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**66063: Secure Coding - API Abuse**

# 2200000: Avoid local variables shadowing class fields

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** This rule will check whether local variables are shadowing class fields. In case of C#, classes as well as structs are considered. In case of Visual Basic, modules also considered in addition to classes. In case of classes, only non-private fields of Base classes are considered.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code - Bookmark to field that is being shadowed

**Rationale:** Both overriding or shadowing a class field (typically non-private) can strongly impact the readability, and therefore the maintainability, of a piece of code.

**Reference:** CERT, DCL01-C. - Do not reuse variable names in subscopes CERT, DCL51-J. - Do not shadow or obscure identifiers in subscopes

**Remediation:** Ensure you have an explicit way, usually in form of naming conventions, to name your local variable to avoid conflict with class fields.

**RemediationSample:**

// Field Shadowing

class MyVector { private int val = 1; private void doLogic() { int newValue;

//...

}

}

// Variable Shadowing

class MyVector { private void doLogic() {

for (int i = 0; i < 10; i++) {/\* ... \*/} for (int i = 0; i < 20; i++) {/\* ... \*/}

}

}

**Sample:**

// Field Shadowing

class MyVector { private int val = 1; private void doLogic() {

int val;

//...

}

}

// Variable shadowing

class MyVector { private int i = 0; private void doLogic() {

for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {/\* ... \*/} for (int i = 0; i < 20; i++) {/\* ... \*/}

}

}

**Total:** Number of Methods

# 2200002: Child class fields should not shadow parent class fields

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** This QR will check whether child class fields shadow parent class fields. The check is irrespective of field type and case-sensitivity.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** Having a variable with the same name in two unrelated classes is fine, but do the same thing within a class hierarchy and you'll get confusion at best, chaos at worst.

**Reference:** <https://rules.sonarsource.com/csharp/RSPEC-2387>

**RemediationSample:**

public class Fruit

{

protected Season ripe; protected Color flesh;

// ... }

public class Raspberry : Fruit

{

private bool ripened;

private static Color FLESH\_COLOR;

}

**Sample:**

public class Fruit

{

protected Season ripe; protected Color flesh;

// ... }

public class Raspberry : Fruit

{

private bool ripe; // Noncompliant

private static Color FLESH; // Noncompliant

}

# 2200004: Inherited member visibility should not be decreased

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** This rule raises an issue when a private method in an unsealed type has a signature that is identical to a public method declared in a base type.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** Changing an inherited member to private will not prevent access to the base class implementation

**Reference:** <https://rules.sonarsource.com/csharp/RSPEC-4015>

**RemediationSample:** using System;

namespace MyLibrary

{

public class Foo

{

public void SomeMethod(int count) { }

}

public sealed class Bar : Foo

{

private void SomeMethod(int count) { } } } **Sample:**

using System;

namespace MyLibrary

{

public class Foo

{

public void SomeMethod(int count) { }

}

public class Bar:Foo

{

private void SomeMethod(int count) { } // Noncompliant

}

}

# 2200006: Track "FIXME" tags

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** This rule will check the use of FIXME tags in comment for method and classes. All comments, single line and multi-line, are considered that have "FIXME" (case insensitive) at the start of the comment.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** FIXME tags are commonly used to mark places where a bug is suspected, but which the developer wants to deal with later. Sometimes the developer will not have the time or will simply forget to get back to that tag. This rule is meant to track those tags and to ensure that they do not go unnoticed.

**Reference:** MITRE, CWE-546 - Suspicious Comment

**Remediation:** Fix the issues in code and remove "FIXME" tags.

**Sample:**

private int Divide(int numerator, int denominator)

{

return numerator / denominator; // FIXME denominator value might be 0

}

**Total:** Number of Artifacts

# 2200008: Track "TODO" tags

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** This rule will check the use of TODO tags in comment for method and classes. All comments, single line and multi-line, are considered that have "TODO" (case insensitive) at the start of the comment.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** TODO tags are commonly used to mark places where some more code is required, but which the developer wants to implement later. Sometimes the developer will not have the time or will simply forget to get back to that tag. This rule is meant to track those tags and to ensure that they do not go unnoticed.

**Reference:** MITRE, CWE-546 - Suspicious Comment

**Remediation:** Complete remaining tasks and remove "TODO" tags.

**Sample:**

private void DoSomething()

{

// TODO

}

**Total:** Number of Artifacts

# 2200010: Classes implementing "IEquatable<T>" should be sealed

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** This rule raises an issue when a unsealed, public or protected class implements IEquatable<T> and the Equals is neither virtual nor abstract.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** When a class implements the IEquatable<T> interface, it enters a contract that, in effect, states "I know how to compare two instances of type T or any type derived from T for equality.". However if that class is derived, it is very unlikely that the base class will know how to make a meaningful comparison. Therefore that implicit contract is now broken. Alternatively IEqualityComparer<T> provides a safer interface and is used by collections or Equals could be made virtual.

**Reference:** <https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms132151(v=vs.110).aspx>

<https://rules.sonarsource.com/csharp/RSPEC-4035>

**Remediation:** Make class sealed or use IEqualityComparer<T> instead.

**RemediationSample:** using System;

namespace MyLibrary

{

public sealed class Foo : IEquatable<Foo>

{

public bool Equals(Foo other)

{

// Your code here

}

} } **Sample:**

using System;

namespace MyLibrary

{

class Base : IEquatable<Base> // Noncompliant

{

bool Equals(Base other)

{

if (other == null) { return false };

// do comparison of base properties

}

override bool Equals(object other) => Equals(other as Base);

}

class A : Base

{

bool Equals(A other)

{

if (other == null) { return false }; // do comparison of A properties return base.Equals(other);

}

override bool Equals(object other) => Equals(other as A);

}

class B : Base

{

bool Equals(B other)

{

if (other == null) { return false }; // do comparison of B properties return base.Equals(other);

}

override bool Equals(object other) => Equals(other as B);

}

static void Main() { A a = new A();

B b = new B();

Console.WriteLine(a.Equals(b)); // This calls the WRONG equals. This causes Base::Equals(Base)

// to be called which only compares the properties in Base and ignores the fact that

// a and b are different types. In the working example A::Equals(Object) would have been

// called and Equals would return false because it correctly recognizes that a and b are // different types. If a and b have the same base properties they will be returned as equal.

}

}

**Total:** Number of Classes

# 2200012: Empty arrays and collections should be returned instead of null

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** This rule will verify that methods\properties that return arrays\collections do not return null.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** Returning null instead of an actual array or collection forces callers of the method to explicitly test for nullity, making them more complex and less readable. Moreover, in many cases, null is used as a synonym for empty.

**Reference:** CERT, MSC19-C. - For functions that return an array, prefer returning an empty array over a null value CERT, MET55-J. - Return an empty array or collection instead of a null value for methods that return an array or collection **Remediation:** Return empty array\collection.

**RemediationSample:**

public Result[] GetResults()

{

return new Result[0];

}

public IEnumerable<Result> GetResults()

{

return Enumerable.Empty<Result>();

} public IEnumerable<Result> GetResults() => Enumerable.Empty<Result>();

public IEnumerable<Result> Results

{ get {

return Enumerable.Empty<Result>();

} } public IEnumerable<Result> Results => Enumerable.Empty<Result>();

**Sample:**

public Result[] GetResults()

{

return null; // Noncompliant

}

public IEnumerable<Result> GetResults()

{

return null; // Noncompliant

} public IEnumerable<Result> GetResults() => null; // Noncompliant

public IEnumerable<Result> Results

{ get {

return null; // Noncompliant

} } public IEnumerable<Result> Results => null; // Noncompliant

**Total:** Number of Artifacts

# 2200014: Interface instances should not be cast to concrete types

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** This rule will check whether variable of interface type is converted into concrete type. Struct and Class are considered as Concrete type. Note: Abstract classes are not considered as concrete classes.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** Needing to cast from an interface to a concrete type indicates that something is wrong with the abstraction in use, likely that something is missing from the interface. Instead of casting to a discrete type, the missing functionality should be added to the interface. Otherwise there is a risk of runtime exceptions.

**Remediation:** Remove the cast.

**Sample:**

public interface IMyInterface

{

void DoStuff();

}

public class MyClass1 : IMyInterface

{

public int Data { get { return new Random().Next(); } }

public void DoStuff()

{

// TODO...

} }

public static class DowncastExampleProgram

{

static void EntryPoint(IMyInterface interfaceRef)

{

MyClass1 class1 = (MyClass1)interfaceRef; // Noncompliant int privateData = class1.Data;

class1 = interfaceRef as MyClass1; // Noncompliant

if (class1 != null)

{

// ...

}

}

}

**Total:** Number of Artifacts

# 2200016: Ensure proper arguments to Events

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** The rule will raise a violation in case of event raising when: 1. NULL is passed as sender when raising an non-static event 2. NULL is passed as event data when raising an event

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** With respect to guidelines from MSDN the following rules must be followed when raising events: 1. DO NOT pass null as the event data parameter when raising an event. 2. DO NOT pass null as the sender when raising a non-static event. It prevents a null reference exception should a method try and do something with the arguments.

**Reference:** <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/standard/design-guidelines/event?redirectedfrom=MSDN>

**Remediation:** You should pass EventArgs.Empty if you don’t want to pass any data to the event-handling method. Developers expect this parameter not to be null.

**RemediationSample:**

class AClass {

public event EventHandler foo;

protected virtual void OnTfoo(EventArgs e)

{

foo?.Invoke(this, e); // Compliant }

}

**Sample:**

class AClass {

public event EventHandler foo;

protected virtual void OnTfoo(EventArgs e)

{

foo?.Invoke(null, e); // Noncompliant }

}

**Total:** Number of methods

# 2200018: Avoid using Assembly.LoadFrom, Assembly.LoadFile and Assembly.LoadWithPartialName

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** This rule will check the use of Assembly.LoadFrom, Assembly.LoadFile and Assembly.LoadWithPartialName methods

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** The trust level of an assembly that is loaded by using this method is the same as the trust level of the calling assembly. To load an assembly from a byte array with the trust level of the application domain, use the Load(Byte[], Byte[], SecurityContextSource) method.

**Reference:** <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.reflection.assembly.loadfrom?view=netcore-3.1> <https://docs.microsoft.com/enus/dotnet/api/system.reflection.assembly.loadfile?view=netcore-3.1> <https://docs.microsoft.com/enus/dotnet/api/system.reflection.assembly.loadwithpartialname?view=netcore-3.1>

**Remediation:** Always use Assembly.Load as main method to load DLL.

**RemediationSample:**

static void Main(string[] args)

{

Assembly.Load(...); // NO VIOLATION } **Sample:**

static void Main(string[] args)

{

Assembly.LoadFrom(...); // VIOLATION

Assembly.LoadFile(...); // VIOLATION

Assembly.LoadWithPartialName(...); // VIOLATION }

**Total:** Number of methods and fields and properties initialized using a lambda function

# 2200020: Avoid methods named without following synchronous/asynchronous convention

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** This rule will check if synchronous task could be distinguished as Async or Sync based on name i.e. if async/sync suffixes are used in such methods as expected.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** According to the Task-based Asynchronous Pattern (TAP), methods returning either a System.Threading.Tasks.Task or a

System.Threading.Tasks.Task<TResult> are considered asynchronous. Such methods should use the Async suffix. Conversely methods which do not return such Tasks should not have an "Async" suffix.

**Reference:** <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/standard/asynchronous-programming-patterns/task-based-asynchronous-pattern-tap>

**Remediation:** Ensure your methods name are following synchronous/asynchronous convention.

**RemediationSample:**

using System.Threading; using System.Threading.Tasks;

namespace theLibrary

{

public class theClass

{

public Task ReadAsync(byte [] buffer, int offset, int count, CancellationToken cancellationToken) // fixed violation

{

// source code

}

public int Read() { // fixed violation

return 0; }

}

}

**Sample:**

using System.Threading; using System.Threading.Tasks;

namespace theLibrary

{

public class theClass

{

public Task Read(byte [] buffer, int offset, int count, CancellationToken cancellationToken) // violation

{

// source code

}

public int ReadAsync() { // violation return 0;

}

}

}

**Total:** Number of methods

# 2200022: Culture Dependent String operations should specify culture

**Description:** This rule will raise violations if string.ToLower(), ToUpper, IndexOf, LastIndexOf, and Compare do not specify culture argument or CompareTo is called.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** Calls without a culture may work fine in the system's "home" environment, but break in ways that are extremely difficult to diagnose for customers who use different encodings. Such bugs can be nearly, if not completely, impossible to reproduce when it's time to fix them.

**Reference:** <https://wiki.sei.cmu.edu/confluence/display/java/STR02-J.+Specify+an+appropriate+locale+when+comparing+locale-dependent+data>

**Remediation:** Use Culture argument or use culture invariant version. In case of CompareTo, CompareOrdinal, or Compare with culture.

**RemediationSample:**

var lowered = someString.ToLower(CultureInfo.InvariantCulture);

-or-

var lowered = someString.ToLowerInvariant();

**Sample:**

var lowered = someString.ToLower(); //Noncompliant

**Total:** Number of Artifacts

# 2200024: Mutable static fields of type System.Collections.Generic.ICollection<T> or System.Array should not be public static

**Description:** This rule checks for fields that are public static of type System.Array or System.Collections.Generic.ICollection<T> and are not read-only.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** If field is static and public and not read-only, it can affect every class that uses them. This can lead to unexpected behavior.

**Remediation:** Make visibility of fields protected\private or make them of type Immutable\read-only. This can done through: - make fields read-only (with inline initialization) - is of type System.Collections.ObjectModel.ReadOnlyCollection<T> System.Collections.ObjectModel.ReadOnlyDictionary<TKey,

TValue> System.Collections.Immutable.IImmutableArray<T> System.Collections.Immutable.IImmutableDictionary<TKey, TValue>

System.Collections.Immutable.IImmutableList<T> System.Collections.Immutable.IImmutableSet<T>

System.Collections.Immutable.IImmutableStack<T> System.Collections.Immutable.IImmutableQueue<T>

**RemediationSample:**

public class A

{

protected static string[] strings1 = {"first","second"}; protected static List<String> strings3 = new List<String>();

// ...

}

**Sample:**

public class A

{

public static string[] strings1 = {"first","second"}; // Noncompliant public static List<String> strings3 = new List<String>(); // Noncompliant

// ...

}

**Total:** Number of Artifacts

# 2200026: Avoid creating exception without throwing them

**Description:** This rule will check whether an exception type object is created but not thrown.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** Only creating exception and throwing it would mean that either it is a mistake or it is used for side effect of object creation. **Remediation:** Throw the exception or remove the statement

**RemediationSample:**

var o = new Exception(); throw o; throw new Exception(); **Sample:**

var e = new Exception(); new Exception();

**Total:** Number of Artifacts

# 2200028: Use Logical OR instead of Bitwise OR in boolean context

**Description:** This rule will check whether bitwise OR (|) is used instead of Logical OR (||) in boolean context.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** When Bitwise OR is used instead of Logical OR in boolean context, it is most probably a mistake or it is intended for side effect which is incorrect programming practice.

**Remediation:** Use Logical OR

**RemediationSample:**

Class AClass {

private int Return1() { return 1;

}

private int Return0() { return 0;

}

public void Test() { bool b1 = false; bool b2 = true; var x = b1 || b2;

x = ReturnFalse() || ReturnTrue();

}

}

**Sample:**

Class AClass {

private int Return1() { return 1;

}

private int Return0() { return 0;

}

public void Test() { bool b1 = false; bool b2 = true; var x = b1 | b2;

x = ReturnFalse() | ReturnTrue(); }

}

**Total:** Number of Artifacts

# 2200030: Avoid empty finalizers

**Description:** The rule will raise a violation when a type implements a finalizer that is empty. Even finalizer with only statement with calls to Debug.Fail and it is not in #if DEBUG part, it will be considered as violation since Debug.Fail is omitted for non-DEBUG configuration.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** Whenever you can, avoid finalizers because of the additional performance overhead that's involved in tracking object lifetime. The garbage collector runs the finalizer before it collects the object. This means that at least two collections are required to collect the object. An empty finalizer incurs this added overhead without any benefit.

**Reference:** <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/fundamentals/code-analysis/quality-rules/ca1821>

<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1069.html>

**Remediation:** Avoid using empty finalizers

**Sample:**

public class Class1

{

// Violation occurs because the finalizer is empty.

~Class1()

{

} }

public class Class2

{

// Violation occurs because Debug.Fail is a conditional method.

// The finalizer will contain code only if the DEBUG directive

// symbol is present at compile time. When the DEBUG

// directive is not present, the finalizer will still exist, but

// it will be empty.

~Class2()

{

Debug.Fail("Finalizer called!");

}

}

**Total:** Number of finalizers

# 2200032: Avoid recursive type inheritance

**Description:** This rule will raise violation if Recursion is used in type inheritance.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** Unlike methods, it is not possible to break out of recursion. If used, it will fail at runtime.

**Remediation:** Do not use recursive type inheritance.

**Sample:**

class C1<T> { }

class C2KO<S> : C1<C2KO<C1<S>>> // Noncompliant

{

public int x = 101; }

class C3KO<S> : C1<C3KO<C3KO<S>>> // Noncompliant

{

public int x = 101;

}

**Total:** Number pf classes

# 2200034: For loop stop condition should be invariant

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** This rule will give violation if condition in for loop is not invariant.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** A for loop stop condition should test the loop counter against an invariant value (i.e. one that is true at both the beginning and ending of every loop iteration). Ideally, this means that the stop condition is set to a local variable just before the loop begins. Stop conditions that are not invariant are slightly less efficient, as well as being difficult to understand and maintain, and likely lead to the introduction of errors in the future. This gives violation when the loop counters are updated in the body of the for loop.

**Remediation:** Make for loop condition invariant.

**RemediationSample:**

class Foo {

static void Main()

{

for (int i = 1; i <= 5; i++)

{

Console.WriteLine(i);

}

} } **Sample:**

class Foo {

static void Main()

{

for (int i = 1; i <= 5; i++)

{

Console.WriteLine(i); if (condition)

{

i = 20;

}

}

}

}

**Total:** Number of methods

# 2200036: Ensure constructors of serializable classes are secure

**Description:** This rule raises an issue when a type implements the System.Runtime.Serialization.ISerializable interface, is not a delegate or interface, is declared in an assembly that allows partially trusted callers and has a constructor that takes a System.Runtime.Serialization.SerializationInfo object and a System.Runtime.Serialization.StreamingContext object which is not secured by a security check, but one or more of the regular constructors in the type is secured.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** Because serialization constructors allocate and initialize objects, security checks that are present on regular constructors must also be present on a serialization constructor. Failure to do so would allow callers that could not otherwise create an instance to use the serialization constructor to do this.

**Reference:** <https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/2017/A8_2017-Insecure_Deserialization.html>

**Remediation:** Make constructors of serializable classes secure.

**RemediationSample:**

using System; using System.IO;

using System.Runtime.Serialization;

using System.Runtime.Serialization.Formatters.Binary; using System.Security; using System.Security.Permissions;

[assembly: AllowPartiallyTrustedCallersAttribute()]

namespace MyLibrary

{

[Serializable]

public class Foo : ISerializable

{

private int n;

[FileIOPermissionAttribute(SecurityAction.Demand, Unrestricted = true)] public Foo()

{

n = -1;

}

[FileIOPermissionAttribute(SecurityAction.Demand, Unrestricted = true)] protected Foo(SerializationInfo info, StreamingContext context)

{

n = (int)info.GetValue("n", typeof(int));

}

void ISerializable.GetObjectData(SerializationInfo info, StreamingContext context)

{

info.AddValue("n", n);

}

}

}

**Sample:**

using System; using System.IO;

using System.Runtime.Serialization;

using System.Runtime.Serialization.Formatters.Binary; using System.Security; using System.Security.Permissions;

[assembly: AllowPartiallyTrustedCallersAttribute()]

namespace MyLibrary

{

[Serializable]

public class Foo : ISerializable

{

private int n;

[FileIOPermissionAttribute(SecurityAction.Demand, Unrestricted = true)] public Foo()

{ n = -1; }

protected Foo(SerializationInfo info, StreamingContext context) // Noncompliant

{

n = (int)info.GetValue("n", typeof(int));

}

void ISerializable.GetObjectData(SerializationInfo info, StreamingContext context)

{

info.AddValue("n", n);

}

}

}

**Total:** Number of constructors

# 2200038: Merge adjacent try blocks with identical catch/finally statements

**Description:** This rule will raise a violation when adjacent try-catch blocks have identical catch blocks.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** Adjacent try-catch blocks having identical catch blocks must be merged to improve readability of code.

**Remediation:** Merge the try-catch blocks.

**RemediationSample:**

try

{

DoTheFirstThing(a, b);

DoSomeOtherStuff(); DoTheSecondThing();

}

catch (InvalidOperationException ex)

{

HandleException(ex);

}

try // Compliant; catch handles exception differently {

DoTheThirdThing(a);

}

catch (InvalidOperationException ex)

{

LogAndDie(ex);

}

**Sample:**

try

{

DoTheFirstThing(a, b);

}

catch (InvalidOperationException ex)

{

HandleException(ex); }

DoSomeOtherStuff();

try // Noncompliant; catch is identical to previous {

DoTheSecondThing();

}

catch (InvalidOperationException ex)

{

HandleException(ex);

}

try // Compliant; catch handles exception differently

{

DoTheThirdThing(a);

}

catch (InvalidOperationException ex)

{

LogAndDie(ex);

}

**Total:** Number of methods

# 2200040: Avoid assignments in sub-expressions

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** This rule will check if assignments are done in if\switch\method\constructor calls.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** Assignments within sub-expressions are hard to spot and therefore make the code less readable. Ideally, sub-expressions should not have sideeffects.

**Reference:** MITRE, CWE-481 - Assigning instead of Comparing CERT, EXP45-C. - Do not perform assignments in selection statements CERT, EXP51J. - Do not perform assignments in conditional expressions

**Remediation:** Remove assignments from if\switch\method calls\constructor calls sub-expressions.

**RemediationSample:**

var result = str.Substring(index, length);

if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(result))

{

//...

}

**Sample:**

if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(result = str.Substring(index, length))) // Noncompliant

{

//...

}

**Total:** Number of Artifacts

# 2200042: Avoid creating new instance of shared instance (.NET)

**Description:** This rule will raise a violation upon invocation of a constructor of a class considered as shared with [PartCreationPolicyAttribute]

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** If a class is marked such that only a single object of the class will be exported as a shared object [PartCreationPolicy(CreationPolicy.Shared)], then invoking the constructor and creating new instances with it will result in unexpected behavior.

**Remediation:** Prefer using the created instance and its resources.

**RemediationSample:**

using System;

using System.Collections.Generic; using System.Linq; using System.Text; using System.Threading.Tasks; using System.ComponentModel.Composition; using System.ComponentModel.Design; using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection; namespace GenericObject { interface IInterface {

}

[PartCreationPolicy(CreationPolicy.Shared)]

class AService : IInterface { public AService() {

System.Console.WriteLine(System.Reflection.MethodBase.GetCurrentMethod().Name);

} } class AServiceUser { private ServiceContainer \_serviceContainer; public AServiceUser() {

\_serviceContainer = new ServiceContainer();

\_serviceContainer.AddService(typeof(IInterface), new AService());

UseAService();

}

public void UseAService() {

var aservice = \_serviceContainer.GetService(typeof(IInterface)); //VIOLATION FIXED

}

} } **Sample:**

using System;

using System.Collections.Generic; using System.Linq; using System.Text; using System.Threading.Tasks; using System.ComponentModel.Composition; using System.ComponentModel.Design; using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection; namespace GenericObject { interface IInterface {

}

[PartCreationPolicy(CreationPolicy.Shared)]

class AService : IInterface { public AService() {

System.Console.WriteLine(System.Reflection.MethodBase.GetCurrentMethod().Name);

} }

class AServiceUser {

private ServiceContainer \_serviceContainer; public AServiceUser() {

\_serviceContainer = new ServiceContainer();

\_serviceContainer.AddService(typeof(IInterface), new AService());

UseAService();

}

public void UseAService() {

var aservice = new AService(); //VIOLATION }

}

}

**Total:** Number of Artifacts

# 2200044: Recursion should not be infinite

**Description:** If recursive methods have a call that results in them being recursive from every control path, recursion becomes infinite. This QR checks for such methods.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for infinite recursive method

**Rationale:** Recursion if become infinite, would crash the program.

**Remediation:** Change code to make sure control is returned to caller.

**RemediationSample:**

void RecursiveMethod(int i) {

if (100 < i) {

RecursiveMethod(++i);

}

}

**Sample:**

void RecursiveMethod(int i) {

RecursiveMethod(++i);

}

**Total:** Number of methods

# 2200046: Ensure Serializable Types Follow Best Practices

**Description:** This rule will raise a violation when an externally visible type is assignable to the System.Runtime.Serialization.ISerializable interface and one of the following conditions is true: - The System.SerializableAttribute attribute is missing. - Non-serializable fields are not marked with the

System.NonSerializedAttribute attribute. - There is no serialization constructor. - An unsealed type has a serialization constructor that is not protected. - A sealed type has a serialization constructor that is not private. - An unsealed type has a ISerializable.GetObjectData that is not both public and virtual. - A derived type has a serialization constructor that does not call the base constructor. - A derived type has a ISerializable.GetObjectData method that does not call the base method. - A derived type has serializable fields but the ISerializable.GetObjectData method is not overridden.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** Instance fields that are declared in a type that inherits the System.Runtime.Serialization.ISerializable interface are not automatically included in the serialization process. To include the fields, the type must implement the GetObjectData method and the serialization constructor. If the fields should not be serialized, apply the NonSerializedAttribute attribute to the fields to explicitly indicate the decision. In types that are not sealed, implementations of the GetObjectData method should be externally visible. Therefore, the method can be called by derived types, and is overridable.

**Reference:** <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.runtime.serialization.iserializable?view=net-5.0>

<https://docs.microsoft.com/enus/dotnet/api/system.nonserializedattribute?view=net-5.0>

<https://medium.com/@CPP_Coder/how-to-not-shoot-yourself-in-the-foot-when-working-withserialization-20a9a13b69b5>

**Remediation:** Follow best practices for serializable type.

**Total:** Number of Artifacts

# 2200048: Members of larger scope element should not have conflicting transparency annotations

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** This rule will raise a violation when a type member is marked with a System.Security security attribute that has a different transparency than the security attribute of a container of the member. Following Security Attributes are considered for comparison:

System.Security.SecurityCriticalAttribute System.Security.SecurityRulesAttribute System.Security.SecuritySafeCriticalAttribute

System.Security.SecurityTransparentAttribute System.Security.SecurityTreatAsSafeAttribute System.Security.SuppressUnmanagedCodeSecurityAttribute System.Security.UnverifiableCodeAttribute

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** Transparency attributes are applied from code elements of larger scope to elements of smaller scope. The transparency attributes of code elements with larger scope take precedence over transparency attributes of code elements that are contained in the first element. For example, a class that is marked with the SecurityCriticalAttribute attribute cannot contain a method that is marked with the SecuritySafeCriticalAttribute attribute.

**Reference:** <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/code-quality/ca2136?view=vs-2019> OWASP Top 10 2017 Category A6 - Security Misconfiguration

**Remediation:** To fix this violation, remove the security attribute from the code element that has lower scope, or change its attribute to be the same as the containing code element.

**RemediationSample:**

using System; using System.Security;

namespace TransparencyWarningsDemo {

[SecurityCritical] public class CriticalClass

{

//Violation Fixed

public void SafeCriticalMethod()

{

}

}

}

**Sample:**

using System; using System.Security;

namespace TransparencyWarningsDemo {

[SecurityCritical] public class CriticalClass

{

// CA2136 violation - this method is not really safe critical, since the larger scoped type annotation

// has precidence over the smaller scoped method annotation. This can be fixed by removing the

// SecuritySafeCritical attribute on this method

[SecuritySafeCritical] //Violation public void SafeCriticalMethod()

{

}

}

}

**Total:** Number of Artifacts

# 2200050: Avoid NULL Pointer Dereference

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** This rule will check if any object set as NULL is used inside a method/function.

Limitation to object set as NULL inside the method/function.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** A NULL pointer dereference occurs when the application dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid, but is NULL, typically causing a crash or exit.

**Reference:** <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/476.html>

**Remediation:** Always check the object is not null before using it or it is not used in a try block.

**RemediationSample:**

object foo = null;

if ( i > 0)

{

if(foo != null)

{

M1(foo.ToString()); // NO VIOLATION

}

}

else

{

foo = new object();

}

M2(foo.ToString());

**Sample:**

object foo = null;

if ( i > 0)

{

M1(foo.ToString()); // VIOLATION IT IS NULL

}

else

{

foo = new object();

}

M2(foo.ToString());

**Total:** Number of methods

# 2200052: Avoid having the same implementation in ALL BRANCHES of a conditional structure

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** This rule will check the if/switch structural blocks to detect if ALL the implementation are similars.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** Having the same implementation in ALL BRANCHES of a conditional structure should not happened. It probably denotes a copy/paste error or there shouldn't have a conditional structure here.

Limitations: no violation on "if" chain without "else" clause and "switch" without "default" clause.

**Reference:** Object Management Group (OMG). "Automated Source Code Maintainability Measure (ASCMM)". ASCMM-MNT-19. 2016-01. <http://www.omg.org/spec/ASCMM/1.0>.

**Remediation:** Ensure you copy/paste does not exist in your conditional structure.

**RemediationSample:**

**Sample:**

if (b == 0) // VIOLATION

{

foo();

}

else

{

foo();

}

int b = a > 12 ? 3 : 3; // VIOLATION

switch (i) // VIOLATION BECAUSE THERE IS A DEFAULT BLOCK

{

case 1:

bar();

break;

case 2:

bar();

break;

case 3:

bar();

break;

default:

bar();

break;

}

**Total:** Number of methods

# 2200054: Avoid Persist Security Info in connection string

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** Reports all .Net methods calling ConnectionStringBuilder.PersistSecurityInfo with True as parameter value.

The following ConnectionStringBuilder are considered:

System.Data.SqlClient.SqlConnectionStringBuilder

System.Data.OleDb.OleDbConnectionStringBuilder

System.Data.Odbc.OdbcConnectionStringBuilder

System.Data.OracleClient.OracleConnectionStringBuilder

System.Data.EntityClient.EntityConnectionStringBuilder

Microsoft.Data.SqlClient.SqlConnectionStringBuilder

Microsoft.Data.OleDb.OleDbConnectionStringBuilder

Microsoft.Data.Odbc.OdbcConnectionStringBuilder

Microsoft.Data.OracleClient.OracleConnectionStringBuilder

Microsoft.Data.EntityClient.EntityConnectionStringBuilder

IBM.Data.DB2.DB2ConnectionStringBuilder

IBM.Data.DB2.iSeries.iDB2ConnectionStringBuilder

MySql.Data.MySqlClient.MySqlConnectionStringBuilder

MySql.Data.MySqlClient.MySqlBaseConnectionStringBuilder

MySqlConnector.MySqlConnectionStringBuilder

Devart.Data.MySql.MySqlConnectionStringBuilder

Oracle.DataAccess.Client.OracleConnectionStringBuilder

Oracle.ManagedDataAccess.Client.OracleConnectionStringBuilder

Devart.Data.Oracle.OracleConnectionStringBuilder

OracleSqlBuilder.OracleSqlConnectionString

Npgsql.NpgsqlConnectionStringBuilder

Microsoft.Data.Sqlite.SqliteConnectionStringBuilder

Teradata.Client.Provider.TdConnectionStringBuilder

Sap.Data.SQLAnywhere.SAConnectionStringBuilder

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** Allowing the server to retain credentials may allow an attacker to retrieve them, and connect to the back-end using permissions associated to these credentials.

**Reference:** Microsoft guide for ADO.NET: Protecting Connection Information - Use Persist Security Info=False

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/data/adonet/protecting-connection-information#use-persist-security-infofalse>

MS SQL Server ADO.NET provider PersistSecurityInfo property

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.data.sqlclient.sqlconnectionstringbuilder.persistsecurityinfo?view=dotnet-plat-ext-6.0>

CWE-257: Storing Passwords in a Recoverable Format

<http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/257.html>

**Remediation:** Either explicitly set Persist Security Info to False or No, or leave it on its default value.

**RemediationSample:**

SqlConnectionStringBuilder builder = new SqlConnectionStringBuilder();

builder["Data Source"] = "(local)";

builder["Persist Security Info"] = false; // FIXED

builder["Initial Catalog"] = "AdventureWorks;NewValue=Bad";

or , by default:

SqlConnectionStringBuilder builder = new SqlConnectionStringBuilder();

builder["Data Source"] = "(local)";

builder["Initial Catalog"] = "AdventureWorks;NewValue=Bad";

**Sample:**

SqlConnectionStringBuilder builder = new SqlConnectionStringBuilder();

builder["Data Source"] = "(local)";

builder["Persist Security Info"] = true; // VIOLATION

builder["Initial Catalog"] = "AdventureWorks;NewValue=Bad";

**Total:** Number of methods

# 2200056: Avoid hidden form field

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** This rule raise a violation for the usage of System.Web.UI.HtmlControls.HtmlInputHidden constructor.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** Since they are not rendered visible, hidden inputs are sometimes erroneously perceived as safe. But similar to session cookies, hidden form inputs store the software’s state information client-side, instead of server-side. This makes it vulnerable.

If a web product does not properly protect assumed-immutable values from modification in hidden form fields, parameters, cookies, or URLs, this can lead to modification of critical data. Web applications often mistakenly make the assumption that data passed to the client in hidden fields or cookies is not susceptible to tampering. Improper validation of data that are user-controllable can lead to the application processing incorrect, and often malicious, input.

**Reference:** CWE-472: External Control of Assumed-Immutable Web Parameter

<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/472.html>

CWE-642: External Control of Critical State Data

<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/642.html>

OWASP Attacks - Web Parameter Tampering

<https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Web_Parameter_Tampering>

CGISecurity - OWASP - A Guide to Building Secure Web Applications (2002, but still interesting)

<https://www.cgisecurity.com/owasp/html/ch11s04.html>

HtmlInputHidden Class

<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.web.ui.htmlcontrols.htmlinputhidden?view=netframework-4.8>

**Remediation:** Instead of using hidden form fields, the application designer can simply use one session token to reference properties stored in a server-side cache. When an application needs to check a user property, it checks the session cookie with its session table and points to the user's data variables in the cache / database. This is by far the correct way to architect this problem.

If the above technique of using a session variable instead of a hidden field cannot be implemented, a second approach is as follows.

The name/value pairs of the hidden fields in a form can be concatenated together into a single string. A secret key that never appears in the form is also appended to the string. This string is called the Outgoing Form Message. An MD5 digest or other one-way hash is generated for the Outgoing Form Message. This is called the Outgoing Form Digest and it is added to the form as an additional hidden field.

**RemediationSample:**

Avoid using HtmlInputHidden constructor.

**Sample:**

HtmlInputHidden hidden = new HtmlInputHidden();

**Total:** Number of methods

# 2200058: Avoid security-critical information exposure

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** This rule reports potentially unintended logging or printing to the console of data fields specifically marked with the attribute [SecurityCritical]. This rule will flag all instances of calls to the most widely used logging methods that report messages at error or critical error levels.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.

The severity of the vulnerability can range widely, depending on the context in which the product operates, the type of sensitive information that is revealed, and the benefits it may provide to an attacker.

The outcome is Information Disclosure / Information Leak, and these information could used in subsequent attacks.

**Reference:** CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html>

CWE-359: Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor

<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/359.html>

OWASP Cheat Sheet Series - User Privacy Protection Cheat Sheet

<https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/User_Privacy_Protection_Cheat_Sheet.html>

OWASP Cheat Sheet Series - Logging Cheat Sheet - Data to exclude

<https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Logging_Cheat_Sheet.html#data-to-exclude>

**Remediation:** Don't disclose data marked as [SecurityCritical], or encrypt them before logging.

**RemediationSample:**

class Program

{

[SecuritySafeCritical]

static int y = 10;

static void Main(string[] args)

{

logger.Error($"y = {y}");

}

public static log4net.ILog logger; // initialized elsewhere

}

**Sample:**

class Program

{

[SecurityCritical]

static int x = 10;

public string Password

{

[SecurityCritical] get { return \_password; }

}

static void Main(string[] args)

{

Console.WriteLine(" Critical X " + x); // Violation

Console.WriteLine(" Password " + Password); // Violation

}

}

**Total:** Number of methods

# 2200060: Avoid using XmlDocument without restriction of XML External Entity Reference (XXE)

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** This rule detects the usage of XmlDocument XML parser calls not preceded in same .Net method by a call to the secure mode of the parser.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** External XML entities may allow an attacker to access confidential information as well as perform server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks. In some cases, XXE may even enable port scanning and lead to remote code execution.

System.Xml.XPath.XPathNavigator is unsafe by default in .NET Framework versions prior to 4.5.2.

This is due to the fact that it implements IXPathNavigable objects like XmlDocument, which are also unsafe by default in versions prior to 4.5.2.

**Reference:** CWE-611: Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference

<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/611.html>

OWASP Vulnerabilities- XML External Entity (XXE) Processing

<https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/XML_External_Entity_(XXE)_Processing>

OWASP Cheat Sheet Series - XML External Entity Prevention Cheat Sheet

<https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/XML_External_Entity_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html>

**Remediation:** The best way to avoid XXE vulnerabilities is to completely disable document type definitions (DTDs) in your XML parser. If this is not possible, you must disable external entities and external document type declarations for your parser.

You can make XPathNavigator safe by giving it a safe parser like XmlReader (which is safe by default) in the XPathDocument's constructor.

**RemediationSample:**

// .NET Framework < 4.5.2

XmlDocument parser = new XmlDocument();

parser.XmlResolver = null; // FIXED: XmlResolver has been set to null

parser.LoadXml("xxe.xml");

or

// .NET Framework 4.5.2+

XmlDocument parser = new XmlDocument(); // FIXED: XmlDocument is safe by default in .NET Framework 4.5.2+ because XmlResolver is set by default to null

parser.LoadXml("xxe.xml");

**Sample:**

// .NET Framework < 4.5.2

XmlDocument parser = new XmlDocument(); // VIOLATION: XmlDocument is not safe by default

parser.LoadXml("xxe.xml");

or

// .NET Framework 4.5.2+

XmlDocument parser = new XmlDocument();

parser.XmlResolver = new XmlUrlResolver(); // VIOLATION: XmlDocument.XmlResolver configured with XmlUrlResolver that makes it unsafe

parser.LoadXml("xxe.xml");

**Total:** Number of methods

# 2200062: Avoid using XmlTextReader without restriction of XML External Entity Reference (XXE)

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** This rule detects the usage of XmlTextReader XML parser calls not preceded in same .Net method by a call to the secure mode of the parser.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** External XML entities may allow an attacker to access confidential information as well as perform server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks. In some cases, XXE may even enable port scanning and lead to remote code execution.

**Reference:** CWE-611: Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference

<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/611.html>

OWASP Vulnerabilities- XML External Entity (XXE) Processing

<https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/XML_External_Entity_(XXE)_Processing>

OWASP Cheat Sheet Series - XML External Entity Prevention Cheat Sheet

<https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/XML_External_Entity_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html>

**Remediation:** The best way to avoid XXE vulnerabilities is to completely disable document type definitions (DTDs) in your XML parser. If this is not possible, you must disable external entities and external document type declarations for your parser.

**RemediationSample:**

// .NET 4.5.2+

XmlTextReader reader = new XmlTextReader("xxe.xml"); // FIXED: XmlTextReader is safe by default in .NET Framework 4.5.2+ because XmlResolver is set by default to null

while (reader.Read())

{ ... }

// .NET 4.0 to .NET 4.5.1

XmlTextReader reader = new XmlTextReader("xxe.xml");

reader.DtdProcessing = DtdProcessing.Prohibit; // FIXED: XmlTextReader is safe by default in .NET Framework 4.5.2+ because XmlResolver is set by default to null

// < .NET 4.0

XmlTextReader reader = new XmlTextReader(stream);

reader.ProhibitDtd = true; // FIXED: default is false

**Sample:**

// .NET Framework < 4.5.2

XmlTextReader reader = new XmlTextReader("xxe.xml"); // VIOLATION: XmlTextReader is not safe by default

while (reader.Read())

{ ... }

or

// .NET Framework 4.5.2+

XmlTextReader reader = new XmlTextReader("xxe.xml");

reader.XmlResolver = new XmlUrlResolver(); // VIOLATION: XmlTextRead.XmlResolver configured with XmlUrlResolver that makes it unsafe

while (reader.Read())

{ ... }

**Total:** Number of methods

# 2200064: Avoid using XPathNavigator without restriction of XML External Entity Reference (XXE)

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** This rule detects the usage of XPathNavigator XML parser calls not preceded in same .Net method by a call to the secure mode of the parser.

Restriction: if the XPathNavigator object is created from an XmlDocument instance we don't raise a violation beacause the rule "Avoid using XmlDocument without restriction of XML External Entity Reference" will already raise a violation if this instance of XmlDocument is not safe.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** External XML entities may allow an attacker to access confidential information as well as perform server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks. In some cases, XXE may even enable port scanning and lead to remote code execution.

System.Xml.XPath.XPathNavigator is unsafe by default in .NET Framework versions prior to 4.5.2.

This is due to the fact that it implements IXPathNavigable objects like XmlDocument, which are also unsafe by default in versions prior to 4.5.2.

**Reference:** CWE-611: Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference

<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/611.html>

OWASP Vulnerabilities- XML External Entity (XXE) Processing

<https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/XML_External_Entity_(XXE)_Processing>

OWASP Cheat Sheet Series - XML External Entity Prevention Cheat Sheet

<https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/XML_External_Entity_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html>

**Remediation:** The best way to avoid XXE vulnerabilities is to completely disable document type definitions (DTDs) in your XML parser. If this is not possible, you must disable external entities and external document type declarations for your parser.

You can make XPathNavigator safe by giving it a safe parser like XmlReader (which is safe by default) in the XPathDocument's constructor.

**RemediationSample:**

// .NET < 4.5.2

XmlReader reader = XmlReader.Create("example.xml");

XPathDocument doc = new XPathDocument(reader);

XPathNavigator nav = doc.CreateNavigator(); // FIXED, because the XML content has been loaded in the XmlReader object first, then passed into the XPathDocument constructor.

string xml = nav.InnerXml.ToString();

**Sample:**

// .NET < 4.5.2

XPathDocument xmlDoc = new XPathDocument(model.FilePath);

XPathNavigator nav = xmlDoc.CreateNavigator(); // VIOLATION : XPathDocument loading XML content using a file URI stored in the model.FilePath variable.

**Total:** Number of methods

# 2200066: Avoid direct use of threads (.Net)

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** This rule reports the use of Thread in the .Net code.

Following methods will be reported as a violation:

- System.Threading.Thread.+ctor (constructor)

- System.Threading.ThreadPool.QueueUserWorkItem

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** Thread management in a web application is always highly error prone. Managing threads is difficult and is likely to interfere in unpredictable ways with the behavior of the application container. Even without interfering with the container, thread management usually leads to bugs that are hard to detect and diagnose like deadlock, race conditions, and other synchronization errors.

**Reference:** CWE-383: J2EE Bad Practices: Direct Use of Threads (applicable to .Net too)

<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/383.html>

CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')

<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html>

CWE-366: Race Condition within a Thread

<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/366.html>

**Remediation:** Avoid using threads.

**RemediationSample:**

Don't use thread API.

**Sample:**

sample 1

Thread x = new Thread(WriteY); // create a new thread: VIOLATION

x.Start(); // execute of the method WriteY()

sample 2

ThreadPool.QueueUserWorkItem(HelloWorld);

**Total:** Number of methods

# 2200068: Avoid unsafe object binding (.NET)

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** This rule reports all post action methods having automatic, unrestricted object binding for object automatically save in database using an ORM.

Limitation: Entity Framework is the only ORM considered at the moment.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** Controllers and Razor pages work with data that comes from HTTP requests. For example, route data may provide a record key, and posted form fields may provide values for the properties of the model. Writing code to retrieve each of these values and convert them from strings to .NET types would be tedious and error-prone. Model binding automates this process. The model binding system:

\* Retrieves data from various sources such as route data, form fields, and query strings.

\* Provides the data to controllers and Razor pages in method parameters and public properties.

\* Converts string data to .NET types.

\* Updates properties of complex types.

However binding objects also permit a direct access to them that an attacker can use to tamper with them.

**Reference:** CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes

<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/915.html>

OWASP Cheat Sheet Series - Mass Assignment Cheat Sheet

<https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Mass_Assignment_Cheat_Sheet.html>

**Remediation:** Ensure that access to attributes and objects of model binded objects are restricted by using:

\* White list the bindable, non-sensitive fields

\* Black list the non-bindable, sensitive fields

\* Use Data Transfer Objects (DTOs)

\* Use attributes ReadOnly or BindNever on sensitive of the data model class

\* Use a strongly type approach with TryUpdateModel<Interface> or UpdateModel<Interface> where the interface only has the non-sensitive fields

**RemediationSample:**

White list : [Bind(Include="UserName,Location")]

or black list: [Bind(Exclude="Password")]

// POST: User/Create

[HttpPost]

public ActionResult Create([Bind(Include="UserName,Location")]User user)

{

try{

\_db.Users.Add(user);

\_db.SaveChanges();

return RedirectToAction("Index");

}catch{

return View();

}

}

// POST: User/Edit

[HttpPost]

public ActionResult Edit([Bind(Exclude="Password,UserId")]User user)

{

try{

\_db.Users.Update(user);

\_db.SaveChanges();

return RedirectToAction("Index");

}catch{

return View();

}

}

**Sample:**

// POST: User/Create

[HttpPost]

public ActionResult Create(User user) // VIOLATION : binding without retriction

{

try{

\_db.Users.Add(user);

\_db.SaveChanges();

return RedirectToAction("Index");

}catch{

return View();

}

}

// POST: User/Edit

[HttpPost]

public ActionResult Edit(User user) // VIOLATION : binding without retriction

{

try{

\_db.Users.Update(user);

\_db.SaveChanges();

return RedirectToAction("Index");

}catch{

return View();

}

}

**Total:** Number of methods

# 2200070: Ensure to abandon previous session before modifying current session

**AssociatedValueName:** Number of violation occurrences

**Description:** This rule verify if the old session is abandoned inside the method modifying a new session, if not the method is reported as a violation.

Application must call Session.Abandon() before modifying the current session.

Limitation: Entity Framework is the only ORM considered at the moment.

**Output:** Associated to each violation, the following information is provided: - The number of violation occurrences - Bookmarks for violation occurrences found in the source code

**Rationale:** An attacker could get a user to log in using the attacker’s session. The attacker could then do anything that the other user has permissions for, such as accessing that user’s confidential information and performing transaction in that user’s name.

The application authenticates users without terminating existing sessions. As a result, an attacker could get a victim to log in to the application during the attacker’s session (for example, by getting the victim to click on a link including a session ID), and the application would authenticate the attacker’s session as the victim’s user account.

**Reference:** CWE-384: Session Fixation

<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/384.html>

OWASP Cheat Sheet Series - Session Management Cheat Sheet - Renew the Session ID After Any Privilege Level Change

<https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Session_Management_Cheat_Sheet.html#renew-the-session-id-after-any-privilege-level-change>

**Remediation:** The application should terminate any existing sessions upon user authentication and create a new session for that user.

**RemediationSample:**

static void foo(string firstName, HttpContext old\_Context)

{

old\_Context.Session.Abandon(); // FIXED

HttpContext context = HttpContext.Current;

context.Session["FirstName"] = firstName;

}

**Sample:**

static void foo(string firstName)

{

HttpContext context = HttpContext.Current;

context.Session["FirstName"] = firstName; // VIOLATION

}

**Total:** Number of methods