# Clemens Possnig

#### PHD CANDIDATE · VANCOUVER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

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#### Education \_\_\_

#### **University of British Columbia**

Vancouver, Canada 2016 - 2023 (expected)

**PHD ECONOMICS** 

- Fields: Microeconomic Theory, Algorithmic Learning, Econometrics
- Committee: Li Hao (co-supervisor), Vitor Farinha Luz (co-supervisor), Michael Peters

#### **Institute for Advanced Studies**

Vienna, Austria

MSc Economics

2014 - 2016

#### **Karl Franzens University**

BA Economics

Graz, Austria 2010-2014

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#### References

#### Li Hao

#### **Co-supervisor**

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### Michael Peters

#### **Committee Member**

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#### **Vitor Farinha Luz**

#### **Co-supervisor**

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## **Kevin Song**

#### Co-author

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#### Papers \_

#### WORKING PAPERS

#### **Reinforcement Learning and Collusion, Job Market Paper**

This paper presents an analytical characterization of the long run policies learned by algorithms that interact repeatedly. These algorithms update policies which are maps from observed states to actions. I show that the long run policies correspond to equilibria that are stable points of a tractable differential equation. As a running example, I consider a repeated Cournot game of quantity competition, for which learning the stage game Nash equilibrium serves as non-collusive benchmark. I give necessary and sufficient conditions for this Nash equilibrium not to be learned. These conditions are requirements on the state variables algorithms use to determine their actions, and on the stage game. When algorithms determine actions based only on the past period's price, the Nash equilibrium can be learned. However, conditioning actions on a richer type of information can preclude the Nash equilibrium from being reached. This type of information allows for the existence of a collusive equilibrium that will be learned with positive probability.

#### **Consistency of Multi-Agent Batch Reinforcement Learning**

This paper provides asymptotic results for a class of actor-critic batch - reinforcement learning algorithms in the multiagent setting. At each period, each agent faces an estimation problem (the critic, e.g. a value function Q(s,a)), and a policy updating problem. The estimation step is done by parametric function estimation based on a batch of past observations. I give sufficient conditions on the environment, growth rate of the batch-size and speed of their step-sizes, so that each agent's parametric function estimator is consistent in the following sense: For large t, the optimal parameter  $\theta_t$  is close to a true optimal parameter  $\theta_t^*$ , depending on t only through the current period's policy profile. This result greatly simplifies the asymptotic analysis of multi-agent learning, e.g. in the application of long-run characterisations using stochastic approximation techniques.

## **Estimating Diffusion over multiple large Networks in a dynamic linear panel Model** (with Andreea Rotarescu and Kevin Song) (submitted)

Spillover of economic outcomes often arises over multiple networks, and distinguishing their separate roles is important in empirical research. For example, the direction of spillover between two groups (such as banks and industrial sectors linked in a bipartite graph) has important economic implications, and a researcher may want to learn which direction appears prominent in data. For this, we need to have an empirical methodology that allows for both directions of spillover simultaneously. In this paper, we develop a dynamic linear panel model and asymptotic inference with large n and small T, where both directions of spillover are accommodated through multiple networks. Using the methodology developed here, we perform an empirical study of spillovers between bank weakness and zombie-firm congestion in industrial sectors, using firm-bank matched data from Spain between 2005 and 2012. Overall, we find that there is positive spillover in both directions between banks and sectors.

Awards, F	Fellowships, & Grants			
2020-2022	President's Academic Excellence Award, University of British Columbia	CAD 1,500 p.a.		
2016-2021	Four Year Fellowship, University of British Columbia	CAD 20,000-26,000 p.a.		
2019,2020	Graduate Fellowship in Gambling Research 6798, University of British Columbia	CAD 32,000		
2020	<b>SSHRC Explore - Faculty of Arts Adaptation Research Assistant Grant</b> , University of British Columbia	p.a. CAD 4,000		
2019	Faculty of Arts Graduate Award, University of British Columbia	CAD 3,800		
2018	Best 2nd Year Paper Award, University of British Columbia	CAD 1,000		
2017	<b>Best Student in 1st Year Micro, Macro and Econometrics Class</b> , University of British Columbia	CAD 600		
2014-2016 2015	Full Scholarship, IHS Vienna Excellence Award, IHS Vienna	EUR 20,000		
Presentations (including forthcoming)				
2022	MATE seminar at Royal Holloway University of London, ACM Economics and Computat Game Theory and Applications, CORS/INFORMS, Canadian Economic Theory	ion,		
2021	Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory			
Teaching	Experience			

2020	Comprehensive Exam in Microeconomics, Official Tutor	UBC
2018,2019	PhD Math Camp, Instructor (Math review course for 1st year PhD students)	UBC
2017,2018	Microeconomics, Teaching Assistant (MA level)	UBC
2015	Time Series Econometrics, Teaching Assistant (MSc level)	IHS Vienna

## Public Policy Consulting \_\_\_\_\_

Jan-Dec 2019 Research Assistant to Prof. Hendrik Wolff (LSE) under the New Mobility Research Grant. A project funded by Vancouver's public transport agency ("TransLink"). Produced a whitepaper to guide the incorporation of new mobility services in Vancouver's urban transportation sector. Particular focus on the effects of various data sharing policies on competition.

### Languages\_

SOFTWARE

MATLAB, PYTHON, JULIA, SQL

#### LANGUAGE

English (Fluent), German (Native), French (CEPR: C1), Spanish (CEPR: B2), Mandarin (CEPR: A2)