CIRT Playbook Battle Card: GSPBC-1079 - Defense Evasion - XSL Script Processing

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(P) Preparation	(I) Identification	(C) Containment
 Patch asset vulnerabilities Perform routine inspections of controls/weapons Maintain Antivirus/EDR application updates Create network segmentation Log traffic between network segments Incorporate threat intelligence Perform routine inspections of asset backups Conduct user security awareness training Conduct response training (this PBC) If msxsl.exe is unnecessary, then block its execution to prevent abuse by adversaries[2] 	 Monitor for: a. DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process[3] b. execution and arguments of msxsl.exe and wmic.exe. Command arguments used before and after the script invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the payload being loaded. The presence of msxsl.exe or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious[4] Investigate and clear ALL alerts associated with the impacted assets or accounts Routinely check firewall, IDS, IPS, and SIEM logs for any unusual activity 	 Inventory (enumerate & assess) Detect Deny Disrupt Degrade Deceive Destroy Observe -> Orient -> Decide -> Act Issue perimeter enforcement for known threat actor locations Archive scanning related artifacts such as IP addresses, user agents, and requests Determine the source and pathway of the attack Fortify non-impacted critical assets Use signature detection to quarantine offending processes[3]
(E) Eradication	(R) Recovery	(L) Lessons/Opportunities
 Close the attack vector by applying the Preparation steps listed above Perform endpoint/AV scans on targeted systems Reset any compromised passwords Inspect ALL assets and user activity for IOC consistent with the attack profile Inspect backups for IOC consistent with the attack profile PRIOR to system recovery Patch asset vulnerabilities 	 Restore to the RPO (Recovery Point Objective) within the RTO (Recovery Time Objective) Address any collateral damage by assessing exposed technologies Resolve any related security incidents Restore affected systems to their last clean backup 	 Perform routine cyber hygiene due diligence Engage external cybersecurity-as-a-service providers and response professionals Implement policy changes to reduce future risk Utilize newly obtained threat signatures Remember that data and events should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities References: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1220/ https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1038/ https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0011/ https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0009/