

# I'm Coming Out! How Voter Discrimination Produces Effective LGBTQ Lawmakers

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## Abstract

Are LGBTQ legislators effective lawmakers? We build on theories linking voter discrimination to effective lawmaking (Anzia and Berry 2011) by arguing that voters' prejudice toward LGBTQ candidates produces effective LGBTQ lawmakers. To test this expectation, we pair data on state legislators' sexual identity (Haider-Markel 2010) with Bucchianeri, Volden, and Wiseman's (Forthcoming) state legislative effectiveness scores (SLES). We find that LGBTQ lawmakers are 26% more effective than non-LGBTQ lawmakers. Additionally, we conduct three tests linking LGBTQ lawmakers' effectiveness to voter discrimination. In one test we create an original measure indicating the year that LGBTQ lawmakers publicly came out. We leverage this data to show that out LGBTQ lawmakers—those who have revealed their LGBTQ identity to voters and are therefore susceptible to discrimination—are 44% more effective than non-out LGBTQ lawmakers.

**Keywords:** LGBTQ+ politics, representation, legislative effectiveness, state politics, campaigns & elections

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## Introduction

In 1974, Elaine Noble was elected to the Massachusetts House of Representatives, becoming the first openly LGBT non-incumbent candidate elected to an American legislature. Throughout her pioneering election, she experienced extreme violence and discrimination from voters because of her sexual identity. In an interview with *Out and Elected in the USA*, Noble recounted protesters breaking windows at her campaign headquarters, destroying her car, and harassing supporters at her campaign office. Despite encountering overt prejudice and violence from some of her constituents, Noble displayed characteristics of a highly effective lawmaker throughout her two terms in office. She championed issues such as school desegregation and LGBTQ rights and, as a testament to her performance in office, won nearly 80% of the district vote share in the following election (*Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts* 1974).

During the 50 years since Noble's election, LGBTQ candidates have increasingly run for and won elections to local, state, and federal office. Despite gains in numeric representation, LGBTQ politicians remain underrepresented at all levels of government. Though 7.1% of the American population, and 20% of Americans born between 1997 and 2003, identify as LGBTQ, only 13 lawmakers in the 118th Congress identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual (Jones 2022; Schaeffer 2023). Likewise, only 1.1% of state legislators identify as LGBTQ. The leading explanation for why LGBTQ candidates are underrepresented in American politics is voter discrimination (Haider-Markel 2010; Magni and Reynolds 2021).

Despite facing electoral discrimination, LGBTQ lawmakers, both at the state and federal levels, have demonstrated a record of effective lawmaking. In the U.S. Congress, LGB lawmakers have persistently championed policies promoting marriage equality and non-discrimination protections. For four consecutive Congresses (114th - 117th), David Cicilline, an openly gay representative from Rhode Island, sponsored the Equality Act. The Equality Act would have enshrined gender and sexuality-based non-discrimination protections into federal law and would have prohibited discrimination in some public accommodations (Kurtzleben 2021). Though this legislation ultimately died in the Senate, Tammy Baldwin, the first openly lesbian Senator, negotiated a deal

with Republican Senators in the 117th Congress to pass the Respect for Marriage Act. Though narrower in scope than the Equality Act, this bill codified marriage equality into law (Jalonick 2022). The legislative successes of LGBTQ lawmakers have been even more apparent at the state level. In California, where more than 10% of the upper chamber identifies as LGBTQ, lawmakers have passed legislation aimed at increasing pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) access, promoting economic equality for same-sex couples, and developing anti-discrimination measures and training for employers and LGBTQ youth (EqualityCalifornia 2023).

We argue that the legislative successes of Elaine Noble and other LGBTQ lawmakers are not a coincidence, but rather one result of electoral discrimination directed at LGBTQ candidates. In this article, we build on existing theories linking voters' prejudice toward underrepresented groups to their performance in office (Anzia and Berry 2011). We argue that if LGBTQ candidates face overt prejudice or perceive that voters are prejudiced against them during an election, the LGBTQ candidate pool will be hollowed out and only the most qualified LGBTQ candidates will become lawmakers. As a result, LGBTQ lawmakers will be more effective, on average, than non-LGBTQ lawmakers. To test our expectations, we use data from Haider-Markel (2010) to identify LGBTQ state legislators. We then pair these data with Bucchianeri, Volden, and Wiseman's (Forthcoming) state legislative effectiveness scores (SLES) for more than 22,500 state legislators.

This article offers three unique contributions to the existing literature on voter discrimination and legislative effectiveness. First, we conduct our analyses at the state legislature level, rather than in the U.S. Congress, which provides greater variation in LGBTQ representation to analyze. Given that so few LGB lawmakers have served in the U.S. Congress, an overtime statistical analysis would likely be impossible. At the state level, however, 946 legislator-term specific observations identify as LGBTQ. Second, we analyze an understudied identity group in legislatures—LGBTQ lawmakers. Though a small and growing literature studies LGBTQ politics (Haider-Markel 2010; Hansen and Treul 2015; Brant and Butcher 2022), we still know relatively little about the legislative behavior of LGBTQ lawmakers. Additionally, studying LGBTQ lawmakers is a good test of our theory given that we are interested in how voter discrimination is related to lawmakers' per-

formance in office. While women and non-white candidates certainly face electoral biases (Dolan 1997, 2004; Newport and Carroll 2007; Lawless and Pearson 2008), recent research suggests that approximately 30% of the American population would oppose an openly gay or lesbian candidate for local, state, and federal office (Haider-Markel, Miller, Flores, Lewis, Tadlock and Taylor 2017). Upwards of 35% of the American population would never vote for a transgender candidate (Haider-Markel et al. 2017), suggesting that discrimination from voters continues to be a challenge experienced by LGBTQ candidates.

Finally, after empirically demonstrating that LGBTQ lawmakers are more effective than non-LGBTQ lawmakers, we conduct three tests linking LGBTQ legislators' effective lawmaking to our proposed voter discrimination mechanism. In one test, we construct a novel data set capturing the election year that LGBTQ lawmakers "come out". Unlike observable descriptive identities, such as race and gender, individuals' LGBTQ identity is not immediately obvious. As a result, we can leverage variation when voters learn that a lawmaker identifies as LGBTQ. This enables us to address a methodological challenge inherent to studies concerning race and gender: *we can measure an LGBTQ legislator's effectiveness before and after they reveal their LGBTQ identity to voters*. If Out LGBTQ lawmakers are more effective than non-Out LGBTQ lawmakers, this suggests, in addition to the evidence provided by our other two tests, that voter discrimination drives LGBTQ legislators' effectiveness. Descriptive statistics and model estimates suggest that LGBTQ lawmakers are considerably more effective than non-LGBTQ lawmakers. Out LGBTQ lawmakers, those who have publicly revealed their LGBTQ identity, are 44% more effective than LGBTQ lawmakers who are not publicly out.

## **How Voter Discrimination Produces Effective LGBTQ Lawmakers**

Public opinion toward LGBTQ people in the United States has generally improved over the last thirty years (Masci, Brown and Kiley 2019; Poushter and Kent 2020). Despite a positive trend in LGBTQ acceptance in the United States, significant prejudice toward LGBTQ people continues to

exist (Jones 2023). Americans' attitudes regarding LGBTQ acceptance have consequences for the emergence of LGBTQ political candidates. Overall, out LGBTQ candidates face discrimination from voters (Haider-Markel 2010; Magni and Reynolds 2021; Wagner 2021). National and state survey data suggests that approximately 25% of the U.S. adult population is unwilling to support an LGBTQ political candidate (Haider-Markel 2010). Demographically, individuals unwilling to support LGBTQ political candidates tend to be older, conservative, Republican males (Haider-Markel 2010, 64). Magni and Reynolds (2021) administered a conjoint experiment asking respondents to cast a (fictional) vote for a set of candidates. They then randomize candidates' attributes, including their sexual identity, and find that, on average, LGBT candidates in the United States face a 6.7% electoral penalty.

Despite strong evidence that LGBT candidates are discriminated against for revealing their sexual identity to voters, they are no less (or more) likely to win in a general election compared to non-LGBT candidates (Haider-Markel 2010). This finding is perhaps puzzling given that we may expect voter discrimination to reduce the likelihood that LGBT candidates win elections. Haider-Markel (2010) proposes one explanation for this puzzle by suggesting that voter prejudice toward LGBTQ candidates is not uniform across social identity groups, but rather LGBTQ candidates select to run in LGBTQ-friendly districts. While Democrats are no more or less likely to penalize LGBT candidates than non-LGBT candidates, Republicans are 14.8% less likely to vote for an LGBT candidate than a non-LGBT candidate (Magni and Reynolds 2021). Thus, LGBTQ candidates are more likely to enter an electoral race in a Democratic urban district with numerous college-educated, Hispanic, LGBTQ, and middle-to-low-income constituents (Haider-Markel 2010, 81). LGBTQ candidates are less likely to run in districts with many Black and protestant evangelical constituents (Haider-Markel 2010, 81).

Another possible explanation that could accommodate these two contradictory findings is that electoral selection effects hollow out the LGBTQ candidate pool, such that only the most qualified run and win elective office. We build on Anzia & Berry's (2011) theory of electoral selection for female candidates and argue that voters' attitudes toward LGBTQ candidates are related to LGBTQ

lawmakers' performance in office (Anzia and Berry 2011; Ashworth, Berry and Bueno de Mesquita 2023; Lollis Forthcoming). If LGBTQ candidates face discrimination during elections—whether it be because voters overtly discriminate against them or because LGBTQ candidates perceive that voters are prejudiced against them—only the most qualified and skilled LGBTQ candidates will enter the electoral arena and win their election. The result of this electoral selection effect is that LGBTQ lawmakers are more effective than non-LGBTQ lawmakers.<sup>1</sup>

LGBTQ electoral selection effects can occur in at least two ways. First, if LGBTQ candidates face overt discrimination from voters as a result of their sexual identity, only the most qualified and skilled LGBTQ candidates will run and win elective office. This leads to a hollowing out of the LGBTQ candidate pool, where only the most qualified LGBTQ candidates remain. As a result, the LGBTQ candidates who do gain representation in legislatures are higher-quality candidates than their non-LGBTQ counterparts.

Second, electoral selection effects may translate into effective lawmaking if candidates *perceive* that voters are prejudiced against them (Anzia and Berry 2011). Indeed, the fact that LGBTQ candidates are more likely to run in LGBTQ-friendly districts is evidence that LGBTQ candidates are aware that (some) voters may penalize them for their sexual identity. Though running in these districts may decrease the likelihood that LGBTQ candidates face overt discrimination, they likely still *expect* to incur an electoral penalty. If LGBTQ candidates perceive voters to be discriminatory, they will likely work harder than non-LGBTQ candidates to win elections. This creates an over-performance premium that may facilitate effective policymaking once in legislative office. Our theory suggests that regardless of whether LGBTQ candidates perceive or actually experience discrimination during elections, the result is the same: if elected, LGBTQ lawmakers will outperform their non-LGBTQ colleagues.

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<sup>1</sup>Anzia and Berry (2011) argue that women candidates perceive and experience sexism within congressional elections and, as a result, perform better than their male colleagues to overcome this discrimination. More recent work also suggests that sex-based selection leads to women lawmakers being more effective than their male counterparts (Ashworth, Berry and Bueno de Mesquita 2023).

***H1 (LGBTQ Legislative Effectiveness)***: LGBTQ legislators are more effective lawmakers than non-LGBTQ legislators.

There are, of course, other mechanisms that could explain our findings. We propose three tests that leverage whether LGBTQ lawmakers are likely to experience voter discrimination to connect our findings to our proposed voter discrimination mechanism. No test alone confirms that voter discrimination *causes* LGBTQ lawmakers' effectiveness; however, leveraging variation in discrimination across three tests collectively builds evidence that voter discrimination is at least one factor contributing to LGBTQ lawmakers' effectiveness.

First, we argue that if voter discrimination is one cause of LGBTQ lawmakers' effectiveness, we should expect only LGBTQ lawmakers who are *publicly out* to be more effective. Given that non-Out lawmakers have not yet revealed their LGBTQ identity to voters, there is little reason to suspect that voters will discriminate against them. If voter discrimination is responsible for producing effective lawmaking, we should observe a "coming out" boost in LGBTQ lawmakers' effectiveness.

Second, discrimination toward LGBTQ individuals has varied over time. In 1996, only 27% of the American public agreed that same-sex marriage should be legalized. In 2023, over 70% of the American public indicated support for same-sex marriage (Mccarthy 2023). We use evolving public opinion toward LGBTQ individuals to test our argument in two ways. We expect that LGBTQ lawmakers will be more effective prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in *Obergefell v. Hodges* (2015) that legalized same-sex marriage at the federal level. Following the court's ruling, public opinion toward LGBTQ rights improved dramatically. If voter discrimination explains LGBTQ lawmakers' effectiveness, LGBTQ lawmakers elected before the ruling should be more effective than LGBTQ lawmakers elected following the ruling. Further, if discrimination drives effectiveness, we should expect LGBTQ lawmakers elected in recent decades to be less effective than LGBTQ lawmakers elected in the 1990s and 2000s.

Third, in some state legislative districts, voters have elected more than one LGBTQ lawmaker.

We expect that voters will be most intolerant toward the first LGBTQ lawmaker elected from a district. As a result, subsequent lawmakers will experience less discrimination. If discrimination fosters effective lawmaking, LGBTQ lawmakers who are not the first LGBTQ lawmaker to be elected from their district should be less effective than LGBTQ lawmakers who are the first to be elected by their district.<sup>2</sup>

### ***H2 (Voter Discrimination Tests):***

- Out LGBTQ lawmakers are more effective than non-out LGBTQ lawmakers.
- LGBTQ lawmakers elected after *Obergefell* are less effective than LGBTQ lawmakers elected prior to the ruling. And LGBTQ lawmakers elected in recent decades are less effective than LGBTQ lawmakers elected in the 1990s and 2000s.
- LGBTQ lawmakers who are not the first LGBTQ lawmaker to be elected from their district are less effective than LGBTQ lawmakers who are the first to be elected by their district.

## **Data & Methods**

To test our hypotheses, we pair data on state legislators' LGBTQ identity for more than 22,500 unique state legislators (Haider-Markel 2010) with Bucchianeri, Volden, and Wiseman's (Forthcoming) state legislative effectiveness scores (SLES). The data set includes SLES for 80,344 legislator-term-specific observations for 49 states from 1987-2017. Of these observations, 946 (or 1.1% of our sample) identify as LGBTQ.

SLES captures the weighted average of a legislator's actions throughout five stages of the lawmaking process: bill introduction (BILL), action in committee (AIC), action beyond committee (ABC), passing one chamber (PASS), and becoming law (LAW) (Bucchianeri, Volden and

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<sup>2</sup>Importantly, in each of these tests we always expect LGBTQ lawmakers to be more effective than non-LGBTQ lawmakers. The prior tests predict that variation *within* LGBTQ lawmakers' effectiveness is explained by varying levels of voter discrimination.



Wiseman Forthcoming). Therefore, these scores evaluate effectiveness throughout the entirety of the legislative process rather than only considering final passage votes. Additionally, SLES are weighted to reflect the substance and significance of legislation. Commemorative and symbolic legislation influences a legislator's effectiveness score less than substantive and significant legislation.<sup>3</sup>

The primary independent variable, "LGBTQ," is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if a legislator identifies as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer (LGBTQ). We use Haider-Markel's (2010; 2020) data set to code state legislators' LGBTQ identity which includes every LGBTQ state legislator elected from 1975 to present. We also construct a novel data set indicating the year in which every LGBTQ lawmaker publicly came out. We use this data set to construct a dichotomous variable, "Out During Election", that indicates whether a legislator was out during each legislative term. Additionally, we create a binary variable coded 1 if the legislator ran an election prior to the *Obergefell* decision in 2015. Finally, we create a binary variable coded 1 if the lawmaker was not the first LGBTQ lawmaker to be elected from their district.

We condition on several covariates that likely influence legislators' effectiveness including demographic and chamber controls (Volden and Wiseman 2014; Bucchianeri, Volden and Wiseman Forthcoming). We also control for the percentage of LGBTQ legislators and Out LGBTQ legislators within a given state, term, and chamber to ensure that the estimated relationship persists regardless of how many (out) LGBTQ lawmakers are in a legislature. Finally, we include various arrangements of state, term, district, and legislator fixed effects to control for variation specific to each state legislature, term, district, and legislator.<sup>4</sup>

## Results

### Are LGBTQ Legislators Effective Lawmakers?

To predict the relationship between legislative effectiveness and legislators' LGBTQ identity, we estimate an OLS regression model with clustered standard errors that include state, term, and

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<sup>3</sup>See section 1 of Appendix for more information about how SLES are calculated.

<sup>4</sup>Descriptive statistics for the variables of interest are presented in Appendix A.2.

district fixed effects.<sup>5</sup> Figure 1 displays the results from this regression model, where the dependent variable is SLES and the independent variable is LGBTQ.<sup>6</sup> LGBTQ lawmakers are 26% more effective than non-LGBTQ lawmakers ( $p < 0.001$ ). This relationship is independent of individual- and chamber-level covariates across statehouses over time, as well as the percentage of LGBTQ lawmakers in a chamber. To contextualize the substantive implication of this finding, the effectiveness boost experienced by LGBTQ lawmakers is nearly as large as the effectiveness boost associated with being in the majority party, which is one of the largest associations in the model. Similar to the prior model, LGBTQ lawmakers are 27% more effective than non-LGBTQ lawmakers after including district-level fixed effects.<sup>7</sup> This suggests that when a district elects an LGBTQ lawmaker, they are 27% more effective than their non-LGBTQ predecessor.


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<sup>5</sup>The mean SLES for LGBTQ lawmakers is 0.16, while the mean SLES for their non-LGBTQ colleagues is -0.002. Given that SLES are Z-scored, the mean SLES value in the sample is 0. This suggests that, descriptively, LGBTQ lawmakers are 16% more effective than the average lawmaker. This provides initial descriptive support for our expectation that LGBTQ legislators are more effective lawmakers than non-LGBTQ legislators.

<sup>6</sup>Full model reported in Table 4.1 in the appendix.

<sup>7</sup>Results reported in the last column of Table 4.1 in the appendix.

**Figure 1: LGBTQ Legislators are More Effective Lawmakers**



*Note:* Dots indicate coefficients estimated from an OLS regression found in Table 3.1 (in the appendix). Estimated with 95% confidence intervals.

## Does voter discrimination produce effective lawmaking?

To test whether voter discrimination explains LGBTQ lawmakers' effectiveness, we leverage variation in voter discrimination by analyzing LGBTQ lawmakers' effectiveness conditional on (1) whether they are out, (2) the time period they ran for legislative office, and (3) if they are the first LGBTQ lawmaker elected from their district. If voter discrimination explains why LGBTQ lawmakers are more effective than non-LGBTQ lawmakers, we should observe three findings: Out LGBTQ lawmakers should be more effective than non-Out LGBTQ lawmakers; lawmakers elected more recently should be less effective than lawmakers elected during earlier time periods;

and LGBTQ lawmakers who are not the first LGBTQ lawmakers to be elected from their district should be less effective than the first LGBTQ lawmaker elected from their district.


Figure 2 presents the results from the Out test.<sup>8</sup> We estimate an OLS regression model using clustered standard errors with state, term, and legislator fixed effects.<sup>9</sup> We regress SLES onto Out During Election, our independent variable of interest. The Out During Election coefficient is 0.44 ( $p < 0.01$ ). This means that publicly out LGBTQ lawmakers are approximately 44% more effective than non-out LGBTQ lawmakers. Substantively, this estimate suggests that an out LGBTQ legislator has a comparable SLES to that of a lawmaker with 6 additional terms of legislative experience in their respective chamber. As seen in this model, going from not publicly out to publicly out increases SLES more than every covariate in the model apart from majority party status.

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<sup>8</sup>The full results are reported in table 4.2 in the appendix.

<sup>9</sup>Non-LGBTQ lawmakers have a mean SLES of -0.002. LGBTQ lawmakers who are not yet publicly out have a mean SLES of -0.162. Publicly out LGBTQ lawmakers have a mean SLES of 0.2. This suggests that when LGBTQ lawmakers publicly reveal their sexual identity, on average, their mean SLES increases by 0.362. Descriptively, these findings suggest that out-LGBTQ lawmakers are more effective than not publicly out LGBTQ lawmakers.

**Figure 2: Out Legislators Are More Effective Lawmakers**



*Note:* Dots indicate coefficients estimated from an OLS regression found in Table 4.2 (in the appendix). Estimated with 95% confidence intervals.

The coefficients estimated for the Obergefell, time, and replacement tests are included in Table 1. The dependent variable in column 1 is the SLES of LGBTQ lawmakers and the independent variable is a binary variable coded 1 if the lawmaker was elected prior to the *Obergefell* ruling. The coefficient is 2.32 ( $p < 0.001$ ), suggesting that LGBTQ lawmakers elected prior to the *Obergefell* ruling are 232% more effective than LGBTQ lawmakers elected following the ruling. Columns 2-4 display the results from the time period test, where the dependent variable is lawmakers' SLES if they were serving in the 1980s-1990s (column 2), 1990s-2000s (column 3), or 2010-2018 (column 4). All coefficients on the LGBTQ variable are positive and significant, suggesting that LGBTQ lawmakers are more effective than non-LGBTQ lawmakers. As predicted, the coefficient is largest

for the 1980-1990s time period (0.394,  $p < 0.05$ ), smaller for the 2000s time period (0.312,  $p < 0.001$ ), and the smallest for the most recent time period (0.205,  $p < 0.01$ ).

Finally, column 5 of Table 1 estimates the relationship between LGBTQ lawmakers' SLES and a binary variable coded 1 if the lawmaker is *not* the first LGBTQ lawmaker elected from a district. As expected, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that LGBTQ lawmakers who are not the first elected from their district are 41% ( $p < 0.05$ ) less effective than the first LGBTQ lawmaker elected from a district. Again, no single mechanism test that we offer is conclusive. Collectively, however, we leverage variation in voter discrimination in three unique ways, and across each of the three tests the finding is consistent—when LGBTQ lawmakers experience or perceive more discrimination from voters, they are more effective lawmakers.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>One additional test is provided in section 6 of the appendix, but was omitted from the main text due to space limitations.

**Table 1: Obergefell, Time Period, and Replacement Tests**

	LGBTQ (SLES)	1980s-90s (SLES)	2000s (SLES)	2010-2018 (SLES)	LGBTQ (SLES)
<b>Pre-Obergefell</b>	2.320*** (0.156)				
<b>LGBTQ</b>		0.394* (0.186)	0.312*** (0.088)	0.205** (0.064)	
<b>Not First LGBTQ from District</b>					-0.409* (0.159)
% LGBTQ	-0.016 (0.022)	0.027* (0.011)	0.009+ (0.005)	0.012** (0.004)	-0.016 (0.022)
Female	-0.091 (0.117)	0.007 (0.024)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.014 (0.019)	-0.095 (0.118)
Black	0.065 (0.257)	0.119 (0.107)	-0.045 (0.109)	0.055 (0.087)	0.094 (0.254)
Hispanic	0.383 (0.292)	0.180+ (0.108)	0.108 (0.109)	0.099 (0.083)	0.392 (0.291)
White	0.383+ (0.213)	0.201* (0.086)	0.136 (0.101)	0.069 (0.072)	0.402+ (0.212)
Democrat	0.161 (0.266)	0.005 (0.022)	0.006 (0.015)	0.062*** (0.017)	0.151 (0.275)
Seniority	0.074* (0.034)	0.029*** (0.005)	0.028*** (0.004)	0.027*** (0.004)	0.078* (0.035)
Committee Chair	0.347* (0.146)	0.622*** (0.031)	0.500*** (0.021)	0.474*** (0.023)	0.327* (0.144)
In Majority	0.816*** (0.183)	0.267*** (0.026)	0.368*** (0.022)	0.420*** (0.026)	0.823*** (0.183)
In Governor's Party	-0.006 (0.111)	0.080*** (0.019)	0.024+ (0.013)	0.034* (0.016)	-0.003 (0.110)
In Majority Leadership	-0.037 (0.266)	0.236** (0.075)	0.171*** (0.043)	0.107+ (0.056)	-0.047 (0.263)
In Minority Leadership	-0.182 (0.238)	0.098+ (0.055)	0.057 (0.036)	0.131** (0.050)	-0.168 (0.242)
Distance from Median	0.013 (0.108)	-0.163*** (0.026)	-0.167*** (0.020)	-0.100*** (0.018)	0.011 (0.108)
Leader, Speaker, or President	-0.160 (0.387)	0.012 (0.125)	0.016 (0.087)	0.014 (0.109)	-0.121 (0.388)
Term Limits	0.363** (0.134)	0.096* (0.038)	0.100*** (0.018)	0.078*** (0.019)	0.346* (0.135)
Professionalism	-0.281 (0.362)	-0.176* (0.081)	-0.206*** (0.059)	-0.117 (0.081)	-0.294 (0.366)
Vote Share	-0.366+ (0.208)	0.039 (0.045)	0.005 (0.031)	-0.034 (0.035)	-0.445* (0.213)
Senate	-0.255* (0.112)	-0.193*** (0.028)	-0.165*** (0.018)	-0.137*** (0.020)	-0.241* (0.109)
Intercept	-0.870* (0.386)	-0.548*** (0.105)	-0.487*** (0.107)	-0.529*** (0.089)	1.472*** (0.351)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Term Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	865	15388	31536	24745	865

Standard errors in parentheses

+  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## Conclusion

We provide a novel empirical test of Anzia & Berry's (2011) argument by demonstrating that, when faced with sexuality-based electoral discrimination, LGBTQ candidates become highly effective lawmakers. We conduct three mechanism tests, all of which support our expectation that voter discrimination is driving LGBTQ lawmakers' effectiveness. Studying the legislative performance of LGBTQ lawmakers is important for at least two reasons. First, while voters likely discriminate against LGBTQ candidates for many reasons, one plausible explanation is that voters suspect that LGBTQ lawmakers will be bad at their job. Our findings suggest exactly the opposite—LGBTQ legislators are more effective lawmakers than non-LGBTQ legislators. Second, if the descriptive representation of an identity group improves substantive representation, our findings suggest that LGBTQ lawmakers have the legislative tools and skills necessary to substantively represent LGBTQ Americans.

Given that LGBTQ lawmakers win as often and legislate as well, what factors explain their numeric underrepresentation in legislatures? We highlight two potential causes of LGBTQ underrepresentation that scholars should empirically evaluate. First, LGBTQ Americans may be less likely than non-LGBTQ Americans to consider running for political office (Fox and Lawless 2004). If a sexuality-based political ambition gap exists, it could be the case that, though they are equally as qualified, LGBTQ Americans do not consider running for office. Second, political gatekeepers (political parties, activists, politicians) may be less likely to recruit LGBTQ candidates, despite being qualified for the job (Fox and Lawless 2010). Presenting empirical evidence demonstrating that LGBTQ lawmakers are capable of winning elections and effectively legislating is necessary to dismiss discriminatory arguments that LGBTQ candidates are in some way less capable than other candidates. Identifying the cause(s) of LGBTQ underrepresentation—whether it be a lack of political ambition, political recruitment, or some other factor—is necessary to increase LGBTQ representation in American politics.



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# Online Supplemental Appendix

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# 1 Computing State Legislative Effectiveness Scores

State Legislative Effectiveness Scores (SLES) are weighted averages calculated for individual legislators ( $i$ ) in each legislative term ( $t$ ) within each legislative chamber. SLES consider the number of bills a legislator ( $i$ ) introduced (BILL), received action in committee (AIC), received action beyond committee (ABC), passed their chamber (PASS), and became law (LAW) (Bucchianeri et al. 2020, p.6). Each bill is weighted by its overall significance. Commemorative bills are weighed  $\alpha=1$ , substantive bills are weighed  $\beta=5$ , and substantive/significant bills are weighed  $\gamma=10$ .

Finally, this equation is normalized ( $n/5$ ) across  $N$  legislators to ensure SLES takes a mean value of 1 for each chamber (Bucchianeri et al. 2020, p. 6). We z-score the SLES variable to produce a normal distribution with a mean of zero.

SLES for four states appear in the data set post-2003: Massachusetts (2009), Nebraska (2007), Oregon (2007), and Rhode Island (2007). SLES do not exist for Kansas due to insufficient data.

The equation below explains how SLES scores are calculated. For a more detailed description of how legislative effectiveness scores are calculated see Volden & Wiseman (2014), and for more information on state legislative effectiveness scores see Bucchianeri et al. (2020).

$$SLES_{it} = \left[ \begin{aligned} & \frac{\alpha BILL_{it}^C + \beta BILL_{it}^S + \gamma BILL_{it}^{SS}}{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^N BILL_{it}^C + \beta \sum_{j=1}^N BILL_{it}^S + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^N BILL_{it}^{SS}} \\ & + \frac{\alpha AIC_{it}^C + \beta AIC_{it}^S + \gamma AIC_{it}^{SS}}{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^N AIC_{it}^C + \beta \sum_{j=1}^N AIC_{it}^S + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^N AIC_{it}^{SS}} \\ & + \frac{\alpha ABC_{it}^C + \beta ABC_{it}^S + \gamma ABC_{it}^{SS}}{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^N ABC_{it}^C + \beta \sum_{j=1}^N ABC_{it}^S + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^N ABC_{it}^{SS}} \\ & + \frac{\alpha PASS_{it}^C + \beta PASS_{it}^S + \gamma PASS_{it}^{SS}}{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^N PASS_{it}^C + \beta \sum_{j=1}^N PASS_{it}^S + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^N PASS_{it}^{SS}} \\ & + \frac{\alpha LAW_{it}^C + \beta LAW_{it}^S + \gamma LAW_{it}^{SS}}{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^N LAW_{it}^C + \beta \sum_{j=1}^N LAW_{it}^S + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^N LAW_{it}^{SS}} \end{aligned} \right] \left[ \frac{N}{5} \right]$$

Note: Equation from Bucchinaeri et al. 2020 (p.6)

## 2 Descriptive Statistics


Variable	Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
LGBTQ	0.012	0.11	0 – 1
Percent LGBTQ	1.2	1.6	0 – 15
Out During Election	0.89	0.31	0 – 1
Percent Out During Election	1.1	1.5	0 – 14
Pre-Obergefell	0.74	0.44	0 – 1
Not First LGBTQ Seatholder	0.0008	0.03	0 – 1
Bill Introductions (BILL)	0.013	0.015	0 – 0.31
Action in Committee (AIC)	0.013	0.017	0 – 0.39
Action Beyond Committee (ABC)	0.013	0.018	0 – 0.44
Pass Chamber (PASS)	0.013	0.018	0 – 0.49
Becomes Law (LAW)	0.013	0.019	0 – 0.55
SLES <sub>z</sub>	0	0.99	-2.9 – 14

### 3 Measuring Out During Election

We leverage the election cycle that LGBTQ lawmakers “come out” (i.e. reveal their LGBTQ identity to voters) as a test of our voter discrimination theory. If voter discrimination drives effective lawmaking, Out LGBTQ lawmakers should be more effective than non-Out LGBTQ lawmakers. Said differently, voters should not electorally penalize an LGBTQ lawmaker who has not yet come out. To test whether Out LGBTQ lawmakers are more effective than non-Out LGBTQ lawmakers, we create a novel data set capturing the election year that LGBTQ lawmakers publicly come out. To do this, we use and update Haider-Markel’s (2010) data on LGBTQ state lawmakers. We google search all 262 LGBTQ state lawmakers in our data set and use a variety of resources to determine when the lawmaker came out. We create a new variable “Out During Election” and, given that our data is at the legislator-term level, code the specific term that each LGBTQ lawmaker comes out. If an LGBTQ lawmaker was out in their first election, “Out During Election” is coded 1 for all legislator-term observations. For lawmakers who come out in office, this variable allows us to isolate LGBTQ lawmakers’ effectiveness in the election cycles prior to coming out, and the election cycles after.

To give a specific example of how our coding scheme operates, we describe our coding decision for State Senator Karen Peterson, an openly lesbian legislator from Delaware. Senator Peterson was elected to the Delaware State Senate in 2002. At the time, she was not publicly out. In 2013, when debating a marriage equality bill, Senator Peterson publicly revealed that she identifies as a Lesbian on the Senate floor. HuffPost published an article the next day titled “Karen Peterson, Delaware State Senator, Comes Out During Gay Marriage Debate” and the Victory Fund, a PAC that supports LGBTQ candidates, and the Human Rights Campaign tweeted about her floor speech. In this case, all term observations prior to 2013 were coded as “Out During Election = 0”, and all term observations after 2013 were coded as “Out During Election = 1”.





Note: HuffPost article describing Senator Peterson coming out on Senate floor (May 7, 2013. Author: Paige Lavender).

We relied on three main sources to determine the election cycle that LGBTQ lawmakers came out: (1) LGBTQ organizations and PACs that endorse LGBTQ candidates, (2) newspapers, and (3) legislator biographies. The Victory Fund is a PAC that endorses and financially supports LGBTQ candidates. They post a profile of each lawmaking they endorse, which often includes information about the lawmaker's LGBTQ identity and when they came out (particularly if it was after they initially ran for elective office). Newspapers were our most utilized source. We searched for local news articles with two search terms: "LAWMAKERS NAME", and "CAME OUT". These often yielded a local news article describing the specific day that the LGBTQ lawmaker publicly came out. Finally, in some cases, LGBTQ lawmakers include information about when they came out in their personal biography (often on the legislature's website).

## 4 Models (In-Text Plots)

### 4.1 Table 4.1: LGBTQ Legislators Are More Effective Lawmakers

	BILL	AIC	ABC	PASS	LAW	SLES	SLES
<b>LGBTQ</b>	0.001*	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.262***	0.271***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.061)	(0.060)
% LGBTQ	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.012***	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000 <sup>+</sup>	0.000*	-0.010	-0.019
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Black	-0.005*	-0.006*	-0.006*	-0.006*	-0.006 <sup>+</sup>	0.002	-0.050
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.078)	(0.074)
Hispanic	-0.003	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	0.106	0.032
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.077)	(0.073)
Race (Other)	-0.005*	-0.005 <sup>+</sup>	-0.006*	-0.008**	-0.008*	-0.161	-0.188 <sup>+</sup>
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.100)	(0.096)
White	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>	-0.005 <sup>+</sup>	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>	-0.005	-0.005	0.112	0.064
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.071)	(0.066)
Democrat	-0.001**	0.000	0.000	0.000*	0.001*	0.030*	0.012
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Seniority	0.000*	0.000 <sup>+</sup>	0.000 <sup>+</sup>	0.000*	0.000*	0.028***	0.027***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Committee Chair	0.006***	0.008***	0.008***	0.009***	0.009***	0.519***	0.524***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.016)	(0.016)
In Majority Party	0.002***	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***	0.351***	0.328***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.016)	(0.018)
In Governor's Party	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.042***	0.042***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.009)	(0.009)
In Majority Leadership	0.003***	0.004***	0.005***	0.006***	0.006***	0.170***	0.174***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.033)	(0.033)
In Minority Leadership	0.002***	0.001 <sup>+</sup>	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.079**	0.091**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Distance from Median	-0.000	-0.001***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.003***	-0.146***	-0.189***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Leader, Speaker, or President	0.002	0.003 <sup>+</sup>	0.004*	0.004*	0.005*	0.015	0.022
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.072)	(0.075)
Term Limits	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.100***	0.071**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.014)	(0.024)
Professionalism	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.175***	0.043
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.049)	(0.116)
Vote Share	0.002***	0.001***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.005	0.091***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.024)	(0.027)
Senate	0.015***	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***	-0.162***	-0.152***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Intercept	0.008***	0.007**	0.006*	0.006*	0.006 <sup>+</sup>	-0.467***	-0.590***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.085)	(0.107)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Term Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
District Fixed Effects							✓
Observations	73483	73483	73483	73483	73483	73483	72708

Standard errors in parentheses

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## 4.2 Table 4.2: Out Legislators Are More Effective Lawmakers


	BILL	AIC	ABC	PASS	LAW	SLES	SLES
<b>Out During Election</b>	-0.005 <sup>+</sup> (0.003)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.436** (0.138)	0.208 (0.146)
% Out	0.001 <sup>+</sup> (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.006 (0.025)	
Female	0.000 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.100 (0.116)	
Black	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.009 <sup>+</sup> (0.005)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.012* (0.005)	-0.016** (0.006)	-0.348 (0.281)	
Hispanic	0.001 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.010 <sup>+</sup> (0.005)	-0.011* (0.006)	0.050 (0.282)	
White	0.000 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.009* (0.004)	-0.010* (0.005)	0.035 (0.223)	
Democrat	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.255 (0.246)	
Seniority	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.072* (0.034)	
Committee Chair	0.004 <sup>+</sup> (0.002)	0.007** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.379** (0.144)	
In Majority Party	0.005** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.730*** (0.187)	
In Governor's Party	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.006 (0.108)	
In Majority Leadership	0.004 (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	0.009 (0.006)	0.008 (0.006)	-0.097 (0.268)	
In Minority Leadership	-0.002 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.118 (0.259)	
Distance from Median	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.017 (0.109)	
Leader, Speaker, or President	-0.009 <sup>+</sup> (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.124 (0.387)	
Term Limits	0.005** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.334* (0.136)	
Professionalism	-0.010 <sup>+</sup> (0.005)	-0.015** (0.005)	-0.014** (0.005)	-0.010 <sup>+</sup> (0.005)	-0.010 <sup>+</sup> (0.005)	-0.205 (0.354)	
Vote Share	0.004 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.298 (0.200)	
Senate	0.014*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.002)	-0.259* (0.108)	
Intercept	0.002 (0.005)	0.011** (0.004)	0.009* (0.004)	0.016** (0.005)	0.020*** (0.005)	1.725*** (0.349)	-0.496 (0.476)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Term Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Legislator Fixed Effects							✓
Observations	865	865	865	865	865	865	946

Standard errors in parentheses


<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## 5 Additional Figures

**5.1 Figure 5.1: Overtime Trends in LGBTQ Lawmakers Being Out for All of Their Legislative Tenure: 1991-2017**



## 5.2 Figure 5.2: Overtime Trends in % LGBTQ and % Out Lawmakers Across State Legislatures: 1987-2018



Note: The maps above display the percentage of LGBTQ and Out LGBTQ lawmakers in each state legislature and time period. SLES scores are not available for Kansas, so the percentage of LGBTQ and Out LGBTQ lawmakers is omitted.

## 6 Additional Mechanism Tests

We conduct one additional test linking our effectiveness findings to our proposed voter discrimination mechanism. Due to space constraints in-text, the findings are presented in the appendix but are largely consistent with the argument and results presented in the paper. We argue that if voter discrimination explains LGBTQ lawmakers' effectiveness, Republican LGBTQ lawmakers should be more effective than Democratic LGBTQ lawmakers. Existing scholarship suggests that Republican voters electorally penalize LGBTQ candidates more than Democratic voters (Magni and Reynolds 2021). One implication of this finding is that it is likely much more difficult for a Republican LGBTQ candidate to win an election, in part, due to higher voter discrimination.

To test this, we estimate three OLS regression models with the independent variable being “Out During Election”. The dependent variable in the first model is SLES for Out LGBTQ Republicans. The dependent variable in the second model is SLES for Out LGBTQ Democrats. In the final model, we interact Republican with “Out During Election”, and the dependent variable is SLES for the full sample.

The results in Table 6.1 suggest that Out Republican lawmakers are more effective (0.824,  $p < 0.1$ ) than Out Democratic lawmakers (0.363,  $p < 0.01$ ). The Republican coefficient is 46% larger than the Democratic coefficient. However, when interacting Republican with “Out During Election”, the results are not statistically significant. One challenge with estimating effectiveness by party is the incredibly small number of Out Republican state legislators in our sample. In the first model, where the dependent variable is SLES for Out Republicans, there are only 54 observations. As a result, it is difficult to discern whether the interaction in column 3 is not statistically significant because of the absence of a meaningful relationship or a lack of statistical power. As a result, we interpret these results as suggestive, but they are directionally consistent with our three in-text mechanism tests.

## 6.1 Table 6.1: Out Republican LGBTQ Legislators Are More Effective Law-makers

	Out Republicans (SLES)	Out Democrats (SLES)	SLES
<b>Out During Election</b>	0.824 <sup>+</sup>	0.363 <sup>**</sup>	0.372 <sup>**</sup>
	(0.426)	(0.138)	(0.143)
Republican			-0.049
			(0.167)
<b>Out During Election + Republican</b>			0.370
			(0.342)
% Out	-0.055	-0.007	-0.004
	(0.155)	(0.026)	(0.025)
Female	0.907	-0.103	-0.104
	(0.946)	(0.116)	(0.116)
Black		-0.238	-0.294
		(0.281)	(0.271)
Hispanic		0.127	0.092
		(0.279)	(0.274)
White	0.000	0.143	0.090
	(.)	(0.220)	(0.212)
Seniority	0.182 <sup>+</sup>	0.058 <sup>+</sup>	0.072 <sup>*</sup>
	(0.093)	(0.031)	(0.034)
Committee Chair	2.363 <sup>***</sup>	0.354 <sup>*</sup>	0.374 <sup>*</sup>
	(0.581)	(0.150)	(0.145)
In Majority Party	-0.272	0.812 <sup>***</sup>	0.727 <sup>***</sup>
	(0.501)	(0.190)	(0.189)
In Governor's Party	-0.902	0.069	-0.003
	(0.536)	(0.107)	(0.108)
In Majority Leadership	1.353	-0.035	-0.092
	(0.920)	(0.295)	(0.268)
In Minority Leadership	0.209	-0.100	-0.103
	(0.932)	(0.262)	(0.258)
Distance from Median	-0.164	0.005	-0.011
	(0.485)	(0.110)	(0.109)
Leader, Speaker, or President		-0.169	-0.126
		(0.402)	(0.387)
Term Limits	-0.378	0.337 <sup>*</sup>	0.332 <sup>*</sup>
	(0.633)	(0.140)	(0.136)
Professionalism	-0.205	-0.137	-0.168
	(0.979)	(0.370)	(0.359)
Vote Share	-1.912 <sup>+</sup>	-0.238	-0.303
	(0.980)	(0.178)	(0.202)
Senate	-0.668	-0.249 <sup>*</sup>	-0.263 <sup>*</sup>
	(0.928)	(0.111)	(0.108)
Intercept	0.242	1.840 <sup>***</sup>	1.919 <sup>***</sup>
	(1.104)	(0.351)	(0.346)
Observations	54	811	865


Standard errors in parentheses

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.1$ , <sup>\*</sup>  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>\*\*</sup>  $p < 0.01$ , <sup>\*\*\*</sup>  $p < 0.001$

## 7 Transformation of the Dependent Variable

The distribution of SLES is skewed rightward, indicating numerous outliers at the upper end of the distribution. Given that outliers could bias our findings, we normalize the dependent variable by z-scoring SLES. Figure 5.1 displays a histogram of both the SLES variable and the transformed z-scored SLES. To guard against the possibility of outliers misrepresenting our specified model, we run all of our analyses using the original SLES variable and a z-scored transformation of the SLES variable. As the tables in section five of the appendix show, our findings are not sensitive to the transformed dependent variable. We choose to report results of our regressions using the normalized SLES variable in-text.

### 7.1 Figure 7.1: Distribution of SLES and Z-Scored SLES





**7.2 Table 7.2: Transformation of the Dependent Variable: LGBTQ Legislators Are More Effective Lawmakers**

	BILL	AIC	ABC	PASS	LAW	SLES
<b>LGBTQ</b>	0.001*	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.227***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.068)
% LGBTQ	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.010**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)
Female	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000 <sup>+</sup>	0.000*	-0.027 <sup>+</sup>
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.015)
Black	-0.005*	-0.006*	-0.006*	-0.006*	-0.006 <sup>+</sup>	-0.023
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.135)
Hispanic	-0.003	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	0.022
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.132)
Race (Other)	-0.005*	-0.005 <sup>+</sup>	-0.006*	-0.008**	-0.008*	-0.107
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.145)
White	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>	-0.005 <sup>+</sup>	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>	-0.005	-0.005	0.072
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.130)
Democrat	-0.001**	0.000	0.000	0.000*	0.001*	0.044***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.013)
Seniority	0.000*	0.000 <sup>+</sup>	0.000 <sup>+</sup>	0.000*	0.000*	0.036***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.005)
Committee Chair	0.006***	0.008***	0.008***	0.009***	0.009***	0.488***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.022)
In Majority Party	0.002***	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***	0.381***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.023)
In Governor's Party	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.048***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.010)
In Majority Leadership	0.003***	0.004***	0.005***	0.006***	0.006***	0.118***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.031)
In Minority Leadership	0.002***	0.001 <sup>+</sup>	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.112*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.045)
Distance from Median	-0.000	-0.001***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.003***	-0.074***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.021)
Leader, Speaker, or President	0.002	0.003 <sup>+</sup>	0.004*	0.004*	0.005*	0.178
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.118)
Term Limits	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.105***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.014)
Professionalism	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.202***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.054)
Vote Share	0.002***	0.001***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	-0.017
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.033)
Senate	0.015***	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***	-0.168***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.016)
Intercept	0.008***	0.007**	0.006*	0.006*	0.006 <sup>+</sup>	0.482***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.144)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Term Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	73483	73483	73483	73483	73483	73483

Standard errors in parentheses

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## 7.3 Table 7.3: Transformation of the Dependent Variable: Out Legislators

### Are More Effective Lawmakers

	BILL	AIC	ABC	PASS	LAW	SLES
Out During Election	-0.005 <sup>+</sup> (0.003)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.304 <sup>+</sup> (0.146)
% Out	0.001 <sup>+</sup> (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.021)
Female	0.000 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.125 (0.113)
Black	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.009 <sup>+</sup> (0.005)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.012 <sup>+</sup> (0.005)	-0.016 <sup>**</sup> (0.006)	-0.443 (0.311)
Hispanic	0.001 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.010 <sup>+</sup> (0.005)	-0.011 <sup>+</sup> (0.006)	0.005 (0.251)
White	0.000 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.009 <sup>+</sup> (0.004)	-0.010 <sup>+</sup> (0.005)	0.008 (0.212)
Democrat	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.430 (0.326)
Seniority	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.095 <sup>+</sup> (0.041)
Committee Chair	0.004 <sup>+</sup> (0.002)	0.007 <sup>**</sup> (0.002)	0.007 <sup>***</sup> (0.002)	0.006 <sup>**</sup> (0.002)	0.006 <sup>**</sup> (0.002)	0.347 <sup>+</sup> (0.149)
In Majority Party	0.005 <sup>**</sup> (0.002)	0.008 <sup>***</sup> (0.002)	0.009 <sup>***</sup> (0.002)	0.010 <sup>***</sup> (0.002)	0.010 <sup>***</sup> (0.002)	0.557 <sup>**</sup> (0.168)
In Governor's Party	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.038 (0.114)
In Majority Leadership	0.004 (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	0.009 (0.006)	0.008 (0.006)	-0.214 (0.242)
In Minority Leadership	-0.002 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.002 (0.260)
Distance from Median	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.038 (0.101)
Leader, Speaker, or President	-0.009 <sup>+</sup> (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.097 (0.318)
Term Limits	0.005 <sup>**</sup> (0.002)	0.005 <sup>**</sup> (0.002)	0.005 <sup>**</sup> (0.002)	0.006 <sup>**</sup> (0.002)	0.006 <sup>**</sup> (0.002)	0.234 <sup>+</sup> (0.134)
Professionalism	-0.010 <sup>+</sup> (0.005)	-0.015 <sup>**</sup> (0.005)	-0.014 <sup>**</sup> (0.005)	-0.010 <sup>+</sup> (0.005)	-0.010 <sup>+</sup> (0.005)	-0.879 <sup>**</sup> (0.330)
Vote Share	0.004 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.387 (0.248)
Senate	0.014 <sup>***</sup> (0.002)	0.013 <sup>***</sup> (0.002)	0.011 <sup>***</sup> (0.002)	0.011 <sup>***</sup> (0.002)	0.011 <sup>***</sup> (0.002)	-0.231 <sup>+</sup> (0.102)
Intercept	0.002 (0.005)	0.011 <sup>**</sup> (0.004)	0.009 <sup>+</sup> (0.004)	0.016 <sup>**</sup> (0.005)	0.020 <sup>***</sup> (0.005)	3.846 <sup>***</sup> (0.354)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Term Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	865	865	865	865	865	865

Standard errors in parentheses

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$