IMPLEMENTATION

A strategy—no matter how comprehensive—is destined to fail without the right implementation plan. Operationalizing this strategy will require: empowered and qualified leadership and personnel; devoted budgets; and much greater coordination within the U.S. government, among domestic and foreign affairs agencies, civilian and military authorities, and law enforcement and social service delivery officials. It will also hinge on the ability to massively increase flexible funding for civil society groups and community actors operating in the United States and abroad.

Debates over the right organizational structures have plagued CVE efforts since September 11, severely weakening our capacity to deal with this ideological threat. After equivocating over various organizational models for over a decade, the U.S. government cannot afford to sink more time into determining the best set-up. To implement this strategy, the Commission recommends the following organizational structures and funding mechanisms, inside and outside of the U.S. government, to significantly reduce the number of people in the United States and worldwide who are drawn to violent extremist groups.

Organizing the U.S. Government to Be an Effective Leader on CVE

Responsibility for CVE is spread across dozens of government departments and agencies, as well as several different directorates at the NSC. Although the U.S. government has extremely talented individuals working on CVE, their efforts are undermined by turf battles over mandates and authorities, bureaucratic constraints on innovation and agility, and coordination challenges. This situation has improved significantly with the creation of the CVE Task Force, under the coleadership of DHS and DOJ, and the Bureau of CT and CVE at the Department of State.

Yet, these structures are inadequate. Without a designated focal point at the NSC, there is nobody accountable for CVE results. Nobody has a bird's-eye view of all relevant efforts across CVE and counterterrorism and can therefore align policy and rationally allocate resources. No one with the president's ear wakes up every day with the sole responsibility of CVE.

This must change. The Commission recommends a new institutional structure for CVE, headed by an assistant to the president based in the NSC. S/he would be situated between and working closely with the assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism and the deputy national security adviser. This person would be responsible for synchronizing policies and programs across counterterrorism and CVE, domestically and internationally; mobilizing and coordinating resources for all government agencies with CVE-relevant mandates, including domestic agencies with a service provision focus (e.g., the Department of Education and Department of Health and Human Services); and building the public-private partnerships necessary to advance this strategy. S/he would also be the primary liaison to the independent presidential advisory council comprising technology and private-sector representatives described in the strategy. Most importantly, the assistant to the president would manage the execution of the comprehensive strategy for CVE and be held accountable for producing results.

Under this new position, the Commission recommends a tripartite leadership structure. The White House should rely on existing entities and capabilities, rather than creating a large footprint at the NSC. The CVE Task Force should

remain the domestic policy lead to leverage the coordination mechanisms it recently established. To make this arrangement sustainable, the Task Force should be given permanent office space, dedicated personnel, and a line-item budget to fund its operational costs. The Task Force also needs greater authority to enhance coordination among domestic agencies. Requiring all domestic departments and agencies to get the Task Force's clearance on new policies, programs, or outreach efforts would go a long way in synchronizing CVE efforts domestically.

The international policy lead should continue to be the State Department Bureau for CT and CVE, as it has the policy influence and relationships needed to drive CVE efforts overseas. Under the leadership of the deputy coordinator for CVE, the bureau has the critical mandate of coordinating within the State Department and with USAID, and serving as a bridge to the CVE Task Force. Currently there are four full-time staff in the bureau's CVE office, with three more positions being created. This pales in comparison to those focused on counterterrorism. The next administration should double the number of CVE slots in the bureau to fulfill its coordination function and offer technical assistance to those in Washington and in embassies responsible for CVE.

Embassies and USAID missions also play an instrumental role in identifying, supporting, and connecting grassroots actors who can make a real difference in their communities. As such, each country team should have a full-time CVE officer, from the State Department or USAID, whose job is to provide a platform for promising influencers and entrepreneurs, build and ex-



CVE RESOURCES PALE IN COMPARISON TO COUNTERTERRORISM

COUNTERTERRORISM BUDGET

CVE BUDGET

The CVE budget is

$\frac{1}{10}$

of **1%** of the counterterrorism budget.

pand networks, and find ways to support cutting-edge CVE work. The Bureau for CT and CVE should ensure that all U.S. efforts incorporate monitoring and evaluation approaches that withstand Congressional scrutiny. It should also be responsible for providing training to all foreign service officers heading overseas and those designated as the CVE focal points.

Expanding the Ecosystem for CVE

Governments cannot and should not be the main face of CVE efforts. The private sector and civil society have tremendous contributions to make, if given sufficient resources, guidance, and backing. For the past 15 years, the U.S. government has seeded a variety of networks and initiatives—from Generation Change, a global network of young leaders building community resilience and cohesiveness, to Peer-to-Peer: Challenging Violent Extremism, an effort to enlist technology-savvy university students in developing strategic messaging campaigns. It is time to build on these efforts and reinvigorate U.S. investment into existing programs and people. There is no need to reinvent the wheel—we must be aware of all of the tools at our disposal and use them to the best of our ability.

Funders

As discussed throughout this report, a dearth of resources has been a major barrier to galvanizing a CVE movement and scaling up promising initiatives. The Commission recommends three different funding mechanisms to infuse resources into the CVE space.

1. **Technology Innovation Fund.** To stimulate innovation in the online space, we need to tap into the creativity and technological prowess of the private sector. The U.S. government



should partner with leading companies to seed a technology innovation fund, modeled on In-Q-Tel, for this purpose. In-Q-Tel is an independent, not-for-profit organization created to bridge the gap between the technology needs of the U.S. intelligence community and commercial ventures. It invests in startups developing technologies that provide "ready-soon" innovation (within 36 months) vital to the intelligence community. Similarly, a CVE innovation fund, initiated by the government with the support of Congress, would bring U.S. technological innovation to the fight against violent extremist propaganda and narratives.

2. **Private Philanthropy Consortium.** The next administration should facilitate funding from the private sector, foundations, and private philanthropists for community-based CVE efforts. In particular, "venture philanthropists," which act more like venture capitalists than traditional foundations, should be a major target of outreach. Practitioners spend an enormous amount of time and effort raising small increments of funding from donors with different procedures, timelines, and requirements. This time would be better spent implementing programs and safeguarding community members from violent extremist groups. The White House could help community stakeholders tap into resources more efficiently by issuing a call to action—like My Brother's Keeper, which raised $1 billion from the private sector—to mobilize private-sector and philanthropic funding and in-kind support. The administration could also play a leadership role in pulling together a consortium of these private donors to streamline fundraising and match funders with organizations with a proven track record on CVE.[110] This model would help community-based organizations access resources without the stigma of government involvement and give private donors greater safety in numbers.[111]

3. **U.S. Government Grants.** Even with increased private-sector and philanthropic investment in CVE, there will always be a need for government funding. The Commission supports the U.S. government's efforts to increase small grants for domestic and international efforts. In particular, we agree that the budget for the Office of Community Partnerships at DHS should be increased to $100 million to cover grantmaking and related operational costs and endorse the $17.4 million that the Department of Justice requested in the president's FY 17 budget for CVE.[112] At the same time, the Commission strongly recommends that other domestic agencies like the Department of Education, Department of Health and Human Services, and Department of Housing and Urban Development—with stronger community linkages—assume a bigger role in CVE. Likewise, the Commission supports efforts within the Department of State—including the Bureau for CT and CVE, Global Engagement Center, Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, and Bureau for Educational and Cultural Exchanges—and USAID to accelerate grantmaking to grassroots organizations and networks on the cutting edge of CVE. However, in providing CVE resources, the U.S. government must keep a low profile and provide flexibility on branding requirements; embed rigorous evaluation mechanisms to measure programs' impact and

"It is time to build on these efforts and reinvigorate U.S. investment into existing programs and people. There is no need to reinvent the wheel—we must be aware of all of the tools at our disposal and use them to the best of our ability."

[110] "Homeland Security Advisory Council," 19.

[111] This consortium would complement the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), a public-private partnership aimed at strengthening resilience against violent extremist agendas. However, unlike GCERF, governments would not be involved in the management, decisionmaking, or oversight of the consortium, beyond the initial facilitative role played by the U.S. government.

[112] "Homeland Security Advisory Council," 19.

build the knowledge base; and offer long-term, core support to strengthen the capacity of its partners.

Research Institutions

Research institutions, including think tanks and universities, have a significant role to play in creating the analytical and evidence base for more successful CVE initiatives. These institutions should increasingly be tapped to generate answers on motivations and drivers, the radicalization process, and effective interventions.

1) **Public-Private Research Coalition.** A major barrier to evidence-based programming has been the divide between governments and technology companies who have access to data and researchers who need the data to conduct rigorous experiments and research. For example, researchers could use data on how users behave online after being exposed to counter- or positive messages to draw conclusions about the impact of those efforts and make recommendations for improving them. However, that would require the government and technology companies to provide access to such information. Likewise, researchers should open their datasets to the government and other researchers to avoid recreating the wheel and allow for the replication of quantitative studies. Building on RESOLVE—a global network of researchers conducting locally informed analysis on the drivers and solutions to violent extremism—the U.S. government should forge research partnerships with universities, think tanks, and the technology sector.

"Implementing this vision will require approximately $1 billion on an annual basis. While that is a huge figure...it is orders of magnitude less than the trillions required in military and law enforcement spending and the billions needed for humanitarian aid if violent extremist groups are able to gain traction."

2) **Programmatic Database.** Donors and policymakers have been reluctant to invest in CVE over lingering doubts about whether competent organizations exist to do this work and whether programs make a tangible difference. CSIS could contribute to advancing the field by developing a database of all CVE-specific programs, with concrete measures of effectiveness that could be tracked over time. Using this data, CSIS could identify the characteristics of effective programs, sharing these best practices and recommendations for scaling up successful efforts. This database could serve as the "gold standard" for assessing the efficacy of CVE programs worldwide.

Community-based Actors

Civil society and community-based organizations working on prevention, intervention, deradicalization, reintegration, and rehabilitation, as well as strategic communications, are in many ways the most important part of the CVE ecosystem. However, such groups are few and far between and need help with capacity building from their peers.

1) **Civil Society-Led Prevention Network.** The Commission endorses the idea, put forward by The Prevention Project, for a civil society-led network in the United States "to harness the efforts of the growing number of communities and professionals around the country interested in helping to prevent the violent radicalization of individuals in their communities."[113] Such a network would help amplify community efforts to intervene with individuals at-risk or in the process of being radicalized. It would also provide emerging CVE professionals with a platform for sharing information, best practices, and lessons learned with each other and with more established practitioners and social service providers (e.g., those working in related fields like drug prevention and treatment, mental health provision, gang violence prevention and rehabilitation).

2) **Network of Young Leaders.** Through its education and cultural exchange programs, the U.S. government has identified and invested in young leaders from all over the world. These are individuals who were handpicked because of their potential as role models and changemakers. The government should capitalize on these investments, creating a global network of young leaders who are interested in CVE, community resilience, or related areas. Through the network, thousands of grassroots actors could share information and best practices, raising the bar for a new generation of practitioners.

[113] Eric Rosand, "Communities First: A National Prevention Network to Defeat ISIS," *The Hill*, August 2, 2016, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/290046-communities-first-a-national-prevention-network-to

Capacity Building and Intermediary Organizations

For CVE efforts to ever reach scale, the United States and its allies need to invest in international and national nongovernmental organizations with a proven track record in CVE, existing partnerships and networks, and strong capacity. The Commission recommends investing in such "intermediary organizations" to drive major strides in the field and help build the capacity of policymakers and practitioners.

1) **CVE Accelerators.** The United States and its allies, as well as the private sector, should make major investments in existing hubs and agencies that use research, technology, and a start-up mentality to incubate and accelerate evidence-based CVE programs and narrative campaigns. Such organizations occupy a central role in creating opportunities for entrepreneurs to design and implement successful CVE operations. With a proven track record and trust from both the government and civil society, they are also essential in delivering cutting-edge CVE programs, innovating and distributing strategic messaging campaigns, and mobilizing social movements against extremism, both on- and offline.

2) **CVE Training Academies.** Training academies in the United States and overseas—run by nongovernmental organizations and civil society actors and funded by the government—could fill vital knowledge gaps for government actors, law enforcement officials, local organizations, parents, teachers, and social workers. One model for this effort is the Hedayah International Center of Excellence, a UAE-based hub for building the capacity of CVE actors across the globe. Educational programs could cover: the risks and warning signs of radicalization; effective methods of counseling and mentoring; child brain development; how violent extremists use social media; how parents and social workers can discuss extremist propaganda; and trust-building and prevention fundamentals, including how to intervene with at-risk individuals. Ideally, CVE academies would connect policymakers and practitioners, informing community-level engagements with the understanding of how violent extremism manifests and how it can be stopped.

Funding CVE

Implementing this vision will require approximately $1 billion from the U.S. government on an annual basis. While that is a huge figure—and a significant increase for CVE funding—it is orders of magnitude less than the trillions required in military and law enforcement spending and the billions needed for humanitarian aid if violent extremist groups are able to gain traction. This number is the least amount required to scale up CVE efforts to match the seriousness of the threat and catalyze further investment. The United States cannot do this alone, but this commitment is the first step in the right direction.

The Commission recommends the following allocation of funds to maximize the impact of this strategy on reducing the radicalization and recruitment of young people in the United States and all over the world.

Grantmaking—$550 million

Technology Innovation Fund (In-Q-Tel model): $150 million

Domestic small grants and related operational costs: $150 million

International small grants and related operational costs: $250 million

Research—$50 million

Public-Private Research Coalition: $10 million

Programmatic Database: $5 million

Independent Research: $35 million

Community-based Actors—$65 million

Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs: $45 million

Network of Networks—Young Leaders: $20 million

Capacity Building Organizations—$85 million

CVE Accelerators: $55 million

Training Academies (3 at $10 million/year): $30 million

Civil-Military "Jump Teams"—$250 million

Operational Costs: $250 million

U.S. investment in these areas is not intended to fulfill the vast need. Rather, the Commission's recommendations are meant to spur other countries and stakeholders to ramp up their support for and commitment to CVE. With these elements and resources in place, we can significantly reduce support for violent extremism and safeguard this generation and generations to come. □