

Project 1

ASSET PROTECTION AND OPSEC

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ET 539

Project 1 – OPSEC Tasks

2. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING WOULD BE OF USE TO THE CARTEL?

Select	Would be of use to the adversary
	Case has made a deal
✓	The informants current location
✓	The informants destination
✓	Crime syndicate informants present
✓	Government vehicles present
✓	Increased traffic to the safe house
✓	Personnel involved in the move
✓	Single point of entry/exit
✓	Time Case is to be moved
✓	Uniformed personnel present

3. EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER: WHY EACH ITEM WOULD BE OF USE TO THE CARTEL

In trying to plot my kidnapping of the informant, I thought it would be helpful to pinpoint his current location. I wouldn't care if he'd made a deal at this juncture. I'd need a positive verification of the asset being alive in the safe house, along with a solid number of government vehicles arriving and leaving the site. I would need to watch traffic to/from the safe house 24/7, avoiding unnecessary scuffles or a blown cover. An assessment of infiltration possibilities at the safe house, including entering in uniforms with stolen identities, fully armed. After gathering information about the location, I would reach out to an informant or info dealer about the personnel photographed during the stakeout.

Another question: Is there a single point of entry and exit preventing a clean escape with the informant? If I'm driving, I would assess access to all entryways into the safe house, then develop the best escape routes. I'd have to plant bugs and hack their surveillance systems/phones, while listening to important or impromptu meetings, and future trip planning. A healthy amount of tailing would provide data by managing off-site conversations with crime syndicate informants, confirming schedule changes, and clarifying known/unknown details, as well as any timeframes for future movements.

After positive confirmation of the date and time of the informant's move, security personnel's vulnerabilities would be exploited. Personnel details will aid in spoiling pre-planned routes, decoys or deep fakes. If I have managed to contact the informant and he's agreed to my terms, I'd create a risk assessment. I don't want unwarranted attention and need the Las Cruces Police Department and the New Mexico State Police Department involved for a quick handoff. If not, I'll need to avoid being on the news before the plan's completed.

7. STRATEGIES OF USE TO THE CARTEL

Select	Strategies to achieve their goal
✓	Bribe Case
	Discredit Case
✓	Kidnap Case
✓	Kill Case


8. EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER: WHY EACH STRATEGY WOULD BE OF USE TO THE CARTEL

When the informant verbally agrees to the cartel's conditions, kidnapping him in the shortest timeframe is essential. The goal to limit the steps needed to instigate personnel confusion within the safe house rests at the top of the action plan. With enough confusion, deciphering whether to kidnap or kill the informant will surface after analyzing a 360-degree view of the situation. Still, killing the informant will expedite sealing an internal leak. Moreover, the informant needs to escape the safe house unseen or be taken by force.

Infiltration strategies include creating false identities and spreading misleading plans. The bribe's purpose is to lure the informant into agreeing to upend security protocols within the safe house. Access to case files inside and outside the safe house is essential in understanding the quality and amount of data divulged by the informant. In response to circulating false claims of a security leak, the operations leadership team will adjust its tactics. Amid the disarray, the informant can grant access to the secure network, slip outside and leave with the cartel. Of course, an escape plan this simple would not succeed without access to the secure network.

If the informant were to dismantle the guards at the single entry/exit, bombarding the safe house with silent weapons wouldn't take long. If there is a helicopter pad on the property, setting explosive traps would be a strategic win. The informant is not to escape via helicopter. Arial attacks are not efficient and could expose military-grade weaponry to the wrong supporters. A public stand with explosives is considered a solid solution for killing the informant.

12. VULNERABILITIES & INDICATORS



	Vulnerability (V)	Indicator (I)
Single point of entry and exit	✓	
Open communications	✓	
Increased traffic to the safe house	✓	✓
Coordination with LCPD	✓	
Uniformed personnel present	✓	
Private aircraft rental		✓
Transporting Case	✓	
Increased communications	✓	
Government vehicles present		✓

13. EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER: WHY EACH IS A VULNERABILITY, AN INDICATOR OR BOTH


- V: Single point of entry and exit: The gated community is home to a couple of families and retirees. An entryway, basement, window or roof exit at the safe house will look enticing if security details lack direction. If a breakdown in communication surrounding schedules or break times were

to happen, the entryways could be vulnerable to attack and seizure. The informant could walk out of the safe house during a panic, small or great.

- V: Open communications: People are careless when using cell phones on speaker. Not scouting a soundproofed location will poke holes in security protocols. Change management plans communicated outside approved devices will open avenues of data leakage.
- V / I: Increased traffic to the safe house: Increased on-premises traffic with visible faces or unchecked identities is a vulnerability. It's an indicator of personnel changes; however, moving materials is an indicator of increased security. The informant could be transported to the airport in material transfers if coordinated with scheduled delivery routines. The viability of a successful transfer within moving containers is higher than car transportation to the airstrip.
- V: Coordination with LCPD: It may be necessary to involve the local PD; however, the cartel's informants in the Las Cruces Police Department and New Mexico State Police Department may compromise the case. If they were to alter secure routes or leak sensitive agent data, all involved would be cemented in vulnerable positions. Not to mention, the ability for the cartel's informant network to transfer sensitive safe house details is exponential.
- V: Uniformed personnel present: As a list topper, allowing uniformed personnel inside the property is the worst idea imaginable. Infiltration with a false identity is easier and increases the chance of the cartel's HUMINT network overtaking the safe house. It's the simplest way to expose copious amounts of data and humans to theft and harm.
- I: Private aircraft rental: A private plane rental isn't something that goes unnoticed. Nevertheless, it's an indicator of a change. Be it one or multiple changes, stakeouts will reveal the enemy's motives. If confusion is the goal, the importance of undetectable decoys, their flight plans, identical delivered lifestyle choices and leveled staff assignments will offer solid diversions.

- V: Transporting Case: The informant will not cooperate without a signed agreement from the Attorney General to reduce his sentence. If the informant has accepted bribery terms, the cartel may change tactics. A barrage of physical and mobile assaults may lead to the informant dying in the battle. Personnel data leaks put agents at risk of threats, even death.
- V: Increased communications: A vulnerability that can neither be ignored nor diverged is increased communications. The informant is a liability, being a skilled hacker. Agents need to translate/examine plans, discuss the latest info, and adhere to schedules. Electronic and verbal communications are susceptible to theft, even by the informant, so there is a 20/80 chance of securing all data.
- I: Government vehicles present: The presence of government vehicles doesn't give off an aura of vulnerability. It's an indicator of safety precautions being taken to protect a boss, the informant or themselves. The important observable points to consider are the number of agents in plain clothes in each vehicle and if any of them are cartel informants.

17. COUNTERMEASURES: WHICH ARE EFFECTIVE IN ELIMINATING EACH OF THE VULNERABILITIES LISTED



Vulnerability	Countermeasures											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Coordination with LCPD				✓			✓	✓				
Open communications				✓			✓	✓			✓	✓
Single point of entry/exit	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓							
Transporting Case	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓		

Countermeasures:


1. Plain clothed personnel
2. Limited visits to safe house
3. Unmarked vehicles
4. Limited communications
5. Secure communications
6. Disguise Case
7. Use a decoy
8. Limited coordination with local authorities
9. Helicopter pickup at safe house
10. Use government jet

11. Use commercial airlines
12. Use pedestrians exit to awaiting car

18. EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER: WHY EACH COUNTERMEASURE EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATES THE VULNERABILITIES:

- Coordination with LCPD: Cartel informants at the local PD are a liability, so limited communication is best. Location of the informant will remain confidential. Distributed details about the decoys will act as fail safes. For the sake of survival with zero bloodshed, specific lead agents will oversee communications between parties on the day of the move.
- Open communications: Because there are processes and procedures in place, authority may be overridden by another department head. Still, when communicating any changes, the team must consider these: limiting communication, how to deliver decoy details, limiting coordination with local authorities, and using fictitious domestic flight departures, if necessary. Agents can use pedestrian walkways to visit the safe house, though we cannot limit official governmental visits.
- Single point of entry/exit: All vehicles must be unmarked to support increased security. All personnel not staying at the safe house must enter and exit at a single point, wear plain clothes, schedule visitation, and always practice secure, limited communication. Of course, inhabitants of the safe house have specific assignments to adhere to and may need to use these routes to complete tasks. On the day of the move, a required security check and a list of agents on-site help to ponder possible scenarios of attack.
- Transporting Case: Transportation should be unmarked and plentiful. Helicopters are not allowed over the safe house during the acquisition of the informant, and the use of one to transport the informant is prohibited. En route to the government jet, the decoys will head to different airstrips. The informant will have disguises to protect his identity and blend in with agents in plain clothes. Limited, secure communications should be checked at every juncture on the day of the move.

20. COUNTERMEASURES: WHICH OF THESE IS EFFECTIVE IN ELIMINATING EACH INDICATOR



Indicator	Countermeasures											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Government vehicles			✓		✓			✓				
Increased communications		✓			✓		✓	✓				✓
Increased traffic to safe house	✓		✓		✓			✓				
Private aircraft rental				✓				✓		✓		
Uniformed personnel	✓	✓		✓			✓	✓				✓

Countermeasures:

1. Plain clothed personnel
2. Limited visits to safe house
3. Unmarked vehicles
4. Limited communications
5. Secure communications
6. Disguise Case
7. Use a decoy
8. Limited coordination with local authorities
9. Helicopter pickup at safe house

10. Use government jet
11. Use commercial airlines
12. Use pedestrian exits to awaiting car

21. EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER: WHY EACH COUNTERMEASURE IS EFFECTIVE IN ELIMINATING INDICATORS

- Government vehicles: Assuming a cartel informant breaches communications, it's prudent to limit retrieval data. Multiple unmarked vehicles should arrive daily for over a week in preparation to escort the informant to confuse surveillance teams.
- Increased communication: Secure communications will be in effect immediately following each unit's debriefing on the day of the move. Safe house visits will be limited to secure details, including surveillance of pedestrian exits leading to an awaiting car. The details gathered on the decoys we use to mimic the informant's daily activities will replace any relevant data distributed about the informant. A small security team will have access to all the files and schedules.
- Increased traffic to safe house: Agents in plain clothes will drive unmarked vehicles around the subdivision on the day of the move. Personnel without proper security clearances are prohibited on-site. Unannounced local PD visits are strictly prohibited.
- Private aircraft rental: Confirmation of the plane's departure will be limited to the security team. There are to be no communications on the procurement of the government jet.
- Uniformed personnel: Anyone arriving in uniform will be asked to leave through pedestrian exits to their awaiting cars. Impromptu meetings with uniformed officers are held off-site with limited communication about meeting spots and knowledge transfers. All decoy data is communicated in place of any details about the informant and his whereabouts.

22. SUMMARY:

I struggled to complete the assessments and write comprehensible answers to the questions. I faced difficulty understanding the rubric, and after reading it a few times, I cleared my confusion about the answers. The first two short-answer sections were easiest to complete. With no word count set for the answers, I wrote three paragraphs. I misunderstood the question & answer for indicator elimination. I had difficulty understanding numbers 14 -17 of the worksheet and wound up following the rubric at the end. Number 16 confused my understanding of the outcome.

As a learning opportunity, I added charts to present visuals for fictitious meetings. However, I am uncertain of their efficacy in the context of the assignment. After finally calling the assignment done, I am still anxious about the grading of each section. Nevertheless, answering the questions through the scope of transporting an informant sparked confidence in my abilities to protect a client.