

Identity Crisis in Attested TLS for Confidential Computing


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
TLS-attest¹



¹<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fossati-tls-attestation/>

Problem with Remote Attestation-only

- PKI cert **not presented** \implies No identity auth
- Is the average cloud customer happy with this?




Solutions

- **Augment** rather than **replace** Server Authentication
 - **Web PKI** cert for ID, e.g., hostname
 - **RA** cert to prove integrity of its computing environment
- Challenge: CertificateVerify message is **not extensible!**
- Possible solutions
 1. Make **CertificateVerify** extensible
 2. Allow **multiple CertificateVerify** messages
 - 2a. As part of handshake
 - 2b. Post-handshake²
 3. **New signature algorithm** that is a concatenation of two cryptographic signatures. (Fully threshold signatures?)
 4. Identity key (LTK) signs CertificateVerify. EK only signs self-signed certificate, which contains the channel binder as part of the evidence.

²Fossati, Sardar, Sheffer, Tschafenig, and Mihalcea, *Remote Attestation with Exported Authenticators*, 2025.

Diversion Attack

- privAK_2 compromised via e.g., Foreshadow³
- VM_2 impersonates VM_1



³Van Bulck, Minkin, Weisse, Genkin, Kasikci, Piessens, Silberstein, Wenisch, Yarom, and Strackx, "Foreshadow: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom with Transient Out-of-Order Execution", 2018.

How to assign ID and LTK?




Image credits: Thomas Fossati

Key References



Fossati, Thomas, Muhammad Usama Sardar, Yaron Sheffer, Hannes Tschofenig, and Ionuț Mihalcea. *Remote Attestation with Exported Authenticators*. Internet-Draft draft-fossati-tls-exported-attestation-00. Work in Progress. Internet Engineering Task Force, Mar. 2025. 9 pp. URL: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fossati-tls-exported-attestation/00/>.



Van Bulck, Jo, Marina Minkin, Ofir Weisse, Daniel Genkin, Baris Kasikci, Frank Piessens, Mark Silberstein, Thomas F. Wenisch, Yuval Yarom, and Raoul Strackx. "Foreshadow: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom with Transient Out-of-Order Execution". In: *Proceedings of the 27th USENIX Security Symposium*. USENIX Association, Aug. 2018.

ACK

- Laurence Lundblade (Security Theory LLC)
- Thomas Fossati (Linaro)
- Hannes Tschofenig (University of Applied Sciences Bonn-Rhein-Sieg and Siemens)
- Ionut Mihalcea (Arm)
- Yaron Sheffer (Intuit)
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- Thore Sommer (Kiel University)
- Jonathan Hoyland (Cloudflare)
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- Maryam Zarezadeh (Barkhausen Institut)