

Changing the Dialogue:
Descriptive Candidacies & Position Taking in
Campaigns for the U.S. House of Representatives

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Abstract

Although the benefits of increasing descriptive diversity in Congress are well-explored, scant attention has been paid to the positive impacts of increasing descriptive diversity in elections. Employing a comprehensive collection of campaign platform text from nearly 5,000 campaign websites, we find that Democratic male and white candidates are significantly more likely to take up women's and Black-associated issues when a candidate who possesses that identity runs in their same-party primary election. Extending our analysis to Republican military veterans, we find that candidates are just as responsive to an opponent whose identity is rooted in shared experiences rather than a physical characteristic. In our comparison of primary and general election platform text, we demonstrate that position taking remains largely unchanged over the course of elections. Our findings suggest that simply the *presence* of candidates from underrepresented populations in congressional elections is important to broadening substantive representation in the legislative arena.

In 2018, Susan Wild—an attorney and former state solicitor—was elected as the first woman to represent Pennsylvania’s 7th congressional district in the U.S. House of Representatives. In her campaign, Wild championed policies related to women’s healthcare accessibility and workplace harassment. Once in office, she continued to advocate for such issues, introducing legislation to address sexual violence against girls (H.R. 723) and to provide better legal services for female veterans (H.R. 3189). Representative Susan Wild’s commitment to women’s issues both during her campaign and in Congress is unsurprising; scholars tend to view descriptive candidates as strong stewards for the interests of constituents with whom they have a shared identity (Burden, 2007). Put plainly, female candidates are expected to take up and fight for female-centric issues. What is *unexpected*, however, is that all five of Wild’s male primary election competitors *also* took up positions related to gender equality in their campaigns. In 2020, when McKayla Wilkes—a Black woman, political newcomer, and previously incarcerated individual—ran for Congress in the Maryland 5th, there was little to no chance that she would succeed in primarying the district’s incumbent House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-MD). Wilkes predictably lost by an overwhelming vote margin, however her presence in the primary still seemed to have an impact on the types of issues Hoyer discussed in his campaign. In the wake of Wilkes’ emergence, Hoyer added an extensive section on criminal justice reform to his official campaign website. Moreover, in the weeks leading up to the primary, Hoyer co-sponsored legislation addressing racial justice and police brutality for the first time in his decades-long political career.

In the following paper, we assess if and how the presence of candidates from underrepresented and underserved populations impacts the kinds of campaign positions taken up by their primary election competitors. Moving beyond electoral factors like district partisanship or issue salience, we contend that Wilkes and Wild’s primary election presence was decisive in motivating their opponents’ position taking behavior. Following literature on representation, we posit that voters will be particularly drawn to candidates who share their identity because these individuals tend to be strong advocates for their groups’ interests. We suspect that candidates who *lack* this same identity will, in turn, take up issues related to their opponents’ group identification in an attempt to neutralize that

descriptive-based advantage. In testing our theory, we shed light on how competition impacts the electoral dialogue in primaries and, further, general elections.

Our analysis centers on primary elections because this is precisely where we expect to see candidates respond to their competitors’ descriptive characteristics. Today, in those many district that are safely partisan, winning the primary may be a candidate’s only major obstacle to attaining office. Candidates running in these all-important primaries should, therefore, devote substantial attention to addressing the positions taken up by their same-party opponents. Furthermore, today’s parties have firmly staked out their policy priorities (Lee, 2016) and, responding to these now-clarified party cues, voters have sorted (Levendusky, 2009). As a result, each party’s constituent base has grown increasingly distinct along cultural, social, and ethnic lines (Mason, 2018). Aligning with this divide, we expect the types of candidates that voters find desirable to differ by party. Our theory posits that candidates take up issues related to their competitors’ identities in an attempt to cross-pressure voters who might find those identities especially appealing. Because voter preferences on candidate attributes should be more consistent within party than across party, primaries provide the ideal vehicle for testing our theory.

To examine the types of issues adopted by candidates, we compiled, cleaned, and coded an original data set of text from candidate campaign websites for the 2018 and 2020 congressional primary elections. These sites usually include a biography, a list of endorsements, and—in particular—outline a candidate’s campaign issue agenda (i.e. their platform). Using this platform text, we hand-coded over 20,000 policy positions to determine whether or not candidates discussed issues in their primary election campaigns that pertained to their competitors’ descriptive qualities. Campaign websites are a data source well-suited for our purposes because they (1) provide a near complete inventory of the issues important to a candidate’s campaign, and (2) are largely representative of the population of campaigns. Importantly, the text collected from these candidates’ websites constitute the first compilation of campaign issue positions from congressional primary elections, providing a comprehensive and important source for data on campaign behavior.

Employing these new data, we seek to determine if there is a relationship between the presence of a Black or female candidate in a primary election and the issues adopted

by their same-party opponents. We find that candidates from underrepresented and underserved populations spark a significant response from their competitors. For example, the presence of a female candidate in a Democratic primary is associated with a *twenty-five* percentage-point increase in the predicted probability that a male candidate in that same race adopts women’s issues (e.g. equal pay for equal work) in their own campaign platform. We uncover similar results in our examination of Black candidate emergence, which is associated with a *twenty-four* percentage-point increase in the predicted probability that a white candidate discusses issues in their platform that disproportionately affect Black Americans (e.g. addressing systematic racial bias in policing).

To broaden the generalizability of our findings, we also investigate candidate responsiveness to the presence of a military veteran in their primary. This extension allows us to assess how candidates respond to a competitor’s identity when it is rooted in a shared set of experiences rather than a physical characteristic (i.e. race or gender). Employing military veterans, we can also compare levels of responsiveness for candidates across both parties using the same type of issue. We find that the presence of a military veteran in a Republican primary is associated with a *twenty-two* percentage-point increase in the predicted probability that a non-veteran adopts veterans’ issues into their own campaign platform. Interestingly, we find no relationship between the presence of a veteran in a Democratic primary and their opponents’ coverage of veterans’ issues.

This paper advances work on both descriptive representation and the study of campaign position taking. Our analysis demonstrates that the diversity of a candidate’s primary election competition has important implications on the issues they will take up in their own campaign. Moreover, comparing the platform text of candidates who won the primary with their issue coverage in the general election, we demonstrate that campaign website content remains largely *unchanged*. In other words, male and white candidates’ coverage of issues that affect women and Black Americans does not begin and end with the primary. How candidates campaign is important because the positions they take during the election will inform how they govern. Politicians follow through on their campaign platforms after attaining office, making good on the promises they made to voters (Sulkin, 2005, 2011). Accordingly, if more candidates cover issues in their campaigns related to

groups traditionally underserved in lawmaking, there should be a greater probability that these policy priorities will reach the halls of Congress. This suggests that simply the *presence* of candidates from underrepresented populations in congressional elections is important to broadening substantive representation in the legislative arena.

The Impacts of Descriptive Representation

The importance of increasing descriptive diversity in Congress cannot be understated. Americans traditionally underrepresented in politics tend to vote at a higher rate and take a greater interest in elections when they are represented by a legislator who shares their identity (Bobo and Gilliam Jr., 1990; Griffin and Keane, 2006; Reingold and Harrell, 2010). Moreover, Black constituents are more likely to contact a co-racial Member of Congress (Gay 2002). Wolak and Juenke (2021) notably find that political knowledge gaps between whites and Blacks are diminished when Black constituents are represented by a co-racial legislator. Turning to female constituents, women tend to feel a greater sense of political empowerment (High-Pippert and Comer 1998) and are more politically knowledgeable (Jones, 2014) when their representative is a woman.¹

The connection between legislators who belong to underrepresented populations and the political engagement of co-group constituents is thought to be a function of group identification. Scholars like Mansbridge (1999) and Phillips (1995) argue that the descriptive representation of a group in legislatures is a necessary condition to achieving substantive representation of that group’s interests. This notion that co-group representatives serve as stronger policy advocates for group interests is supported by abundant examinations of legislative behavior. In particular, Juenke and Preuhs (2012) find that representatives who belong to a racial minority are not only more responsive to minority populations but also possess ideological variation that is unique to their racial background. In her book, Swers (2002) demonstrates that women are more committed to women’s issues than are men at every stage of the legislative process. Employing 88,000 communication records between U.S. House representatives and federal agencies, Lowande et al. (2019) also show

¹It is important to note that some scholars assert that the effect of symbolic representation on political engagement may be more modest than other work suggests (e.g. Swain 1995; Dolan 2006; Lawless 2004).

that women and racial/ethnic minorities are more likely to work on behalf of constituents who share their identities. All of this supports the idea that, by electing co-group members to Congress, Black and female voters work to advance their own interests in the policymaking sphere. Considering the role descriptive representatives play as policy advocates, it is no surprise that women and racial minorities prefer to elect representatives who look like them (Dolan, 2004; Brians, 2005; Adler, 2001; Philpot and Jr, 2007).

The literature cited above reflects only a fraction of those studies dedicated to understanding the relationship between candidates from underrepresented populations and constituents' vote choice. Scant attention, however, has been paid to evaluating how these kinds of candidates impact broader electoral dynamics. In this paper, we seek to determine if and how the descriptive identity of a candidate impacts the policy priorities taken up by competitors who do not share their identity. In other words, does the presence of a female candidate in a race motivate male candidates to discuss women's issues? Can the presence of a Black candidate spur white candidates to talk about issues that disproportionately affect people of color? Using new data on the issue positions of congressional candidates who ran in 2018 and 2020, we find that there is a strong association between the presence of a female or Black candidate in a race and the issues taken up by their same-party primary election opponents.

A Theory of Strategic Responsiveness

When crafting their campaign platform, candidates must make a number of considerations. Previous work highlights a diverse set of factors that may motivate a candidate's position taking behavior, such as issue salience (e.g. Bélanger and Meguid 2008), district characteristics (e.g. Hayes et al. 2010) and—notably for this paper—the composition of their *opponent's* campaign platform. The idea of elections as a dialogue, where candidates react to their competitor's position taking, is captured in theories on issue convergence. Banda (2015) describes this concept as a “defensive campaign strategy,” where candidates respond to each other's platforms as a way “to negate—or at least moderate—the electoral benefits their opponents may receive due to their strategies” (p. 826).

Extending this premise, we argue that candidates who possess a politically salient identity should elicit a similar kind of reaction from their competitors. Descriptive cues like race and gender demonstrate a “shared experience” with voters, indicating a deeper commitment towards advancing shared group interests (Kahn, 1996). As outlined in the previous section, it is for this reason that female and Black candidates receive out-sized electoral support from co-group voters. Following literature on issue convergence, candidates should take up issues related to their competitor’s identity in an attempt to neutralize that identity’s electoral benefits. Moving beyond established theories, however, we suspect that simply the *presence* of a female or Black candidate should be enough to motivate competitors’ adoption of identity-related issues. Because descriptive cues are tied to a candidate’s perceived ability to serve as a policy advocate, their identity alone should prompt a strategic response from competitors. This expectation breaks from existing work in that we hypothesize substantive issue coverage is not always necessary to elicit a strategic reaction. To account for this expectation, our analysis explores candidates’ responsiveness to opponents who *discuss* their politically salient identity (i.e. gender or race) as well as those who *do not discuss* this identity.

We expect the relationship described above to be conditioned by party. Political polarization has precipitated a divide where Democrats and Republicans prefer entirely different types of candidates (Mason, 2018). This partisan division on preferred candidate qualities extends over personality traits, ideological purity, and demographic characteristics. In tandem with polarization, “party-owned” issues have also become an increasingly important component of campaigns (Petrocik, 1996). Accordingly, voters today see Democrats as better at handling social welfare and issues of equality, while Republicans are perceived to excel on defense issues, like national security.

In today’s elections, partisan preferences over candidate characteristics and perceived issue competencies have become intertwined. Voter stereotypes about candidates are only powerful insofar as they align with partisan stereotypes. For example, the perception that Black candidates are more concerned with minority rights is conditioned on that candidate being a Black Democrat (Fairdosi and Rogowski, 2015). Similarly, the perception that women are especially strong stewards for women’s issues is generally limited to Democratic

women (Sanbonmatsu and Dolan, 2009). This distinction is integral to understanding the candidate preferences of Democratic voters because, “[these] voters do not simply want more women in office; they want a particular kind of woman in office” (Dolan 2014, p. 193). For that reason, female and Black Democratic voters should not be any more likely to support a co-group Republican candidate than they would be otherwise. In a similar vein, being female or Black does not intrinsically advantage Democratic candidates in the eyes of Republican voters; these identities do not resonate with the Republican electorate in the same way they do with fellow partisans (Karl and Ryan, 2016).

Recall, the crux of our theory is that candidates should take up issues related to their competitor’s identity when that identity gives their competitor an electoral advantage. Because female and Black Democrats lack crossover appeal, these candidates pose a nominal threat to Republican candidates in the general election and vice versa. For this reason, the presence of a female or Black Democrat in an election should not affect *inter*-party position taking. We, therefore, look to *intra*-party position taking. In primaries, setting oneself apart from the competition is vital and, moreover, difficult with the cue of partisanship removed. Candidates from descriptively underrepresented populations, however, can use their identity to their advantage by standing out amongst crowded fields of primary election candidates. Moreover, the Democratic Party is seen as especially dedicated to issues of diversity and descriptively underrepresented candidates tend to be favored by Democratic voters. All of this to say, we argue that female and Black candidates pose an especially salient electoral threat in Democratic primary elections. In order to moderate this threat, we posit that male/white primary election candidates will take up issues related to the identities of their female/Black Democratic competitors (see H1_a & H1_b).

H1_a: Democratic male candidates will be more likely to cover women’s issues when there is a female candidate in their same-party primary election.

H1_b: Democratic white candidates will be more likely to cover Black-associated issues when there is a Black candidate in their same-party primary election.

Examining strategic candidate responsiveness in primaries for the U.S. House of Representatives presents other advantages, given the increasing competitiveness of these nominating contests. Since the mid-2000’s the proportion of uncontested primaries has steadily decreased and the average number of primary elections decided by a slim vote margin has steadily increased (Porter and Treul, 2019). Moreover, the vast majority of congressional districts today are safely-partisan; in these kinds of contests, earning the party’s nomination may actually be more difficult than winning the general election. Paying attention to one’s primary competition is more crucial to a successful campaign for Congress than ever before. Examining primary elections, therefore, extends the scope of observable campaign behaviors in our analysis to better encompass the factors that motivate candidates to behave the way they do in modern elections.

We do not expect all Democrats to be equally responsive to the presence of a female or Black competitor in their primary election. We anticipate that a male or white candidate’s inclination to take up issues related to their competitor’s identity will be conditional on whether that male/white candidate is “strategic.” Strategic campaign behavior may take many forms, such as garnering electoral experience before a run for Congress (Jacobson, 1989) or being judicious in one’s emergence decisions (Jacobson and Kernell, 1983). Truly “amateur” candidates, on the other hand, are often agnostic towards their electoral environment because these individuals choose to run for their own purposes—not necessarily to win (Canon, 1993). A candidate’s decision to take up those issues their opponent champions is clearly a strategic choice. It involves identifying a competitor’s strengths, formulating an approach to counteract that opponent’s potential advantage, and presenting oneself as credible and committed to such policies. Accordingly, we expect that candidates who are mounting a serious, strategic campaign for office will be the most responsive to the presence of a female or Black candidate in their primary (see H2_a & H2_b).

H2_a: Strategic male Democrats will be more responsive to the presence of a female candidate in their same-party primary than will amateur male Democrats.

H2_b: Strategic white Democrats will be more responsive to the presence of a Black candidate in their same-party primary than will amateur white Democrats.

Data

In the age of digital campaigning, almost all candidates have an official campaign website. Typically, these websites have a main menu that directs readers to a series of sub-pages with titles like “Meet the Candidate” or “Donate Today.” Among these sub-pages there is often an “Issues” tab, which explicitly lays out a candidate’s policy priorities and issue positions. In this paper, we characterize a congressional candidate’s campaign platform as the text presented on this “Issues” sub-page.

Traditionally, television advertisements have been used to measure position taking behavior in congressional campaigns. However, this data source has notable drawbacks—chief among them that television ads bias towards competitive races and their adoption in primary elections is nearly non-existent (Druckman et al., 2009). Congressional campaign websites, on the other hand, have become especially well-adopted over the past decade, thus providing a more representative survey of campaign position taking behavior. Additionally, candidates are not limited to the same time and space restrictions on websites that they might face in television ads, press releases, or social media posts; this means they can emphasize every issue that they think might be important to potential supporters (Schneider, 2014). This idea of websites as a campaign “snapshot” is echoed by Sulkin et al. (2007) who find that candidates typically present twice as many issues on their campaign websites than they do in their advertisements.

According to Druckman et al. (2009, p. 345), candidate campaign websites are a uniquely ideal form of data for studying campaign communication because they are “unmediated (i.e., directly from the campaign), complete (i.e. covering a full range of rhetorical strategies), and representative of the population of campaigns.” Candidates and their staff spend substantial time crafting their website messaging because these sites serve as an informational “hub” for campaigns. It behooves candidates to paint a complete picture of themselves on their websites because journalists often use this information for their stories, which are then circulated to a broader audience (Herrnson et al., 2019). These sites are also frequented by electoral stakeholders, like would-be constituents and potential donors (Druckman et al., 2009). All of this suggests that campaign websites

are the most comprehensive and complete source for studying congressional candidate position taking behavior.

It is not as though this research is the first to use campaign websites as its chief source of data. However, because of the sheer amount of time involved in compiling and cataloging campaign websites, previous analyses have examined only a sample of campaign sites or restricted their scope to the general election (conversely, see McDonald et al. 2020). In order to capture a near complete picture of the types of issues candidates took up in their campaigns, we extracted, cleaned, and parsed the text from campaign platforms for *all* candidates who had an official campaign website that ran in the 2018 or 2020 congressional primary elections. This collection is the *first* comprehensive data set of website platform text and provides numerous opportunities for future research.

Campaign Websites Text Collection

To collect text data from candidate campaign websites, we first identified the names of all major party candidates running in 2018 and 2020 using candidate filings with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) as well as state-level elections websites. Using this list of candidate names, we sought to identify the campaign website URLs for all candidates in each election year by following links from online repositories like Politics1.com, visiting candidates’ social media pages, and conducting simple Google searches.²

Next, we identified which of those candidates with a campaign website also had a platform of policy positions on that site. For many candidates, this was a simple process; platforms pages on campaign sites often had clear titles like “Where I Stand” or “My Positions.” To extract this position taking text from campaign websites, we used a combination of automated text collection (i.e. extraction with a pre-programmed web scraper) and manual downloading (i.e. copy and pasting). To ensure consistency, text was collected the day before or the day of each candidate’s congressional primary. In our data collection, we found that 1,311 of those 1,718 Democrats who ran in partisan primary elections across 2018 and 2020 had an official campaign website and—on that site—also included a campaign platform.³

²This excludes official websites for Members of Congress, identified by a .gov web address.

³This number excludes individuals who ran in Louisiana, California, or Washington because these


Table 1: Main Indicators for Missingness in Democratic Policy Platform Adoption in Congressional Campaign Websites, 2018-2020

	<i>DV: Presence of Policy Platform on Campaign Website</i>
No Pre-Primary Election Campaign Receipts (Raised less than \$2,000 prior to their primary)	−2.082* (0.150)
Performed Poorly in the Primary (Garnered less than 5% of their primary’s vote share)	−0.589* (0.191)
Current Member of Congress	−0.929* (0.163)
Constant	2.020* (0.182)
Observations	1,718

Note: In our sample, 407 Democratic candidates lacked a campaign website and/or a policy platform (missing data); 1,311 Democratic candidates had a campaign website and also included a policy platform. Other covariates in this model include primary competitiveness (uncontested or contested); candidate quality (no elected experience or previously held public office); and incumbent in race (open seat, incumbent same party, incumbent other party). Full results presented in Table A1. $p < 0.05$

A small group of candidates running in the 2018 and 2020 primaries either had no official campaign website or, if they did adopt a website, did not outline any policy positions on that site. To determine if this missingness was non-random, we regressed policy platform presence on a series of candidate characteristics and election-level covariates. The truncated results of this logistic regression, which are presented in Table 1, outline three main predictors for the absence of an online campaign platform. Candidates who raised nominal funds prior to their primary election were the least likely to adopt an online campaign platform. Campaign platform adoption was also weak among candidates who garnered less than 5% of the vote share in their partisan primary election. Generally, these kinds of poor performing candidates lack any official campaign presence—online or otherwise—so a missing website is not at all surprising. Weaker adoption in online campaign platforms among Member of Congress is also expected. All federal legislators have a government-domain website, and legislators typically use these sites to disseminate press states do not hold partisan primary elections.

Figure 1: Examples of Campaign Issue Pages from 2018 and 2020 Democratic Congressional Primary Elections



(a) Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, 2018 (D-NY)

(b) Cori Bush, 2020 (D-MO)

releases, voting records, and other information to constituents. Many incumbents, therefore, rely on a campaign website principally for fundraising rather than position taking. When candidates who fit any of the above categories are removed from our sample, the rate of campaign platform missingness drops from 24% to less than 12%. Excluding these kinds of candidates from the following analyses produces substantively similar results.

Identifying Candidate Issue-Positions

The issue text on a candidate's website is typically organized as a collection of paragraphs, each with a topical subheading that describes the overarching message for that snippet of text. Figure 1 depicts two examples of platform pages on campaign websites. In Figure 1 (a), Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) includes *Women's Rights* as a component of her 2018 platform and, in the subsequent text, goes on to discuss equality in the workplace. Similarly, in Figure 1 (b), Cori Bush lists action points she would pursue on criminal justice reform should she be elected to Congress. To identify those issues that should be most associated with female and Black Democrats, we turned the policy priorities put forward by organized movements and advocacy groups.

We define "women's issues" as the policy priorities outlined by The Women's March Network—the group responsible for coordinating the 2017 Women's March on Washington. The goals put forward by Black Lives Matter and the NAACP provided a template for those policy priorities that should be most associated with Black Democratic candidates. A near-comprehensive list of example policies for each descriptive candidate type

Table 2: Descriptive Candidate Topic Categories and Example Policies

Women’s Issues; Women’s March Network	
Topic Category	Example Subtopic Issues
Reproductive Rights	Pro-choice; Sex education; Access to contraception; Maternal Healthcare; Funding Planned Parenthood; Body autonomy; Right to reproductive privacy
Women’s Healthcare	Maternal mortality rates; Gender as a pre-existing condition; Breast-cancer screening; Racial minority (female) healthcare access and quality of care
Wage Discrimination	Female entrepreneurship; Equal pay for equal work; Hiring discrimination; Breaking the glass ceiling; Support for the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
Domestic Abuse	Re-authorizing the Violence Against Women Act; Closing the boyfriend loophole
Sexual Harassment	Support for #MeToo; Support for It’s On Us Campaign; Workplace safety
Black Issues; Black Lives Matter & NAACP	
Topic Category	Example Subtopic Issues
Criminal Justice Reform	School-to-prison pipeline; Ending mandatory minimum sentencing; Ban the Box; Re-enfranchising felons; Ending the cash bail system; Stopping mass incarceration; Ending the private prison system; Increasing rehabilitative programs
Police Brutality	Addressing systematic bias; Demilitarizing the police; Investing in community-based policing; De-escalation training; Defund the police; Re-examining hiring practices
Racial Injustice	Support for Black Lives Matter; Discussions of racism, white supremacy, etc.
Voter Suppression	Ballot access initiatives; Increasing polling stations; Repealing Voter ID laws

is provided in Table 2. In addition to explicit policy priorities, our issue definitions include broader topics like healthcare or gun-rights that are framed in racial or gendered terms. For instance, if a candidate covers education reform in her platform while also discussing the racial achievement gap, we would consider that candidate to have taken up a Black-associated issue. To exclude these kinds of discussions would be to misrepresent the scope of topics related to race and gender.

Our criteria for determining whether or not a candidate incorporated women’s or Black-associated issues into their campaign platform was broad. By this we mean that, in our coding of issue coverage, we made no qualitative judgments about the substance of a candidate’s *policy discussion*. For instance, if a male Democrat simply stated that women should receive equal pay for equal work, we would consider that candidate to have covered a women’s issue; we did not require candidates to discuss specific policy proposals. Conversely, if a candidate expressed support for diversity but made *no policy statement whatsoever*, we would not consider that candidate as having covered women’s or Black-associated issues in their platform. These kinds of non-policy statements often took the form of platitudes like: “I will fight for Americans of every skin color.” For issues

with an ideological slant, candidates were only considered to have covered a women’s or Black-associated issue if their position was left-leaning. For instance, in their discussion of abortion, if a Democratic candidate stated that they were in favor of repealing *Roe v. Wade*, we would *not* consider that candidate as having covered a women’s issue.⁴

Given these complexities, instead of relying on an automated approach for text classification, we read and coded each individual candidate’s platform to discern issue coverage. Based on our reading of thousands of policy positions across 1,311 Democratic candidate platforms, we determined that nearly 70% of women and 50% of men discussed women’s issues. Additionally, 40% of white, non-Hispanic Democrats, 60% of Black Democrats, and 50% of other racial/ethnic minorities discussed Black-associated issues.

Identifying Candidate Gender & Racial Identity

To determine whether or not a candidate ran against a female or Black competitor, we spent considerable time collecting data on each individual candidate’s gender and racial identity. We distinguished male from female Democrats through their use of gender pronouns in campaign website text.⁵ Classifying the racial identity of Democratic candidates was more challenging. Although some candidates identified themselves as African American or Black in their campaign biographies, this was not universal. Using images to classify race is fraught with concern due to the complexities of racial identity. Therefore, to further identify Black candidates, we employed resources like newspaper articles, interest group endorsements, and data from social-networking websites.⁶ There are certainly other candidate types we could have examined to explore the relationship between descriptive candidate presence and competitors’ issue coverage (e.g. LGBTQ candidates, Latinx candidates, or candidates who are immigrants). We specifically chose to examine women and Black candidates because a large pool of each candidate type ran in both elec-

⁴We noted a total of four Democratic male candidates as having held non-progressive positions on “women’s issues.” We noted that a total of twelve white Democrats stated their support for the police and other first-responders while evoking themes purported by Blue Lives Matter.

⁵We consider any candidates who identifies as a woman to be regarded as such. Between 2018 and 2020, two candidates who ran for Congress that identified as women also identified as transgender. No identified candidates used they/them pronouns.

⁶We identified fewer than ten candidates as racially ambiguous. We did not consider these individuals to be Black candidates in our primary analyses. However, including these individuals in our estimations produces substantively identical results.

tion years across a diverse set of district conditions. Of those 1,718 Democratic primary election candidates who ran in 2018 and 2020, 602 (35%) were women and 1,116 (65%) were men. Additionally, we identified 1,165 Democrats as white, non-Hispanic (68%), 324 Democrats as Black (19%), and 229 Democrats as some other race or ethnicity (13%).

Empirical Analysis

In the following analysis, we ask whether the presence of a female or Black candidate in a primary election affects the kinds of policy priorities taken up by their competitors. More specifically, are male Democrats more likely to talk about women’s issues in the presence of a female Democrat? Are white Democrats more likely to talk about Black-associated issues when a Black candidate runs in their same-party primary election? We run two sets of models to test our hypotheses: our gender models assess the issue uptake behavior of male Democrats who had a policy platform on their campaign website; our race models assess the issue uptake behavior of white Democrats who had a policy platform on their campaign website. In the logistic regressions to follow, our dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator for whether or not a male/white candidate took up women’s or Black-associated issues into their campaign platform. To test our hypotheses concerning male candidates’ adoption of women’s issues, we include a dichotomous indicator for female candidate presence in each primary election. To test our hypotheses concerning white candidates’ adoption of Black-associated issues, we include a dichotomous indicator for Black candidate presence in each primary election.⁷ In Table 3, we lay out other model covariates, which include measures of district seat safety, primary election rules, and whether a given district had a retiring incumbent.

Our second set of hypotheses investigate whether “strategic” male/white candidates are more responsive to a female/Black candidate’s presence than their true amateur counterparts. To gauge whether or not a candidate is strategic, we rely on two principal measures. First, we consider a candidate to be strategic if they currently hold or have previously held publicly-elected office (Jacobson, 1989). This variable is widely considered

⁷It is important to note that even if a female/Black candidate *did not* have a campaign website, we still considered their male/white competitors as having ran against that kind of descriptive candidate.

Table 3: Covariates for Gender and Race Democratic Primary Models

Model Covariate	Covariate Values	
Unit of Analysis: Male Democratic Primary Election Candidates		
Dependent Variable: Discussed Women’s Issues in Campaign Platform		
Independent Variables:		
Presence of a Female Candidate	0 (No Female Candidate)	1 (Female Candidate)
Racial Minority	0 (Non-White Candidate)	1 (White Candidate)
Open Seat	0 (Incumbent in Race)	1 (Open Seat)
Primary Election Rules	0 (Non-Open Primary)	1 (Open Primary)
Primary Election Year	0 (2018 Primary)	1 (2020 Primary)
District Seat Safety	0 (Two-Party Competitive)	1 (Safely Democratic)
	2 (Safely Republican)	
Unit of Analysis: White Democratic Primary Election Candidates		
Dependent Variable: Discussed Black-Associated Issues in Campaign Platform		
Independent Variables:		
Presence of a Black Candidate	0 (No Black Candidate)	1 (Black Candidate)
Southern State	0 (Non-South)	1 (South)
Open Seat	0 (Incumbent in Race)	1 (Open Seat)
Primary Election Rules	0 (Non-Open Primary)	1 (Open Primary)
Pre/Post George Floyd Protests	0 (Before 04/26/20)	1 (After 04/26/2020)
District % Black Population	0 (Below Average)	1 (Equal/Above Average)
District Seat Safety	0 (Two-Party Competitive)	1 (Safely Democratic)
	2 (Safely Republican)	

Note: We consider a district to be safely Democratic if its average Democratic vote-share across the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections was greater or equal to 55%. We consider district to be safely Republican if its average Democratic vote-share across the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections was less than or equal to 45%. We consider a district to have an above-average Black population if the 2018 ACS by the U.S. Census reported that 13.04% or more of its residents identified themselves as Black or African American.

to be a strong indicator for strategic behavior because it demonstrates that a candidate possesses electoral know-how. Some candidates who lack elected experience may also be especially strategic—a trait observable in their ability to reach the same fundraising potential as their electorally experienced counterparts (Maestas and Rugeley, 2002). Therefore, we consider a political newcomer to be a strategic candidate if they garnered more logged campaign contributions in the primary than the average Democratic candidate in that election year.⁸ We identified 45% of Democratic men as strategic and 49% of

⁸Averages were computed separately by year to accommodate potential fundraising differentials based on presidential versus midterm electoral dynamics. These averages exclude candidates who *did not* report any primary election fundraising to the Federal Election Commission (FEC). The average logged fundraising among Democrats in 2018 was 11.06 (\$63,463) and in 2020 was 11.55 (\$103,778).

white Democrats as strategic. Because we expect that strategic behavior will condition a candidate’s responsiveness to all kinds of electoral dynamics, we run separate gender and race models for each candidate type. Accordingly, we produce four different models, where the units of analysis are: male strategic candidates (N=367), male amateur candidates (N=445), white strategic candidates (N=446), and white amateur candidates (N=457).

Candidate emergence is not random; competitors choose to run in districts where they think they have the best shot at winning. These emergence patterns, however, could prove to be problematic for our analysis if certain kinds of candidates are more likely to run against a female/Black opponent. If this is indeed the case, then our findings could be attributable to sample differences rather than the unique effect of a female/Black candidate’s presence. To account for any sizable differences across our set of candidates who *did* run against a female/Black opponent and those who *did not*, we employ a non-parametric method for data preprocessing developed by Hainmueller (2012) called entropy balancing. This approach seeks to make a male/white candidate’s status as having run against a female/Black opponent closer to being independent through the estimation and assignment of observational weights. These weights work to achieve “balance” over our samples of candidates based on covariates that predict where a female/Black Democrat may be more likely to run. These weighted data are then employed in our logistic regressions to more accurately estimate the effect of female/Black candidate presence. We conduct separate balancing exercises for each of the four samples of candidates described above.

A more thorough discussion of our balancing strategy and methodology can be found in Sections A & B of the Online Appendix; a list of balancing covariates (A.1), plots for covariate distributional balance (A.2), and the results for a series of sensitivity analyses (B.1) can additionally be found in these sections. Across our four samples of candidates, we achieve balance on all covariates of interest. We also find our estimates for the effect of female/Black candidate presence to be robust to other covariate balancing strategies. Additionally, we demonstrate that unobserved confounders do not present a sufficient threat to the robustness of our findings to follow.

Findings

Using our weighted data, we fit four sets of models to estimate the likelihood that strategic and amateur candidates take up women’s and Black-associated issues into their online campaign platforms. In our gender models, we expect male Democrats will be more likely to discuss women’s issues when a female Democrat runs in their primary. In our race models, we expect white Democrats will be more likely to discuss Black-associated issues when a Black Democrat runs in their primary.⁹ We fit separate logistic regressions for strategic and amateur candidates and include all covariates in Table 3 as predictors.

The results for all four models are reported in Table 4. Coefficients of interest are presented as predicted probabilities for interpretability.¹⁰ The column titled “No Candidate” indicates the predicted probability of issue uptake for strategic and amateur candidates who *did not* run against the kind of descriptive opponent specified in the left-most column. The column titled “Candidate” indicates the predicted probability of issue uptake for strategic and amateur candidates who *did* run against the kind of descriptive opponent specified in the left-most column. First differences in point estimates as well as corresponding 95% confidence intervals are included in the right-most column.

Across both our race and gender models, we find support for our responsiveness hypotheses (H1_a & H1_b). The presence of a female candidate in a Democratic primary increases the predicted probability that a strategic male candidate running in the same race will take up women’s issues by *twenty-five* percentage points. The presence of a Black candidate in a Democratic primary increases the predicted probability that a strategic white candidate running in the same race will take up Black-associated issues by *twenty-four* percentage points. In our models for strategic male and white Democrats’ position taking behavior, the presence of a female or Black candidate serves as the strongest predicted for women’s and Black-associated issue uptake.

⁹Although our race models do not include non-Black minority candidates as units of analysis—here units of analysis are white candidates only—our regressions include primaries that had a Black candidate emerge as well as other candidates who self-identified as a non-Black racial/ethnic minority. After re-balancing our data and constraining our analyses to only include races with Black and white, non-Hispanic candidates, these new models produce substantively identical results to those presented in Table 4.

¹⁰Predicted probabilities are produced from 1,000 simulated coefficients drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with all predictors are held constant at their mean value.

Table 4: Predicted Probabilities of Issue Adoption in Partisan Primary Elections

Type of Descriptive Candidate	No Candidate	Candidate	Difference (95% CI)
Female Candidate in Democratic Race			
Male Democrats, Strategic	0.52	0.77	+ 0.25 [0.17, 0.34]
Male Democrats, Amateur	0.45	0.60	+ 0.15 [0.05, 0.27]
Black Candidate in Democratic Race			
White Democrats, Strategic	0.35	0.59	+ 0.24 [0.14, 0.33]
White Democrats, Amateur	0.32	0.34	+ 0.02 [-0.10, 0.15]


Note: Coefficients correspond to a logistic regression where the units of analysis are male and white Democratic candidates who had a policy platform on their campaign website. The DV is whether or not a candidate took up women’s or Black associated issues in their campaign platform. The coefficient of interest is the presence of a female/Black candidate in a same-party primary election. For full models, see Tables A2 and A3. Bolding in Table 4 indicates statistical significance of $p < 0.05$.

As expected, we find less consistent responsiveness among true amateur candidates. The presence of a female candidate in a Democratic primary increases the predicted probability that an amateur male candidate running in the same race will take up women’s issues by fifteen percentage points. Although the size of this effect is notable, it is statistically significantly weaker than that of a strategic male candidate. Per Table 4, white amateurs are not any more likely to talk about Black-associated issues when a Black Democrat runs in their same-party primary election. Aligning with our strategic candidate hypotheses (H_{a_a} & H_{a_b}), these findings demonstrate that strategic Democrats have a greater probability of related issue coverage in the presence of a descriptive opponent than their true amateur counterparts, all else equal.

Descriptive Candidacies and Substantive Coverage

Theories on issue convergence conceptualize elections as a kind of dialogue, where candidates react to the issue positions taken up by their opponents. Our theory follows this framework to the extent that we also expect candidates to respond to the campaign strategies of their opponents. However, departing from existing work, we posit that female/Black candidates need not discuss issues related to their identity in order to elicit a strategic response from their opponents—their presence alone is enough motivation. To test this theory, we leverage disparities in the identity-related issue uptake of female

Figure 2: First Differences in the Predicted Probability of Strategic Male/White Candidate Issue Coverage Conditional on Type of Female/Black Candidate in Race



Male/white strategic Democrats in the *Substantive Coverage* models ran against a female/Black primary opponent who discussed issues related to their descriptive identity in their campaign platform. Male/white strategic Democrats in the *No Substantive Coverage* models ran against a female/Black primary opponent who *did not* discuss issues related to their descriptive identity in their campaign platform. These point estimates are presented with 95% confidence intervals, simulated using the same methodology employed to produce those first differences shown in the right-most column of Table 4.

and Black Democrats. As noted previously, 35% of female Democrats and 40% of Black Democrats *did not* discuss issues related to their identity in their campaign platforms. Using the same covariates discussed in Table 3, we re-weight our data and re-estimate two new sets of models.¹¹ Across these models, we are interested in comparing the magnitude of first differences—or, the effect of moving from no female/Black candidate in a race to the presence of a female/Black candidate, conditional on whether that female/Black candidate did (*Substantive Coverage*) or did not (*No Substantive Coverage*) discuss issues related to their own identity.

Point estimates for first differences in predicted probabilities are shown in Figure 2.¹² The point estimates for our *No Substantive Coverage* models measure the effect of moving from no female/Black candidate in a Democratic primary to running against a female/Black candidate who *did not* discuss issues related to their own descriptive iden-

¹¹Female/Black candidates with no substantive coverage were given this label for two reasons. First, they had a platform on their website but did not include any discussion of women's or Black-associated issues. Additionally, a minority of female/Black candidates were labeled as having no substantive coverage because they did not have a campaign website. We assume that candidates with no campaign website did not have a campaign presence or did not make identity-related issues an integral part of their campaign.

¹²These point estimates are presented with 95% confidence intervals, simulated using the same methodology employed to produce those first differences shown in the right-most column of Table 4.


tity.¹³ If a descriptive candidate’s presence is enough to motivate their opponents to adopt women’s or Black-associated issues, then we should see positive point estimates for first differences in predicted probabilities across both of our *No Substantive Coverage* models.

Aligning with our theory, we find that a male or white candidate’s decision to take up women’s or Black associated issue can be tied to the *presence* of a female or Black candidate in their race—not only that candidate’s discussion of their own identity. Additionally, we demonstrate that differences between point estimates across our *Substantive Coverage* and *No Substantive Coverage* models lack statistical significance. This indicates that strategic male Democrats’ responsiveness to the presence of a female candidate who *did not* discuss women’s issues is indistinguishable from that of a male Democrat who ran against a female candidate who *did* discuss women’s issues. Similarly, strategic white Democrats’ responsiveness to the presence of a Black candidate who *did not* discuss Black-associated issues is indistinguishable from that of a white Democrat who ran against a Black candidate who *did* discuss Black-associated issues.

Turning to amateur male Democrats, we find that these candidates’ responsiveness to a female competitor is contingent on that competitor discussing women’s issues in her own platform. The point estimate in our *Substantive Coverage* gender model is statistically significant and similar to the effect presented in Table 4; however, for our *No Substantive Coverage* gender model, the effect of female candidate presence on amateur male candidate’s uptake of women’s issues is statistically indistinguishable from zero. This indicates that, when a female Democrats *does not* discuss women’s issues, her presence has no effect on the likelihood of women’s issue coverage for amateur male Democrats in their same primary. Across all of our race models for amateur white Democrats, the presence of a Black candidate has not effect on Black-associated issue uptake. These differences in the responsiveness of strategic and amateur Democrats align with our broader expectations about each candidate type. It follows our theory that amateurs would be less likely to respond to the presence alone of a female or Black competitor than their strategic counterparts, who possess greater electoral know-how and are motivated to win.

¹³In instances where multiple female/Black candidates ran against a male/white candidate, the category *No Substantive Coverage* was only assigned if none of the female/Black candidates in that race substantively discussed issues related to their identity.

Figure 3: First Differences in the Predicted Probability of Amateur Male/White Candidate Issue Coverage Conditional on Type of Female/Black Candidate in Race



Male/white amateur Democrats in the *Substantive Coverage* models ran against a female/Black primary opponent who discussed issues related to their descriptive identity in their campaign platform. Male/white amateur Democrats in the *No Substantive Coverage* models ran against a female/Black primary opponent who *did not* discuss issues related to their descriptive identity in their campaign platform. These point estimates are presented with 95% confidence intervals, simulated using the same methodology employed to produce those first differences shown in the right-most column of Table 4.

Extension: Experience-Based Identity

To further test our theory and, moreover, extend the generalizability of our findings, we assess whether the presence of a military veteran in a primary affects competitors' coverage of veterans' issues in their online campaign platforms. Just like women and Black politicians, veterans have been shown to be especially strong stewards for group issues. Members of Congress who have served in the military tend to have greater success in advancing their defense-related legislation (Swers, 2007), are more likely to advocate for constituents who served in the military (Lowande et al., 2019), and may be better equipped to produce legislation addressing veterans' mental health concerns (Purtle, 2016). For all of these reasons, voters who have served in the military should be especially supportive of co-group candidates. According to our proposed theory, this outsized base of support gives military veterans a perceived electoral advantage and, to counteract that advantage, their competitors should take up veterans' issues in their own campaign platforms.

We choose to examine military veterans because this candidate type gives us purchase in evaluating central—but unexplored—elements of our theory. First, by employing military veterans, we can evaluate if identities rooted in shared experiences have a similarly strong association with competitors' issue uptake. Comparing the magnitude of

effect sizes across our gender, race, and veterans’ models, we can investigate whether the presence of a veteran in a primary has the same kind of impact on a competitor’s position taking as does a candidate whose identity is rooted in a physical characteristic. Second, military veterans also allows us to evaluate if and how voters’ preferences impact strategic responsiveness. Up until this point, we have examined only Democratic primaries because candidate characteristics like race and gender do not appeal to Republican voters; according to our theory, this means that the presence of a female or Black Republican in a primary should *not* affect opponents’ position taking. Testing this relationship, however, is challenging because female and Black Republicans do not run on the same kinds of women’s or Black-associated issues as their Democratic counterparts. Veterans’ issues do not present this same measurement problem. Both Republicans *and* Democrats are viewed as committed advocates for military veterans (Lowande et al., 2019); however, Republican voters have a stronger preference for candidates with military experience (McDermott and Panagopoulos, 2015). This dichotomy is similar to that of our race and gender analyses—where one party greatly prefers a type of candidate over the other—allowing us to evaluate if partisan preferences on candidate characteristics impact strategic responsiveness.

To formalize our expectations, we put forward three new hypotheses. Our first hypothesis, H1_c, is a verbatim extension of our strategic responsiveness hypotheses (H1_a & H1_b). We expect that Republican non-veterans will be more likely to discuss veterans’ issues in their online campaign platforms when a military veteran runs in their same-party primary election. Our second hypothesis, H2_c, is a verbatim extension of our strategic candidate hypotheses (H2_a & H2_b), where strategic Republicans will be more responsive to the presence of a military veteran in their primary than their true amateur counterparts.

H1_c: Republican non-veterans will be more likely to cover veterans’ issues when there is a military veteran in their same-party primary election.

H2_c: Strategic Republicans non-veterans will be more responsive to the presence of a military veteran in their same-party primary than will amateur non-veterans.

Table 5: Military Veteran Candidate Topic Categories and Example Policies

Veterans' Issues; Concerned Veterans for America & With Honor	
Topic Category	Example Subtopic Issues
Veteran's Healthcare	Reforming the VA; Disability access; Privatization of veteran's healthcare; Expanding vets' healthcare options (i.e. Tricare); Improving VA benefits and eligibility; Passage of the VA MISSIONS Act
PTSD & Suicide	Mental health advocacy; Suicide awareness; Veterans' homelessness
Reintegration	GI Bill; Higher education and vocational training opportunities; Improving hiring for veterans and their families; Improving reintegration and transition programs
Female Veterans	Increasing maternity support; Raising awareness of sexual violence and harassment

Given the Republican Party's "ownership" of defense-related issues (Petrocik, 1996) and Republican voters' preference for candidates with military experience (McDermott and Panagopoulos, 2015), we also put forward a third hypothesis (H3). We expect that Republican candidates will be more responsive to the presence of a military veteran in their same-party primary than will Democrats.

H3: Democratic non-veterans will not be any more likely to cover veterans' issues when there is a military veteran in their same-party primary election.

For our analyses, we identified veterans' issues using the policy priorities put forward by two advocacy groups: Concerned Veterans for America and With Honor. A near-comprehensive list of example veterans' issues is provided in Table 5. We considered a candidate a military veteran if they served in any branch of the United States Armed Forces. We identified 187 Democratic and 376 Republican primary election candidates as veterans. Based on the careful reading of thousands of policy positions across 1,150 Republican platforms, we determined that 57% of Republican veterans and 45% of non-veteran Republicans discussed veterans' issues in their campaign platforms. Conversely, 58% of Democratic veterans and 40% of non-veteran Democrats discussed veterans' issues.

Replicating the same estimation procedure as above, we run two sets of partisan models to assess the issue uptake behavior of Democratic and Republican non-veterans who had a policy platform on their campaign website. We include covariates in our models for district seat safety, election rules and whether a given district had a retiring incumbent. Additionally, we include a measure for each district's veteran population and the number

Table 6: Predicted Probabilities of Issue Adoption in Partisan Primary Elections

Type of Descriptive Candidate	No Candidate	Candidate	Difference (95% CI)
Military Veteran in Republican Race			
Non-Veteran Republicans, Strategic	0.64	0.86	+ 0.22 [0.15, 0.30]
Non-Veteran Republicans, Amateur	0.25	0.24	− 0.01 [-0.12, 0.10]
Military Veteran in Democratic Race			
Non-Veteran Democrats, Strategic	0.48	0.45	− 0.03 [-0.11, 0.05]
Non-Veteran Democrats, Amateur	0.25	0.27	+ 0.02 [-0.08, 0.13]

Note: Coefficients correspond to a logistic regression where the units of analysis are non-veteran Republican and Democratic candidates who had a policy platform on their campaign website. The DV is whether or not a candidate took up veterans’ issues in their campaign platform. The coefficient of interest is the presence of a military veteran in a same-party primary election. For full models, see Tables A8 and A9. Bolding in Table 6 indicates statistical significance of $p < 0.05$.

of military installations in that district (i.e. VA hospitals and military bases). A full list of covariates is presented in Table A7 of the Online Appendix. Our key independent variable is a dichotomous indicator for military veteran presence. Just as before, we condition our models on whether or not a non-veteran candidate was identified as “strategic.”¹⁴ Accordingly, we produce four different models in our analyses to follow, where the units of analysis are: Republican strategic non-veterans (N=430), Republican amateur non-veterans (N=418), Democratic strategic non-veterans (N=549), and Democratic amateur non-veterans (N=567). To achieve covariate balance across our samples of candidates who *did* and *did not* run against a veteran, we once again employ entropy balancing. We achieve balance across all covariates of interest; a list of balancing covariates and plots for covariate distributional balance can be found in Section C of the Online Appendix.

The results for all four models are reported in Table 6. Coefficients of interest are presented as predicted probabilities for interpretability.¹⁵ The presence of a Republican candidate in a primary election increases the predicted probability that a strategic non-veteran running in the same race will take up veterans’ issues by *twenty-two* percentage points. This findings aligns with our responsiveness hypothesis (H1_c), which posit that

¹⁴Averages in logged fundraising among Republican primary election candidates in 2018 was 11.66 (\$116,541) and in 2020 was 11.81 (\$134,457.03).

¹⁵Predicted probabilities are produced from 1,000 simulated coefficients drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with all predictors are held constant at their mean value.


Republican non-veterans will be more likely to take up veterans’ issues when a candidate who possesses that identity runs in their primary. This effect size (21%) is comparable to the magnitude of first differences in our strategic Democratic gender and race models, as shown in Table 4. Additionally, we do not find any statistically significant relationship among amateur non-veterans; these candidates are not any more likely to talk about veterans’ issues when a Republican veteran runs in their same-party primary election. These results provide support for our strategic candidate hypotheses (H2_c), demonstrating that strategic Republican non-veterans have a greater probability of related issue coverage in the presence of a military veteran than their true amateur counterparts, all else equal.

Turning to our Democratic models, we find that the presence of a military veteran in a Democratic Party primary has no effect on the likelihood of veterans’ issue uptake for both strategic and amateur non-veterans. As expressed in our threat hypothesis (H3), we find that candidate responsiveness is contingent on their competitor’s identity presenting an electoral threat. Unlike Republican voters, Democrats are not especially warm towards candidates with a history of military service. Because these veterans lack a perceived electoral advantage with same-party voters, Democratic non-veterans do not feel they must build their own reputation on veterans’ issues. These results not only support an important mechanism of our theory, but also underscore the importance of primary elections in shaping campaign behavior.

Discussion

Today, more women and Black representatives are serving in the U.S. House of Representatives than ever before—but there is still much progress to be made. Ample research has gone into understanding the benefits of electing more women and racial minorities to Congress. However, scant attention has been paid to assess the benefits of seeing greater candidate diversity in elections. This paper makes significant strides in demonstrating that simply the *presence* of a female or Black Democrat in a primary can affect the kinds of issues taken up and talked about in that election. These findings are important because the contents of candidates’ campaigns will have consequences on their legislative behav-

Figure 4: Changes in Platform Text on Women’s or Black-Associated Issues from the Primary to General Election



Note: Bars represent the percent of male/white primary election winners that fall into each coding category. Candidates are included in these plots if they were a male/white Democratic candidate went on to the general election after besting a female/Black candidate in their primary.

ior, should they be elected to Congress. A variety of literature finds that representatives tend to follow-through on their promises, legislating on and voting in accordance with those positions they touted during their campaigns (Sulkin, 2005, 2011). For example, examining campaign promises in the area of environmental protection policy, (Ringquist and Dasse, 2004) find that incumbents followed-through on their campaign promises 73 percent of the time. Similarly, Sulkin and Swigger (2008) find that election winners who discussed women’s issues in their campaign advertisements had a higher legislative voting scorecard with the American Association for University Women (AAUW).

Following this literature, if more candidates from underrepresented and underserved backgrounds run, their presence will not only diversify the electoral dialogue but will also increase the probability that issues related to their identity will reach the halls of Congress—even if those candidates themselves do not win. This relationship, however, rests on the assumption that male and white primary election winners carry their discussions of women’s and Black-associated issues onto the general election. To measure consistency in campaign position taking, we conducted a line-by-line comparison of primary and general election campaign platform text. Our comparisons include all male and white Democratic general election candidates who bested a female or Black candidate to earn their party’s nomination.

As evident in Figure 4, the vast majority of male and white Democrats who discussed women’s and Black-associated issues in the primary carried forward their issue discussions to the general election. Over 80% of male and white candidates either made no changes to their issue text or added additional text on women’s or Black-associated issues. Candidates from minority populations often feel that, in order to make their bid for Congress count, they must win their election (Lawless and Fox, 2010). Our work should be encouraging to minority candidates who want to run—the mere presence of their candidacy has downstream consequences on the electoral dialogue and, potentially, legislative discussion.

Conclusion

In the preceding analysis, we demonstrate that candidates from underrepresented and underserved populations can affect the campaign behavior of their primary election opponents in important ways. Using new data on the campaign issue positions of candidates who ran in the 2018 and 2020 congressional primary elections, we find a strong association between the presence of a female or Black candidate in a race and the issues taken up by their same-party primary election opponents. More specifically, we find that male and white Democrats are nearly twenty-five percentage points more likely to discuss women’s or Black-associated issues when a competitor who possess that identity runs in their primary. Importantly, we show that this relationship is conditional on whether a candidate is a strategic competitor or a “true amateur.” Breaking from existing work, we show that a male or white candidate’s decision to take up women’s or Black associated issue is tied to the *presence* of a competitor who possess that identity—not a female or Black candidate’s own discussion of identity-related issues. Finally, extending our analysis to examine military veterans, we show that candidates are similarly responsive to competitors whose identity is rooted in shared experiences (i.e. veteran status) rather than a physical characteristic (i.e. race or gender).

There is still much to learn about the effect that descriptively underrepresented candidates have on the issue dialogue in congressional campaigns. Although our results suggest that other identities rooted in shared experiences—like sexual orientation or immigrant

status—may motivate competitors’ position taking behavior, other research should devote attention to addressing these important questions. Moreover, our analysis does not broach topics of intersectionality—in particular, how competitors might respond to a Black female candidate in their race. Our hope is that these findings and novel data can spur more research on political representation and the strategic behavior of elites.

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Changing the Dialogue:

Descriptive Candidacies & Position-Taking in
Campaigns for the U.S. House of Representatives

Online Appendix & Supplementary Information

Table A1: Main Indicators for Missingness in Policy Platform Adoption on Congressional Campaign Website, 2018-2020

	<i>DV: Presence of Policy Platform on Campaign Website</i>
No Pre-Primary Election Campaign Receipts (Raised less than \$2,000 prior to their primary)	−2.082* (0.150)
Performed Poorly in the Primary (garnered less than 5% of their primary’s vote-share)	−0.589* (0.191)
Current Member of Congress	−0.929* (0.238)
Ran Unopposed in the Primary	−0.318* (0.125)
Previously Held Public Office (state-wide or local-level; prior Member of Congress)	−0.402* (0.217)
Incumbent in Primary, Other Party (Reference Category: Incumbent in Primary, Same Party)	0.088 (0.186)
Open Seat	0.306 (0.207)
Constant	2.020* (0.182)
Observations	1,718
Log Likelihood	−803.664
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,623.327
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05

A Entropy Balancing

Before model estimation, we employ a non-parametric method for data preprocessing. This procedure endeavors to make our subsequent estimation for the effect of Black/female candidate presence more accurate and considerably less model-dependent (Ho et al. 2007). Methods such as matching and weighting achieve this aim by accounting for differences in covariates that, in our application, measure (1) a candidate’s intrinsic likelihood to take up women’s or Black-associated issues, and (2) indicate in which types of races a female and Black candidates may be more likely to emerge. This adjustment is done through the estimation of observational weights, which seek to achieve “balance” across covariates so candidates who *did* run against a descriptive competitor and those who *did not* are sufficiently similar. After the assignment of weights, a candidate’s status as having run against a Black/female competitor is closer to being independent from previously specified covariates and, thus, model dependence is greatly reduced. We do not claim to have causally identified any effects through this analysis. There are any number of unobserved potential pathways through which our outcome of interest could have been brought into being. Instead, what we present here is a fairly robust investigation of the empirical relationship between the presence of a descriptive candidate and a non-descriptive candidate’s platform content.

Although there are a number of methods for inducing balance across covariates, we employ a weighting methodology called entropy balancing (EB) developed by Hainmueller (2012). Entropy balancing purports a key advantage over more traditional matching methods (i.e. propensity score matching) in that it makes balance the primary target of intent. Put differently, this approach eliminates the need to cyclically model propensity scores and check for covariate balance—what Imai et al. (2008) call the “propensity score tautology”—by directly incorporating covariate balance into the weight estimation procedure. Entropy balancing also (1) keeps estimates for observational weights as close as possible to their base weights to prevent loss of information and (2) is doubly robust (Zhao and Percival 2017). This means that if either the true outcome model corresponds to a linear regression on the covariates or the true treatment assignment model corresponds to a logistic regression on the covariates, the effect estimated using EB weights is unbiased.¹⁶ Using the `WeightIt` package developed by Greifer (2020), we estimate balancing weights using the covariates described below. We estimate four sets of observational weights for our four candidate samples:

- Male Strategic Democrats (Gender Model I)
- Male Amateur Democrats (Gender Model II)
- White Strategic Democrats (Race Model I)
- White Amateur Democrats (Race Model II)

A.1 Observational Weight Estimation

In our analysis, we seek to achieve balance on covariates that measure a candidate’s intrinsic likelihood to take up women’s or Black-associated issues (the outcome) and

¹⁶For a deeper discussion of the advantages of covariate balancing methods, see Imai et al. (2008).

covariates that indicate in which types of races a female or Black candidate may be more likely to run (key IV). Across all three models, we balance over some basic district conditions. Candidates tend to run in races where they perceive themselves as possessing a strategic advantage (Maisel and Stone 1997; 2014). Accordingly, Black and female Democrats may be more likely to emerge in safely partisan congressional districts where they have greater clout with voters.

To capture voter sentiment, we include a covariate that indicates district seat safety. We consider district to be safely Democratic if its average Democratic vote-share across the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections was greater than or equal to 55%. We consider district to be safely Republican if its average Democratic vote-share across the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections was less than or equal to 45%. Moreover, incumbents tend to win reelection at overwhelming rates (Porter and Treul, 2019), therefore it is often most strategic for a candidate to emerge when a seat becomes vacant (Jacobson 1983). Therefore, in our covariate balancing, we include an indicator for “incumbent in race” (0) or “open seat” (1). Finally, there is competing research on the effects of a state’s primary system (i.e. openness) on strategic candidate behavior (see McGhee et al. 2014; Hill 2015). To ensure our definition of balancing covariates is comprehensive, we include a binary indicator for whether or not a state’s primary election system is “closed” (i.e. only registered partisans can vote in the primary).

A.1.1 IV: Female Candidate Emergence

To determine the effect of a female candidate’s presence on male Democrats’ campaign behavior, we balance over covariates that indicate in which types of races a female candidate may be more likely to emerge. Democratic female candidates are especially calculated in their decision to run, choosing to emerge only when they think that they have a good shot at winning (Fox and Lawless 2005; Fulton et al. 2006; Kanthak and Woon 2014). Therefore, we expect women to be more likely to run in districts that are safely-Democratic. These are the kinds of races where voters are especially receptive to female candidates (Dolan 2014) and where women may find greater success in building their donor networks (Thomsen and Swers 2017). Studies also suggest that women may be especially likely to emerge in districts without an incumbent (Palmer and Simon 1998). The presence of an incumbent is indicated by our “open race” covariate.

A.1.2 IV: Black Candidate Emergence

To determine the effect of a Black candidate’s presence on white Democrats’ campaign behavior, we balance over covariates that indicate in which types of races a Black candidate may be more likely to emerge. Similar to women, Black candidates are incredibly judicious in their decision to run and, therefore, less likely to emerge (Fox and Lawless 2005). The absence of Black candidates, however, may also be rooted in explanations irrespective of political ambition. Supply-side theories on minority candidate emergence note that, in districts with a small minority population, there may be no viable Black candidate to run for office—absent any hesitations that candidate may have about running (Canon 1996; Branton 2009; Shah 2014). To account for the baseline supply of potential Black candidates, we include a dichotomous measure for districts with an above-average number of Black residents as reported by the 2018 American Community Survey. We consider a district to have an above-average Black population if the 2018 ACS by the U.S. Census reported that 13.04% or more of its residents reported their race/ethnicity as Black or

African American. Moreover, Juenke and Shah (2016) find that district conditions like seat vacancy and partisanship are key predictors for Black candidate electoral success. Our measure for presidential vote-share and binary indicator for open race status capture these important factors which predict where Black candidates may be more likely to win and, therefore, where they may be especially likely to run.

A.1.3 Outcome Variable: Likelihood of Issue Coverage

We expect that a candidate’s likelihood to cover Black issues will be mediated by the number Democratic-leaning constituents in a district (captured by our district seat safety measure), prevalence of Black constituents in a district (captured by a dichotomous indicator for Black residents in a district), and whether or not a non-descriptive candidate is running in a southern state. We expect that a candidate’s likelihood to cover women’s progressive issues will be similarly mediated by whether or not a district leans Democratic. There may be some male or white Democrats who have a personal stake in an issue and, therefore, may be more likely to take up these issues. This is problematic because candidate intention is nearly impossible to observe; therefore, our ability to condition on this covariate is limited. We expect, however, that each individual candidate’s inclination to take up a given issue will—to some extent—be mediated by whether or not he is “strategic.” For instance, even if a male Democrat genuinely cares about advocating for women’s equality, he should be far less likely to cover this topic if he is running in a Republican-controlled district. In such a race, covering “women’s issues” presents no advantage to that candidate and, in all likelihood, discussing this topic would serve as a liability (e.g. Thomsen 2015; McDonald et al. 2020). Therefore, by controlling for candidate strategic intent, we can (somewhat) account for a candidate’s unobserved personal convictions towards a policy.

A.2 Love Plots: Covariate Distributional Balance

We establish balance across all covariates identified in Table 3. Plots of covariate distributions are presented in Figures 1 through 4. These figures depict—before and after weighting—the absolute mean differences in the covariate distributional balance for white and male Democratic candidates who did and did not run against a descriptive opponent in their partisan primary election. To best approximate the conditions of a controlled experiment using observational data, these mean difference between candidate types should be close to zero. The dotted line indicates a 0.05 threshold; points falling to the left of this line indicates balance has been achieved for that covariate. To provide a mode of comparison beyond unweighted data, covariate distributions weighted with the covariate balancing propensity score methodology (CBPS) proposed by Imai and Ratkovic (2012) are also plotted. In each instance plotted, entropy balancing outperforms unweighted data and CBPS in achieving covariate distributional balance.

Figure 1: Covariate Balance: Love Plot for Male Democratic Strategic Candidates




Figure 2: Covariate Balance: Love Plot for Male Democratic Amateur Candidates




Figure 3: Covariate Balance: Love Plot for White Democratic Strategic Candidates




Figure 4: Covariate Balance: Love Plot for White Democratic Amateur Candidates




Table A2: Full Results: Logistic Regression for Male Democrats' Coverage of Women's Issues in Online Campaign Platforms, 2018-2020

	DV: Adopted Women's Issues in Online Campaign Platforms	
	Strategic Male Democrat (1)	Amateur Male Democrat (2)
Presence of Female Candidate	1.169* (0.350)	0.649* (0.264)
Experience in Elected Office	-0.292 (0.375)	
Open Seat (Reference Category: Incumbent in Race)	-0.509 (0.448)	-0.282 (0.323)
Safely Democratic Seat (Reference Category: Two-Party Competitive)	-0.151 (0.480)	0.090 (0.444)
Safely Republican Seat (Reference Category: Two-Party Competitive)	-0.856* (0.403)	-0.253 (0.372)
Primary Election Rules: Open	-0.185 (0.317)	0.046 (0.277)
2020 Primary Election	-0.130 (0.321)	0.034 (0.264)
Non-White Candidate	0.696 (0.451)	-0.335 (0.322)
Constant	0.537 (0.696)	-0.236 (0.409)
Observations	367	445
<i>Note:</i>		*p<0.05

Table A3: Full Results: Logistic Regression for White Democrats' Coverage of Black-Associated Issues in Online Campaign Platforms, 2018-2020

	DV: Adopted of Black-Associated Issues in Online Campaign Platforms	
	Strategic Male Democrat (1)	Amateur Male Democrat (2)
Presence of Black Candidate	1.042* (0.281)	0.084 (0.274)
Experience in Elected Office	0.317 (0.383)	
Open Seat (Reference Category: Incumbent in Race)	0.390 (0.335)	-0.062 (0.319)
Safely Democratic Seat (Reference Category: Two-Party Competitive)	-0.526 (0.326)	0.120 (0.466)
Safely Republican Seat (Reference Category: Two-Party Competitive)	-0.321 (0.385)	-0.945* (0.448)
Primary Election Rules: Open	-0.852* (0.301)	0.021 (0.333)
Pre/Post George Floyd Protests	0.402 (0.333)	-0.092 (0.399)
Female Candidate	-0.123 (0.299)	0.487* (0.288)
Above Average % Black Population	1.002* (0.349)	0.920* (0.301)
Southern State	-0.077 (0.337)	0.906* (0.353)
Constant	-0.946 (0.601)	-0.798 (0.447)
Observations	446	457

Note: *p<0.05

B Sensitivity Analysis

We endeavor to understand to what extent unobserved cofounders may be responsible for our findings for the effect of descriptive candidate presence, as presented in Table A2 and Table A3. To do so, we employ the `sensmakr` package developed by Cinelli et al. (2020). A sensitivity analysis examining the fragility of our estimates for strategic male Democratic responsiveness is presented in Table A4. A sensitivity analysis examining the fragility of our estimates for amateur male Democratic responsiveness is presented in Table A5. Moreover, a sensitivity analysis examining the fragility of our estimates for strategic white Democratic responsiveness is presented in Table A6. A sensitivity analysis examining the fragility of our estimates for amateur white Democratic responsiveness is presented in Table ??.

B.1 Robustness: Male Democratic Candidates

Table A4: Sensitivity Analysis: Strategic Male Democrat Responsiveness to the Presence of a Female Candidate

Outcome: Probability of Discussing Women’s Issues (0,1)						
Treatment:	Est.	S.E.	t-value	$R^2_{Y \sim D \mathbf{X}}$	$RV_{q=1}$	$RV_{q=1, \alpha=0.05}$
<i>Presence of Female Candidate</i>	0.25	0.049	5.282	7.2%	24.3%	16%
Observations = 358				<i>Bound (3x Republican Safe Seat)</i>		


Table A5: Sensitivity Analysis: Amateur Male Democrat Responsiveness to the Presence of a Female Candidate

Outcome: Probability of Discussing Women’s Issues (0,1)						
Treatment:	Est.	S.E.	t-value	$R^2_{Y \sim D \mathbf{X}}$	$RV_{q=1}$	$RV_{q=1, \alpha=0.05}$
<i>Presence of Female Candidate</i>	0.158	0.047	3.37	2.5%	14.9%	6.5%
Observations = 437				<i>Bound (3x Republican Safe Seat)</i>		


The partial R^2 of descriptive candidate presence (treatment) with candidate issue uptake (outcome) presented in column 4 of Table A4 demonstrates that an extreme confounder (orthogonal to the covariates) that explains 100% of the residual variance of the outcome, would need to explain at least 7.2% of the residual variance of the treatment to fully account for the observed estimated effect. Per column 5 of Table A4, unobserved confounders (orthogonal to the covariates) that explain more than 24.3% of the residual variance of both the treatment and the outcome to fully account for our findings (i.e. bring the point estimate to 0). If unobserved cofounders were to explain 16% of the residual variance of both the treatment and outcome, these factors would be sufficiently strong enough to make our results indifferent from zero at the significance level of 0.05.

The partial R^2 of descriptive candidate presence (treatment) with candidate issue uptake (outcome) presented in column 4 of Table A5 demonstrates that an extreme confounder (orthogonal to the covariates) that explains 100% of the residual variance of the outcome, would need to explain at least 2.5% of the residual variance of the treatment to fully account for the observed estimated effect. Per column 5 of Table A5, unobserved confounders (orthogonal to the covariates) that explain more than 14.9% of the residual

Figure 5: Sensitivity contour plots in the partial R^2 scale with benchmark bounds for Strategic Male Democrats




(a) Sensitivity of the Point Estimate




(b) Sensitivity of the T-Value

Figure 6: Sensitivity contour plots in the partial R^2 scale with benchmark bounds for Amateur Male Democrats



(a) Sensitivity of the Point Estimate



(b) Sensitivity of the T-Value

variance of both the treatment and the outcome to fully account for our findings (i.e. bring the point estimate to 0). If unobserved cofounders were to explain 6.5% of the residual variance of both the treatment and outcome, these factors would be sufficiently strong enough to make our results indifferent from zero at the significance level of 0.05.

Next, in Figure 5(a) Figure 5(b), we visually demonstrate how confounders of different types would affect point estimates and t-values for our strategic Democratic male model (shown in column (1) of Table A2). The horizontal axis describes the fraction of the residual variation in the treatment (partial R^2) explained by the confounder; the vertical axis describes the fraction of the residual variation in the outcome explained by the confounder. The contours show the adjusted estimate that would be obtained for an unobserved confounder (in the full model) with hypothesized values of the sensitivity parameters. The three reference points show that a confounder 3x, 7x, or 11x stronger than observed covariate *Republican Safe Seat* still produce robust findings. Figure 5(b) shows the sensitivity of the t-value of the treatment effect. As we move along the horizontal

axis, the adjusted effect and standard-errors remain fairly consistent. This plot shows that the statistical significance of our treatment remains robust to a confounder 3x, 7x, or 11x stronger than observed covariate *Republican Safe Seat*.

Similarly, in Figure 6(a) Figure 6(b), we visually demonstrate how confounders of different types would affect point estimates and t-values for our amateur Democratic male model (shown in column (2) of Table A2). The horizontal axis describes the fraction of the residual variation in the treatment (partial R^2) explained by the confounder; the vertical axis describes the fraction of the residual variation in the outcome explained by the confounder. The contours show the adjusted estimate that would be obtained for an unobserved confounder (in the full model) with hypothesized values of the sensitivity parameters. The three reference points show that a confounder 3x, 7x, or 11x stronger than observed covariate *Republican Safe Seat* still produce robust findings. Figure 6(b) shows the sensitivity of the t-value of the treatment effect. As we move along the horizontal axis, the adjusted effect and standard-errors remain fairly consistent. This plot shows that the statistical significance of our treatment remains robust to a confounder 3x, 7x, or 11x stronger than observed covariate *Republican Safe Seat*.

B.2 Robustness: White Democratic Candidates


Table A6: Sensitivity Analysis: Strategic White Democrat Responsiveness to the Presence of a Black Candidate

Outcome: Probability of Discussing Black-Associated Issues (0,1)						
Treatment:	Est.	S.E.	t-value	$R^2_{Y \sim D \mathbf{X}}$	$RV_{q=1}$	$RV_{q=1, \alpha=0.05}$
<i>Presence of Black Candidate</i>	0.232	0.045	5.176	5.8%	21.9%	14.2%
Observations = 358				<i>Bound (3x Black District Pop.)</i>		

The partial R^2 of descriptive candidate presence (treatment) with candidate issue uptake (outcome) presented in column 4 of Table A6 demonstrates that an extreme confounder (orthogonal to the covariates) that explains 100% of the residual variance of the outcome, would need to explain at least 5.8% of the residual variance of the treatment to fully account for the observed estimated effect. Per column 5 of Table A6, unobserved confounders (orthogonal to the covariates) that explain more than 21.9% of the residual variance of both the treatment and the outcome to fully account for our findings (i.e. bring the point estimate to 0). If unobserved cofounders were to explain 14.2% of the residual variance of both the treatment and outcome, these factors would be sufficiently strong enough to make our results indifferent from zero at the significance level of 0.05.

Next, in Figure 7(a) Figure 7(b), we visually demonstrate how confounders of different types would affect point estimates and t-values for our strategic Democratic male model (shown in column (1) of Table A2). The horizontal axis describes the fraction of the residual variation in the treatment (partial R^2) explained by the confounder; the vertical axis describes the fraction of the residual variation in the outcome explained by the confounder. The contours show the adjusted estimate that would be obtained for an unobserved confounder (in the full model) with hypothesized values of the sensitivity parameters. The three reference points show that a confounder 3x, 7x, or 11x stronger than observed covariate *Above Average District Black Population* still produce robust findings. Figure 7(b) shows the sensitivity of the t-value of the treatment effect. As

Figure 7: Sensitivity contour plots in the partial R² scale with benchmark bounds for Strategic Male Democrats



we move along the horizontal axis, the adjusted effect and standard-errors remain fairly consistent. This plot shows that the statistical significance of our treatment remains robust to a confounder 3x, 7x, or 11x stronger than observed covariate *Above Average District Black Population*.

C Analysis Extension: Military Veterans

Table A7: Covariates for Military Veteran Democratic and Republican Models

Model Covariate	Covariate Values	
Unit of Analysis: Non-Veteran Primary Election Candidates		
Dependent Variable: Discussed Veterans’ Issues in Congressional Campaign Platform		
Independent Variables:		
Presence of a Military Veteran	0 (No Veteran)	1 (Veteran)
Open Seat	0 (Incumbent in Race)	1 (Open Seat)
Primary Election Rules	0 (Closed Primary)	1 (Open Primary)
# of Military Installations	0 (Min)	21 (Max)
District % Military Veterans	0 (Below Average)	1 (Above Average)
District Seat Safety	0 (Two-Party Competitive)	1 (Safely Democratic)
	2 (Safely Democratic)	

Note: We consider a district to be safely Democratic if its average Democratic vote-share across the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections was greater or equal to 55%. We consider district to be safely Republican if its average Democratic vote-share across the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections was less than or equal to 45%. We consider a district to have an above-average veteran population if 6% or more of its residents identified themselves as having served in the United States Armed Forces.

C.1 Entropy Balancing

To determine the effect of a military veteran’s presence on non-veteran Republicans’ campaign behavior, we balance over covariates that indicate in which types of races a vet may be more likely to emerge. Supply-side explanations may also provide a rationale for the emergence patterns of Republican military veterans. Certain congressional districts—particularly those with a military base or resources for veterans—tend to have larger populations of veterans and, therefore, have a larger supply of potential candidates. Aside from an elevated presence of veterans, these kinds of installations also provide jobs for the local community and support the local economy, making defense-related issues especially salient to constituents. Studies on the strategic campaign behavior of vets are limited. However, the nascent body of work dedicated to this topic indicates military vets tend to run in “high opportunity” environments (e.g. Collens 2020). Districts with constituent populations who care deeply about veterans and policies related to the military seem to fit this description. For all of these reasons, we include count for the number of a military base in a district and the presence of a VA hospital to approximate not only a district’s population of military vets but also the salience of veteran-related issues to that district’s constituency.

C.2 Love Plots: Covariate Distributional Balance

We establish balance across all covariates identified in Table A7. Plots of covariate distributions are presented in Figures 8 through 11. These figures depict—before and after weighting—the absolute mean differences in the covariate distributional balance for non-veteran Democratic and Republican candidates who did and did not run against a military veteran in their partisan primary election. To best approximate the conditions of a controlled experiment using observational data, these mean difference between candidate types should be close to zero. The dotted line indicates a 0.05 threshold; points falling to the left of this line indicates balance has been achieved for that covariate. To provide a mode of comparison beyond unweighted data, covariate distributions weighted with the covariate balancing propensity score methodology (CBPS) proposed by Imai and Ratkovic (2012) are also plotted. In each instance plotted, entropy balancing outperforms unweighted data and CBPS in achieving covariate distributional balance.

Figure 8: Covariate Balance: Love Plot for Non-Vet. Republican Strategic Candidates




Figure 9: Covariate Balance: Love Plot for Non-Vet. Republican Amateur Candidates




Figure 10: Covariate Balance: Love Plot for White Democratic Strategic Candidates




Figure 11: Covariate Balance: Love Plot for White Democratic Amateur Candidates




Table A8: Full Results: Logistic Regression for Republican Non-Veterans' Coverage of Veterans' Issues in Online Campaign Platforms, 2018-2020

	DV: Adopted of Veterans' Issues in Online Campaign Platforms	
	Strategic Non-Vet Republican (1)	Amateur Non-Vet Republican (2)
Presence of Military Veteran	1.013* (0.253)	-0.014 (0.299)
Experience in Elected Office	-0.598* (0.270)	
Open Seat (Reference Category: Incumbent in Race)	0.390 (0.265)	0.603 (0.319)
Safely Republican Seat	0.022 (0.308)	-0.343 (0.466)
Primary Election Rules: Open	-0.224 (0.288)	-0.352 (0.306)
2020 Primary Election	-0.625* (0.260)	0.101 (0.319)
Above Average % Vet Population	0.431 (0.297)	0.005 (0.307)
# Military Installations	0.037 (0.004)	0.014 (0.058)
Constant	0.782 (0.518)	-0.399 (0.451)
Observations	430	418

Note:

*p<0.05

Table A9: Full Results: Logistic Regression for Democratic Non-Veterans' Coverage of Veterans' Issues in Online Campaign Platforms, 2018-2020

	DV: Adopted of Veterans' Issues in Online Campaign Platforms	
	Strategic Non-Vet Democrat (1)	Amateur Non-Vet Democrat (2)
Presence of Military Veteran	-0.126 (0.217)	0.100 (0.217)
Experience in Elected Office	-0.160 (0.271)	
Open Seat (Reference Category: Incumbent in Race)	-0.358 (0.251)	-0.090 (0.233)
Safely Republican Seat	-0.070 (0.243)	0.182 (0.289)
Primary Election Rules: Open	0.115 (0.228)	-0.285 (0.238)
2020 Primary Election	-0.269 (0.223)	-0.130 (0.227)
Above Average % Vet Population	0.216 (0.248)	0.485* (0.243)
# Military Installations	0.059 (0.039)	0.051 (0.041)
Constant	-0.109 (0.380)	-0.839* (0.318)
Observations	549	570

Note:

*p<0.05