

Q1. The design of internet advertisement systems is:

Pick the correct option.

- a. An auction design problem
- b. An information retrieval (IR) problem
- c. Both A and B**
- d. None of the Above

Q2. There are N buyers competing for a single ad slot in a click-through auction. Consider the problem of maximising welfare. Each buyer i is defined by their bid  $v_i$  that represents the value for a click, which is reported by the buyer and a click-through rate (CTR)  $r_i$  that specifies the probability of a click. The ideal solution for the auctioneer is to choose the ad: Pick the correct option.

- a. Maximizing  $r_i + v_i$
- b. Maximizing  $r_i * v_i$**
- c. Minimizing  $r_i + v_i$
- d. Minimizing  $r_i * v_i$

Q3. A probing mechanism is truthful when :

Pick the correct option.

- a. It does not remain truthful when composed with any downstream auction mechanism that is not truthful by itself.
- b. It does not remain truthful when composed with any downstream auction mechanism that is truthful by itself.
- c. It remains truthful when composed with any downstream auction mechanism that is not truthful by itself.
- d. It remains truthful when composed with any downstream auction mechanism that is truthful by itself.**

Q4. Eligibility mechanisms must satisfy the property that:

Pick the correct option.

- a. For any agent, whenever this agent is chosen by the mechanism, the action of this agent cannot affect which other agents are also chosen.**
- b. For any agent, whenever this agent is chosen by the mechanism, the action of this agent can affect which other agents are also chosen.
- c. None of the above

Q5. In the paper, the combined problem of designing a first-stage probing mechanism and a second-stage auction mechanism in order to maximize the social welfare resulted from the overall allocation is defined considering:

Pick the correct option.

- a. Adaptive probing
- b. Nonadaptive probing**
- c. Both A and B
- d. None of the above

Q6. In the paper, the approximation factor of the Constant-Factor Eligibility Mechanism when  $m=1$  is ( $m$  corresponds to the number of ad slots to be allocated):

Pick the correct option.

- a.  $2e/(e+1)$
- b.  $2e/(e+2)$
- c.  $2e/(e-2)$
- d.  $2e/(e-1)$**

Q7. Summarize the contribution of the paper in max 200 words.

Q8. Summarize the limitations of the paper in max 300 words.