

# CoreDAO - Chain and BTCPowerMirror Golang Security Audit

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Visit: Halborn.com

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### EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

#### 1.1 INTRODUCTION

CoreDAO engaged Halborn to conduct a security audit on their chain and btc power mirror repositories beginning on August 22nd, 2022 and ending on November 28th, 2022. The security audit was scoped to the repositories provided to the Halborn team.

#### 1.2 AUDIT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn was provided nearly six weeks for the engagement and assigned three full-time security engineers to audit the security of the **chain and btc power mirror** implementation. The security engineers are blockchain and smart-contract security experts with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this audit to achieve the following:

- Ensure that module Implementation functions as intended.
- Identify potential security issues with the CoreDAO team.

In summary, Halborn identified few security risks that were mostly addressed by the CoreDAO Team.

#### 1.3 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the chain and power mirror implementation. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of structures and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.

The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the audit:

- Research into architecture and purpose.
- Static Analysis of security for scoped repository, and imported functions. (staticcheck, gosec, unconvert, LGTM, ineffassign and semgrep).
- Manual Assessment for discovering security vulnerabilities on codebase.
- Ensuring correctness of the codebase.
- Dynamic Analysis on chain Implementation functions and data types.

#### RISK METHODOLOGY:

Vulnerabilities or issues observed by Halborn are ranked based on the risk assessment methodology by measuring the LIKELIHOOD of a security incident and the IMPACT should an incident occur. This framework works for communicating the characteristics and impacts of technology vulnerabilities. The quantitative model ensures repeatable and accurate measurement while enabling users to see the underlying vulnerability characteristics that were used to generate the Risk scores. For every vulnerability, a risk level will be calculated on a scale of 5 to 1 with 5 being the highest likelihood or impact.

#### RISK SCALE - LIKELIHOOD

- 5 Almost certain an incident will occur.
- 4 High probability of an incident occurring.
- 3 Potential of a security incident in the long term.
- 2 Low probability of an incident occurring.
- 1 Very unlikely issue will cause an incident.

#### RISK SCALE - IMPACT

- 5 May cause devastating and unrecoverable impact or loss.
- 4 May cause a significant level of impact or loss.
- 3 May cause a partial impact or loss to many.
- 2 May cause temporary impact or loss.

1 - May cause minimal or un-noticeable impact.

The risk level is then calculated using a sum of these two values, creating a value of 10 to 1 with 10 being the highest level of security risk.

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
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10 - CRITICAL

9 - 8 - HIGH

**7 - 6** - MEDIUM

**5 - 4** - LOW

3 - 1 - VERY LOW AND INFORMATIONAL

#### 1.4 SCOPE

The security assessment was scoped to the following repositories.

#### Core Chain

• Commit ID : 6219caa1de6182643e136e27c79355addaee1fc5

#### BTC Power Mirror

Commit ID : 52b70ff629216ce8b40ad05652631da3efb95da3

#### BTC Power Mirror Second Phase Audit

Commit ID : ec22e535a2e2d441d853795309c8f67c8e495509

#### Second Phase Audit Branch - Core Chain

Commit ID: 9b9088a6a99121e983fd1a955a3d1209bed1b66a

#### FIX COMMIT ID :

cad6814457999e2de97ad653f91f3288b342f222 9b9088a6a99121e983fd1a955a3d1209bed1b66a IMPACT

## 2. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
0	1	1	3	2

#### LIKELIHOOD

	(HAL-01)	
(HAL-03) (HAL-04) (HAL-05)	(HAL-02)	
(HAL-06) (HAL-07)		

SECURITY ANALYSIS	RISK LEVEL	REMEDIATION DATE
HAL-01 - SYSTEM CONTRACT UPGRADES ARE DISABLED	High	SOLVED - 11/28/2022
HAL-02 - CHAIN ID COLLISION	Medium	SOLVED - 10/31/2022
HAL-03 - USING VULNERABLE PACKAGE LEADS TO DOS	Low	SOLVED - 10/31/2022
HAL-04 - MATH RAND IS NOT SAFE FOR CONCURRENT USE	Low	RISK ACCEPTED
HAL-05 - MEMORY LEAK ON THE HANDLER	Low	SOLVED - 10/31/2022
HAL-06 - OUT-OF-DATE PACKAGES	Informational	SOLVED - 10/31/2022
HAL-07 - MISSING GO COMPILER BUILD DIRECTIVES	Informational	ACKNOWLEDGED

## FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS

## 3.1 (HAL-01) SYSTEM CONTRACT UPGRADES ARE DISABLED - HIGH

#### Description:

In the **CoreDAO** chain, system contract upgrades can be done via the **upgrade.go** file. This gives you the ability to upgrade system contracts. However, the feature is disabled in the **CoreDAO** chain.

#### Proof Of Concept:

- 1. Go to upgrade.go#L41.
- 2. Upgrades to the system contract are commented out in the code base.
- 3. With the following parameters, the system contract can be enabled.

4. By calling the following function, the system contracts can be triggered.

5. In the BSC, the system contract upgrades can be done using the fork number. The implementation can be seen from the code.

6. On the other hand, the System Burn contract should not be updated during the upgrades. All funds burned will be located at the Burn address. In the BSC, the BurnContract address is deleted from the constant contract addresses.

#### Code Location:

The following code files indicate that system contract upgrades are <u>disabled</u>.

#### upgrade.go#L41

```
Listing 3

1 func UpgradeBuildInSystemContract(config *params.ChainConfig,
L blockNumber *big.Int, statedb *state.StateDB) {
2   /*
3     apply system upgrades
4   */
5 }
```

#### Risk Level:

```
Likelihood - 3
Impact - 5
```

#### Recommendation:

Make sure that the functionality is correctly implemented in the code base. Without this functionality, system contracts could not be updated in the code base.

#### Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED**: The CoreDAO Team solved the issue in the following commit v1.1.0\_- fix - 9b9088a by enabling system upgrades.


## 3.2 (HAL-02) CHAIN ID COLLISION - MEDIUM

#### Description:

Ethereum's networks have two identifiers, a network ID and a chain ID. Although they usually have the same value, they have different uses. Peer-to-peer communication between nodes uses the network ID, while the transaction signature process uses the chain ID. EIP 155 introduced the use of the chain ID as part of the transaction signing process to protect against replay attacks of transactions. In CoreDAO Chain, ChainId is defined as 56.

#### Proof Of Concept:

- 1. Navigate to BSC code base.
- 2. In the BSC code base, ChainID is defined as 56.
- 3. From the following code location, you can see that there is a conflict with the BSC config.



4. With the conflict, **CoreDAO** can suffer from the transaction replay attack.

#### Code Location:

#### config.go#L224

```
14 Epoch: 200,
15 },
16 }
```

#### Risk Level:

Likelihood - 3

Impact - 3

#### Recommendation:

Consider changing the ChainID in the parameter definition.

#### Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED**: The CoreDAO team solved the issue by changing **testnet/mainnet** chain IDs.

## 3.3 (HAL-03) USING VULNERABLE PACKAGE LEADS TO DOS - LOW

#### Description:

During the code review, it was noted that the system uses a vulnerable version of go-ethereum. From the Security Advisory, it can be seen that the malicious crafted P2P message can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

#### Code Location:

#### peer.go#L326

```
Listing 5

1    case msg.Code == discMsg:
2        var reason [1]DiscReason
3        // This is the last message. We don't need to discard or
4        // check errors because, the connection will be closed
L after it.
5        rlp.Decode(msg.Payload, &reason)
6        return reason[0]
7        case msg.Code < baseProtocolLength:
8        // ignore other base protocol messages
9        return msg.Discard()
```

#### Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1 Impact - 3

#### Recommendation:

It is recommended to update the system component.

#### Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED**: The CoreDAO team solved the issue by updating the dependency.

## 3.4 (HAL-04) MATH RAND IS NOT SAFE FOR CONCURRENT USE - LOW

#### Description:

Using math/rand is deterministic random by default, and it is dangerous. The BackOff time depends directly on math.Rand. In shuffling, the math/rand based random number that is used for the shuffle operation. Consider using crypto/rand instead of math/rand.

Code Location:

#### satoshi.go#L12

```
Listing 6
 1 func backOffTime(snap *Snapshot, val common.Address) uint64 {
       if snap.inturn(val) {
           return 0
       } else {
           idx := snap.indexOfVal(val)
           if idx < 0 {
               return 0
           s := rand.NewSource(int64(snap.Number))
           r := rand.New(s)
           n := len(snap.Validators)
           backOffSteps := make([]uint64, 0, n)
           for idx := uint64(0); idx < uint64(n); idx++ {
               backOffSteps = append(backOffSteps, idx)
           r.Shuffle(n, func(i, j int) {
               backOffSteps[i], backOffSteps[j] = backOffSteps[j],

    backOffSteps[i]

           delay := initialBackOffTime + backOffSteps[idx]*wiggleTime
           return delay
       }
```

```
23
```

```
Risk Level:
```

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 3

Recommendation:

It is recommended to use crypto/rand instead of math/rand.

Remediation Plan:

RISK ACCEPTED: The CoreDAO team accepted the risk of this finding.

## 3.5 (HAL-05) MEMORY LEAK ON THE HANDLER - LOW

#### Description:

In the current BSC repository, it has been noticed that on the Drift Protocol side, the memory leak issue has been fixed. However, the issue is not fixed in the CoreDAO chain.

#### Code Location:

#### /eth/handler.go#L392

```
Listing 7

1 func (h *handler) runDiffExtension(peer *diff.Peer, handler diff.
L, Handler) error {
2    h.peerWG.Add(1)
3    defer h.peerWG.Done()
4
5    if err := h.peers.registerDiffExtension(peer); err != nil {
6        peer.Log().Error("Diff extension registration failed", "
L, err", err)
7        return err
8    }
9    return handler(peer)
10 }
```

#### Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1 Impact - 3

#### Recommendation:

Make sure all recent findings (BSC) are fixed to the CoreDAO chain.

#### Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED**: The CoreDAO team solved the issue by changing the code base.

## 3.6 (HAL-06) OUT-OF-DATE PACKAGES - INFORMATIONAL

#### Description:

A software component is part of a system or application that extends the functionality of the application. Component-based vulnerabilities occur when a software component is incompatible, out of date, or vulnerable to a known exploit. You may inadvertently use vulnerable software components in production environments.

Code Location:

go.mod#L63

#### Vulnerable Text Package:

[CVE-2021-38561] CWE	[CVE-2021-38561] CNE-125: Out-of-bounds Read		
Description	on golang-x-text - Out-of-bounds Read		
OSS Index ID	dex ID		
CVSS Score	Score 4.3/18 (Medium)		
CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L			
Link for more info	.ink for more info https://ossindex.sonatype.org/vulnerability/CVE-2021-385617component-type=golang&component-name=golang.org%27x%Eftext&utm_source=namcy-client&utm_medium=integration&utm_content=0.0.0-dev		

#### Vulnerable InfluxDB Package:

ig:golang/github.com/influmdata/influmdhexi.8.3 kmown vulnerabilities affecting installed version			
[CVE-2022-36640] CHE	-276: Incorrect Oufselt Permissions		
	** DISPUTED ** Influenta influenta influenta before vi.8.10 contains no authentication mechanism or controls, allueing unumithenticated attackers to execute arbitrary commands. NOTE: the CVE ID assignment its disputed because the vendor's documentation states "IT influend is being deployed on a publicly accessible endpoint, we strongly recommend authentication be enabled. Otherwise the data ville be publicly available to any unauthenticated user. The default settings do NOT enable authentication and authorization.		
OSS Index ID	CVE-2022-36640		
CVSS Score	9.8/10 (Critical)		
CVSS Vector	CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/T:H/A:H		
Link for more info	https://ossindex.sonatype.org/vulnerability/CVE-2022-36640?component-type-golang&component-name-github.com/2Finfluxdata%2Finfluxdb&utm_source-nancy-client&utm_nedium=integration&utm_content=0.0.0-dev		

#### Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1 Impact - 1

#### Recommendation:

Update the software to the latest version.

#### Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED**: The CoreDAO team solved the issue by updating the dependency.

## 3.7 (HAL-07) MISSING GO COMPILER BUILD DIRECTIVES - INFORMATIONAL

#### Description:

During testing, it has been observed that the build flags of the Go compiler are not set. The use of compiler flags and compiler sequences can optimize and improve the performance of specific types of applications.

#### Risk Level:

```
Likelihood - 1
Impact - 1
```

Repository Makefile Flags:

#### Makefile#L16

```
Listing 8

1 geth:
2   $(GORUN) build/ci.go install ./cmd/geth
3   @echo "Done building."
4   @echo "Run \"$(GOBIN)/geth\" to launch geth."
5
6 all:
7   $(GORUN) build/ci.go install
```

#### Example Flags:

## Listing 9: Example Compiler Build Flags 1 -a 2 force rebuilding of packages that are already up-to-date. 3 -ldflags "-s -w" 4 The -w turns off DWARF debugging information 5 The -s turns off generation of the Go symbol table 6 -trimpath 7 The -trimpath Remove all file system paths from the resulting Ly executable. 8 -gcflags 9 arguments to pass on each go tool compile invocation.

#### Recommendation:

Enabling the compiler build flags could speed up binary build and outputs in a smaller and probably more efficient binary. Therefore, the flags should be reviewed and enabled according to the structure.

#### Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED**: The CoreDAO team acknowledged the issue.

### FUZZING

#### Description:

As part of the automated testing techniques, Halborn performed fuzzing using go-fuzz and libfuzzer. This is a technique that involves developing a custom script that injects malformed or unexpected input into the application to reveal possible vulnerabilities in the handling of that input.

For chain testing, most efforts were focused on the Satoshi plus consensus code. For that reason, the targeted fuzzing functions selected from satoshi.go were:

IsRoundEnd, Finalize, FinalizeAndAssemble, VerifyHeader, VerifyHeaders, Delay, BeforeValidateTx, BeforePackTx and Seal

As for the BtcLightMirror structure, our focus was on the Deserialize and CheckMerkle functions, which were more susceptible to potentially handling user input.

#### Fuzzing Harness:

For fuzzing, the target functions are needed to create a fuzzing harness. This is the script that the fuzzer program will use to inject the generated input into the target functions.

Since targeted functions take complex data structures as input, a combination of structure-aware fuzzing using the gofuzz library and valid objects was used to increase code coverage.

#### Fuzzing - Harness Code for Satoshi:

Satoshi's harness code is divided into 2 sections.

The first contains the definition of variables and the creation of the necessary objects that will be part of each function input. The second contains the fuzzing functions (one for each targeted function) in which data input is injected into some valid objects and other go objects are populated with the gofuzz library.

#### Listing 10: Fuzzing Harness for Satoshi 1 package corechain\_fuzz 3 import ( "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/accounts" "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/consensus/satoshi" "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/core/rawdb" "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/core/types" "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto" "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/params" fuzz "github.com/google/gofuzz" 19 var ( = [32]byte{} = []byte{} string uint64 timestamp int64 extraVanity = 32= 65 = rawdb.NewMemoryDatabase() = crypto.HexToECDSA(" key, \_ = crypto.PubkeyToAddress(key.PublicKey) chainConfig = &params.ChainConfig{big.NewInt(1337), big.NewInt ↓ (0), nil, false, big.NewInt(0), common.Hash{}, big.NewInt(0), big. → NewInt(0), big.NewInt(0), big.NewInt(0), big.NewInt(0), big.NewInt ↓ (0), big.NewInt(0), big.NewInt(0), nil, nil, nil, nil, nil, & params.SatoshiConfig{Period: 0, Epoch: 30000, Round: 3}} []\*types.Transaction []\*types.Header

receipts \*[]\*types.Receipt

```
uint64 = uint64(1234)
      signFn = func(account accounts.Account, s string, data []byte)
   ([]byte, error) {
          return crypto.Sign(crypto.Keccak256(data), key)
      signTxFn = func(accounts.Account, *types.Transaction, *big.Int
signer := types.NewEIP155Signer(big.NewInt(18))
          utx := types.NewTransaction(0, addr, new(big.Int), 0, new(

    big.Int).SetUint64(10000000), nil)

          tx, err := types.SignTx(utx, signer, key)
      genspec = &core.Genesis{
          ExtraData: make([]byte, extraVanity+common.AddressLength+

    extraSeal),
          Alloc: map[common.Address]core.GenesisAccount{
              addr: {Balance: big.NewInt(1)},
          }, Config: chainConfig,
      }
59)
62 func Fuzz1(data []byte) int {
      fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&hash)
      fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&code)
      fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&gas)
      fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&timestamp)
      fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&dif)
      var engine = satoshi.New(chainConfig, db, nil, hash)
      defer engine.Close()
      engine.Authorize(addr, signFn, signTxFn)
      copy(genspec.ExtraData, data)
      _ = genspec.MustCommit(db)
      tx := types.NewContractCreation(0, big.NewInt(0), gas, big.

    NewInt(1), common.FromHex(code))

      txs = append(txs, tx)
```

```
header := &types.Header{
                       big.NewInt(1),
          Difficulty: big.NewInt(1),
                       uint64(timestamp),
      }
      headerchain, _ := core.NewHeaderChain(db, chainConfig, engine,
   func() bool { return false })
      engine.IsRoundEnd(headerchain, header)
      return 1
91 }
94 func Fuzz2(data []byte) int {
      fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&hash)
      fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&code)
      fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&gas)
      fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&timestamp)
      fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&dif)
      fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&usedgas)
      var engine = satoshi.New(chainConfig, db, nil, hash)
      defer engine.Close()
      engine.Authorize(addr, signFn, signTxFn)
      copy(genspec.ExtraData, data)
      _ = genspec.MustCommit(db)
      tx := types.NewContractCreation(0, big.NewInt(0), gas, big.
→ NewInt(1), common.FromHex(code))
      txs = append(txs, tx)
      header := &types.Header{
                       big.NewInt(1),
          Difficulty: big.NewInt(1),
                       data,
                       uint64(timestamp),
      }
      headerchain, _ := core.NewHeaderChain(db, chainConfig, engine,
   func() bool { return false })
```

```
state, err := state.New(common.Hash{}), state.NewDatabase(rawdb
err = engine.Finalize(headerchain, header, state, &txs, uncles
if err != nil {
           return 0
       return 1
130 }
133 func Fuzz3(data []byte) int {
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&hash)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&code)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&gas)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&timestamp)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&dif)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&usedgas)
       var engine = satoshi.New(chainConfig, db, nil, hash)
       defer engine.Close()
       engine.Authorize(addr, signFn, signTxFn)
       copy(genspec.ExtraData, data)
       _ = genspec.MustCommit(db)
       tx := types.NewContractCreation(0, big.NewInt(0), gas, big.
→ NewInt(1), common.FromHex(code))
       txs = append(txs, tx)
       header := &types.Header{
                      big.NewInt(1),
          Difficulty: big.NewInt(1),
                      data,
                      uint64(timestamp),
       }
```

```
headerchain, _ := core.NewHeaderChain(db, chainConfig, engine,
    func() bool { return false })
       state, err := state.New(common.Hash{}, state.NewDatabase(rawdb
_, _, err = engine.FinalizeAndAssemble(headerchain, header,

    state, txs, uncles, nil)

       if err != nil {
           return 0
       }
       return 1
172 func Fuzz4(data []byte) int {
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&hash)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&code)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&gas)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&timestamp)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&dif)
       var engine = satoshi.New(chainConfig, db, nil, hash)
       defer engine.Close()
       engine.Authorize(addr, signFn, signTxFn)
       copy(genspec.ExtraData, data)
       _ = genspec.MustCommit(db)
       tx := types.NewContractCreation(0, big.NewInt(0), gas, big.

    NewInt(1), common.FromHex(code))
       txs = append(txs, tx)
       header := &types.Header{
                       big.NewInt(1),
           Difficulty: big.NewInt(1),
```

```
uint64(timestamp),
       }
       headerchain, _ := core.NewHeaderChain(db, chainConfig, engine,
    func() bool { return false })
       err := engine.VerifyHeader(headerchain, header, true)
       if err != nil {
           return 0
       return 1
203 }
206 func Fuzz5(data []byte) int {
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&hash)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&code)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&gas)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&timestamp)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&dif)
       var engine = satoshi.New(chainConfig, db, nil, hash)
       defer engine.Close()
       engine.Authorize(addr, signFn, signTxFn)
       copy(genspec.ExtraData, data)
       _ = genspec.MustCommit(db)
       tx := types.NewContractCreation(0, big.NewInt(0), gas, big.
txs = append(txs, tx)
       header := &types.Header{
                       big.NewInt(1),
           Difficulty: big.NewInt(1),
                       data,
                       uint64(timestamp),
       }
       headerchain, _ := core.NewHeaderChain(db, chainConfig, engine,
    func() bool { return false })
       headers := []*types.Header{header}
       _, _ = engine. VerifyHeaders(headerchain, headers, []bool{true
→ })
```

```
return 1
234 }
237 func Fuzz6(data []byte) int {
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&hash)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&code)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&gas)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&timestamp)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&dif)
       var engine = satoshi.New(chainConfig, db, nil, hash)
       defer engine.Close()
       engine.Authorize(addr, signFn, signTxFn)
       copy(genspec.ExtraData, data)
       if genspec == nil {
       tx := types.NewContractCreation(0, big.NewInt(0), gas, big.

    NewInt(1), common.FromHex(code))

       txs = append(txs, tx)
       header := &types.Header{
                        big.NewInt(1),
           Difficulty: big.NewInt(1),
                        data,
                        uint64(timestamp),
       }
       headerchain, _ := core.NewHeaderChain(db, chainConfig, engine,
    func() bool { return false })
       _ = engine.Delay(headerchain, header)
       return 1
267 }
270 func Fuzz7(data []byte) int {
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&hash)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&code)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&gas)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&timestamp)
```

```
var engine = satoshi.New(chainConfig, db, nil, hash)
       defer engine.Close()
       engine.Authorize(addr, signFn, signTxFn)
       copy(genspec.ExtraData, data)
       _ = genspec.MustCommit(db)
       tx := types.NewContractCreation(0, big.NewInt(0), gas, big.

    NewInt(1), common.FromHex(code))
       txs = append(txs, tx)
       header := &types.Header{
                      big.NewInt(1),
          Difficulty: big.NewInt(1),
                      data,
                      uint64(timestamp),
       }
       headerchain, _ := core.NewHeaderChain(db, chainConfig, engine,
    func() bool { return false })
       state, _ := state.New(common.Hash{}, state.NewDatabase(rawdb.

    NewMemoryDatabase()), nil)

       err := engine.BeforeValidateTx(headerchain, header, state, &
if err != nil {
           return 0
       return 1
306 }
309 func Fuzz8(data []byte) int {
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&hash)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&code)
```

```
fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&gas)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&timestamp)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&dif)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&usedgas)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&receipts)
       var engine = satoshi.New(chainConfig, db, nil, hash)
       defer engine.Close()
       engine.Authorize(addr, signFn, signTxFn)
       copy(genspec.ExtraData, data)
       _ = genspec.MustCommit(db)
       tx := types.NewContractCreation(0, big.NewInt(0), gas, big.
txs = append(txs, tx)
       header := &types.Header{
                     big.NewInt(1),
          Difficulty: big.NewInt(1),
                      uint64(timestamp),
       headerchain, _ := core.NewHeaderChain(db, chainConfig, engine,
    func() bool { return false })
       state, err := state.New(common.Hash{}, state.NewDatabase(rawdb
err = engine.BeforePackTx(headerchain, header, state, &txs,
→ uncles, receipts)
       if err != nil {
          return 0
       return 1
347 }
```

```
350 func Fuzz9(data []byte) int {
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&hash)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&code)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&gas)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&timestamp)
       fuzz.NewFromGoFuzz(data).Fuzz(&usedgas)
       var engine = satoshi.New(chainConfig, db, nil, hash)
       defer engine.Close()
       engine.Authorize(addr, signFn, signTxFn)
       copy(genspec.ExtraData, data)
       _ = genspec.MustCommit(db)
       tx := types.NewContractCreation(0, big.NewInt(0), gas, big.
   NewInt(1), common.FromHex(code))
       txs = append(txs, tx)
       header := &types.Header{
                       big.NewInt(1),
           Difficulty: big.NewInt(1),
                        gas,
                        uint64(timestamp),
       }
       results := make(chan *types.Block)
       headerchain, _ := core.NewHeaderChain(db, chainConfig, engine,
    func() bool { return false })
err := engine.Seal(headerchain, types.NewBlockWithHeader(
   header), results, nil)
       if err != nil {
           return 0
       }
       return 1
384 }
```

#### Fuzzing - Harness Code for BtcLightMirror:

For the BtcLightMirror fuzzing, a small program was built to write a valid serialized object to a corpus file. These data will be the initial point to be mutated by gofuzz throughout the fuzzing process.

Listing 11: Small program for Corpus preparation 3 import ( 5) 7 var blmEncoded = []byte{ 0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x6f,0xe2,0x8c,0x0a,0xb6,0xf1,0xb3,0  $\rightarrow$  x72,0xc1,0xa6,0xa2,0x46, 0xae,0x63,0xf7,0x4f,0x93,0x1e,0x83,0x65,0xe1,0x5a,0x08,0  $\rightarrow$  x9c, 0x68, 0xd6, 0x19, 0x00, 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x3b,0xa3,0xed,0xfd,0x7a,0x7b,0x12,0 0x67,0x76,0x8f,0x61,0x7f,0xc8,0x1b,0xc3,0x88,0x8a,0x51,0  $\rightarrow$  x32,0x3a,0x9f,0xb8,0xaa,  $0 \times 4b$ ,  $0 \times 1e$ ,  $0 \times 5e$ ,  $0 \times 4a$ ,  $0 \times 29$ ,  $0 \times ab$ ,  $0 \times 5f$ ,  $0 \times 49$ ,  $0 \times ff$ ,  $0 \times ff$ ,  $0 \times 00$ , 0 $\rightarrow$  x1d,0xf3,0xe0,0x01,0x00,  $0 \times 01$ ,  $0 \times 00$ ,  $0 \times 00$ ,  $0 \times 00$ ,  $0 \times 01$ ,  $0 \times 00$ ,  $0 \times$  $\rightarrow$  x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,  $0 \times 000$ ,  $\rightarrow$  x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,  $0 \times 00$ ,  $0 \times$  $\rightarrow$  x31,0xdc,0x00,0x1b,0x01, 0x62,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x02,0x00,0xf2,0x05,0x2a,0x01,0  $\rightarrow$  x00,0x00,0x00,0x43,0x41, 0x04,0xd6,0x4b,0xdf,0xd0,0x9e,0xb1,0xc5,0xfe,0x29,0x5a,0  $\rightarrow$  xbd, 0xeb, 0x1d, 0xca, 0x42, 0x81,0xbe,0x98,0x8e,0x2d,0xa0,0xb6,0xc1,0xc6,0xa5,0x9d,0  $\rightarrow$  xc2,0x26,0xc2,0x86,0x24, 0xe1,0x81,0x75,0xe8,0x51,0xc9,0x6b,0x97,0x3d,0x81,0xb0,0  $\rightarrow$  x1c,0xc3,0x1f,0x04,0x78, 0x34,0xbc,0x06,0xd6,0xd6,0xed,0xf6,0x20,0xd1,0x84,0x24,0 0xa6,0xac,0x00,0xe1,0xf5,0x05,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x43,0  $\rightarrow$  x41,0x04,0xd6,0x4b,0xdf,

```
0xd0,0x9e,0xb1,0xc5,0xfe,0x29,0x5a,0xbd,0xeb,0x1d,0xca,0
\rightarrow x42,0x81,0xbe,0x98,0x8e,
             0x2d,0xa0,0xb6,0xc1,0xc6,0xa5,0x9d,0xc2,0x26,0xc2,0x86,0
\rightarrow x24,0xe1,0x81,0x75,0xe8,
             0x51,0xc9,0x6b,0x97,0x3d,0x81,0xb0,0x1c,0xc3,0x1f,0x04,0
\rightarrow x78,0x34,0xbc,0x06,0xd6,
             0xd6,0xed,0xf6,0x20,0xd1,0x84,0x24,0x1a,0x6a,0xed,0x8b,0
\rightarrow x63,0xa6,0xac,0x00,0x00,
             0x00,0x00,0x01,0x9d,0x0e,0x29,0x88,0x3d,0x9b,0xdc,0x34,0
\rightarrow x65,0x5a,0x80,0xe4,0xd1,
             0 \times 7 d, 0 \times b7, 0 \times a1, 0 \times 79, 0 \times 63, 0 \times a5, 0 \times a0, 0 \times 4c, 0 \times 16, 0 \times 5c, 0 \times e0, 0
\rightarrow x8d,0xf3,0x2f,0x52,0x5a,
             0 \times d1, 0 \times 00, 0 \times 01,
29 }
31 func main() {
        f, err := os.Create("corpus/in")
        defer f.Close()
        _, err = f.Write(blmEncoded)
        if err != nil {
             panic(err)
        }
        f.Sync()
42 }
```

This is the fuzz harness that was executed for the Deseralize and CheckMerkle functions, using the initial mutated corpus as data.

```
11      if err != nil {
12          return 0
13      }
14
15      err = mirror.CheckMerkle()
16      if err != nil {
17          return 0
18      }
19
20      return 1
21 }
```

### Fuzzing - Libfuzzer Output Sample for Satoshi:

```
$ GOPATH=$(pwd) GO111MODULE=off go-fuzz-build -libfuzzer -o fuzz3.a -func Fuzz3 . 86 \
clang -o Fuzz.libfuzzer3 fuzz3.a -fsanitize=fuzzer & \
./Fuzz.libfuzzer3 coredao_wd/corpus -rss_limit_mb=15500 -workers=4 -max_len=1000
INFO: Running with entropic power schedule (0×FF, 100).
INFO: Seed: 2520844396
INFO: 65536 Extra Counters
            2597 files found in coredao_wd/corpus
INFO:
INFO: seed corpus: files: 2597 min: 1b max: 871065b total: 9988708b rss: 51Mb
         pulse ft: 5545 corp: 314/715b exec/s: 170 rss: 60Mb
pulse ft: 5722 corp: 383/1521b exec/s: 146 rss: 65Mb
pulse ft: 5920 corp: 469/8287b exec/s: 120 rss: 69Mb
#512
#1024
#2048
          INITED ft: 6123 corp: 526/36Kb exec/s: 108 rss: 70Mb
NEW ft: 6128 corp: 527/36Kb lim: 1000 exec/s: 108 rss: 70Mb L: 17/1000 MS: 1 ChangeByte-
#2598
#2599
                  ft: 6133 corp: 528/36Kb lim: 1000 exec/s: 108 rss: 70Mb L: 5/1000 MS: 1 CrossOver-
ft: 6138 corp: 529/36Kb lim: 1000 exec/s: 109 rss: 70Mb L: 118/1000 MS: 1 InsertRepeatedBytes-
#2615
          NEW
#2631
          NEW
                  ft: 6143 corp: 530/36Kb lim: 1000 exec/s: 110 rss: 70Mb L: 123/1000 MS: 1 ChangeByte-
ft: 6154 corp: 531/36Kb lim: 1000 exec/s: 110 rss: 70Mb L: 2/1000 MS: 1 ChangeByte-
#2647
          NEW
#2663
          NEW
                   ft: 6157 corp: 532/36Kb lim: 1000 exec/s: 107 rss: 70Mb L: 90/1000 MS: 4 InsertRepeatedBytes-Ch
#2698
          NFW
                  ft: 6162 corp: 533/37Kb lim: 1000 exec/s: 108 rss: 70Mb L: 395/1000 MS: 3 InsertByte-CopyPart-E
#2711
          NEW
          REDUCE ft: 6162 corp: 533/37Kb lim: 1000 exec/s: 105 rss: 70Mb L: 58/1000 MS: 1 EraseBytes-
NEW ft: 6163 corp: 534/37Kb lim: 1000 exec/s: 106 rss: 70Mb L: 6/1000 MS: 2 ShuffleBytes-InsertRepe
#2769
                   ft: 6164 corp: 535/37Kb lim: 1000 exec/s: 107 rss: 71Mb L: 24/1000 MS: 3 ChangeBit-ChangeBinInt
#2807
          NEW
#2822
                   ft: 6167 corp: 536/37Kb lim: 1000 exec/s: 108 rss: 71Mb L: 1/1000 MS: 5 ChangeByte-CopyPart-Cha
                   ft: 6172 corp: 537/37Kb lim: 1000 exec/s: 108 rss: 71Mb L: 595/1000 MS: 1 PersAutoDict- DE: "\x
#2823
          NEW
          REDUCE ft: 6172 corp: 537/37Kb lim: 1000 exec/s: 106 rss: 71Mb L: 45/1000 MS: 4 CopyPart-ShuffleBytes-
#2877
                  ft: 6183 corp: 538/37Kb lim: 1000 exec/s: 106 rss: 71Mb L: 23/1000 MS: 5 CrossOver-ChangeBinInt
```

### Fuzzing - gofuzz Output Sample for BtcLightMirror:

```
→ lightmirror go-fuzz - po-fuzz - p
```

### Fuzzing Results:

After fuzzing all selected functions, no vulnerabilities were found.

# AUTOMATED TESTING

### Description:

Halborn used automated testing techniques to enhance coverage of certain areas of the scoped component. Among the tools used were staticcheck, gosec, semgrep, unconvert, LGTM and Nancy. After Halborn verified all the contracts and scoped structures in the repository and was able to compile them correctly, these tools were leveraged on scoped structures. With these tools, Halborn can statically verify security related issues across the entire codebase.

Semgrep - Security Analysis Output Sample:

```
Listing 13: Rule Set

1 semgrep --config "p/dgryski.semgrep-go" x --exclude='*_test.go' --
L, max-lines-per-finding 1000 --no-git-ignore -o dgryski.semgrep
2 semgrep --config "p/owasp-top-ten" x --exclude='*_test.go' --
L, max-lines-per-finding 1000 --no-git-ignore -o owasp-top-ten.
L, semgrep
3 semgrep --config "p/r2c-security-audit" x --exclude='*_test.go' --
L, max-lines-per-finding 1000 --no-git-ignore -o r2c-security-audit.
L, semgrep
4 semgrep --config "p/r2c-ci" x --exclude='*_test.go' --
L, max-lines-per-finding 1000 --no-git-ignore -o r2c-ci.semgrep
5 semgrep --config "p/ci" x --exclude='*_test.go' --
L, max-lines-per-finding 1000 --no-git-ignore -o ci.semgrep
6 semgrep --config "p/golang" x --exclude='*_test.go' --
L, max-lines-per-finding 1000 --no-git-ignore -o golang.semgrep
7 semgrep --config "p/trailofbits" x --exclude='*_test.go' --
L, max-lines-per-finding 1000 --no-git-ignore -o trailofbits.semgrep
```

### Semgrep Results:

```
| Part |
```

## Gosec - Security Analysis Output Sample:

```
Results:

Colang errors in file: [:/..];

Summary:
Cosec: 2.11.0
files: 10
Nosec: 10
Nosec: 10
Insues: 10
```

THANK YOU FOR CHOOSING

