RAKF Version 1 Release 2 Modification 0

A Security System for MVS 3.8j

User’s Guide

June 2011

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\* © Craig J. Yasuna \*

\* See Appendix for detailed Copyright Information \*

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\* RAKF is based on the ESG Security System \*

\* written by Craig J. Yasuna (Mar 1991) \*

\* adapted to MVS 3.8J: A. Philip Dickinson (Aug 2005) \*

\* Phil Roberts (Apr 2011) \*

\* Jürgen Winkelmann (Apr 2011) \*

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\* This document applies to RAKF Version 1 Release 2 Modification 0 \*  
\* with PTFs RRKF001, RRKF002, RRKF003, RRKF004, RRKF005 and RRKF006. \*

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\* The information in this User’s Guide is adapted from the original \*

\* ESG Security System’s documentation as prepared by Sam Golob in \*

\* 1991. For historical reasons the original documentation has been \*

\* retained and can be found as member $$$$$DOC of HLQ.SAMPLIB (HLQ = \*

\* High Level Qualifier of RAKF libraries as chosen at installation \*

\* time) after RAKF installation. \*

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# RAKF User’s Guide

## Introduction

The RAKF Security System is a RACF™-like MVS System Authorization Facility (SAF). RACF™ Version 1.7 facilities are emulated, except for the RACF™ database. Two tables, the users and the profiles table, are kept in storage. The actual security verifications are made by ICHSFR00, using these two tables. The formats of these users and profiles tables are compatible with RACF™ database entry data.

Protection is achieved by routing all operating system or vendor product security calls (including RACDEF, RACINIT, and RACHECK) through the ICHSFR00 RACROUTE interface. ICHSFR00 contains the real verification code. The RAKF Security System is designed to force "one point of handling" for all security calls. ICHSFR00 processes the various kinds of security calls in a standard way that is (mostly) documented by IBM. ICHSFR00 refers to the installation-coded user and profile in-core tables, to make its judgments. These in-core user and resource tables are each reloadable at any time by the execution of their special started tasks.

## Installation

Installation is performed through the standard SMP RECEIVE, APPLY and ACCEPT procedure. The process has been tested with SMP level 04.48 which is the level provided by the Tur(n)key 3 MVS system. This presumably is equivalent to having PTFs UR13349, UR15994, UR17644 and UR19590 applied, which can be found on the allptfs.het tape of the Tur(n)key 3 MVS distribution CD. Tests have shown that APPLY processing doesn't work reliably at lower levels: For example at level 04.44 APPLY doesn't assemble and link all modules. So before starting please update your SMP as close to level 04.48 as possible.

1. Locate job RAKF12:
   * If you’re installing from CBT File 850 it is in member $RAKF12 of the received PDS.
   * If you’re installing from the files section of the H390-MVS Yahoo group it can be downloaded from <http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/H390-MVS/files/RAKF/RAKF_V1R2M0.jcl>.

Adapt the name of the installation job control library (//INSTJCL DD statement) in job RAKF12 to your needs and submit the job.

1. Edit jobs A@PREP, C@APPLY and D@ACCPT in the installation job control library:
   * change the //ASAMPLIB DD and //SAMPLIB DD statements (only in job A@PREP) to read:

//ASAMPLIB DD DISP=(,CATLG),DSN=HLQ.ASAMPLIB,VOL=SER=dddddd,

// UNIT=SYSDA,DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=80,BLKSIZE=19040),

// SPACE=(TRK,(**120**,**40**,**10**))

//SAMPLIB DD DISP=(,CATLG),DSN=HLQ.SAMPLIB,VOL=SER=ssssss,

// UNIT=SYSDA,DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=80,BLKSIZE=19040),

// SPACE=(TRK,(**120**,**40**,**10**))

The changes to the job as distributed on the product tape are the space allocation values printed in bold above. After having made this change you can ignore the special installation instruction in PTF RRKF006 requesting these two libraries to be reallocated due to larger space requirements.

* + change all occurrences of HLQ to the desired high level qualifier for the RAKF libraries, e.g. RAKF, RAKF.V1R2M0, etc. Please note that HLQs where HLQ.SAMPLIB, HLQ.ASAMPLIB, HLQ.APROCLIB, HLQ.APARMLIB HLQ.MACLIB, HLQ.AMACLIB, HLQ.SRCLIB or HLQ.ASRCLIB already exist are not recommended.
  + change all occurrences of dddddd to the desired volume for the RAKF distribution libraries.
  + change all occurrences of ssssss to the desired volume for the RAKF target libraries.
  + change all occurrences of tttt to the device type and all occurrences of rrrrrr to the volume of the sysres device where SYS1.LPALIB and SYS1.LINKLIB of the system reside on which RAKF is to be installed (If you are running TK3 MVS and install on your current system the device type is 3350 and the volume is MVSRES).
  + Verify that in jobs C@APPLY and D@ACCPT the sequence of the SYSLIB and the target and distribution library DD statements matches your SMPAPP and SMPACC procedures. The jobs have been tested with the SMP procedures as defined in the Tur(n)key 3 MVS system. If the sequence of DD statements in the SMP procedures in your system doesn't match the sequence of the overriding DD statements in C@APPLY and D@ACCPT RAKF elements may erroneously be placed in SYS1.ASAMPLIB, SYS1.SAMPLIB, SYS1.APROCLIB, SYS1.APARMLIB, SYS1.AMACLIB or SYS1.MACLIB instead of their HLQ.xxxxLIB counterparts.

1. Submit job A@PREP. This job performs the following actions to prepare your system for RAKF 1.2.0 installation:
   * Delete MODs and LMODs that are defined in MVS 3.8j as placeholders for RACF modules from SMP's target and distribution zones.
   * Delete the placeholder modules as well as potentially installed pre RAKF 1.2.0 modules from SYS1.LINKLIB and SYS1.LPALIB.
   * Allocate RAKF 1.2.0 target and distribution libraries.
2. Receive RAKF by submitting job B@RECV. Be prepared to mount the RAKF distribution tape rakf12.aws after submitting the job.
3. Apply RAKF by submitting job C@APPLY. This job places all RAKF components in their designated target libraries and assembles and link-edits the SVCs (ICHRIN00) and the SAF router (ICHSFR00) to SYS1.LPALIB and the support modules (ICHSEC00, RAKFUSER, RAKFPROF and RAKFPWUP) to SYS1.LINKLIB. These six load modules constitute the complete code provided by RAKF, making up an extremely small footprint as compared with RACF™.
4. Accept RAKF by submitting job D@ACCPT. This step can be skipped if you don't want to accept the RAKF sysmod now. It is, however, strongly recommended to accept it as only then it will be possible to "test drive" updates that might be published later and to return to the previous state in case of problems.
5. Perform an IPL CLPA of your system. The system will come up with all RAKF elements installed but without activating RAKF. Successful installation can be verified from the RAKF banner being displayed at the beginning of the IPL and by checking the system's SVC table for example using menu option T in IMON and scroll forward to the RACF SVCs (130 - 133) which should show entries like this:

130 82 00EAEB30 3/4 RACHECK -RACF IGC00130 RAKF mm/dd/yy  
131 83 00EAEB52 3/4 YES RACINIT -RACF IGC0013A RAKF mm/dd/yy  
132 84 00EAEB74 3/4 YES RACLIST -RACF ICHRIN00 DUMMY mm/dd/yy  
133 85 00EAEB9A 3/4 YES RACDEF -RACF IGC0013C RAKF mm/dd/yy

where mm/dd/yy is RAKF's installation date.

1. Check for any applicable RAKF PTFs and install these following the steps in chapter “PTF Installation” on page 7. PTFs are available in folder files/RAKF/PTFs of the H390-MVS Yahoo group and in CBT file 850.
2. Chapter “Installation of the Auxiliary Utilities” on page 9 outlines the installation of some utilities that are not part of RAKF. They are distributed with RAKF because they are required to efficiently handle the RACF indicator of datasets, catalogs and VSAM objects, which is crucial to achieve a reliable dataset protection. It is recommended to install these utilities after having installed all PTFs and before continuing to customize RAKF.
3. Consult chapter “Customization” on page 10 for information on how to customize and activate RAKF.

## PTF Installation

To install a RAKF PTF pretty much the same procedure as for RAKF base installation is used:

* Upload the PTF to a sequential file or PDS member (LRECL=80,RECFM=FB) on your MVS system.
* Customize job B@RECV from your HLQ.SAMPLIB (HLQ = highlevel qualifier for RAKF libraries as chosen at RAKF installation time): Have the //SMPPTFIN DD statement point to the dataset or PDS member where you placed the PTF and change the RECEIVE command to read:

RECEIVE S(PTF-ID) .

PTF-ID is the ID of the PTF, for example RRKF001. Submit the job. Return code 0 is expected.

* Customize job C@APPLY as described in chapter “Installation” on page 4 (if not already done) and change the APPLY command to read:

APPLY S(PTF-ID) DIS(WRITE) .

Check the comment section at the beginning of the PTF (the “Cover Letter”) for any special installation instructions for APPLYing the PTF and perform these as appropriate. Then submit the APPLY job. Return code 0 is expected.

* Test RAKF operation with the PTF in place to ensure that no function you use got broken.
  + When RAKF with the applied PTF operates as it is supposed to, accept the PTF: Customize job D@ACCEPT as described in chapter “Installation” on page 4 (if not already done) and change the ACCEPT command to read:

ACCEPT S(PTF-ID) DIS(WRITE) .

Check the Cover Letter for any special installation instructions for ACCEPTing the PTF and perform these as appropriate. Then submit the ACCEPT job. Return code 0 is expected.

* + When RAKF with the applied PTF exhibits problems, restore the PTF: Customize job D@ACCEPT as described in chapter “Installation” on page 4 (if not already done) and change the ACCEPT command to read:

RESTORE S(PTF-ID) DIS(WRITE) .

Submit the job. Return code 0 is expected. After running the RESTORE command your RAKF system is restored to the state before the PTF was applied.

**Note:** As long as there are no special installation instructions that cannot be satisfied at the same time, multiple PTFs can be RECEIVED, APPLIED or ACCEPTED at once in a single SMP run. Although some of the PTFs available as of the publication date of this User’s Guide carry special installation instructions, none of them are in conflict with each other, i.e. all PTFS currently available can be handled together by a single RECEIVE, APPLY and ACCEPT run.

Special installation instructions frequently involve receiving a PDS packaged in XMI format. If the RECV370 utility isn’t installed on your system you cannot use the sample jobs provided to receive these datasets. In this case, please use the Hercules dasdload utility instead.

## Auxiliary Utilities

Chapter “Turning the RACF Indicator On or Off” on page 19 outlines procedures for setting or clearing the RACF indicator of datasets, catalogs and VSAM objects which is crucial to provide a reliable dataset protection. These procedures make use of set of utilities that are neither part of the RAKF product nor of native MVS 3.8j. They have been collected or derived from different publicly available sources and are provided with the RAKF distribution for ease of installation as a one stop installable OCO package. This package contains the following utilities:

* **mawk:** An implementation of the pattern scanning and text processing language AWK as defined in “Aho, Kernighan and Weinberger, *The AWK Programming Language,* Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1988”.

The original mawk source is published under the GNU public license at <http://invisible-island.net/mawk>. An adaption of this source to MVS and the ready to run mawk load module, which is included in the utilities package, have been published in the files section of the H390-MVS Yahoo group at <http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/H390-MVS/files/mawk.zip>.

* **VTOC:** A TSO command to list DSCB information for selected datasets. The version used here is an adaption of CBT File 112, created by Phil Roberts. It extends the functionality of the VTOC version distributed with the Tur(n)key 3 MVS system by the ability to display the RACF indicator of the listed datasets and to use the RACF indicator as a criteria for selecting and sorting the datasets to be displayed. As of the publishing date of this User’s Guide this modified VTOC version hasn’t been published but it is intended to be included in upcoming releases of the Tur(n)key MVS system.
* **CDSCB:** A TSO command to modify the DSCB of a dataset. The source of this command is available with CBT File 300. The Tur(n)key 3 MVS System provides a slightly modified version using an unsecured SVC 244 to enable access to supervisor state. The source of this version seems to be lost. CDSCB checks for being executed from an interactive TSO session with OPER privileges to -kind of- prevent unauthorized use. In

<http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/turnkey-mvs/message/7383> a ZAP for the TK3 version of CDSCB is proposed which allows batch usage without compromising security. As batch usage is required for mass manipulation of RACF indicators the CDSCB version from the Tur(n)key 3 MVS system with this ZAP applied is provided in the utility package.

* **SVC 244:** This SVC is originally provided with the Tur(n)key 3 MVS system, where it is used to enable certain utilities and TSO commands (like CDSCB) to access supervisor state easily. As it is completely unsecured its use as provided in TK3 can only be recommended for single user systems. Systems with security present typically aren’t single user systems but still have requirements to allow certain utilities supervisor access when used by authorized users (sysprogs, etc.), but not when used by “normal” users. For this reason <http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/turnkey-mvs/message/7332> proposes a modification to the TK3 SVC 244 to have it check the calling user’s authority to access profile SVC244 in the FACILITY class before allowing authorization. The use of a secured authorization SVC is strongly recommended when opening CDSCB for batch usage, which is the primary reason for providing the secured version of the TK3 SVC 244 with the utilities package.

If you are running a Tur(n)key MVS system having the unsecured original SVC 244 installed, it should be replaced by secured one anyway, not only because of CDSCB: The unsecured SVC 244 allows tampering any security policy you might want to enforce thus making the installation of a security system like RAKF completely useless if you don’t replace it by the secured one.

### Installation of the Auxiliary Utilities

Perform the following steps to install the auxiliary utilities:

1. Edit installation job AUXINST in hlq.SAMPLIB:
   * Change all occurrences of hlq to the high level qualifier of your the RAKF libraries.
   * Change the system libraries pointed to by arrows (🡨) in the JCL according to the needs of your system. The defaults provided fit for Tur(n)key MVS systems.
2. If you have DYNABLDL installed on your system issue the “S DBSTOP” command from the system console.
3. Submit job AUXINST.
4. If you have DYNABLDL installed on your system issue the “S DBSTART” command from the system console.
5. Define the SVC244 profile in the FACILITY class and authorize the users that should have access to SVC 244. The following RAKF profiles table entries are provided as an example on how to do this:

FACILITYSVC244 NONE

FACILITYSVC244 ADMIN READ

FACILITYSVC244 STCGROUPREAD

This example defines a universal access of “none” (i.e. nobody has access unless authorized explicitly) and explicitly authorizes user ADMIN (or all members of group ADMIN) and all started tasks (the STCGROUP).

If the RAKF profiles table has not yet been defined on your system, then postpone the above step until you have created the profiles table according to step 1 of the customization procedure on page 10.

1. Perform an IPL CLPA at your earliest convenience to activate the secured SVC 244.

**Note:** The above instructions assume that the RECV370 utility is installed on your system. If you don’t have REV370 installed please use the Hercules dasdload utility to load member AUXUTILS of hlq.SAMPLIB to a loadlib (AUXUTILS is in XMI format). Then remove step RECEIVE from job AUXINST and have the //AUX DD statement in step INSTALL point to the loadlib created using dasdload. After this change you can proceed according to the above procedure.

## Customization

This chapter describes the steps to customize and activate RAKF 1.2.0 after SMP4 installation of the base product and of all PTFs has been completed.

1. The RAKF security configuration is defined by the RAKF users table and the RAKF profiles table, which are text files maintained by the security administrator to define the system’s users, groups, resources and their protection. These tables are members of the partitioned data set SYS1.SECURE.CNTL:
   * USERS: The RAKF users table
   * PROFILES: The RAKF profiles table

Job INITTBLS in SAMPLIB is used to create SYS1.SECURE.CNTL and to populate it with initial tables:

1. If you are a first time RAKF user proceed as follows:

* Ensure that SYS1.SECURE.CNTL doesn’t exist. If it exists, you’re not a first time RAKF user and should proceed to procedure b).
* Change all occurrences of hlq in job INITTBLS to reflect the high level qualifier you chose for the RAKF libraries during installation and all occurrences of rrrrrr to the volume where SYS1.SECURE.CNTL is to be created. It is recommended to create SYS1.SECURE.CNTL on the sysres device.
* Change all occurrences of uuuuuuuu in job INITTBLS to
  + TK3USR if you are running a TK3 or newer (Tur(n)key MVS) system: This defines IBMUSER and the users HERC01, HERC02, HERC03 and HERC04 with equivalent attributes as they are defined in UADS. Note, however, that RAKF doesn't allow users having no password. For this reason IBMUSER, HERC01 and HERC03 have a password of NONE defined instead of no password as in TK3.
  + MINUSR in all other cases: This establishes a minimal configuration equivalent to an unprotected system with IBMUSER being defined as the only user. IBMUSER has operations privilege allowing all accesses.

Note that each TSO user still needs an UADS entry to define the TSO attributes and authorizations. These are not covered by the RAKF users table.

* Submit job INITTBLS.
* Amend the users table so that it contains at least all TSO users being currently present in your system.

1. If RAKF already was in use on your system earlier, SYS1.SECURE.CNTL probably exists and contains usable users and profile tables. If this is the case, proceed to step 2.

If SYS1.SECURE.CNTL doesn’t currently exist, create it using the instructions in procedure a) and replace the USERS and/or PROFILES members with your old tables if you still have them and want to reuse them.

1. Change all occurrences of rrrrrr in SAMPLIB job INITPWUP to the volume and of tttt to the device type where the password queue dataset SYS1.SECURE.PWUP is to be allocated and submit the job. It is recommended to use the sysres device for this dataset. This dataset serves as a queue: User initiated password changes are saved here until the next run of RAKFUSER integrates them into the RAKF users table.

Note: During the process of adapting the profiles and users tables to meet your security requirements (step 6) special attention to the protection of the datasets created in steps 1 and 2 should be paid:

* SYS1.SECURE.CNTL: started tasks and the user(s) and/or group(s) responsible for RAKF administration need UPDATE access to this dataset.
* SYS1.SECURE.PWUP: started tasks need UPDATE access to this dataset.

As both datasets contain clear text passwords normal users shouldn't be allowed any access to them. An easy way to protect these datasets is to define a dataset profile SYS1.SECURE.\* with universal access NONE and selectively allow the RAKF administrator user(s)/group(s) UPDATE access to this profile. If the standard setup is used started tasks have operations authority and thus don't need to be explicitly allowed.

1. Issue the command

S RAKF

at the MVS console and reply YES to message RAKF002A. Verify that the profiles and users tables initialize correctly and that you can logon using the usernames and passwords from SYS1.SECURE.CNTL(USERS).

Note: Although the RAKF procedure loads the in-core users and profiles tables it is not primarily intended to be used for that purpose during normal operations. To routinely update the profiles or user table to activate changes the procedures RAKFPROF or RAKFUSER, respectively, should be used. The main purpose of the RAKF procedure is to provide a means to activate RAKF if initialization didn't take place automatically at IPL time, for example during installation and customization. If the RAKF procedure is run when RAKF had been activated already it will skip the initialization and refresh the in-core users and profile table, which is equivalent to running RAKFPROF and RAKFUSER.

1. To enable automatic initialization of RAKF at system IPL time (highly recommended!) MSTRJCL needs to be modified to contain DD statements pointing to the users and profiles tables and the password changes queue:

//RAKFPROF DD DSN=SYS1.SECURE.CNTL(PROFILES),

// DISP=SHR

//RAKFUSER DD DSN=SYS1.SECURE.CNTL(USERS),

// DISP=SHR

//RAKFPWUP DD DSN=SYS1.SECURE.PWUP,

// DISP=SHR

Member ZJW0003 of HLQ.SAMPLIB provides a sample USERMOD accomplishing this. If ZJW0003 fits your system just submit it. If not use any other method of your choice to add the required DD statements.

1. Edit SYS1.PARMLIB(RAKFINIT) and change the value NO in line 1 to ASK. Then reIPL the system. Message RAKF002A will now be issued immediately after master scheduler initialization and give you the choice to start RAKF or not. Reply YES to initialize RAKF and continue the IPL.
2. Start now modifying your USERS and PROFILES tables until the desired level of protection is reached. Please refer to chapter “Setting Up and Enabling the Users and Profiles Tables” on page 12 for information on setting up these tables.
3. Once you're satisfied with your configuration change line 1 in SYS1.PARMLIB(RAKFINIT) from ASK to YES which will cause RAKF to be activated unconditionally during IPL.

## Setting Up and Enabling the Users and Profiles Tables

Please note that when MVS is informed that "security" is present on the system, all previously defined passwords, including VSAM passwords, are ignored. Any password protection must be reinstated by the security system. Evidently, the MVS designers wanted any passwords designated by security, not to be interfered with by any other password mechanisms in MVS.

Additionally it should be noted that the ESG Security System, which RAKF is based on, has been developed in 1991 for MVS versions released 5 to 10 years later than RAKF’s target MVS 3.8j. Consequently RAKF supports security features that are used by MVS 3.8j differently than by later MVS versions or are not used at all and thus will not work as expected. Please read chapter “Security Authorization Facility (SAF) Support in MVS 3.8j” on page 16 for considerations concerning this situation.

The way that protection will work on your system is entirely up to your control. Protection depends completely on the way you code the users and profiles tables. RAKF utilizes these tables for its protection decisions, instead of using a RACF™ database. Minimal tables to create a state equivalent to MVS without an active security product have been provided. Starting from these you should gradually move forward to tighten security as needed on your system.

In order for both the users and profiles tables to be valid, they must be in sort order. Under RPF Edit, the command "SORT" is adequate to sort the records correctly (if they were coded properly in the first place). Sort errors will inhibit initialization of the tables and will generate nasty error messages.

Note that the tables may contain comment lines starting with an asterisk (\*). If you have comment lines in your tables using a “SORT” command in RPF Edit will move these lines away from their desired location. Consequently it is advisable to keep your users and profiles tables in sort order manually if comment lines are used.

In the profiles table, DEFAULT, or "UNIVERSAL" access for any facility or dataset must be coded before any specific access is coded. You code a universal access entry in the profiles table by leaving the user group field blank. Then you code other entries for the same facility, specifying different settings for each user group that will have special access (or denial of access) to that facility.

Generally, only those features included in "IBM RACF™ Version 1.7" have been emulated.

RAKF uses the decision logic of the ESG Security System without modifications. The author of the ESG security system has referred to two RACF™ manuals during his planning. It is important for all users of RAKF to obtain these manuals also. These are needed in the security administration, which will be ongoing.

The two manuals are:

SPL RACF - Referred to for information how to write

(SC28-1343-2) macros and return codes.

RACF Administrator's Guide - Has an overview of profiles that

(SC28-1340) should be used, and their structure.

You should try to find versions of these manuals being as close as possible to RACF™ Version 1.7 because later manuals describe features not available with RAKF and/or MVS 3.8j.

An example for a minimal users table may be found in the member MINUSR in HLQ.SAMPLIB. An example for a minimal profiles table may be found in the member MINPRF. Users of the Tur(n)key 3 MVS system can find in member TK3USR a users table defining all users present in the system after initial TK3 installation to RAKF. Note, however, that these tables only define users and passwords. All profiles are set to grant every request, so the system is in a state equivalent to running without an active security product after activating these minimal tables.

Members CJYUDATA and CJYPDATA of the original ESG Security System distribution as available in CBT file 165 are sample tables showing a realistic setup and might be used as an example for defining the RAKF tables for MVS 3.8j. It is hoped that enough data is provided in these examples to give a working knowledge for further coding and setting up but it should be noted that these tables use resource classes available only in MVS versions 5 to 10 years later than MVS 3.8j and thus cannot be used as they are. Major differences in security handling between MVS 3.8j and later systems are detailed in chapter “Security Authorization Facility (SAF) Support in MVS 3.8j” on page 16.

Please be informed that in core, these tables will be read from the bottom upwards which is the reason why the source tables need to be in ascending sort order: Reading them in reverse order ensures to find the most significant hit for a resource or user search before any less significant hits, so tables search can (and will!) always be stopped upon the first hit.

The users table is coded in SYS1.SECURE.CNTL(USERS) as follows:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Columns | Contents |
| 1 - 8 | USERID (TSO, CICS, or whatever application) |
| 10 - 17 | User Group (Installation defined) |
| 18 | Asterisk '\*' to denote that multiple user groups exist for this userid. Otherwise blank. |
| 19 - 26 | Password |
| 28 | Operations Authority (Y or N). If "Y", then access is always granted to this user unless it is denied explicitly. |
| 31 - 50 | Comment field (ignored by ESG Security but used by "IBM RACF™"). |
| 51 - 80 | Ignored |

Userids in the users table that were set up with multiple group entries will get the highest authority for all protected objects in all the groups. As a practical example, multiple groups are used for managers who oversee the work of several programming groups. The multiple group arrangement gives these managers access to everything done by all the groups under them.

The users table is activated by issuing the command

S RAKFUSER

at the MVS console.

The profiles table is coded in SYS1.SECURE.CNTL(PROFILES) as follows:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Columns | Contents |
| 1 - 8 | Facility title: (DASDVOL, DATASET, FACILITY, etc.) See the RACF™ Administrator's Guide. You need to know the different facility types used by the operating system, CICS, TP products, and vendor products. |
| 9 - 52 | Dataset Name, or Generic Name, or Name to be protected. (Generics are achieved using the asterisk '\*'. See the examples.) |
| 53 - 60 | User Group Id (Installation defined). Blanks in this field denote universal access rules for this resource. |
| 61 - 66 | Permission Level (NONE, READ, UPDATE, ALTER) |
| 67 - 72 | Blank |

To protect products other than MVS 3.8j, they must have an interface to the security system, typically through the use of specific profiles in the FACILITY class.

The profiles table is activated by issuing the command

S RAKFPROF

at the MVS console.

As outlined above the RAKFUSER and RAKFPROF utilities are used to create the in core users and profiles tables, respectively. Any user having access to these utilities can completely take over the system by activating “private” users and profiles tables, which is why these utilities need to be protected carefully. To prevent unauthorized use RAKFUSER and RAKFPROF request READ access to the RAKFADM profile in the FACILITY class. It is strongly recommended to define the RAKFADM profile and create appropriate permissions to protect it. The following RAKF profiles table entries are provided as an example on how to do this:

FACILITYRAKFADM NONE

FACILITYRAKFADM RAKFADM READ

FACILITYRAKFADM STCGROUPREAD

This example defines a universal access of “none” (i.e. nobody has access unless authorized explicitly) and explicitly authorizes user RAKFADM (or all members of group RAKFADM) and all started tasks (the STCGROUP).

Note that it is RAKF’s standard behavior to grant ALTER access requested for an undefined resource. Thus everyone will be able to use the RAKFUSER and RAKFPROF utilities if there is no RAKFADM profile defined in the FACILITY class.

It has to be reemphasized that your security protection is completely dependent on how you code these tables. Please get most of your knowledge from the RACF™ Administrator's Guide.

Special attention should be given to the above mentioned fact that RAKF allows ALTER access to all undefined resources. A user can, for example, delete any dataset on any volume even if access NONE is defined for the dataset as long as there is no DASDVOL profile defined: ALTER access to a DASDVOL allows scratching of any file on it regardless of the file's protection and exactly that's what a user gets if no DASDVOL profile is defined.

## Batch Jobs and Started Task Considerations

Batch jobs and STCs are controlled as follows: All batch jobs default to a userid of PROD and a user group of PRDGROUP. Started tasks are forced a userid of STC and a user group of STCGROUP. This default is imposed by ICHSFR00. Any job that has no userid connected to it is assigned a userid of PROD and a user group of PRDGROUP by ICHSFR00. That situation is true for jobs submitted by RJE or by a local (card or internal) reader. The authorities (i.e. Operations or not) of the PROD and STC userids are hardcoded in ICHSFR00. Upon initial RAKF installation, the PROD user has no Operations authority while the STC user has Operations authority defined. The specific authorities of the PRDGROUP and STCGROUP groups are controlled by the profiles table.

Under MVS 3.8j no userid propagation takes place. Without further measure all jobs entering the system have no userid and thus get userid PROD and group PRDGROUP assigned by RAKF, be it jobs submitted by already authenticated users or jobs, or by started tasks. That means that all jobs that shall run under a specific userid need to have the USER and PASSWORD parameters coded on their JOB card. Coding these parameters constitutes a security hole if jobs are saved in publicly readable JCL libraries. But even with read protected JCL libraries having to code these parameters is for sure not desired.

To avoid having to code USER and PASSWORD parameters on JOB cards it is highly recommended to install an IKFEFF10 user exit that automatically provides these parameters for jobs submitted using the TSO submit command processor and to configure RPF to use TSO submit instead of RPF submit. That way the majority of jobs submitted in day to day system usage don’t need to code these parameters on their JOB cards. There are many such exits available on the CBT tape and it might be a problem to find one that fulfills that (and only that) function and works on MVS 3.8j. File 358 from the “Georgia Departement of Labor” on the old CBT249 archive does exactly that.

## Security Authorization Facility (SAF) Support in MVS 3.8j

RAKF supports security features that are used by MVS 3.8j differently than by later MVS versions or are not used at all and thus will not work as expected. The “historical” reason for this is that RAKF's predecessor ESG Security System is dated 1991 which is 5 to 10 years later than most components of "current" MVS 3.8j systems. Some of the issues resulting from this discrepancy are discussed here.

### General Resource Classes

There are resource classes supported by RAKF but not used by MVS 3.8j. So, if you are going to define a profile in any resource class in the RAKF profiles table that you never used before make sure to test it by trying an access that should be denied by that profile. Only if it then really gets denied, you can be sure that the corresponding hook to call the SAF is already implemented in the level of MVS you are running.

The probably most relevant of these classes is the PROGRAM class which is meant to be used to protect programs from being executed by unauthorized users: RAKF will accept profiles in the PROGRAM class flawlessly but none of the programs defined there will be protected because MVS 3.8j simply doesn't ask the SAF for permission before executing a program.

So, basically, with MVS 3.8j one has to make sure that “critical” programs cannot be executed by unauthorized users through other means. The following solutions might be feasible on a case by case basis:

* Programs that need to call a specific SVC for successful execution: Introduce a profile in the FACILITY class and have that SVC verify the caller’s authorization against this profile. This method can only be used, if the SVC in question is specific enough to the calling program, so that no other system functions get broken when access to that SVC is restricted.

An example for this method is SVC 244: This SVC is originally provided with the Tur(n)key MVS System, where it is used to enable certain utilities and TSO commands to access supervisor state easily. As it is completely unsecured its use as provided in TK3 can only be recommended for single user systems. Systems with security present typically aren’t single user systems but still have requirements to allow certain utilities supervisor access when used by authorized users (sysprogs, etc.), but not when used by “normal” users. For this reason <http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/turnkey-mvs/message/7332> proposes a modification to SVC 244 to have it check the calling user’s authority to access profile SVC244 in the FACILITY class before allowing authorization. This way SVC 244 is turned from a big security hole to an efficient means of protecting utilities that need to run authorized.

The secured version of SVC 244 is part of the auxiliary utility package distributed with RAKF. If you are running a Tur(n)key MVS system having the unsecured version of this SVC installed, it is strongly recommended to replace it by installing the utility package as outlined in “Installation of the Auxiliary Utilities” on page 9.

* Programs with source code available: Introduce a profile in the FACILITY class and have the program verify the caller's authorization against this profile. This method of course provides a reliable protection only for programs that will not work, for example due to APF requirements, if called from a private library!

An example for this method can be found within RAKF itself (introduced through PTF RRKF003): The utilities RAKFUSER and RAKFPROF used to update the in-core USERS and PROFILES tables are critical in the sense that anyone having access to them can take over the security administration of the whole system and thus can conduct arbitrary fraudulent activities. To enable control over who is authorized to use these utilities they request READ access to FACILITY RAKFADM and don’t execute if this access isn’t granted. That way the use of these utilities can effectively be restricted by defining profile RAKFADM in the FACILITY class and giving only authorized users or groups READ access to this profile.

* Programs without source code available: Create a separate loadlib protected by a DATASET profile and place the program there. This, of course, is kind of a last resort.

### Dataset Protection using the RACF indicator

The implementation of calls to the security system in MVS 3.8j to protect datasets greatly relies on the concept of indication: Only datasets having their "RACF indicator" turned on are protected. The RACF indicator is a bit in the type 1 DSCB of a non-VSAM dataset or in the catalog entry of a VSAM object. Once activated RAKF ensures that all newly created datasets, catalogs and VSAM objects have their RACF indicator turned on. But this is not the case for already existing ones.

Due to artifacts (not to say bugs ;-)) in the logic flow of DADSM processing it is possible to gain access to a RAKF protected dataset which has its RACF indicator turned on by manipulating an arbitrary unprotected dataset (i.e. one with its RACF indicator not turned on) in a certain way before trying to access the protected one. Consequently a reliable dataset protection can only be achieved by explicitly turning on the RACF indicator for ***all*** datasets, catalogs and VSAM objects after RAKF activation, not only for ***those needing protection***.

On the other hand it should be noted that once the whole system is protected (i.e. the RACF indicator is turned on for all datasets, catalogs and VSAM objects) it is no longer feasible to run it without RAKF or any other security system being active as most accesses will then be denied. Consequently the RACF indicators of all datasets, catalogs and VSAM objects explicitly need to be turned off prior to removing RAKF from the system.

Chapter “Turning the RACF Indicator On or Off” on page 19 outlines how to manipulate the RACF indicator of datasets, catalogs or VSAM objects, individually or for the whole system. Using these procedures clearly is the recommended way to enable dataset protection as well as to revert back to native MVS security should this ever become necessary.

### Dataset Protection using “Always Call Security”

In the course of creating RAKF by porting the ESG Security System to MVS 3.8j an alternate approach to relying on the RACF indicator was pursued in the beginning: More modern MVS systems provide an “always call security” feature which basically ensures that the security system is called always when a dataset is to be accessed as opposed to only calling it when the dataset’s RACF indicator is set. It was tried to implement such a behavior by modifying DADSM routines to skip checking the RACF indicator and unconditionally call security. It quickly turned out that this approach doesn’t lead to a satisfactory solution:

* As no source for the DADSM modules at the typical PTF levels is available creating the modifications was a tedious and error prone process of disassembling the modules, comparing them with the base source and then creating ZAPs working at a given PTF level. So no universal (i.e. PTF level independent) solution could be created this way.
* In addition to the DADSM routines the VSAM catalog management routines would have had to be modified in an analogous way to create a fully functioning “always call security”. The many dependencies between VSAM catalog management and DADSM lead to unpredictable behavior when catalog management functions are called in a system with DADSM modified for “always call” but catalog management not. Modifying catalog management turned out to be way too complex, given the almost unreadable PL/S generated assembler base source and the huge amount of OCO maintenance applied.

For these reasons the attempt to create an “always call security” feature has been abandoned.

The ZAPs created to enforce unconditional DADSM calls to the security system still exist and are part of the RAKF distribution. If for whatever reason RAKF is to be used without fully RACF-indicating the system these ZAPs may be an alternative, despite their unwanted effects on catalog management.

Chapter “Enforcing Security Calls on Not Fully RACF-indicated Systems” on page 23 describes the usage of these “always call security” ZAPs. Their use, however, is strongly discouraged given the fact that in chapter “Turning the RACF Indicator On or Off” on page 19 an easy to use procedure to fully RACF-indicate a system is outlined.

## Turning the RACF Indicator On or Off

This chapter describes how to set or clear the RACF indicator of a single dataset, catalog or VSAM object as well as mass processing of all eligible datasets, catalogs and VSAM objects in the system.

Prerequisite for all tasks outlined in this chapter are the utilities listed in “Auxiliary Utilities” on page 8. If these utilities aren’t yet installed on your system please turn to “Installation of the Auxiliary Utilities” on page 9 for step by step instructions. Read access to profiles RAKFADM and SVC244 in the FACILITY class is required to perform these tasks.

Before submitting the “mass mode” jobs that act on all datasets, catalogs and VSAM objects in the system it is advisable to verify that the involved utilities are working as expected by:

* Setting and clearing the RACF indicator of a single non-VSAM dataset: This verifies the CDSCB command.
* Setting and clearing the RACF indicator of a VSAM cluster and its components: This verifies the RACIND utility.
* Running the VTOCLRAC job to list the current non-VSAM status: This verifies the VTOC command.
* Running the VSAMLRAC job to list the current VSAM status: This verifies the mawk utility.

### Setting or Clearing the RACF Indicator of a Single Non-VSAM Dataset

Logon to TSO and enter the following command:

CDSCB 'datasetname' VOL(vvvvvv) UNIT(SYSDA) SHR racind

where:

datasetname is the fully qualified name of the dataset the RACF indicator of which is to be set or cleared

vvvvvv is the volume identifier of the DASD on which the dataset resides

racind is the desired setting of the RACF indicator:

RACF if the RACF indicator is to be set

NORACF if the RACF indicator is to be cleared

The RACF indicator of the following datasets **must never be set**:

* The PASSWORD dataset, i.e. the dataset with the single qualifier name PASSWORD
* Temporary datasets, i.e. datasets with the following naming format:

SYSnnnnn.Tnnnnnn.RAnnn.\*, where each n represents a decimal digit.

### Setting or Clearing the RACF Indicator of a Single Catalog or VSAM Object

Each component of a catalog or VSAM object has its own RACF indicator bit in its catalog entry. The following requirements must be observed when setting or clearing the RACF indicators of catalogs or VSAM objects:

* **Catalog:** Only the RACF indicator of the catalog’s cluster entry is to be set or cleared. The RACF indicators of the catalog’s data and index components **must never be set**.
* **All other VSAM objects:** The RACF indicator of the object’s catalog entry, as well as the RACF indicators of the object’s component catalog entries must be set or cleared synchronously.

To set or clear the RACF indicator of any catalog entry (the catalog cluster itself, any VSAM objects and their components) the RACIND utility is used. It is called as follows:

//RACIND EXEC PGM=RACIND

//SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=\*

//SYSIN DD \*

control statement

.

.

.

control statement

/\*

The control statements consist of a command verb beginning in column 1 and an entry name to act upon beginning in column 11. The command verbs are defined as follows:

CATALOG directs RACIND to operate in the catalog specified as the entry name until the next CATALOG statement is encountered

RACON sets the RACF indicator of the entry specified

RACOFF clears the RACF indicator of the entry specified

A line starting with an asterisk (“\*”) is treated as a comment. Any number of control statements is allowed, but no RACON or RACOFF statement is accepted until a valid CATALOG statement has been executed.

Member RACIND in hlq.SAMPLIB is a sample job demonstrating the use of the RACIND utility.

### Setting or Clearing the RACF Indicator of All Eligible Non-VSAM Datasets

Two sample jobs are provided in hlq.SAMPLIB:

* **VTOCLRAC:** This job lists the RACF indicator status of all non-VSAM datasets in the system.
* **VTOCSRAC:** This job sets or clears the RACF indicator of all eligible non-VSAM datasets in the system. To specify whether the action is to set or to clear the RACF indicator edit and submit the job as follows:
  + Find the following comment line:

### ==> BEGIN of standard customization section <==

* + This comment section leads you to the statement initializing the setracf parameter. In the job as distributed the setracf parameter is initialized to the value "OFF".
    - Submit the job as it is (i.e. with the default setracf = "OFF" in effect) if you want to clear all RACF indicators.
    - Activate setracf = "ON" by removing the comment (# character) from the corresponding line and submit the job if you want to set all RACF indicators.

VTOCSRAC operates on all mounted DASD volumes. To exclude certain volumes (i.e. IPL and SPOOL volumes for other systems like START1 and SPOOL0 in TK3 systems) from processing vary them offline before submitting VTOCSRAC. The job executes an AWK script to find the eligible datasets out of a dataset list and to generate a CDSCB command with the RACF or NORACF parameter for each dataset found.

Note that the AWK scripts used in job VTOCSRAC contain characters (“[“ and “]”) that might display incorrectly (for example as “Ý” and “¨”) on a tn3270 screen dependent on the national language setup in effect. Nonetheless they will work as designed as this is only a question of the code pages used for display. It is absolutely unnecessary to change these scripts to fit your tn3270 session’s code page!

Datasets are considered eligible for RACF indicator modification if they are **not**:

* The PASSWORD dataset, i.e. the dataset with the single qualifier name PASSWORD
* Temporary datasets, i.e. datasets with the following naming format:

SYSnnnnn.Tnnnnnn.RAnnn.\*, where each n represents a decimal digit.

### Setting or Clearing the RACF Indicator of All Catalogs and VSAM Objects

Two sample jobs are provided in hlq.SAMPLIB:

* **VSAMLRAC:** This job lists the RACF indicator status of all catalogs and VSAM objects in the system.
* **VSAMSRAC:** This job sets or clears the RACF indicator of all catalogs and VSAM objects in the system. To specify whether the action is to set or to clear the RACF indicator edit and submit the job as follows:
  + Find the following comment line:

### ==> BEGIN of customization section <==

* + This comment section leads you to the statement initializing the setracf parameter. In the job as distributed the setracf parameter is initialized to the value "OFF".
    - Submit the job as it is (i.e. with the default setracf = "OFF" in effect) if you want to clear all RACF indicators.
    - Activate setracf = "ON" by removing the comment (# character) from the corresponding line and submit the job if you want to set all RACF indicators.

VSAMSRAC operates on the master catalog and on all user catalogs defined in the master catalog. To exclude a user catalog from processing vary the volume on which it resides offline before submitting VSAMSRAC. The job executes an AWK script to find the catalogs, VSAM objects and their components out of IDCAMS LISTCAT output and to generate RACIND control statements for all eligible entries. All VSAM entries **not** being components (DATA or INDEX) of a catalog are considered eligible.

## Enforcing Security Calls on Not Fully RACF-indicated Systems

If for whatever reason RAKF is to be used without fully RACF-indicating the system, a set of ZAPs to the MVS modules handling non-VSAM datasets is provided that enforce calls to RAKF for all non-VSAM datasets, not only for those with RACF indicator turned on. Although applying these ZAPs probably is the easiest way to get some basic protection on the system their use is strongly discouraged due to the many unwanted effects they may cause. The recommended way to achieve a reliable dataset protection is to fully RACF-indicate the system as described in chapter “Turning the RACF Indicator On or Off” on page 19.

There exist complex interactions between VSAM catalog management and the DADSM functions modified by the ZAPs. So, while intensive testing has shown that these ZAPs together with correctly defined RAKF DATASET and DASDVOL profiles provide protection for non-VSAM datasets, they partly break VSAM catalog management. An artifact of this situation is that with applied ZAPs an IDCAMS "DELETE CLUSTER" command of a VSAM cluster that hadn't been allocated with the SUBAL option ends with CC=0 but leaves the data and index dataspaces of this cluster orphaned on disk.

Phil Roberts has found a workaround to delete these orphaned VSAM components from disk which is cited here to help in case this problem occurred. He wrote:

"I have tinkered some and have a work around for the situation where a

VSAM dataset may get orphaned due to a mixed environment. It doesn't

take any outside utilities.

Basically if a VSAM cluster is deleted while running with the MVSZAPs

(not recommended operation but perhaps necessary for some) one can:

- DELETE hlq.vsam.name NOSCR

- CDSCB hlq.vsam.name.data DSORG(PS) VOL(xxxxxx) RACF

- CDSCB hlq.vsam.name.index DSORG(PS) VOL(xxxxxx) RACF

- RPF 3.4 with hlq and VOL xxxxxx to C CATALOG then D to delete the

orphaned components from pack xxxxxx"

This example illustrates why the use of the MVS ZAPs is strongly discouraged.

It should also be noted that the protection provided by these ZAPs is relatively weak as compared to the rock solid protection achieved by fully RACF-indicating the system. The following table gives an overview on the influence of the ZAPs in a few scenarios and should help to decide whether to use them or not:

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

| All datasets | |

| VSAM objects | System has mixed |

| and catalogs | indication status |

| are indicated | |

| | | VSAM | NVSAM |

| | | i | n | i | n |

| VSAM | NVSAM | n | o | n | o |

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_| | | d | t | d | t |

| Z | Reliable protection | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y |

| A | Reliable catalog management | N | Y | N | N | Y | Y |

| P | Catalog protection | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | N |

| Z | Reliable protection | Y | Y | Y | N | N | N |

| No A | Reliable catalog management | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |

| P | Catalog protection | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | N |

In a mixed environment without ZAPs even RACF-indicated non-VSAM datasets aren't reliably protected, that's not a typo! The table shows clearly that one should by all means try to reach the "not ZAPed and fully RACF-indicated" configuration because this is the only one to provide full protection without introducing risky changes to basic system functionality. Refer to chapter “Turning the RACF Indicator On or Off” on page 19 for an easy to use procedure to fully RACF-indicate your system.

The following steps describe the installation and removal of the MVS ZAPs. Continue at your own risk:

1. Run job LPABACK: In step 2 you'll ZAP MVS modules IFG0194A, IGC0002I, IGC00030 and IGG0553A. These modules are typically located in SYS1.LPALIB but they might also be elsewhere in LPALIST or LINKLIST. Job LPABACK copies these modules and their aliases to a backup library... just in case you want to revert to the non-ZAPed versions later. Find out where these modules reside on your system and change SYS1.LPALIB in job LPABACK to the name of that library. If you want to use another name for the backup library than RAKF.LPALIB.BACKUP then change that name too at the location indicated by a comment in the JCL. Then submit the job and check that the library has been created correctly. It should contain 4 members and 17 aliases.
2. Run job ZAPMVS38: This job applies the MVS ZAPs. If necessary change the //SYSLIB DD statement to the name of the library where IFG0194A, IGC0002I, IGC00030 and IGG0553A reside. If module IFG0194A had already been ZAPed as recommended in Phil D's original rakf.pdf installation procedure then comment out the 6 ZAP statements indicated by the respective comment in the job. Run the job and verify that the ZAPs where successful. If any of the ZAPs failed your system isn't at a service level compatible with the ZAPs. The ZAPs were tested with the following PTF levels of the ZAPed modules:
   * IFG0194A PTF UZ74083
   * IGC0002I PTF UZ68267
   * IGC00030 PTF UZ63439
   * IGG0553A PTF UZ63439

This is the level of the Tur(n)key 3 MVS system. If you're using other PTF levels most probably the ZAPs need to be reworked to reflect at least the correct addresses of the ZAPed instructions. After having run job ZAPMVS38 successfully your system is ready to use with RAKF 1.2.0 for basic non-VSAM dataset protection.

1. Restore job LPAREST: If you want to remove the MVS ZAPs... job LPAREST copies the modules backed up in step 1 by job LPABACK back to their original locations. If you adjusted dataset names in LPABACK make analogous changes in LPAREST before running it. Please note that Phil D's original OPEN processing ZAP is still applied after running LPAREST if it was already applied before running LPABACK. So, if you want to get rid of that ZAP too which is strongly recommended, you need to find another source to restore IFG0194A and its aliases from (hopefully you backed them up before applying Phil D's ZAP).

## Deinstallation

This chapter describes the steps to deinstall RAKF 1.2.0 and reinstate native MVS security behavior.

**/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\**

**Danger!!! Danger!!! Danger!!! Danger!!! Danger!!! Danger!!!**

**\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/**

After deinstallation RACF indicated files will no longer be accessible. This may lead to a not IPLable or not accessible system. Removing RAKF and reinstating native MVS security behavior is not recommended unless in preparation the RACF indicator of all non VSAM datasets, VSAM catalogs and VSAM objects has been turned off. Consult chapter “Dataset Protection using the RACF indicator” on page 18 for instructions on how to turn the RACF indicator off.

**/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\**

**Danger!!! Danger!!! Danger!!! Danger!!! Danger!!! Danger!!!**

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The following instructions assume that you've read the above warning and understood the consequences of removing RAKF from your system. Continue at your own risk:

1. If you've applied the MVS ZAPs using job ZAPMVS38 consult chapter “Enforcing Security Calls on Not Fully RACF-indicated Systems” on page 23 for instructions on how to remove these ZAPs. The ZAPs MUST be removed prior to deinstalling RAKF otherwise the system will not be accessible or will not even IPL after the deinstallation.
2. Copy members C@APPLY, RAKFRMV and RAKF2MVS from your RAKF SAMPLIB to a private library. Work with these copies throughout the following steps as the RAKF libraries will be deleted! The jobs to be edited and submitted in the course of this procedure have been prepared under the assumption that the libraries to be deleted or modified can be located through the standard catalog search order. If this is not the case look thoroughly through the JCL to be sure to add VOL and/or UNIT parameters to the DD statements to correctly identify the libraries.
3. a) If RAKF SYSMOD TRKF120 has been APPLIed but not ACCEPTed, edit installation job C@APPLY:
   * change all occurances of HLQ to the high level qualifier of your RAKF libraries, e.g. RAKF, RAKF.V1R2M0, etc. and verify the correct sequence of the overiding DD statements against your SMPAPP procedure as described in chapter “Installation” on page 4.
   * change the command "APPLY S(TRKF120) DIS(WRITE)" in line 30 to read "RESTORE S(TRKF120) DIS(WRITE)".

Submit changed job C@APPLY to remove all RAKF components from your system.

b) If RAKF SYSMOD TRKF120 has been ACCEPTed, edit job RAKFRMV:

Change all occurrences of tttt to the device type and all occurrences of rrrrrr to the volume of the sysres device where SYS1.LPALIB and SYS1.LINKLIB of the system reside from which RAKF is to be deleted (if you are running TK3 MVS and delete from your current system the device type is 3350 and the volume is MVSRES).

Submit changed job RAKFRMV to remove all RAKF components from your system.

1. Review the DD statements pointing to SYS1.LINKLIB and SYS1.LPALIB in job RAKF2MVS and add VOL and/or UNIT parameters if necessary. Change all occurances of HLQ to the high level qualifier of your RAKF libraries. Submit the job which concludes the deinstallation procedure.

The system libraries as well as SMP are now reverted back to native MVS security. Before activating this configuration through an IPL CLPA make sure that no dataset needed for IPL is RACF indicated.

# Version History

## ESG Security System (March 1991)

The ESG Security System was published by Craig J. Yasuna as an alternative to IBM's RACF™ and similar products. It uses the ICHRTX00 security router exit to communicate its security decisions to MVS. ICHRTX00 is a user exit of the SAF router ICHSFR00.

## RAKF "RAcK oF" Security System (August 2005)

RAKF was published by A. Philip Dickinson as an adaption of the ESG Security System to MVS 3.8j. The ESG Security doesn't natively support MVS 3.8j for several reasons. The major ones are:

* At MVS 3.8j times the SAF router ICHSFR00 was part of the RACF™ product and thus not available on MVS systems without RACF™ being installed. So the ICHRTX00 exit as a convenient place for third party security products to hook into the SAF didn't exist.
* incompatible ACEE handling.
* The ESG Security System uses the BAS instruction which is not available in S/370.
* ESG Security's 24/31 bit AMODE handling wasn't compatible with the usage of high order address bytes for flags in MVS 3.8j.
* incompatible parameter lists of RACROUTE, RACDEF, RACHECK and RACINIT.
* handling of in core profiles incompatible with MVS's VSAM catalog management.

Phil D. converted ESG Security's ICHRTX00 router exit into an ICHSFR00 SAF router to overcome the first major incompatibility. He also solved the next two points and in parts the 24/31 bit AMODE issues. The rest remained undetected when he published his work and caused several problems when using RAKF on MVS 3.8j:

* Arbitrary 0C4 abends during RACINIT and RACDEF processing. The most severe of these abends is the "initiator blowout" mentioned in <http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/H390-MVS/message/10015>.
* Arbitrary 0C4 abends and FREEMAIN errors during RACHECK processing of VSAM catalogs and objects. These problems are discussed in <http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/H390-MVS/message/11811>.
* Arbitrary invalid authorization decisions: Access denied if it should have been granted and access granted if it should have been denied. The latter in a way that with some trial and error any user is able to acquire ALTER access to any dataset in the system.

## RAKF 1.2.0 (April 2011)

When the above mentioned problems became visible and identified as being RAKF caused in several MVS 3.8j environments it turned out that Phil D's RAKF source wasn't accessible any more (lost in a package crate from moving). Phil Roberts stepped in and reconstructed the source by disassembling Phil D's binary RAKF distribution and comparing it with the original source of the ESG Security System. Based on that reconstructed source the rest of the incompatibilities listed above were identified and corrected by Jürgen Winkelmann.

To avoid another loss of the source to occur an additional effort has been made to clean up the source to a publishable state and to provide an SMP4 compatible source distribution enabling RAKF installation using the standard SMP 4 standard RECEIVE, APPLY, ACCEPT procedure.

## RAKF 1.2.0 PTF Summary

The following PTFs are available as of the publishing date of this manual:

**RRKF001**: Enable comment lines (lines starting with \* ) to be entered in the source users and profiles tables and minor bug fixes in RAKFUSER utility.

**RRKF002**: Enhance RACINIT NEWPASS functionality to support permanent password changes to be initiated by an application. This enables standard password change functionality as for example entering currentpw/newpw on the “ENTER CURRENT PASSWORD for uuuuuuu” at TSO logon time.

**RRKF003**: Security enhancement in users and profiles tables processing.

**RRKF004**: Consolidation of documentation members from RAKF’s SAMPLIB to the RAKF User’s Guide.

**RRKF005**: Introduce the RACIND utility to control VSAM RACF indicators.

**RRKF006**: Sample jobs and utilities to turn the RACF indicator on or off for all non-VSAM datasets, catalogs and VSAM objects. Sample jobs to create the profiles and users tables and the password update queue. Documentation changes and minor bug fixes.

These PTFs are available in folder files/RAKF/PTFs of the H390-MVS Yahoo group and in CBT file 850, future PTFs will be made available at the same locations.

# Appendix A: Copyright Information

Please observe the ESG Security System copyright whenever using this product:

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\*

\* From: Yasuna, Craig

\* Sent: Thursday, April 07, 2011 6:47 PM

\* To: Winkelmann Juergen

\* Subject: RE: Question concerning the ESG Security System

\*

\* Absolutely ... I am very glad that the code still lives on and that it

\* has value.

\*

\* THANKS!!! - Craig

\*

\* -----Original Message-----

\* From: Winkelmann Juergen

\* Sent: Thursday, April 07, 2011 12:46 PM

\* To: Yasuna, Craig

\* Subject: Question concerning the ESG Security System

\*

\* . . .

\*

\* Phil Roberts reconstructed Phil Dickinson's changes to the original

\* ESG source through disassembly and compare. Based on that source I

\* finalized Phil D's work and now have RAKF fully working on MVS 3.8j.

\* I'm still in a final testing phase. After having finished this, I'd

\* like to post RAKF to the H390-MVS group and also to submit the changed

\* source back to CBT to avoid it getting lost again. Before doing this,

\* I'd like to ask for your consent as the original author. As far as I

\* understood Phil D asked for the same permission in 2005 but I don't

\* want to just quietly take over from him.

\*