is called a matching. The table below gives the ranked preferences of the people, with most preferred on the left and least preferred on the right. man ranking woman ranking 1 B, A, C3, 2, 1Α 2 1, 2, 3A, B, CВ 3 B, A, C \mathbf{C} 2, 1, 3Given a matching, we say that two people form a rouge couple if both prefer each other to the partner they are

Say that we want to pair up the men (1,2,3) with the women (A,B,C); such a pairing

Stable Matchings.

1. Select all of the

| e partner they are currently matched to. |
|--|
| Select all of the rogue couples for the matching (1A, 2B, 3C) with respect to the preferences in the table above. |
| Review the definition of a matching and a rogue couple above. For more details read course note 4. Remember that a rogue couple requires the man and the woman to <i>mutually</i> prefer each other! |
| |

- woman to mutue (a) (1, B) (b) (1, C)(c) (2, A)(d) (2, C)
 - (e) (3, A)(f) (3, B)Let's consider the choices in turn.

current partner 1, so (3, A) do form a rogue couple.

- a) Man 1 ranks woman B above his current partner A, and woman B likewise ranks man 1 above her current partner 2, so (1, B) do form a rogue couple. b) Woman C prefers man 1 to her current partner 3, but man 1 prefers his partner A over C, so (1, C) do not form a rogue couple. c) Man 2 prefers A over his current partner, and A prefers him over her
- current partner, so (2, A) do form a rogue couple. d) While woman C prefers man 2 over her current partner 3, man 2 prefers his current partner over C, so (2, C) do not form a rogue couple. e) Man 3 prefers A over his current partner C, and A prefers him over her
- f) Man 3 prefers B over his current partner, but B does not prefer him over her current partner, so (3, B) do not form a rogue couple. 2. Again given the preferences above, select all of the rogue couples for the matching (3A, 2B, 1C).
- read course note 4. Remember that a rogue couple requires the man and the woman to *mutually* prefer each other! (a) (1, A)

Review the definition of a matching and a rogue couple above. For more details

- (b) (1, B)(c) (2, A)(d) (2, C)
- (e) (3, B)(f) (3, C)Let's consider each choice in turn.
 - a) Man 1 prefers woman A to his current partner C, but A prefers her current partner 3 over 1, so (1, A) do *not* form a rogue couple. b) Man 1 and woman B both prefer each to their current partners, so (1, B)
 - do form a rogue couple. c) Man 2 prefers woman A to his current partner, but woman A does not prefer man 2, so (2, A) do not form a rogue couple.

prefer woman C, so (2, C) do not form a rogue couple.

d) Woman C prefers man 2 over her current partner, but man 2 does not

one can convince anyone else to leave their partner in order to form a new pair.

3. Consider the preference ranks given below for the men/suitors (1,2,3,4) and

Simulate the stable marriage algorithm (with male suitors), and answer the following questions about the algorithm. We consider the first offers to have taken

 \mathbf{C}

 \mathbf{D}

4, 1, 3, 2

1, 2, 3, 4

- e) Woman A prefers man 3 to her current partner, but man 3 does not prefer woman A, so (3, A) do not form a rogue couple.
- f) Man 3 prefers woman B over his current partner, but woman B does not prefer 3, so (3, B) do not form a rogue couple.
- A matching is considered stable if it contains no rogue couples. This is because no
- The stable marriage algorithm allows us to find stable matchings. This algorithm is described in course note 4. The following problems are designed to give you

3

(a) Who did suitor 1 propose to on day 1?

practice with this algorithm.

women/suitees (A,B,C,D).

His first choice, A.

place on day 1.

ranking ranking man woman A, B, D, C 1 3, 1, 4, 2Α 2 A, C, B, D В 2, 1, 3, 4

B, C, D, A

B, A, D, C

(b) Was he rejected? • Yes No No, A received proposals from 1 and 2 and she preferred 1. (c) Who did suitor 4 propose to on day 1? His top choice, B. (d) Was he rejected?

(e) Who proposed (with a new proposal) to A on day 2?

(g) Who was 1 matched to when the algorithm terminated?

Yes, B received proposals from 3 and 4 and preferred 3.

4, because he was rejected by B on day 1 and A is the next woman on his

• Some men will get the same match as before, some will prefer their new

The algorithm run with men proposing produces a male-optimal pairing. Therefore the original matches are as high on their list as each man can hope for. Another way to arrive at the same conclusion is to note that the algorithm

• Yes No Yes, A received proposals from 4 and 1 and preferred 1.

(f) Did he get rejected?

• Yes No

(h) Who was 2 matched to when the algorithm terminated? (i) Who was 3 matched to when the algorithm terminated?

Woman A.

(j) Who was 4 matched to when the algorithm terminated?

Woman D.

- (k) Now let us simulate the algorithm with women proposing (being the suitors). Before finding the outcome, what do you think is going to happen to men's matches (compared to when they were proposing)?
- Each man will either get the same match as before, or prefer his new match. • Each man will either get the same match as before, or prefer his old
- produces male-pessimal pairings if run with women proposing. Therefore men get partners that are as low as it can be on their list in the second run. (l) Who will woman A propose to on the first day? Her top choice, 3.

(m) Who gets rejected on the first day?

- A B • C D • No one

matches, and some will prefer their old matches.

- No one gets rejected, because all men receive exactly one proposal. (n) In a male-optimal stable matching, who would be paired with man 4? The algorithm with male suitors returns a male-optimal pairing. We have
- already seen that the algorithm run with men proposing matches 4 with D. (o) In a female-optimal stable matching, who would be paired with man 4? The algorithm with female suitors returns a female-optimal pairing. In that
- matching, 4 is matched with C. (p) In a male-pessimal stable matching, who would be paired with woman A? We get the male-pessimal pairing by running the algorithm with women
- proposing. In that case A is matched with 3. (q) In a female-pessimal stable matching, who would be paired with woman A? We get the female pessimal pairing by running the algorithm with men propos-

ing. In that case A is matched with 1 as we have already seen.