– public key:  $(N, e)$

Encrypt:  $c \leftarrow m^e \quad (\text{in } Z_N)$

– secret key:  $(N, d)$

Decrypt:  $c^d \rightarrow m$


Insecure cryptosystem !!

– Is not semantically secure and many attacks exist

$\Rightarrow$  The RSA trapdoor permutation is not an encryption scheme !



# A simple attack on textbook RSA



Suppose  $k$  is 64 bits:  $k \in \{0, \dots, 2^{64}\}$ . Eve sees:  $c = k^e$  in  $Z_N$

If  $k = k_1 \cdot k_2$  where  $k_1, k_2 < 2^{34}$  (prob.  $\approx 20\%$ ) then  $c/k_1^e = k_2^e$  in  $Z_N$

Step 1: build table:  $c/1^e, c/2^e, c/3^e, \dots, c/2^{34e}$ . time:  $2^{34}$

Step 2: for  $k_2 = 0, \dots, 2^{34}$  test if  $k_2^e$  is in table. time:  $2^{34}$

Output matching  $(k_1, k_2)$ .

Total attack time:  $\approx 2^{40} \ll 2^{64}$

End of Segment