



FLORIDA STATE  
UNIVERSITY

## **ECO 5505: Graduate Public Economics**

**Professor Christopher Clapp**

**Syllabus, Fall 2016**

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Class Location: Bellamy 280

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Phone: (850) 645-0756

Class Meetings: M W 11:00am - 12:15pm

Office Hours: By appointment

### **Course Description**

What is public economics? It's the study of the role of the government in the economy, which is a very broad definition. Sub-fields of public economics focus on government programs (expenditures), taxes (revenues), the structure and process of governments (political economy), and market failures (that create an opportunity for government policies).

So where does this class fit in? At FSU, we offer three classes in the graduate Public Economics sequence. Mark's Public Goods course "explores the theory, empirical evidence, and experimental evidence regarding how human societies provide public goods," and Randy's Public Choice course examines "the role of government, public goods and externalities, voting and collective choice, bureaucracy theory, and political structure and economic organization." The official description for this course says that we'll cover "principles of taxation and debt, shifting and incidence, public expenditures and redistribution theory." We'll examine those topics from an applied microeconomics perspective, but more-so we'll try to give you a sense of the breadth of a broad and fascinating field... and develop some useful skills along the way. To do so, we'll primarily focus on reading, discussing, and understanding interesting articles in public economics.

Specifically, we'll cover taxation (focusing on incidence and efficiency), public goods, political economy, externalities, asymmetric information (both adverse selection and moral hazard), and several important government programs (unemployment insurance, social security, and welfare).

### **What's My Incentive for Taking This Course?**

My primary objective for this class is to help you begin the transition from consumers of economics to producers of economics (me too – it's a lifelong process). What's the difference? A few things....

First, it's a transition from answers to questions. In your undergraduate and core graduate courses there was an accepted body of knowledge that you had to learn and then use to find the right answers. Conducting research requires questioning existing knowledge, asking and addressing an interesting research question, and then having your work hold up to the questioning of others. This type of critical and creative thinking is an often under-emphasized skill in the early part of graduate school, so we'll work on it now by (you guessed it): questioning existing knowledge in the articles we read, asking and addressing interesting research questions in homework assignments, and having your work hold up to the questioning of others when presenting to the class.

Second, it's a transition from passive consumption of knowledge to active production of knowledge. You're almost to the point in your educational lives where you'll no longer have a "tour guide" to learning, rather you'll be taking the self-guided tour. No one graduates knowing everything and most of the problems worth tackling are really hard, so you'll grapple with things you don't understand throughout your careers. This can be really frustrating, but learning to overcome that frustration and figure things out is crucial. Fortunately, we're all in the same boat in academia (and economists understand comparative advantage), so we have access to a multitude of other references at our disposal, colleagues to work with, visitors to talk to, and reading groups where we all endeavor to understand the same thing at once. The structure of this class will often follow that of a reading group. This will likely be different than most classes you've taken before. I'll endeavor to lecture as little as possible. Rather, we'll have discussions where your input will be crucial to getting something out of the class. All this means class will require more day-to-day effort than you may be used to: you should expect to be uncertain about parts of the articles we read, but you need to work to understand them before and during class. The practice will be worth the effort in the long run. Learning requires getting one's hands dirty and this class is about that process.

Finally, being a producer of economics requires developing some professional skills. First, almost as important as what you produce is improving the production of your peers. So we'll practice "being public goods" by helping others figure out concepts they're struggling with when discussing articles and problem sets. Also, we'll practice improving the work of our peers by asking good seminar questions and giving constructive criticism when others present. Second, the work that we produce is validated by peer-review. This is a crucial part of the production of knowledge in academia and requires that we write referee reports. So you know what to do when you're asked to write a referee report, I'll give you some guidance on how they're structured and you'll write a practice ref-report. Finally, an important skill is being able to explain complex material to a varied and often hostile audience. So you'll practice presenting academic research.

Along the way you can expect to:

- Acquire an understanding of the important issues in the field.
- Apply the scientific method to research questions.
- Use the economic triple-threat (intuition/pictures/math) to analyze economic phenomena.
- Gain a greater sense of the theoretical and empirical methods public economists use.
- Appreciate the way good research motivates empirical techniques with theoretical models.
- Recognize the trade-offs between efficiency and redistribution.
- Work on developing your research skills and ideas.

## **Prerequisites**

This course is primarily designed for students in the Economics Ph.D. Program. I assume that students have taken the Ph.D. or Master's core curriculum courses in Microeconomic Theory and Econometrics. If you have not done so, please let me know within the first week of class (this isn't a deal breaker, but you will have to put in additional effort to address shortcomings in your knowledge).

## **Evaluation**

Your final grade in this course will be related to performance in several areas. The weight placed on each component will be as follows:

Class Participation	30%
Reading Questions	20%
Referee Report	10%
Problem Sets (2)	20%
Presentation	20%

Class participation grades will be based on your level of active, attentive, inquisitive participation in class discussions and assignments. Note that regular class attendance is a necessary (but not sufficient) component of earning a good class participation grade.

The structure of the class requires that everyone participates in class discussions.<sup>1</sup> As such, you are expected to have read the assigned paper(s) in depth in advance of class. To help you with this, this syllabus contains a list of questions that you should answer after you read each paper. You should be prepared to share the answers to all of these questions with the class, not just the ones you feel sure about. In addition, you should upload your answers to these questions to Blackboard by 9:00am on the day of our class meetings so I can get a sense of how everyone did with the article.

During the course of the semester, you will write a referee report on one of the articles we read. The report will be a more formal version of the answers to your reading questions, so you do not have to hand in questions if you hand in a referee report. You are free to write a report on whichever paper you choose, but you must get approval to write about the given article with me in advance (so I don't have to read too many referee reports on the same paper). This will be something that you will be asked to do throughout your career, so treat this assignment as if it is for a journal. It is far better you get some practice with this in a low stakes environment now than when you are contacted for the first time. Guidance on how to structure your referee report is included in a subsequent section of this syllabus.

There will be two problem sets, which will be posted on the FSU Blackboard site at least one week before the due date (please email to remind me if I fail to do so). The problem sets must be turned in at the start of the class on the dates indicated below. Problem sets will be designed to give you a chance to work on your modeling skills, so they will ask you how you would address some "big picture" research questions. They will be very open ended. You should form groups of three students (this will depend on the number of students who register for the class) and work out the theoretical and empirical specifications you would use to address the research question together. Everyone should complete his/her own write-up of your answer independently, but you are welcome and encouraged to turn in one problem set for the group. If members of the group differ on key parts of their write-up, you are welcome to turn in separate answers. Please be sure to include the names of everyone you work with on each problem set. I don't expect that there will be problems with free-riding, but please alert me if this becomes an issue.

In small groups of two students (again this will depend on the number of students who register for the class), you will prepare a presentation and lead a class discussion of a paper from the reading list. You will do this twice (so you can practice and improve). Groups will be determined and papers assigned later in the semester. The goal of this assignment is to give students practice presenting Economic research. Presenters should present the paper as if it was their work and students in the audience should ask questions as if they were at a seminar or conference. For presenters, this means preparing overhead slides and practicing in advance of the presentation, after reading the paper carefully. Students in the audience are required to read the paper in advance of it being presented, so they can ask good, tough questions. I will provide guidance on presentation techniques in a subsequent section of this syllabus.

I do not intend to give a final exam in this class. However, I reserve the right to add one and adjust the grade weights according if I feel that students are not putting forth sufficient effort in reading and understanding the assigned papers, completing the problem sets, or in any other area of the class.

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<sup>1</sup>It could be worse, I could make you "break into teams and debate something."

## Materials

There is no required textbook in this class, but there are references in the reading list that may come in handy (now or in the future).

## Office Hours

My office hours for this class are by appointment. I prefer that you email me to set up a time, but you can also drop-in if my door is open (although if you do the latter, I may ask you to come back at another time). I only ask that if you know in advance that you cannot make a scheduled appointment that you email me to let me know.

## Course Policies [Undergrad Stuff]

### • General

- All cell phones and other personal communication devices must be turned off in class (unless I instruct you to use them as part of a class activity). If you are expecting an emergency call prior to class, please let me know.
- The class webpage is available through the Blackboard @ FSU portal. I will use it to post announcements, assignments, and grades. Please check it regularly.
- Email is the official means of communication for out-of-class communication. In other words, you are expected to check your FSU email account regularly.
- Any and all results of in-class and out-of-class assignments and examinations are data sources for research and may be used in published research. All such use will always be anonymous.

### • Attendance

- There is no attendance requirement (beyond the first day), but regular attendance is necessary to do well in the class.

### • Assignments<sup>2</sup>

- Handing in an assignment after its due would give you an unfair advantage over your classmates, so no late assignments will be accepted for any reason, valid or otherwise.<sup>3</sup> Not turning in an assignment or handing it in late will result in a grade of zero.
- If you are unable to turn in an assignment in person, I will accept a LEGIBLE scan of your work in a SINGLE PDF document via email so long as I receive it before the end of class on the appropriate date. The legibility of scans is entirely at my discretion. I will not accept cell phone pictures of assignments (often, they're too hard to read) or a separate document for each page being submitted (they're a nuisance for me to deal with).

### • Validating Excuses

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<sup>2</sup>The reading questions, referee report, and problem sets constitute the assignments in this class.

<sup>3</sup>Reasons include, but are not limited to: illnesses, athletic competitions, work trips, job fairs, job interviews, travel reservations, relative illnesses, relative funerals, out-of-town weddings, car accidents, car trouble, scooter trouble, tickets to see Billy Joel in concert, and emergency visits to the veterinarian with your dog.

- Should you miss an exam or an extended period of class due to an illness or other valid excuse, please contact The Dean of Students Department to have your circumstances validated. Upon confirming your situation as they see fit, a member of the Department staff will contact your professors and let them know that your excuse is valid. This saves me the trouble of trying to validate student excuses (which I have no idea how to do) and saves you the hassle of presenting an excuse to multiple faculty members. Contact information for The Dean of Students Department is listed in the table that follows.<sup>4</sup>

<u>General</u>	<u>Direct Contact</u>
4th Floor of the University Center	Robert Summerill
Building A, Suite 4100	(850) 644-9555
(850) 644-2428	rsummerill@fsu.edu

- If the Dean of Students Department cannot or will not validate the reason you missed an exam, you will receive a grade of zero on that exam. There are no exceptions to this policy.

### **Academic Integrity (See also the “Academic Honor Policy” section)**

I apologize for the heavy handed tone of this section. It is intended to protect the many honest students who take my class and the University as a whole.

As a member of the Student Government Judicial Branch as an undergraduate and a graduate student at a university where any non-trivial act of lying, cheating or stealing results in expulsion, I take Florida State’s Academic Honor Policy very seriously. All alleged honor violations brought to my attention will be handled by following the Academic Honor Policy process (see [Flowchart](#)). If, in my judgment, the preponderance of the evidence indicates that a student has committed an honor violation on an assignment, that student will receive an immediate grade of zero for that assignment, regardless of the outcome of the Academic Honor Policy process. I trust every student in this course to fully comply with all of the provisions of the Academic Honor Policy.

### **University Attendance Policy**

Excused absences include documented illness, deaths in the family and other documented crises, call to active military duty or jury duty, religious holy days, and official University activities. These absences will be accommodated in a way that does not arbitrarily penalize students who have a valid excuse. Consideration will also be given to students whose dependent children experience serious illness.

### **Academic Honor Policy**

The Florida State University Academic Honor Policy outlines the University’s expectations for the integrity of students’ academic work, the procedures for resolving alleged violations of those expectations, and the rights and responsibilities of students and faculty members throughout the process. Students are responsible for reading the Academic Honor Policy and for living up to their pledge to “. . . be honest and truthful and . . . [to] strive for personal and institutional integrity at Florida State University.” (Florida State University Academic Honor Policy, found at <http://fda.fsu.edu/Academics/Academic-Honor-Policy>.)

<sup>4</sup>This information is current as of 12/2015. Please let me know if I need to update the “direct contact” information.

## **Americans With Disabilities Act**

Students with disabilities needing academic accommodation should:

1. register with and provide documentation to the Student Disability Resource Center; and
2. bring a letter to the instructor indicating the need for accommodation and what type. This should be done during the first week of class.

This syllabus and other class materials are available in alternative format upon request. For more information about services available to FSU students with disabilities, contact the:

Student Disability Resource Center  
874 Traditions Way  
108 Student Services Building  
Florida State University  
Tallahassee, FL 32306-4167  
(850) 644-9566 (voice)  
(850) 644-8504 (TDD)  
sdrc@admin.fsu.edu  
<http://www.disabilitycenter.fsu.edu/>

## **Free Tutoring from FSU**

On-campus tutoring and writing assistance is available for many courses at Florida State University. For more information, visit the Academic Center for Excellence (ACE) Tutoring Services' comprehensive list of on-campus tutoring options - see <http://ace.fsu.edu/tutoring> or contact [tutor@fsu.edu](mailto:tutor@fsu.edu). High-quality tutoring is available by appointment and on a walk-in basis. These services are offered by tutors trained to encourage the highest level of individual academic success while upholding personal academic integrity.

## **Syllabus Change Policy**

“Except for changes that substantially affect implementation of the evaluation (grading) statement, this syllabus is a guide for the course and is subject to change with advance notice.”

## Reading Academic Papers<sup>5</sup>

You are responsible for reading all assigned papers in depth and you should take notes on all of the papers we read. To help guide you when you read, please answer the following questions.

Overall:

1. What are the concrete questions studied in the paper?
2. Why do we care?
3. What is the bottom line of the paper?
4. What are the contributions of the paper? How do these relate to what we already knew?

If theoretical:

5. What is the model (simple sketch)?
6. Is the model a variation of other familiar models?
7. What are the main results?
8. What are the key forces (assumptions) and insights at work?

If empirical:

9. What is the theoretical model behind the analysis?
10. What is the empirical model? What are the parameters to be estimated?
11. What is the estimation strategy? What are the identifying assumptions?
12. What is the data?
13. What are the main results?

In both cases:

14. What are the problems with the analysis (what qualifications might apply to the analysis)?
15. Can these problems be solved? How?
16. Come up with 1-3 ideas for future research (improve an extend the analysis, new research ideas).
17. Evaluation. Suppose that you are a referee for the journal where the paper is published or the AER if it is unpublished. Would you accept the paper as it is? Accept subject to some changes? Revise and resubmit without commitment? Reject? Provide a justification for your decision and, if necessary, describe the required changes.

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<sup>5</sup>This guide is modified slightly from a set of questions produced by Dr. Amalia Miller.

## Referee Report Guidelines

These guidelines come in two parts. The first is an overview based on my limited experience in writing referee reports.<sup>6</sup> The second is a list of references and links to additional material.

### My Guidelines

- Plan to read any article you referee multiple times. First, read it to get a sense of the topic and the methods the authors use. Then take a few days to think about the paper and how you would have approached the research question. Next, read the paper in detail and take notes. Draft your referee report. Finally, reread the paper to make sure your comments are accurate.
- Referee reports consist of two parts: a cover letter to the editor and a detailed report.
- Use the cover letter to offer your specific recommendation (accept, revise and resubmit, or reject).
  - Your recommendation should take into account the quality of the paper, the quality of the paper relative to the quality of the journal, and whether the paper fits the scope of the journal.
  - It is uncommon to accept a paper after the first round of review.
    - \* If you recommend a revision, describe the issues you expect the authors to address and differentiate between major and minor points. Be sure to list those issues that you feel are essential for publication.
    - \* If you recommend rejection, briefly describe why you do so. Suggest other journals the authors should consider.
  - The cover letter is a separate document for the editor. The authors will not see it.
- The detailed report consists of two sections: your overall assessment and specific comments.
  - Overall Assessment
    - \* You should begin the overall assessment with a few paragraphs that describe what question the authors tried to answer, what they did to answer the question, and what they achieved. This is to ensure that you and the authors are “on the same page.” You do not need to give a recap of each part of the paper. Rather, try to place the paper in the overall context of the literature. Does the paper represent a contribution to the literature? Does it advance what we know about the topic?
    - \* Note that your overall recommendation to the editor should not explicitly appear in the report. However, make apparent the reasoning behind your recommendation.
  - Comments
    - \* Continue your report with detailed comments. You should divide them into major and minor, order them as they appear in the paper, or group them according to category.
    - \* Generally, it makes sense to discuss the major shortcomings in the paper first. Focus on (a) important ways the paper could be improved in order to better answer the research question you identified, (b) why the paper fails to answer the question it poses, why the question is uninteresting, whether an alternate approach would be better suited to the topic, and/or whether the question is unanswerable given the current methods and/or data.

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<sup>6</sup>Fortunately, this section is modified slightly from a guide produced by Dr. Leora Friedberg.



- \* Next, discuss less important deficiencies, both in the implementation of the theoretical or empirical work and in the exposition (including copy-editing suggestions such as misspellings, grammatical mistakes, etc.). In terms of exposition, consider suggesting ways in which the paper can be shortened.
- Be as specific as possible in your comments. If something about the paper bothers you, think about its implications for the paper as a whole and potential fixes. If it cannot be fixed, decide how you think it should be discussed in the paper. If it can be fixed, discuss how you would expect the authors to do so.
- Each comment should cite a section, page, and/or paragraph where the problem occurs. Number the pages and comments in your report. This will make writing a response to your comments much easier, and it will make it easier for you to read those responses.
- The report itself is anonymous, so don't include your name. The editor will want to pass the report along to the authors without making modifications to the document.
- For your class referee reports, you do not need to write a cover letter and you may omit noting all copy-editing errors, however, you should include your name and explicitly state your overall recommendation as part of your "overall assessment."

## References

- Masayuki Kudamatsu maintains a website of "[TIPS for Economists](#)" that contains links to references on "How to write a referee report" and "Seminar Presentation," amongst many other things.
- [Thomson \[2011\]](#) is a great general reference that contains a lot of information about "how to be an economist," including a chapter titled "Writing Referee Reports."
  - I've posted a PDF of that chapter from [Thomson \[2001\]](#) on Blackboard.

## Presentation Guidelines

I'll give you a few suggestions that I see as being key ingredients in a good presentation, then I'll defer to those with more authority on the subject.

### My Guidelines

- Treat your presentation like a mix of a sales pitch and reading a story.
  - That it's a sales pitch means you have to sell your work... and yourself. Be sure to be excited about your research!
  - Since you're telling us a story, make sure you transition cleanly from one idea to the next. Organize and link your ideas in a coherent manner.
- Your first slide should be something to get us interested in your presentation. This might be a surprising pattern in the data, a sense of the magnitude of an inefficiency, a puzzle in the Economics literature, etc.
- Your second (no later than third) slide should tell us, in broad strokes, what you're doing and why it's interesting/innovative/cool (remember, be excited). That's about all the time you'll have before people start asking questions. Get to the good stuff quick!

- Preview your results. The probability that you won't get to them at the end is not zero.
  - A corollary, keep an eye on your time and know what you can skip over if you're behind. Make sure you have a way to transition past the skipped material without making subsequent slides confusing.
- When presenting your literature review, outline relevant information that we know from the literature, then fill in with specific examples. DO NOT list papers and tell us what they said. Tell a story!
- When presenting complex equations, explain the big picture. What does each term represent and why is it in the model? Just about everyone in your audience will require longer to digest the equations than you'll spend on the slide, so explain the forest for the trees.
- Use intuitive stories and examples to explain complex concepts, but also know how those examples function in terms of the theory/empirics of your work.
- Your slides and bullet points should be succinct.
- Practice your presentation in advance! Next, revise your presentation based on your practice presentation. Finally, repeat this process several times for as many different audiences as you can muster (pets, significant others, and fellow graduate students are all great candidate audiences). Do so until you can give a crisp, precise, and lively presentation without looking at your slides. DO NOT READ YOUR SLIDES TO YOUR AUDIENCE!

## References

- As for the experts, Cawley [2014], Section 5c (Job Talk) provides a thorough overview of presenting in academia (although you'll probably want to read the whole article at some point to get a sense of what going on the job market entails).
- Pay particular attention to Shapiro's "How to Give an Applied Micro Talk" slides, especially how few words are on each slide!
- Also, take note of the general ideas in Schwabish [2014]. Economists are generally pretty bad at data visualization. This means that there's probably room for improvement over the figures in the articles you are presenting. It also means that you have the potential to impress people on the job market with your figures. Just don't let your presentation come at the expense of content.
- Also, Chapter 3 of Thomson [2011] is titled "Giving Talks."
  - An earlier version of the book, Thomson [2001], is available in an electronic version through the FSU library.

## Tentative Course Outline

The weekly coverage might change as it depends on the progress of the class.

Preliminary Course Schedule for Graduate Public Economics					
Week	Date	Day	Topic/Assignment	Papers	Presenters
1	08/29	Mon	Introduction		
	08/31	Wed	Tax	Chetty, Looney & Kroft (2009)	
2	09/05	Mon	<b>Labor Day – No Class</b>		
	09/07	Wed	Tax	Doyle & Samphantharak (2008)	
3	09/12	Mon	Tax	Bento, Goulder, Jacobsen & von Haefen (2009)	
	09/14	Wed	Tax	Chetty (2008) – Suf. Stats.	
4	09/19	Mon	Public Goods	Browning, Bourgignon, Chiappori & Lechene (1994)	
	09/21	Wed	Political Economy	Tiebout (1956) and Bewley (1981)	
5	09/26	Mon	Political Economy	Banzhaf & Walsh (2008)	
	09/28	Wed	Externalities	Parry, Walls & Harrington (2007)	
6	10/03	Mon	<b>Problem Set 1 Presentations/Discussion</b>		
	10/05	Wed	Public Goods	Black (1999)	
7	10/10	Mon	Asymmetric Information	Rothschild & Stiglitz (1976)	
	10/12	Wed	Externalities	Muehlenbachs, Spiller & Timmins (2014)	BT & CW
8	10/17	Mon	Adverse Selection	Finkelstein & Poterba (2004)	
	10/19	Wed	Moral Hazard	Kaestner, Darden & Lakdawalla (2013)	
9	10/24	Mon	Adverse Selection	Finkelstein & McGarry (2006)	BB & EH
	10/26	Wed	Moral Hazard	Pichler & Ziebarth (2016)	AN & RG
10	10/31	Mon	Unemployment Insurance	Meyer (1995)	
	11/02	Wed	<b>Problem Set 2 Presentations/Discussion</b>		
11	11/07	Mon	Unemployment Insurance	Card, Johnston, Leung, Mas & Pei (2015)	
	11/09	Wed	<b>UEA Meetings – No Class</b>		
12	11/14	Mon	Welfare	Moffitt (2002)	
	11/16	Wed	Welfare	Miller & Zhang (2012)	BT & CW
13	11/21	Mon	Social Security	Engelhardt & Gruber (2004) & Background	
	11/23	Wed	<b>Gobble, Gobble! – No Class</b>		
14	11/28	Mon	Social Security	Manoli & Weber (2016)	
	11/30	Wed	Wild Card	Duranton & Turner (2011)	AN & RG
15	12/05	Mon	Wild Card	Currie & Walker (2011)	BB & EH
	12/07	Wed	Wild Card	TBD	
Final	12/09	Fri	Final exam from 10:00am–12:00pm (if necessary)		

## Reading List

This list is too long to read every paper. I will let you know which papers you should read in advance of the class in which they will be discussed.

- General References

- Books

- \* Graduate

- A.B. Atkinson and J.E. Stiglitz. *Lectures on public economics*. Economics handbook series. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1980. ISBN 9780070841055. URL <http://books.google.com/books?id=iwOzAAAAIAAJ>
      - G.D. Myles. *Public Economics*. Public Economics. Cambridge University Press, 1995. ISBN 9780521497213. URL <http://books.google.com/books?id=IapgQgAACAAJ>
      - B. Salanié. *The Economics of Taxation*. MIT Press, 2011. ISBN 9780262016346. URL <http://books.google.com/books?id=UYb6AQAAQBAJ>

- \* Undergraduate

- J. Gruber. *Public Finance and Public Policy*. Worth Publishers. Worth Publishers, 2012. ISBN 9781429278454. URL <http://books.google.com/books?id=FEIoMAEACAAJ>
      - H. Rosen and T. Gayer. *Public Finance*. McGraw-Hill Companies, Incorporated, 2008. ISBN 9780073511283. URL <http://books.google.com/books?id=7S2zAAAAIAAJ>
      - L.S. Seidman. *Public Finance*. McGraw-Hill Series in Public Finance. McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2008. ISBN 9780073375748. URL <http://books.google.com/books?id=u5IbAQAAMAAJ>

- Articles

- \* Martin Feldstein. The transformation of public economics research: 1970-2000. *Journal of Public Economics*, 86(3):319–326, 2002. ISSN 0047-2727. doi: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727\(01\)00190-6](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00190-6). URL <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272701001906>. Symposium Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the Initial publication of the Journal of Public Economics

- Taxes

- Classic Papers

- \* Arnold C. Harberger. The measurement of waste. *The American Economic Review*, 54(3):pp. 58–76, 1964. ISSN 00028282. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1818490>
    - \* Alan J. Auerbach and James R. Hines Jr. Taxation and economic efficiency. Working Paper 8181, National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2001. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w8181>
      - Also, Handbook of Public Economics, Volume 3.
      - Read pages 1-14.
    - \* J. A. Mirrlees. An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 38(2):pp. 175–208, 1971. ISSN 00346527. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2296779>

- Incidence

- \* Raj Chetty, Adam Looney, and Kory Kroft. Salience and taxation: Theory and evidence. *The American Economic Review*, 99(4):1145–1177, 2009. doi: doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.1145. URL <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.99.4.1145>
- \* Jérôme Adda and Francesca Cornaglia. Taxes, cigarette consumption, and smoking intensity. *American Economic Review*, 96(4):1013–1028, 2006. doi: 10.1257/aer.96.4.1013. URL <http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.96.4.1013>
- \* Jacob Goldin and Tatiana Homonoff. Smoke gets in your eyes: Cigarette tax salience and regressivity. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 5(1):302–36, 2013. doi: 10.1257/pol.5.1.302. URL <http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.5.1.302>
- \* E. Glen Weyl and Michal Fabinger. Pass-through as an economic tool: Principles of incidence under imperfect competition. *Journal of Political Economy*, 121(3):pp. 528–583, 2013. ISSN 00223808. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/670401>
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