

By Charis Rogers

REPLICATION PROJECT: 'DO WOMEN MAKE MORE PROTECTIONIST TRADE POLICY?'



RESEARCH BACKGROUND

Well-documented gap in trade protectionist preferences


Research Question: Does women's representation affect the trade policy choices of governments?

Hypothesis: Women's representation is associated with higher tariff rates

% of women in legislature and cabinet



Applied tariff rates





FINDINGS

Looked at 141 countries over 3 decades

Two-way fixed effects (country and time)

Three models

All show that women's representation has positive effects on tariff rates

“An increase in women's legislative seat shares of 10% is associated with an increase in tariff rates of about 1.40%” (p. 5)

```
M1 <- feols(lnahs ~ lnseats * nHousehold + polity2 + lngdp + gdp_capita +  
            unemp | factor(iso3n) + factor(year),  
            data = data)
```

Table 1: Women's Representation and Protectionism in Trade Policy

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Base Model		Applied Tariff Rate Political Institutions		Socioeconomic Factors	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Log seat share women	0.135*** (0.040)		0.109* (0.059)		0.186*** (0.047)	
Log cabinet share women		0.072** (0.029)		0.092*** (0.030)		0.066** (0.033)
Intermediate inputs	-1.227*** (0.063)	-1.148*** (0.075)	-1.240*** (0.084)	-1.134*** (0.073)	-1.279*** (0.071)	-1.176*** (0.082)
Polity score	-0.082 (0.117)	-0.111 (0.108)	-0.230* (0.127)	-0.245* (0.127)	-0.107 (0.120)	-0.142 (0.116)
Log GDP	-0.036 (0.201)	-0.047 (0.178)	-0.093 (0.259)	-0.123 (0.249)	-0.126 (0.266)	-0.186 (0.244)
GDP per capita	-0.216 (0.175)	-0.178 (0.187)	-0.238 (0.210)	-0.184 (0.215)	-0.452** (0.212)	-0.444** (0.219)
Unemployment rate	-0.598 (1.862)	-1.215 (1.807)	-1.334 (1.923)	-1.725 (1.821)	-0.839 (2.058)	-1.427 (1.941)
Right-wing party			0.254** (0.116)	0.279** (0.111)		
Center party			0.402* (0.221)	0.439** (0.216)		
Left-wing party			0.170 (0.113)	0.180* (0.107)		
Plurality rule			-0.164 (0.181)	-0.174 (0.168)		
Presidential system			-0.011 (0.132)	0.097 (0.162)		
Secondary school enrollment					-0.004 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)
Women, Business, and Law Index					-0.011 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.007)
Women labor force participation					-0.032** (0.013)	-0.030** (0.012)
Log seat share women x intermediate inputs	-0.149*** (0.025)		-0.146*** (0.040)		-0.175*** (0.026)	
Log cabinet share women x intermediate inputs		-0.107*** (0.029)		-0.085*** (0.028)		-0.115*** (0.030)
Constant	3.806 (4.677)	5.074 (4.136)	5.126 (5.985)	5.712 (5.716)	8.543 (6.412)	9.787* (5.824)
Observations	36338	36335	32246	31973	25195	25579
R-squared	0.49	0.492	0.498	0.503	0.435	0.433

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TWIST...

```
M1 <- feols(lnahs ~ lnseats * nHousehold + polity2 + lngdp + gdp_capita +  
            unemp | factor(iso3n) + factor(year),  
            data = subset_countries,  
            fsplit = "subset")
```




Is this relationship connected to the gap in protectionist opinions?

In countries where men are more protectionist than women, women's representation will be associated with a smaller increase in tariff rates.

Data from International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)

[Country] should limit import of foreign products?

Agreement on 5-point Likert scale



TYPICAL AND ATYPICAL COUNTRIES

Table 2: Linear Regression of Gender Gap in Protectionist Opinions

	Country	Coefficient	P_values
Switzerland	CH	-0.100***	0.001
Estonia	EE	-0.022	0.501
Finland	FI	-0.043	0.117
Georgia	GE	0.059**	0.032
Croatia	HR	0.003	0.908
Hungary	HU	0.007	0.828
India	IN	0.031	0.106
Iceland	IS	-0.009	0.741
Japan	JP	-0.047*	0.080
Korea (South)	KR	-0.111***	0.00004
Lithuania	LT	-0.036	0.241
Latvia	LV	-0.026	0.376
Mexico	MX	-0.023	0.444
Norway	NO	-0.008	0.745
Philippines	PH	0.028	0.277
Russia	RU	0.016	0.557
Sweden	SE	-0.081***	0.005
Slovenia	SI	-0.097***	0.002
Taiwan	TW	-0.052**	0.023
United States	US	-0.057**	0.044
South Africa	ZA	-0.041**	0.021

Data


- 21 countries in common

Binary variable

- Recoded to agree or neutral / disagree

6 atypical countries

- Men more protectionist



BASE MODEL

Table 3: Base Model: Effect of Women's Representation in Typical and Atypical Countries

Dependent Variable: subset Model:	Applied Tariff Rate					
	Full sample (1)	Atypical (2)	Typical (3)	Full sample (4)	Atypical (5)	Typical (6)
<i>Variables</i>						
Log seat share women	0.539 (0.326)	0.286 (0.565)	0.138 (0.220)			
Intermediate inputs	-1.54*** (0.215)	-1.73*** (0.331)	-1.52*** (0.209)	-1.37*** (0.139)	-1.15*** (0.197)	-1.38*** (0.155)
Polity score	-0.583 (1.13)	-2.12*** (0.521)	0.154 (1.16)	-0.331 (1.07)	-1.70* (0.793)	0.143 (1.17)
Log GDP	-1.32 (0.910)	-1.86 (0.974)	1.16 (1.49)	-1.14 (0.860)	-2.17* (1.01)	1.17 (1.40)
GDP per capita	-0.187 (0.403)	-2.57 (2.03)	-0.512 (0.514)	-0.215 (0.479)	-2.65 (2.33)	-0.425 (0.520)
Unemployment rate	-8.57 (7.32)	-24.5* (10.8)	5.52 (4.18)	-8.82 (8.04)	-25.4* (11.7)	5.29 (4.11)
Log seat share women × Intermediate inputs	-0.263* (0.134)	-0.447** (0.141)	-0.195 (0.151)			
Log cabinet share women				0.169* (0.086)	0.126 (0.125)	0.143 (0.091)
Log cabinet share women × Intermediate inputs				-0.159** (0.075)	-0.154* (0.066)	-0.111 (0.106)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>						
factor(iso3n)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
factor(year)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>						
Observations	5,088	1,696	3,392	5,136	1,696	3,440
R ²	0.42783	0.61029	0.36367	0.42095	0.60367	0.35813
Within R ²	0.08410	0.21806	0.07479	0.08037	0.22298	0.07394

Clustered (iso3n) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

- No support for hypothesis

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Table 4: Political Institutions: Effect of Women's Representation in Typical and Atypical Countries

Dependent Variable: subset Model:	Applied Tariff Rate					
	Full sample (1)	Atypical (2)	Typical (3)	Full sample (4)	Atypical (5)	Typical (6)
<i>Variables</i>						
Log seat share women	0.617* (0.315)	0.148 (0.262)	0.128 (0.216)			
Intermediate inputs	-1.54*** (0.214)	-1.74*** (0.335)	-1.52*** (0.209)	-1.37*** (0.139)	-1.15*** (0.197)	-1.38*** (0.155)
Polity score	-0.056 (0.973)	2.09** (0.744)	0.156 (1.32)	0.107 (0.954)	2.44** (0.692)	0.094 (1.32)
Log GDP	-1.28 (0.855)	-0.422 (0.848)	1.21 (1.55)	-1.10 (0.805)	-0.862 (0.707)	1.21 (1.41)
GDP per capita	-0.027 (0.418)	-8.24*** (1.57)	-0.513 (0.531)	-0.095 (0.509)	-8.02*** (1.32)	-0.437 (0.534)
Unemployment rate	-7.02 (5.97)	-30.0*** (3.19)	5.55 (3.93)	-7.18 (6.71)	-30.6*** (3.53)	5.46 (3.88)
Right-wing party	0.396 (0.272)	0.542 (0.504)	-0.075 (0.166)	0.452 (0.312)	0.438 (0.384)	-0.034 (0.132)
Center party	0.728 (0.459)	1.16*** (0.262)	-0.087 (0.255)	0.686 (0.473)	1.17*** (0.245)	-0.111 (0.238)
Left-wing party	0.385 (0.314)	0.482 (0.509)	-0.040 (0.173)	0.471 (0.364)	0.445 (0.305)	-0.024 (0.161)
Plurality rule	-0.196 (0.625)	-4.48** (1.26)		-0.095 (0.628)	-4.27*** (1.02)	
Log seat share women × Intermediate inputs	-0.263* (0.133)	-0.450** (0.143)	-0.195 (0.151)			
Log cabinet share women				0.168* (0.086)	0.099 (0.075)	0.143 (0.092)
Log cabinet share women × Intermediate inputs				-0.157* (0.075)	-0.152* (0.067)	-0.111 (0.106)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>						
factor(iso3n)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
factor(year)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>						
Observations	5,072	1,680	3,392	5,120	1,680	3,440
R ²	0.43338	0.65084	0.36371	0.42529	0.64716	0.35821
Within R ²	0.09077	0.28552	0.07485	0.08510	0.29426	0.07404

Clustered (iso3n) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1



SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS

- No support for hypothesis, in fact results seem to indicate the opposite

Table 5: Socioeconomic factors: Effect of Women's Representation in Typical and Atypical Countries

Dependent Variable: subset Model:	Full sample (1)	Atypical (2)	Applied Tariff Rate Typical (3)	Full sample (4)	Atypical (5)	Typical (6)
<i>Variables</i>						
Log seat share women	1.12** (0.433)	-0.020 (0.814)	0.350** (0.145)			
Intermediate inputs	-1.78*** (0.159)	-1.88*** (0.379)	-1.73*** (0.159)	-1.45*** (0.142)	-1.12*** (0.182)	-1.50*** (0.159)
Polity score	0.646 (1.45)	-1.34 (1.57)	1.85* (0.971)	0.719 (1.43)	-1.57 (1.12)	1.76* (0.956)
Log GDP	-1.39 (1.18)	-3.05** (1.07)	4.30*** (1.08)	-0.887 (1.16)	-3.18** (1.05)	4.81*** (1.14)
GDP per capita	-0.316 (0.389)	-4.76* (2.33)	-0.550 (0.334)	-0.412 (0.479)	-3.83 (1.97)	-0.543 (0.369)
Unemployment rate	-10.9 (6.68)	-41.4** (10.5)	7.80*** (2.35)	-10.7 (7.57)	-36.0** (10.1)	8.45*** (2.37)
Secondary school enrollment	-0.020* (0.011)	-0.143*** (0.029)	-0.013* (0.006)	-0.027*** (0.009)	-0.124* (0.050)	-0.016** (0.006)
Women, Business, and Law Index	-0.039** (0.017)	-0.035 (0.025)	-0.036*** (0.009)	-0.014 (0.016)	-0.032 (0.020)	-0.034*** (0.010)
Women labor force participation	-0.055* (0.030)	-0.244*** (0.056)	-0.103*** (0.029)	-0.037 (0.029)	-0.229** (0.071)	-0.103** (0.033)
Log seat share women × Intermediate inputs	-0.427*** (0.080)	-0.528** (0.160)	-0.367*** (0.105)			
Log cabinet share women				0.238** (0.103)	0.252** (0.096)	0.131 (0.088)
Log cabinet share women × Intermediate inputs				-0.228*** (0.063)	-0.146* (0.064)	-0.214* (0.106)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>						
factor(iso3n)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
factor(year)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>						
Observations	4,272	1,456	2,816	4,288	1,456	2,832
R ²	0.46002	0.64562	0.41913	0.44911	0.62836	0.41431
Within R ²	0.09927	0.30525	0.10229	0.08631	0.29249	0.10009

Clustered (iso3n) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

CONCLUSION



Limitations

Small sample of countries

A lot of the countries do not have a significant difference in the opinions of men and women

Conclusion

ISSP sample is not large enough to answer the question



Reference List

Betz, T., Fortunato, D. and O'Brien, D.Z. (2023) 'Do Women Make More Protectionist Trade Policy?', *American Political Science Review*, 117(4), pp. 1522–1530. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055422001307>.

ISSP Research Group (2015). International Social Survey Programme: National Identity III - ISSP 2013. *GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5950 Data file Version 2.0.0*, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12312>.



THANK YOU FOR LISTENING!