

Go or No Go: Differential Fuzzing of Native and C Libraries


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^Block, Inc.

Motivation

- You are a Go developer writing an Anti-Virus (AV) engine
- The AV engine needs to decompress incoming files
- Which library to use?




Go or No Go?

- Conventional wisdom:
 - C library: Fast! 
 - Go library: Memory safe! 
- “Use Go for more security”?
- What about non-memory corruption vulnerabilities?





Parser tree differentials

- Two parsers for the same language may differ
- The differences may have security consequences
 - Parser may be overly liberal or strict in accepting input
 - Specification may be under-specified

Differential fuzzing



Evaluation



- Library choice criteria:
 - Parsing
 - Security sensitive
 - Widely used C library
 - Easy to write harnesses
- Our differential fuzzer is effective
 - Less than ~1 hour to first bug

Use case: libz

Compliant:

789c 8b30 f557 0c50...



Go libz uncompress: OK

C zlib uncompress: OK

Mutated:

f81f 8b30 f557 0c50...



Go libz uncompress: OK

C zlib uncompress: **Fail**



C


Security impact: libz

Compliant:

789c 8b30 f557 0c50...


Mutated:

f81f 8b30 f557 0c50...



Bypassing AVs


f81f 8b30 f557 0c50...



✓ No security vendors and no sandboxes flagged this file as malicious

053596f7f1eb62f53e0d0efa9627787ece7d582789ffbd95249b2bc9069e1a96
eicar-corrupt.com.zz

789c 8b30 f557 0c50...



⚠ 22 security vendors and no sandboxes flagged this file as malicious

e48d374a37a5aecb9c0f44273108d6237e10b76d47228f557439f4c74dd05fcc
eicar.com.zz

Bypassing AVs

New Message – ↗ ×

Recipients

Subject

New Message – ↗ ×

Recipients

Subject

eicar.com.zz (1K) Virus detected! [Help](#) ×

789c 8b30 f557 0c50...

eicar-corrupt.com.zz (1K) ×

f81f 8b30 f557 0c50...

Takeaways

As a library user:

- Native libraries are not necessarily "more secure"
- Danger in settings where two distinct parsers are used

As a library writer:

- Use differential fuzzing to find bugs in your code!

Additional results

- Other bug-inducing differences
- Certificate transparency use case
- Practical implementation challenges
- A study of prevalence of C/S code in Go programs


Check out the paper!





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Alessandro Sorniotti, Michael Weissbacher, Anil Kurmus



Evolution of fuzzer-found differences over time for four Go/C libraries. Each color represents a distinct fuzzer run.

- Design and implementation of a **differential fuzzer** to uncover security relevant parsing differences in libraries used in Go programs.
- Evaluation on unique differences and analyse root cause and potential impact.
- Two case studies where discovered **parser differences lead to security impact**. One study affecting **Certificate Transparency** and one **bypass for 19 AV systems** tested on Virus Total, plus Gmail.

Get the paper here:

