

(P) Preparation	(I) Identification	(C) Containment
<div>1. Patch asset vulnerabilities</div> <div>2. Perform routine inspections of controls/weapons</div> <div>3. Maintain Antivirus/EDR application updates</div> <div>4. Create network segmentation</div> <div>5. Log traffic between network segments</div> <div>6. Incorporate threat intelligence</div> <div>7. Perform routine inspections of asset backups</div> <div>8. Conduct user security awareness training</div> <div>9. Conduct response training (this PBC)</div>	<div>1. Monitor for:<div><div>a. abnormal LDAP queries with filters for groupPolicyContainer and high volumes of LDAP traffic to domain controllers. Windows Event ID 4661 can also be used to detect when a directory service has been accessed[2]</div><div>b. suspicious use of gpresult. Monitor for the use of PowerShell functions such as Get-DomainGPO and Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup and processes spawning with command-line arguments containing GPOLocalGroup[3]</div><div>c. newly executed processes that may gather information on Group Policy settings to identify paths for privilege escalation, security measures applied within a domain, and to discover patterns in domain objects that can be manipulated or used to blend in the environment[4]</div><div>d. any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent[5]</div></div></div> <div>2. Investigate and clear ALL alerts associated with the impacted assets or accounts</div> <div>3. Routinely check firewall, IDS, IPS, and SIEM logs for any unusual activity</div>	<div>1. Inventory (enumerate & assess)</div> <div>2. Detect Deny Disrupt Degrade Deceive Destroy</div> <div>3. Observe -> Orient -> Decide -> Act</div> <div>4. Issue perimeter enforcement for known threat actor locations</div> <div>5. Archive scanning related artifacts such as IP addresses, user agents, and requests</div> <div>6. Determine the source and pathway of the attack</div> <div>7. Fortify non-impacted critical assets</div>
(E) Eradication	(R) Recovery	(L) Lessons/Opportunities
<div>1. Close the attack vector by applying the Preparation steps listed above</div> <div>2. Perform endpoint/AV scans on targeted systems</div> <div>3. Reset any compromised passwords</div> <div>4. Inspect ALL assets and user activity for IOC consistent with the attack profile</div> <div>5. Inspect backups for IOC consistent with the attack profile PRIOR to system recovery</div> <div>6. Patch asset vulnerabilities</div>	<div>1. Restore to the RPO (Recovery Point Objective) within the RTO (Recovery Time Objective)</div> <div>2. Address any collateral damage by assessing exposed technologies</div> <div>3. Resolve any related security incidents</div> <div>4. Restore affected systems to their last clean backup</div>	<div>1. Perform routine cyber hygiene due diligence</div> <div>2. Engage external cybersecurity-as-a-service providers and response professionals</div> <div>3. Implement policy changes to reduce future risk</div> <div>4. Utilize newly obtained threat signatures</div> <div>5. Remember that data and events should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities</div>
		<div>References:</div> <div><div>1. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1615/</div><div>2. https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0026/</div><div>3. https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0017/</div><div>4. https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0009/</div><div>5. https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0012/</div></div>