The Production Function for Housing: Evidence from France

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We propose a new nonparametric approach to estimate the production function for housing. Our estimation treats output as a latent variable and relies on a first-order condition for profit maximization combined with a zero-profit condition. More desirable locations command higher land prices and, in turn, more capital to build houses. For parcels of a given size, we compute housing production by summing across the marginal products of capital. For newly built single-family homes in France, the production function for housing is close to constant returns and is well, though not perfectly, approximated by a Cobb-Douglas function with a capital elasticity of 0.65.

I. Introduction

A good understanding of the supply of housing is important for a number of reasons. First, housing is an unusually important good. It arguably provides an essential service to households and represents more than 30% of their expenditure in both France and the United States (Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon 2019). It is also an important asset. French households owned about $4.6 trillion worth of housing in 2011 (Mauro 2013). The value of the US residential stock owned by households was around $20 trillion in 2007 (Gyourko 2009). For both countries, this represents about 180% of their gross domestic product.

Housing and the construction industry also matter to the broader economy. The construction industry is arguably an important driver of the business cycle (e.g., Davis and Heathcote 2005). The role of housing in the Great Recession has been studied by, among others, Kiyotaki, Michaelides, and Nikolov (2011) and Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015). The broader effects of housing are not limited to the business cycle. Housing has also been argued to affect a variety of aggregate variables, such as unemployment (Head and Lloyd-Ellis 2012; Rupert and Wasmer 2012) and economic growth (Davis, Fisher, and Whited 2014; Hsieh and Moretti 2019).

Finally, and most importantly, housing is also central to our understanding of cities. Different locations within a city offer different levels of accessibility to jobs and amenities. Housing production is crucial in transforming households' demand for locations into patterns of land use and housing consumption. Unsurprisingly, housing is at the heart of land use models in the spirit of Alonso (1964), Mills (1967), and Muth (1969) that form the core of modern urban economics. Related to this, the welfare consequences of land use regulations depend on the shape of the housing production function (Larson and Yezer 2015). For instance, the consequences of minimum lot size requirements will depend on how easily substitutable land is in the production of housing.

Following Muth's (1969, 1975) pioneering efforts, there is a long tradition of work estimating production functions for housing. Some of this work mirrors standard practice in productivity studies and regresses a measure of housing output on land and other construction inputs ("capital"). Unfortunately, it is hard to separate the unit price of housing from the (quality-adjusted) amount of housing that a house offers. Then, a regression of the value of a house on land and capital is likely to have an error term correlated with the unit price of housing. Since we expect this price to determine the quantity of capital, the regression will not appropriately identify the production function for housing. This is a version of the unobserved price/unobserved quality problem that plagues the estimation of production functions (Ackerberg et al. 2007; Syverson 2011).

A popular alternative is to estimate the elasticity of substitution between land and capital directly by regressing the ratio of capital to land inputs on

the unit price of land. Because the price of land is equal to the value of a house minus the replacement cost of capital, this regression potentially suffers from severe reverse causation. With these important estimation caveats in mind, extant results are generally supportive of constant returns to scale in the production of housing, and estimates for the elasticity of substitution between land and other inputs typically range between 0.50 and 0.75.[1]

To summarize, housing is highly heterogeneous, and its unit price is unobserved. To produce housing, land, an immobile factor whose price varies greatly across locations, plays a particularly important role. These features call for specific estimation techniques, impose strong data constraints, and require careful attention to the sources of variation used for identification.

To meet our first challenge and separate the quantity of housing from its price per unit, we develop a novel estimation approach that relies on three main assumptions. First, we assume a production function for housing that uses land and capital as primary factors. Since it cannot be directly observed, the quantity of housing is best thought of as a latent variable. Second, house builders maximize profit. They choose how much capital to use in order to build a house on a particular parcel of land, given the price that households are willing to pay for housing on this parcel. Third, we assume free entry among builders.

The first-order condition for profit maximization by competitive house builders pins down the marginal value product of capital. Then, under free entry, the difference between the price of a house and the cost of the capital used to produce it should be equal to the price of the land parcel. We can use this zero-profit condition to eliminate the price of housing from the first-order condition and obtain a partial differential equation that links the marginal product of capital to the quantity of housing produced and the expenditure on both factors. For a given parcel size, this partial differential equation can be solved to obtain a nonparametric estimate of the amount of housing as a function of capital. Because our estimation is conditional on parcel size, the production function for housing is only partially identified.[2]

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[1] Thorsnes (1997) provides an interesting exception. He estimates an elasticity of substitution between land and other inputs statistically indistinguishable from one, using high-quality data for which he observes both the price of land before construction and the price of the house when it is sold.

[2] To estimate production functions, Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers (2020) jointly use the first-order condition for profit maximization and the production function to eliminate unobserved persistent firm heterogeneity in productivity. This leads them to derive a partial differential equation similar to ours. For partial identification of the production function of housing, we rely on only the integration of this differential equation. For full identification, we make further assumptions about returns to scale in production. By contrast, Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers (2020) make assumptions about the dynamics of productivity, insert the related equation into the production function, and estimate the resulting specification that includes both the current and lagged values of inputs. *(continued on next page)*

The second challenge is to find appropriate data. Our methodology requires information about the price of land parcels, their size, and the cost of construction. The unique data we use satisfy these requirements. They consist of several large annual cross sections of land parcels sold in France with a building permit for a single-family home for which we know the subsequent building cost.

Given our approach and the data at hand, the third challenge is to use an appropriate source of variation. Although our estimation technique is nonstandard, it remains that the supply of housing should be identified from the variation in the demand for housing across parcels. We develop a novel procedure, inspired by instrumental variable approaches, that relies on exploiting the variation in systematic determinants of the demand for housing, such as the city of a parcel and its location within this city, while conditioning out potentially confounding supply factors, such as the nature of the soil and the wage of construction workers.

We obtain three main results. First, we find that the elasticity of housing production with respect to capital is roughly constant at 0.65. As a first-order approximation, housing is produced under constant returns to scale and is Cobb-Douglas in land and capital. This said, we can nonetheless formally reject that the housing production function is Cobb-Douglas and constant returns. We can also reject more general functional forms such as the CES (constant elasticity of substitution). Finally, we find evidence of an elasticity of substitution slightly below one between land and capital.

In the recent literature, we note the work of Yoshida (2016). He develops a new approach to account for capital depreciation in housing and shows that standard estimates of the elasticity of substitution between land and other inputs can be sensitive to how depreciation is accounted for. Albouy and Ehrlich (2018) estimate a cost function for the production of housing at the city level. Their objective is to explore the determinants and implications of differences in housing productivity across cities. While our focus is to obtain a better measure of the amount of housing, Albouy and Ehrlich (2018) measure it simply, using standard hedonics in an intermediate step. Finally, our work is most closely related to that of Epple, Gordon, and Sieg (2010) and subsequent work by Ahlfeldt and McMillen (2020), who also treat housing as a latent variable. We postpone a detailed comparison with their work until later.

Our approach consists of eliminating the unobserved price of output, and we rely on information about input prices and quantities. An alternative solution to this problem is to impose further assumptions about the structure of demand, as in Klette and Griliches (1996) or De Loecker (2011). The production function can then be recovered from an extended productivity regression. Because standard assumptions about demand and industry structure made for manufacturing goods are questionable in our context, this type of approach is not appropriate here.

II.   Treating Housing Production as a Latent Variable

We first introduce the simplest version of our model with homogenous factors. We then consider factor heterogeneity before discussing some of our assumptions further and making a detailed comparison with Epple, Gordon, and Sieg (2010).

A.   Base Model

House builders produce a quantity of housing H, using land T and non-land inputs or capital K.[3] The production technology $H(K, T)$ is strictly increasing and concave in K.

Land is exogenously partitioned into parcels, which differ in their area T and in their other characteristics, denoted x. These characteristics, which include location, determine the demand for housing on a parcel of land. A unit of housing on a parcel fetches a price, $P(x)$, that reflects the willingness to pay of residents to live there. This price is taken as given by competitive house builders. A builder, who develops a parcel of size T and characteristics x purchased at the endogenously determined price R, seeks to maximize profits $\pi = P(x)H(K, T) - K - R$ with respect to K after normalizing the price of capital to one. Below, we extend this model to allow for supply differences between parcels, for the price of capital to vary across locations, for heterogeneity in the composition of capital, and for endogenous parcel size.

The first-order condition for profit maximization with respect to housing capital is

$$P(x)\frac{\partial H(K, T)}{\partial K} = 1. \tag{1}$$

The optimal amount of capital that satisfies this condition is given implicitly by $K^* = K^*(P(x), T)$. Because the production function for housing $H(\cdot, \cdot)$ is concave in K, K^* is unique, given T. Applying the implicit-function theorem to equation (1), the concavity of $H(\cdot, \cdot)$ also implies that $\partial K^*/\partial P > 0$. Hence, there is a bijection between the price of housing and the profit-maximizing level of capital for any T, and we can write $P(x) = P(K^*, T)$.

Then, free entry implies that the profit from construction is dissipated into the price of a parcel:

$$R = P(K^*, T)H(K^*, T) - K^* \equiv R(K^*, T). \tag{2}$$

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[3] Nonland inputs are essentially construction labor and materials, which both get frozen into housing through the construction process. This is consistent with the usual definition of capital.

Note that the price of a parcel in equilibrium is uniquely defined for any K^* and T.

While in the data described below we observe K^*, T, and $R(K^*, T)$, we cannot separately measure $P(x)$ and $H(K^*, T)$. We observe only the product $P(x)H(K^*, T)$. To eliminate the unit price of housing $P(x)$, we can insert equation (1) into equation (2) and obtain the following partial differential equation:

$$\frac{\partial H(K^*, T)}{\partial K^*} = \frac{H(K^*, T)}{K^* + R(K^*, T)}. \tag{3}$$

For consistency with our empirical work below, we can rewrite this expression, using natural logarithms on the left-hand side:

$$\frac{\partial \log H(K^*, T)}{\partial \log K^*} = \frac{K^*}{K^* + R(K^*, T)}. \tag{4}$$

In words, at the competitive equilibrium, the elasticity of housing production with respect to capital is equal to the share of capital in the cost of building a house.[4]

Consider that for parcels of size $T \in [\underline{T}, \overline{T}]$, parcel characteristics vary so that the price of housing is distributed over the interval $[\underline{P}, \overline{P}]$. The optimal level of capital in housing K^* then covers the interval $[\underline{K}, \overline{K}]$, where $\underline{K} = K^*(\underline{P}, T)$ and $\overline{K} = K^*(\overline{P}, T)$. The solution to the differential equation (4) for a given value of the optimal amount of capital inputs K^* in this interval is readily obtained by integration and can be written as

$$\log H(K^*, T) = \int_{\underline{K}}^{K^*} \frac{K}{K + R(K, T)} \, \mathrm{dlog}\, K + \log Z(T), \tag{5}$$

where $Z(T)$ is a positive function equal to $H(\underline{K}, T)$. Equation (5) enables the computation of the (unobserved) number of units of housing on a parcel of size T, knowing the (observed) prices of parcels of the same size and the (observed) amounts of capital invested to build on them.

The intuition behind this result is relatively straightforward. Parcels differ in desirability and thus in their unit price for housing. This price is not observed, but it appears in both the optimal capital investment rule described by the first-order condition (1) and in the zero-profit condition (2). We can use the latter equation to substitute for the price of housing in the

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[4] The equality between the elasticity of output with respect to an input and this input's share in cost is often used in the literature, since the cost share of inputs is usually readily available from firm data and can be used to estimate the output elasticity. See Klein (1953) and Solow (1957) for two early applications and Syverson (2011) for a more recent discussion. In a different spirit, De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and followers use the difference between an input's cost share and its output elasticity under imperfect competition to recover price markups. We differ from the literature by what we do next, as we integrate "individual" cost shares to recover output and separate it from prices.

former and derive differential equation (3) or its log equivalent in equation (4). We then readily obtain log H in equation (5) by integration over log K.

To illustrate the workings of equation (5) and check the consistency of our approach, consider first a Cobb-Douglas production function. In this case, the price of land, R, and the capital used to build a house, K, are proportional. This implies that the term within the integral is constant. As a result, log H is proportional to log K. That is, we retrieve a Cobb-Douglas form. To take another example, assume now that the production function has a CES between land and capital $\sigma = 2$. Then, profit maximization implies that capital should increase with the square of parcel price, given parcel size. Integrating the share of capital as in equation (5) implies that the production of housing is proportional to $(\sqrt{K} + z)^2$ where z is a constant. This functional form is indeed the generic functional form for a CES production function with an elasticity of substitution equal to 2 when a factor (land) is held constant.

B.   Factor Heterogeneity

An important assumption of our model so far is that land and capital are both homogeneous factors. We worry that parcels may differ in their ability to supply housing, that the price of housing capital differs across locations, and that housing capital is heterogeneous. We address these three concerns in turn.

Starting with land, consider first a simple illustrative example where all parcels are of unit size and the demand for housing is the same everywhere, with $P(x) = P = 1$. Assume that housing is produced according to $H(K, y) = y^{1-a} K^a / a$. The shifter y measures the ease of construction, which differs across parcels. Then, capital is given in equilibrium by $K(y) = y$, and parcel prices capitalize the ease of construction, $R(y) = (1 - a)y / a = (1 - a)K / a$. Using equation (5) to estimate the value of housing while ignoring y would wrongly imply that the production of housing is linear in K instead of being proportional to K^a.

More generally, assume that parcels are now characterized by two sets of characteristics, x and y. The characteristics x still affect the price that residents are willing to pay for housing, $P(x)$, while the characteristics y affect the production of housing directly, which is now given by $H(K, T, y)$. The analogue to the first-order condition (1) is $P(x)\partial H(K, T, y)/\partial K = 1$. The zero-profit condition also implies that y affects the price of land directly: $R(K^*, T, y) = P(x)H(K^*, T, y) - K^*$. The partial differential equation analogous to equation (4) is then

$$\frac{\partial \log H(K^*, T, y)}{\partial \log K^*} = \frac{K^*}{K^* + R(K^*, T, y)}, \qquad (6)$$

where $K^* = K^*(P(x), T, y)$ and $R(K^*, T, y)$ both depend on y and there is no longer a unique mapping between R and K^*, given T. Hence, if we ignore y when we integrate equation (6), the computed quantity will depend on a mixture of values for y and will not recover the true H, even in cases where y is uncorrelated with P, as in our simple example above.

A first possible solution to this problem is to note that equation (6) can still be integrated for a given y. Hence, if y is observed, we can still identify $H(K, T, y)$ for each T and y. For instance, it may be cheaper to build on flat terrain. In this case, we can still identify how H varies with K, depending on parcel size and the slope of the terrain. A limitation of this approach is that we may run out of statistical power, as there are potentially many supply characteristics to consider.

A second solution is to obtain parametric predictions of K^* and R that both explicitly rely on demand factors x and condition out potential supply factors y in a first step. With $K^* = K^*(P(x), T, y) \equiv K^*(x, T, y)$ and $R = R(K^*(P(x), T, y), T, y) \equiv R(x, T, y)$, we can regress K^* and R on the parcel characteristics x that affect only the demand for housing, parcel area T, and the characteristics y that affect the supply of housing. We then reconstruct investment in housing capital and parcel price for a set value of y, say, its average $\bar{y}$, as $\hat{K} = \hat{K}^*(x, T, \bar{y})$ and $\hat{R} = \hat{R}(x, T, \bar{y})$. Equation (6) then becomes

$$\frac{\partial \log H(\hat{K}, T, \bar{y})}{\partial \log \hat{K}} = \frac{\hat{K}}{\hat{K} + \hat{R}}, \tag{7}$$

which can be readily integrated, like equation (4).

While we postpone further discussion of how we implement this approach and extend it for the possible additional endogeneity of T, we note that it relies on the same principle as standard instrumental variables approaches. We exploit the (conditional) variation of exogenous variables x to predict K and R under the exclusion restriction that x does not play any role in $H(\cdot)$ after conditioning out supply characteristics, y.[5]

Turning to capital, a first issue is that the price of construction material or, perhaps more likely, the price of construction labor (also embedded

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[5] Our approach also resembles that of Olley and Pakes (1996) and followers. Like them, we worry that a shock y, unobserved to us but not to the house builder, affects the choice of both input and output. In Olley and Pakes (1996), capital evolves over time, following new investments affected by the shock y. Since the investment function $I = I(y, K)$ increases with y, given K, it can be inverted to obtain $y = y(K, I)$. Then, y can be replaced by this last expression in the production function, $H(K, T, y) = H(K, T, y(K, I))$. Hence, the key parameters of the production function are estimated thanks to an economic proxy, investment, for unobserved shocks. In our case, we have $K^*(x, T, y)$ and $R(x, T, y)$, and we use the variations of observed proxies for x and y to predict K^* and R. The two main differences are that, first, we implement our approach by predicting the inputs $\hat{K}^*(x, T, \bar{y})$ and $\hat{R}(x, T, \bar{y})$ for a given $y = \bar{y}$ instead of using a control function and, second, we use exogenous proxies for y instead of an endogenous variable as in Olley and Pakes (1996).

in K) may differ across parcels. Instead of being normalized to one everywhere, the unit price of capital is now denoted r. The analogue to the first-order condition analogous to equation (1) is $P(x)\partial H(K, T)/\partial K = r$. With the zero-profit condition, $R(K^*, T, r) = P(x)H(K^*, T) - rK^*$, the partial differential equation analogous to equation (4) is now

$$\frac{\partial \log H(K^*, T)}{\partial \log K^*} = \frac{rK^*}{rK^* + R(K^*, T, r)}, \tag{8}$$

where we observe rK^* and T in the data but cannot separate r from K^*.

As with heterogeneous parcels, we cannot, in general, integrate this expression irrespective of r, since this variable affects the price of land independently of K^*. Importantly, differences in price for housing capital do not create any problem in the Cobb-Douglas case where the value of land R depends only linearly on rK^*. In this particular case, the cost ratio in equation (8) is a constant, as noted above.

There are two possible solutions to the issues raised by heterogeneous prices for housing capital. They mirror those proposed above for heterogeneous land. First, we can reasonably assume that differences in the price of housing capital consist mainly of differences in construction costs across cities and, to a lesser extent perhaps, differences between more or less central locations within cities.[6] We can thus integrate equation (8) separately for different subsamples of observations likely to face the same price of housing capital, because they belong either to the same city or to the same type of location, central or suburban. Alternatively, we can also use information about the wages of construction workers by city, condition them out of parcel prices and housing capital, and then use the residualized values instead of the actual ones in our estimation.

Finally, we turn to the possible heterogeneity of the composition of capital itself. In our context, it is natural to assume two types of capital. The first produces "raw floor space," while the second produces "housing quality." House builders maximize their profits with respect to both K_1 and K_2. In the data, we observe only total capital, $K = K_1 + K_2$. In appendix A, we show that, despite the heterogeneity of capital, our approach still recovers the quantity of housing for a given T.

A complication arises when the use of one type of capital, say K_1 to produce floor space, is subject to local regulatory constraints, such as a cap. As we show in appendix A, the elasticity of housing with respect to capital

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[6] Another source of differences in construction costs across parcels may arise from economies of scale associated with being able to build many houses at the same location at the same time vs. building only one house. While this is a concern, we show in the next section that it is unlikely to be a first-order issue here, since most new houses in France are infills that are built individually or in very small numbers. The caveat is nonetheless that we estimate the production function for one house, not for builders who may build several houses jointly.

is then of the form $K^*/(K^* + R(K^*, T, \overline{K}_1))$, where $\overline{K}_1$ is a cap on floor space capital and $K^* = \overline{K}_1 + K_2^*$. As with heterogeneous land parcels or heterogeneous prices of capital, there is an extra argument entering the price of parcels, so that the cost share cannot be integrated directly to recover the quantity of housing. To handle this issue, we distinguish between new constructions subject to stricter land use regulations and those subject to less strict ones. We postpone further discussion of land use regulations.

C. Further Threats

We assume competitive developers operating with nonincreasing marginal returns to capital on exogenously determined parcels. Because of the ease of entry in this industry, our assumption of competitive builders strikes us as reasonable.[7] Then, our results below strongly support our assumption of decreasing marginal returns to capital. Section VII relaxes the assumption of exogenous parcel size and provides evidence against the endogenous determination of parcel size.

We also assume in our model that housing is homogeneous. This assumption is core to our approach, since it allows us to think in terms of units of housing that can be measured and compared across houses purchased by different households.[8] In defense of this assumption, we note first that we mainly consider the construction cost of houses before they get fully customized. In a robustness check, we use available information about the degree of completion of houses. Should housing heterogeneity matter, we expect that it will matter more for houses at a more advanced state of completion. In another robustness check, we conduct separate estimations for different socioeconomic groups of buyers, who may compete in different segments of the market.

Our model of housing construction is static and ignores a range of dynamic issues. First, housing prices may diverge over time across locations. Below, we extend our model to two periods and show how differences in expectations about future prices across locations affect our estimations. Second, we ignore that housing development is, to a large extent, an irreversible decision. Under uncertainty, irreversible development implies that the price of vacant land includes an option value to develop it. This

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[7] A search on the French yellow pages (http://www.pagesjaunes.fr/) yields 1,783 single-family house builders for Paris (the largest urban area, with a population above 12 million), 111 for Rennes (the 10th largest urban area, with a population of 654,000), and still 38 for Troyes (the 50th largest urban area, with a population of 188,000). The search was conducted on May 21, 2013, looking for "*constructeurs de maisons individuelles*"—builders of single family homes—by typing "Ile-de-France" to capture the urban area of Paris and "Rennes *et son agglomération*" and "Troyes *et son agglomération*" for the other two cities.

[8] The polar opposite implies that each house is a uniquely differentiated variety over which residents have unique idiosyncratic preferences. Our approach is unable to deal with such an extreme case, where each and every resident values each and every house differently, since the notion of a common unit of housing is no longer well defined.

option value of waiting is highest for marginal parcels at the urban fringe. We omit this issue here because most parcels in the data are more centrally located, as we show below.

Finally, we assume that the price of housing on a parcel does not depend on the intensity of its development. This is a simplification, because single-family homes are indivisible (by definition) and the price per unit of housing may decline with the quantity of housing offered by a house, at least beyond a certain quantity. In this case, house builders are no longer price takers, since the unit price of housing is also determined by the quantity of housing built: $P(x, H)$. In turn, the first-order condition analogous to equation (1) contains a term in $\partial P/\partial H$ that can no longer be eliminated by using the zero-profit condition.

D. Comparison with Epple, Gordon, and Sieg (2010)

We now compare our approach with that of Epple, Gordon, and Sieg (2010). Appendix B provides formal derivations. Like us, those authors develop a nonparametric estimation of the housing production function, using restrictions from theory, and treat output as a latent variable. The first substantive difference is that our approach may be viewed as the primal of their dual approach. We rely on the first-order condition for profit maximization after eliminating the unobserved unit price of housing using a zero-profit condition. From the resulting partial differential equation, we can then provide an explicit solution for housing quantities. Epple, Gordon, and Sieg (2010) rely instead on duality theory and Hotelling's lemma to recover the supply function of housing before computing the production function. This is a less direct route that relies on a more intricate differential equation with no closed-form solution. Second, we make no restriction regarding returns to scale. Epple, Gordon, and Sieg (2010) impose instead constant returns to scale in the production of housing. Empirically, we show below that we can reject constant returns. In appendix B, we rework their approach in the absence of constant returns to scale. Third, and most importantly, we tackle various forms of factor heterogeneity, which Epple, Gordon, and Sieg (2010) do not consider.

Other differences with Epple, Gordon, and Sieg (2010) are more cosmetic. We exploit information about capital K, parcel prices R, and land areas T, whereas they use house values PH instead of capital together with parcel prices and land areas. This difference is superficial because both approaches impose the same zero-profit condition, $PH = K + R$. Hence, capital can be immediately obtained by subtracting parcel prices from house values. Finally, we implement our approach on very different data: newly built houses for an entire country instead of assessed land values for all houses in a single city, Pittsburgh. For comparison purposes, we estimate a variant of their approach on our data below.

III. Data

The observations in our data are transacted land parcels with a building permit that are extracted from the French Survey of Developable Land Price (Enquête Prix des Terrains à Bâtir). This survey has been conducted every year in France since 2006 by the French Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development, and Energy. The sampling frame is drawn from Sitadel, the official land registry, which covers the universe of all building permits for detached houses. The survey selects building permits for owner-occupied, single-family homes. Permits for extensions to existing houses are excluded. For a small fraction of parcels (less than 3% in 2006), there is also a demolition permit. Our study period covers transactions from 2006 to 2012.[9] Originally, about two-thirds of the transactions with permits were sampled. The survey became exhaustive in 2010. It is mandatory, and the response rate, after one follow-up, is above 75%. Annually, the number of observations ranges from 48,991 (in 2009) to 127,479 (in 2012).

While it is possible to get new houses built in many ways in France, the arrangement we study covers a large fraction of new constructions for single-family homes.[10] Households typically first buy a constructible land parcel, then obtain a building permit and get a house built through a general contractor, through an architect, or directly by themselves. Only about 20% of new houses are "self-built," as French law requires the use of a general contractor or an architect for constructions above €100,000. Getting a new house by first buying land before signing a contract with a builder is fiscally advantageous, as it avoids the payment of stamp duties on the structure. This arrangement also greatly reduces financing constraints for house builders and lowers their risks. Finally, this arrangement is consistent with the model above, where the house buyer pays first for the land parcel, $R(K^*, T)$, and then pays the builder for the structure, $PH(K^*, T) - R(K^*, T) = K^*$.

For each transaction, we know the price of the parcel, its size, whether it is "serviced" (i.e., has access to water, sewerage, and electricity), its municipality, how it was acquired (purchase, donation, inheritance, other), some information about its buyer, whether the parcel was acquired through an intermediary (a broker, a builder, another type of intermediary, or none), and some information about the house built, including its cost (but with no breakdown between material and labor) and its floor area.

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[9] It is important to keep in mind that, unlike in the United States, there was no housing bust in France during this period and that the heterogeneity of housing price fluctuations across locations was far from being as extreme as in the United States.

[10] The consultancy Développement-Construction reports between 120,000 and 160,000 new single-family homes per year during the period (http://www.developpement-construction .com/). These magnitudes essentially match our number of observations, after accounting for the sampling frame and the response rate and allowing for a lag between land transactions and the completion of houses.

The notion of "building costs" is potentially ambiguous, but we know whether the reported cost reflects the cost of a fully decorated house, the cost of a serviced house before decoration (i.e., excluding interior paint, light fixtures, faucets, kitchen cabinets, etc.), or only the cost of the bare-bones structure. The second category, ready-to-decorate houses, represents the large majority of our observations (72%). We consider only parcels that were purchased and ignore inheritances and donations. We also appended a range of municipal and urban-area characteristics to our main data. They are described in appendix F (apps. F–O are available online).

Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all our main variables. The first interesting set of facts pertains to the variation in parcel size, total construction costs, and parcel price per square meter. A parcel in the top decile is about four times as large as a parcel in the bottom decile. Interestingly, for construction costs, the corresponding interdecile ratio is only about 2.4, whereas for parcel prices per square meter, it is nearly 12. The second interesting feature of the data highlighted in table 1 is that this variation does not reflect only differences across urban areas or between urban and rural areas. Even when we consider only transactions from Greater Paris, we still observe considerable variation in parcel price per square meter.

A first important reason for the variation in parcel prices is that new constructions in French urban areas are, in their large majority, infills that occur everywhere in their urban area, from more expensive central

TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	First Decile	Median	Ninth Decile
Entire country:					
Parcel area	1,156	947	477	883	2,079
House area	123	35	87	117	161
Construction cost	127,552	55,002	78,442	115,000	190,667
Parcel price	63,371	57,648	19,672	50,000	120,000
Parcel price per m^2	80	86	14	58	166
Urban areas:					
Parcel area	1,030	812	434	806	1,843
House area	126	36	89	120	167
Construction cost	132,979	58,714	80,778	119,000	200,000
Parcel price	75,481	63,891	27,465	59,841	140,000
Parcel price per m^2	101	99	23	76	204
Greater Paris:					
Parcel area	839	673	329	665	1,492
House area	134	42	90	126	188
Construction cost	151,319	73,713	89,173	132,850	236,605
Parcel price	141,711	102,709	69,155	124,406	220,000
Parcel price per m^2	237	193	67	182	466

Note.—The sample contains 386,177 observations for the entire country, 218,767 observations for urban areas, and 17,178 observations for Greater Paris. Parcel and house areas are in square meters. Parcel prices and construction costs are expressed in 2012 euros, using the French consumer price index.

Fig. 1.—Probability distribution function of the relative distance for new constructions: French urban areas, all years of data used; 218,767 observations. For each new construction, we compute the distance between the centroid of its municipality and the centroid of its urban area and divide by the greatest observed distance for any new construction in this urban area. Less than 2% of the observations are beyond 95% of the maximum distance to the center. The modal distance is about 40% of the maximum distance to the center of the urban area.

locations to cheaper peripheral ones. To illustrate this feature, figure 1 represents the probability distribution function of the relative distance of new constructions to the center of their urban area. Consistent with the preponderance of infills, another data source, the Survey of Commercialization of New Dwellings (Enquête sur la Commercialisation des Logements Neufs) indicates that less than 10% of building permits for single-family homes are for houses that are part of a group of five or more.

Beyond the systematic variation explained by the location of parcels within and across urban areas, the price of a parcel also reflects features such as idiosyncratic buyer preferences, their degree of optimism about future housing prices, and the bargaining ability and eagerness of buyers and sellers.[11] In addition, the market for constructible land in many parts of France is thin. Comparing construction costs across competing builders is perhaps easier than assessing the value of a parcel of land. This lack of information about land prices may add to the variation in parcel prices.

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[11] In a regression of log land price per square meter, the extensive parcel and location characteristics used in table 7 explain only 65% of the variance within each decile of parcel area.

Regardless of its exact source, this idiosyncratic variation is an important reason why the implementation of the approach described below uses predicted parcel prices obtained from a kernel nonparametric regression. Kernel smoothing on a grid allows us to reduce the noise for particular transactions while obtaining quasi-continuous series for land prices and capital, which are needed for our nonparametric estimation.

Two further measurement issues require discussion. First, the construction costs reported by surveyed households may not accurately reflect how much they actually paid. We do not think that this is the case. We first note that contracts with house builders usually include a small number of installments, and we expect households to remember the headline figure. We can investigate this issue further, using data from the Survey of Costs of New Dwellings (Enquête sur le Prix de Revient des Logements Neufs). This is a detailed survey of builders that forms the basis of the French construction price index, which, in turn, is used to index rent increases for residential rented properties, parking spots, and, until quite recently, commercial leases. From the second quarter of 2010 through the fourth quarter of 2012, we could match all 2,336 observations in this survey with our main data, using the building permit identifier. Reassuringly, the correlation between the two measures of housing costs is 0.83, for both levels and logs. Finally, we note that our identification approach, which relies on predicting construction costs by using exogenous characteristics of parcels, also corrects for measurement error in construction costs, like a traditional instrumental variable estimation. The similarity between our results using actual construction costs and those using predicted ones is consistent with measurement issues for construction costs being minor.

Second, we expect parcel areas to be measured with a high degree of accuracy, since they are an essential part of the official land registry. The data we use report parcel size for both the transaction and the building permit. We retain the latter to account for land assembly. When the size of the permitted parcel is larger than the size of the purchased parcel, we increase parcel price proportionately. For only about 1% of the permits, the permitted parcel is more than 20% smaller than the purchased parcel. When we treat parcel size as endogenous below and thus possibly correct for measurement error, we find that it makes essentially no difference to our results.

In summary, we rely on data documenting parcel prices and construction costs for newly built single-family homes in France. These data stem from an unusual institutional setting where house buyers purchase empty parcels before construction to save on transaction costs and from a unique follow-up survey of buyers that can be, for some houses, matched to another survey of house builders. While we know of no other equivalent data elsewhere, we note that the same information could, in principle, be obtained from transaction prices for new homes and prior transaction prices

for empty parcels or teardowns. Then, construction costs can be obtained indirectly by subtracting the price of land from the price of new houses. Alternatively, information about construction costs, if available, may be used to recover land prices.[12] Nonetheless, the information extracted from these alternative sources of data is likely to be more noisy than the data at hand.[13]

IV. Implementation

We now turn to the five practical steps we take to compute the production of housing and estimate the elasticity of housing production with respect to capital. First, we make the data comparable over time. Second, we estimate the price of parcels R for any pair of capital K and parcel size T, using kernel smoothing. Third, we nonparametrically estimate the amount of housing $H(K, T)$ for a given T, using equation (5) on a (K, T) grid. Fourth, we describe the shape of $H(K, T)$ by means of simple regressions. Finally, we extend our approach to condition out factor heterogeneity.

Because we use data for a 6-year period, we first make parcel prices and capital investments comparable over time. We do so by correcting for year effects, which we obtain from regressions of log parcel prices and log capital on year fixed effects.

Our second step is more consequential. In the data, the price of parcels is observed only for some values of capital and parcel size, not for the entire continuum, as required by the integration in equation (5). To make up for these "missing values," we estimate the price of land for any given level of capital K and parcel size T from actual observations with slightly larger and slightly lower values of K and T, using a kernel nonparametric estimation.

The kernel we use is the product of two independent normal distributions, and the bandwidth is computed with a standard rule of thumb for the bivariate case (see Silverman 1986). For a given value of (K, T), the estimated price of land is given by the following formula:

$$\widetilde{R}(K, T) = \sum_i \omega_i R_i, \quad \text{with} \quad \omega_i = \frac{L_{h_K}(K - K_i)L_{h_T}(T - T_i)}{\sum_i L_{h_K}(K - K_i)L_{h_T}(T - T_i)}. \quad (9)$$

In this expression, $L_{h_K}(K - K_i) \equiv f((K - K_i)/h_K)/h_K$, where $f(\cdot)$ is the density of the normal distribution and the bandwidth h_K is given by $h_K = N^{-1/6}\sigma(K)$, for which $\sigma(K)$ is the standard deviation computed from the data and N is the number of observations. Analogous expressions apply for the other factor, T. This kernel estimator has the property of making $R(K, T)$ unique, which is requested by our model.

The correlation between actual parcel prices and those predicted with the rule-of-thumb bandwidth is 0.45. Using instead bandwidths that are half, a quarter, and a tenth of the rule-of-thumb bandwidth leads to correlations between actual and predicted parcel prices of 0.50, 0.57, and 0.66, respectively.[14] We verify below that our choice of bandwidth does not affect our results.

We also note that we kernel-smooth over R before computing the cost share associated with K, $\widetilde{R}$, and T. An alternative is to consider that the cost share $CS(K, R, T) = K/(K + R(K, T))$ is computable only at the observed values of capital and parcel size. We can then directly estimate smoothed cost shares $\widetilde{CS}(K, R, T)$ for other values of capital and parcel size, using a kernel nonparametric regression. This alternative approach differs because it implies smoothing a function of R and K instead of smoothing R only. In practice however, the two approaches yield very similar results, as we show below in a robustness check.

For our third step, the integral in equation (5) is computed with a trapezoidal approximation on a (K, T) grid. An estimator of the production function at a given node (K_i^g, T^g) is

$$\widehat{\log H}(K_i^g, T^g) = \sum_{j=2}^{i} \left(\frac{c_{j-1} + c_j}{2}\right)\left(\log K_j^g - \log K_{j-1}^g\right), \quad (10)$$

where K_j^g, $j = 1, \ldots, J$, are the grid values of capital and

$$c_j = \frac{K_j^g}{K_j^g + \widetilde{R}(K_j^g, T^g)}. \quad (11)$$

The lower bound in equation (10), K_1^g, which corresponds to $\underline{K}$ in model, is the lowest value of the capital we consider. We can potentially use any value of capital as the lower bound, but there is a trade-off. A smaller value will allow us to study the variations of the housing production function over a wider range of values for capital, but this may come at the cost

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[14] While smaller bandwidths lead to a better fit at the observed values of capital and parcel size, they are potentially problematic for some points of our grid, since they may not allow the use of enough observations around these points to obtain accurate predicted parcel prices or correct for measurement error in R.

of being in a region where there are few observations. We restrict attention to observations above the first decile (and below the ninth decile) of capital to estimate the production of housing for each of the nine deciles of parcel size. This corresponds to 74.2% of all land values. With 900 uniformly distributed values of capital for each decile of parcel size, we thus generate a fine grid of 8,100 (K, T) points from 386,177 observations for the entire country in our data set.[15]

In the fourth step, we regress housing production, as estimated in equation (10), on capital investment to describe how housing production varies with capital. For instance, under Cobb-Douglas and for any fixed T, the relationship between log housing and log capital is linear. We estimate confidence intervals of the estimated coefficients by bootstrap. At each iteration, we draw with replacement a random sample from the universe of all transacted land parcels. We recompute parcel prices at each point of our (K, T) grid, using kernel nonparametric regressions, before reestimating production and regressing it on capital investment. Confidence intervals can be deduced from the reestimated coefficients.

Finally, in the last step, we extend our approach to handle estimation issues related to factor heterogeneity. We describe our implementation in the case of parcel characteristics y that directly affect the production of housing. For heterogeneity in the price or in the composition of housing capital, we follow a similar approach. Consider, for instance, that some parcels are more costly to develop because of a steep slope or because their soil is harder to excavate. For a given unit price of housing, these parcel are worth less in equilibrium, and our base approach will fail to recover the appropriate production of housing from the data. As argued above, we can compute housing production if we purge our variables of interest, K and R, from the effects of supply characteristics and rely only on the variation in demand for housing. Consider the regressions

$$\log Z_i = X_i a^Z + Y_i b^Z + f^Z(T_i) + \epsilon_i^Z \quad \text{for} \quad Z = K, R. \qquad (12)$$

In equation (12), X is the vector of characteristics that (are assumed to) affect the demand for housing, Y is a vector of characteristics that potentially affect the supply of housing, $f^Z(T)$ is a nonparametric function of T, and ϵ_i^Z is an error term.

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[15] We use a uniform grid. It would be possible to consider a greater density of grid points closer to actual transactions and fewer points in regions where there are fewer transactions. A procedure to determine an optimal grid accounting for both the precision with which the points on the grid are estimated and the approximation error in the integration is beyond the scope of this paper. While we do not know what an "optimal" grid looks like, we note that it is unlikely to matter in practice, since we use the high density of transactions between the first and last deciles of capital to create an extremely fine grid along the K-axis, with capital increments of less than 0.12%. This allows us to exploit precise estimates for our grid while keeping the approximation error from integration low.

The vector X is the empirical counterpart of x in our framework above, while Y is the empirical counterpart of y. To estimate $f^z(T)$, we use indicator variables for every parcel size centile. Then, under the assumption that the residuals are normally distributed, we compute unbiased predicted values $\hat{Z}_i = \exp(X_i \hat{a}^z + \bar{Y}\hat{b}^z + \hat{f}^z(T_i) + (\hat{\sigma}^z)^2/2)$ for $Z = K, R$, where $\bar{Y}\hat{b}^z$ is the mean effect of supply characteristics and $\hat{\sigma}^z$ is the estimator of the standard deviation of the error term in equation (12). These predicted values for capital and parcel prices depend only on demand characteristics X and not on supply characteristics y. They are then used to estimate parcel values nonparametrically in equation (10). We postpone the important discussion of the variables included in X and Y.

Our model takes parcel size T as given. However, the location characteristics that affect the cost of construction may also affect parcel size. For instance, parcels may be larger where construction is more costly. This suggests applying the same approach to parcel size. However, we need to amend equation (12) and consider instead

$$\log Z_i = X_i a^z + Y_i b^z + \epsilon_i^z \quad \text{for} \quad Z = K, R, T, \tag{13}$$

where T is now an endogenous variable and is no longer included as determinant of K^* and R.

V.   Results

A.   Base Results

Before looking at formal estimation results, it is useful to visualize our nonparametric estimations. Each panel of figure 2 plots the estimated log production of housing, $\log H$, as a function of capital investment, $\log K$, for every decile of parcel size T. This is the empirical counterpart to equation (5) after normalizing $\log H(\underline{K})$ to zero for all deciles. Panel A represents the production function for housing for the entire country, while B, C, and D do the same for all urban areas, small urban areas with population between 50,000 and 100,000, and large urban areas with population above 500,000 (bar Paris), respectively. We obtain similar patterns for other urban-area size classes.

Although we must remain cautious with visual impressions, several remarkable features emerge from figure 2. First, as might be expected, housing production always increases with capital. More specifically, log housing is an apparently linear function of log capital, with a slope of about 0.65. This is, of course, consistent with a Cobb-Douglas function with an elasticity of housing production with respect to capital of about 0.65. Second, the relationship between $\log H$ and $\log K$ appears very similar across all deciles of parcel size. The last important feature of figure 2 regards the differences across panels. While the relationship between $\log H$ and $\log K$ is very much the same across the first three panels, the last panel, for large

FIG. 2.—Log housing production as a function of log capital, nonparametric estimates. The log of housing production is represented on the vertical axis, and the log of capital investment is represented on the horizontal axis. To ease the comparison across deciles of parcel size, we normalize $\log H(\underline{K})$ to zero for all deciles. There are 386,177 observations for the entire country and 218,767 for urban areas.

urban areas, is modestly different, with more dispersion across deciles and a less steep slope on average.

We next turn to regressions to describe these features more precisely. Our first set of results is reported in panel A of table 2, where, for each decile of parcel size, we regress our nonparametric estimates of the log production of housing on log capital for observations located in urban areas. Each regression relies on 900 observations obtained after smoothing of parcel prices, as per equation (9), at values of capital between the first and last deciles. Each column of table 2 corresponds to a separate decile of parcel size. The estimated capital elasticity of housing for the first decile is 0.62. It is 0.64 for the second to fifth deciles, 0.65 for the seventh and eighth, and finally 0.66 for the last decile. These findings point at some apparent log supermodularity in the production of housing and reject Cobb-Douglas. This said, these differences in capital elasticity between deciles of parcel size are economically small. Finally, we note that our linear regressions provide a near-perfect fit, as the R^2 is always above 0.999.[16]

[16] Recall that we work with smoothed data, which condition out idiosyncratic variation. To be clear, this R^2 does not measure how well our regression fits the raw data but measures how well the functional form imposed by the regression fits the nonparametric estimate of the housing production function.

TABLE 2
Log Housing Production in Urban Areas, by Parcel Size Decile

	Decile								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
					A				
log (K)	.624***	.637***	.639***	.638***	.642***	.650***	.653***	.659***	.661***
	(.00092)	(.00084)	(.00082)	(.00087)	(.00098)	(.0014)	(.0017)	(.0022)	(.0027)
	[.00090]	[.00078]	[.00081]	[.00090]	[.0011]	[.0014]	[.0018]	[.0022]	[.0026]
R^2	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
					B				
log (K)	.114***	−.023	−.112***	−.033	−.017	.085	.266***	.232**	.257**
	(.041)	(.028)	(.029)	(.044)	(.053)	(.070)	(.088)	(.103)	(.141)
	[.040]	[.028]	[.031]	[.041]	[.052]	[.069]	[.087]	[.107]	[.130]
$(\log (K))^2$	.021***	.028***	.032***	.028***	.028***	.024***	.016***	.018***	.017***
	(.0017)	(.0012)	(.0012)	(.0019)	(.0023)	(.0030)	(.0037)	(.0044)	(.0060)
	[.0017]	[.0012]	[.0013]	[.0017]	[.0022]	[.0029]	[.0037]	[.0045]	[.0055]
R^2	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

Note.—Ordinary least squares regressions with a constant in all columns; 900 observations for each regression. Nonparametric estimates of housing production rely on 218,767 observations. Bootstrapped standard errors with 100 bootstraps are in parentheses and those with 1,000 bootstraps are in square brackets; significance is based on 1,000 bootstraps.

** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.

Panel B of table 2 replicates the regressions of panel A, adding the square of log capital as the explanatory variable. The estimated coefficient of the quadratic term is between 0.016 and 0.032 and significant in all regressions. Together with the differences in coefficients across deciles of parcel size in the previous panel, this is another indication that the production function for housing is not strictly log-linear in capital. Instead, housing is a log-convex function of capital, but only modestly so. For the third decile of parcel size for which log convexity is strongest, our estimates imply that the capital elasticity of housing is only about 0.05 larger for houses built at the top decile of capital (where $\log K \approx 12.2$), relative to that of houses built at the bottom decile (where $\log K \approx 11.4$).[17]

Before turning to various forms of heterogeneity, we discuss four technical issues. First, table 2 reports two series of standard errors, with 100 and 1,000 bootstraps. Taking 1,000 bootstraps instead of 100 does not make any substantive difference. Because these bootstraps are computationally intensive, we report only standard errors computed from 100 bootstraps in subsequent tables. Second, we verify that our results are not affected by our choice of bandwidth. Table 9 (tables 9–25 are available online), in appendix G, repeats the estimations of table 2 for bandwidths equal to a half, a quarter, and a tenth of the rule-of-thumb bandwidth. The results are virtually identical. This shows that we need to consider extreme forms of undersmoothing before running into problems where "holes" in the data are no longer properly smoothed away. Third, instead of ignoring all parcels in the bottom and top deciles, as in table 2, table 10, in appendix G, considers a broader range of observations, where we sort parcels by ascending investment and eliminate 3% of aggregate land values in each tail. Despite a loss of precision, this table shows that the results of table 2 are generally robust to considering more extreme regions of the data, where observations are sparser. Finally, table 11, in appendix G, duplicates table 2 but smooths the cost share $K^*/(K^* + R)$ directly instead of smoothing R before computing the cost share. This alternative leads to a minor change to the results, as we estimate capital elasticities that are 0.02–0.03 larger than those of table 2. All the other features of table 2 remain.

B. Factor Heterogeneity: Results Using Predicted Values for K^*, R, and T

We now turn to factor heterogeneity. In section II, we proposed two strategies to avoid biases caused by factor heterogeneity. The first is to use predicted values of K^*, R, and T after conditioning out potential supply determinants, to keep only the variation coming from demand factors. The second

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[17] At this point, we note only two modest deviations from Cobb-Douglas but do not explore functional form issues further, since our findings may be contaminated by unobserved factor heterogeneity. We return to functional form approximations in sec. VI.

strategy is to use homogeneous subsamples for which factor heterogeneity is less of a concern. In this subsection, we present results using predicted values, first for K^* and R, using equation (12), and then for R, K^*, and T, using equation (13). We explore results for more homogeneous subsamples in the next subsections.

As sources of exogenous demand variation that determine the price of housing P, and in turn K^* and R, we rely on the urban area to which a parcel belongs and the distance to its center. This is in the spirit of monocentric urban models (Alonso 1964; Mills 1967; Muth 1969). In simple versions of these models, the price of housing, land prices, and capital investment at each location are fully explained by the distance to the center and urban-area population. We also use measures of local income, a demand factor in more elaborate models of urban structure with heterogeneous residents (Duranton and Puga 2015). More specifically, in the demand vector X of equation (12), we include urban-area fixed effects, distance to the center (allowing the effect to vary across urban areas), and three municipal socioeconomic characteristics (log mean income, its standard deviation, and the share of population with a university degree). Although we do not develop a procedure to assess the predictive power of our demand-related variables, there is little doubt that these variables strongly predict our quantities of interest. Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2019) find that urban-area fixed effects and (log) distance to the center explain 63% of the variation of the price of land per square meter in France.

We worry nonetheless that the variables entering our demand vector may be correlated with the ease of building and other forms of factor heterogeneity. For instance, terrain characteristics may vary systematically with distance to the center. To avoid this issue, we include a number of geographic characteristics as part of our vector of potential supply characteristics Y to be conditioned out in the estimation of equation (12). More specifically, in the supply vector Y, we include seven geological variables (ruggedness and two indicator variables for each of soil erodability, soil hydrogeological class, and soil dominant parent material) and three land use variables (share of built-up land, share of urbanized land, and share of agricultural land).

In addition, we want to condition out the local wage of workers in the construction industry, since construction costs may vary across urban areas (Gyourko and Saiz 2006). We cannot include urban-area wages in the construction industry directly among the explanatory variables of equation (12) because they would be collinear with urban-area fixed effects. Instead, we regress urban-area fixed effects on wages in the construction industry and retain the estimated residual in the vector of demand factors X. This amounts to conditioning out construction wages from our predicted values for K^*, R, and T.

For our preferred set of demand-related factors used to predict K^* and R, panel A of table 3 reports a first series of estimations. The estimated

TABLE 3

Log Housing Production in Urban Areas Obtained from Predicted Values of Variables, by Parcel Size Decile

	Decile								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A. Predicted R and K									
log (K)	.645***	.647***	.649***	.652***	.658***	.666***	.670***	.676***	.683***
	(.0010)	(.00061)	(.00061)	(.00061)	(.00086)	(.0011)	(.0015)	(.0020)	(.0023)
B. Predicted R and K									
log (K)	.105	.954***	1.633***	2.095***	2.257***	2.217***	1.773***	1.647***	1.880***
	(.129)	(.080)	(.077)	(.075)	(.087)	(.128)	(.169)	(.205)	(.226)
(log (K))^2	.023***	−.013***	−.042***	−.061***	−.068***	−.066***	−.047***	−.041***	−.051***
	(.0055)	(.0034)	(.0032)	(.0032)	(.0037)	(.0054)	(.0071)	(.0086)	(.0095)
C. Predicted R, K, and T									
log (K)	.652***	.664***	.654***	.653***	.650***	.645***	.648***	.663***	.677***
	(.0018)	(.0018)	(.0025)	(.0025)	(.0026)	(.0021)	(.0033)	(.0026)	(.0032)
D. Predicted R, K, and T									
log (K)	.006	.734***	1.080***	2.342***	3.304***	3.007***	3.365***	2.456***	2.250***
	(.407)	(.240)	(.379)	(.368)	(.411)	(.408)	(.464)	(.415)	(.385)
(log (K))^2	.027	−.003	−.018	−.071***	−.112***	−.100***	−.115***	−.076***	−.066***
	(.010)	(.016)	(.016)	(.017)	(.017)	(.017)	(.020)	(.018)	(.016)

Note.—Ordinary least squares regressions with a constant in all columns; 900 observations for each regression. The R^2 is 1.00 in all specifications. Capital and parcel price are constructed using urban-area fixed effects (after conditioning out construction wages), distance to the center (urban-area specific), and income variables (log mean municipal income, log standard error of income, and share of population with a university degree). We also condition out the effect of the seven geological variables and the three land use variables listed in the text. For parcel size, observed values are used in panels A and B, and values predicted from the same variables as we use to predict capital and parcel price are used in panels C and D. Nonparametric estimates of housing production rely on 213,786 observations (instead of 218,767 when we do not use predicted values of land prices and capital). Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.

*** Significant at the 1% level.

capital elasticities of housing are close to those of table 2 but slightly higher, by 0.01–0.02. While some of these differences are significant in a statistical sense, they are economically small. We also still observe the same pattern of higher elasticity of housing production as higher deciles of parcel size are considered.

Panel B of table 3 adds a quadratic term for log K. The results indicate the presence of a mild log concavity for all deciles of parcel size except the first one. This is in contrast with table 2, where the results point toward modest log convexity. While there is some variation in the estimated coefficient on the quadratic term in log K across deciles of parcel size, the largest one in absolute value is 0.07 for the fifth decile of parcel size. With log K varying from 11.4 to 12.2 between the bottom and top deciles of capital, this log concavity implies a capital elasticity of housing production of about 0.70 for the bottom decile of capital and 0.60 for the top decile.

Before interpreting these findings further, we confirm them in a variety of ways. Panels C and D of table 3 duplicate the previous two panels but also consider that parcel size is affected by supply factors and net out their effects. The results are qualitatively similar and quantitatively close. In table 12, in appendix H, we report results experimenting with the variables we include in the vectors X and Y of demand and supply factors. The similarity with table 3 shows that our results are not sensitive to the exact details of what we include and exclude to predict K^*, R, and T.

Overall, our results using predicted values for K^* and R suggest a marginally higher capital elasticity. The differences with our base results of table 2 are nonetheless too small to be economically meaningful. More importantly, predicted values for K^* and R imply that the production function for housing is mildly log-concave rather than log-convex when observed quantities are used. These new results imply an elasticity of substitution between capital and land slightly below 1 instead of slightly above 1. This difference makes intuitive sense in relation to the possible biases described above. For parcels of the same size, we expect parcels that are more difficult to build on to require more capital. The price of these parcels will then be lower for this reason, and the share of capital will thus be higher. This can bias our results and generate an apparent log convexity for the production function of housing when we do not control for supply factors.

C.   Factor Heterogeneity: Results by Location

We now examine differences across locations. We first assess differences in capital intensity for new constructions, depending on how far they are from the center of their urban area. We measure distances in relative terms. While a location 5 kilometers from the center is still "central" in large urban areas, it is often "peripheral" in small urban areas. Table 13, in appendix I, reports a moderately greater capital intensity for new constructions in more

peripheral locations. Since parcels are larger in more peripheral locations, these results are consistent with the greater capital intensity for larger parcels reported in tables 2 and 3.

Next, table 4 reports results for different classes of urban areas, grouped by population size. Panel A regresses again the log of housing production on log capital. Unlike previous tables, in each regression we pool observations for all deciles of parcel size and include decile fixed effects. The first column considers the entire population of transactions. The estimated capital elasticity of housing is 0.65, about equal to that of the middle decile in table 2. Column 2 uses only observations from urban areas and estimates a similar elasticity. The following six columns consider urban areas of increasing sizes. For the smallest urban areas, with population below 50,000, the estimated capital elasticity is 0.71. This elasticity falls to 0.58 for large urban areas with population above 500,000 and to 0.54 for Paris.

These differences in capital elasticity across urban areas are confirmed by the other panels of table 4. Table 14, in appendix I, which provides more detailed results by decile of parcel size for each size class of urban area, further corroborates these differences in capital intensity across urban areas. This table also shows that the differences in capital intensity across deciles of parcel size are generally half or less of the already modest differences reported in table 2. This suggests that the greater capital intensity of larger parcels found above reflects in part the greater capital intensity of housing construction in smaller urban areas where parcels are larger.

To explain these sizeable differences in capital intensity across urban areas, we first dismiss a number of candidate explanations before turning to our preferred one. First, this heterogeneity across urban areas may be caused by a complementarity between land and capital, leading to less capital investment where land is more expensive. Appendix J shows that this explanation requires an implausibly low elasticity of substitution between land and capital of about 0.2.

Next, this heterogeneity across urban areas is also unlikely to be caused by differences in construction costs. First, differences in capital intensity still occur in panels C and D of table 4, where we use predicted values of K^* and R (or K^*, R, and T) that condition out the wage of construction workers. Second, relative to small urban areas, construction wages are 14.2% higher in Paris and 5.8% higher in large urban areas. Simple calculations in appendix J show that for these modest differences in construction wages to explain the large difference in capital elasticity between these two groups of urban areas, the elasticity of substitution between land and capital would need to be, this time, implausibly high (above 3). Third, we verify in table 15, in appendix I, that the results of table 2 are unaffected when we either condition out local construction wages or directly deflate them from capital investment.

TABLE 4
Log Housing Production, by Class of Urban-Area Population

| | | | City Size Class | | | | | |
	Country	Urban Areas	0–50,000	50,000–100,000	100,000–200,000	200,000–500,000	500,000+	Paris
				A. Observed Data				
log (K)	.645***	.645***	.719***	.698***	.686***	.646***	.575***	.539***
	(.00088)	(.00087)	(.0020)	(.0022)	(.0015)	(.0014)	(.0017)	(.0026)
				B. Observed Data				
log (K)	.089***	.086***	−.605***	−.419***	−.135***	−.317***	−.443***	−.288***
	(.039)	(.030)	(.078)	(.079)	(.056)	(.054)	(.055)	(.087)
$(\log (K))^2$	.024***	.024***	.056***	.047***	.035***	.041***	.043***	.034***
	(.0017)	(.0013)	(.0033)	(.0033)	(.0024)	(.0023)	(.0023)	(.0036)
				C. Predicted Data				
log (K)	...	.661***	.727***	.708***	.698***	.663***	.582***	...
	...	(.00062)	(.0012)	(.0013)	(.0011)	(.0013)	(.0011)	...
				D. Predicted Data				
log (K)	...	1.618***	.976***	1.142***	2.345***	1.943***	1.349***	...
	...	(.078)	(.197)	(.269)	(.130)	(.185)	(.080)	...
$(\log (K))^2$	...	−.040***	−.011	−.018*	−.070***	−.054***	−.032***	...
	...	(.0033)	(.0084)	(.011)	(.0055)	(.0078)	(.0034)	...

Note.—Ordinary least squares regressions with decile fixed effects in all columns; 8,100 observations for each regression. The R^2 is 1.00 in all specifications. In panels C and D, capital and parcel price are constructed using urban-area fixed effects (after conditioning out construction wages), distance to the center (urban-area specific), and income variables. Observed values of parcel size are used. We cannot report results for the entire country, given that our construction of capital and land price relies on urban-area fixed effects and distance to the center, which are unavailable in rural areas. Similarly, we cannot implement our approach when we consider Paris alone. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.

* Significant at the 10% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.

Finally, we also show below that differences in land use regulations across urban areas are also unlikely to provide an explanation for the differences in capital elasticity across urban areas that we estimate.

Our preferred explanation relies instead on differing growth rates for housing rents across urban areas. When housing capital can be adjusted over time, higher future housing rents do not affect current housing investments. They lead only to greater future housing investments, after their increase. At the same time, current land prices already capitalize future housing rents. Hence, the share of capital in housing may differ across urban areas following differences in future housing rent growth.

To formalize this intuition, we propose a two-period extension of our model in appendix C. We show that when housing capital depreciates and can be adjusted at each period, the elasticity of housing production with respect to capital is no longer equal to the share of capital in total costs. Instead, the share of capital is multiplied, first, by a discount factor that accounts for the interest rate and capital depreciation and, second, by the ratio of housing values to housing rents at the current period. Importantly, this ratio, which captures expected changes in housing rents, can be measured in the data.[18]

Appendix K provides justifications for our choices of 4% for the annual interest and 1% for the annual rate of capital depreciation. This appendix also provides details regarding our estimation of the ratio of housing values to annual housing rents for each class of urban-area population. We estimate values ranging from 18.1 in small urban areas to 24.1 in Paris. We note that these ratios are consistent with findings from prior research (Chapelle and Eyméoud 2017).

Table 5 duplicates the estimations of table 4 for the same six size classes of urban areas. The estimated elasticities in panel A are now all tightly centered around 0.64, with minimal systematic variation across size classes of urban areas. This stability is confirmed by the other panels of the same table.

While the raw cost shares increase from 0.54 in Paris to 0.71 in small urban areas, the value-to-rent ratio varies in the opposite direction, with similar magnitudes. Hence, when computing our corrected cost shares, these two differences offset each other nearly exactly. Less obviously, the discount factor of about 5% common to all urban areas and the average value-to-rent

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[18] Appendix C also shows that the capital elasticity in this dynamic extension can also be expressed as a user-cost-corrected share, where capital is adjusted by the sum of the interest rate r and capital depreciation τ, while land values are adjusted by the difference between the interest rate and their expected rate of appreciation, g. The elasticity of housing production with respect to capital is then given by $(r + \tau)K^*/[(r + \tau)K^* + (r - g)R]$. While this expression makes intuitive sense, implementing it requires a measure of the expected growth rate of land prices, g. This quantity can be obtained only indirectly, using housing rents and housing values, which takes us back to the expression we use.

La estructura

TABLE 5
Log Housing Production (Corrected Cost Shares),
by Class of Urban-Area Population

	CITY SIZE CLASS					
	0–50,000	50,000–100,000	100,000–200,000	200,000–500,000	500,000+	Paris
	A. Observed Data					
log (K)	.623***	.622***	.636***	.635***	.644***	.644***
	(.0018)	(.0020)	(.0014)	(.0014)	(.0019)	(.0031)
	B. Observed Data					
log (K)	−.529***	−.373***	−.125**	−.312***	−.496***	−.345***
	(.068)	(.070)	(.052)	(.053)	(.062)	(.103)
$(\log (K))^2$	.049***	.042***	.032***	.040***	.048***	.041***
	(.0029)	(.0030)	(.0022)	(.0023)	(.0026)	(.0043)
	C. Predicted Data					
log (K)	.636***	.631***	.647***	.651***	.652***	. . .
	(.0010)	(.0011)	(.0010)	(.0013)	(.0012)	. . .
	D. Predicted Data					
log (K)	.854***	1.019***	2.171***	1.910***	1.512***	. . .
	(.173)	(.240)	(.120)	(.182)	(.089)	. . .
$(\log (K))^2$	−.009	−.016	−.065***	−.053***	−.036***	. . .
	(.0073)	(.010)	(.0051)	(.0077)	(.0038)	. . .

Note.—Ordinary least squares regressions with decile fixed effects in all columns; 8,100 observations for each regression. This table duplicates table 4 for the same six size classes of urban areas but uses the correction described in the text, with details provided in app. K. The R^2 is 1.00 in all specifications. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.

ratio of nearly 20 mostly offset each other in our correction, so that, on average for the country, the estimated capital elasticity is essentially unchanged relative to the results reported above.

D. Factor Heterogeneity: Land Use Regulations

In France, housing development is regulated as in many other countries. The three main regulatory instruments during our study period are (1) the zoning designation, (2) minimum lot size and severe restrictions on parcel division, and, most importantly for our purpose, (3) the maximum intensity of development.[19]

Starting with the zoning designation, it indicates whether a parcel can be developed and, if yes, whether this can be for residential purpose. Given

[19] We ignore constraints arising from building codes and local regulations forcing particular architectural styles or the use of specific construction materials. We think of these constraints as a form of supply heterogeneity, which we explored above.

that we observe only parcels with a development permit for a single-family home, this creates no further issue for us beyond the fact that we estimate the production function for single-family homes on parcels allowing this type of development. Then, restrictions on parcel divisions are the main reason why we take parcel size as given.

Turning to the maximum intensity of development that applies to a parcel, it is essentially a maximum floor-to-area ratio (FAR).[20] While the information about maximum FAR is not centrally collected by the French government, we know the actual FAR of each newly built house from our main data. We also know the FAR for each and every single-family house in France from exhaustive data about all buildings (see app. F for details).

We propose a measure the absolute FAR stringency that applies to a new construction by taking the 30th percentile of the distribution of the FAR of all single-family homes in the same municipality.[21] This measure relies on the notion that if a new construction is subject to a more stringent maximum FAR, its neighbors will have been subject to a more stringent maximum FAR as well and will thus exhibit a lower realized FAR.

A limitation here is that a maximum FAR of, say, 0.8 where parcels are tiny may be more constraining than a maximum FAR of 0.2 where parcels are large. To avoid this pitfall, we can also measure the relative stringency of the local FAR for new constructions. To do this, we compute the centile to which any new construction belongs in its municipal distribution of FAR for all single-family homes.

With these measures at hand, we then reestimate our base results for separate quintiles of absolute and relative FAR stringency. Tables 16 and 17, in appendix L, report the results. First, we find that the capital elasticity for houses built in municipalities with a higher FAR is modestly smaller. This is likely because high FARs disproportionately occur in larger urban areas, where the capital elasticity is generally lower, as documented in table 4.[22] We also find that the capital elasticity for newly built houses with a FAR higher than their neighbors' is only modestly larger. Taken together, these results suggest that FAR limits have only a minor effect on the production of housing, either because they may not bind much or because the capital used to produce more floor space and that used to produce better-quality housing are highly substitutable.

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[20] Building height is also regulated, but this should not be binding for single-family homes, since there was no constraint on the share of a parcel that is built up until the last year of our study period.

[21] We choose the 30th percentile because it roughly corresponds to the median FAR percentile of newly built houses in the distribution of all homes in the same municipality.

[22] This result also runs contrary to the prediction of the extension of our model proposed in app. A, where higher FARs should lead to a higher capital elasticity in the Cobb-Douglas case, as capital can be deployed with fewer constraints.

To provide further evidence about the small effects of land use regulations on how housing is produced, we conduct two further checks. First, we take advantage of a change in land use regulations starting in 2012, after which new constructions are also subject to a building coverage ratio. Table 18, in appendix L, duplicates our base analysis for 2006–11 and 2012 separately and fails to uncover any difference in capital intensity for new constructions between these two subperiods. Second, we regress log housing on log capital and deciles of parcel sizes as previously but also include indicators for quintiles of municipal FAR. For the same parcel size and capital invested, we find that the amount of housing is only about 1% higher in the top quintile of municipality FAR, relative to the bottom quintile.

Obviously, these findings do not imply that land use regulations are irrelevant. They indicate instead that we fail to find evidence of an important role for land use regulations to explain the differences in capital share across locations documented above. More generally, we believe that land use regulations in France strongly limit where and whether new developments may occur but impose only modest constraints on what can be built when a parcel is constructible.

E.   Housing Heterogeneity

Aside from factor heterogeneity, we also worry about housing heterogeneity, since houses in the data are built for specific buyers. These buyers may have idiosyncratic preferences, which could affect construction costs. Because the information we have about construction costs is for one of three levels of completion, we can compare results across these levels of completion (fully finished units, ready-to-decorate units, and units with only a bare-bones structure). Any unobserved heterogeneity associated with the customization of houses should have a greater effect on fully finished units than on bare-bones structures. Table 19, in appendix M, duplicates panel A of table 2 but splits observations by level of completion. Unsurprisingly, we find a slightly higher capital elasticity for houses at a more advanced degree of completion. For the median parcel, the capital elasticity is 0.66 for fully finished units, 0.64 for ready-to-decorate units, and 0.61 for units with only a bare-bones structure. The corresponding elasticity in table 2 is 0.64. For all levels of completion, we find again a modestly increasing capital elasticity as we consider higher parcel size deciles, as in table 2.

While we cannot track the heterogeneity of houses directly, it may be reflected in the heterogeneity of buyers. We can split the sample of transactions by buyers' occupation: executives, intermediate occupations, and clerical and blue-collar workers. We report results for these three groups in table 20, in appendix M. The differences between occupational categories are small. For the median parcel, the capital elasticity is 0.63 for executives, 0.64 for intermediate occupations, and 0.65 for clerical and blue-collar

workers, with the same general pattern of modestly increasing elasticity as we consider larger parcels.

VI. Functional Forms and Comparisons with Alternative Approaches

So far, we have nonparametrically estimated the production of housing as a function of capital before using simple regressions to assess the shape of this nonparametric function. While the production function of housing can be described by a Cobb-Douglas function with a coefficient on capital of about 0.65, a more detailed look suggests some mild log convexity when using our base approach and, perhaps more reasonably, modest log concavity when we rely on predicted values for parcel prices and capital. In this section, we assess a variety of functional forms for the production function of housing. This is useful to characterize our results further and to compare with alternative approaches.

A. Assessing Functional Forms and Recovering Their Parameters

We proceed as follows. First, we consider a specific parametric form for the production function and recover the underlying parameters by fitting the theoretical cost shares to their empirical counterparts. Next, we use the estimated parameters to compute the value of the parametric production function at each point of our grid. Then, we duplicate our estimation of the capital elasticity for each decile of parcel size. Finally, we compare the results we obtain by using preimposed functional forms to our earlier, nonparametric estimations results.[23] Let us develop these four steps in turn.

For the exposition to remain concrete, consider a CES production function. The production of housing is given by $H = A(\alpha K^{(\sigma-1)/\sigma} + (1 - \alpha) T^{(\sigma-1)/\sigma})^{\sigma/(\sigma-1)}$, where σ is the elasticity of substitution between land and capital and A is a productivity shifter. Using equation (4) and the partial derivative of the CES production function with respect to K, we obtain the following cost share:

$$\frac{K^*}{K^* + R(K^*, T)} = \frac{\alpha(K^*)^{1-1/\sigma}}{\alpha(K^*)^{1-1/\sigma} + (1 - \alpha) T^{1-1/\sigma}}. \tag{14}$$

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[23] An alternative to what we do here would be to use standard specification tests to isolate the "best" functional form. This would be problematic in our case. First, standard specification tests provide an arbitrary resolution to the trade-off between goodness of fit and the number of parameters. Our nonparametric smoothing yields a very high R^2, even with the simplest Cobb-Douglas specification, making this trade-off one sided. Second, these tests would assess the fit only with respect to K and not with respect to T.

From values on a 300×300 grid, we can estimate α and σ, using equation (14) by minimizing the sum of the squared distances between empirical costs shares and those predicted by a CES production function.[24] We then compute the "CES productions" of housing at the points of our grid, using the estimated values for α and σ, and perform the same regressions as in table 2. We also repeat the same exercise, using values of parcel prices and capital predicted by demand factors, as in table 3. Beyond the CES, we also assess Cobb-Douglas and second- and third-order translog production functions.

Tables 21 and 22, in appendix N, report results for these four functional forms. These two tables duplicate the base results of table 2 and those of table 3 for predicted values of K^* and R, respectively. For Cobb-Douglas production functions, we recover a capital elasticity of 0.634, close to the cross-decile mean of the coefficients estimated in table 2. Using predicted values, the capital elasticity is 0.652 and again close to the corresponding mean in table 3. Obviously, the Cobb-Douglas form is unable to replicate any of the modest differences in capital elasticity we observe across deciles of parcel size in tables 2 and 3. This functional form also fails to replicate the slight log convexity estimated in table 2 and the slight log concavity in table 3.

For the CES case, the estimated parameter values for the production function are $\alpha = 0.601$ and $\sigma = 1.028$ when observed values of K and R are used and $\alpha = 0.767$ and $\sigma = 0.900$ when predicted values for K and R are used. These values of the elasticity of substitution σ close to one confirm that the Cobb-Douglas form provides a good approximation. CES functions provide a better fit, since they are able to duplicate finer features of our nonparametric results, such as the tendency of the capital elasticity to be larger for higher deciles of parcel size. The CES functions we estimate also display the log convexity and concavity estimated in tables 2 and 3, albeit attenuated. With more parameters, and thus more flexibility to fit the data, the second- and third-order translog production functions can match the patterns of nonparametric results reported in tables 2 and 3 even more closely. Despite this, we can reject that the coefficients we estimate when regressing log H and on log K with a translog are statistically equal to those we estimate after fitting the data nonparametrically. This said, despite these statistical differences, the coefficients are economically very close.

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[24] While for expositional reasons we report results for only nine deciles of parcel size and estimate regressions for 900 capital points for each decile, we prefer to use a grid that treats both factors symmetrically to estimate functional forms. To take into account the distribution of observations in the data, we also weight observations with the kernel weights used for determining the land price on the grid. Finally, taking a finer grid does not affect the point estimates, but it makes the computation of standard errors highly time-consuming.

We draw three conclusions from this analysis. First, we confirm that a Cobb-Douglas specification provides a good first-order description of the data. Second, and consistent with this, we find that the estimation of a CES production function for housing implies an elasticity of substitution between land and capital inputs close to one, either 0.90 or 1.03, depending on whether we predict capital and parcel prices with demand factors. Overall, the third-order translog offers the closest approximation to our nonparametric results, but the gain from this more flexible functional form relative to the Cobb-Douglas case remains small. Third, none of the functional forms we consider is able to match the results of our nonparametric estimation exactly. Put differently, these results suggest that it is better to use a nonparametric approach and then provide a functional form approximation than to impose a functional form directly into the estimation.

B.   Comparisons with Alternative Methodologies

We now compare our results to those obtained from alternative approaches. Given past literature, we focus on the estimation of CES production functions and use the CES approximation of our nonparametric approach as benchmark. The first alternative is the traditional regression of $\log(K/T)$ on $\log(R/T)$, which comes out of a rewriting of equation (14). We also duplicate the approach of Ahlfeldt and McMillen (2020). They follow Epple, Gordon, and Sieg (2010) to obtain an estimate of $\log(K/T)$, which they then regress on $\log(R/T)$ as in the traditional regression. Finally, closer to the spirit of our main approach, we can estimate equation (14) directly, using nonlinear least squares, without computing the quantity of housing. An important feature of this alternative is that the variable that may be the most affected by measurement error, R, is now part of the dependent variable and no longer an explanatory variable, as in the traditional regression. Appendix O provides further details about these approaches. Because of our concern regarding the measurement of parcel prices, R, we use both raw and smoothed values for parcel prices. We also provide results when we predict K and R as above.

In table 6, we report the estimated coefficients for the elasticity of substitution, σ, and the "share," α, for the three alternatives we have just described and for the CES approximation of our approach. Panel A reveals stark differences between two groups of estimates. In the first group, the traditional regression with raw data for parcel prices in column 1 estimates an elasticity of substitution of 0.490. The approach of Ahlfeldt and McMillen (2020), which also uses R as an explanatory variable, estimates again an elasticity of substitution well below one with unsmoothed data in column 3. By contrast, the other estimations, which either use smoothed data or have land prices in the dependent variable, estimate an elasticity of substitution close to one. These results are consistent with measurement error

TABLE 6
Comparison across Alternative Approaches

	Traditional (1)	Traditional Smoothed (2)	EGS-AM (3)	EGS-AM Smoothed (4)	Cost Share (5)	Cost Share Smoothed (6)	Our Approach (7)
			A. Observed Data				
σ	.490	.994	.745	1.043	1.046	1.102	1.028
	(.0015)	(.0027)	(.013)	(.030)	(.0028)	(.0038)	(.0048)
α	.997	.631	.915	.573	.600	.509	.601
	(.0003)	(.0033)	(.0096)	(.0341)	(.0033)	(.0042)	(.0057)
			B. Predicted Data				
σ	.644	.933	.816	.952	.982	.975	.900
	(.0024)	(.0033)	(.0025)	(.0032)	(.0032)	(.0032)	(.0046)
α	.971	.729	.860	.707	.682	.679	.767
	(.0008)	(.0039)	(.0023)	(.0038)	(.0037)	(.0038)	(.0052)

Note.—213,876 observations in cols. 1–6 of both panels and 90,000 in col. 7. Observed parcel prices and capital investment are used for regressions in panel A. Predicted parcel prices and capital investment, as per table 3, are used for regressions in panel B. The coefficients in both panels are obtained from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions in cols. 1–4 (including for the Ahlfeldt-McMillen 2020 [AM] estimates), nonlinear least squares regressions in cols. 5 and 6, and OLS regressions weighted by the sum of kernel weights in col. 7. A nonlinear transformation of the estimated coefficients is applied to recover coefficient α in cols. 1–4 and 7. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. EGS = Epple, Gordon, and Sieg (2010).

on R being of first-order importance. Further support for this interpretation can be found in panel B of table 6, which duplicates the results of panel A, using predicted values of R and K. Interestingly, the elasticities of substitution for the traditional regression and for the approach of Ahlfeldt and McMillen (2020) with predicted data are higher than those from the raw data, as we expect the use of predicted data to correct for measurement error. For the other approaches, including ours, we estimate an elasticity of substitution slightly below one.[25]

While the results of table 6 strongly suggest that how we handle measurement error for parcel prices is crucial to explain the differences in the estimated elasticity of substitution across approaches, we keep in mind that smoothing R is not innocuous. Smoothing reduces (classical) measurement error but may also bias our estimates of σ, possibly toward one, since oversmoothing reduces the underlying concavity or convexity of the

[25] Importantly, in cols. 1–4 of panel B, we do not perform a two-stage least squares estimation with some instruments to identify a causal effect. This is because $R \equiv PH - K^*$, and thus any determinant of R must also be a direct determinant of K^*, making the exclusion restriction impossible to satisfy. Estimating the "true" σ in the traditional regression is not about estimating the causal effect of R on K; it is about estimating the simultaneous relationship between K, R, and T in the absence of interference from unobserved factor heterogeneity.

data. To explore this issue, appendix O provides a characterization of the bias introduced by smoothing. Monte Carlo simulations in the same appendix show that the systematic error associated with smoothing is small, even when the elasticity of substitution is far from one. This result is consistent with the stability of our base results with respect to the smoothing bandwidth. We also use simulations calibrated to the variations we observe in the data to confirm the sensitivity of the traditional regression to measurement error. Finally, these simulations confirm the robustness to measurement error of the approaches that smooth parcel prices.

VII.   Full Identification?

Our approach identifies how the production of housing varies with housing capital, given parcel size. Full identification, including how the production of housing varies with parcel size, would obviously be desirable. This section provides four results. First, we prove the impossibility of full identification in the absence of restriction on the returns to scale of the production function. Second, we show that, if we impose constant returns to scale in production, full identification is possible. Third, the data we use strongly reject a key corollary of constant returns: the linearity of parcel prices in parcel size. Fourth, while the capital elasticity we estimate when imposing constant returns is statistically different from the capital elasticity we estimate under partial identification, the difference between the two is economically modest.

In appendix D, we show that the elasticity of housing production with respect to parcel size is equal to the share of land in the total value of the house multiplied by the elasticity of parcel price with respect to parcel size,

$$\frac{\partial \log H(K^*, T)}{\partial \log T} = \frac{R(x, T)}{K^* + R(x, T)} \frac{\partial \log R(x, T)}{\partial \log T}. \tag{15}$$

This is the counterpart for land of equation (4), which states that the elasticity of housing production with respect to capital is equal to the share of capital in the value of the house. To recover the quantity of housing, the expression for the elasticity of housing with respect to parcel size should be integrated over parcels of increasing size T for a given (unobserved) set of characteristics x and a given K^*. This is impossible, since K^* generally depends on T.

The elasticity of housing production with respect to parcel size can nonetheless be integrated when the elasticity of parcel price with respect to parcel size is equal to one. In turn, parcel price can increase proportionately with parcel size, given x, only when the production function is constant returns to scale, as we demonstrate in appendix E. In this specific case, we show how the production function for housing can be recovered

by integrating the relevant cost shares over the variation of capital, the variation of parcel size, and the joint variation of capital and parcel size.

To assess whether the price of parcels per unit of land is constant at a given location, we regress the log of the price of parcels per unit of land on log parcel size and other parcel characteristics. The results are reported in table 7. Column 1 regresses the log price of parcels per square meter on the log of their size. Strikingly, the coefficient is about -1. Adding parcel controls, urban-area indicators, distance to the center (with a coefficient specific to each urban area), and many municipal controls in columns 2–5 lowers the magnitude of the coefficient on log parcel size. Nonetheless, even with a full set of controls, the coefficient on parcel size remains large in magnitude, at about -0.66.[26] Adding a quadratic term on log parcel size in column 6 provides evidence of some log concavity, indicating that the marginal price of land declines faster for larger parcels. Columns 7 and 8 use kernel-smoothed land price data instead of the actual transaction price data used in columns 1–6. The results in these last two columns essentially confirm the result that unit land prices strongly decline with parcel size. We take these results as a strong rejection of constant parcel prices per unit of land and thus a rejection of constant returns in the production of housing.

For our last exercise, we proceed in the spirit of section VI and reestimate housing production under the added restriction of constant returns to scale. We then regress log H computed under constant returns on log K. If imposing constant returns to scale was appropriate, we should find results similar to those obtained above under partial identification when this assumption is not imposed. The results are reported in table 8.

For the first decile of parcel sizes, the results from panels A and B of table 8 are similar to those of table 2. For subsequent deciles, the capital elasticity falls from 0.61 to 0.55 in table 8, while this elasticity increases from 0.64 to 0.66 in table 2. We observe a similar pattern of divergence, albeit in the opposite direction, in the last two panels of table 8 relative to the two corresponding panels of table 3 when using predicted quantities.

We interpret this divergence between the results obtained with a constant-return assumption and those obtained without it as evidence that imposing constant returns to scale may be warranted when considering small parcels but becomes increasingly less appropriate when we consider larger parcels. This interpretation is consistent with the results of table 7 showing that the price of land per square meter declines with parcel size. In turn, parcels are probably best viewed as exogenous because of their indivisibility rather than the product of a maximizing choice by house builders. This

[26] For a very similar specification using US land price data, Albouy and Ehrlich (2013) estimate a coefficient of -0.61.

TABLE 7
EXPLAINING THE PRICE OF LAND PER SQUARE METER

	DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OBSERVED VALUES						DEPENDENT VARIABLE: SMOOTHED VALUES	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Log parcel size	−.991***	−.971***	−.759***	−.644***	−.656***	.922***	−1.084***	−.254***
	(.002)	(.003)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.024)	(.002)	(.063)
Log parcel size squared						−.114***		−.060***
						(.002)		(.005)
Parcel controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Urban-area indicator	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Distance to the center	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Municipal controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
R^2	.43	.45	.74	.79	.80	.81	.81	.81

NOTE.—Ordinary least squares regressions with year effects in all columns, with 213,786 observations in cols. 1–6 and 90,000 observations in cols. 7–8. Parcel controls include indicator variables for whether the parcel is serviced and three types of intermediaries through whom the parcel may have been bought. Municipal controls include log area, log mean income of the year, log standard error of income of the year, share of municipal land that is urbanized (covered) in 2006, share of municipal land for agriculture, ruggedness, soil erodability, soil hydrogeological class, and dominant parent material.

*** Significant at the 1% level.

TABLE 8
LOG HOUSING PRODUCTION WITH CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE, BY PARCEL SIZE DECILE

	Decile								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	A. Observed Data								
$\log(K)$	.624***	.606***	.590***	.577***	.568***	.561***	.556***	.553***	.549***
	(.00093)	(.0011)	(.0013)	(.0016)	(.0019)	(.0022)	(.0024)	(.0025)	(.0026)
	B. Observed Data								
$\log(K)$	.113***	−.650***	−1.279***	−1.935***	−2.629***	−3.295***	−3.932***	−4.482***	−4.927***
	(.038)	(.075)	(.107)	(.129)	(.153)	(.169)	(.187)	(.211)	(.246)
$(\log(K))^2$	.029***	.053***	.079***	.106***	.135***	.162***	.189***	.212***	.231***
	(.0016)	(.0032)	(.0045)	(.0055)	(.0065)	(.0072)	(.0080)	(.0090)	(.010)
	C. Predicted Data								
$\log(K)$	.645***	.640***	.652***	.670***	.690***	.708***	.723***	.733***	.744***
	(.0010)	(.0027)	(.0035)	(.0039)	(.0042)	(.0046)	(.0052)	(.0059)	(.0066)
	D. Predicted Data								
$\log(K)$	.105	1.028*	1.461**	1.002	−.095	−1.592*	−3.416***	−5.302***	−7.137***
	(.137)	(.565)	(.720)	(.787)	(.847)	(.923)	(.991)	(1.051)	(1.109)
$(\log(K))^2$	.023***	−.016	−.034	−.014	.033	.097**	.175***	.255***	.333***
	(.0059)	(.024)	(.031)	(.033)	(.036)	(.039)	(.042)	(.044)	(.047)

NOTE.—Ordinary least squares regressions with a constant in all columns; 300 observations for each regression. In panels C and D, capital and parcel price are predicted from demand-related factors, as in table 3. The R^2 is 1.00 in all specifications. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.

* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.

said, our rejection of constant returns to scale is like our rejection of the Cobb-Douglas functional form. Although we can formally reject that houses are produced under constant returns, this remains a reasonable first-order approximation.

VIII.   Conclusions

We develop a novel approach to estimate the production function of housing. We rely on the notion that, although heterogeneous in many dimensions, houses all provide units of housing. The price of a house is then the product of the price of housing per unit (which varies across locations) and the number of units of housing provided by this house. To separate these two quantities, we assume that housing is competitively provided. Then, the first-order condition for house builders determines the marginal value product of capital. Using the zero-profit condition, we can eliminate the price of housing per unit from the first-order condition and isolate the marginal product of capital when building a house. For parcels of a given size, we can sum this marginal product across houses in different locations that have optimally received different levels of capital and recover the production of housing associated with each level of capital. Although our approach could potentially be applied to other production function estimations, we believe that using it for housing is particularly appropriate because we can rely on the large spatial variations of land prices, a fundamentally important input in our context.

Our main result is that the production function of housing is reasonably well approximated by a Cobb-Douglas production function under constant returns. This said, we can nonetheless show that this is not exactly true. Our preferred results indicate a mild amount of log concavity in the production function of housing and an elasticity of housing production with respect to capital increasing with parcel size, which is consistent with an elasticity of substitution between land and capital slightly below one. We also statistically reject that the production function for housing exhibits constant returns. Nonetheless, the capital elasticity we estimate when imposing constant returns is close to our unrestricted estimates.

There are three challenges that future work will have to deal with. First, we implicitly assume that housing is perfectly divisible (unlike parcels). We do not expect households who purchase a new house to get exactly the quantity of housing they wanted. In turn, the willingness to pay of a household for a unit of housing may decline as the house they consider deviates from their preferred choice. Exploring the implications of the indivisibility of housing in our framework is a natural next step. Second, we assume that houses vary only in the amount of housing units that they provide. While we show that this may be a reasonable assumption for new houses in a given city or for buyers who belong to the same occupational group, it will be

important in future work to consider richer forms of heterogeneity in the demand for housing. Finally, with richer data about the houses being built, it will be interesting to decompose the quantity of housing we estimate into a house's observable characteristics.

Appendix A

Extending the Base Model to Two Types of Housing Capital

We now extend our base model to two types of capital. The first type of capital produces raw floor space, while the second produces housing quality. The production function now contains three arguments instead of the two in the base model: $H(K_1, K_2, T)$, where T is the land area of the parcel. We distinguish here between floor space and quality, but finer distinctions could obviously be envisioned (flooring, finishes, structure quality, etc.), since the reasoning would be the same.

The builder, who develops a parcel of exogenously given size T and characteristics x purchased at the endogenously determined price R, seeks to maximize profits, now given by $\pi = P(x)H(K_1, K_2, T) - K_1 - K_2 - R$ with respect to both K_1 and K_2. The first-order conditions for profit maximization are

$$P(x)\frac{\partial H(K_1, K_2, T)}{\partial K_1} = 1 \quad \text{and} \quad P(x)\frac{\partial H(K_1, K_2, T)}{\partial K_2} = 1. \tag{A1}$$

As $H(K_1, K_2, T)$ is increasing and strictly concave in K_1 and K_2, the profit-maximizing capital investments K_1^* and K_2^* are unique. Free entry still dissipates the profits from construction into the price of land: $R = P(x)H(K_1^*, K_2^*, T) - K_1^* - K_2^* \equiv R(K_1^*, K_2^*, T)$. This condition can be used to eliminate the price of housing from the first-order conditions. Writing the resulting expressions as elasticities, we obtain

$$\frac{\partial \log H(K_1^*, K_2^*, T)}{\partial \log K_1^*} = \frac{K_1^*}{K_1^* + K_2^* + R(K_1^*, K_2^*, T)} \tag{A2}$$

and a symmetric expression for K_2^*. These two expressions duplicate equation (4) for each type of capital. We cannot use these two expressions empirically, since we do not observe K_1 and K_2 separately.

To obtain the elasticity of housing with respect to total capital K^* $(=K_1^* + K_2^*)$, we need K_1^* and K_2^* to be functions of K^* (and T). From the first-order conditions (A1) and the restrictions imposed on the production function, both K_1^* and K_2^* are functions of P and T, increasing in both arguments. Their sum, $K^* = K_1^* + K_2^*$ is thus also an increasing function of P and T. Hence, this sum can be inverted so that P is written as function of K^* and T. We can use this property to rewrite K_1^* and K_2^* as functions of K^* and T, using equation (A1). We can then replace the two resulting expressions for K_1^* and K_2^* into the production function of housing and write it as $H(K_1^*(K^*, T), K_2^*(K^*, T), T)$. With a slight abuse of notation to keep the algebra readable, we then derive the housing production function:

$$\frac{\partial \log H(K_1^*, K_2^*, T)}{\partial \log K^*} = \frac{\partial \log H(K_1^*, K_2^*, T)}{\partial \log K_1^*} \frac{\partial \log K_1^*}{\partial \log K^*} + \frac{\partial \log H(K_1^*, K_2^*, T)}{\partial \log K_2^*} \frac{\partial \log K_2^*}{\partial \log K^*}$$

$$= \frac{K^*}{K_1^*} \frac{\partial \log H(K_1^*, K_2^*, T)}{\partial \log K_1^*} \frac{\partial K_1^*}{\partial K^*} + \frac{K^*}{K_2^*} \frac{\partial \log H(K_1^*, K_2^*, T)}{\partial \log K_2^*} \frac{\partial K_2^*}{\partial K^*}$$

$$= \frac{K^*}{K^* + R(K_1^*, K_2^*, T)} \left(\frac{\partial K_1^*}{\partial K^*} + \frac{\partial K_2^*}{\partial K^*} \right)$$

$$= \frac{K^*}{K^* + R(K^*, T)},$$

$$(A3)$$

where the third equality uses equation (A1) and the last one relies on $K^* = K_1^* + K_2^*$. Equation (A3) is equivalent to equation (4), and we can integrate it in the same manner to recover the quantity of housing. Hence, equation (A3) shows that, although the composition of capital may be highly heterogeneous, our approach still recovers $H(K, T)$ for a given T.

Importantly, we recover the quantity of housing from the variations of K^* and R only along the optimal path for K_1^* and K_2^* for a given T. To be concrete, we can determine how the quantity of housing varies with the overall housing investment but cannot recover how floor space and quality map into housing units.

We now introduce a regulatory constraint taking the form of a cap on floor space: $K_1 \leq \overline{K}_1$. Because our estimation is for T given, this constraint readily generalizes to $K_1 \leq \overline{K}_1(T)$. While a simple cap on floor space is not realistic, recall that maximum FAR constraints are the main tools used to regulate the intensity of land use in France.

The first-order conditions in equation (A1) imply that K_1 and K_2 are strictly increasing in $P(x)$, given T. Hence, there is always a high enough level of housing price that the cap on floor space is binding and $K_1 = \overline{K}_1$. The other derivations remain, however, the same as above. When the constraint on K_1 is not binding, equation (A3) applies. When it is binding, the capital elasticity is

$$\frac{\partial \log H(\overline{K}_1, K_2^*, T)}{\partial \log K^*} = \frac{\partial H(\overline{K}_1, K_2^*, T)}{\partial K_2^*} \frac{K^*}{H(\overline{K}_1, K_2^*, T)}$$

$$= \frac{K^*}{K^* + R(K^*, T, \overline{K}_1)},$$

$$(A4)$$

where the first equality arises because $\partial K^* = \partial K_2^*$ when the constraint $K_1 = \bar{K}_1$ is binding and the second equality uses equation (A3). This rewriting highlights that we cannot integrate equation (A4) as in the base case because $\bar{K}_1$ may depend on x and thus vary jointly with K^*. It also shows that the housing elasticity with respect to capital is estimated, given the constraint.

In the Cobb-Douglas case where H is proportional to $K_1^{\beta_1} K_2^{\beta_2}$, it is easy to show, using equations (A3) and (A4), that the capital elasticity is equal to $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ when the constraint is not binding and $\beta_2(\overline{K}_1 + K_2^*)/K_2^*$ when the constraint is binding. Considering a gradual increase in P from 0, we first observe a capital elasticity

of $\beta_1 + \beta_2$, followed by a gradual decrease to β_2 as the constraint becomes more binding.

Appendix B

Comparison with Epple, Gordon, and Sieg (2010)

In this appendix, we provide a detailed comparison between our approach and that of Epple, Gordon, and Sieg (2010; the "EGS approach").

B1.   *Applying Our Approach with EGS Data*

We first show that our approach can be used with data similar to those of Epple, Gordon, and Sieg (2010). The main apparent difference is that those authors observe the value of the house, whereas we observe the investment made to build the house. More specifically, they have information on (V, R, T), where $V \equiv PH$ is the house value, instead of (K, R, T) in our case. It is nonetheless possible to implement our approach with the EGS data. To do this, note that the first-order condition for profit maximization (eq. [1]) used in the main text can be rewritten as

$$\frac{1}{H(K, T)} \frac{\partial H(K, T)}{\partial K} = \frac{1}{V},$$ (B1)

after we divide both sides by $V = PH$ and omit the argument x for brevity. Although the value of capital, K^*, is not directly observed with the EGS data, the zero-profit condition readily yields $K^* = V - R$. From equation (1), we have $P = P(K^*, T)$. Inserting this into the expression for house values, we get $V = P(K^*, T)H(K^*, T) \equiv V(K^*, T)$, and we end up with the differential equation

$$\frac{1}{H(K^*, T)} \frac{\partial H(K^*, T)}{\partial K} = \frac{1}{V(K^*, T)}.$$ (B2)

This differential equation can be integrated over K^* to recover the housing production function (up to a multiplicative function of T).

B2.   *The EGS Approach in Our Setting*

A corollary of the previous result is that we can also apply the EGS approach to estimate the housing production function with the data at hand for France.

To compare the two approaches further, it is insightful to rederive the EGS approach in the spirit of our paper. Note first that Epple, Gordon, and Sieg (2010) make two additional assumptions relative to our approach. First, they assume that the housing production function is constant returns to scale. Second, the value of parcels is linear in their size. We show below that it is possible to adapt their approach and avoid making these two assumptions. This leads to the partial identification of the housing production function, as in our case.

The crux of the EGS approach is to make K^*, which is unobserved in their case, disappear from the first-order condition by substituting its expression as a function of the house price V and parcel size T to recover a differential equation for

the supply function of housing $S(P, T)$, which links housing production to house prices for a given land area. Their differential equation contains a function that can be estimated with the data at hand. Once the supply of housing is recovered, house prices, $P = P(K^*, T)$, can be computed as a function of the optimal structure and land area from the zero-profit condition. Finally, inserting this expression for house prices into the supply function for housing yields the housing production function.

More formally, note first that we have $K^* = K^*(V, T)$ from equation (B1). The zero-profit condition then implies that $R = V - K^*(V, T) \equiv R(V, T)$. It is possible to recover nonparametrically the function $R(V, T)$, since (R, V, T) is observed.

The first-order condition for profit maximization implies that we have $K^* = K^*(P, T)$. From this equation and following the EGS derivation, the first-order condition can be rewritten to obtain a differential equation for the supply function of housing:

$$P\frac{\partial H(K, T)}{\partial K} = 1 \Leftrightarrow P\left(\frac{\partial K^*(P, T)}{\partial P}\right)^{-1}\frac{\partial H(K^*(P, T), T)}{\partial P} = 1, \qquad \text{(B3)}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow P\frac{\partial S(P, T)}{\partial P} = \frac{\partial K^*(P, T)}{\partial P}, \qquad \text{(B4)}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow P\frac{\partial S(P, T)}{\partial P} = \frac{\partial (V - R(V, T))}{\partial P}. \qquad \text{(B5)}$$

As $V = PS(P, T)$, we have

$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial P} = S(P, T) + P\frac{\partial S(P, T)}{\partial P}. \qquad \text{(B6)}$$

Substituting this expression into equation (B5) yields

$$S(P, T) = \frac{\partial R(PS(P, T), T)}{\partial P}. \qquad \text{(B7)}$$

This is the equation used by Epple, Gordon, and Sieg (2010) to estimate the supply function for housing for a given land area. Note that this expression could alternatively be obtained directly from Hotelling's lemma applied to the short-run profit given by $PH - K$ ($=R$).

Using the fact that $\partial R/\partial P = (\partial R/\partial V)(\partial V/\partial P)$ and equation (B6) and dropping the arguments of S for readability, equation (B7) can be developed to obtain the following differential equation:

$$S = \frac{\partial R(PS, T)}{\partial V}\left(S + P\frac{\partial S}{\partial P}\right). \qquad \text{(B8)}$$

Since the function R can be recovered from the data through the zero-profit condition, so can its partial derivative with respect to V. The resulting differential equation can then be solved to recover S as a function of P for a given land area T. Note that the differential equation (B8) is made intricate by the presence of S in the function R, which makes it implicit only, contrary to our approach.

Once the supply of housing is recovered, the optimal amount of capital corresponding to price P can be obtained with the zero-profit condition

$$K^*(P, T) = PS(P, T) - R(PS(P, T), T). \tag{B9}$$

This function can be inverted to obtain $P = P(K^*, T)$, and the variations of the production function of housing with respect to K (holding T fixed) can be recovered by using the fact that $S(P(K^*, T), T) = H(K^*, T)$. Note that, as in our case, the differential equation can be solved up to a function of T and the production function of housing is only partially identified. Under the constant-return-to-scale assumption made by Epple, Gordon, and Sieg (2010), there is full identification, since there is only one differential equation to solve regardless of the value of T. This single differential equation is simply equation (B8) where T is set to one.

Appendix C

A Two-Period Extension of Our Base Model

We develop a two-period extension of the model in the main text. The argument readily generalizes to many periods or to an infinite time horizon, but the calculations below are simpler and more transparent with two periods, 1 and 2. With multiple periods, we need to distinguish between the asset value of housing and its rental value. We denote the rental value of housing per unit P_1 in period 1 and P_2 in period 2.

If housing investment can occur only at the beginning of period 1, house builders seek to maximize $\pi = (P_1 + \delta P_2)H(K_1, T) - K_1$, where $\delta < 1$ is the actualization factor from period 2 to period 1. We can define $\delta \equiv 1/(1 + r)$, where r is now the interest rate for the first period. With $P \equiv P_1 + \delta P_2$, this model is equivalent to the static model in the main text. That is, higher future housing prices, once appropriately discounted, are no different than higher current prices. Then, the elasticity of output with respect to capital is still equal to the share of capital in construction costs, as per equation (4). Hence, with this framework, the large differences in capital shares across urban areas reported in table 4 remain difficult to reconcile with the "more stable" results of table 2.

We now consider that housing investment can be made in both period 1 and period 2. To distinguish between stocks and flows, we denote as I_1 the investment in housing made in period 1 and as I_2 the investment made in period 2. We have $K_1 = I_1$ and $K_2 = (1 - \tau)K_1 + I_2$, where $0 \leq \tau \leq 1$ is the depreciation of capital between period 1 and period 2. Profit in period 1 is given by

$$\pi_1 = P_1 H(K_1, T) - I_1 - R_1 + \delta V_2 = P_1 H(K_1, T) - K_1 - R_1 + \delta V_2, \tag{C1}$$

where V_2 is the resale value of the house at the beginning of period 2 before any second-period investment in housing. This resale value can be written as $V_2 = R_2 + (1 - \tau)K_1$, which sums the remaining housing capital and the endogenously determined value of the land in period 2.

The profit of the builder rebuilding a house in period 2 is given by

$$\pi_2 = P_2 H(K_2, T) - I_2 - V_2 = P_2 H(K_2, T) - I_2 - (1 - \tau)K_1 - R_2$$
$$= P_2 H(K_2, T) - K_2 - R_2, \tag{C2}$$

where we use the expressions above giving K_2 and V_2 to rewrite the profit in period 2 as a function of K_2 to obtain the last equality.

Maximizing profits in period 2 with respect to K_2 implies that the optimal level of capital in the second period K_2^* is given implicitly by

$$P_2 \frac{\partial H(K_2^*)}{\partial K_2^*} = 1. \tag{C3}$$

Then, optimal investment is immediately obtained from $I_2^* = K_2^* - (1 - \tau)K_1^*$, where K_1^* is derived below. Zero profit for builders in period 2, $\pi_2 = 0$, also implies

$$R_2 = P_2 H(K_2^*) - I_2^* - (1 - \tau)K_1. \tag{C4}$$

Turning to period 1, we can use $V_2 = R_2 + (1 - \tau)K_1$ and equation (C4) to rewrite period 1 profit in equation (C1) as

$$\pi_1 = P_1 H(K_1, T) - K_1 - R_1 + \delta(P_2 H(K_2^*, T) - I_2^*). \tag{C5}$$

The first-order condition for profit maximization with respect to K_1 implies that optimal period 1 capital, K_1^*, is given by

$$P_1 \frac{\partial H(K_1^*, T)}{\partial K_1^*} = 1 - \delta \left(P_2 \frac{\partial H(K_2^*)}{\partial K_2^*} \frac{\partial K_2^*}{\partial K_1^*} - \frac{\partial I_2^*}{\partial K_1^*} \right). \tag{C6}$$

We can use expression (C3) (the envelope theorem) and $I_2^* = K_2^* - (1 - \tau)K_1^*$ to rewrite the first-order condition (C6) as

$$P_1 \frac{\partial H(K_1^*)}{\partial K_1^*} = 1 - \delta(1 - \tau). \tag{C7}$$

This expression corresponds to the optimal investment equation (1) for a two-period setting.

Then, it is useful to rewrite equation (C7) in elasticity form:

$$\frac{\partial \log H(K_1^*)}{\partial \log K_1^*} = \frac{[1 - \delta(1 - \tau)]K_1^*}{P_1 H(K_1^*)}$$
$$= [1 - \delta(1 - \tau)] \frac{V_1}{P_1 H(K_1^*)} \frac{K_1^*}{K_1^* + R_1}, \tag{C8}$$

where the last equality is obtained with $V_1 = K_1^* + R_1$. Recall that with optimal investment and zero profit for the builder, the value of a house is equal to the value of its land plus the optimal capital invested. Equation (C8) differs from equation (4) because it multiplies the cost share $K_1^*/(K_1^* + R_1)$ on the right-hand side by $1 - \delta(1 - \tau)$, a factor that accounts for the discount rate and the depreciation

of capital, and by $V_1/(P_1 H(K_1^*))$, the ratio of the value of the house to its rental value for the period.

While we use this expression in our empirical exercise in section V.C, further insight can be gained from replacing $P_1 H(K_1^*)$, using equation (C5), after setting π_1 to zero. After simplifications, equation (C8) becomes

$$\frac{\partial \log H(K_1^*)}{\partial \log K_1^*} = \frac{[1 - \delta(1 - \tau)]K_1^*}{[1 - \delta(1 - \tau)]K_1^* + (R_1 - \delta R_2)}. \tag{C9}$$

Denoting the growth rate of value of parcels $g \equiv R_2/R_1 - 1$ and expressing the discount rate as function of the interest rate as defined above, $\delta \equiv 1/(1 + r)$, equation (C9) can finally be rewritten as

$$\frac{\partial \log H(K_1^*)}{\partial \log K_1^*} = \frac{(r + \tau)K_1^*}{(r + \tau)K_1^* + (r - g)R_1}, \tag{C10}$$

where K_1^* is implicitly defined by equation (C7) and depends on P_1 but not on P_2. This expression for the elasticity of housing production with respect to capital is no longer equal to the cost share $K^*/(K^* + R)$ as in equation (4), as already noted. Instead, it is equal to the ratio of the cost of capital for the first period $(r + \tau)K_1^*$ to the sum of the cost of capital and the cost of land $(r - g)R_1$. Each factor is now adjusted by its user cost. This user cost is equal to the sum of the interest rate and the rate of depreciation for capital. It is equal to the interest rate minus the rate of appreciation for land. This correction is in the spirit of the user cost correction first proposed by Poterba (1984).

Appendix D

Full Identification in Absence of Restrictions on the Returns to Scale

According to first-order condition in equation (1), profit-maximizing housing capital is a function of both parcel size T and the location characteristics x: $K^* = K^*(x, T)$. Then, from the zero-profit condition (2), we deduce that the price of a parcel depends on the same two arguments: $R \equiv R(x, T)$. To remain consistent with our assumption of exogenous parcels, we consider builders bidding for parcels of different sizes and anticipating the amount of capital they will use, K^*. To know how much a profit-maximizing developer is willing to pay for a marginal increase of parcel size, we derive the zero-profit condition with respect to T:

$$\frac{\partial R(x, T)}{\partial T} = P(x)\frac{\partial H(K^*, T)}{\partial K^*}\frac{\partial K^*(x, T)}{\partial T} + P(x)\frac{\partial H(K^*, T)}{\partial T} - \frac{\partial K^*(x, T)}{\partial T}$$

$$= P(x)\frac{\partial H(K^*, T)}{\partial T}, \tag{D1}$$

where the simplification arises from the envelope theorem and the builder's first-order condition for profit maximization with respect to K. Although we formally

derive the zero-profit condition, we note that expression (D1) is equivalent to a first-order condition with respect to T.[27]

We can then use the zero-profit condition to eliminate $P(x)$ from equation (D1) and obtain

$$\frac{1}{H(K^*, T)} \frac{\partial H(K^*, T)}{\partial T} = \frac{1}{K^* + R(x, T)} \frac{\partial R(x, T)}{\partial T}, \tag{D2}$$

or equivalently,

$$\frac{\partial \log H(K^*, T)}{\partial \log T} = \frac{R(x, T)}{K^* + R(x, T)} \frac{\partial \log R(x, T)}{\partial \log T}. \tag{D3}$$

Importantly, these two expressions are conditional on x. Because we do not know x, we cannot integrate them over T to recover $H(K^*, T)$. Note that this problem cannot be solved by substituting for x using equation (1), since it would make the housing production function appear on the right-hand side.

Since we observe K and T in the data but not x, we could try to use R written as a function of K^* and T (as in the zero-profit condition [2]):

$$\frac{\partial \log R(x, T)}{\partial \log T} = \frac{\partial \log R(K^*, T)}{\partial \log T} + \frac{\partial \log R(K^*, T)}{\partial \log K} \frac{\partial \log K^*}{\partial \log T}. \tag{D4}$$

Again, this expression cannot be integrated over T, since K^* is also a function of T.

Appendix E

Full Identification under Constant Returns to Scale

In this appendix, we consider again the full identification of the housing production function (up to a constant). We now assume that developers directly choose parcel size and that the price of parcels is linear in their size: $R = \widetilde{R}(x)T$, where $\widetilde{R}$ is the unit land price. This is consistent with the notion that, if parcels are divisible, there should be no arbitrage possibility between parcels of different sizes in equilibrium.

Builders' profit at location x is $\pi = P(x)H(K, T) - K - \widetilde{R}(x)T$, which is now maximized over both K and T. Aside from the first-order condition for profit maximization with respect to capital (eq. [1]), there is also one for land:

$$P(x) \frac{\partial H(K, T)}{\partial T} = \widetilde{R}(x). \tag{E1}$$

Plugging the two first-order conditions into the zero-profit condition and simplifying by $P(x)$ leads to

$$H(K, T) = K \frac{\partial H(K, T)}{\partial K} + T \frac{\partial H(K, T)}{\partial T}. \tag{E2}$$

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[27] This avoids having to deal explicitly with the unit price of land and the fact that optimal parcel size is zero under decreasing returns. See app. E.

This is Euler's condition that characterizes homogeneous functions of degree 1. For it to be verified, $H(K, T)$ must be constant returns to scale.

Then, the first-order condition with respect to K, equation (1), still shows that the housing price can be rewritten as a function of K^* and T only, and, as before, the free-entry condition then implies that it is also the case for the total land price, $R(K, T)$. We can substitute away $P(x)$ from the free-entry condition by using now the first-order condition for T given by equation (E1). Recalling that $\widetilde{R}(x) = R(K, T)/T$, this leads to

$$\frac{\partial H(K, T)}{\partial T} = \frac{\widetilde{R}(x)}{P(x)} = \frac{H(K, T)}{K + R(K, T)} \frac{R(K, T)}{T}, \tag{E3}$$

which is equivalent to

$$\frac{\partial \log H(K, T)}{\partial \log T} = \frac{R(K, T)}{K + R(K, T)}. \tag{E4}$$

We obtain an expression that mirrors equation (4) for the elasticity of housing production with respect to capital. To derive the production function, we substitute expression (5) into equation (E4) and obtain

$$\frac{R(K, T)}{K + R(K, T)} = \frac{\partial \log Z(T)}{\partial \log T} - \int_K \frac{KT(\partial R(K, T)/\partial T)}{(K + R(K, T))^2} \, d\log K. \tag{E5}$$

Integrating this equation with respect to $\log T$ yields

$$\log Z(T) = C + \int_T \frac{R(K, T)}{K + R(K, T)} d\log T + \int_T \int_K \frac{KT(\partial R(K, T)/\partial T)}{(K + R(K, T))^2} d\log K \, d\log T, \tag{E6}$$

where C is a constant. Substituting equation (E6) into equation (5), we get

$$\log H(K, T) = C + \int_T \frac{R(K, T)}{K + R(K, T)} \, d\log T + \int_K \frac{K}{K + R(K, T)} \, d\log K \tag{E7}$$

$$+ \int_T \int_K \frac{KT(\partial R(K, T)/\partial T)}{(K + R(K, T))^2} \, d\log K \, d\log T.$$

Note that this expression is consistent with a Cobb-Douglas production function, since, for that function, the second and third right-hand-side terms are integrals of constant cost shares and collapse into $\log T$ and $\log K$. Moreover, we have $R(K, T) = (1 - \alpha)K/\alpha$ (where α is the share of capital), which implies that $\partial R(K, T)/\partial T = 0$ and the third right-hand side term of equation (E7) is then zero.

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