



Trinity College Dublin

Coláiste na Tríonóide, Baile Átha Cliath

The University of Dublin

Hardware-In-The-Loop Emulator For In-Vehicle Controller Area Networks

Changhong Li

Supervisor: Shreejith Shanker

Date 23/05/2024

Background & Project goals

Problem Recap

■ Background



Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway

Increased
complexity



Increased
risk

■ Project goals


In this project, we will build a **hardware in the loop runtime for vehicular ECUs** using a RISC-V / Microblaze softcore processor as the compute core for each ECU. We will integrate the **ability to inject errors (like DoS, replay and spoofing) into the emulation framework** with multiple ECUs spread across one or more FPGA development boards.

A hardware-in-the-loop emulator
for vehicle bus attack simulation & prevention

Hacker exposed the security vulnerabilities in automobiles by hacking into cars remotely, controlling the cars' various controls from the radio volume to the brakes on Wednesday, July 1, 2015 in Ladue

Previous work & Novelty

Previous work - HWIL



Hardware-in-the-loop simulation was first used in the 1960s in the **aerospace field**, it was used to test flight control systems, and now it is also widely used in the automotive field.[1]



The applications in the **automotive field**, HIL provides a virtual vehicle for system-level verification.

Virtual ECU technology is in the ascendant


[1] S Raman, N Sivashankar, W Milam, W Stuart, and S Nabi. Design and implementation of hil simulators for powertrain control system software development. In Proceedings of the 1999 American Control Conference (Cat. No. 99CH36251), volume 1, pages 709–713. IEEE, 1999

Previous work & Novelty

Previous work – attack detection



Traditional Detection & Encryption



IDS & DNN detection

Neural networks have greatly improved attack detection performance,


But how to deal with **flexible system changes and long development cycle**

Agile attack simulation & model building toolchain
to be developed

| Method | Precision (%) | | Recall (%) | | F1-Score (%) | |
|----------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | Known | New | Known | New | Known | New |
| OCSVM | 35.43 | 10.83 | 71.15 | 35.12 | 47.30 | 16.55 |
| IF | 43.58 | 15.62 | 73.42 | 31.56 | 54.69 | 20.90 |
| OTIDS | 99.82 | 70.81 | 71.68 | 42.01 | 83.44 | 52.73 |
| RNN+Heuristics | 98.69 | 70.25 | 99.49 | 50.53 | 99.09 | 58.78 |
| CANTransfer | 94.93 | 87.97 | 95.57 | 88.97 | 95.25 | 88.47 |
| Gain | -4.89 | 17.16 | -3.92 | 38.44 | -3.84 | 26.69 |

Progress Review


Project Structure



Progress Review

Milestone Review

Gantt Chart




Main goals

- Build virtual ECU cores
- Build virtual CAN bus network
- Build ECU control logic
- Build ECU attack functions
- Build attack detection model
- Integrate the model onto hardware
- Benchmarking


Progress Review

HWIL Emulator - structure




HWIL Emulator structure

- **Flexible nodes(type, scale)**
- **Physical device access**
- **Automatic testing**
- **Complete tool chain**



Progress Review

Virtual ECUs




Simulating CAN bus topology



Hardware Implementation Platform

Soft MCU Core: AMD Microblaze




Effective Resource Utilization - Scalable


Progress Review

Virtual CAN BUS network

Avoid using paid IP, adopt the original CAN controller code of Bosch from Open-core, repackage the AXI bus interface and develop matching transceiver IP for applications without external hardware.



AXI CAN controller IP core



CAN transceiver IP core

Progress Review

Virtual CAN BUS network


Establish a standard CAN bus driver and perform timing simulation test on the IP core

```

245 void can_init(uint32_t can_addr);
246 void can_set_pin(uint32_t can_addr, uint8_t pin, uint8_t value);
247 void can_set_data(uint32_t can_addr, uint8_t value);
248 uint8_t can_read_data(uint32_t can_addr);
249 void write_register(uint32_t can_addr, uint8_t reg_addr, uint8_t reg_data);
250 uint8_t read_register(uint32_t can_addr, uint8_t reg_addr);
251 void can_txd(uint32_t can_addr);
252 void can_rxd(uint32_t can_addr);
253 void can_txd_frame(struct can_data_frame *frame);
254 struct can_data_frame initialize_can_data_frame(addr1, addr2, addr3, can_addr);
255 void can_rxd_frame(struct can_data_frame *frame);

```

Standard driver




IP core timing simulation

Progress Review

Virtual ECU control logic

Virtual communication protocol



| # | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K |
|----|----|---|----|-----------|-----------|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | | | | CAN mode | Data Type | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | =1 extend | =0 data | | | | | | |
| 3 | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | | | |
| 4 | 2 | | 2 | | | | | | | | |
| 5 | 3 | 1 | 3 | | | | | | | | |
| 6 | 4 | | 4 | | | | | | | | |
| 7 | 5 | 2 | 5 | | | | | | | | |
| 8 | 6 | | 6 | | | | | | | | |
| 9 | 7 | | 7 | | | | | | | | |
| 10 | 8 | 4 | 8 | | | | | | | | |
| 11 | 9 | | 9 | | | | | | | | |
| 12 | 10 | | 10 | | | | | | | | |
| 13 | 11 | | 11 | | | | | | | | |
| 14 | 12 | 6 | 12 | | | | | | | | |

Build up 4 ECUs with different logic for the test.
All ECUs: Generate Life signal to indicate that they are alive.
periodically send status messages to report their status.

ECU1: Control Engines, transmission unit and brake unit.

ECU2: Control Airbags and Steering Lights.

ECU3: Physical IO inputs, receive the signal from the sensors like Collision detector, brake detector, Lights control switches


ECU4: Control Front light and back light of the car.

All the ECUs communicate with CAN bus.

Building a virtual communication protocol And build ECU collaborative applications

Progress Review

ECU Attack Test Platform



Status Monitor



ECU Program



Auto Injection



Labeled Data
Export

| No. | Type | Msg |
|-----|----------|----------------------------|
| 1 | Dos | 88000000f80000000000000000 |
| 2 | Spoofing | 88040404f81580880408800030 |
| 3 | Replay | 88040404f81580880408800000 |
| 4 | Dos | 88000000f80000000000000000 |
| 5 | Dos | 88000000f80000000000000000 |
| 6 | Dos | 88000000f80000000000000000 |
| 7 | Spoofing | 88040404f81580880408800030 |


Attack
Sequence

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|------|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|--------|
| 237 | 0505 | 8 | 21 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | Normal |
| 240 | 0606 | 8 | 85 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | Normal |
| 241 | 0404 | 8 | af | 80 | 80 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | Dos |
| 242 | 0505 | 8 | 96 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | Dos |
| 243 | 0606 | 8 | c9 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | Dos |
| 244 | 0404 | 8 | f9 | 80 | 80 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | Dos |
| 245 | 0505 | 8 | 0b | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | Dos |

Labeled data
for training

Progress Review

Model and performance




**Integrate Mature
Flexible & Deployable & High-performance
CAN bus Attack detection model [1]**


| Attack | Model | Precision | Recall | F1 | FNR |
|-----------|------------------|-----------|--------|-------|------|
| DoS | GIDS [30] | - | 99.9 | - | - |
| | DCNN [13] | 100 | 99.89 | 99.95 | 0.13 |
| | MLIDS [36] | 99.9 | 100 | 99.9 | - |
| | G-IDS [28] | 99.81 | 98.86 | 99.33 | - |
| | TAN-IDS [29] | 100 | 100 | 100 | - |
| | HyDL-IDS [33] | 100 | 100 | 100 | 0 |
| | NovelADS [32] | 99.97 | 99.91 | 99.94 | - |
| | TCAN-IDS [31] | 100 | 99.97 | 99.98 | - |
| | iForest [35] | - | - | - | - |
| | GRU [34] | 99.93 | 99.91 | 99.92 | - |
| | CQMLP-IDS | 99.92 | 99.88 | 99.90 | 0.11 |
| Fuzzing | GIDS [30] | - | 98.7 | - | - |
| | DCNN [13] | 99.95 | 99.65 | 99.80 | 0.5 |
| | MLIDS [36] | 99.9 | 99.9 | 99.9 | - |
| | G-IDS [28] | 99.71 | 99 | 99.35 | - |
| | TAN-IDS [29] | 99.99 | 99.99 | 99.99 | - |
| | HyDL-IDS [33] | 99.98 | 99.88 | 99.93 | - |
| | NovelADS [32] | 99.99 | 100 | 100 | - |
| | TCAN-IDS [31] | 99.96 | 99.89 | 99.22 | - |
| | iForest [35] | 95.07 | 99.93 | 97.44 | - |
| | GRU [34] | 99.32 | 99.13 | 99.22 | - |
| | CQMLP-IDS | 99.93 | 99.69 | 99.81 | 0.27 |
| RPM-Spoof | GIDS [30] | - | 99.6 | - | - |
| | DCNN [13] | 99.99 | 99.94 | 99.96 | 0.05 |
| | MLIDS [36] | 100 | 100 | 100 | - |
| | G-IDS [28] | 99.85 | 98.69 | 99.27 | - |
| | TAN-IDS [29] | 99.99 | 99.93 | 99.96 | - |
| | HyDL-IDS [33] | 100 | 100 | 100 | 0 |
| | NovelADS [32] | 99.9 | 99.9 | 99.9 | - |
| | TCAN-IDS [31] | 99.9 | 99.9 | 99.9 | - |
| | iForest [35] | 98.9 | 100 | 99.4 | - |
| | CQMLP-IDS | 99.96 | 100 | 99.98 | 0 |

[1] Shashwat Khandelwal and Shanker Shreejith. Exploring highly quantised neural networks for intrusion detection in automotive can. In 2023 33rd International Conference on Field-Programmable Logic and Applications (FPL), pages 235–241. IEEE, 2023


Model integration and testing



FINN Flow for traditional FPGA Not only for ZYNQ series
Also for traditional light-weight platforms



MLP Model IP core ILA data capture



Microblaze calls FINN IP via AXI-Stream

[illegible]

Comparison of consistency of model software running results

Progress Review

JLR Testing Tech Week - Share Fair



Participate in Jaguar Land Rover testing technology sharing fair and demonstrated the project

Progress Review





Milestone modification

- **Original plan:** Using **Risc-V rocket** soft core simulation ECU
- **Plan after the change:** Using **Microblaze** as ECU soft core
- **Reason for change:** Microblaze is more suitable for Xilinx ecosystem, which is **convenient for debugging and driver coding**. **Microblaze** is gradually beginning to **support Risc-V** instruction set.
- **Original plan:** Adopt the standard FINN integrated flow integrated attack detection core
- **Plan after the change:** Slightly behind schedule with custom build flows that can target both lightweight and traditional FPGAs
- **Reason for change:** Makes the project more versatile, but the custom workflow is slightly more complicated than the standard integration process

Functions such as automated attack injection, data export, and attack detection IP core hardware deployment were not originally planned, but were added for engineering integrity and usability.

Plan for the rest of the project

Next step



**Testing and comparison of other methods
(like using STFT with DNN for attack detection)**

- Model accuracy performance optimization evaluation
- Resource Utilization optimizing
- Model ablation experiment, quantization accuracy change experiment
- Acceleration test

Model benchmarking and optimizing

Of course, there is also thesis writing, refer to the previous Gantt chart plan



Trinity College Dublin

Coláiste na Tríonóide, Baile Átha Cliath

The University of Dublin

Thank You

Changhong Li

Supervisor: Shreejith Shanker

Date 23/05/2024