Trinity College Dublin
Coláiste na Tríonóide, Baile Átha Cliath
The University of Dublin

Hardware-In-The-Loop Emulator For In-Vehicle Controller Area Networks

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Background & Project goals

Problem Recap

Background

Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway (2015 USA)

Increased Network Complexity → **Increased Cyber Security Risk**

Project goals

In this project, we will build **a hardware in the loop runtime for vehicular ECUs** using a RISC-V / Microblaze softcore processor as the compute core for each ECU. We will integrate the **ability to inject errors (like DoS, replay and spoofing) into the emulation framework** with multiple ECUs spread across one or more FPGA development boards.

A hardware-in-the-loop emulator for vehicle bus attack simulation & prevention

Hacker exposed the security vulnerabilities in automobiles by hacking into cars remotely, controlling the cars' various controls from the radio volume to the brakes on Wednesday, July 1**, 2015 in Ladue**

Previous work & Novelty

Previous work - HWIL



Hardware-in-the-loop simulation was first used in the **1960s** in the **aerospace field**, it was used to test flight control systems, and now it is also widely used in the automotive field.[1]

The applications in the **automotive field**, HIL provides a virtual vehicle for **system-level verification**.

Virtual ECU technology is a hot topic

[1] S Raman, N Sivashankar, W Milam, W Stuart, and S Nabi. Design and implementation of hil simulators for powertrain control system software development. In Proceedings of the 1999 American Control Conference (Cat. No. 99CH36251), volume 1, pages 709–713. IEEE, 1999

Previous work & Novelty

Previous work – attack detection





Traditional Detection & Encryption



IDS & DNN detection

Neural networks have greatly improved attack detection performance,

But how to deal with flexible system (Topo change -> Feature change)

Agile attack simulation & model building toolchain to be developed

Method	Precision (%)		Recall (%)		F1-Score (%)	
	Known	*New*	*Known*	*New*	*Known*	*New*
OCSVM	35.43	10.83	71.15	35.12	47.30	16.55
IF	43.58	15.62	73.42	31.56	54.69	20.90
OTIDS	**99.82**	70.81	71.68	42.01	83.44	52.73
RNN+Heuristics	98.69	70.25	**99.49**	50.53	**99.09**	58.78
CANTransfer	94.93	**87.97**	95.57	**88.97**	95.25	**88.47**
Gain	-4.89	**17.16**	-3.92	**38.44**	-3.84	**26.69**

Progress Review

Project Structure



Flexible
HWIL Emulator



High-Performance
QNN Accelerators



Deployable
Stitched IP for Edge

Flexibly Changeable
System Structure

Complete CAN bus Test & Detection Solution

Empower

Automotive Safety

Progress Review

Milestone Review

Gantt Chart

No	Month Task	Task	Description
1	build workflow, get familiar to the Env	Linux Dev Env and board	get Nexys-Vedio board and build development enviroment of the project on linux
		Risc-V Vivado Project	build risc-v vivado project and finish basic simulation
2	build Risc-V core and testify the communication between cores	Risc-V core	build risc-v core and dowload it to the FPGA board
		CAN controller core	build the CAN controller core form opencore
		bare-metal program and test	build the bare-metal program of risc-v, basic BSP program to drive gpio like switches and leds and
		CAN transceiver core	to make it possible to communicate on the board without a physical CAN transceiver, we need to
		testify comm	verify the communication between two cores with CAN bus IP and its driver code
3	build 4-core risc-v and mircoblaze project and Wrap the can cantroller to a AXI mode to speed it up	build 4-core prj	build 4-core risc-v block design and adjust the structure of the project
		wrap CAN controller	wrap the CAN controller to AXI mode in order to speed up the control process
		Interim Report(Jan 26)	Finish the Interim report and determine the structure of the project
4	build Comm to PC and get fimiliar to the DNN ip core	build Ethernet node and interface	build the Ethernet node on the board to send command and monitor the risc-v cores
		build basic python script	build the python script on PC to operate the risc-v core, make it possible to download software and
		build DNN core	get familiar and build the DNN core on the FPGA
5	error Injection and DNN detection data preparation	inject errors to the CAN bus	inject errors like Dos, Replay, Spoofing to the CAN net with the software on PC
		data gathering	gather the data of CAN bus for training the DNN model and for pre-processing
		DNN core utilization	utilize the DNN core to detect the attack on the CAN bus, build the basic framework
6	build benchmark of the DNN model	build benchmark of the DNN model	build benchmark of the DNN model
		Milestone Progress Report(April 24)	Milestone Progress Report
7	deploy the core on the FPGA progress Presentation	Progress Presentation(May 17)	Progress Presentation
8	Written Dissertation	Dissertation(1st version)	Written Dissertation(1st version)
9	Written Dissertation	Dissertation(final version)(July 12)	Written Dissertation(final version)



Main goals

- Virtual ECU cores & Control logic
- Virtual CAN bus network
- Attack Injections
- Attack detection model
- Hardware Accelerators
- Benchmarking

Progress Review

HWIL Emulator - Structure





- **Flexible nodes(type, scale)**
- **Physical device access**
- **Automatic testing**
- **Complete tool chain**

HWIL Emulator Structure

Network Change	Test&Data	Model Deployment
Software Define	**Auto Annotation**	**FINN Tool chain**

Accelerate Deployment

Progress Review

Virtual ECUs



Simulating CAN bus topology

Hardware Implementation Platform

Soft MCU Core: AMD Microblaze



Effective Resource Utilization - Scalable

Progress Review

Virtual CAN BUS network



AXI CAN controller IP core



CAN transceiver IP core

```
245 void can_init(uint32_t can_addr);
246 void can_set_pin(uint32_t can_addr, uint8_t pin, uint8_t value);
247 void can_set_data(uint32_t can_addr, uint8_t value);
248 uint8_t can_read_data(uint32_t can_addr);
249 void write_register(uint32_t can_addr, uint8_t reg_addr, uint8_t reg_data);
250 uint8_t read_register(uint32_t can_addr, uint8_t reg_addr);
251 void can_txd(uint32_t can_addr);
252 void can_rxd(uint32_t can_addr);
253 void can_txd_frame(struct can_data_frame *frame);
254 struct can_data_frame initialize_can_data_frame(addr1,addr2,addr3,can_addr);
255 void can_rxd_frame(struct can_data_frame *frame);
```

Standard driver



IP core timing simulation

Progress Review

Virtual ECU control logic

Virtual communication protocol



			7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	
0	0	0	CAN mode =1 extend	Data Type =0 data			Data Length = 8				
1		1	CAN ADDR1(ECU3 = 06H)								
2	1	2	CAN ADDR2(ECU3 = 06H)								
3		3	CAN ADDR3(ECU3 = 06H)								
4	2	4	FIXED VALUE(F8H)								
5		5	Life Signal								
6	3	6	Collision Detector Status								
7		7	Brake Detector Status								
8	4	8	Steering Light Button Detector	Front Light Button Detector Status	Back Light Button Detector Status						
9		9	Control Flag								
10	5	10									
11		11									
12	6	12									

Build up 4 ECUs with different logic for the test.
All ECUs: Generate Life signal to indicate that they are alive. periodically send status messages to report their status.

ECU1: Control Engines, transmission unit and brake unit.
ECU2: Control Airbags and Steering Lights.
ECU3: Physical IO inputs, receive the signal from the sensors like Collision detector, brake detector, Lights control switches
ECU4: Control Front light and back light of the car.

All the ECUs communicate with CAN bus.

Building a virtual communication protocol And build ECU collaborative applications

Progress Review

ECU Attack Test Platform






```
1  No,Type,Msg
2  1,Dos,88000000f8000000000000000
3  2,Spoofing,88040404f81580880400800030
4  3,Replay,88040404f81580800000000000
5  4,Dos,88000000f8000000000000000
6  5,Dos,88000000f8000000000000000
7  6,Dos,88000000f8000000000000000
8  7,Spoofing,88040404f81580880400800030
```

Attack Sequence

```
239  237,0505,8,21,00,00,00,00,00,00,Normal
240  238,0606,8,85,00,00,00,00,00,00,Normal
241  239,0404,8,af,80,80,00,00,00,00,Dos
242  240,0505,8,96,00,00,00,00,00,00,Dos
243  241,0606,8,c9,00,00,00,00,00,00,Dos
244  242,0404,8,f9,80,80,00,00,00,00,Dos
245  243,0505,8,0b,00,00,00,00,00,00,Dos
```

Labeled data for training

Progress Review

Model and performance

Successive CAN Message (ID + Payload)



Mature
Flexible & Deployable & High-performance
CAN bus Attack detection model [1]

Attack	Model	Precision	Recall	F1	FNR
DoS	GIDS [30]	-	99.9	-	-
	DCNN [13]	100	99.89	99.95	0.13
	MLIDS [36]	99.9	100	99.9	-
	G-IDCS [28]	99.81	98.86	99.33	-
	TAN-IDS [29]	100	100	100	-
	HyDL-IDS [33]	100	100	100	0
	NovelADS [32]	99.97	99.91	99.94	-
	TCAN-IDS [31]	100	99.97	99.98	-
	iForest [35]	-	-	-	-
	GRU [34]	99.93	99.91	99.92	-
	CQMLP-IDS	99.92	99.88	99.90	0.11
Fuzzing	GIDS [30]	-	98.7	-	-
	DCNN [13]	99.95	99.65	99.80	0.5
	MLIDS [36]	99.9	99.9	99.9	-
	G-IDCS [28]	99.71	99	99.35	-
	TAN-IDS [29]	99.99	99.99	99.99	-
	HyDL-IDS [33]	99.98	99.88	99.93	
	NovelADS [32]	99.99	100	100	-
	TCAN-IDS [31]	99.96	99.89	99.22	-
	iForest [35]	95.07	99.93	97.44	-
	GRU [34]	99.32	99.13	99.22	-
	CQMLP-IDS	99.93	99.69	99.81	0.27
RPM-Spoof	GIDS [30]	-	99.6	-	-
	DCNN [13]	99.99	99.94	99.96	0.05
	MLIDS [36]	100	100	100	-
	G-IDCS [28]	99.85	98.69	99.27	-
	TAN-IDS [29]	99.99	99.93	99.96	-
	HyDL-IDS [33]	100	100	100	0
	NovelADS [32]	99.9	99.9	99.9	-
	TCAN-IDS [31]	99.9	99.9	99.9	-
	iForest [35]	98.9	100	99.4	-
	CQMLP-IDS	99.96	100	99.98	0

[1] Shashwat Khandelwal and Shanker Shreejith. Exploring highly quantised neural networks for intrusion detection in automotive can. In 2023 33rd International Conference on Field-Programmable Logic and Applications (FPL), pages 235–241. IEEE, 2023

Progress Review

Model integration and testing

FINN Flow for light-weight platforms



Microblaze calls FINN IP via AXI-Stream



Model data ILA capture



Compare SW model with HW model

Progress Review

JLR Testing Tech Week - Share Fair

Participate in Jaguar Land Rover testing technology sharing fair and demonstrated the project

Progress Review

Milestone modification

- **Original plan:** Using **Risc-V rocket** soft core simulation ECU
- **Plan after the change:** Using **Microblaze** as ECU soft core
- **Reason for change:** Microblaze is more suitable for Xilinx ecosystem, which is **convenient for debugging and driver** coding. Microblaze is gradually beginning to support **Risc-V** instruction set.

- **Original plan**: Adopt the standard FINN integrated flow integrated attack detection core
- **Plan after the change:** Slightly behind schedule with custom build flows that can target both lightweight and traditional FPGAs
- **Reason for change:** Makes the project more **versatile**, but the custom workflow is slightly more complicated than the standard integration process

Functions such as automated attack injection, data export, and attack detection IP core hardware deployment were not originally planned, but were added for engineering integrity and usability.

Plan for the rest of the project

Next step

- Performance optimization
- Resource utilization optimization
- Ablation experiment
- Quantization effect
- Acceleration test

Model benchmarking and optimizing



Testing and comparison of other methods (like using STFT with DNN for attack detection)

Of course, there is also thesis writing, refer to the previous Gantt chart plan

Trinity College Dublin
Coláiste na Tríonóide, Baile Átha Cliath
The University of Dublin

Thank You

Changhong Li
Supervisor: Shreejith Shanker

Date 23/05/2024