

1st Workshop on Trustworthy Software
Ecosystems

*Emerging Software Ecosystems:
a glimpse of challenges and opportunities*


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Emerging Computing Platforms




- Real world scenarios require cooperation of different software paradigms
 - Shift from isolated environments to **interconnected ecosystems**

A Plethora of Use-Cases

Automotive



Smart Home




Industrial-IoT




Software Ecosystems






- Interconnected devices are managed through multi-layer/actor architecture
- Main actors:
 - Operating systems
 - Applications



Smart Home Ecosystems



OWASP IoT 2018 - TOP Security Risks


- 1 Weak, Guessable, or Hardcoded Passwords**
Use of easily bruteforced, publicly available, or unchangeable credentials, including backdoors in firmware or client software that grants unauthorized access to deployed systems.
- 2 Insecure Network Services**
Unneeded or insecure network services running on the device itself, especially those exposed to the internet, that compromise the confidentiality, integrity/authenticity, or availability of information or allow unauthorized remote control...
- 3 Insecure Ecosystem Interfaces**
Insecure web, backend API, cloud, or mobile interfaces in the ecosystem outside of the device that allows compromise of the device or its related components. Common issues include a lack of authentication/authorization, lacking or weak encryption, and a lack of input and output filtering.
- 4 Lack of Secure Update Mechanism**
Lack of ability to securely update the device. This includes lack of firmware validation on device, lack of secure delivery (un-encrypted in transit), lack of anti-rollback mechanisms, and lack of notifications of security changes due to updates.
- 5 Use of Insecure or Outdated Components**
Use of deprecated or insecure software components/libraries that could allow the device to be compromised. This includes insecure customization of operating system platforms, and the use of third-party software or hardware components from a compromised supply chain.

Is There “Actually” a Security Problem?

“If the attacker is on the same internal network as the HG100 or a mobile device with the companion app ([android](#) or [iPhone](#)), he can **take control** of all the connected IoT devices.”



- CVE-2019-11061 : Broken access control in HG100
- CVE-2019-11063 : Broken access control in SmartHome app



Can it get worse?


“In October 2020, Google Project Zero discovered seven 0-day exploits being actively used in-the-wild. These exploits were delivered via "watering hole" attacks in a handful of websites pointing to two exploit servers that hosted exploit chains for Android, Windows, and iOS devices.”

MASTER HACKERS —

“Expert” hackers used 11 0-days to infect Windows, iOS, and Android users

The breadth and abundance of exploits for unknown vulnerabilities sets group apart.

DAN GOODIN - 3/18/2021, 11:18 PM



<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/03/in-wild-series-october-2020-0-day.html>

Security Issues

- Applications are the soft underbelly of ecosystems
- Heterogeneous technologies boost the complexity in security and risk assessment
- Manual inspection & testing does not scale
- Existing techniques are typically limited to single domains

**MANUAL
SINGLE-DOMAIN
ANALYSIS**

**AUTOMATIC
SINGLE
DOMAIN ANALYSIS**

**SEMI-AUTOMATIC
CROSS-DOMAIN
ANALYSIS**

**AUTOMATIC
ECOSYSTEM
ANALYSIS**

imgflip.com



(Some) Research Opportunities/*Questions*



➤ **Model cross-domain interactions**

- *Can we define a model to represent cross-domain interactions among apps?*
- *Can we introduce a technology-agnostic solution to cope with heterogeneous apps and protocols?*

➤ **Define ecosystem-wide analysis methodologies**

- *Can we compose static and dynamic analysis techniques to evaluate complex vulnerabilities?*
- *Can we adapt existing VA/PT procedures for the evaluation of an entire ecosystem?*


(Some) Research Opportunities/*Questions*

➤ Move towards automated solutions

- *Can we automate the modeling and analysis phases?*
- *Can we emulate/simulate a software ecosystem?*


➤ Evaluate the entire lifecycle (and supply chain)

- *Can we define methodologies to detect cross-domain vulnerabilities during development?*
- *Can we evaluate the security/integrity of apps in the supply chain to mitigate ecosystem vulnerabilities?*




A (possible) Research Battle Plan

- Identify and model **cross-domain** security **threats** (a.k.a. what to check)
- Evaluate the **combination** of **SAST** and **DAST** technologies to propose novel detection methodologies and tools
- Empower **DevSecOps** pipelines to detect early stage vulnerabilities
- Define **VA/PT** processes to evaluate existing ecosystems



Research Challenge: Hybrid Ecosystem App Analysis




Ecosystem Modeling

- App extraction
- Interaction detection


Attack Surface

- Internal/external threats
- Malicious interactions

Research Challenge: Hybrid Ecosystem App Analysis




Research Challenge: Hybrid Ecosystem App Analysis



Dynamic Analysis


- Relies on the Static Analysis phase to test the presence of vulnerabilities (F.P. removal)
- Generates ad-hoc test cases
- **Detect ecosystem vulnerabilities**



Two examples:

- 1) an **hybrid mobile-iot** vulnerability assessment methodology;
- 2) a **DevSecOps** pipeline to detect security vulnerabilities in **IoT firmwares**.


An App-IoT Testing Environment (ApploTTE)



- ApploTTE, a cross-domain security assessment methodology for mobile and IoT apps
- Includes both static and dynamic analysis techniques
- Prototype for Android ecosystems

Verderame, L., Caputo, D., Migliardi, M., & Merlo, A. (2020, April). ApploTTE: an architecture for the security assessment of mobile-IoT ecosystems. In *Workshops of the International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications* (pp. 867-876). Springer, Cham.


IoT Application Verification Framework (IoTAV)



- Static analysis module to **enforce security policies** on firmware software updates;
- Relies on **model extraction** and **model checking** techniques to evaluate software update coming from untrusted ISMs;
- Prototype evaluation for the **RIOT Ecosystem** and the **SUIT update** workflow
- Preliminary evaluation detected **26 policy violations** on 21 real-world RIOT apps

Some Open Issues

- Model granularity and analysis scaling
- Emulation/simulation vs real systems
- Use of technology-agnostic methodologies
- Strategies to reduce F.P and F.N.
- Software availability (e.g., proprietary solutions, closed environments)



Conclusions

- Emerging computing paradigms shifted from isolation to interconnected ecosystems.
- Applications are the soft underbelly of ecosystems.
- Current approaches are focused on a single domain.
- We need to join forces to propose next-generation methodologies to evaluate the security of software ecosystems.



THANK YOU!



ANY QUESTIONS?



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