# Clemens Possnig

#### PhD Candidate · Vancouver School of Economics

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#### Education \_\_\_

#### **University of British Columbia** Vancouver, Canada PhD Economics

2016 - 2023

- Fields: Microeconomic Theory, Algorithmic Learning, Econometrics
- Committee: Li Hao (co-supervisor), Vitor Farinha Luz (co-supervisor), Michael Peters

#### **Institute for Advanced Studies**

Vienna, Austria

MSc Economics

2014 - 2016

#### **Karl Franzens University**

Graz. Austria

**BA ECONOMICS** 

2010-2014

Papers \_\_

#### **WORKING PAPERS**

### **Reinforcement Learning and Collusion, Job Market Paper**

This paper presents an analytical characterization of the long run policies learned by algorithms that interact repeatedly. These algorithms update policies which are maps from observed states to actions. I show that the long run policies correspond to equilibria that are stable points of a tractable differential equation. As a running example, I consider a repeated Cournot game of quantity competition, for which learning the stage game Nash equilibrium serves as non-collusive benchmark. I give necessary and sufficient conditions for this Nash equilibrium not to be learned. These conditions are requirements on the state variables algorithms use to determine their actions, and on the stage game. When algorithms determine actions based only on the past period's price, the Nash equilibrium can be learned. However, conditioning actions on a richer type of information can preclude the Nash equilibrium from being reached. This type of information allows for the existence of a collusive equilibrium that will be learned with positive probability.

#### **Consistency of Multi-Agent Batch Reinforcement Learning**

This paper provides asymptotic results for a class of actor-critic batch - reinforcement learning algorithms in the multiagent setting. At each period, each agent faces an estimation problem (the critic, e.g. a value function Q(s,a)), and a policy updating problem. The estimation step is done by parametric function estimation based on a batch of past observations. I give sufficient conditions on the environment, growth rate of the batch-size and speed of their stepsizes, so that each agent's parametric function estimator is consistent in the following sense: For large t, the optimal parameter  $\theta_t$  is close to a true optimal parameter  $\theta_t^*$ , depending on t only through the current period's policy profile. This result greatly simplifies the asymptotic analysis of multi-agent learning, e.g. in the application of long-run characterisations using stochastic approximation techniques.

#### Estimating Diffusion over multiple large Networks in a dynamic linear panel Model (with Andreea Rotarescu and Kevin Song) (submitted)

Spillover of economic outcomes often arises over multiple networks, and distinguishing their separate roles is important in empirical research. For example, the direction of spillover between two groups (such as banks and industrial sectors linked in a bipartite graph) has important economic implications, and a researcher may want to learn which direction appears prominent in data. For this, we need to have an empirical methodology that allows for both directions of spillover simultaneously. In this paper, we develop a dynamic linear panel model and asymptotic inference with large n and small T, where both directions of spillover are accommodated through multiple networks. Using the methodology developed here, we perform an empirical study of spillovers between bank weakness and zombie-firm congestion in industrial sectors, using firm-bank matched data from Spain between 2005 and 2012. Overall, we find that there is positive spillover in both directions between banks and sectors.

Awards, Fellowships, & Grants \_\_\_

2020-2022	President's Academic Excellence Award, University of British Columbia	CAD 1,500 p.a.	
2016-2021	Four Year Fellowship, University of British Columbia	CAD 20,000-26,000 p.a.	
2019,2020	Graduate Fellowship in Gambling Research 6798, University of British Columbia	CAD 32,000	
2020	SSHRC Explore - Faculty of Arts Adaptation Research Assistant Grant, University of British Columbia	p.a. CAD 4,000	
2019	Faculty of Arts Graduate Award, University of British Columbia	CAD 3,800	
2018	Best 2nd Year Paper Award, University of British Columbia	CAD 1,000	
2017	<b>Best Student in 1st Year Micro, Macro and Econometrics Class</b> , University of British Columbia	CAD 600	
2014-2016 2015	Full Scholarship, IHS Vienna Excellence Award, IHS Vienna	EUR 20,000	
Conferen	ces (including forthcoming)		
2023	SAET Conference Paris, INFORMS Annual Meeting (Session Organizer), Workshop on Game Theory and Machine Learning (LSE), SEA Annual Conference		
2022	MATE seminar at Royal Holloway University of London, ACM Economics and Computat Game Theory and Applications, CORS/INFORMS, Canadian Economic Theory	ion,	
2021	Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory		
Teaching	Experience		
2023 2023 2020 2018,2019 2017,2018 2015	Econ 392, Strategic Situations and Welfare Economics Econ 101, Intro to Microeconomics Comprehensive Exam in Microeconomics, Official Tutor PhD Math Camp, Instructor (Math review course for 1st year PhD students) Microeconomics, Teaching Assistant (MA level) Time Series Econometrics, Teaching Assistant (MSc level)	U of Waterloo U of Waterloo UBC UBC UBC IHS Vienna	
Referee_			
American Ecor	nomic Review		
Consultir	ng Experience		
Jan-Dec 2019	Research Assistant to Prof. Hendrik Wolff (LSE) under the New Mobility Research Grant. A project funded by Vancouver's public transport agency ("TransLink"). Produced a whitepaper to guide the incorporation of new mobility services in Vancouver's urban transportation sector. Particular focus on the effects of various data sharing policies on competition.		
Language	es		

## SOFTWARE MATLAB, PYTHON, JULIA, SQL

## LANGUAGE

English (Fluent), German (Native), French (CEPR: C1), Spanish (CEPR: B2), Mandarin (CEPR: A2)