CSC309 Programming on the Web

week 10: Security

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some contents are from:

- Security in Computing: Pfleeger et al.
- Computer Security: Principles and Practice, Stallings et al.

computer security

triad architectural requirements



computer security definition: protection afforded to an automated information system in order to attain the applicable objectives of preserving the integrity, availability and confidentiality of information system resources (includes hardware, software, firmware, information/data, and telecommunications).

security 10-2

all main arch. req's

- confidentiality
 - data (& system services) is not accessible to unauthorized
- integrity
 - data (& system services) are the right ones
- availability
 - data (& system services) is accessible to authorized parties
- · authenticity
 - the triad req's (above) should be verifiable
- accountability
 - all actions in the system should be traceable

security 10-3

security 10-5

preserving security is difficult (1)

- * a battle of human vs human!
 - no one is smarter!
 - -∞ to +∞!

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
preserving security is difficult (2)


- defense vs offense
 - defender needs to close all holes
 - attacker needs only one open hole
 - · one bad component in defense side is sufficient enough to fail

preserving security is difficult (3)

- · complex mechanisms, although simple req's
- requires considering potential attacks
- requires avoiding counterintuitive procedures developing error-free software is challenging
- recursive nature (developing software to protect software)
- requires deciding where to deploy mechanisms
- requires possession of secret info
- requires constant teamwork and cooperation
 - hence, good training becomes even more critical
- battle of wits between attacker / admin · not perceived on benefit until fails
- · requires regular monitoring
- * too often an afterthought
- · regarded as impediment to using system

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attacks

- attacks are threats carried out and may be
 - passive: attempt to learn or make use of information from the system that does not affect system resources
 - · Eavesdropping on, or monitoring of, transmissions
 - Goal of attacker is to obtain information that is being transmitted
 - Two types:
 - · are hard to detect, so aim to prevent them active: attempt to alter system resources or affect their operation
 - Involve some modification of the data stream or the creation of a false stream

 - Denial of service
 - · are hard to prevent, so aim to detect them

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security 10-11

defense methods (countermeasures)

- · means used to deal with security attacks
 - prevent it
 - deter it (make attacks harder)
 - deflect it (make attacks look not worthy)
 - detect it
 - recover from it
- may result in new vulnerabilities
- · will have residual vulnerability
- * the goal is to minimize risk given constraints
- depth defense (layering)

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some countermeasure mechanisms (1)

- for data
 - cryptography
- for systems
 - authentication
 - access control
 - os security measures
 - anti virus scanner
 - firewalls

some countermeasure mechanisms (2)

- physical countermeasures
 - physical protection of hardware
 - locks
 - guards
 - surveillance systems
 - off-site backup
- policies and procedures
 - covers data, systems, and physical controls

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threat consequences

- disclosure
 - data/system is accessed by an unauthorized entity
- deception
 - authorized entity accesses wrong (falsified) data/system, and believe it
- disruption
 - the data/system is not available to authorized entity

security functional

requirements (2)

• an unauthorized entity gets the control of the data/system

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requirements (1)

security functional

3 paradigm principles

- principle of easiest penetration
 - a system is only as strong as its weakest link
- principle of effectiveness
 - countermeasures must be efficient, easy, and appropriate
 - · awareness of problem
 - · likelihood of use
 - · overlapping countermeasures
 - · periodic review
- principle of adequate protection
 - security is economics

security 10-16

13 design principles (1)

- principle of simplicity
 - the design must be as small and simple as possible
- principle of closed-world assumption
 - fail-safe default (false negative is better than false positive in this context)
- principle of complete mediation
 - access should be controlled not only at arrival also throughout the system
 - · rarely used

13 design principles (2)

- principle of open design
 - cannot assume the adversary does not know your
- principle of separation of privileges
 - inspired by separation of duties (multistepping)
 - more than one privilege is needed to access a critical data/system
- principle of least privilege
 - minimize privileges given to entities

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design principles (3) principle of least common mechanism minimize the functions shared by different end-users principle of psychological acceptability do not interfere unduly with normal work of end-users principle of isolation public components should be isolated from critical ones; critical ones should be isolated from one another if can isolations should be both logically and physically principle of encapsulation object oriented form of isolation

Design principles (4) Principle of modularity develop security modules that are shared by all other modules principle of layering depth defense principle of least astonishment use transparent methods minimize surprising approach

