

Hardware-In-The-Loop Emulator For In-Vehicle Controller Area Networks

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Background & Project goals

Problem Recap

Background



Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway

Increased complexity Increased risk

Project goals

In this project, we will build a hardware in the loop runtime for vehicular ECUs using a RISC-V / Microblaze softcore processor as the compute core for each ECU. We will integrate the ability to inject errors (like DoS, replay and spoofing) into the emulation framework with multiple ECUs spread across one or more FPGA development boards.


A hardware-in-the-loop emulator for vehicle bus attack simulation & prevention

Hacker exposed the security vulnerabilities in automobiles by hacking into cars remotely, controlling the cars' various controls from the radio volume to the brakes on Wednesday, July 1, 2015 in Ladue

Previous work & Novelty

Previous work - HWIL





Hardware-in-the-loop simulation was first used in the 1960s in the aerospace field, it was used to test flight control systems, and now it is also widely used in the automotive field.[1]


The applications in the **automotive field**, HIL provides a virtual vehicle for system-level verification.

Virtual ECU technology is in the ascendant

[1] S Raman, N Sivashankar, W Milam, W Stuart, and S Nabi. Design and implementation of hil simulators for powertrain control system software development. In Proceedings of the 1999 American Control Conference (Cat. No. 99CH36251), volume 1, pages 709–713. IEEE, 1999

Previous work & Novelty

Previous work – attack detection



Traditional Detection & Encryption

Neural networks have greatly improved attack detection performance,


But how to deal with flexible system changes and long development cycle

Agile attack simulation & model building toolchain to be developed

IDS & DNN detection

Method	Precisi	on (%)	Recal	1 (%)	F1-Score (%)					
Method	Known	New	Known	New	Known	New				
OCSVM	35.43	10.83	71.15	35.12	47.30	16.55				
IF	43.58	15.62	73.42	31.56	54.69	20.90				
OTIDS	99.82	70.81	71.68	42.01	83.44	52.73				
RNN+Heuristics	98.69	70.25	99.49	50.53	99.09	58.78				
CANTransfer	94.93	87.97	95.57	88.97	95.25	88.47				
Gain	-4.89	17.16	-3.92	38.44	-3.84	26.69				

Project Structure



Milestone Review


Gantt Chart

				1	Nov Dec		Jan				Feb			Mar			Ap	oril		N	lay		J	une	T)	July			
No	Month Task	Task	Description	1 2	3	4	1	2 3	4	1	2 3	3 4	1	2	3 4	1	2	3 4	1	2	3	4	1 2	3	4	1 2	3	4	1 2	2 3
1	build workflow, get familiar		get Nexys-Vedio board and build development enviroment of the project on linux			F	\exists	\pm	Ε			Η	Н			Н			Ε	Е		\exists	\pm	E	\Box		\blacksquare	\pm	\pm	\blacksquare
•	to the Env	Risc-V Vivado Project	build risc-v vivado project and finish basic simulation			*		\pm	\perp				Н			Н			Ł		Н	1	\pm	L			\perp	\pm	\pm	\perp
		Risc-V core	build risc-v core and dowload it to the FPGA board		\pm	\vdash		+	\pm			\pm	Н			Н			t		Н	1	\pm	\pm		\pm	\pm	\pm	\pm	\pm
	build Risc-V core and	CAN controller core	build the CAN controller core form opencore	+	\pm	\vdash					+	+	Н	+		Н			H		Н	+		\vdash	\vdash		+	\pm	\pm	\pm
2	testify the communication		build the bare-metal program of risc-v, basic BSP	\perp	\perp							\perp	П			П			L		\Box	\Box		\perp	\Box	\perp	\Box	\neg	\perp	\Box
~	between cores	and test	program to drive gpio like switches and leds and to make it possible to communicate on the board	\vdash	+	\perp	\vdash	_			-	+	\vdash	\perp	+	\vdash	\dashv	-	╄	\vdash	\vdash	4	_	⊢	\vdash	+	+	+	+	+
		CAN transceiver core	without a physical CAN transceiver, we need to	+	+		Н	+			+	+	Н	+	+	H	\forall	+	╁	\vdash	Н	+	+	+	Н	+	+	+	+	+
		testify comm	verify the communication between two cores with CAN bus IP and its driver code	+	Ŧ	\vdash	Н	\mp	F		*	Ŧ	Н	\exists		Н	\exists	+	F	F	Н	7	+	F	Н	+	\blacksquare	\mp	\mp	\blacksquare
	build 4-core risc-v and	build 4-core prj	build 4-core risc-v block design and adjust the structure of the project	\blacksquare	F	F	Н	\mp	F				Н			Н	\exists	+	F	F	Н	\exists	\mp	F	П	\mp	\blacksquare	\mp	Ŧ	\blacksquare
3	mircoblaze project and Wrap the can cantroller to	wrap CAN controller	wrap the CAN controller to AXI mode in order to speed up the control process		\pm	\vdash		\pm	\pm						\pm	Н			E		Н	\exists	\pm	Н		\pm	\blacksquare	\pm	\pm	\pm
	a AXI mode to speed it up	Interim Report(Jan 26)	Finish the Interim report and determine the structure of the project	+	+	+	Н	+	+	Н		*	Н	+	+	Н	+	+	╁	\vdash	Н	+	+	+	Н	+	+	+	+	+
		build Ethernet node and interface	build the Ethernet node on the board to send command and monitor the risc-v cores	\Box	Ŧ	F	\Box	\mp	\vdash	П		\top			\mp	П	\exists	\mp	F	F	П	7	\mp	F	П	\mp	\Box	7	\mp	\blacksquare
	build Comm to PC and get		build the python script on PC to operate the risc-v	+	+	+	\vdash	+	+	Н	+	+	П			\vdash	\dashv	+	+	+	\vdash	7	+	+	\vdash	+	+	\pm	+	+
4	fimiliar to the DNN ip core		core, make it possible to download software and		#		\Box	#	\perp			$^{\pm}$						#	1		\Box	#		⇇			\perp	#	\pm	=
		build DNN core	get familiar and build the DNN core on the FPGA	+	\pm		\forall	\pm	+	Н	+	\pm	Н	+			1		t		Н	1		+	\forall	\pm	\pm	\pm	\pm	\pm
		inject errors to the	inject errors like Dos, Replay, Spoofting to the CAN	\Box	T		\Box	\perp	\blacksquare		=	=	П	\Box	\perp		Ŕ		Τ			7		\blacksquare		\perp	\Box	\Box	Ŧ	\Box
		CAN bus	net with the software on PC gather the data of CAN bus for training the DNN	-	+	+	\vdash	+	+	Н	-	+	\vdash	\rightarrow	+			_	╀	\vdash	\vdash	4	-	⊢	\vdash	+	+	+	+	+
5	error Injection and DNN detection data preparation	data gathering	model and for pre-processing	+	+		\vdash	\pm	+	Н		+	Н			Н			t		Н	+		+	\vdash	\pm	\forall	\pm	\pm	$\pm \pm$
	A TOTAL CONTROL OF MARKET STATE OF THE CONTROL OF T	DNN core utilization	utilize the DNN core to detect the attack on the CAN bus, build the basic framework	+	+	+	\forall	+	+	Н	+	+	Н	+	+	Н						\pm	+	\vdash	\forall	+	+	\pm	\pm	+
6	build benchmark of the	build benchmark of the DNN model	build benchmark of the DNN model		E	\vdash		\pm	\pm			E	Н		\perp	Н						-		E			\blacksquare	\exists	\pm	\blacksquare
	DNN model	Milestone Progress Report(April 24)	Milestone Progress Report		\pm	\perp	\exists	\pm	\pm			\pm	Н		1	Н			Ł			*		\perp	\sqcup		\perp	\pm	\pm	\perp
7	FPGA progress	Progress Presentation(May 17)	Progress Presentation	H	F	F	\Box	Ŧ	F		T	F	П		T	П		Ŧ	F	F				*		Ŧ	\blacksquare	\pm	\pm	\blacksquare
8	Written Dissertation	Dissertation(1st version)	Written Dissertation(1st version)		F	F	H	\blacksquare	F		\perp	F	Н	\exists	1	Н	\exists		F	F	Н	\exists	-	F				*	\perp	\blacksquare
9	Written Dissertation	Dissertation(final version)(July 12)	Written Dissertation(final version)	H	F	F	Н	Ŧ	F	П	-	F	П	-	Ŧ	П		T	F	F	П	1	Ŧ	Е	П	Ŧ	П	7	*	П


Main goals

- Build virtual ECU cores
- Build virtual CAN bus network
- Build ECU control logic
- Build ECU attack functions
- Build attack detection model
- Integrate the model onto hardware
- Benchmarking

HWIL Emulator - structure



Virtual ECUs




Simulating CAN bus topology



Hardware Implementation Platform




Soft MCU Core: AMD Microblaze



Effective Resource Utilization - Scalable


Virtual CAN BUS network



AXI CAN controller IP core

```
void can_init(uint32_t can_addr);
void can_set_pin(uint32_t can_addr, uint8_t pin, uint8_t value);
void can_set_data(uint32_t can_addr, uint8_t value);
void can_set_data(uint32_t can_addr);
void write_register(uint32_t can_addr, uint8_t reg_addr, uint8_t reg_addr);
void can_txd(uint32_t can_addr, uint8_t reg_addr);
void can_txd(uint32_t can_addr);
void can_txd(uint32_t can_addr);
void can_txd(uint32_t can_addr);
void can_txd_frame(struct can_data_frame(addr1,addr2,addr3,can_addr);
void can_txd_frame(struct can_data_frame(addr1,addr2,addr3,can_addr);
void can_txd_frame(struct can_data_frame(addr1,addr2,addr3,can_addr);
void can_txd_frame(struct can_data_frame(addr1,addr2,addr3,can_addr);
```

Standard driver




CAN transceiver IP core



IP core timing simulation

Virtual ECU control logic

Virtual communication protocol





Build up 4 ECUs with different logic for the test.

All ECUs: Generate Life signal to indicate that they are alive. periodically send status messages to report their status.

ECU1: Control Engines, transmission unit and brake unit.

ECU2: Control Airbags and Steering Lights.

ECU3: Physical IO inputs, receive the signal from the sensors


like Collision detector, brake detector, Lights control switches


ECU4: Control Front light and back light of the car.

All the ECUs communicate with CAN bus.

Building a virtual communication protocol And build ECU collaborative applications

ECU Attack Test Platform






Sequence

for training

Model and performance



Integrate Mature
Flexible & Deployable & High-performance
CAN bus Attack detection model [1]


Attack	Model	Precision	Recall	F1	FNR		
	GIDS [30]	547	99.9		-		
	DCNN [13]	100	99.89	99.95	0.13		
DoS	MLIDS [36]	99.9	100	99.9			
	G-IDCS [28]	99.81	98.86	99.33			
	TAN-IDS [29]	100	100	100	-		
	HyDL-IDS [33]	100	100	100	0		
	NovelADS [32]	99.97	99.91	99.94	-		
	TCAN-IDS [31]	100	99.97	99.98	0.000		
	iForest [35]		500	1001			
	GRU [34]	99.93	99.91	99.92			
	CQMLP-IDS	99.92	99.88	99.90	0.11		
	GIDS [30]		98.7		-		
	DCNN [13]	99.95	99.65	99.80	0.5		
Fuzzing	MLIDS [36]	99.9	99.9	99.9			
	G-IDCS [28]	99.71	99	99.35			
	TAN-IDS [29]	99.99	99.99	99.99			
	HyDL-IDS [33]	99.98	99.88	99.93			
	NovelADS [32]	99.99	100	100			
	TCAN-IDS [31]	99.96	99.89	99.22	-		
	iForest [35]	95.07	99.93	97.44			
	GRU [34]	99.32	99.13	99.22	-		
	CQMLP-IDS	99.93	99.69	99.81	0.27		
	GIDS [30]		99.6		-		
	DCNN [13]	99.99	99.94	99.96	0.05		
RPM-Spoof	MLIDS [36]	100	100	100	-		
	G-IDCS [28]	99.85	98.69	99.27			
	TAN-IDS [29]	99.99	99.93	99.96			
	HyDL-IDS [33]	100	100	100	0		
	NovelADS [32]	99.9	99.9	99.9			
	TCAN-IDS [31]	99.9	99.9	99.9			
	iForest [35]	98.9	100	99.4	-		
	COMLP-IDS	99.96	100	99.98	0		

^[1] Shashwat Khandelwal and Shanker Shreejith. Exploring highly quantised neural networks for intrusion detection in automotive can. In 2023 33rd International Conference on Field-Programmable Logic and Applications (FPL), pages 235–241. IEEE, 2023


Model integration and testing



FINN Flow for traditional FPGA Not only for ZYNQ series Also for traditional light-weight platforms



MLP Model IP core ILA data capture



Microblaze calls FINN IP via AXI-Stream

Comparison of consistency of model software running results

JLR Testing Tech Week - Share Fair





Participate in Jaguar Land Rover testing technology sharing fair and demonstrated the project

Milestone modification


- Original plan: Using Risc-V rocket soft core simulation ECU
- Plan after the change: Using Microblaze as ECU soft core
- Reason for change: Microblaze is more suitable for Xilinx ecosystem, which is convenient for debugging and driver coding. Microblaze is gradually beginning to support Risc-V instruction set.

- Original plan: Adopt the standard FINN integrated flow integrated attack detection core
- Plan after the change: Slightly behind schedule with custom build flows that can target both lightweight and traditional FPGAs
- Reason for change: Makes the project more versatile, but the custom workflow is slightly more complicated than the standard integration process

Functions such as automated attack injection, data export, and attack detection IP core hardware deployment were not originally planned, but were added for engineering integrity and usability.

Plan for the rest of the project

Next step



Testing and comparison of other methods (like using STFT with DNN for attack detection)

- Model accuracy performance optimization evaluation
- Resource Utilization optimizing
- Model ablation experiment, quantization accuracy change experiment
- Acceleration test

Model benchmarking and optimizing

Of course, there is also thesis writing, refer to the previous Gantt chart plan



Thank You

Changhong Li Supervisor: Shreejith Shanker

Date 23/05/2024

