



Odds and ends

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Key Derivation

# Deriving many keys from one

**Typical scenario.** a single source key (SK) is sampled from:

- Hardware random number generator
- A key exchange protocol (discussed later)

Need many keys to secure session:

- unidirectional keys; multiple keys for nonce-based CBC.

**Goal:** generate many keys from this one source key



# When source key is uniform

$F$ : a PRF with key space  $K$  and outputs in  $\{0,1\}^n$

Suppose source key  $SK$  is uniform in  $K$

- Define Key Derivation Function (KDF) as:

**KDF**(  $SK$ ,  $CTX$ ,  $L$  ) :=

$F(SK, (CTX \parallel 0)) \parallel F(SK, (CTX \parallel 1)) \parallel \cdots \parallel F(SK, (CTX \parallel L))$

**CTX**: a string that uniquely identifies the application

**KDF**( SK, CTX, L) :=

$F(\text{SK}, (\text{CTX} \parallel 0)) \parallel F(\text{SK}, (\text{CTX} \parallel 1)) \parallel \dots \parallel F(\text{SK}, (\text{CTX} \parallel L))$

What is the purpose of CTX?

- ☐ Even if two apps sample same SK they get indep. keys
- ☐ It's good practice to label strings with the app. name
- ☐ It serves no purpose
- ☐

# What if source key is not uniform?

Recall: PRFs are pseudo random only when key is uniform in  $K$


- SK not uniform  $\Rightarrow$  PRF output may not look random

Source key often not uniformly random:

- Key exchange protocol: key uniform in some subset of  $K$
- Hardware RNG: may produce biased output

# Extract-then-Expand paradigm

**Step 1: extract** pseudo-random key  $k$  from source key  $SK$



salt: a fixed non-secret string chosen at random

**step 2: expand**  $k$  by using it as a PRF key as before

# HKDF: a KDF from HMAC

Implements the extract-then-expand paradigm:

- extract: use  $k \leftarrow \text{HMAC}(\text{salt}, SK)$
- Then expand using HMAC as a PRF with key  $k$

# Password-Based KDF (PBKDF)

Deriving keys from passwords:

- Do not use HKDF: passwords have insufficient entropy
- Derived keys will be vulnerable to dictionary attacks  
(more on this later)

PBKDF defenses: **salt** and a **slow hash function**

Standard approach: **PKCS#5** (PBKDF1)

$H^{(c)}(\text{pwd} \parallel \text{salt})$ : iterate hash function  $c$  times



End of Segment