

# NUMERICAL METHODS FOR TIME INCONSISTENCY, PRIVATE INFORMATION AND LIMITED COMMITMENT

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# ONE-SIDED LACK OF COMMITMENT

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{\{c_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} E_{-1} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (y_t - c_t) \\ & s.t. \quad E_{-1} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t) \geq U_0 \\ & \quad u(c_t) + \beta E_t \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^{j-1} u(c_{t+j}) \geq u(y_t) + \beta U_{aut} \forall t \end{aligned}$$

Assume  $y_t$  is i.i.d. and its support is  $\mathbf{Y} \equiv \{\bar{y}_s\}_{s=1}^S$ . Call its distribution function  $\pi_s, s = 1, \dots, S$ .

# PROMISED UTILITY

Define the *agent's promised utility* as:

$$U_t \equiv E_{t-1} \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j u(c_{t+j}) \quad (1)$$

This variable summarizes the promises that the principal makes to the agent in each period.

# RECURSIVE CONTRACT

- Principal enters period  $t$  with a promise  $U_-$  made in  $t - 1$
- Complies with previous promise by choosing state-contingent consumption  $c_s, s = 1, \dots, S$  and a new promise  $U_s, s = 1, \dots, S$
- Let  $P(U_-)$  be the value function of the principal:

$$P(U_-) = \max_{\{c_s, U_s\}_{s=1}^S} \sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s [\bar{y}_s - c_s + \beta P(U_s)] \quad (2)$$

$$s.t. \quad \sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s [u(c_s) + \beta U_s] \geq U_- \quad (3)$$

$$u(c_s) + \beta U_s \geq u(\bar{y}_s) + \beta U_{aut} \quad s = 1, \dots, S \quad (4)$$

$$c_s \in C \quad (5)$$

$$U_s \in \mathcal{U} \quad (6)$$

## THE SET $\mathcal{U}$

The set  $\mathcal{U}$  is obtained iterating on the APS operator  $B$  defined as:

$$B(W) = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} U \in W : \sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s [u(c_s) + \beta U_s] \geq U, \\ u(c_s) + \beta U_s \geq u(\bar{y}_s) + \beta U_{aut} \quad s = 1, \dots, S \\ c_s \in C \quad s = 1, \dots, S \end{array} \right\} \quad (7)$$

# GETTING A SOLUTION

Apart from this set, the functional equation looks like a Bellman equation in which we have the agent's value function as a state variable. Therefore, we can characterize the optimal contracts in two steps:

- 1 Find the set  $\mathcal{U}$  by repeatedly applying the operator  $B$  defined in (7)
- 2 Solve the Bellman equation as usual, either with value function iteration or Howard's improvement algorithm.

# ENDOWMENT IS PRIVATE INFORMATION

$$\max_{\{\tau_t(y^t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{y^t \in Y^{t+1}} \beta^t \left[ -\tau_t(y^t) \right] \pi(y^t | y_{-1}) \quad (8)$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{y^t \in Y^{t+1}} \beta^t u(c_t(y^t)) \pi(y^t | y_{-1}) \geq U_0 \quad (9)$$

$$DIC_t(y^{t-1}, \bar{y}_i; \bar{y}_{i-1}) \geq 0 \quad \forall y^{t-1}, \quad \forall \bar{y}_i, \quad i = 2, \dots, M \quad (10)$$

# RECURSIVE CONTRACT

$$P(U_-) = \max_{\{\tau_s, U_s\}_{s=1}^S} \sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s [-\tau_s + \beta P(U_s)] \quad (11)$$

$$s.t. \quad \sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s [u(\tau_s + \bar{y}_s) + \beta U_s] = U_- \quad (12)$$

$$u(\tau_s + \bar{y}_s) + \beta U_s \geq u(\tau_{s-1} + \bar{y}_s) + \beta U_{s-1} \quad s = 2, \dots, S \quad (13)$$

$$c_s \in C \quad (14)$$

$$U_s \in \mathcal{U} \quad (15)$$



# THE SET $\mathcal{U}$

$\mathcal{U}$  is the fixed point of the operator:

$$B(W) = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} U \in W : \sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s [u(\tau_s + \bar{y}_s) + \beta U_s] \geq U, \\ u(\tau_s + \bar{y}_s) + \beta U_s \geq u(\tau_{s-1} + \bar{y}_s) + \beta U_{s-1} \quad s = 2, \dots, S \\ c_s \in C \quad s = 1, \dots, S \end{array} \right\} \quad (16)$$

# HIDDEN EFFORT

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \max_{\{\tau_t(y^t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{y^t \in Y^{t+1}} \beta^t \left[ -\tau_t(y^t) \right] \pi(y^t \mid a^{t-1}(y^{t-1})) \\
 & \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{y^t \in Y^{t+1}} \beta^t \left[ u(c_t(y^t)) - v(a_t(y^t)) \right] \pi(y^t \mid a^{t-1}(y^{t-1})) \geq U_0 \\
 & \quad \left\{ a_t(y^t) \right\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \in \arg \max_{\{a_t(y^t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{y^t \in Y^{t+1}} \beta^t \left[ u(c_t(y^t)) - v(a_t(y^t)) \right] \pi(y^t \mid a^{t-1}(y^{t-1}))
 \end{aligned}$$

# RECURSIVE CONTRACT

$$P(U_-, \bar{y}_i) = \max_{\{c, \{U_s\}_{s=1}^S, a^*\}} \left[ \bar{y}_i - c + \beta \sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s(a^*) P(U_s, \bar{y}_s) \right] \quad (17)$$

$$s.t. \quad u(c) - v(a^*) + \beta \sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s(a^*) U_s = U_- \quad (18)$$

$$a^* = \arg \max_{a \in A} \left\{ u(c) - v(a) + \beta \sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s(a) U_s \right\} \quad (19)$$

$$c \in C, a \in A \quad (20)$$

$$U_s \in \mathcal{U} \quad (21)$$

Notice different timing convention: effort affects the probability of the state tomorrow

# THE SET $\mathcal{U}$

$\mathcal{U}$  is the fixed point of the operator:

$$B(W) = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} U \in W : u(c) - v(a^*) + \beta \sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s(a^*) U_s = U, \\ a^* = \arg \max_{a \in A} \left\{ u(c) - v(a) + \beta \sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s(a) U_s \right\} \\ c \in C, a \in A \quad s = 1, \dots, S \end{array} \right\} \quad (22)$$

# OPTIMAL FISCAL POLICY

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{c_t, b_t, l_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \quad & E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [u(c_t) + v(l_t)] \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & c_t - \beta \frac{E_t u'(c_{t+1})}{u'(c_t)} b_{t+1}^g = -(c_t + g_t) \frac{v'(c_t + g_t)}{u'(c_t)} - b_t^g \end{aligned}$$

# OPTIMAL FISCAL POLICY (CONT.)

Small departure from APS:

- Instead of using the continuation value of the agent as a state variable, we are going to use the marginal utility of consumption
- We have already a state variable in this problem: debt holdings.
- We have to characterize a feasible set for continuation values for any value of debt holdings: i.e. a correspondence

# RECURSIVE CONTRACT

Let  $m \equiv u'(c)$ , govt expenditure can take  $S$  values and is i.i.d. as in previous examples

$$P(m_-, \bar{g}_s, b_-) = \max_{\{c, b, l, \{m_s\}_{s=1}^S\}} u(c) + v(l) + \beta \sum_{s=1}^S P(m_s, \bar{g}_s, b) \quad (23)$$

$$s.t. \quad c - \beta \frac{\sum_{s=1}^S m_s}{m_-} b = -(c + \bar{g}_s) \frac{v'(c + \bar{g}_s)}{m_-} - b_- \quad (24)$$

$$c \in C, l \in L, b \in B \quad (25)$$

$$m_s \in \mathcal{U}(b_-) \quad (26)$$

# THE SET $\mathcal{U}(b_-)$

$\mathcal{U}(b_-)$  is the fixed point of the operator

$$B(W(b_-)) = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} m \in W(b_-) : c - \beta \frac{\sum_{s=1}^S m_s}{m_-} b = -(c + \bar{g}_s) \frac{v'(c + \bar{g}_s)}{m_-} - b_- \\ c \in C, l \in L, b \in B \end{array} \right\} \quad (27)$$

This set changes as  $b_-$  changes



$$DP^2 = (\text{CURSE OF DIMENSIONALITY})^2$$

- Any application can be solved by a two-step procedure:
  - 1 Characterize the set of continuation values
  - 2 Solve the Bellman equation
- First step causes many troubles if other ("natural") state variables or several agents (e.g., optimal fiscal policy)
- Set of admissible continuation values is a correspondence that maps from the set of natural states to the set of continuation values
- I don't know any paper that works with more than 2 natural states

# THE LAGRANGEAN APPROACH

# INTRODUCTION

- APS suggest to "recursify" the problem by using the continuation values as state variables
- Marcet and Marimon (2017): use duality theory (i.e., Lagrangean methods)
- Provide a recursive formulation in terms of a **saddle point functional equation**: auxiliary state variables are obtained from Lagrange multipliers
- Big advantage: does not suffer from "curse of dimensionality squared"
- Disadvantage: does not work in all situations

# NON-STANDARD DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING

Many dynamic problems we face in (macro)economics can be described with the following non-standard dynamic programming problem:

$$V(x, s) = \sup_{a_t} E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t r(x_t, a_t, s_t) \quad \text{PP}$$

$$s.t. \quad x_{t+1} = \ell(x_t, a_t, s_{t+1}), \quad p(x_t, a_t, s_t) \geq 0$$

$$E_t \sum_{n=1}^{N_j+1} \beta^n h_0^j(x_{t+n}, a_{t+n}, s_{t+n}) + h_1^j(x_t, a_t, s_t) \geq 0 \quad (28)$$

$$j = 1, \dots, l; \quad t \geq 0, \quad x_0 = x, s_0 = s,$$

$$N_j = \infty \quad \text{for } j = 1, \dots, k \quad N_j = 0 \quad \text{for } j = k+1, \dots, l$$

## GENERALIZATION OF THE PROBLEM

$$V_{\mu}(x, s) = \sup_{\{a_t\}} E \left[ \sum_{j=0}^l \sum_{t=0}^{N_j} \beta^t \mu^j h_0^j(x_t, a_t, s_t) \mid s \right] \quad \mathbf{PP}_{\mu}$$

$$s.t. \quad x_{t+1} = \ell(x_t, a_t, s_{t+1}), \quad p(x_t, a_t, s_t) \geq 0 \quad (29)$$

$$E_t \sum_{n=1}^{N_j+1} \beta^n h_0^j(x_{t+n}, a_{t+n}, s_{t+n}) + h_1^j(x_t, a_t, s_t) \geq 0 \quad (30)$$

$$j = 0, \dots, l; \quad t \geq 0, \quad x_0 = x, s_0 = s,$$

$$N_j = \infty \quad \text{for } j = 1, \dots, k \quad N_j = 0 \quad \text{for } j = k+1, \dots, l$$

# GENERALIZATION OF THE PROBLEM (CONT.)

- $\mathbf{PP} = \mathbf{PP}_\mu$  when  $\mu = (1, 0, 0, \dots, 0)$ , and  $h_0^0(x, a, s) \equiv r(x, a, s)$ ,  
 $h_0^1(x, a, s) \equiv r(x, a, s) - R$  where  $R > 0$  is a large, never binding bound.
- The value function of this problem takes the form  $V_\mu(x, s) = \mu v_\mu(x, s)$ ,  
 i.e. it looks like a social welfare function with Pareto weights given by the vector  $\mu$

# SADDLE-POINT PROBLEM

By attaching Lagrange multipliers  $\gamma^j$  to the first-period constraints (28), you can transform  $(\mathbf{PP}_\mu)$  in the following saddle point problem  $(\mathbf{SPP}_\mu)$ :

$$\inf_{\gamma \in R_+^l} \sup_{\{a_t\}} \sum_{j=0}^l \left( \mu^j h_0^j(x, a_0, s) + \gamma^j h_1^j(x, a_0, s) \right) + \quad \mathbf{SPP}_\mu$$

$$+ \beta E \left[ \sum_{j=0}^k \left( \mu^j + \gamma^j \right) \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \beta^n h_0^j(x_n, a_n, s_n) + \sum_{j=k+1}^l \gamma^j h_0^j(x_1, a_1, s_1) \mid s \right]$$

$$s.t. \quad x_{t+1} = \ell(x_t, a_t, s_{t+1}), \quad p(x_t, a_t, s_t) \geq 0, \quad t \geq 0$$

$$E_t \sum_{n=1}^{N_j+1} \beta^n h_0^j(x_{t+n}, a_{t+n}, s_{t+n}) + h_1^j(x_t, a_t, s_t) \geq 0$$

$$j = 1, \dots, l; \quad t \geq 1$$

# SADDLE-POINT PROBLEM (CONT.)

- We have incorporated the period-0 constraints (28) in the objective of this *inf sup* problem
- Crucial step: show that this problem has a recursive structure
- Define a law of motion  $\varphi$  for the weights  $\mu$  as follows:  

$$\mu^{tj} = \varphi(\mu, \gamma, s) = \mu^j + \gamma^j \text{ if } N_j = \infty, \text{ and } \mu^{tj} = \varphi(\mu, \gamma, s) = \gamma^j \text{ if } N_j = 0$$
- The solution  $\gamma^*$  of  $\mathbf{SPP}_\mu$  in state  $(x, s)$  generates a new problem  $\mathbf{SPP}_{\varphi(\mu, \gamma^*, s)}$  in state  $(x^{*'}, s')$
- MM show that solutions of  $\mathbf{SPP}_{\varphi(\mu, \gamma^*, s)}$  in state  $(x^{*'}, s')$  are one-period ahead solutions of  $\mathbf{SPP}_\mu$  in state  $(x, s)$ , i.e.  $\mathbf{SPP}_\mu$  is recursive



# SADDLE-POINT FUNCTIONAL EQUATION

This implies that the optimal solution of  $\mathbf{SPP}_\mu$  satisfies the following functional equation:

$$W(x, \mu, s) = \inf_{\gamma \geq 0} \sup_a \left\{ \mu h_0(x, a, s) + \gamma h_1(x, a, s) + \beta E \left[ W(x', \mu', s') \mid s \right] \right\}$$

**SPFE**

$$\begin{aligned} s.t. \quad & x' = \ell(x, a, s'), \quad p(x, a, s) \geq 0 \\ & \mu' = \varphi(\mu, \gamma, s) \end{aligned}$$

(31)

# SADDLE-POINT FUNCTIONAL EQUATION (CONT.)

- This is a saddle-point functional equation which is the analog of Bellman equation for problems with constraints in the form of (28)
- Recursivity comes from the Lagrange multipliers: we use Lagrange multipliers as record-keeping tools, that incorporate the promises of the contract
  - For  $N_j = \infty$ , the relevant state is the sum of past Lagrange multipliers
  - For  $N_j = 0$  we use the past Lagrange multiplier as a state variable

# SUMMARY

- MM show that problems like ( $\mathbf{PP}_\mu$ ) can be solved recursively by using (cumulated) Lagrange multipliers as state variables
- Standard way to proceed: write down the Lagrangean of the problem at hand, and solve the functional equation ( $\mathbf{SPFE}$ ) associated with it
- Value function iteration or Howard's improvement algorithm work well for this methodology **if the policy correspondence is single-valued** (see Marimon, Messner and Pavoni (2009) for examples)
- The majority of applications solve Lagrangean's FOCs (even more problematic...)

# ASSUMPTIONS (ALL AT ONCE)

## ASSUMPTION 1

*$S$  is a countable set, and the process  $\{s_t\}$  is Markov.*

## ASSUMPTION 2

*$X$  and  $A$  are convex subsets of  $R^n$  and  $R^m$ . Functions  $p(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$  and  $\ell(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$  are continuous. For any  $(x, s) \in X \times S$  there exists  $\tilde{a} \in A$  such that  $p(x, \tilde{a}, s) > 0$ .*

## ASSUMPTION 3

*$\ell(\cdot, \cdot, s)$  is linear and  $p(\cdot, \cdot, s)$  is concave.*

# ASSUMPTIONS (ALL AT ONCE)

## ASSUMPTION 4

*Given  $(x, s) \in X \times S$  there exist constants  $B > 0$  and  $\varphi \in (0, \beta^{-1})$  such that if  $p(x, a, s) \geq 0$  and  $x' = \ell(x, a, s')$ , then  $\|a\| \leq B\|x\|$  and  $\|x'\| \leq \varphi\|x\|$ .*

## ASSUMPTION 5

*$h_i^j(\cdot, \cdot, s)$ ,  $i = 0, 1, j = 0, \dots, l$ , are continuous and uniformly bounded,  $h_0^j(\cdot, \cdot, s)$  is non-decreasing and  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ .*

## ASSUMPTION 6

*$h_i^j(\cdot, \cdot, s)$ ,  $i = 0, 1, j = 0, \dots, l$ , are continuously differentiable on  $\{(x, a) : p(x, a, s) > 0\}$ .*

# ASSUMPTIONS (ALL AT ONCE)

## ASSUMPTION 7

$h_i^j(\cdot, \cdot, s)$ ,  $i = 0, 1, j = 0, \dots, l$ , are concave.

## ASSUMPTION 8

Assumption 7 holds and moreover  $h_0^j(\cdot, \cdot, s)$ ,  $j = 0, \dots, l$ , are strictly concave.

## ASSUMPTION 9

For all  $(x, s)$ , there exists a plan  $\{\tilde{a}\}_{n=0}^\infty$  with initial conditions  $(x, s)$  which satisfies the inequality constraints (29) and (30) with strict inequality.

# ASSUMPTIONS (ALL AT ONCE)

- Assumptions 1-5 are quite standard for many models
- Assumption 4 allows for technologies that yield long-run growth (e.g. AK technology in Ramsey growth model)
- Under Assumptions 1 - 5 and 7, and given  $\mu \in R_+^{l+1}$ , there is a solution  $\mathbf{a}^* \equiv \{a_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$  that solves  $\mathbf{PP}_\mu$  with initial conditions  $(x, s)$ , achieving the value  $V_\mu(x, s)$
- If Assumption 8 holds, the solution is unique.

$$PP_\mu \Rightarrow SPP_\mu$$

The first theorem links the solution of  $\mathbf{PP}_\mu$  to  $\mathbf{SPP}_\mu$ .

### THEOREM 1

$(\mathbf{PP}_\mu \Rightarrow \mathbf{SPP}_\mu)$  *Let Assumptions 1 - 5, 7 and 9 be satisfied. Given  $\mu \in R_+^{l+1}$ , let  $\mathbf{a}^*$  be a solution of  $\mathbf{PP}_\mu$  with initial conditions  $(x, s)$ . Then there exists  $\gamma^* \in R_+^l$  such that  $(\mathbf{a}^*, \gamma^*)$  is a solution to  $\mathbf{SPP}_\mu$  in state  $(x, s)$ , and the value of the latter is  $V_\mu(x, s)$ .*



$$PP_\mu \Leftarrow SPP_\mu$$

The second theorem proves the converse result, and it is worth mentioning that it is basically assumption-free:

## THEOREM 2

**( $SPP_\mu \Rightarrow PP_\mu$ )** Given  $\mu \in R_+^{l+1}$  and initial conditions  $(x, s)$ , let  $(\mathbf{a}^*, \gamma^*)$  be a solution to  **$SPP_\mu$** . Then  $\mathbf{a}^*$  is a solution to  **$PP_\mu$**  in state  $(x, s)$ .

# SADDLE-POINT POLICY CORRESPONDENCE

Define the saddle-point policy correspondence as:

$$\Psi(x, \mu, s) = \left\{ (a^*, \gamma^*) : W(x, \mu, s) = \mu h_0(x, a^*, s) + \gamma^* h_1(x, a^*, s) + \beta E \left[ W(x^{*'}, \mu^{*'}, s') \mid s \right] \right. \\ \left. s.t. \quad x^{*'} = \ell(x, a^*, s'), \quad p(x, a^*, s) \geq 0, \quad \mu^{*'} = \varphi(\mu, \gamma^*, s) \right\}$$

# $(SPP_\mu \Rightarrow SPFE)$

We can therefore state the result:

## THEOREM 3

**$(SPP_\mu \Rightarrow SPFE)$**  *Let  $W(x, \mu, s) \equiv V_\mu(x, s)$  be the value of  $SPP_\mu$  at  $(x, s)$ , for an arbitrary  $(x, \mu, s)$ , then the value function  $W$  satisfies **SPFE**. In particular, if  $(\mathbf{a}^*, \gamma^*)$  is a solution to  $SPP_\mu$  in state  $(x, s)$ , then  $(a_0^*, \gamma^*) \in \Psi(x, \mu, s)$ .*

$$(\mathbf{SPP}_\mu \Leftarrow \mathbf{SPFE})$$

The converse is also true under differentiability assumptions:

#### THEOREM 4

$(\mathbf{SPFE} \Rightarrow \mathbf{SPP}_\mu)$  *Let  $W$  be continuous in  $(x, \mu)$ , concave in  $z$ , homogeneous of degree one in  $\mu$ , and satisfy  $\mathbf{SPFE}$ . Let Assumption 6 hold. Then if  $(\mathbf{a}^*, \gamma^*)$  is generated by the saddle-point policy function  $\psi$  associated with  $W$  from initial conditions  $(x, \mu, s)$ , and  $p(x_t^*, a_t^*, s_t) > 0$  for any  $t$  and any  $s_t$ , then  $(\mathbf{a}^*, \gamma^*)$  is also a solution to  $\mathbf{SPP}_\mu$  at  $(x, s)$ .*

## NOTICE THAT:

- Conditions under which Theorem 4 holds are quite standard
- Homogeneity, continuity and boundedness of  $W$  are due to Assumptions 2-5
- Concavity and differentiability of  $W$  are more restrictive, and due to Assumptions 7 and 6
- However, Theorem 4 can be proved also without Assumptions 7 and 6: in that case the only restrictive condition is that  $(\mathbf{a}^*, \gamma^*)$  must be generated by a saddle-point policy function, i.e. must be uniquely determined.

# SPFE

- Next result: **SPFE** is a contraction mapping
- We can use iterative methods analogous to dynamic programming to solve for the optimal policy

# SPFE

- Next result: **SPFE** is a contraction mapping
- We can use iterative methods analogous to dynamic programming to solve for the optimal policy
- $W$  is homogeneous of degree one in  $\mu$  and we can therefore rewrite it as  $W = \mu \omega$ . Define the set  $M$  as:

$$M = \{ \omega : X \times R_+^{l+1} \times S \rightarrow R^{l+1} \text{ s.t. for } j = 0, \dots, l$$

- $\omega_j(\cdot, \cdot, s)$  is continuous, and  $\omega_j(\cdot, \mu, s)$  is bounded if  $\|\mu\| \leq 1$
- $\omega_j(\cdot, \mu, s)$  is concave, and
- $\omega_j(x, \cdot, s)$  is convex and homogeneous of degree zero }

# DYNAMIC SADDLE-POINT PROBLEM

Define the Dynamic Saddle-Point Problem as:

$$\inf_{\gamma \geq 0} \sup_a \left\{ \mu h_0(x, a, s) + \gamma h_1(x, a, s) + \beta E \left[ \mu' \omega(x', \mu', s') \mid s \right] \right\} \quad \mathbf{DSPP}_{(x, \mu, s)}$$

$$s.t. \quad x' = \ell(x, a, s'), \quad p(x, a, s) \geq 0$$

$$\mu' = \varphi(\mu, \gamma, s)$$



# INTERIORITY ASSUMPTION

In order to have a well defined program in  $\mathbf{DSPP}_{(x,\mu,s)}$ , we need to make the following interiority assumption:

## ASSUMPTION 10

*For any  $(x, \mu, s) \in X \times R_+^{l+1} \times S$ , there exists  $\tilde{a} \in A$  satisfying Assumption 2 such that for any  $\mu' \in R_+^{l+1}$ ,  $\|\mu'\| \leq 1$ , and  $j = 0, \dots, l$  the following holds:*

$$h_1^j(x, \tilde{a}, s) + \beta E \left[ \omega^j(\ell(x, \tilde{a}, s), \mu', s') \mid s \right] > 0.$$

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$$h_1^j(x, \tilde{a}, s) + \beta E \left[ \omega^j(\ell(x, \tilde{a}, s), \mu', s') \mid s \right] > 0.$$

This assumption is satisfied whenever Assumption 9 is and  $\mu' \omega(\ell(x, \tilde{a}, s), \mu', s')$  is the value function of  $\mathbf{SPP}_{(\ell(x, \tilde{a}, s), \mu', s')}$ .

# DSPP $_{(x,\mu,s)}$ HAS A SOLUTION

## PROPOSITION 1

*Let  $\omega \in M$  and assume Assumptions 1-5, 7 and 10 hold. Then there exists  $(a^*, \gamma^*)$  that solves **DSPP** $_{(x,\mu,s)}$ . If Assumption 8 is satisfied, then  $a^*(x, \mu, s)$  is unique.*

# **DSPP**<sub>(x,μ,s)</sub> HAS A SOLUTION

## PROPOSITION 1

*Let  $\omega \in M$  and assume Assumptions 1-5, 7 and 10 hold. Then there exists  $(a^*, \gamma^*)$  that solves **DSPP**<sub>(x,μ,s)</sub>. If Assumption 8 is satisfied, then  $a^*(x, \mu, s)$  is unique.*

Assume from now on that:

## ASSUMPTION 11

**DSPP**<sub>(x,μ,s)</sub> has a unique solution

# THE SADDLE-POINT OPERATOR

We can write **SPFE** as

$$\begin{aligned} \mu \omega(x, \mu, s) = & \mu h_0(x, a^*, s) + \gamma^* h_1(x, a^*, s) + \\ & + \beta E \left[ \varphi(\mu, \gamma^*, s) \omega(x^*, \varphi(\mu, \gamma^*, s), s') \mid s \right] \end{aligned}$$

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and notice that at the optimum:

$$\gamma^{*j} \left\{ h_1^j(x, a^*, s) + \beta E \left[ \omega_j(x^*, \varphi(\mu, \gamma^*, s), s') \mid s \right] \right\} = 0$$

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We can use these two facts to define **SPFE** operator  $T : M \rightarrow M$

$$\omega_j(x, \mu, s) = h_0^j(x, a^*(x, \mu, s), s) + \beta E \left[ \omega_j(x', \mu', s') \mid s \right] \quad (32)$$

if  $j = 0, \dots, k$ , and

$$\omega_j(x, \mu, s) = h_0^j(x, a^*(x, \mu, s), s) \quad \text{if } j = k+1, \dots, l \quad (33)$$

# THE SADDLE-POINT OPERATOR IS A CONTRACTION MAPPING

- Let  $M^j$  be the  $j$ -th projection of  $M$ ,  $j = 0, \dots, l$ .
- Let  $T^j : M^j \rightarrow M^j$  be the "individual" operator defined by (32)-(33) under Assumption 11.



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- Therefore it is possible to show:

## LEMMA 5

*Let Assumptions 1-5, 7, 8, 10 and 11 hold. Then  $T^j : M^j \rightarrow M^j$  is a contraction mapping.*

$$\mathbf{DSPP}_{(x,\mu,s)} \Rightarrow \mathbf{PP}_\mu(x,s)$$

By using Lemma 5, and Theorems 2 and 4, we obtain the final result:

### THEOREM 6

$\left( \mathbf{DSPP}_{(x,\mu,s)} \Rightarrow \mathbf{PP}_\mu(x,s) \right)$  *Let Assumptions 1-5, 7, 8, 10 and 11 hold. Then  $T : M \rightarrow M$  has a unique solution  $\omega$ , which defines a value function  $W(x, \mu, s) = \mu \omega(x, \mu, s)$  and a saddle-point policy function  $\psi$ , such that if  $(\mathbf{a}^*, \gamma^*)$  is generated by  $\psi$  from  $(x, \mu, s)$ , then  $\mathbf{a}^*$  is the unique solution to  $\mathbf{PP}_\mu$  at  $(x, s)$ .*

# A THEOREM WITHOUT CONCAVITY ASSUMPTIONS

We can have unique solutions also without concavity. Define  $\tilde{M}$  as the set  $M$  without the concavity assumption:

## COROLLARY 7

**(Bounded returns)** Let Assumptions 1-5 and that for all  $(x, \mu, s)$  Assumption 11 hold. Then  $T : \tilde{M} \rightarrow \tilde{M}$  has a unique solution  $\omega$ , which defines a value function  $W(x, \mu, s) = \mu \omega(x, \mu, s)$  and a saddle-point policy function  $\psi$ , such that if  $(\mathbf{a}^*, \gamma^*)$  is generated by  $\psi$  from  $(x, \mu, s)$ , then  $\mathbf{a}^*$  is the unique solution to  $\mathbf{PP}_\mu$  at  $(x, s)$ .

# NUMERICAL APPROACHES

- We showed that the operator defined by the functional equation is a contraction mapping
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- Another approach is Parameterized Expectations

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$$g\left(E_t\left[\phi(z_{t+1}, z_t) \mid x_t\right], z_t, z_{t-1}, u_t\right) = 0 \quad (34)$$

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where  $x_t$  is a subset of  $(z_{t-1}, u_t)$  and a vector of state variables.

- Conditional expectations in (34) is recursive

$$E_t\left[\phi(z_{t+1}, z_t) \mid x_t\right] = \mathcal{E}(x_t) \quad (35)$$

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- The task is to find a good approximation

# PARAMETERIZED EXPECTATIONS ALGORITHM

- 1 Write the system of equations (34) such that it is invertible in its second argument. Find a set of state variables that satisfy (35). Replace the true conditional expectation by the parameterized function  $\psi(\beta; \cdot)$  and get (36). Fix initial conditions  $(z_0, u_0)$ . Generate a series  $\{u_t\}_{t=0}^T$  for T large.

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- 2 Given  $\beta$ , recursively calculate  $\{z_t(\beta)\}_{t=0}^T$  using (36) and the series  $\{u_t\}_{t=0}^T$  generated in step 1.
- 3 Find a new vector of parameters  $G(\beta)$  that solves the following non-linear least squares problem:

$$G(\beta) = \arg \min_{\xi} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=0}^T \|\phi(z_{t+1}(\beta), z_t(\beta)) - \psi(\xi; x_t(\beta))\| \quad (37)$$

which is easy to solve if we perform a NLLS regression of  $\phi(z_{t+1}(\beta), z_t(\beta))$  on  $\psi(\xi; x_t(\beta))$ .



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- 4 Iterate on steps 2-3 until you get the fixed point of  $G(\cdot)$ , i.e. until  $G(\beta_f) \approx \beta_f$  in numerical terms.

# OPTIMAL POLICY

The problem was:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{c_t, b_t, l_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \quad & E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [u(c_t) + v(l_t)] \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & c_t - \beta \frac{E_t u'(c_{t+1})}{u'(c_t)} b_{t+1}^g = -(c_t + g_t) \frac{v'(c_t + g_t)}{u'(c_t)} - b_t^g \end{aligned}$$

# OPTIMAL POLICY

Define:

$$y_t \equiv \frac{-(c_t + g_t) v'(c_t + g_t) + b_t u'(c_t) - c_t u'(c_t)}{b_{t+1}} \quad (38)$$

Notice that we can transform it in a  $\mathbf{PP}_\mu$  problem in the following way. Let  $l \equiv 1$ ,  $N_0 = \infty$  and  $N_1 = 0$ ,  $s \equiv g$ ,  $x \equiv b$ ,  $a \equiv (c, l)$ ,  $p(x, a, s) \equiv l - (c + g)$ ,  $h_0^0(x, a, s) \equiv u(c) + v(c + g)$ ,  $h_0^1(x, a, s) \equiv u'(c)$ ,  $h_1^0(x, a, s) \equiv h_0^0(x, a, s) - R$ ,  $R$  big,  $h_1^1(x, a, s) \equiv -y$ , and  $\ell(x, a, s) \equiv \frac{-(c+g)v'(c+g)+bu'(c)-cu'(c)}{y}$ .

# OPTIMAL POLICY

$$\max_{\{c_t, b_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} E \left[ \left\{ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \mu^0 [u(c_t) + v(c_t + g_t)] \right\} + \mu^1 [u'(c_0)] | s \right] \quad (\mathbf{PP}_{\mu} \text{ Optimal Policy})$$

$$s.t. \quad b_{t+1} = \frac{-(c_t + g_t) v'(c_t + g_t) + b_t u'(c_t) - c_t u'(c_t)}{y_t}$$

$$E_t \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \beta^n [u(c_n) + v(c_n + g_n)] + [u(c_t) + v(c_t + g_t) - R] \geq 0 \quad t \geq 0 \quad (39)$$

$$\beta E_t [u(c_{t+1})] - y_t \geq 0 \quad t \geq 0 \quad (40)$$

# OPTIMAL POLICY

- Write down the Lagrangean of ((**PP** <sub>$\mu$</sub>  Optimal Policy)) (Lagrange multipliers  $\gamma_t^j$ )
- Use constraints (40) multiplied by  $b_{t+1}$
- Constraint (39) is always not binding because of our interiority assumptions  $\rightarrow \gamma_t^0 = 0$  for any  $t$
- We can consider the relaxed program where there is no the sequence of constraints (39).

# THE LAGRANGEAN

We can write the Lagrangean as:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{L}(\{c_t, g_t, b_t, \mu_t, \gamma_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}) &= \\ &= E \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left\{ \mu^0 [u(c_t) + v(c_t + g_t)] + \mu_t^1 [u'(c_t)] b_t - \right. \right. \\ &\quad \left. \left. - \gamma_t^1 [-(c_t + g_t) v'(c_t + g_t) + b_t u'(c_t) - c_t u'(c_t)] \right\} | s \right]\end{aligned}$$

where  $\mu_{t+1}^1 = \gamma_t^1$ , with  $\mu_0^1 = \mu^1 = 0$ , and  $\mu^0 = 1$ .

# THE LAGRANGEAN FOCs

$$\begin{aligned} /c_t : \quad & u'(c_t) + v'(c_t + g_t) + \mu_t^1 u''(c_t) b_t - \gamma_t^1 [-v''(c_t + g_t) - \\ & - (c_t + g_t) v''(c_t + g_t) + b_t u''(c_t) - u'(c_t) - c_t u''(c_t)] = 0 \end{aligned} \quad (41)$$

$$/b_{t+1} : \quad E_t \left[ \left( \mu_{t+1}^1 - \gamma_{t+1}^1 \right) u'(c_{t+1}) \right] = 0 \quad (42)$$

plus all the constraints of the original problem

# COLLOCATION

Given that we can apply MM, we know that the policy functions will be:

$$\left(c_t, b_{t+1}, \gamma_t^1\right) = \psi\left(b_t, g_t, \mu_t^1\right)$$



# COLLOCATION

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$$\left(c_t, b_{t+1}, \gamma_t^1\right) = \psi\left(b_t, g_t, \mu_t^1\right)$$

We can approximate  $\psi$  with Chebichev polynomials, substitute this approximation in the first order conditions (41)-(42) and all the constraints of the original problem, and iterate until the approximated policy function solves them.

# OPTIMAL POLICY

## Exercise 1      Optimal policy

Modify the code for collocation over the first order conditions of the stochastic growth model to solve the Ramsey taxation problem.

# LACK OF COMMITMENT

The problem was:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{c_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \quad & E_{-1} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (y_t - c_t) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & E_{-1} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t) \geq U_0 \end{aligned} \quad (43)$$

$$u(c_t) + \beta E_t \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^{j-1} u(c_{t+j}) \geq u(y_t) + \beta U_{aut}, \quad t = 0, 1, \dots \quad (44)$$

# REWRITE THE PROBLEM

We can get rid of (43): this constraint only requires the principal to give a weight  $\alpha$  (which depends on the minimum value  $U_0$ ) to agent's utility in the principal's maximization problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{c_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} E_{-1} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (y_t - c_t + \alpha u(c_t)) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad u(c_t) + \beta E_t \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^{j-1} u(c_{t+j}) \geq u(y_t) + \beta U_{aut}, \quad t = 0, 1, \dots \end{aligned}$$

# REWRITE THE PROBLEM

We can see this problem is already in the form  $\mathbf{PP}_\mu$ , by letting  $l \equiv 1$ ,  $N_0 = \infty$  and  $N_1 = \infty$ ,  $s \equiv y$ ,  $a \equiv c$ ,  $h_0^0(x, a, s) \equiv y - c + \alpha u(c)$ ,  $h_0^1(x, a, s) \equiv u(c)$ ,  $h_1^0(x, a, s) \equiv h_0^0(x, a, s) - R$ ,  $h_1^1(x, a, s) \equiv h_0^1(x, a, s) - u(y) - \beta U_{aut}$ , and using  $\mu_0 = (1, 0)$ . We can write it as:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \max_{\{c_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} E_{-1} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ \mu^0(y_t - c_t + \alpha u(c_t)) + \mu^1 u(c_t) \right] \\
 & s.t. \quad u(c_t) + \beta E_t \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^{j-1} u(c_{t+j}) \geq u(y_t) + \beta U_{aut}, \quad t = 0, 1, \dots \\
 & \quad E_t \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \beta^n [y_{t+n} - c_{t+n} + \alpha u(c_{t+n})] - R \geq 0
 \end{aligned} \tag{45}$$

# THE LAGRANGEAN

The Lagrangean is:

$$\mathcal{L}(\{c_t, y_t, \mu_t, \gamma_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}) = E \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ \mu^0 (y_t - c_t) + (\mu^0 \alpha + \mu_t^1) u(c_t) + \gamma_t^1 (u(c_t) - u(y_t) - \beta U_{aut}) \right]$$

with  $\mu^0 = 1$ ,  $\mu^1 = 0$  and  $\mu_{t+1}^j = \mu_t^j + \gamma_t^j$  for  $j = 0, 1$ .

# THE LAGRANGEAN FOCs

Take first order conditions with respect to consumption:

$$-1 + \left( \alpha + \mu_{t+1}^1 \right) u'(c_t) = 0$$

Rearranging, we get:

$$\frac{1}{u'(c_t)} = \left( \alpha + \mu_{t+1}^1 \right) \quad (46)$$

# COLLOCATION

Participation constraint is not always binding, therefore we must solve for the two possible cases: the case of binding constraint, and the case with no binding constraint:

- 1 We solve the problem without taking into account the participation constraint. We calculate the RHS of (44) consistent with this solution.
- 2 For those gridpoints such that  $RHS > u(y_t) + \beta U_{aut}$ , our solution is good. For those gridpoints such that  $RHS < u(y_t) + \beta U_{aut}$ , assume the participation constraint is binding, and re-solve the problem.



# ENDOWMENT IS PRIVATE INFORMATION

For this problem, we use the methodology of Sleet and Yeltekin (2009). Remember our maximization problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{\tau_t(y^t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} & \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{y^t \in Y^{t+1}} \beta^t \left[ -\tau_t(y^t) \right] \pi(y^t | y_{-1}) \\ \text{s.t.} & \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{y^t \in Y^{t+1}} \beta^t u(c_t(y^t)) \pi(y^t | y_{-1}) \geq U_0 \end{aligned} \quad (47)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \beta^t \left[ u(c_t(y^{t-1}, \bar{y}_i)) + \beta U_{t+1}(y^{t-1}, \bar{y}_i) - u(c_t(y^{t-1}, \bar{y}_{i-1})) - \beta U_{t+1}(y^{t-1}, \bar{y}_{i-1}) \right] \geq 0 \\ \forall y^{t-1}, \quad \forall \bar{y}_i, \quad i = 2, \dots, N \end{aligned} \quad (48)$$

where

$$U_{t+1}(y^{t-1}, \bar{y}_i) \equiv \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \sum_{y^{t+j} \in Y^{t+j+1}} \beta^{j-1} u(c_{t+j}(y^{t-1}, \bar{y}_i, y^{t+j})) \pi(y^{t+j} | y_{-1})$$

# REWRITE THE PROBLEM

Eliminate the constraint (47):

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{c_t(y^t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \quad & \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{y^t \in Y^{t+1}} \beta^t \left[ y_t - c_t(y^t) + \alpha u(c_t(y^t)) \right] \pi(y^t | y_{-1}) \\ & \beta^t \left[ u(c_t(y^{t-1}, \bar{y}_i)) + \beta U_{t+1}(y^{t-1}, \bar{y}_i) - u(c_t(y^{t-1}, \bar{y}_{i-1})) - \beta U_{t+1}(y^{t-1}, \bar{y}_{i-1}) \right] \geq 0 \\ & \forall y^{t-1}, \quad \forall \bar{y}_i, \quad i = 2, \dots, N \end{aligned}$$

# REWRITE THE PROBLEM

Assume shocks are i.i.d., and define:

$$p_{ik} \equiv \frac{\pi(\bar{y}_k)}{\pi(\bar{y}_i)}$$

$$\varsigma_t^j(y^{t-1}, \bar{y}_i) \equiv \gamma_t^j(y^{t-1}, \bar{y}_i)$$

$$\varsigma_t^j(y^{t-1}, \bar{y}_k) \equiv -\gamma_t^j(y^{t-1}, \bar{y}_i)p_{ik}$$

where  $\gamma_t^j(y^{t-1}, \bar{y}_i)$  is the Lagrange multiplier attached to constraint  $j = 0, 1$  as usual, and in particular  $\gamma_t^1(y^{t-1}, \bar{y}_i)$  is attached to  $DIC_t(y^{t-1}, \bar{y}_i; \bar{y}_{i-1})$ .

# THE LAGRANGEAN

We can do our standard algebra, and by defining

$\mu_t^j(y^{t-1}, \bar{y}_i) \equiv \mu_{t-1}^j(y^{t-1}) + \zeta_t^j(y^{t-1}, \bar{y}_i)$  for any  $\bar{y}_i \in Y$  with

$\mu_{-1}^0(y_{-1}) = \mu_{-1}^0 = 1$ , and  $\mu_{-1}^1(y_{-1}) = \mu_{-1}^1 = 0$ , we can write the Lagrangean as:

$$\mathcal{L}(c^\infty, \gamma^\infty; \alpha) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{y^t \in Y^{t+1}} \beta^t \left[ \mu^0(y_t - c_t(y^t)) + (\mu^0 \alpha + \mu_t^1(y^t)) u(c_t(y^t)) \right] \pi^t(y^t)$$

# HIDDEN EFFORT

The problem of the planner is:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \max_{\{c_t(y^t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{y^t \in Y^{t+1}} \beta^t \left[ y_t - c_t(y^t) \right] \pi(y^t \mid a^{t-1}(y^{t-1})) \\
 & \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{y^t \in Y^{t+1}} \beta^t \left[ u(c_t(y^t)) - v(a_t(y^t)) \right] \pi(y^t \mid a^{t-1}(y^{t-1})) \geq U_0 \\
 & \quad \{a_t(y^t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \in \arg \max_{\{a_t(y^t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{y^t \in Y^{t+1}} \beta^t \left[ u(c_t(y^t)) - v(a_t(y^t)) \right] \pi(y^t \mid a^{t-1}(y^{t-1}))
 \end{aligned} \tag{49}$$

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- We need to restrict the class of models we can solve
- We assume we can use a first-order approach: instead of using (49), we use the first-order conditions of that optimization problem with respect to effort
- In order to guarantee that we get the same solution as in the original problem, we assume that two conditions are satisfied. They are known as **Rogerson conditions**.



# ROGERSON'S CONDITIONS

## CONDITION 1 (MONOTONE LIKELIHOOD-RATIO CONDITION (MLRC))

$\hat{a} \leq \hat{\hat{a}} \implies \frac{\pi(\bar{y}_s|\hat{a})}{\pi(\bar{y}_s|\hat{\hat{a}})}$  is nonincreasing in  $s$ .

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## CONDITION 1 (MONOTONE LIKELIHOOD-RATIO CONDITION (MLRC))

$\hat{a} \leq \hat{\hat{a}} \implies \frac{\pi(\bar{y}_s|\hat{a})}{\pi(\bar{y}_s|\hat{\hat{a}})}$  is nonincreasing in  $s$ .

- If  $\pi(\cdot)$  is differentiable, then MLRC is equivalent to  $\frac{\pi_a(\bar{y}_s|a)}{\pi(\bar{y}_s|a)}$  being nondecreasing in  $s$  for any  $a$

## ROGERSON'S CONDITIONS (CONT)

### CONDITION 2 (CONVEXITY OF THE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION CONDITION (CDFC))

$F''(\bar{y}_s | a)$  is nonnegative for any  $s$  and every  $a$ .

CDFC is a sort of decreasing marginal returns for effort in stochastic terms.

The two conditions make sure the agent's problem is strictly concave

# REWRITE THE PROBLEM

$$W^{SWF}(s_0) = \max_{\{a_t(y^t), c_t(y^t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \mu_0^0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{y^t} \beta^t \left[ y(y_t) - c_t(y^t) \right] \pi(y^t | s_0, a^{t-1}(s^{t-1})) + \\ + \mu_0^1 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{y^t} \beta^t \left[ u(c_t(y^t)) - v(a_t(y^t)) \right] \pi(y^t | s_0, a^{t-1}(s^{t-1}))$$

$$s.t. \quad v'(a_t(y^t)) = \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j \sum_{y^{t+j}|y^t} \frac{\pi_a(y_{t+1} | y_t, a_t(y^t))}{\pi(y_{t+1} | y_t, a_t(y^t))} \times \\ \times \left[ u(c_{t+j}(y^{t+j})) - v(a_{t+j}(y^{t+j})) \right] \pi(y^{t+j} | y^t, a^{t+j-1}(y^{t+j-1} | y^t))$$

# THE LAGRANGEAN

$$\begin{aligned}
 L(y_0, c^\infty, a^\infty, \lambda^\infty) = & \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{y^t} \beta^t \left\{ \mu_0^0 \left( y_t - c_t(y^t) \right) + \mu_0^1 \left( u \left( c_t(y^t) \right) - v \left( a_t(y^t) \right) \right) \right\} \pi \left( y^t \mid s_0, a^{t-1}(y^{t-1}) \right) + \\
 & - \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{y^t} \beta^t \lambda_t(y^t) \left\{ v' \left( a_t(y^t) \right) - \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j \sum_{y^{t+j} \mid y^t} \frac{\pi_a(y_{t+1} \mid y_t, a_t(y^t))}{\pi(y_{t+1} \mid y_t, a_t(y^t))} \times \right. \\
 & \times \left[ u \left( c_{t+j}(y^{t+j}) \right) - v \left( a_{t+j}(y^{t+j}) \right) \right] \pi \left( y^{t+j} \mid y^t, a^{t+j-1}(y^{t+j-1} \mid y^t) \right) \left. \right\} \pi \left( y^t \mid y_0, a^{t-1}(y^{t-1}) \right)
 \end{aligned}$$

# THE LAGRANGEAN (CONT.)

$$L(y_0, c^\infty, a^\infty, \lambda^\infty) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{y^t} \beta^t \left\{ \mu_0^0 \left( y_t - c_t(y^t) \right) + \mu_t^1(y^t) \left[ u \left( c_t(y^t) \right) - v \left( a_t(y^t) \right) \right] + \right. \\ \left. - \lambda_t(y^t) v' \left( a_t(y^t) \right) \right\} \pi \left( y^t \mid s_0, a^{t-1}(y^{t-1}) \right)$$

where

$$\mu_t^1(y^{t-1}, y_t) = \mu_0^1 + \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} \lambda_i(y^i) \frac{\pi_a(y_{i+1} \mid y_i, a_i(y^i))}{\pi(y_{i+1} \mid y_i, a_i(y^i))}$$

# THE LAW OF MOTION FOR $\mu_t^1(y^t)$

$$\mu_{t+1}^1(y^t, \hat{y}_s) = \mu_t^1(y^t) + \lambda_t(y^t) \frac{\pi_a(y_{t+1} = \hat{y}_s \mid y_t, a_t(y^t))}{\pi(y_{t+1} = \hat{y}_s \mid y_t, a_t(y^t))} \quad \forall \hat{y}_s \in Y$$

$$\mu_0^1(y^0) = \mu_0^1$$

# THE SADDLE-POINT FUNCTIONAL EQUATION

$$\begin{aligned}
 J(y^i, \mu) &= \max_{a, c,} \min_{\lambda} \mu^0 (y^i - c) + \mu^1 [u(c) - v(a)] - \lambda v'(a) + \\
 &\quad + \beta \sum_s J(y^s, \mu'_s) \pi(y^s | a) \\
 s.t. \quad \mu_s^{h'} &= \mu^h + \lambda \frac{\pi_a(y_s | a_i)}{\pi(y_s | a_i)}
 \end{aligned}$$



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- Collocation algorithm over the first-order conditions of the Lagrangean

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- $\zeta \equiv$  vector of allocations
- $\chi \equiv$  vector of Lagrange multipliers
- $x \equiv$  vector of natural states
- $\theta \equiv$  vector of costates
- $R(y, \zeta, \chi, x, \theta) \equiv$  objective function in the Lagrangean
- $r(y, \zeta, \chi, x, \theta) \equiv$  instantaneous utility function for the agent

# THE ALGORITHM

- ① Fix  $\mu_0^1$  and define a discrete grid  $G \subset X \times \Theta$  for natural states and costates.
- ② Approximate policy functions for allocations  $\varsigma$  and Lagrange multipliers  $\chi$ , the value function of the principal  $J$  and the continuation value of the agent  $U$  using cubic splines (or Chebychev polynomials, depending on the application), and set initial conditions for the approximation parameters
- ③ For any  $(y, x, \theta) \in G$ , use a nonlinear solver to solve for the Lagrangean first order conditions and the following two equations for the continuation value  $U$  and the value function  $J$ :

$$U(y, x, \theta) = r(y, \varsigma, \chi, x, \theta) + \beta \left[ \pi(a) U(y^H, x^H, \theta^H) + (1 - \pi(a)) U(y^L, x^L, \theta^L) \right] \quad (50)$$

$$J(y, x, \theta) = R(y, \varsigma, \chi, x, \theta) + \beta \left[ \pi(a) J(y^H, x^H, \theta^H) + (1 - \pi(a)) J(y^L, x^L, \theta^L) \right] \quad (51)$$

# MORE DETAILS

$$c_t : \quad u'(c_t) = \frac{1}{\mu_t^1} \quad (52)$$

$$\begin{aligned} a_t : \quad 0 = & -\lambda_t v''(a_t) - \mu_t^1 v'(a_t) + \\ & + \pi_a(a_t) \beta E_{t+1}^a \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^{j-1} \left\{ (y_{t+j} - c_{t+j}) - \lambda_{t+j} v'(a_{t+j}) + \mu_{t+j}^1 [u(c_{t+j}) - v(a_{t+j})] \right\} \mid y_{t+1} = y^H \right\} + \\ & - \pi_a(a_t) \beta E_{t+1}^a \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^{j-1} \left\{ (y_{t+j} - c_{t+j}) - \lambda_{t+j} v'(a_{t+j}) + \mu_{t+j}^1 [u(c_{t+j}) - v(a_{t+j})] \right\} \mid y_{t+1} = y^L \right\} + \\ & + \beta \lambda_t \pi(a_t) \frac{\partial \left( \frac{\pi_a(a_t)}{\pi(a_t)} \right)}{\partial a_t} [u(c_{t+1}) - v(a_{t+1}) \mid y_{t+1} = y^H] + \\ & + \beta \lambda_t (1 - \pi(a_t)) \frac{\partial \left( \frac{-\pi_a(a_t)}{1 - \pi(a_t)} \right)}{\partial a_t} [u(c_{t+1}) - v(a_{t+1}) \mid y_{t+1} = y^L] \end{aligned} \quad (53)$$

# MORE DETAILS

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda_t : \quad 0 = & -v'(a_t) + \pi_a(a_t) \beta E_{t+1}^a \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^{j-1} \left[ u(c_{t+j}) - v(a_{t+j}) \mid y_{t+1} = y^H \right] \right\} + \\ & - \pi_a(a_t) \beta E_{t+1}^a \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^{j-1} \left[ u(c_{t+j}) - v(a_{t+j}) \mid y_{t+1} = y^L \right] \right\} \end{aligned} \quad (54)$$

# MORE DETAILS

Notice that

$$\begin{aligned}
 J\left(y^i, \mu_{t+1}^{1,i}\right) &= \\
 &= E_{t+1}^a \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^{j-1} \left\{ \left( y_{t+j} - c_{t+j} \right) - \lambda_{t+j} v' \left( a_{t+j} \right) + \mu_{t+j}^1 \left[ u \left( c_{t+j} \right) - v \left( a_{t+j} \right) \right] \right\} \mid y_{t+1} = y^i \right\} \\
 &\hspace{15em} i = H, L
 \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}
 U\left(y^i, \mu_{t+1}^{1,i}\right) &= E_{t+1}^a \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^{j-1} \left[ u \left( c_{t+j} \right) - v \left( a_{t+j} \right) \mid y_{t+1} = y^i \right] \right\} \\
 &\hspace{15em} i = H, L
 \end{aligned}$$

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- APS complicated and easily untractable when state space is large
- MM easy and no big problems with many state variables
- MM + collocation on Lagrangean FOCs: easy and FAST

